PROBLEM AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS
BASED ON THE LECTURES OF ATTY ARNOLD ABEJARON
2019 MANRESA III
February 18, 2019
CHRISTINE JOY BERMUDO
IMPRESCRIPTIBILITY OF DISBARMENT
PROCEEDINGS
BOBIE ROSE V. FRIAS vs. ATTY. CARMELITA S.
BAUTISTA-LOZADA (May 4, 2006)
One of the defenses raised by the lawyer here is
that the complaint against here already
prescribed.
Issue: W/N disbarment proceedings against
lawyers will prescribe.
Ruling: NO
Rule VIII, Section 1 of the Rules of Procedure of
the CBD-IBP –
“SECTION 1. Prescription. A complaint
for disbarment, suspension or discipline
of attorneys prescribes in two (2) years
from the date of the professional
misconduct.”
The SC said that this rule which provides for a
prescriptive period for the filing of
administrative complaints against lawyers runs
afoul of the settled ruling of the Supreme
Court. It is void and of no legal effect for being
ultra vires.
Prevailing: An administrative complaint
against a member of the bar does not
prescribe.
If the rule were otherwise, members of the bar
would be emboldened to disregard the very
oath they took as lawyers, rescinding from the
fact that as long as no private complainant
would immediately come forward, they stand
a chance of being completely exonerated
from whatever administrative liability they
ought to answer for. It is the duty of this Court
to protect the integrity of the practice of law
as well as the administration of justice. No
matter how much time has elapsed from the
time of the commission of the act complained
of and the time of the institution of the
complaint, erring members of the bench and
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bar cannot escape the disciplining arm of the
Court.
This categorical pronouncement is aimed at
unscrupulous members of the bench and bar,
to deter them from committing acts which
violate the Code of Professional Responsibility,
the Code of Judicial Conduct, or the Lawyer’s
Oath. x x x
Thus, even the lapse of considerable time from
the commission of the offending act to the
institution of the administrative complaint will
not erase the administrative culpability of a
lawyer.
One of the bases of the SC in ruling that this Rule
is unconstitutional for being ultra vires on the part
of the Committee on Bar Discipline is that it
deprived the SC of its constitutional power to
regulate the practice of law.
But of course, apart from that, you have to
remember that if you limit or if you put restrictive
period to wrong doings of a counsel a lawyer, in
a way you defeat the purpose or the essence of
the requirement of Continuing Good Moral
Character because it can be an escape goat of
a lawyer who commits a wrongdoing.
It would be against public policy requiring
lawyers to be in good moral standing not just
before admission to the Bar but as well as after
admission.
In fact, even Affidavits of Desistance is worthless
when you talk of administrative proceedings
against lawyers. If you really want to avoid any
problem, you have to settle the case even
before an administrative case is filed. Because
once an administrative case is filed against the
lawyer, even if the party-complainant would file
an affidavit of desistance, the court can still
continue investigating the case and imposed the
sanction which it deems appropriate against the
lawyer. Tingnan nila kung talaga naming may
mali na ginawa.
In relation to this, there’s also another case where
the court ruled that the power of the IBP when
they conduct investigation of cases is only
recommendatory when it comes to dismissal.
Dati kasi, the IBP itself can dismiss the case. So
ang ginawa ng SC is binago ang rules. So the
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 PROBLEM AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS
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ultimate decision whether to dismiss the case or
not lies with the SC.
CONFLICT OF INTEREST
NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY, INC., and BEN A.
NICOLAS, vs. Atty. MACARIO D. ARQUILLO
(August 2, 2005)
Northwestern University, Inc. and Mr. Ben A.
Nicolas, accuses Atty. Macario D. Arquillo, of
engaging in conflicting interest in a case
before the National Labor Relations
Commission, Regional Arbitration Branch No. 1,
San Fernando, La Union. Allegedly Atty.
Arquillo appeared and acted as counsels for
both complainants (eight out of the eighteen
complainants therein) and respondent (one
out of the ten respondents therein). For
instance, a motion to dismiss was filed by Jose
de Castro, whose counsel was Atty. Arquillo. As
the counsel of the complainants, he had the
duty to oppose the very same motion to
dismiss filed also by his client, Jose de Castro.
Atty. Arquillo had the duty to prove the
Complaint wrong but cannot do this because
he is also the counsel for the complainants.
Issue: Was there a conflict of interest?
Ruling: Yes.
The circumstances involving the motion to
dismiss show the inconsistency. The
inconsistency of interests is very clear. The
attorney in that situation will not be able to
pursue, with vigor and zeal, the clients claim
against the other and to properly represent the
latter in the unrelated action, or, if he can do
so, he cannot avoid being suspected by the
defeated client of disloyalty or partiality in
favor of the successful client. The foregoing
considerations will strongly tend to deprive the
relation of attorney and client of those special
elements which make it one of trust and
confidence. Representing conflicting interests
is prohibited by the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Unless all the affected clients
written consent is given after a full disclosure of
all relevant facts, attorneys guilty of
representing conflicting interests shall as a rule
be sanctioned with suspension from the
practice of law.
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TESTS for presence of CONFLICTS OF INTEREST:
When a lawyer represents two or more
opposing parties, there is a conflict of interests,
the existence of which is determined by three
separate tests:
(1) when, in representation of one client, a
lawyer is required to fight for an issue or claim,
but is also dutybound to oppose it for another
client;
(2) when the acceptance of the new retainer
will require an attorney to perform an act that
may injuriously affect the first client or, when
called upon in a new relation, to use against
the first one any knowledge acquired through
their professional connection; or
(3) when the acceptance of a new relation
would prevent the full discharge of an
attorneys duty to give undivided fidelity and
loyalty to the client or would invite suspicion of
unfaithfulness or double dealing in the
performance of that duty.
So what is required of the lawyer to be exempt or
to be able to handle a case where there exists
conflict of interest?
a. There has to be a written consent from
all parties concerned; and
b. It is given after full disclosure of the
facts involved.
So before accepting an engagement, the first
thing to do is to determine whether there exist
conflict of interest. So if ever medyo debatable
ung situation, such as in this case, kay Atty.
Arquillo then the most logical and the safest thing
to do is to secure the written consent of all the
parties concerned to be given after full
disclosure of facts.
This is also provided under the Code of
Professional Responsibilities –
Rule 15.03. - A lawyer shall not represent
conflicting interests except by written consent of
all concerned given after a full disclosure of the
facts.
Penalty meted: Suspension
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2019 MANRESA III
So can you just imagine na kung gagawa ka ng
paper/pleading for the complainant then at the
same time, you will also be preparing a position
paper to argue against yourself. Para kang may
identity crisis or double personality. You should
learn to say “NO”.
