De Venecia v Sandiganbayan
for certiorari.
GR 130240, 5 February 2002
Facts: On 12 March 1993, an Information was filed with the
Sandiganbayan against then Congressman Ceferino S.
Paredes, Jr., of Agusan del Sur for violation of Section 3 (e) of
Republic Act 3019 (The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,
as amended). After the accused pleaded not guilty, the
prosecution filed a “Motion to suspend the accused pendente
lite.” In its Resolution, the Sandiganbayan granted the motion
and ordered the Speaker to suspend the accused. But the
Speaker did not comply. Thus, on 12 August 1997, the
Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution requiring him to appear
before it, on 18 August 1997 at 8:00 a.m., to show cause why
he should not be held in contempt of court. Unrelenting, the
Speaker filed, through counsel, a motion for reconsideration,
invoking the rule on separation of powers and claiming that he
can only act as may be dictated by the House as a body
pursuant to House Resolution 116 adopted on 13 August
1997. On 29 August 1997, the Sandiganbayan rendered a
Resolution declaring Speaker Jose C. de Venecia, Jr. in
contempt of court and ordering him to pay a fine of
P10,000.00 within 10 days from notice. Jose de Venecia, Jr.,
in his capacity as Speaker of the House of Representatives;
Roberto P. Nazareno in his capacity as Secretary-General of
the House of Representatives; Jose Ma. Antonio B. Tuaño,
Cashier, House of Representatives; Antonio M. Chan, Chief,
Property Division, House of Representatives, filed the petition
Issue: 1. Whether the suspension provided in the Anti-Graft
law is a penalty or a precautionary measure; and
2. Whether the doctrine of separation of powers
exclude the members of Congress from the mandate of R.A.
3019.
Held: As held in Ceferino S. Paredes, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan
(GR 118354, 8 August 1995), the suspension provided for in
the Anti-Graft law is mandatory and is of different nature and
purpose. It is imposed by the court, not as a penalty, but as a
precautionary measure resorted to upon the filing of valid
Information. As held in Miriam Defensor Santiago v.
Sandiganbayan, et al., the doctrine of separation of powers
does not exclude the members of Congress from the mandate
of RA 3019. The order of suspension prescribed by RA 3019
is distinct from the power of Congress to discipline its own
ranks under the Constitution. The suspension contemplated in
the above constitutional provision is a punitive measure that is
imposed upon a determination by the Senate or the House of
Representatives, as the case may be, upon an erring
member.
Ratio: Its purpose is to prevent the accused public officer
from frustrating his prosecution by influencing witnesses or
tampering with documentary evidence and from committing
further acts of malfeasance while in office. It is thus an
incident to the criminal proceedings before the court. On the
other hand, the suspension or expulsion contemplated in the
Constitution is a House-imposed sanction against its
members. It is, therefore, a penalty for disorderly behavior to
enforce discipline, maintain order in its proceedings, or
vindicate its honor and integrity. The doctrine of separation of
powers by itself may not be deemed to have effectively
excluded members of Congress from Republic Act No. 3019
nor from its sanctions. The maxim simply recognizes that
each of the three co-equal and independent, coordinate,
branches of the government – the Legislative, the Executive
and the Judiciary – has exclusive prerogatives and
cognizance within its own sphere of influence and effectively
prevents one branch from unduly intruding into the internal
affairs of either branch.

Note: Section 16 (3) “Each House may determine the rules of its
proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly behavior, and, with the
concurrence of two-thirds of all its Members, suspend or expel a Member.
A penalty of suspension, when imposed, shall not exceed sixty days.”