Article 370 and 35-A:

Rigmarole to becloud UN
charter and resolutions
India has scrapped articles 370 and 35-A of its constitution. The article 370 withdraws
`special status’ for disputed Kashmir. According to India, this status was quid pro
quo for fire-brand Kashmir leader Sheikh Abdulah and so-called `Kashmir constituent
assembly’ for `acceding to India’. Article 35-A protects hereditary rights granted by
Kashmir’s prince to its subjects.
To divert world’s attention from disputed nature of the state, India beclouds the bitter
truth that Kashmir is a disputed state, not an `integral part’ of India. `Accession to India’
is ultra vires under United Nations’ resolutions and Simla Accord. Future of Kashmir
remains to be self-determined by Kashmiris themselves.
Historian Alastair Lamb, in his works has lambasted India’s view that Kashmir
prince, maharajha Hari Singh acceded to India by signing an `instrument of accession’
on October 26, 1947.Avtar Singh Bhasin, through lens of Pandit Jawahar Lal Nehru’s
documents, shows that Nehru had a perfidious mind. He remained committed to
plebiscite and never cared a fig for `accession’ resolution or `instrument’. Curious
readers may refer to Lamb’s Incomplete Partition, Kashmir – A disputed legacy
1846-1990, and Birth of a Tragedy. Avtar Singh Bhasin, have tried to sift truth about
`Pakistan’s aggression’ and the myth of `accession instrument’. Curious readers may
refer to Lamb’s Incomplete Partition, Kashmir – A disputed legacy 1846-1990,
and Birth of a Tragedy; besides, Bhasin’s India and Pakistan: Neighbours at Odds (
Bloomsbury, New Delhi, 2018), 10-volume documentary study of India-Pakistan
Relations 1947-2007. It contains 3649 official documents, accessed from archives of
India’s external-affairs ministry. Also, Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru (SWJ),
Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, Department of Culture, Government of India.
Let’s have a bird’s-eye view of documented facts.

UN outlaws `accession’ and supports plebiscite: Accession resolution, passed

by the occupied Kashmir’s ‘constituent assembly’ is void. Aware of India’s intention to
get the ‘Instrument of Accession’ rubber-stamped by the puppet assembly, the Security
Council passed two resolutions, Security Council’s Resolution No 9 of March 30, 1951
and confirmatory Resolution No 122 of March 24, 1957, to forestall the `foreseeable
accession’.
It is eerie to note that `Instrument of Accession’ is not registered with United Nations
India took the Kashmir issue to the UN in 1948 under article 35 of Chapter VI which
outlines the means for a peaceful settlement of disputes on Jammu and Kashmir state,
not under Chapter VII dubbing Pakistan as `aggressor’. India knew at heart that she
herself was an aggressor.

India’s `father of constitution’ Ambedkar advocates a plebiscite: After

revoking the special status of Jammu and Kashmir, India’s prime minister Narendra
Modi told the nation that the government has fulfilled Ambedkar and other tall leaders’
dream. His view was orchestrated by a coterie that included Union Minister Arjun
Meghwal, Vice President Venkaiah Naidu, and BSP President Mayawati. There are no
documents to corroborate the view that Ambedkar opposed article 370. Ambedkar was
misquoted by Hindu extremist leader Balraj Madhok in RSS mouthpiece, Organiser,
published on November 14, 2004
Ambedkar’s well-documented speeches, writings and parliamentary debates are
available on the Ministry of External Affairs’ website. Ambedkar sought a quick solution
for the Kashmir issue and advocated a plebiscite. Ambedkar even said that the Partition
was the right solution for Kashmir!

In a speech Ambedkar rendered in the Parliament on 10 October 1951, while resigning

from Nehru’s cabinet, he said, “Give the Hindu and Buddhist part to India and the
Muslim part to Pakistan, as we did in the case of India. We are really not concerned with
the Muslim part of Kashmir. It is a matter between the Muslims of Kashmir and
Pakistan. They may decide the issue as they like.” (BR Ambedkar, in 1951). He
suggested a zonal plebiscite saying, “… If you like, divide it into three parts: the Cease-
fire zone, the Valley and the Jammu-Ladhak Region, and have a plebiscite only in the
Valley. What I am afraid of is that in the proposed plebiscite, which is to be an overall
plebiscite, the Hindus and Buddhists of Kashmir are likely to be dragged into Pakistan
against their wishes and we may have to face the same problems as we are facing
today in East Bengal.” Obviously, Ambedkar did not want to cling to Valley against
wishes of the Muslim majority there. In another speech in 1953, during a parliamentary
debate on India’s

foreign policy, Ambedkar said, “The key note of our foreign policy is to solve the
problems of the other countries, and not to solve the problems of our own. We have
here the problem of Kashmir. We have never succeeded in solving it. Everybody seems
to have forgotten that it is a problem. But I suppose, someday, we may wake up and
find that the ghost is there.”(BR Ambedkar, in 1953).

Nehru disowns `accession’ and supports plebiscite: In Chapter 5

titled Kashmir, India’s Constitution and Nehru’s Vacillation (pages 51-64), Bhasin
Nehru discarded maharajah’s and Kashmir assembly’s `accession’. In a letter dated
October 31, 1947, addressed to the disputed state’s prime minister, he `after
consideration of the problem, we are inclined to think that it [plebiscite] should be held
under United Nations’ auspices (p. 28 ibid.). He reiterated in New Delhi on November3,
1951 that `we have made it perfectly clear before the Security Council that the Kashmir
Constituent Assembly does not [insofar] as we are concerned come in the way of a
decision by the Security Council, or the United Nations’(SWJ: Volume 4: page 292,
Bhasin p.228). Again, at a press conference on June 11, 1951, he was asked `if the
proposed constituent assembly of Kashmir “decides in favour of acceding to Pakistan,
what will be the position?”’ he reiterated, `We have made it perfectly clear that the
Constituent Assembly of Kashmir was not meant to decide finally any such question ,
and it is not in the way of any decision which may ultimate flow from the Security
Council proceedings’ (SWJ: Volume 15:, Part II, page 394. Bhasin page 56). He re-
emphasised his view once again at a press conference in New Delhi On November 3,
1951. He said `we have made it perfectly clear before the Security Council that the
Kashmir Constituent Assembly does not [insofar as] we are concerned come in the way
of a decision by the Security Council or the United Nations’. Bhasin points out (page 57
op. cit.), `at press conference on 24 July, 1952 when asked what the necessity of
plebiscite was now that he had got [accession by]
the Constituent Assembly, he replied “Maybe theoretically you may be right. But we
have given them an assurance and we stand by it (SWJ: Volume 19, pp. 240-241.
Bhasin).

Was India the `aggressor’ in Kashmir in 1947: The factual position is that India
marched its troops into Kashmir without Maharajah’s permission _ an act of aggression.
Historian Alastair Lamb, in his book Incomplete Partition (Chapter VI: The
Accession Crisis, pp. 149-151) points out that Mountbatten wanted India not to
intervene militarily without first getting `instrument of accession’ from maharajah [prince]
Hari Singh. Not doing so would amount to `intervening in the internal affairs of what
was to all intents and purposes an independent State in the throes of civil conflict’. But,
India did not heed his advice. Lamb says `timing of the alleged Instrument of Accession
undoubtedly affected its legitimacy'(p.172, ibid). He adds `If in fact it took place after the
Indian intervention, then it could well be argued that it was either done under Indian
duress or to regularise an Indian fait accompli’.
Lamb concludes (p. 191, ibid):`According to Wolpert, V. P. Menon returned to Delhi
from Srinagar on the morning of 26 October with no signed Instrument of
Accession. Only after the Indian troops had started landing at Srinagar airfield on the
morning of 27 October did V. P. Menon and M. C. Mahajan set out from Delhi from
Jammu. The Instrument of Accession, according to Wolpert, was only signed by
Maharajah Sir Hari Singh [if signed at all] after Indian troops had assumed control of the
Jammu and Kashmir State’s summer capital, Srinagar.
Lamb regards the so-called Instrument of Accession, ‘signed’ by the maharajah of
Kashmir on October 26, 1947, as fraudulent (Kashmir – A disputed legacy 1846-1990).
He argues that the maharajah was travelling by road to Jammu (a distance of over 350
km). How could he sign the instrument while being on the run for safety of his life?
There is no evidence of any contact between him and the Indian emissaries on October
26, 1947. Actually, it was on October 27, 1947 that the maharajah was informed by MC
Mahajan and VP Menon (who had flown into Srinagar) that an Instrument of Accession
is being fabricated in New Delhi. Obviously, the maharajah could not have signed the
instrument earlier than October 27, 1947. Lamb points out Indian troops had already
arrived at and secured Srinagar airfield during the middle of October 1947. On October
26, 1947, a further airlift of thousands of Indian troops to Kashmir took place.

