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Decena, Leona Mae

De Egurrola, Kevin Marc


Ruiz, Lorenzo
Ungab, Junimark

CASE DIGEST

1.) DONALDSON, SIM & Co. vs. SMITH, BELL, & Co.
G.R. No. 411. April 23, 1902

Facts:

Luis R. Yangco, the property owner of the warehouses and also in this case
the lessor, entered into an agreement with the U.S Military. Yangco objected to
the occupancy of the buildings by the defendants SMITH, BELL, & Co., The
Chief quartermaster of the Military sent a letter to the defendants stating that
the latter has no right of occupancy of the warehouses owned by Yangco and
requested that they be vacated at once. On the 30th of April the lease from
Yangco to the Government was terminated by mutual consent.

Yangco then entered into a one-year lease agreement with Donaldson, Sim &
Co. And the latter then notified defendant Smith, Bell, & Co. that they should
vacate the property to which the defendants declined to do. The court
rendered judgement in favor of the defendants. The plaintiffs appealed.

Issue:

Whether the defendants have failed to perform any duty which they owed to
the plaintiffs.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that Plaintiff had acquired no right to make
Defendants vacate the property because they never acquired the leased
property. This is because Plaintiff has not acquired the prior right of
possession before the occupancy of the defendant. Article 1560 of the Civil
Code discusses invoked by plaintiff discusses that “a lessee can direct action
against the trespasser when such lessee has possession of the property
before such interference by the trespasser.” In this case, the plaintiff cannot
assert a right against defendant because the defendant has prior possession
to the property and the plaintiff never had actual possession of the property.

Plaintiff cannot also invoke Article 1902 where there is a liability for damages
caused by fault or negligence. This is because the defendant has no obligation
whatsoever to the plaintiff in heading their request because there is no privity
or legal relations between the plaintiff and defendant.

The plaintiff’s correct recourse should have been against Yangco, the lessor,
because the lessor failed to remove defendant’s possession of the property
before entering into a lease agreement, and to protect and aid in the lessee’s
right in taking possession of his property made under a mutual agreement of
lease.

2.) HONORIO BULAO vs. COURT OF APPEALS, RTC JUDGE FRANCISCO


VILLARTA and SANTIAGO BELLEZA,
G.R. No. 101983 February 1, 1993

Facts:

Respondent Belleza owns parcels of land that gives a yearly crop of 75 cavans
of rice for each cropping season. Beside such lands has an irrigation ditch that
supplies water for the area. Plaintiff installed a Dam that would divert the flow
of the water in the ditch that resulted to the destruction of the rice plants of the
Respondent because water was no longer going through the ditch beside the
land of the respondent because of the dam maliciously constructed by the
Plaintiff.

Plaintiff avers that the MCTC has no jurisdiction over the case and that the
National Water Resources Council had jurisdiction over the case because it
involved rights on the utilization of water.

Issue:

Whether the National Water Resource Council has jurisdiction over the case.

Held:

The Supreme Court decided that MCTC has jurisdiction because the case is
an action for damages. Even though respondent’s prayer is for the removal of
the dam, this did not yield to the fact that the action was for the damages
because in the Ultimate facts provided in Respondent’s initial complaint, all the
elements of a quasi-delict is present. The acts of the plaintiff caused the
interruption of water passing through petitioner's land towards respondent's
lands, resulting in the destruction of the respondent's rice plants. The
averments of the complaint plainly make out a case of quasi-delict that may be
the basis of an action for damages.

3.) ZENAIDA R. GREGORIO vs. COURT OF APPEALS, SANSIO


PHILIPPINES, INC., and EMMA J. DATUIN,
G.R. No. 179799, September 11, 2009

Facts:

Respondents filed an affidavit of complaint for violation of BP 22 against


petitionerGregorio. Respondents Datuin and Sansio claimed that Gregorio
delivered insufficiently funded bank checks as payment for appliances Alvi
Marketing bought from Sansio. Gregorio was then indicted for three counts of
violation of BP 22 before the MTC. The MTC issued a warrant of arrest and
she was subsequently arrested by armed operatives while visiting her family
house in Quezon City.

Gregorio filed before the MTC a Motion for Deferment of Arraignment and
Re-investigation. She alleged that she could not have issued the bounced
checks as she did not have a checking account with the bank on which the
checks were drawn. This was certified by the manager of the said bank.
Gregorio also alleged that the signature on the bounced checks were radically
and patently different from her own signature. The MTC granted the motion,
and a re-investigation was conducted. Subsequently, the MTC ordered the BP
22 cases dismissed.