SPOUSES MAKADAYA SADIK and USODAN SADIK
vs. JUDGE ABDALLAH CASAR
Judge Casar (respondent) represented
Spouses Sadik as beneficiaries of Lekiya Paito
when he was still in private practice. It was a
case for specific performance in relation to
Spouses Sadik’s insurance claim.
When the court rendered judgment on the
case, Casar was already a member of the
judiciary, serving as the Presiding Judge of the
5th Municipal Circuit Trial Court of
KolambuganMaigo (*Not the court handling
the specific performance). Nevertheless,
Judge Casar continued to represent the Sadiks
when the case was brought to the Court of
Appeals and Supreme Court. Eventually the
Insurance Company agreed to pay to the
Sadiks the judgment award. It was Judge
Casar who received 1 Santos v. Beltran, 418
SCRA 17, December 11, 2003 as cited in the
Northwestern case the judgment award in the
amount of 30,000 pesos. However, Casar
retained the award instead of handling it to
the Sadiks. He reasoned that he has the right
to retain the same until he is paid for his
expenses pursuant to Sec. 37, Rule 138 of the
Rules of Court. Thus, the Spouses Sadik
charged Judge Abdallah Casar, with
misconduct and misappropriation.
It has to be noted that in the abovementioned
specific performance case, Atty. Casar also
deliberately, knowingly and willfully agreed to
procure a substitute witness, an impostor, to
pose as claimant Makadaya Sadik and testify
in the case. He even proposed that such
witness be paid P5,000.00. And he actually
presented such witness as Makadaya Sadik in
that case and that impostor is the Makadaya
Sadik who is the complainant in this case.
Issue: Is the act of Judge Casar in serving as a
counsel while already an active municipal
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court judge a violation of the Code of Judicial
Conduct and of the Lawyer’s Oath?
Ruling: Yes.
Respondent judge proved himself repeatedly
unworthy of his post.
The records show that even after he became
judge, respondent acted as counsel for herein
complainants and misappropriated the
judgment award of P30,000.00 which rightfully
belongs to complainants. Moreover,
respondent's line of defense revealed a
significant and deplorable flaw in his
character. In hoping to redeem himself, he
categorically admitted that he deliberately,
knowingly and willfully agreed to handle a
case involving a fraudulent insurance claim
and in the process procured and presented
false witnesses in court. Under the
circumstances, this Court is amazed at how
brazen respondent has comported himself
and without compunction at leaving a "paper
trail" behind him.
He violated Rule 5:07 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct which states that –
“A judge shall not engage in the
private practice of law.”
He likewise violated the Attorney's Oath in
agreeing to file a civil case for the purpose of
claiming the insurance proceeds from
Grepalife despite his having been informed
that the insurance policy of Lekiya Paito was
fraudulently applied for. Agreeing to handle
the claim said to have arisen from a fraudulent
act against the insurer certainly speaks of a
moral flaw in his character.
It must be borne in mind that courts exist to
dispense and to promote justice. However, the
reality of justice depends, above all, on the
intellectual, moral and personal quality of the
men and women who are called to serve as
our judges.
Indeed, to be effective in his role, a judge must
be a man of exceptional integrity and honesty.
The special urgency for requiring these
qualities in a judge is not hard to understand
for the judge acts directly upon the property,
liberty, even life, of his countrymen. Hence,
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being in a position of such grave responsibility
in the administration of justice, a judge must
conduct himself in a manner befitting the
dignity of such exalted office.
Supposed to be, what is the rule when you are a
lawyer and subsequently you are appointed as a
trial judge or a justice of the court?
So automatically, you are no longer allowed to
engage in private practice of law.
BENEDICTO HORNILLA and ATTY. FEDERICO D.
RICAFORT vs. ATTY.ERNESTO S. SALUNAT
Benedicto Hornilla and Federico Ricafort were
members of the Philippine Public School
Teachers Association (PPSTA). In 1997, they
accused the Board of Directors of PPSTA of
unlawfully spending the funds of PPSTA.
However, since the PPSTA was not initiating a
complaint against the Board of Directors, the
two then filed a suit on behalf of PPSTA against
the Board of PPSTA. In the said suit, the Board
of Directors was represented by Atty. Ernesto
Salunat.
Hornilla et al were against the legal
representation being made by Salunat for and
on behalf of the Board of Directors because of
the fact that Salunat is part of the ASSA Law
Office WHICH is also the retained law firm of
the PPSTA. In short, Hornilla et. Al. alleged that
there is conflict of interests.
Issue: Can a lawyer engaged by a corporation
defend members of the board of the same
corporation in a derivative suit?
Ruling: No. The possibility for conflict of interest
here is universally recognized.
Although early cases found joint
representation permissible where no conflict of
interest was obvious, the emerging rule is
against dual representation in all derivative
actions. Outside counsel must thus be retained
to represent one of the defendants. The cases
and ethics opinions differ on whether there
must be separate representation from the
outset or merely from the time the corporation
seeks to take an active role. Furthermore, this
restriction on dual representation should not
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be waivable by consent in the usual way; the
corporation should be presumptively
incapable of giving valid consent.
There is conflict of interest when a lawyer
represents inconsistent interests of two or more
opposing parties. The test is "whether or not in
behalf of one client, it is the lawyer’s duty to
fight for an issue or claim, but it is his duty to
oppose it for the other client. In brief, if he
argues for one client, this argument will be
opposed by him when he argues for the other
client."
This rule covers not only cases in which
confidential communications have been
confided, but also those in which no
confidence has been bestowed or will be
used.
Also, there is conflict of interests if the
acceptance of the new retainer will require
the attorney to perform an act which will
injuriously affect his first client in any matter in
which he represents him and also whether he
will be called upon in his new relation to use
against his first client any knowledge acquired
through their connection.
Another test of the inconsistency of interests is
whether the acceptance of a new relation will
prevent an attorney from the full discharge of
his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his
client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or
double dealing in the performance thereof.
In this case, the records show that SEC Case
No. 05-97-5657, entitled "Philippine Public
School Teachers Assn., Inc., et al. v. 1992-1995
Board of Directors of the Philippine Public
School Teachers Assn. (PPSTA), et al.," was filed
by the PPSTA against its own Board of Directors.
Respondent admits that the ASSA Law Firm, of
which he is the Managing Partner, was the
retained counsel of PPSTA. Yet, he appeared
as counsel of record for the respondent Board
of Directors in the said case. Clearly,
respondent was guilty of conflict of interest
when he represented the parties against
whom his other client, the PPSTA, filed suit.