He questions: “Would the Maharajah have signed the Instrument of Accession, had the
Indian troops not been on Kashmiri soil?” Actually, it was on October 27, 1947 that the
maharajah was informed by MC Mahajan and VP Menon (who had flown into Srinagar)
that an Instrument of Accession is being fabricated in New Delhi. Obviously,
the maharajah could not have signed the instrument earlier than October 27, 1947. The
instrument remains null and void, even if the maharajah had actually signed it. In his
later work, Birth of a Tragedy, Lamb claimed that Maharajah of Jammu and Kashmir
never signed the Instrument of Accession at all.
No allegiance to Indian constitution in `instrument’: The ‘Instrument’ expresses ‘intention
to set up an interim government and to ask Sheikh Abdullah to carry the responsibilities’
with maharajah’s prime minister. By Balkanising the disputed state, India tore the
Instrument of Accession, even otherwise doubtful, to shreds. Para 7 of the Instrument of
Accession, `signed’ by Maharaja Hari Singh ostensibly on October 26, 1947 stated,
“nothing in this Instrument shall be deemed to commit me in any way to acceptance of
any future Constitution of India or to fetter accession resolution, passed by the occupied
Kashmir’s ‘constituent assembly’. Bhasin, p. 57).

Pakistan never labeled `aggressor’ at UN: Nehru told parliament on March 1,

1954 `that …United States have thus far not condemned it [aggression] and we are
asked not to press this point in the interest of peace (Bhasin, pp. 55-56, ibid.).
Nehru himself invokes UN’s intervention: Bhasin points out Nehru made `tactical
error’. One `of committing himself to the UN’ (p. 28. op. cit., SWJ: Volume 8: pages335-
340). Accession documents are un-registered with the UN.
Post-Nehru equivocal rhetoric: The Kashmir Question is intact on General
Assembly’s agenda, with United Nations’ Military Observers’ Military Group on duty.
Inference: It is eerie that the whole architecture of India’s `integral part’ stand on
Kashmir is erected on the mythical `instrument of accession’ and its endorsement by the
disputed state’s assembly. Legal rigmarole at India’s Supreme Court about special
status being temporary or permanent is immaterial. UN charter and right to self-
determination override ultra vires `accession’ antics.

Are India and Pakistan

on the Verge of a Water
War?
In reprisal for a deadly terrorist attack in Kashmir, the Indian government says it
will divert river waters that downstream Pakistan has been counting on.

ith tensions rising between India and Pakistan in the wake of a deadly terrorist attack earlier
this month that killed more than 40 Indian police officers in Kashmir, New Delhi has decided to
retaliate in part by cutting off some river water that flows downstream to Pakistan. The decision
to build a dam on the Ravi River, whose waters are allocated to India by treaty but a portion of
which had been allowed to flow through to Pakistan, adds an extra source of conflict between
two nuclear-armed neighbors that have repeatedly clashed over the disputed Kashmir territory.
To understand the issue better, Foreign Policy spoke with Sunil Amrith, a professor of South
Asian studies at Harvard University and the author of Unruly Waters, a look at how water
shapes South Asia’s history, politics, and economic development.

Foreign Policy: India and Pakistan were torn apart at Partition, including critical water
resources that had been shared under British India; is this the mother of all transnational water
conflicts?

Sunil Amrith: It probably is, at least in the suddenness, the arbitrariness, and the brutality
with which it emerged. In Asia, many of the other transnational water conflicts were slower to
escalate—for example, it wasn’t until the 1980s that neighboring states had the capacity or the
ambition to dam and divert the upper reaches of the Himalayan rivers. In terms of the numbers
of countries and interests at stake, the Mekong is perhaps the ur-transnational water conflict in
Asia, but in the sense of a conflict that was created with the stroke of a pen, the conflict over the
Indus delta is quite distinctive.

FP: From the vagaries of the monsoon and famines in the colonial period to the development
and dam-building boom in the Jawaharlal Nehru years, how central is control of water to India’s
concept of nationhood, especially under Prime Minister Narendra Modi?

SA: The control of water has long been central to many visions of freedom and nationhood in
India; that is one of the key arguments in Unruly Waters. This goes back to at least the late 19th
century, when a diverse group of Indian nationalists, British water engineers, and
administrators began to see irrigation as India’s salvation. The dam-building boom of the Nehru
years epitomized the ambitions of a proud post-colonial state and its planned conquest over the
vagaries of nature and climate. Nehru famously called large dams the “temples of the new
India.”

Under Modi, the control of water has continued to be of symbolic value. The government has
also committed itself to the gigantic river-linking project, at an estimated cost of at least $90
billion. But none of this started with Modi. I think in terms of their approach to water
management, there is a long thread of continuity across the past several Indian governments.

FP: In this case, India seems to be exercising its legitimate claim to the waters in the Ravi. Do
you see this escalating, to the point that India starts to infringe on Pakistan’s allocated waters in
the western rivers or even abandons the Indus Water Treaty altogether? What happens if it
does?

SA: The World Bank-brokered IWT of 1960 is a paradox: It is touted by many scholars of
international relations as an example of successful cooperation between hostile states, and at the
same time it’s a frequent target of complaints from politicians on both sides of the border.

Following the failure to broker a deal where India and Pakistan would manage the water
resources of the basin collectively, the Indus Treaty sought to legislate their division: The waters
of the Sutlej, the Beas, and the Ravi were awarded to India; and the west Indus, the Jhelum, and
the Chenab to Pakistan.
History of India Pakistan water
conflict
Scarcity of water is a huge problem to many countries of the world, especially those
which are developing. The effects of environmental degradation and poor management
of available water resource have made water one of the scarcest resources in many poor
economies. As a result, there is a struggle for this resource and this sometimes leads to
conflicts. The India-Pakistan water conflict is an example of conflict arising from struggle
from scarce resources. Growing scarcity of water resources, increasing population and
poor management of water resource in India and Pakistan has resulted in an increasing
demand for water resources. The increasing scarcity of water leads to the desire for
control of water resources, which in turn becomes a ground for breeding conflicts.

These conflicts are manifested at interstate and intra-state levels.

The need for water is accentuated by the fact that these countries are mainly agrarian
economies. These conflicts have not only hampered their economic development at the
national level, but the region, as a whole, is not fully benefiting from the process of
globalization. However, the scarcity of water resources in some cases has been
instrumental in developing cooperation among states. The Indus Waters Treaty between
India and Pakistan is one of the few examples, of the settlement of a major, international
river basin conflict. However, the grievances of contracting parties, lead to the possibility
that the present cooperation may turn into a future conflict.

This paper will focus on the India-Pakistan water dispute. The study will focus on water
sharing treaty with Pakistan and India, with a comparative evaluation of past and future
trends, followed by suggestions for sustainable future cooperation. Factors which have
led to the dispute, status of disputes and the threat of transformation of the disputes to
armed conflicts in future will be discussed in the paper. In addition, implications of the
disputes amongst these states and how cooperation can resolve the disputes will also
be discussed. Recommendations on how this dispute can be resolved, including using
mediation, dialog, water conservation and others will also be briefly discussed. Finally, a
short summary will highlight the discussed issues.

History of India-Pakistan water dispute

The water dispute between Pakistan and India began during the early 1960s.

However, the Indus Treaty between the two countries created an understanding of how
water between the two countries would be shared. Six rivers that is; the Chenab, Indus,
Beas, Sutlej, Ravi and Jhelum flow to Pakistan from India. This treaty divided three rivers
for use by each country, and India had the Beas, Sutlej and Ravi. Pakistan had access to
the Jhelum, Chenab and Indus. [1] During the 1990s, India constructed a hydro-electric
plant in Doda district along Chenab River. This river is one of the tributaries of the Indus
River and was designated by the Indus Treaty for use by Pakistan.