On August 18, 2000, Gregorio filed a complaint for damages against


Respondents before the RTC. Part of her complaint was that as a result of her
wrongful arrest and arraignment, she suffered helplessness, hunger and
humiliation and being distraught. Respondents meanwhile filed a Motion to
Dismiss on grounds that Gregorio’s complaint arose from grounds of
compensation arising from malicious prosecution. The RTC denied the Motion
to Dismiss. Respondents then filed a Motion for Reconsideration but was again
denied. They went to the Court of Appeals alleging grave abuse of discretion
on the part of the presiding judge of the RTC in denying their motions to
dismiss and for reconsideration. On January 31, 2007, the CA rendered a
Decision granting the petition and ordering Gregorio’s damage suit to be
dismissed.

Issue:

Whether the complaint, a civil suit filed by Gregorio, is based on quasi-delict or


malicious prosecution.

Held:

The Supereme Court held that Respondents are liable for damages. Among
other reasons, the Supreme Court decided that Gregorio’s rights to personal
dignity, personal security, privacy, and peace of mind were infringed by
Respondents when they failed to exercise the requisite diligence in
determining the identity of the person, they should rightfully accuse of
tendering insufficiently funded checks. Because she was not able to refute the
charges against her, petitioner was falsely indicted for three (3) counts of
violation of B.P. Blg. 22. Gregorio was conveniently at her city residence while
visiting her family. She suffered embarrassment and humiliation over her
sudden arrest and detention and she had to spend time, effort, and money to
clear her tarnished name and reputation, considering that she had held several
honorable positions in different organizations and offices in the public service,
particularly her being a Kagawad in Oas, Albay at the time of her arrest.
4.) CORINTHIAN GARDENS ASSOCIATION, INC. vs. SPOUSES
REYNALDO and MARIA LUISA TANJANGCO, and SPOUSES FRANK and
TERESITA CUASO
G.R. No. 160795, June 27, 2008

Facts:

Respondents spouses Tanjangco own lots located at Corinthian Gardens


Subdivision. While spouses Cuaso owns lot, which is adjacent to the
Tanjangco’s. Before the Cuasos constructed their house, a relocation survey
was necessary. Corinthian conducted periodic ocular inspections in order to
determine compliance with the the approved plans. After the construction of
the house, their perimeter fence encroached on the lots of Tanjancos.

The Tanjangcos demanded the demolition of the perimeter fence after no


amicable settlement was reached between the parties but the Cuasos failed
and refused to do so. The Tanjangcos’ filed a suit against the Cuasos for
Recovery of Possession with Damages to which the latter filed a third party
complaint against Corinthian for the failure of Paraz to ascertain the proper
specifications of their house and failure of Geodetic Engineer De Dios in
undertaking an accurate location survey of the land and exposing them to
litigation.

Issue:

Whether Corinthian was negligent under the circumstances and such


negligence contributed to the injury suffered by the Tanjangcos.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that Corinthian must be held liable. “The test to
determine the existence of negligence in a particular case may be stated as
follows: Did the defendant in committing the alleged negligent act use that
reasonable care and caution which an ordinary person would have used in the
same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence. The law, in effect, adopts
the standard supplied by the imaginary conduct of the discreet paterfamilias in
Roman law. The existence of negligence in a given case is not determined by
reference to the personal judgment of the actor in the situation before him. The
law considers what would be reckless, blameworthy, or negligent in a man of
ordinary intelligence and prudence, and determines liability according to that
standard.”

By this test, Corinthian was indeed negligent.

5.) PHILIPPINE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION, JUAN D. LIM,


BENJAMIN P. PAULINO, ANTONIO M. MAGTALAS, COL. PEDRO SACRO
and LT. M. SORIANO
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. REGINA ORDOÑEZ-BENITEZ, in her capacity
as Presiding Judge of Branch 47, Regional Trial Court, Manila, SEGUNDA
R. BAUTISTA and ARSENIA D. BAUTISTA
G.R. No. 84698 February 4, 1992

Facts:

A stabbing incident which caused the death of Carlitos Bautista on the


premises of the Philippine School of Business Administration (PSBA)
prompted the parents of the deceased to file for damages against the said
PSBA and its corporate officers. At the time of his death, Carlitos was enrolled
in the third-year commerce course at the PSBA. It was established that his
assailants were not members of the school's academic community but were
elements from outside the school.