In his Answer, respondent argues that he only
represented the Board of Directors in OMB
Case No. 0-97-0695. In the said case, he filed a
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 PROBLEM AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS
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Manifestation of Extreme Urgency wherein he
prayed for the dismissal of the complaint
against his clients, the individual Board
Members. By filing the said pleading, he
necessarily entered his appearance therein.
Again, this constituted conflict of interests,
considering that the complaint in the
Ombudsman, albeit in the name of the
individual members of the PPSTA, was brought
in behalf of and to protect the interest of the
corporation.
It has to be noted that this case involves a
derivative suit.
“Where corporate directors have
committed a breach of trust either by
their frauds, ultra vires acts, or
negligence, and the corporation is
unable or unwilling to institute suit to
remedy the wrong, a stockholder may
sue on behalf of himself and other
stockholders and for the benefit of the
corporation, to bring about a redress of
the wrong done directly to the
corporation and indirectly to the
stockholders.”
This is what is known as a Derivative Suit.
Settled is the doctrine that in a derivative suit, the
corporation is the real party in interest while the
stockholder filing suit for the corporation’s behalf
is only nominal party. The corporation should be
included as a party in the suit.
So in the case of a derivative suit, it is clear that a
lawyer cannot represent the BOD because the
real party in interest is the corporation.
Hindi lang sa corporation noh. It will also apply in
a case involving the union and its members when
the members will sue the officers of the union on
behalf of the union itself. In such case, the party
in interest is not really the member but the
juridical entity that they seek to protect.
So what must the lawyer do in this situation?
1. Withdraw as the counsel of the other
party and be retained by only one of the parties
in the case; or
2. Secure the written consent of all
concerned after a full disclosure of the facts.
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So this is also for the protection of the lawyer
himself.
JOSEFINA M. ANIÑON vs. ATTY. CLEMENCIO
SABITSANA, JR
Aninon filed a disbarment case against Atty.
Sabitsana.
Atty Sabitsana’s legal services were initially
engaged by Josefina M. Aniñon
(complainant) to protect her interest over a
certain property. The records show that upon
the legal advice of Atty. Sabitsana, the Deed
of Sale over the property was prepared and
executed in the complainant’s favor. Atty.
Sabitsana met with Zenaida Cañete to discuss
the latter’s legal interest over the property
subject of the Deed of Sale. At that point, Atty.
Sabitsana already had knowledge that
Zenaida Cañete’s interest clashed with the
complainant’s interests.
Despite the knowledge of the clashing
interests between his two clients, Atty.
Sabitsana accepted the engagement from
Zenaida Cañete. Atty. Sabitsana’s actual
knowledge of the conflicting interests
between his two clients was demonstrated by
his own actions: first, he filed a case against the
complainant in behalf of Zenaida Cañete;
second, he impleaded the complainant as the
defendant in the case; and third, the case he
filed was for the annulment of the Deed of Sale
that he had previously prepared and
executed for the complainant.
In a resolution dated February 27, 2004, the IBP
Board of Governors resolved to adopt and
approve the Report and Recommendation of
the IBP Commissioner after finding it to be fully
supported by the evidence on record and
Respondent was suspended from the practice
of law for a period of one year. Atty. Sabitsana
moved to reconsider the above resolution, but
the IBP Board of Governors denied his motion.
Issue: Whether Atty. Sabitsana is guilty of
misconduct for representing conflicting
interests.
Ruling: Yes. By his acts, not only did Atty.
Sabitsana agree to represent one client
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against another client in the same action; he
also accepted a new engagement that
entailed him to contend and oppose the
interest of his other client in a property in which
his legal services had been previously
retained.
The relationship between a lawyer and his/her
client should ideally be imbued with the
highest level of trust and confidence. This is the
standard of confidentiality that must prevail to
promote a full disclosure of the client’s most
confidential information to his/her lawyer for
an unhampered exchange of information
between them.
Needless to state, a client can only entrust
confidential information to his/her lawyer
based on an expectation from the lawyer of
utmost secrecy and discretion; the lawyer, for
his part, is duty-bound to observe candor,
fairness and loyalty in all dealings and
transactions with the client.
Part of the lawyer’s duty in this regard is to
avoid representing conflicting interests, a
matter covered by Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility.
"The proscription against representation of
conflicting interests applies to a situation
where the opposing parties are present clients
in the same action or in an unrelated action."
The prohibition also applies even if the "lawyer
would not be called upon to contend for one
client that which the lawyer has to oppose for
the other client, or that there would be no
occasion to use the confidential information
acquired from one to the disadvantage of the
other as the two actions are wholly unrelated."
EXCEPTION: By written consent of all
concerned given after a full disclosure of the
facts.
*For the exception to apply, there must be a
full disclosure of the facts (that he will be
representing a party which might lead to a
conflict of interest) to both of the clients.
The conflicting interests here are:
- The deed of sale was actually prepared
by Atty. Sabitsana for the benefit of
Aninon, the common law wife.
- The wife also engaged the services of
Atty. Sabitsana filed a civil case against
Aninon for the purpose of nullifying the
deed of sale.
Di ba buang ka? You prepared the deed of
conveyance, the deed of sale, and then you are
the same person who will attack/annul the very
same instrument which you prepared.
As a lawyer, kung gagawa ka ng deed of sale,
ano ang dapat una sinisiguro mo to avoid mga
suspicions?
To make sure that the document is fair and
airtight. Meaning, it cannot be subject to any
attack.
So since you prepared the very same document
then more or less alam mo kung ano ung butas
ng document na iyan.
Atty. Sabitsana here is guilty of conflict of interest.
The exception does not apply.

To be held accountable under this rule, it is

"enough that the opposing parties in one case,
one of whom would lose the suit, are present
clients and the nature or conditions of the
lawyer’s respective retainers with each of
them would affect the performance of the
duty of undivided fidelity to both clients."

RULE: A lawyer shall not represent conflicting

interests.

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SAMSON VS ERA
An attorney who wittingly represents and
serves conflicting interests may be suspended
from the practice of law, or even disbarred
when circumstances so warrant.
Samson and his relatives were among the
investors who fell prey to the pyramiding scam
perpetrated by ICS Corporation, a corporation
whose corporate officers were led by Sison.
Samson engaged Atty. Era to represent and
assist him and his relatives in the criminal
prosecution of Sison and her group. Pursuant
to the engagement, Atty. Era prepared the
demand letter dated July 19, 2002 demanding
the return or refund of the money subject of
their complaints. He also prepared the
complaint-affidavit that Samson signed and
swore to on July 26, 2002. Subsequently, the
complaint-affidavit charging Sison and the
other corporate officials of ICS Corporation
with several counts of estafa was presented to
the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon
City (OCPQC). After the preliminary
investigation, the OCPQC formally charged
Sison and the others with several counts
of estafa.