The Pakistani government, political and religious leaders saw this as a move by India to
control these waters. This was seen to be in breach of the Indus Treaty and a threat to
the Pakistani economy. There were several ways in which the Pakistani economy could
be affected. These include reduction of water capacity for Pakistani peoples, which could
affect agricultural and animal rearing activities. India also had political superiority by
having the ability to flood Pakistan during war times through releasing excess water.
These and other reasons increased tension between both countries in attempts to
control this water resource.

Factors which can lead to conflicts over water resource sharing especially
during scarcity
There are various factors which may lead to conflicts between states or groups who
share scarce resources. Most conflicts arise when there is perception that one group is
unduly benefiting at the expense of another. This is made worse when resources being
shared are scarce, and are required by a lot of people. The Pakistan-India conflict over
the water resource is one example. Various factors which lead to conflicts over water
sharing will be briefly analyzed below;

Population growth

Population growth is a major factor which puts pressure on resources. Population

growth leads to the over-utilization of resources, and in case these resources are scarce,
the population needs are not met. In such circumstances, this may lead to the
development of conflict. Water is a scarce resource in many countries. When population
growth exhausts the available water resource or the growth rate does not match the
increase in water resources, then population needs will not be met, leading to conflict.
The population will be unable to acquire safe water for consumption and adequate
water for agriculture, especially in agrarian economies. In such cases, political instability
may occur as citizens fight for their right to access a water resource. This conflict may
begin at a local level and gradually escalate to a matter of international concern as in
the case of Pakistan and India.

Weak treaties
Weak treaties are another major source of international conflict. Sometimes, treaties are
used when sharing resources to ensure all parties acquire a reasonable stake in the
resource. Treaties which are weak are those which may be ambiguous, those which do
not anticipate future trends and those with loopholes among others. Weak treaties are
bound to generate conflicts over time, as each party to the treaty analyzes their benefits
from the treaty and seeks ways of maximizing benefits. When one or more parties
realize that the treaty does not favor them, they are likely to rescind their decision to
follow the treaty.

However, one mistake which often occurs when making treaties, and is the cause of
conflict between Pakistan and India, is the inability to project future trends and needs.
When the Indus treaty was made in 1960, adequate projections on the water needs of
both countries, in decades to come, were not properly done. [2] It was therefore
impossible to factor into account exceptions where either country would be allowed to
construct dams in the various rivers, and their repercussions to those relying on such
rivers for agriculture. It is necessary for treaties to factor in dynamic nature of the world
in order to avoid future conflicts over water resource sharing.

Inadequate water conservation measures

When many countries discover a resource, they exploit it until it gets depleted without
understanding the consequences of depletion of the resource. Water resources are no
exception, and unless they are conserved, they are likely to be depleted or used
ineffectively. Many poor countries do not conserve water although it is a scarce
resource. Such countries are unable to meet the population needs when these water
resources dry up, or have declining levels. As it will later be discussed, Pakistan loses
millions of cubic meters of water daily due to lack of water conservation efforts. When
such losses occur, the country is unable to satisfy its citizens’ water demands. The
inability to meet this need is blamed on other factors and this may create conflict
between two or more nations.

Climate change

Climate change has had severe impacts on available resources. Environmental

destruction has led to unpredictable and adverse weather conditions across the world.
Such weather conditions include drought, floods, heat waves and others. In economies
which heavily rely on agriculture, these conditions may cause heavy losses. When
drought or winter occurs, and there is a limited water resource, this may lead to conflict
over this resource especially if a nation has not taken enough water conservation
measures. The latest dispute involving Pakistan and India relates to construction of a
dam, and Pakistan argues that climate change will bring harsh winters, which will reduce
the river flow as a consequence of diversion of the river by India.

Poor political leadership

Leadership in any country entails the distribution of resources. All leaders should ensure
that available resources are distributed and used for the welfare of the majority
population in the nation. When there are good leaders, even scarce resources are
effectively used and conserved to ensure that they satisfy the country’s needs. However,
in cases where the leadership is weak, the available resources are misappropriated or
used for the benefit of a few. This leads to wastage, and the majority population does
not have access to such resources. In this case, conflict over the limited water resource is
likely to occur. The dispute between India and Pakistan can be partly blamed for weak
leadership which is hesitant in solving the issues present.

Status of disputes between Pakistan and India over water sharing

Indus water treaty

The Indus water treaty was developed to solve the water dispute between Pakistan and
India during the 1960s. This treaty set out how water from the various rivers is to be
shared between India and Pakistan. India was granted access to the Jhelum, Chenab and
Indus rivers for purposes of developing hydro-electricity but not construction of dams.
However, for development in these rivers to be acceptable, India is expected to provide
technical details of projects to Pakistan before commencing operations. India on the
other hand has access to the Beas, Sutlej and Ravi rivers. For Pakistan to develop these
rivers, it is similarly expected to provide India with details, before commencing
operations. Pakistan is also not allowed to develop dams along these three rivers. When
India was constructing the Baglihar Dam, Pakistan had several concerns which it raised
during this process. These include the dam size, design, water capacity and gated
spillways. Although there have been numerous discussions on these contentious issues,
the 1960 treaty has been insufficient in ending the conflict.

Present status of the dispute

The dispute between Pakistan and India over water has continued over several decades.
Currently, the dispute revolves around the construction of a hydro-electric plant along a
tributary of Indus, which is Kishenganga River. Although India is defending its right to
construct the dam, Pakistan is raising several issues over the project. Pakistan explains
that India is planning to divert the river course and this is bound to have adverse effects
on Pakistani who rely on the river. Pakistani officials explain that this would reduce the
capacity of the river by more than 30% during winter as a result. [3] When this happens,
the Pakistani plans to construct their own dam will be adversely affected. However, the
dispute is about to be solved through arbitration, as both parties are hopeful to see this
mechanism work.

Factors which worsened the Pakistan-India water conflict

Declining water levels

The water capacity in Pakistan has been declining over the years and it poses a threat to
the survival of its population within the next decade. Pakistan had water crisis during
2009 due to the reduction of its water capacity. In 2009 its water capacity was 1200
cubic meters while in 1950 it was 5000 cubic meters. This figure is expected to reduce to
800 cubic meters over the next decade. Scientists warn that Pakistan will face a water
disaster within the next three years if interventions to ensure availability of water are not
implemented.

Population growth and poor water storage

The Pakistani population is increasing gradually and is set to reach 250 million within
the next decade. This is a huge population which requires adequate water to sustain its
livelihood. In addition, Pakistan has poor water storage techniques and facilities. This
leads to loss of water to the sea at the rate of over 360 cubic meters each second. Lack
of facilities such as dams, which can be used for water storage, can be blamed for this
wastage. These problems hinder the access of water by the population, and when India
constructs a dam along the Chenab River, this is seen as a further threat to Pakistan’s
survival.

Reduction of available water from India’s Baglihar Dam

As has been stated, there is a great concern that the construction of the Baglihar Dam
will deprive Pakistan of water. Pakistan is of the opinion that further reduction in water
capacity can be attributed to India’s construction of the Baglihar Dam. [4] Scientists
explain that over 320,000 acre feet of water will be lost from the construction of this
dam. This will adversely affect agricultural activities such as the production of wheat in
the province of Punjab. In addition, irrigated land around Ravi and Chenab rivers is set
to be adversely affected due to the reduced water capacity.

How the conflicts can be transformed into armed conflicts in future

Terrorism

Pakistan is one of the countries which face an increased risk of terrorism activities. There
are many terrorist groups which operate in Pakistan and some of these include Tehrek-
e-sahaba, Lashkar-e-Taiba and Tehrek-e-taliban terrorist groups. These groups have
committed various terrorism acts through suicide bombing, booby-trapping, arming
vehicles, armed assaults and others. These acts have been serious and have led to many
fatalities. Between 2006 and 2009, over five thousand fatalities were attributed to these
groups. [5] This is a very high fatality rate in any country. However, most of these attacks
are political in nature and they aim at discrediting the government. As a result,
policemen and the public have been the major targets.

