ACCIDENTS HAVE ESSE IN ACTU BUT NOT AN ACT OF BEING (ESSE AS

ACTUS ESSENDI) OF THEIR OWN

Paul Gerard Horrigan, Ph.D., 2016.

Although accidents have esse in actu, a secondary existence (existentia), they do not have
an act of being1 (esse as actus essendi) of their own, but rather are by reason of the act of being
(actus essendi) which belongs to the substance. Esse in actu corresponds to esse essentiae.
Accidental esse is the esse in actu in first substance (substantia prima), esse accidentale being a
secondary existence derived from the real substance. Accidental being (esse accidentale) would
indicate, explains Cornelio Fabro, “the reality of the accidents insofar as they are properties and
acts or perfections of the individuated substance from which they proceed and in which they are
received; […]. In other words, the accidents have and give a ‘modus essendi’ according to a
proper content and this ‘esse accidentale,’ which is actuated according to that temporal-plexus,
can be called existentia.” “…accidents are attributed a proper existence, a proper special-
temporal situation in the substance, but not a proper esse as actus essendi.”2

Concerning the act of being (esse as actus essendi) Fabro writes in his Partecipazione e
causalità: “Esse ut actus essendi is the principium subsistendi of the substance, thanks to which
both the essence of the substance as well as that of the accidents are in act…” “…esse in the
proper sense is only actus essendi which gives subsistence to the substance. There is, therefore,
esse essentiae and esse which is actus essendi; …the actualizing esse which is non-divisible
actus essendi, is so because it indicates the quality of absolute act that makes the first
discrimination of the real and the first foundation of truth, since it is inseparable and most simple
affirmation of its act and only has non-being for its contrary.”3

Esse in the proper sense is actus essendi. In its intensive meaning esse as actus essendi
emerges over all other acts, formalities and perfections, it being the actuality of all acts and the
perfection of all perfections, as St. Thomas Aquinas writes in De Potentia Dei and the Summa
Theologiae: “That which I call esse is among all (things), the most perfect, and this is clear
because act is always more perfect than potency. Now no signate form is understood to be in act
unless it be supposed to have esse. For humanity or fiery nature may be considered as existing
potentially in matter, or as existing in the power of an agent, or even as in the intellect: but when
it has esse it becomes an existens in act. Wherefore it is clear than when I say esse, it is the
actuality of all acts, and therefore the perfection of all perfections.”4 “Esse is the most perfect of
all, for it is compared to all as act; for nothing has actuality except insofar as it is. Hence esse is

1
If essence (essentia) is that which makes a thing to be what it is, the act of being (esse) is that which makes a thing
to be.
2
C. FABRO, Partecipazione e causalità secondo san Tommaso d’Aquino, SEI, Turin, 1961, p. 200.
3
C. FABRO, op. cit., pp. 201, 203-204.
4
De Potentia Dei, q. 7, a. 2, ad 9: “Ad nonum dicendum, quod hoc quod dico esse est inter omnia perfectissimum:
quod ex hoc patet quia actus est semper perfectio potentia. Quaelibet autem forma signata non intelligitur in actu nisi
per hoc quod esse ponitur. Nam humanitas vel igneitas potest considerari ut in potentia materiae existens, vel ut in
virtute agentis, aut etiam ut in intellectu: sed hoc quod habet esse, efficitur actu existens. Unde patet quod hoc quod
dico esse est actualitas omnium actuum, et propter hoc est perfectio omnium perfectionum.”

1
the actuality of all things, even their forms. Therefore it is not compared to other things as the
receiver is to the received; but rather as the received to the receiver.”5

Christian Ferraro, professor of Metaphysics at the Lateran University, explains in his

Appunti di metafisica (2013) that, although accidents do indeed have esse in actu, they do not
have an esse as actus essendi of their own (which belongs to the substance), this esse as actus
essendi being that which enters into a real composition with the essence (essentia) and is the
principle of subsistence of the suppositum. The suppositum, Ferraro stresses, has only one esse ut
actus, which is the esse suppositi, but he notes that the suppositum has a multiplicity of esse in
actu, according to the specific degree of the substantial essence and of the diverse accidental
actuations: “Che gli accidenti allora non siano composti da essenza e atto di essere?
Effettivamente. Gli accidenti non hanno un esse proprio. L’esse ut actus (l’essere come atto,
l’atto di essere, ipsum esse, actus essendi) è proprietà esclusiva della sostanza, principio della sua
sussistenza. Pertanto, mentre ciò che appartiene al genere della sostanza è per forza realmente
composto, invece ciò che appartiene ad alcuno dei nove generi di accidenti non è composto,
bensì semplice, anche se entra in composizione con la sostanza – come abbiamo appena visto.6

“Se l’accidente non ha l’esse ut actus, non è detto però che non abbia l’esse in actu.
Anche la forma accidentale infatti dà l’esse in actu, com’è proprio di ogni forma. Gli accidenti
esistono, sono attuali, e questa loro attualità è l’esse in actu, con il quale arricchiscono la
sostanza.