In April 2003, Atty. Era called a meeting with
Samson and his relatives to discuss the
possibility of an amicable settlement with Sison
and her cohorts. He told Samson and the
others that undergoing a trial of the cases
would just be a waste of time, money and
effort for them, and that they could settle the
cases with Sison and her group, with him
guaranteeing the turnover to them of a
certain property located in Antipolo City
belonging to ICS Corporation in exchange for
their desistance. They acceded and executed
the affidavit of desistance he prepared, and in
turn they received a deed of assignment
executed by Sison in behalf of ICS Corporation.
Samson and his relatives later demanded from
Atty. Era that they be given instead a deed of
absolute sale to enable them to liquidate the
property among themselves. It took some
period of negotiations between them and
Atty. Era before the latter delivered to them
copies of a deed of absolute sale involving the
property. However, Atty. Era told them that
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whether or not the title of the property had
been encumbered or free from lien or defect
would no longer be his responsibility. He further
told them that as far as he was concerned he
had already accomplished his professional
responsibility towards them upon the amicable
settlement of the cases between them and ICS
Corporation.
However, they could not liquidate the
property because it was no longer registered
under the name of ICS Corporation but was
already under the name of Bank Wise
Inc. Upon their urging, Atty. Era negotiated as
their counsel with ICS Corporation.
During the hearings in the RTC, Atty. Era did not
anymore appear for Samson and his group.
This forced them to engage another lawyer.
They were shocked to find out later on,
however, that Atty. Era had already been
entering his appearance as the counsel for
Sison in her other criminal cases.
Atty. Era alleged that the conclusion on April
23, 2002 of the compromise settlement
between Samson and his group, on one hand,
and Sison and her ICS Corporation, on the
other, had terminated the lawyer-client
relationship between him and Samson and his
group; and that on September 1, 2003, he had
been appointed as counsel de officio for Sison
by Branch 102 of the RTC in Quezon City only
for purposes of her arraignment.
IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD)
found Atty. Era guilty of misconduct for
representing conflicting interests, for failing to
serve his clients with competence and
diligence, and for failing to champion his
clients' cause with wholehearted fidelity, care
and devotion.
ISSUE
Whether or not Atty Era violated the CPR.
YES
Samson charged Atty. Era with violating
Canon 15 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility for representing conflicting
interests by accepting the responsibility of
representing Sison in the cases similar to those
in which he had undertaken to represent
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Samson and his group, notwithstanding that
Sison was the very same person whom Samson
and his group had accused with Atty. Era's
legal assistance. He had drafted the demand
letters and the complaint-affidavit that
became the bases for the filing of
the estafa charges against Sison and the
others in the RTC in Quezon City.
Atty. Era's contention that the lawyer-client
relationship ended when Samson and his
group entered into the compromise
settlement with Sison on April 23, 2002 was
unwarranted.
The lawyer-client relationship did not terminate
as of then, for the fact remained that he still
needed to oversee the implementation of the
settlement as well as to proceed with the
criminal cases until they were dismissed or
otherwise concluded by the trial court. It is also
relevant to indicate that the execution of a
compromise settlement in the criminal cases
did not ipso facto cause the termination of the
cases not only because the approval of the
compromise by the trial court was still required,
but also because the compromise would
have applied only to the civil aspect, and
excluded the criminal aspect pursuant to
Article 2034 of the Civil Code.
Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility provides that: "A
lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests
except by written consent of all concerned
given after a full disclosure of the facts." Atty.
Era thus owed to Samson and his group entire
devotion to their genuine interest, and warm
zeal in the maintenance and defense of their
rights.[25] He was expected to exert his best
efforts and ability to preserve the clients'
cause, for the unwavering loyalty displayed to
his clients likewise served the ends of justice.
lawyer should not do anything that will
injuriously affect his former client in any matter
in which the lawyer previously represented the
client. Nor should the lawyer disclose or use
any of the client's confidences acquired in the
previous relation. In this regard, Canon 17 of
the Code of Professional
Responsibility expressly declares that: "A
lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client
and he shall be mindful of the trust and
confidence reposed in him."
The lawyer's highest and most unquestioned
duty is to protect the client at all hazards and
costs even to himself. The protection given to
the client is perpetual and does not cease with
the termination of the litigation, nor is it
affected by the client's ceasing to employ the
attorney and retaining another, or by any other
change of relation between them. It even
survives the death of the client.
In the absence of the express consent from
Samson and his group after full disclosure to
them of the conflict of interest, therefore, the
most ethical thing for Atty. Era to have done
was either to outrightly decline representing
and entering his appearance as counsel for
Sison, or to advice Sison to engage another
lawyer for herself. Unfortunately, he did neither,
and should now suffer the proper sanction.

Contrary to Atty. Era's ill-conceived attempt to

explain his disloyalty to Samson and his group,
the termination of the attorney-client
relationship does not justify a lawyer to
represent an interest adverse to or in conflict
with that of the former client. The spirit behind
this rule is that the client's confidence once
given should not be stripped by the mere
expiration of the professional employment.
Even after the severance of the relation, a

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BUTED AND BOLISAY VS ATTY
HERNANDO
Atty. Hernando was counsel for Luciana
Abadilla and Angela Buted for a partition case
of the late Teofilo Buted’s lot. He successfully
defended the case. When Luciana died,
Hernando withdrew appearance. Luciana
once sold the property to Benito Bolisay but it
appears that the TCT was issued to the Sy
couple.
Upon filing specific performance, Bolisay got
Atty. Hernando to represent him (free of
charge). They succeeded in ejecting the
couple. Atty. Hernando claims to have
terminated relationship with Bolisay. In
February 1974, Atty. Hernando filed a petition,
in behalf of Luciana’s heirs without their
consent, to cancel TCT of Bolisay couple over
the lot. The couple filed disapproval. The case
was dismissed for prescription. In August of
1974, Bolisay couple filed an administrative
complaint against Atty. Hernando for having
abused personal secrets obtained by him as
their counsel.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty Hernando had a conflict of
interests
YES
The Supreme Court ruled that Atty. Hernando
had a conflict of interest. In the action for
specific performance, Atty Hernando
defended the Bolisay couple’s right to
ownership but assailed the very same right in
the cadastral proceeding in favor of Luciana’s
heirs.