Since terrorist activities are clearly established in Pakistan, it is clear that terror attacks
can occur anytime. Although the terrorist activities follow political causes, it is very easy
to alter the cause and motivate terrorists to carry out attacks due to the India-Pakistan
water crisis. Such terrorists may be brainwashed into believing that they are carrying out
terrorism for the good of their nation. If a charismatic leader who believes in terrorism
emerges, he or she may easily convince them to attack Indian targets. This shows that it
is important to resolve the Pakistan-India water crisis as soon as possible.

War

The conflict between Pakistan and India over water resources has been developing for a
long time. Dialog has apparently failed to solve this crisis which relates to the Indus
treaty. Since this conflict has lasted several decades, leaders may get frustrated and
resolve to use force to achieve their objectives. There are many scholars who are of the
opinion that India is intentionally flouting the Indus treaty in order to force Pakistan to
take military action against it. In such circumstances, India is of the view that it will win
the resultant war and put the water crisis matter to rest. The water crisis should
therefore be solved before leaders resort to taking this cause of action which may
adversely affect both countries.

It has been discussed that terrorism is a real threat in Pakistan, and the water conflict
may degenerate into a terrorism war if terrorists are of the opinion that it is a real cause
worth defending. Any terrorist activity by India or Pakistan may easily lead to war
between both countries. This is because it will be perceived that the government
supported the attack. Other countries which are either enemies of Pakistan or India may
also influence the perception that the government supported these terrorist attacks.
This may lead to a full-scale war between the concerned countries hence the need to
resolve the water crisis.
Implications of these conflicts on regional and national development of
these states
There are various implications which the water conflict between India and Pakistan has
on these states. Most are adverse implications and they are related to the hostility and
suspicion between these countries, which hinders cooperation on essential economic
matters. Some of these implications will be discussed below in more detail;

Water conservation

Water is one of the most important resources which India and Pakistan rely on in
achieving economic development. This is because both countries rely on agrarian
economies which form a large proportion of their GDPs. For these two countries to
achieve greater economic prosperity, they should cooperate in implementing moves
aimed at conserving the water resource. Since these rivers flow between Pakistan and
India, it is necessary for both countries to implement simultaneous actions aimed at
conserving water and using it effectively to meet the needs of each country. However,
there is suspicion and hostility between these countries, and they have been unable to
develop uniform policies aimed at achieving water conservation. As a result, there is a
lot of water wastage which increases costs to the government and decreases water
available for agricultural activities. This has a negative impact on both the economies of
Pakistan and India.

Fight against terrorism

The Indian Prime Minister is of the opinion that the best way to fight terrorism in the
region is through collaboration efforts between Indian and Pakistan. [6] Since both
countries face similar terrorist threats and they border each other, the fight against
terrorism will only be won after a joint approach is used by both countries. In fact,
foreign secretaries of both countries have met and strategize on how terrorism would
be fought by both countries. However, the water dispute is threatening to erode these
efforts due to hostility and suspicion which is brought about by the dispute. If the
dispute is not resolved and this dual-approach in fighting terrorism is neglected, then
terrorist activities are bound to rise. The high number of terrorist attacks in these two
countries will increase when this happens and an unprecedented wave of terror may be
seen leaving a trail of destruction.

Way out for cooperation in sharing water resources

In order to resolve this and other conflicts which involve the sharing of resources,
countries concerned should cooperate to ensure that they all benefit from the use of
such resources.
Effective policies by countries

In order to ensure that India and Pakistan both benefit from the rivers, both countries
should implement policies which favor their mutual use of the rivers. Pakistan should
allow India to use rivers which complement its goals and vice verse, as long as national
interests are not affected. For instance, when both countries are constructing dams,
mutual consultation will enable then to draft policies which favor both countries and
reduces destructive effects of this construction to the other country. Just as the two
countries are collaborating to fight terrorism, they should also collaborate to ensure that
they both achieve their objectives regarding the availability and use of the water
resource.

Dialog

Dialog is the most effective way in which the dispute between India and Pakistan over
water can be resolved. Other measures such as aggression or violence will only lead to
losses among both countries. It is imperative that the issue is sorted soon in order to
prevent further conflict or bloodshed which may occur as a result of the conflict, as has
been seen. Since the 1960 Indus Treaty has proved to be ineffective in solving the
current dispute, both the Pakistan and Indian leaders should hold dialog and develop a
new treaty which will solve the present stalemate. The various issues which have been
brought under consideration are relatively complex and may have been unforeseeable
when developing the initial treaty. It is therefore necessary to alter the treaty to reflect
the current concerns while safeguarding the interests of both countries. Since these
rivers under consideration flow in both countries, it is clear that India and Pakistan are
dependent on one other and none can exist independently.

Mediation

Mediation is another successful strategy which may be used to end the conflicts
between Pakistan and India. For mediation to be a success, it should involve a mediator
who is neutral to concerned parties. Both Pakistan and India should choose a leader who
comes from a country which is neutral to both countries’ interests. The proceedings
should be held at a neutral country or on a rotation between both countries. Both
countries should choose representatives who will argue their case to the mediator. The
mediator will then make a decision on India’s decision to build a dam, on the basis of
evidence provided. [7] Decisions which are made in such cases are binding to both
Pakistan and India.

Water conservation
It has been discussed that water conservation is a problem which faces both Pakistan
and India. However, Pakistan appears to have greater problems as far as water
conservation is concerned. Water conservation is important since it will enable both
countries reduce reliance on the rivers, which are scarce resources and instead take
advantage of rainfall and sea water to mitigate the citizens’ needs. [8] It has been
discussed that Pakistan loses millions of cubic water to the sea due to lack of water
conservation initiatives. It has also been discussed that Pakistan faces a looming water
disaster. Water conservation will enable Pakistan have more water for use in agriculture,
and ensure that citizens have access to water. It will also reduce disputes which arise
from the use of rivers by India and Pakistan since poor water conservation is one of the
factors which have worsened the crisis.

Development of a new treaty

The establishment of a new treaty is another way in which the India-Pakistan conflict
maybe resolved. It is clear that the conflict is solely related to the Indus Treaty which
forbade India from constructing a dam within Chenab River without permission from
Pakistan. However, when the treaty was initially established, future projections on water
needs for both countries were not adequately assessed. For instance, the surge in
population to hundreds of millions, decades later was not factored in when establishing
the treaty. Since the modern world is dynamic, it is necessary to reconsider the contract
and factor in these changing factors. India and Pakistan should re-negotiate the treaty
afresh and clearly explain how the water maybe used by both countries to achieve
mutual benefit. The new treaty should project future trends as far as water consumption
is concerned to avoid other future conflicts relating to water use.

Summary and conclusion

The Pakistan-India water dispute has been discussed in detail in the paper. The dispute
has been seen to have lasted for several decades. This dispute is attributed to the Indus
treaty made in the 1960s which set out how Pakistan and India would share water
resources. One of the clauses was that India would not construct a dam in rivers which
belonged to Pakistan without express permission from Pakistan. However, India flouted
this rule by constructing a hydro-electric plant in Doda district along Chenab River
without due consultation from Pakistan. Pakistan saw this as an economic and political
threat since it depended on waters from this river for agricultural purposes.

However, this conflict has adversely affected both countries by limiting development
through cooperation. It also poses a danger of encouraging terrorism between the two
countries especially if terrorists find it a cause worthy of their intervention. This conflict
may also degenerate into war, especially if a terrorist activity occurs as a result of the
conflict or if leaders intentionally provoke each other in a bid to resolve the dispute. This
may lead to a regional war and may cause very many fatalities.

In order to mitigate the threats caused by the conflict, it is imperative that action is
taken to prevent further escalation of the conflict. There are various ways in which the
dispute may be resolved and one of the most effective ways is use of dialog and
mediation. Dialog and mediation enables concerned parties to discuss issues and
present them to a neutral mediator who makes a binding decision on issues raised.
Another means is the re-negotiation of the treaty. Since the treaty was made many
decades ago, and it overlooked certain societal changes which occur over time, a new
treaty which replaces the current one may be developed by Pakistan and India.
However, this treaty should predict future trends which may cause further disputes in
future.