The private respondents sought to adjudge PSBA liable for the victim's
untimely demise due to their alleged negligence, recklessness and lack of
security precautions, means and methods before, during and after the attack
on the victim.

Petitioners sought to have the suit dismissed, alleging that since they are
presumably sued under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, the complaint states no
cause of action against them, as jurisprudence on the subject is to the effect
that academic institutions, such as the PSBA, are beyond the ambit of the rule
in the afore-stated article.

The respondent trial court overruled petitioners' contention and denied their
motion to dismiss. Petitioners then assailed the trial court's disposition before
the respondent appellate court which affirmed the trial court's orders. Hence,
this petition.

Issue:

Whether or not PSBA may be held liable under quasi-delicts.

Held:

When an academic institution accepts students for enrollment, there is


established a contract between them, resulting in bilateral obligations which
both parties are bound to comply with.

Because the circumstances of the present case evince a contractual relation


between the PSBA and Carlitos Bautista, the rules on quasi-delict do not really
govern. A perusal of Article 2176 shows that obligations arising from
quasi-delicts or tort, also known as extra-contractual obligations, arise only
between parties not otherwise bound by contract, whether express or implied.

In the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, however, there is, as yet, no
finding that the contract between the school and Bautista had been breached
thru the former's negligence in providing proper security measures. This would
be for the trial court to determine. And, even if there be a finding of negligence,
the same could give rise generally to a breach of contractual obligation only.
The negligence of the school would not be relevant absent a contract. In fact,
that negligence becomes material only because of the contractual relation
between PSBA and Bautista. In other words, a contractual relation is a
condition sine qua non to the school's liability. The negligence of the school
cannot exist independently of the contract, unless the negligence occurs under
the circumstances set out in Article 21 of the Civil Code.

6.) AIR FRANCE vs. RAFAEL CARRASCOSO and the HONORABLE


COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. L-21438, September 28, 1966

Facts:

Air France, through its authorized agent, Philippine Air Lines, Inc., issued to
Carrascoso a "first class" round trip airplane ticket from Manila to Rome. From
Manila to Bangkok, respondent travelled in "first class", but at Bangkok, the
Manager of the airline forced him to vacate the "first class" seat that he was
occupying because, in the words of the witness Ernesto G. Cuento, there was a
"white man", who, the Manager alleged, had a "better right" to the seat. When
asked to vacate his "first class" seat, Carrascoso, as was to be expected,
refused, and told defendant's Manager that his seat would be taken over his
dead body; a commotion ensued.

Carrascoso filed for moral damages, averring in his complaint the contract of
carriage between Air France and himself. Air France claims that to authorize
an award for moral damages there must be an averment of fraud or bad faith,
upon which Carrascoso’s complaint is silent.

Issue:

Whether Carrascoso is entitled to the first-class seat he claims.

Held:

The foregoing substantially aver: First, that there was a contract to furnish
plaintiff a first class passage covering, amongst others, the Bangkok-Teheran
leg; Second, That said contract was breached when petitioner failed to furnish
first class transportation at Bangkok; and Third, That there was bad faith when
petitioner’s employee compelled Carrascoso to leave his first class
accommodation berth “after he was already seated” and to take a seat in the
tourist class, by reason of which he suffered inconvenience, embarrassment
and humiliation, thereby causing him mental anguish, serious anxiety,
wounded feelings and social humiliation, resulting in moral damages.

In this case, the responsibility of an employer for the tortious act of its
employees need not be essayed. It is well settled in law. For the willful
malevolent act of petitioner's manager, petitioner, his employer, must answer.
Article 21 of the Civil Code says:
ART. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a
manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damage.

A contract to transport passengers is quite different in kind and degree from any
other contractual relation. And this, because of the relation which an air-carrier
sustains with the public. Its business is mainly with the travelling public. It
invites people to avail of the comforts and advantages it offers. The contract of
air carriage, therefore, generates a relation attended with a public duty. Neglect
or malfeasance of the carrier's employees, naturally, could give ground for an
action for damages.

Passengers do not contract merely for transportation. They have a right to be


treated by the carrier's employees with kindness, respect, courtesy and due
consideration. They are entitled to be protected against personal misconduct,
injurious language, indignities and abuses from such employees. So it is, that
any rule or discourteous conduct on the part of employees towards a
passenger gives the latter an action for damages against the carrier.