The Canons of Professional Ethics prohibits
conflicting interests for lawyers. “It is
unprofessional to represent conflicting
interests, except by express consent of all
concerned given after a full disclosure of the
facts. Within the meaning of this canon, a
lawyer represents conflicting interests when, in
behalf of one client, it is his duty to contend for
that which duty to another client requires him
to oppose. The obligation to represent the
client with undivided fidelity and not to divulge
his secrets or confidence forbids also the
subsequent acceptance of retainers or
employment from others in matters adversely
affecting any interest of the client with respect
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to which confidence has been reposed.” And
despite Atty Hernando’s claim that he had
never seen nor taken hold of the Transfer
Certificate of Title or that he divulged any
confidential information belonging to the
Bolisay couple, that the mere fact that
respondent had acted as counsel for Benito
Bolisay in the action for specific performance
should have precluded him from appearing as
counsel for the other side in in the cancellation
of the Transfer Certificate of Title of the
spouses.
There is no necessity for proving the actual
transmission of confidential information to an
attorney in the course of his employment by his
first client in order that he may be precluded
from accepting employment by the second or
subsequent client where there are conflicting
interests between the first and the subsequent
clients. The prohibition on conflict of interest
was designed not only to prevent the
dishonest practitioner from fraudulent
conduct, but as well to protect the honest
lawyer from unfounded suspicion of
unprofessional practice. Although the relation
of attorney and client has terminated, and the
new employment is in a different case; nor can
the attorney use against his former client any
knowledge or information gained through their
former connection.
SUSPENDED for 5 months.
LAWYER-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
RULE ON PRIVILEGED
COMMUNICATION
HADJULA VS MADIANDA
Ma. Luisa Hadjula alleged that she and
respondent used to be friends as they both
worked at the Bureau of Fire Protection (BFP)
whereat respondent was the Chief Legal
Officer while she was the Chief Nurse of the
Medical, Dental and Nursing Services. She
approached respondent for some legal
advice. Complainant further alleged that, in
the course of their conversation which was
supposed to be kept confidential, she
disclosed personal secrets and produced
copies of a marriage contract, a birth
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certificate and a baptismal certificate, only to
be informed later by the respondent that she
(respondent) would refer the matter to a
lawyer friend. It was malicious, so complainant
states, of respondent to have refused handling
her case only after she had already heard her
secrets.
Her friendship with respondent soured after her
filing of criminal and disciplinary actions
against the latter. What, per complainant's
account, precipitated the filing was when
respondent, then a member of the BFP
promotion board, demanded a cellular phone
in exchange for the complainant's promotion.
According to complainant, respondent, in
retaliation to the filing of the aforesaid actions,
filed a COUNTER COMPLAINT charging her
(complainant) with violation of Section 3(a) of
Republic Act No. 3019,4 falsification of public
documents and immorality, the last two
charges being based on the disclosures
complainant earlier made to respondent. And
also on the basis of the same disclosures,
complainant further stated, a disciplinary case
was also instituted against her before the
Professional Regulation Commission.
In an order dated October 2, 2002, the IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline required
respondent to file her answer to the complaint.
In her answer, styled as COUNTER-AFFIDAVIT,5
respondent denied giving legal advice to the
complainant and dismissed any suggestion
about the existence of a lawyer-client
relationship between them. Respondent also
stated the observation that the supposed
confidential data and sensitive documents
adverted to are in fact matters of common
knowledge in the BFP.
Investigating Commissioner of the IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline came out with a
Report and Recommendation, stating that the
information related by complainant to the
respondent is "protected under the attorney-
client privilege communication."
ISSUE
Whether a lawyer-client relationship exists.
YES
A LO | B A JA O | B E RM U D O
Complainant went to respondent, a lawyer
who incidentally was also then a friend, to
bare what she considered personal secrets
and sensitive documents for the purpose of
obtaining legal advice and assistance. The
moment complainant approached the then
receptive respondent to seek legal advice, a
veritable lawyer-client relationship evolved
between the two. Such relationship imposes
upon the lawyer certain restrictions
circumscribed by the ethics of the profession.
Among the burdens of the relationship is that
which enjoins the lawyer, respondent in this
instance, to keep inviolate confidential
information acquired or revealed during legal
consultations. The fact that one is, at the end
of the day, not inclined to handle the client's
case is hardly of consequence. Of little
moment, too, is the fact that no formal
professional engagement follows the
consultation. Nor will it make any difference
that no contract whatsoever was executed by
the parties to memorialize the relationship.
BORBE VS MAGULTA. A lawyer-client
relationship was established from the very first
moment complainant asked respondent for
legal advise regarding the former's business. To
constitute professional employment, it is not
essential that the client employed the attorney
professionally on any previous occasion.
It is not necessary that any retainer be paid,
promised, or charged; neither is it material that
the attorney consulted did not afterward
handle the case for which his service had been
sought.
It a person, in respect to business affairs or
troubles of any kind, consults a lawyer with a
view to obtaining professional advice or
assistance, and the attorney voluntarily
permits or acquiesces with the consultation,
then the professional employments is
established.
Likewise, a lawyer-client relationship exists
notwithstanding the close personal
relationship between the lawyer and the
complainant or the non-payment of the
former's fees.
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Dean Wigmore lists the essential factors to
establish the existence of the attorney-client
privilege communication, viz:
(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought (2)
from a professional legal adviser in his
capacity as such, (3) the communications
relating to that purpose, (4) made in
confidence (5) by the client, (6) are at his
instance permanently protected (7) from
disclosure by himself or by the legal advisor,
(8) except the protection be waived.7
Respondent indeed breached his duty of
preserving the confidence of a client. The
documents shown and the information
revealed in confidence to the respondent in
the course of the legal consultation in
question, were used as bases in the criminal
and administrative complaints lodged against
the complainant.
The purpose of the rule of confidentiality is
actually to protect the client from possible
breach of confidence as a result of a
consultation with a lawyer.
The seriousness of the respondent's offense
notwithstanding, the Court feels that there is
room for compassion, absent compelling
evidence that the respondent acted with ill-
will. Without meaning to condone the error of
respondent's ways, what at bottom is before
the Court is two former friends becoming bitter
enemies and filing charges and counter-
charges against each other using whatever
convenient tools and data were readily
available. Unfortunately, the personal
information respondent gathered from her
conversation with complainant became
handy in her quest to even the score. At the
end of the day, it appears clear to us that
respondent was actuated by the urge to
retaliate without perhaps realizing that, in the
process of giving vent to a negative sentiment,
she was violating the rule on confidentiality.
MERCADO VS VITRIOLO
Mercado filed a complaint against Atty.
Vitriolo, seeking his disbarment for maliciously
instituting a case for falsification of public
document against her based on confidential
A LO | B A JA O | B E RM U D O
information gained from their attorney-client
relationship.