Finally, water conservation is an important policy which should be embraced by Pakistan

and India to reduce expenses on water costs and prevent the depletion of the water
resource. These measures should be embraced by all countries with resources, since
they will prevent future problems or conflicts which are associated with possession of
resources.

The 1947 Partition: Drawing the

Indo-Pakistani Boundary
February 2002

by Lucy Chester

The author, a visiting fellow at the Center for International Security and Cooperation
at Stanford University, is a doctoral candidate in history at Yale University. Drawing
from her dissertation, she considers here the background to timely questions
associated with the Kashmir dispute. She raises the policy question of partition as a
tool for crisis management or resolution, and she provides useful historical evidence
for scholars wishing to draw contemporary lessons.—Ed.
Introduction
The 1947 partition of South Asia has had lasting repercussions not only for the region,
but also for the larger international community. Border tensions between India and
Pakistan have taken on a new magnitude since both countries carried out nuclear tests
in May 1998. Surprisingly, historians have paid little attention to the creation of the
Indo-Pakistani boundary, a key element of the 1947 division. This article analyzes the
1

problematic procedure and format of the body responsible for delineating that
boundary through the province of Punjab, the Radcliffe Boundary Commission. It is 2

part of a larger project that will examine links between the boundary-making process
and the repercussions of partition, particularly mass violence. The commission takes
its name from its chairman, Sir Cyril Radcliffe. In the end, his boundary-making effort
was a failure in terms of boundary-making, but a striking success in terms of
providing political cover to all sides. The British seized the opportunity to withdraw
from their onerous Indian responsibilities as quickly as possible; the Indian National
Congress, the avowedly secular but primarily Hindu party headed by Jawaharlal
Nehru and Sardar Patel, took control of India, as it had desired for so long. The
Muslim League, which claimed to represent South Asia’s Muslims and was led by
Muhammad Ali Jinnah, won Pakistan, the sovereign Muslim state for which it had
campaigned.
Although the British had, in 1946, considered leaving India
piecemeal, transferring power to individual provences as they
withdrew, they concluded that such an approach was
impractical. without defining the entity or entities that would
come into power, they concluded that such an approach was
impractical. It would not be possible to hand over power Jinnah, Patel,
without making it clear what international entity would take on and Nehru
that power; in order to define a new international entity, a new
boundary was necessary. From a certain perspective, however,
a rigorously and properly delineated boundary was not
necessary to accomplish these political ends—any boundary
line would do. Due to this fact and to a myriad of political
pressures, the Radcliffe Commission failed to draw a geopolitically sound line
delineated and demarcated in accordance with accepted international procedure. The
Punjab’s population distribution was such that there was no line that could neatly
divide Hindus, Muslims, and Sikhs. Radcliffe’s line was far from perfect, but it is
important to note that alternative borders would not necessarily have provided a
significant improvement. There is, in contrast, a great deal to be said about flaws in
the boundary-making procedure—and why those flaws existed.Significance
This territorial division is significant on multiple levels. As an episode in imperial
history, it marked the beginning of a global trend towards decolonization. For South
Asian history, it meant independence for India and Pakistan. Unfortunately, it also
inaugurated Indo-Pakistani tension. Conflict between Hindus and Muslims had existed
on the subcontinent, to a greater or lesser degree, for many centuries, but the partition
brought that conflict to the international level—and exacerbated it. The results include
three wars, in 1948, 1965, and 1971, as well as the Kargil conflict of 1999. The
problem of Indo-Pakistani tension took on greater urgency when both India and
Pakistan tested their nuclear weapons in May 1998, and current events in South Asia
demonstrate the need for continued attention to and greater understanding of this vital
region.
How did this division intensify the very conflict it was intended to resolve? Part of the
answer lies in the drawing of the boundary. My primary goal is to clarify and analyze
the boundary-making process, but having identified specific flaws in this division, I
hope to lay them out in terms that might be useful for decision-makers considering
partition as a tool to resolve conflict in other regions of the world.
Methodology
Because this project focuses on a controversial episode, which reasonable historians
describe differently according to their own national or political biases, my first
research priority was balancing these varied perspectives. Accordingly, I gathered
archival material and conducted interviews in England, Pakistan, and India. In all
three countries, I focused on government documents, examining material relating to
the work of the Radcliffe Commission and to the repercussions of the Radcliffe Line.
I also examined private papers, mostly of British officials serving the raj, but also,
where accessible, the papers of Indian and Pakistani leaders. Regrettably, Radcliffe
destroyed all his papers before he left India—in keeping, his biographer claims, with a
lifelong habit of discarding material he no longer needed. As a result, it may be
3

impossible ever to clarify Radcliffe’s thinking completely. I have attempted to

compensate through archival research and through interviews with Radcliffe’s stepson
and executor, with his private secretary on the Boundary Commission, and with the
last surviving Pakistani official associated with the Punjab Boundary Commission. 4

This research explores the balance between structural influences and the role of
individuals. My story centers on a small number of individuals: Radcliffe, the man
who had responsibility for the boundary line; Mountbatten, the last viceroy of India;
Nehru and Patel, leaders of the Indian National Congress; and Jinnah, head of the
Muslim League. But my argument also has a great deal to do with the sweeping drives
of British imperialism, Indian and Pakistani nationalism, and decolonization. My
conclusions about the forces that shaped the Indo-Pakistani boundary would seem to
support a structural approach, but the lessons of this particular division could be read
another way. If at any point enough individuals had decided to take another path—for
example, if Radcliffe had withdrawn his services once he reached India and was
informed of the August 15 deadline—the outcome could have been dramatically
different. Alternatively, if the key individuals had had different backgrounds—for
example, if all the Indian leaders had not been lawyers, but rather businessmen or
engineers—the outcome could again have been very different. The story of the
Radcliffe Commission concerns individuals attempting to do what they saw as best,
and as a result both bowing to and struggling against the pressures of larger structural
forces.
Historical Context
The 1947 partition was shaped not only by decades of Indian nationalist pressure on
the British Government and by the rise of civil unrest in the subcontinent after World
War Two, but also by Britain’s precarious economic position in the aftermath of the
war. After nearly two centuries as an economic asset, British India had become a
liability at a time when Britain could least afford it. In addition, American pressure to
decolonize the subcontinent influenced both international and British domestic
opinion against the raj. British India became a political and symbolic liability as well
as an economic problem. These factors, combined with domestic political
considerations for the newly elected Labour Party, meant that ridding itself of its
responsibilities in India suddenly became a priority to His Majesty’s Government
(HMG).
However, Indian independence had not always been such an urgent goal for the
British Government. The first half of the twentieth century saw a series of small steps
towards self-government in South Asia. Traditional imperialist historiography holds
that these ventures marked carefully incremented progress, part of the process of
training Indians to govern themselves. Other interpretations, including but not
confined to South Asian nationalist schools, argue that these steps were actually sops
intended to keep nationalists satisfied enough to prevent a more serious threat to
British rule. This view holds that HMG had no intention of letting go its “jewel in the
5

crown”—until it had no choice.