“Ora, questo esse accidentale, del quale parla più volte san Tommaso, non è però da
confondersi con l’esse ut actus, quell’esse che entra in composizione reale con l’essenza ed è il
principio della sussistenza del supposito.7 Si tratta invece dell’attualità seconda che acquista la
sostanza sussistente in virtù della forma accidentale. Infatti, così come la forma sostanziale
specificava l’esse ut actus determinandone il grado d’intensità e conferendo al composto l’esse
in actu, in maniera simile la forma accidentale determina ulteriormente il tutto sostanziale
conferendo un «secondo» esse in actu, a seconda di tutte le modalità accidentali: un esse qualis,
un esse quantum, un esse ad, ecc. Perciò l’accidente non è ente nel senso di eseguire o di avere
esso stesso l’esse ut actus, bensì nel senso che per esso (eo mediante) un qualcosa è in un
determinato modo secondario, che presuppone l’attualità e consistenza sostanziale. Il supposito

5
Summa Theologiae, I, q. 4, a. 1, ad 3: “Ad tertium dicendum quod ipsum esse est perfectissimum omnium,
comparatur enim ad omnia ut actus. Nihil enim habet actualitatem, nisi inquantum est, unde ipsum esse est actualitas
omnium rerum, et etiam ipsarum formarum. Unde non comparatur ad alia sicut recipiens ad receptum, sed magis
sicut receptum ad recipiens.”
6
Cf. De Veritate, q. 27, a. 1, ad 8.
7
Per non aver adeguatamente distinto l’esse in actu e l’esse ut actus, molti rappresentanti della scuola tomista
(Gaetano, Giovanni di san Tommaso, Gredt, Maritain, M.-D. Philippe, Elders, De Raeymaeker, per elencare soltanto
alcuni) hanno attribuito agli accidenti un esse (ut actus) proprio. Si sono visti costretti ad ammetterlo, sia sulla base
di certi testi di san Tommaso che sembrerebbero affermarlo (nei quali però egli parla soltanto ed esclusivamente
dell’esse in actu), sia sulla base della loro fuorviante interpretazione dell’esse ut actus come exsistentia, nel senso
del principio per cui la cosa è messa fuori delle cause: se infatti l’accidente è reale, esso allora dovrebbe avere una
«existentia» propria. Certamente, poi aggiungevano che questo «atto di essere» era sì debole da aver bisogno di
poggiare sulla sostanza.
È chiaro che questa posizione non rispecchia fedelmente il pensiero di san Tommaso. D’altronde, è un esempio
quanto mai eloquente dell’«essenzialismo formalista» e del da Heidegger deprecato oblio dell’essere.

2
pertanto ha un unico esse ut actus, che è l’esse suppositi, ma è molteplice il suo esse in actu, a
seconda del grado specifico dell’essenza sostanziale e delle diverse attuazioni accidentali.”8

Influenced by the existential Thomism of Étienne Gilson and Cornelio Fabro on this
matter, Tomás Alvira, Luis Clavell and Tomás Melendo explain that “strictly speaking, what
properly is is that which has the act of being as an act belonging to itself, i.e., that which is by
itself, and this is true only of the substance. In contrast, ‘since the accidents do not subsist, they
do not have being (esse) strictly speaking: it is their subject that is, in one way or another, in
accordance with these accidents.’9 The weight of a horse does not exist by itself, neither does its
color or shape. Hence, it is more correct to say that the horse is heavy, or is white, precisely
because of having these accidents.

“In the final analysis, accidents do not possess an act of being ‘of their own’; rather, they
depend on the act of being of the substance, which is their subject. Thus, a 5-kilo weight only
exists in a body endowed with that specific heaviness. This does not mean that the accidents are
nothing; they also are, that is, they are real, insofar as they form part of a substance, and
constitute specific determinations of that subject.