Mercado's husband filed a civil case for
annulment of their marriage with RTC which was
dismissed.
Atty. Anastacio P. de Leon, then counsel
of Mercado, died so Atty. Vitriolo entered
his appearance as collaborating counsel.
It also appears that Atty. Vitriolo filed a criminal
action against Mercado for falsification of
public document for false entries in the
Certificates of Live Birth of her children.
Mercado denied using any other name
than Rosa F. Mercado and insisted that she
has gotten married only once. Mercado
alleged that said criminal complaint disclosed
confidential facts and information relating to
the civil case for annulment, then handled by
the lawyer as her counsel so that the lawyer is
guilty of breaching their privileged and
confidential lawyer-client relationship.
Atty. Vitriolo maintains that his filing of the
criminal complaint does not violate the rule on
privileged communication between attorney
and client because the bases are the two
certificates of live birth which are public
documents and in no way connected with the
confidence taken during his engagement as
counsel.
The IBP Board of Governors approved the
report finding the lawyer guilty of violating the
rule on privileged communication between
attorney and client, and recommending his
suspension from the practice of law for one
(1) year. Upon receiving a copy of the IBP
report and recommendation, Mercado wrote
CJ Davide a letter of desistance however, the
court said that the letter imparting forgiveness
is inconsequential in disbarment proceedings
ISSUE
Whether Atty. Vitriolo violated the rule on
privileged communication between attorney
and client.
NO
In engaging the services of an attorney,
the client reposes on him special powers of
trust and confidence. Their relationship is
strictly personal and highly confidential and
fiduciary. The relation is of such delicate,
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exacting and confidential nature that is
required by necessity and public interest.
On the rule on attorney-client privilege.
the factors essential to establish the existence
of the privilege. (1) There exists an attorney-
client relationship, or a prospective attorney-
client relationship, and it is by reason of this
relationship that the client made the
communication. (2) The client made the
communication in confidence. (3) The legal
advice must besought from the attorney in his
professional capacity.
Applying all these rules to the case at bar, the
evidence on record fails to substantiate
complainants allegations. Mercado did not
even specify the alleged communication
inconfidence disclosed. All her claims
were couched in general terms and lacked
specificity.
She contends that respondent violated the
rule on privileged communication when he
instituted a criminal action against her for
falsification of public documents because the
criminal complaint disclosed facts relating to
the civil case for annulment then handled by
the lawyer but did not spell out these facts
which will determine the merit of
her complaint. The Court cannot be involved
in a guessing game as to the existence of facts
which the complainant must prove.
Indeed, Mercado failed to attend the hearings
at the IBP. Without any testimony as to the
specific confidential information allegedly
divulged without her consent, it is difficult, if not
impossible to determine if there was any
violation of the rule on privileged
communication.
Such confidential information is a crucial link in
establishing a breach of the rule on privileged
communication between attorney and client.
It is not enough to merely assert the attorney-
client privilege. The burden of proving that the
privilege applies is placed upon the
party asserting the privilege.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the complaint against
respondent Atty. Julito D. Vitriolo is hereby
DISMISSED for lack of merit. SO ORDERED.
A LO | B A JA O | B E RM U D O
REGALA, ANGARA VS SANDIGANBAYAN
The Presidential Commission on Good
Government (PCGG), raised a complaint
before the Sandiganbayan (SB) against
Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr. and Teodoro Regala
and his partners in the ACCRA Law Firm, for the
recovery of alleged ill-gotten wealth, which
includes shares of stocks in the named
corporations in PCGG Case No. 33, entitled -
Republic of the Philippines versus Eduardo
Cojuangco, et al.
During the course of the proceedings, PCGG
filed a Motion to Admit Third Amended
Complaint- which excluded private
respondent Raul Roco from the complaint on
his undertaking that he will reveal the identity
of the principal for whom he acted as
nominee/stockholder.
In their answer to the Expanded Amended
Complaint, ACCRA lawyers requested that
PCGG similarly grant the same treatment to
them as accorded Roco. The PCGG has
offered to the lawyers the same conditions
availed of by Roco but they have refused to
disclose the identities of their clients. ACCRA
lawyers filed the petition for certiorari, invoking
that the Honorable Sandiganbayan gravely
abusedits discretion:
a) In subjecting ACCRA lawyers who
acted to the strict application of the
law of agency;
b) In not considering petitioners ACCRA
lawyers and Roco as similarly situated
and therefore, deserving of equal
treatment;
c) In not holding that, under the facts of
this cae, the attorney-client privilege
prohibits petitioners ACCRA lawyers
from revealing the identity of their
client(s) and other information
requested by PCGG;
d) In not requiring that the dropping of
party defendants by the PCGG must
be based on reasonable and just
grounds and with due consideration to
equal protection of the law.
ISSUE
Whether or not client’s identity in a case
involving and acquiring companies allegedly
sourced from ill-gotten wealth is privileged and
disclosure of such is unethical.
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YES
As a matter of public policy, a client's identity
should not be shrouded in mystery. Under this
premise, the general rule in our jurisdiction as
well as in the United States is that a lawyer may
not invoke the privilege and refuse to divulge
the name or identity of this client.
The reasons advanced for the general rule are
well established.
First, the court has a right to know that the
client whose privileged information is
sought to be protected is flesh and blood.
Second, the privilege begins to exist only
after the attorney-client relationship has
been established. The attorney-client
privilege does not attach until there is a
client.
Third, the privilege generally pertains to the
subject matter of the relationship.
Finally, due process considerations require
that the opposing party should, as a
general rule, know his adversary. "A party
suing or sued is entitled to know who his
opponent is." 32 He cannot be obliged to
grope in the dark against unknown forces.
Notwithstanding these considerations, the
general rule is however qualified by some
important exceptions.
1) Client identity is privileged where a
strong probability exists that revealing
the client's name would implicate that
client in the very activity for which he
sought the lawyer's advice.
2) Where disclosure would open the client
to civil liability; his identity is privileged.
3) Where the government's lawyers have
no case against an attorney's client
unless, by revealing the client's name,
the said name would furnish the only
link that would form the chain of
testimony necessary to convict an
individual of a crime, the client's name
is privileged.
Apart from these principal exceptions, there
exist other situations which could qualify as
exceptions to the general rule.
For example, the content of any client
communication to a lawyer lies within the
privilege if it is relevant to the subject matter of
the legal problem on which the client seeks
A LO | B A JA O | B E RM U D O
legal assistance. Moreover, where the nature
of the attorney-client relationship has been
previously disclosed and it is the identity which
is intended to be confidential, the identity of
the client has been held to be privileged, since
such revelation would otherwise result in
disclosure of the entire transaction.