Many historians, imperialist and nationalist alike, trace the roots of partition to the
Morley-Minto reforms of 1909. These changes increased Indian participation in their
own governance, anticipating an eventual move to self-rule. By creating separate
6

electorates for different religious groups, however, these reforms also “embed[ded]
deeply in Indian life the idea that its society consisted of groups set apart from each
other. . . . The result was the flowering of a new communal rhetoric, and ultimately, of
the Pakistan movement.” Politicians found religious rhetoric useful for rallying
7

support, with dangerous results. The elections of 1937 and 1945-46, in which both
Congress and the Muslim League rhetoric played on communal themes, provided
further evidence of a lack of political cooperation at the highest levels.
With the onset of the Second World War, the Government of India found itself in a
difficult position. HMG declared war on India’s behalf, without even a pretense of
consulting Indian leaders. Indian politicians and public opinion were outraged. The
prospect of civil unrest loomed. In 1942, with the Allies in urgent need of a reliable
8
Indian base, Churchill dispatched Sir Stafford Cripps to India at the head of a Cabinet
delegation charged with exploring the possibility of self-government after the war.
Cripps offered an implicit promise that if India fought in World War II it would be
granted freedom; Congress rejected this offer with Gandhi’s memorable phrase that it
was a “post-dated cheque on a bank that was failing.” In the aftermath of Cripps’s
9

failed mission, Gandhi launched the “Quit India” movement, which the British
repressed violently. Most Indians subsided into more or less supportive attitudes. 10

With the end of the war, Indian leaders and people alike expected to be repaid, with
independence, for their wartime backing. In Britain, the Conservatives were voted out
and the Labour Party took power, under Clement Attlee. Meanwhile, the India Office
was losing patience with its viceroy, Lord Wavell. Relations between the India Office
and Wavell had been steadily worsening throughout 1946. Wavell, a career military
man whose stolid exterior concealed a bent for writing poetry, had been viceroy of
India since 1943. Left with the difficult job of guiding India through treacherous post-
war waters, he sent increasingly blunt warnings to London that their Indian policies
were misguided and inadequate to the challenges ahead. Lord Pethick-Lawrence,
Britain’s Secretary of State for India, resented these warnings and paid less attention
to them as time went on. In particular, Wavell’s outline of potential partition
boundaries, the first serious discussion of the issue, received little attention. However,
Wavell’s “Breakdown Plan,” calling for a withdrawal of all British presence in South
Asia, alarmed HMG. Attlee sent another cabinet mission to India in hopes of
negotiating a less drastic outcome. The resulting proposal, known as the “ABC Plan,”
11

called for a loose federation to consist of three groups of provinces, each of which had
the option to “opt out” of the federation. This proposal met a curious reception. It was
first accepted, then rejected, by Congress; the Muslim League initially announced that
it would cooperate, but in the aftermath of the Congress decision it renounced
constitutional methods and declared “Direct Action” Day on August 16, 1946. “Direct
Action Day” became the “Great Calcutta Killing,” and the next thirteen months saw
rioting and violence across North India. 12

By the beginning of 1947, Pethick-Lawrence and Attlee had lost all confidence in
Wavell, regarding him as “frankly defeatist.” In February 1947, they asked him to
resign, appointing Lord Louis Mountbatten, a career naval officer and cousin to the
king, in his place. Although Mountbatten was given a June 1948 deadline by which to
disentangle Britain from India, he concluded shortly after his arrival in India that a
rapprochement between the various parties was impossible. Within a few months he
decided to move the decolonization deadline up, to August 15, 1947.
Boundary Commission Format and Procedure
It was not until the summer of 1947 that British and South Asian leaders began
serious discussions about the format and procedure of a boundary commission. All in
all, however, the central parties agreed on all aspects of the Boundary Commission
arrangements with surprisingly little wrangling. There would be two commissions,
one for Bengal, in northeast India, and one for Punjab, in the northwest. The same
man, Sir Cyril Radcliffe, would chair both commissions. Radcliffe was widely
respected for his intellectual abilities, but he had never been to India. Paradoxically,
this fact made him a more attractive candidate, on the theory that ignorance of India
would equal impartiality. Each commission would consist of four South Asian judges,
two selected by Congress and two by the League. In the end, this two-versus-two
format and the judges’ strong political biases produced deadlock, leaving Radcliffe
the responsibility to make all the most difficult decisions himself. The commission’s
terms of reference directed it to “demarcate the boundaries of the two parts of the
Punjab on the basis of ascertaining the contiguous majority areas of Muslims and non-
Muslims. In doing so, it will also take into account other factors.” These terms, with
13

their vague reference to “other factors,” allowed the Chairman enormous leeway.
However, after the final boundary decision, known as the “Radcliffe Award,” was
announced, all sides complained that Radcliffe had not taken the right “other factors”
into account.
This structure limited the commission’s effectiveness, but the most serious flaw was
the extremely tight timetable that the British Government, Congress, and League
imposed on the entire partition effort. Radcliffe arrived in India on July 8 and met
with Mountbatten and the nationalist leaders soon thereafter. It was at this meeting
that Radcliffe learned, apparently for the first time, that the boundary must be
completed by August 15. He protested, but Mountbatten, Nehru, and Jinnah stood
firm. Despite warnings that the time restriction could wreck the end result, they
wanted the line finished by August 15.
Radcliffe’s efforts were further hampered by the fact that he was almost completely
ignorant of the information and procedures necessary to draw a boundary, procedures
that were well established by 1947. Moreover, he lacked any advisors versed in even
14

the basics of boundary-making, and only his private secretary, Christopher Beaumont,
was familiar with the realities of administration and everyday life in the Punjab.
Radcliffe’s South Asian colleagues, all legal experts like himself, were as ignorant as
their Chairman of boundary-making requirements.
However, Radcliffe was not as unbiased, nor as ignorant, as the Indian leaders
assumed. On the contrary, his wartime experience as director-general of the British
Ministry of Information, along with his sound Establishment background, left him
intimately familiar with the goals and interests of His Majesty’s Government. There is
no evidence that Radcliffe was biased against Hindus, Muslims, or Sikhs, but he was
certainly biased in favor of preserving British interests. As far as its undeclared
political ends were concerned, then, the Radcliffe Commission was well arranged.
Unfortunately, the forces that shaped the commission to fulfill political needs also
prevented it from following well-established boundary-making procedures.
The commission’s membership, composed entirely of legal experts, hampered its
boundary-making effort but added a valuable veneer of justice and legitimacy to what
was, in reality, a chaotic jumble of events. Its composition of equal numbers of
Congress and League nominees paved the way to deadlock but created an appearance
of political balance. The presence of these political nominees came at the expense of
the use of the necessary geographical experts, but satisfied the demands of Congress,
League, and of course the British Government to have their own men on the
commission. The absence of outside participants—for example, from the United
Nations—also satisfied the British Government’s urgent desire to save face by
avoiding the appearance that it required outside help to govern—or stop governing—
its own empire. The Commission’s extremely tight timetable made it impossible to
gather the survey and other information vital to a well-informed decision, but speedily
provided all parties with the international boundary that was a prerequisite for the
transfer of power.
Analysis of the Boundary Decision
The Facts of the Award
The final boundary, known as the Radcliffe award, allotted some sixty-two percent of
the area of undivided Punjab to India, with fifty-five percent of the population. The
15

boundary ran from the border of Kashmir State south along the Ujh River, leaving
one tehsil of Gurdaspur District to Pakistan and allotting the remainder to India.
16

Where the Ujh met the Ravi River, the boundary followed the Ravi southwest, until it
met the existing administrative line dividing Amritsar District from Lahore District.
Radcliffe was careful to specify that the relevant administrative boundaries, not the
course of the Ujh or the Ravi, constituted the new international boundary. The
boundary then ran through Lahore District, along tehsil and village boundaries,
leaving the district’s easternmost corner in India. When the Radcliffe boundary met
the Ferozepore District line, it turned to follow the River Sutlej along the
administrative boundary between Ferozepore and Montgomery Districts. The
Radcliffe line ended where it met the border of Bahawalpur, a princely state whose
ruler, like the Maharajah of Kashmir, had the choice of acceding to Pakistan or India.
The primary feature of this line was that it divided Amritsar, now in India, from
Lahore, which went to Pakistan. By and large it followed major administrative
divisions, although it did meander between villages in the Kasur region southeast of
Lahore. The two most controversial elements of this line involved Gurdaspur and
Ferozepore. Pakistani critics interpreted Radcliffe’s decision to grant most of
Gurdaspur District to India as an attempt to provide India with a land link to Kashmir.
As one element of the beginnings of the Kashmir conflict, this allegation remains
controversial. It is worth noting that no all-weather road linked Kashmir and India in
1947; when the first Indo-Pakistani war began in late 1947, India airlifted troops and
supplies into Kashmir rather than take an overland route. The other controversy was
over Ferozepore’s allocation to India; this decision came as a surprise in the wake of
early August leaks indicating that Radcliffe would allocate a section of Ferozepore to
Pakistan.
In accordance with Mountbatten, Nehru, and Jinnah’s demands that he complete his
work before August 15, Radcliffe submitted his award on August 12. By this time,
Mountbatten had changed his mind (for reasons discussed below) and asked Radcliffe
to delay the award until after August 15. Radcliffe refused, but Mountbatten had his
way, choosing not to release the award until August 16, when he discussed it with the
Indian and Pakistani leaders at a meeting in New Delhi. On August 17, the award was
finally published.
Allegations of Bias
Throughout the difficult process of partition, accusations of official partiality towards
one group or another were leveled on all sides, not only in the popular press but also
by the leaders themselves. For example, Justice Munir of the Punjab Commission
accused Radcliffe’s top aide, Christopher Beaumont, of pro-Hindus bias. Munir
claimed that Beaumont intentionally misled Radcliffe in order to achieve a result
favorable to India. Beaumont rejects these charges as ludicrous. The most contentious
17

point was the Ferozepore border and the nearby headworks. On August 8,
Mountbatten’s private secretary, George Abell, sent a letter with a preliminary
description of the Punjab boundary to Evan Jenkins, the provincial governor. This
draft showed the Ferozepore area and its headworks going to Pakistan. When the final
award was released, Ferozepore was assigned to India. Infuriated Pakistanis were sure
that Nehru and Mountbatten had pressured Radcliffe to change his line. After
partition, each side leveled accusations in the vernacular press that their opponents
had successfully bribed Radcliffe to take their part. Many were convinced that the
18