“Hence, the accidents always imply imperfection, ‘since their being consists in ‘being in
another,’ on which it depends and, consequently, in being part of a composition formed with
some subject.’10

“We can also arrive at the conclusion that the accidents do not have an act of being of
their own by observing generation and corruption. Since generation and corruption – the
acquisition and loss of being – affect that which has being, these terms are only applied to the
substance. Whiteness, for instance, is neither engendered nor corrupted; rather, bodies become
white or lose their original whiteness. Accidents are neither generated nor corrupted. We can
only validly state that accidents are ‘generated’ or ‘corrupted’ insofar as their subject begins to
be or ceases to be in act in accordance with these accidents.”11

Explaining how the act of being (esse) is the root of the unity of the substance-accidents
composite, Alvira, Clavell, and Melendo write: “A being (ens) is a certain whole which is
composed of a substance and certain accidents. These are elements which form a certain unity,
and do not exist separately. No accident exists without its substance, and no substance exists
without its accidents.12 These realities lie in different levels, however, since the accidents depend
on the being of the substance and not the other way around. Therefore, the composite is by virtue
of the act of being (actus essendi) of the substance in which each of the accidents also shares.

8
C. FERRARO, Appunti di metafisica, Lateran University Press, Vatican City, 2013, pp. 282-283.
9
De Veritate, q. 27, a. 1, ad 8.
10
Idem. In I Sententiarum, d. 8, a. 4, a. 3.
11
T. ALVIRA, L. CLAVELL, T. MELENDO, Metaphysics, Sinag-Tala, Manila, 1991, pp. 50-51.
12
There are exceptions to this statement. First, in God, who is absolutely simple, no accidents are found; God cannot
be perfected by accidents because He is the fullness of being. Second, in the Holy Eucharist, as soon as
transubstantiation takes place, the accidents of the bread and wine remain present in a miraculous way – they no
longer inhere, in their own substance, or in any other substance. The first exception is studied in Natural Theology,
while the second is taken up in Sacramental Theology, which presupposes supernatural faith.

3
 “Each thing has but one act of being. Thus, the entire substantial and accidental reality
of a being ‘is’ by virtue of a single act of being, which, properly speaking, belongs to the
substance. A being has esse in accordance with the manner determined by its specific essence,
which is the essence of the substance. This substantial perfection, in turn, gives rise to a wide
range of accidental perfections in conformity with that specific manner of being. Hence, every
man is a single being which possesses the act of being according to his human essence or nature.
From that degree of perfection of being, his accidental perfections arise: for instance, a certain
bodily make-up, a complex of sense and motor powers, as well as spiritual operations.

“A being has but one act of being (actus essendi), which is that of the substance. Though
lacking their own being, the accidents are also real, by virtue of the act of being of the substance.
There are some Thomists, however, who speak as though accidents had a being of their own,
distinct from that of the substance. Such statements tend to undermine the radical unity of a
being. St. Thomas Aquinas does employ at times the terms esse substantiale and esse
accidentale. Nevertheless, in these cases the term esse does not strictly signify actus essendi; it is
used in a more general sense – of being ‘real’ (esse in actu); every being certainly has some
accidental realities which are distinct from its substantial reality, but it has those accidents only
by virtue of a single esse, which properly belongs to the substance.”13

Gilson explains in the fifth edition of his Le Thomisme (the 1948 French edition,
translated into English by Lawrence K. Shook, C.S.B. and published by Random House, New
York, in 1956): “To speak of things as ‘substances’ is not to conceive of them as groups of
accidents bound by some kind of copula to a subject. Quite to the contrary, it is to say that they
set themselves up as units of existence, all of whose constitutive elements are, by virtue of one
and the same act of being, which is that of the substance. Accidents have no act of being of their
own to be added to that of the substance in order to complete it. They have no other act of being
than that of the substance. For them, to be is simply ‘to-be-in-the-substance’ or, as it has been
put, ‘their being is to-be-in.’14”15 Gilson also maintains this position in his article, La notion
d’existence chez Guillaume d’Auvergne, published in Archives d’histoire doctrinale et littéraire
du moyen age in 1946.16 The position is also held by Louis-Baptiste Geiger, the scholar on
participation in St. Thomas Aquinas,17 Aimé Forest in his La structure métaphysique du concret
selon saint Thomas d’Aquin,18 and Cornelio Fabro in his Partecipazione e causalità
(Participation et causalité).19