Petitioner's contract with Carrascoso is one attended with public duty. The
stress of Carrascoso's action as we have said, is placed upon his wrongful
expulsion. This is a violation of public duty by the petitioner air carrier — a case
of quasi-delict. Damages are proper.

Exemplary damages are well awarded. The Civil Code gives the court ample
power to grant exemplary damages — in contracts and quasi- contracts. The
only condition is that defendant should have "acted in a wanton, fraudulent,
reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner." The manner of ejectment of
respondent Carrascoso from his first-class seat fits into this legal precept. And
this, in addition to moral damages.

SYNTHESIS

In the case of Donaldson vs. Smith, Article 1902 of the Civil Code, relied
upon by the plaintiffs, established the general principle of liability for damage
caused by fault or negligence, but there can be no fault or negligence where,
as in the present case, there was no obligation resting upon the person
causing the damage to exercise diligence as respects the injured person.

In the case of Bulao vs. CA, A quasi-delict has the following elements: a) the
damage suffered by the plaintiff; b) the act or omission of the defendant
supposedly constituting fault or negligence; and c) the causal connection
between the act and the damage sustained by the plaintiff.

All these elements are set out in the private respondent's complaint thereof.
The damage claimed to have been sustained by private respondents consists
of his loss of harvest and consequent loss of income. The act constituting the
fault is the alleged malicious construction of a dam and diversion of the flow of
water by the petitioner. The said acts allegedly caused the interruption of water
passing through petitioner's land towards respondent's lands, resulting in the
destruction of the respondent's rice plants. The averments of the complaint
plainly make out a case of quasi-delict that may be the basis of an action for
damages.

The Court also notes that the title of the complaint is "Civil Case
No. 70 — Damages." Although not necessarily determinative of the nature of
the action, it would nevertheless indicate that what the private respondent
contemplated was an action for damages.

In Gregorio vs CA, the Supreme Court decided that Gregorio’s rights to


personal dignity, personal security, privacy, and peace of mind were infringed
by Respondents when they failed to exercise the requisite diligence in
determining the identity of the person, they should rightfully accuse of
tendering insufficiently funded checks. Because she was not able to refute the
charges against her, petitioner was falsely indicted for three (3) counts of
violation of B.P. Blg. 22. Gregorio was conveniently at her city residence while
visiting her family. She suffered embarrassment and humiliation over her
sudden arrest and detention and she had to spend time, effort, and money to
clear her tarnished name and reputation, considering that she had held several
honorable positions in different organizations and offices in the public service,
particularly her being a Kagawad in Oas, Albay at the time of her arrest.

The case of CORINTHIAN GARDEN ASSOCIATION vs. TANJANGCO held


that the test to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case may
be stated as follows: Did the defendant in committing the alleged negligent act
use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinary person would have
used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence. The law, in
effect, adopts the standard supplied by the imaginary conduct of the discreet
paterfamilias in Roman law. The existence of negligence in a given case is not
determined by reference to the personal judgment of the actor in the situation
before him. The law considers what would be reckless, blameworthy, or
negligent in a man of ordinary intelligence and prudence, and determines
liability according to that standard.

Because the circumstances of the PSBA vs CA evince a contractual relation


between the PSBA and Carlitos Bautista, the rules on quasi-delict do not really
govern. A perusal of Article 2176 shows that obligations arising from
quasi-delicts or tort, also known as extra-contractual obligations, arise only
between parties not otherwise bound by contract, whether express or implied.
However, this impression has not prevented this Court from determining the
existence of a tort even when there obtains a contract. In Air France
vs. Carrascoso, the private respondent was awarded damages for his
unwarranted expulsion from a first-class seat aboard the petitioner airline. It is
noted, however, that the Court referred to the petitioner-airline's liability as one
arising from tort, not one arising from a contract of carriage. In effect, Air
France is authority for the view that liability from tort may exist even if there is a
contract, for the act that breaks the contract may be also a tort.
Air France penalized the racist policy of the airline which emboldened the
petitioner's employee to forcibly oust the private respondent to cater to the
comfort of a white man who allegedly "had a better right to the seat."

From the foregoing, it can be concluded that should the act which breaches a
contract be done in bad faith and be violative of Article 21, then there is a
cause to view the act as constituting a quasi-delict.

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