Commissions were a sham and that Mountbatten himself had simply dictated the new
divisions. In his final report as Viceroy, Mountbatten admitted, “I am afraid that there
is still a large section of public opinion in this country which is firmly convinced that I
will settle the matter finally.” In 1992, Christopher Beaumont added his voice to the
19

chorus of accusations against Mountbatten. This circumstantial evidence indicates

20

that Mountbatten may well have influenced the final shape of the boundary award.
I argue, however, that these allegations and angry resentments miss the point. On the
contrary, it would not be surprising if Mountbatten offered Radcliffe advice, nor if
Radcliffe took it. As one historian has noted, “Radcliffe was a barrister following a
brief”—and Mountbatten was his client. Those who object to Mountbatten’s
21

interference are buying in to the myth that the partition was a rational, objective
process.
The Problem of “Other Factors”
One of the most difficult questions facing the Commissions was the respective
significance to assign to various “other factors.” In his awards, Radcliffe himself
noted that “differences of opinion as to the significance of the term ‘other factors’ and
as to the weight and value to be attached to these factors, made it impossible to arrive
at any agreed line.” The Congress argued that the unreliability of the 1941 census
22

figures meant that “other factors” must be given greater weight in the Punjab; the
Muslim League maintained that the census figures were valid and thus “other factors”
could be all but ignored. Over the years, observers have speculated on various factors
that may have motivated Radcliffe, including communal bias, pressure from
Mountbatten, economic considerations, prevailing administrative borders, defense
needs, and existing infrastructure.
Years later, Mountbatten offered this curious appraisal of Radcliffe’s
reasoning: “I’ll tell you something ghastly. The reasons behind his award
weren’t very deep-seated at all. I am quite certain they were based on
some rule of thumb about the proportion of population.” Given the fact
23

the Mountbatten’s government gave Radcliffe the mandate to focus on

religious demographics, it seems odd that the former Viceroy thought it
“ghastly” that Radcliffe had not come up with “deeper” reasons for
drawing his lines. Mountbatten’s sentiment may indicate an awareness
among British officials that the categories they themselves had set up Mountbatten
were inadequate for the job at hand.Even by Mountbatten’s standards,
this statement about Radcliffe’s “rule of thumb” is rather peculiar.
Perhaps by the time Mountbatten gave this interview, in the early 1970s, he had
developed reservations about the partition process. Until his death, Mountbatten
staunchly defended his actions in 1947, making it unlikely that he would openly
question himself. However, Mountbatten had a great capacity for remembering
24

history differently than other observers, invariably along lines most flattering to
himself. Given Hodson’s statement that it was the viceroy himself who brought up the
notion of “balance,” one wonders whether Mountbatten subconsciously transferred
responsibility for his own idea onto Radcliffe’s shoulders, before criticizing it. This
speculation may seem rather convoluted, but Mountbatten was a notably twisty
individual. A colleague famously told him, “Dickie, you’re so crooked that if you
swallowed a nail you’d shit a corkscrew!” Mountbatten’s biographer records that this
was “a remark which Mountbatten remembered and repeated, though
characteristically changing the recipient of the insult.
25

Some observers felt Radcliffe gave too much weight to economic considerations,
neglecting his mandate to determine the “contiguous majority areas” of religious
groups. For example, the Chittagong Hill Tracts in Bengal were awarded to Pakistan
despite the fact that the Muslim population amounted to only three per cent. When
Nehru complained on August 16, Mountbatten explained Radcliffe’s decision,
emphasizing “the economic ties that bound Chit-tagong District and the Hill Tracts
together.” Radcliffe apparently thought these economic necessities more important
26

than the overwhelmingly non-Muslim population.

Whenever possible, Radcliffe used existing administrative borders. The commission’s
terms of reference directed it to draw its lines within the two provinces of Bengal and
Punjab, so the existing provincial administrative boundaries were not an option.
Within provinces, however, Radcliffe seems to have preferred existing lines, using
district, tehsil, thana, and even village boundaries. His textual description of the
27

boundary relies very little on “natural” landmarks like crest or rivers. In the Punjab
award, Radcliffe repeatedly notes that although nearby rivers present apparently
logical natural boundaries, the new boundary must run along the existing district or
tehsil borders. 28

Mountbatten recalled later that he had counseled Radcliffe “not to take defence
considerations under judgment in making the award.” In a memo dated May 11,
29

1946, Field Marshall Sir Claude Auchinleck, Commander-in-Chief of the Indian

Armed Forces, discussed the repercussions of Partition for imperial and Indo-
Pakistani defense. He concluded that without a united India, the British military
position in South Asia would be irreparably damaged. Furthermore, although he
considered the possibility of Indo-Pakistani conflict, he saw no way to define a
defensible frontier. Radcliffe himself seems to have consistently operated on the
30

assumption that India and Pakistan would have good relations after independence.
Other decision-makers—and those impacted by the divisions—took this view as well.
Radcliffe repeatedly expressed hope that India and Pakistan could work together to
solve some of the most difficult infrastructure problems created by his boundary
award. Mountbatten himself seemed optimistic that inclusion in the Commonwealth
would keep India and Pakistan on mutually friendly terms, emphasizing that
Dominion Status meant membership in a community of cooperative nations.
The Role of Infrastructure
Although the prominence of “other factors” in Radcliffe’s thinking remains unclear,
his awards demonstrate the importance of infrastructure considerations. In both the
Punjab and Bengal awards, Radcliffe discusses canals, headworks, roads, railways,
and ports before turning to population factors. In the Punjab awards, he explicitly
states that “there are factors such as the disruption of railway communications and
water systems that ought in this instance to displace the primary claim of contiguous
majorities.” In the Bengal award, he demonstrates a similar concern with maintaining
31

“railway communications and river systems,” as well as preserving the relationship of

the Nadia and Kulti river systems with the port of Calcutta.
32

The irrigation systems and other infrastructure of Punjab and Bengal had been built
under a single administration. They were never intended to be divided. No partition
line Radcliffe could have concocted would have allowed Pakistan and India to operate
their infrastructure separately, without cross-border interference. In the few weeks he
had, Radcliffe seems to have tried to minimize infrastructure disruptions, but he was
well aware that his proposal was flawed. In his attempt to draw the boundary near the
Suleimanke headworks in Punjab, for example, he emphasized that his intention was
to award this equipment to Pakistan and acknowledged that the reality of the terrain
might necessitate that “the boundary shall be adjusted accordingly.” Several months
33

later, the Suleimanke headworks were “reallocated” in a clash between Indian and
Pakistani soldiers. In an optimistic moment, Radcliffe expressed the hope that “a
34

solution may be found by agreement between the two States for some joint control of
what has hitherto been a valuable common service.” Events soon proved this
35

optimism unfounded.
The Boundary Announcement Delayed
Radcliffe had prepared his decision by August 12, as the various parties, including
Mountbatten, had insisted. As the transfer of power approached, however,
Mountbatten chose to delay the boundary announcement until after the independence
ceremonies. In public statements, Mountbatten insisted that he simply wished to avoid
spoiling the joyous celebration of independence by announcing news that would
undoubtedly distress all parties. However, in private government communications and
in the minutes of the Staff Meeting at which the decision was taken, it becomes clear
that Mountbatten’s primary motivation was avoiding the appearance of British
responsibility for the disorder that inevitably would follow the announcement. 36