13
T. ALVIRA, L. CLAVELL, T. MELENDO, op. cit., pp. 53-54.
14
“Nam accidentis esse est inesse”(In V Metaphys., 9, 894, p. 286). It has therefore only a relative and borrowed
esse. “Esse enim album non est simpliciter esse, sed secundum quid,”(In VII Metaphys., I, 1256, p. 377). Accidents
are not beings, but the beings of being; “non dicuntur simpliciter entia, sed entis entia, sicut qualitas et motus”(In XII
Metaphys., 1, 419, p. 683).
15
E. GILSON, The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas, Random House, New York, 1956, pp. 31, 445.
16
E. GILSON, La notion d’existence chez Guillaume d’Auvergne, “Archives d’histoire doctrinale et littéraire du
moyen age,” 15 (1946), p. 89, n. 1.
17
L.-B. GEIGER, La participation dans la philosophie de s. Thomas d’Aquin, Vrin, Paris, 1942, pp. 269ff.
18
A. FOREST, La structure métaphysique du concret selon saint Thomas d’Aquin, “Etudes de philosophie
médiévale,” 14 (1931), p. 89.
19
C. FABRO, Partecipazione e causalità, SEI, Turin, 1961. French translation: Participation et causalité selon s.
Thomas d’Aquin, Louvain-Paris, 1961, pp 299-302. See especially page 301.

4
 And even after knowing via Louvain’s Louis De Raeymaeker that the Thomist
Commentator Domingo Bañez20 later in life changed his mind on this issue, in opposition to the
position of Gilson, Geiger, Forest, and Fabro, this, nevertheless, did not change Gilson’s position
on this matter: in the sixth and final edition of Le Thomisme (the 1965 French edition [Vrin,
Paris], translated into English by Lawrence Shook and Armand Maurer, and published by the
Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies in Toronto in 2002) Gilson states as his final position on
this issue: “To speak of things as substances is not to think of them as groups of accidents bound
to a subject by a copula. It is rather that they present themselves as units of existence, all the
elements of which are in virtue of one and the same act of being (esse), which is that of the
substance. The accidents have no act of being of their own, which would be added to that of the
substance so as to complete it. They have no other act of being than that of the substance. Their
esse is simply ‘to be in the substance,’ or, as is sometimes said, their esse est inesse.21”22

In Partecipazione e causalità, Fabro explains how accidents, though having esse in actu,
have no act of being (esse as actus essendi) of their own; what has the act of being (esse as actus
essendi) is the substance and the accidents are by reason of this one act of being (esse as actus
essendi) which belongs to the substance: “Una conferma ed un’applicazione dell’esse essentiae
(l’essenza metafisica), è la divisione dell’esse in esse substantiale ed esse accidentale che non
può riguardare direttamente l’esse come actus essendi, il quale è l’atto proprio della sostanza
completa (substantia prima). Per il fatto stesso che l’esse essentiae è detto comune a tutti i
predicamenti, ed è quindi o sostanziale o accidentale, San Tommaso usa con frequenza anche del
termine di esse accidentale23: in modo esplicito l’Angelico attribuisce agli accidenti un esse
accanto a quello della sostanza24, così che si è diffusa fra i tomisti l’opinione che attribuisce agli
accidenti un esse come «actus essendi» in senso proprio, benchè dipendente dall’esse principale
della sostanza. È chiaro, ed è ripetuto in tutte le opere da San Tommaso, che l’esse in senso forte

20
Cf. B. S. LLAMSON, Supposital and Accidental Esse: A Study in Bañez, “The New Scholasticism,” 39 (1965),
pp. 170-188.
21
“Nam accidentis esse est inesse”(In V Metaphys., 9, ed. Cathala-Spiazzi, p. 239, n. 894). Hence an accident has
only a relative and borrowed esse: “Esse enim album non est simpliciter esse, sed secundum quid”(In VII Metaphys.,
1, p. 317, n. 1256). Accidents are not beings, but beings of a being; “non dicuntur simplicter entia, sed entis entia,
sicut qualitas et motus”(In XII Metaphys., 1, p. 568, n. 2419).
22
E. GILSON, Thomism. The Philosophy of Thomas Aquinas, Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, Toronto,
2002, p. 156.
23
«In creaturis per paternitatem additur novum esse quod est esse accidentale, et non idem, quod est esse
subjecti»(In I Sent., d. 21, I, 2; Parm., VI, 181 b; Mand. I, 520). Ver., XXI, 6 ad 9um: «Sicut est aliud esse
substantiale et accidentale, ita constat esse aliam formam substantialem et accidentalem et utraque propium habet
modum et proprium ordinem». E prima: «Sicut ens est quoddam essentiale et quoddam accidentale ita est bonum, et
eodem modo amittit aliquis bonitatem sicut esse substantiale vel accidentale»(Ver. XXI, 1 ad 6um). Ancora: «Forma
substantialis est principium substantialis esse, et accidentalis dat aliquod esse, scilicet accidentale»(In I Sent., d. 32,
q. 11, a. 1, Parm., VI, 261 b; Mand., I, 752). «Omnis forma addens aliquod esse super esse substantiale, facit
compositionem cum substantia et ipsum esse est accidentale, sicut esse albi et nigri»(De Pot., IX, 5 ad 19um). Qui
s’insinua il principio forma dat esse, di cui più avanti. Ho l’impressione che la terminologia di esse accidentale si
dirada negli scritti più maturi.
24
C. G., IV, 14: «In nobis relationes habent esse dependens, quia eorum esse est aliud ab esse substantiae; unde
habent proprium modum essendi secundum propriam rationem, sicut et in aliis accidentibus contingit; quia enim
omnia accidentia sunt formae quaedam superadditae, et a principiis substantiae causatae, oportet quod eorum esse sit
superadditum supra esse substantiae et ab ipso dependens». L’esse di cui si parla qui e nei testi consimili non indica
l’esse come actus essendi, ma l’esse in actu di una forma ovvero l’attuazione che tale forma conferisce al soggetto
nell’àmbito formale ed è in questo senso che San Tommaso, d’accordo con Aristotele, parla di un esse accidentale.