Summarizing these exceptions, information
relating to the identity of a client may fall within
the ambit of the privilege when the client's
name itself has an independent significance,
such that disclosure would then reveal client
confidences.
The circumstances involving the engagement
of lawyers in the case at bench, therefore,
clearly reveal that the instant case falls under
at least two exceptions to the general rule.
First, disclosure of the alleged client's name
would lead to establish said client's
connection with the very fact in issue of the
case, which is privileged information, because
the privilege, as stated earlier, protects the
subject matter or the substance (without
which there would be not attorney-client
relationship).
The link between the alleged criminal offense
and the legal advice or legal service sought
was duly establishes in the case at bar, by no
less than the PCGG itself. The key lies in the
three specific conditions laid down by the
PCGG which constitutes petitioners' ticket to
non-prosecution should they accede thereto:
(a) the disclosure of the identity of its
clients;
(b) submission of documents
substantiating the lawyer-client
relationship; and
(c) the submission of the deeds of
assignment petitioners executed in
favor of their clients covering their
respective shareholdings.
From these conditions, particularly the third,
we can readily deduce that the clients indeed
consulted the petitioners, in their capacity as
lawyers, regarding the financial and corporate
structure, framework and set-up of the
corporations in question. In turn, petitioners
gave their professional advice in the form of,
among others, the aforementioned deeds of
assignment covering their client's
shareholdings.
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There is no question that the preparation of the
aforestated documents was part and parcel
of petitioners' legal service to their clients. More
important, it constituted an integral part of
their duties as lawyers. Petitioners, therefore,
have a legitimate fear that identifying their
clients would implicate them in the very
activity for which legal advice had been
sought, i.e., the alleged accumulation of ill-
gotten wealth in the aforementioned
corporations.
Furthermore, under the third main exception,
revelation of the client's name would obviously
provide the necessary link for the prosecution
to build its case, where none otherwise exists. It
is the link, in the words of Baird, "that would
inevitably form the chain of testimony
necessary to convict the (client) of a . . .
crime."
If we were to sustain respondent PCGG that
the lawyer-client confidential privilege under
the circumstances obtaining here does not
cover the identity of the client, then it would
expose the lawyers themselves to possible
litigation by their clients in view of the strict
fiduciary responsibility imposed on them in the
exercise of their duties.
The complaint in Civil Case No. 0033 alleged
that the defendants therein, including herein
petitioners and Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr.
conspired with each other in setting up
through the use of coconut levy funds the
financial and corporate framework and
structures that led to the establishment of
UCPB, UNICOM and others and that through
insidious means and machinations, ACCRA,
using its wholly-owned investment arm,
ACCRA Investment Corporation, became the
holder of approximately fifteen million shares
representing roughly 3.3% of the total capital
stock of UCPB as of 31 March 1987. The PCGG
wanted to establish through the ACCRA
lawyers that Mr. Cojuangco is their client and
it was Cojuangco who furnished all the monies
to the subscription payment; hence,
petitioners acted as dummies, nominees
and/or agents by allowing themselves, among
others, to be used as instrument in
accumulating ill-gotten wealth through
government concessions, etc., which acts
constitute gross abuse of official position and
authority, flagrant breach of public trust, unjust
A LO | B A JA O | B E RM U D O
enrichment, violation of the Constitution and
laws of the Republic of the Philippines.
By compelling petitioners, not only to reveal
the identity of their clients, but worse, to submit
to the PCGG documents substantiating the
client-lawyer relationship, as well as deeds of
assignment petitioners executed in favor of its
clients covering their respective shareholdings,
the PCGG would exact from petitioners a link
"that would inevitably form the chain of
testimony necessary to convict the (client) of
a crime."
UY CHICO VS THE UNION LIFE ASSURANCE
SOCIETY LTD
The plaintiff seeks to recover the face value of
two insurance policies upon a stock of dry
goods destroyed by fire. It appears that the
father of the plaintiff died in 1897, at which
time he was conducting a business under his
own name, Uy Layco. The plaintiff and his
brother took over the business and continued
it under the same name, "Uy Layco."
Sometime before the date of the fire, the
plaintiff purchased his brother's interest in the
business and continued to carry on the
business under the father's name. At the time
of the fire "Uy Layco" was heavily indebted and
subsequent thereto the creditors of the estate
of the plaintiff's father.
During the course of these proceedings, the
plaintiff's attorney surrendered the policies of
insurance to the administrator of the estate,
who compromised with the insurance
company for one-half their face value, or
P6,000. This money was paid into court and is
now being held by the sheriff. The plaintiff now
brings this action, maintaining that the policies
and goods insured belonged to him and not to
the estate of his deceased father and alleges
that he is not bound by the compromise
effected by the administrator of his father's
estate.
The defendant insurance company sought to
show that the plaintiff had agreed to
compromise settlement of the policies, and for
that purpose introduced evidence showing
that the plaintiff's attorney had surrendered
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the policies to the administrator with the
understanding that such a compromise was to
be effected. The plaintiff was asked, while on
the witness stand, if he had any objection to
his attorney's testifying concerning the
surrender of the policies, to which he replied in
the negative.
The counsel for the plaintiff formally withdrew
the waiver previously given by the plaintiff and
objected to the testimony of the attorney on
the ground that it was privileged. Counsel, on
this appeal, base their argument of the
proposition that a waiver of the client's
privilege may be withdrawn at any time
before acted upon.
ISSUE
Was the testimony in question privileged?
NO
"A lawyer must strictly maintain inviolate the
confidence and preserve the secrets of his
client. He shall not be permitted in any court,
without the consent of his client, given in open
court, to testify to any facts imparted to him by
his client in professional consultation, or for the
purpose of obtaining advice upon legal
matters." (Sec. 31, Act No. 190.)
A similar provision is inserted in section 383, No.
4, of the same Act. It will be noted that the
evidence in question concerned the dealings
of the plaintiff's attorney with a third person. Of
the very essence of the veil of secrecy which
surrounds communications made between
attorney and client, is that such
communications are not intended for the
information of third persons or to be acted
upon by them, put of the purpose of advising
the client as to his rights. It is evident that a
communication made by a client to his
attorney for the express purpose of its being
communicated to a third person is essentially
inconsistent with the confidential relation.