It is difficult to see how these concerns, either for Indian or Pakistani national joy or
for the evasion of British national responsibility, could outweigh the potential benefit
of making administrative, military, and constabulary arrangements before the actual
transfer of power took place. Governor Jenkins of the Punjab had begged Mountbatten
repeatedly for advance notice of the award. On July 30, Jenkins told the Viceroy that
“even a few hours would be better than none.” As it was, in some border regions
37

whose destiny was uncertain, both Indian and Pakistani flags were raised. In some
cases Pakistani officials set to work in territories that later became Indian. As August
15 drew closer, many administrators joined the last-minute flow of refugees
themselves, disrupting administrative access across India by leaving their posts empty.
In short, the Punjab found itself in administrative chaos, ill prepared to deal with the
impact of partition.
When Mountbatten released the award to the Indian and Pakistani leaders on August
16, both sides objected furiously to various aspects of the boundary. In the end, they
agreed to issue the decision as it stood, with no public statement of their
disappointment. When the award was finally announced, on 17 August, the border
forces in place were inadequate to stop the communal massacres. Violence was
particularly severe along the new border areas, although there was serious bloodshed
in Delhi as well. The first Indo-Pakistani war broke out in late 1947; both Pakistan
and India sent troops into Kashmir, where they remain today. Subsequent wars in
1965 and 1971 made it clear that Radcliffe’s boundaries were not neat lines but raw
and restless divisions.
REPERCUSSIONS OF PARTITION
The partition resulted in extreme violence and one of the largest migrations in history.
Partition deaths throughout India and Pakistan numbered between 500,000 and one
million, while some ten to twelve million migrants moved across the new borders in
Punjab and Bengal. In addition, tens of thousands of girls and women were raped
38
and/or abducted. Violence was the most dramatic repercussion of partition, but the
39

boundary award contributed to other disruptions: long-term border tensions,

infrastructure problems, and the lasting conflict over Kashmir.
First, the high casualties and tremendous population dislocation that burdened both
India and Pakistan during and after partition proved awkward responsibilities for
fledgling states. In Pakistan, the position of mohajirs, or migrants from India, remains
a dangerous political problem.
Second, the boundaries that Radcliffe defined turned out to be restless divisions, and
in both the 1965 and 1971 wars India and Pakistan battled over their Punjabi border.

Third, the Radcliffe Line also cut through the Punjab’s well-developed infrastructure
systems, disrupting road, telephone, and telegraph communications, but most
importantly, interfering with the region’s vital irrigation system. In a rare success
story, the 1960 Indus Waters Treaty largely resolved Punjab’s water-related problems.
However, those original water problems were related to the final and most serious
issue plaguing current Indo-Pakistani relations: Kashmir.
In 1947, Kashmir was a princely state, whose ruler was entitled to choose for himself
between India and Pakistan; Radcliffe had no direct responsibility for the Kashmir
question. However, there are a number of interesting links between Kashmir and the
Radcliffe award. Those links include the fact that the water feeding the Punjabi
irrigation system originates in Kashmiri rivers, as well as allegations that Radcliffe
awarded India certain areas of northern Punjab as a strategic corridor to Kashmir. One
of the most intriguing connections between the Radcliffe award and the Kashmir
problem involves not the substance of the award but the possibility that Mountbatten,
the last Viceroy of British India, who delayed the announcement of the Radcliffe
award until two days after independence, may have done so in an effort to coerce the
Maharajah of Kashmir into acceding to India rather than Pakistan. The truth of these
40

allegations remains uncertain; what is clear is that the political successes that the
Radcliffe Commission enabled have been less lasting than its failures.
Although estimates of partition casualties remain controversial, it is clear that great
suffering, on a scale rarely seen in human history, accompanied the partition.
Violence, and the memory of violence, is therefore one of partition’s legacies to the
South Asian region. It is not 1947’s only legacy, of course—that year also brought
independence and great pride to many Indians and Pakistanis—but partition’s scars
remain in the minds, if no longer on the bodies, of many South Asians. It is not only
the actual survivors of partition who exhibit this damage; their descendents are also
marked. Pakistani bitterness against India and Indians and Indian bitterness against
Pakistan and Pakistani are facts of life in South Asia. Many other Indians and
Pakistanis long for peace, feeling that the people across the border are their kinfolk,
but government propaganda and certain streams of public discourse, including those
generated by media and educational institutions, reinforce cross-border resentments.
LESSONS OF PARTITION
In addition to providing a detailed analysis of the Radcliffe Boundary Commission’s
composition and work, this project seeks to identify specific ways in which the 1947
partition failed. My hope is that describing these failures may assist policymakers
considering partition in other regions to define the practical steps necessary to
implement workable divisions.
In addition to the irregular boundary-making process detailed above, the larger South
Asian partition was flawed in several major ways. The most significant error, for
which all parties must share responsibility, was misguided reliance on a best-case
result, combined with consistent refusal even to acknowledge the possibility of a
worst-case outcome. Mountbatten and the rest of the interim Government of India
ignored repeated warnings from Sir Evan Jenkins, the highly respected Governor of
the Punjab, that the division would result in large-scale violence.
In addition, the architects of partition refused to provide a sufficiently prolonged
timetable to allow for

1) the necessary geographic surveys and other information gathering, for

2) boundary demarcation (the process of fixing boundary markers on the ground), for
3) public announcement of the new line, and for
4) transfer of populations, if necessary.
If they had provided more time for government institutions and local communities to
absorb and adapt to the implications of the Radcliffe award, the level of violence
might have been lower—and the authorities’ abilities to impose law and order higher.
In their rush to achieve their own political goals, British India’s most powerful parties
decided not to complete territorial partition before final political separation. This
decision left Indian and Pakistani citizens in the peculiar predicament of not knowing
which country they were in on August 15 or 16. Additionally, Mountbatten’s delay in
announcing the Radcliffe Line meant effectively that India and Pakistan had no
boundaries for the first two days of their existence. Even if the award had been
announced a few days earlier, provincial and local officials would not have had
enough time—particularly in the demanding circumstances they faced—to make the
necessary administrative arrangements.
Finally, they did not define cooperative procedures for resource sharing or, failing
that, clear and complete division of linked infrastructure systems. The result was
severe infrastructure disruptions, with consequences not only for communications and
transportation, but also for the food supply of millions of people. Future partitions
must include these elements in order to avoid the failures that so tragically limited the
effectiveness of the South Asian partition. The daunting nature of this task,
particularly the intricate problem of linked infrastructures, makes it clear that partition
must be a last resort. Further work on the conditions under which partition is likely to
be more or less successful is also required to understand the full nature of this
diplomatic option.
CONCLUSIONS
The story of the creation of the Indo-Pakistani boundary remains a neglected, yet
crucial, element of partition history. Further research is required to place the boundary
question within the larger historical context of partition and of British and South
Asian politics in the 1940s. In addition, the precise nature of links between the
boundary commission’s work and the violence of partition remains to be explored.
Instead of resolving tension by clearly separating religious groups, the Boundary
Commission may actually have contributed to the upheaval, albeit without malicious
intent. The surge in violence that began shortly before the Radcliffe award was
announced can be traced in part to rumors and uncertainty over where the Line would
fall. A lengthier and more transparent boundary-making process might have averted
41

this situation. The lack of a methodologically sound boundary-making process must

be counted prominently among the failures of the South Asian division, and present-
day policy-makers should consider this and the other flaws identified above when
appraising the value of partition as a tool for conflict resolution.
Finally, this project challenges the notion that partition can be appraised in absolute
terms, as a flawed approach that merely aggravates violence. In reality, it often both
42

limits and exacerbates tension; one of the paradoxes of the 1947 partition is that it
stimulated new violence even as it resolved political conflict on some levels. I hope
this analysis will contribute to a more nuanced and practical understanding of the
ways that partition can contribute to containing violence, the steps and conditions
required for effective divisions, and the limits of this particular tool for peace.