5
– quello che fa composizione reale con l’essenza – è l’atto proprio della sostanza ed è alcune
volte indicato col termine speciale di subsistere, mentre agli accidenti compete l’inesse. L’esse
accidentale quindi è la realtà degli accidenti in quanto sono proprietà e atto o perfezioni della
sostanza individua dalla quale procedono e nella quale sono ricevuti; l’esse dell’accidente è nella
formalità secondaria «realtà di fatto» che i vari attributi e molteplici modificazioni conferiscono
alla sostanza. In altre parole, gli accidenti hanno e dànno un «modus essendi»25 secondo un
contenuto proprio e questo «esse accidentale», che si attua secondo quel plesso-temporale, può
essere detto l’existentia. In senso rigoroso quindi agli accidenti va attribuita al più una esistenza
propria, una propria situazione spazio-temporale, nella sostanza, non un proprio esse come actus
essendi.

“…l’esse in actu corrisponde all’esse essentiae: come all’essenza sostanziale corrisponde

un esse sostanziale, così all’essenza accidentale (la quantità, la qualità, la relazione…)
corrisponde l’esse accidentale.26 Ma l’esse ut actus essendi è il principium subsistendi della
sostanza, grazie al quale tanto l’essenza della sostanza come anche quella degli accidenti sono in
atto e operano nella realtà: l’esse degli accidenti è l’esse in actu nel tutto ch’è la sostanza prima,
è quindi un’esistenza secondaria derivata dalla sostanza reale come un tutto in atto.”27

25
Che si tratti dell’esse essentiae, e non dell’actus essendi, lo si vede chiaramente dall’interpretazione che San
Tommaso dà della definizione aristotelica della «relazione» come predicamento nel Quodl., IX, q. 11, a. 4: U. in
Christo sit una tantum filiatio. Ob. 3: «…Huiusmodi relativa secundum Philosophum in Praedicamentis [cfr. Cat., 7,
6 b 36] sunt quorum esse est ad aliud se habere»: «Dicendum quod in illa Philosophi descriptione esse ponitur pro
ratione essendi, secundum quod definitio dicitur realis secundum genus, quod est esse; unde non oportet quod habeat
esse relatio ex respectu, sed ex causa respectus; ex respectu vero habet propriam rationem generis vel speciei»(ad
3um).
26
Summa Theologiae, III, 77, 1 ad 4um. E prima ancora: «Illud autem proprie dicitur esse, quod habet ipsum esse,
quasi in suo esse subsistens. Unde solae substantiae proprie et vere dicuntur entia; accidens vero non habet esse,
sed eo aliquid est et hac ratione ens dicitur; sicut albedo dicitur ens, quia ea aliquid est album. Et propter hoc dicitur
quod “accidens magis est entis, quam ens”[Metaph., VII, 1, 1028 a 25]. Et eadem est de omnibus aliis formis non
subsistentibus»(Summa Theologiae, I, 90, 2). Questa dottrina non è che una conseguenza del principio della
partecipazione e si trova con ogni chiarezza negli scritti della maturità: cfr. Summa Theologiae, I, 45, 4; I-II, 55, 4 ad
1um; III, 8, 1; Pot., VII, 7 ad 7um. In VII Metaph., lect. I, n. 2157; XI lect. 3, n. 2197; XII, lect. 1, n. 2419: «Ens
dicitur quasi esse habens: hoc autem est solius substantiae». Ancora: «Accidentia entia dicuntur non quia in seipsis
esse habent, sed quia esse eorum est in hoc quod insunt substantiae»(De subst. sep., c. 6, n. 42; Perrier 149: tertia
ratio).
27
C. FABRO, Partecipazione e causalità, SEI, Turin, 1961, pp. 199-201.