When the attorney has faithfully carried out his
instructions be delivering the communication
to the third person for whom it was intended
and the latter acts upon it, it cannot, by any
reasoning whatever, be classified in a legal
sense as a privileged communication
between the attorney and his client. It is plain
that such a communication, after reaching
A LO | B A JA O | B E RM U D O
the party for whom it was intended at least, is
a communication between the client and a
third person, and that the attorney simply
occupies the role of intermediary or agent. We
quote from but one case among the many
which may be found upon the point:
The proposition advanced by the respondent
that one, after fully authorizing his attorney, as
his agent, to enter into contract with a third
party, and after such authority has been
executed and relied on, may effectively nullify
his own and his duly authorized agent's act by
closing the attorney's mouth as to the giving of
such authority, is most startling. A perilous
facility of fraud and wrong, both upon the
attorney and the third party, would result. The
attorney who, on his client's authority,
contracts in his behalf, pledges his reputation
and integrity that he binds his client. The third
party may well rely on the assurance of a
reputable lawyer that he has authority in fact,
though such assurance be given only by
implication from the doing of the act itself.
It is manifest that the objection to the
testimony of the plaintiff's attorney as to his
authority to compromise was properly
overruled. The testimony was to the effect that
when the attorney delivered the policies to the
administrator, he understood that there was a
compromise to be effected, and that when he
informed the plaintiff of the surrender of the
policies for that purpose the plaintiff made no
objection whatever. The evidence is sufficient
to show that the plaintiff acquiesced in the
compromise settlement of the policies. Having
agreed to the compromise, he cannot now
disavow it and maintain an action for the
recovery of their face value.
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GENATO VS SILAPAN
In this complaint for disbarment filed by William
Ong Genato against respondent Atty. Essex L.
Silapan, complainant alleged that respondent
asked if he could rent a small office space in
complainant's building for his law practice.
Complainant acceded and introduced
respondent to Atty. Benjamin Dacanay,
complainant's retained lawyer, who
accommodated respondent in the building
and made him handle some of complainant's
cases. Hence, the start of the legal relationship
between complainant and respondent.
The conflict between the parties started when
respondent borrowed (P200,000.00) from
complainant which he intended to use as
downpayment for the purchase of a new car.
He likewise mortgaged to complainant his
house and lot in Quezon City but did not
surrender its title claiming that it was the
subject of reconstitution proceedings before
the Quezon City Register of Deeds.
With the money borrowed from complainant,
respondent purchased a new car. However,
the document of sale of the car was issued in
complainant's name and financed through
City Trust Company.
In January 1993, respondent introduced to
complainant a certain Emmanuel Romero.
Romero likewise wanted to borrow money
from complainant. Complainant lent Romero
the money and, from this transaction,
respondent earned commission in the amount
of P52,289.90. Complainant used the
commission to pay respondent's arrears with
the car financing firm.
Subsequently, respondent failed to pay the
amortization on the car and the financing firm
sent demand letters to complainant.
Complainant tried to encash respondent's
postdated check with the drawee bank but it
was dishonored.
Respondent failed to heed complainant's
repeated demands for payment.
Complainant then filed a criminal case against
respondent for violation of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 22 and a civil case for judicial foreclosure
of real estate mortgage.
A LO | B A JA O | B E RM U D O
In answering the foreclosure case, respondent
alleged that "complainant is a businessman
who is engaged in the real estate
business,trading and buy and sell of deficiency
taxed imported cars, shark loans and other
shady deals and hasmany cases pending in
court."
Complainant griped that the allegations are
false, immaterial to theforeclosure case and
maliciously designed to defame him. He
charged that in making suchallegations,
respondent is guilty of breaking their
confidential lawyer-client relationship and
should be held administratively liable therefor.
Consequently, he filed the present complaint
for disbarment, praying also that an
administrative sanction be meted against
respondent for hisissuance of a bouncing
check. The Board of Governors of the IBP
approved the report of theinvestigating
commissioner finding the respondent guilty as
charged and recommending hissuspension
from the practice of law for one (1) year.
ISSUE
Whether respondent commited a breach of
trust and confidence by imputing to
complainant illegal practices and disclosing
complainant's alleged intention to bribe
government officials in connection with a
pending case.
YES
Canon 17 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility provides that a lawyer owes
fidelity to the cause of his client and shall be
mindful of the trust and confidence reposed
on him. The long-established rule is that an
attorney is not permitted to disclose
communications made to him in his
professional character by a client, unless the
latter consents. This obligation to preserve the
confidences and secrets of a client arises at
the inception of their relationship. The
protection given to the client is perpetual and
does not cease with the termination of the
litigation, nor is it affected by the party's
ceasing to employ the attorney and retaining
another, or by any other change of relation
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between them. It even survives the death of
the client.
It must be stressed, however, that the privilege
against disclosure of confidential
communications or information is limited only
to communications which are legitimately and
properly within the scope of a lawful
employment of a lawyer. It does not extend to
those made in contemplation of a crime or
perpetration of a fraud. If the unlawful purpose
is avowed, as in this case, the complainant's
alleged intention to bribe government officials
in relation to his case, the communication is
not covered by the privilege as the client does
not consult the lawyer professionally.
The disclosures were not indispensable to
protect his rights as they were not pertinent to
the foreclosure case. It was improper for the
respondent to use it against the complainant
in the foreclosure case as it was not the subject
matter of litigation therein and respondent's
professional competence and legal advice
were not being attacked in said case. A
lawyer must conduct himself, especially in his
dealings with his clients, with integrity in a
manner that is beyond reproach. His
relationship with his clients should be
characterized by the highest degree of good
faith and fairness.
Atty. Essex L. Silapan is ordered suspended
from the practice of law for a period of six (6)
months. the country.
SUARA VS ATTY AGDEPPA
Atty. Lalaine Lilibeth Agdeppa was charged
for violation of her lawyer’s oath and disregard
of Sections 15, 22, 25, 29, 31 and 32 of the
Canons of Professional Ethics.
The said complaint is related to a settlement
case handled by Atty. Agdeppa involving a
piece of property owned in common by herein
petitioners and other siblings.
The dispute arose, when the petitioners
learned that the subject property was sold with
the assistance of Atty. Agdeppa, who
notarized the deed of sale herself without the
petitioners’ knowledge and participation.
Petitioners therefore demanded the disclosure
of the amount of the sale but the vendor or
A LO | B A JA O | B E RM U D O
their counsel refused to do so, hence the filing
of the present case.
Atty. Agdeppa on her defense said that she
could not answer the charges against her
without violating the attorney-client privilege
rule.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the request for the information
regarding the sale of the property and to
account for proceeds is a privileged
communication.
NO
The request for the information regarding the
sale of the property and to account for the
proceeds is not a violation of the attorney-
client privilege. Rule 130, Section 24 (b) of the
Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 24. Disqualification by reason of privileged
communication. — The following persons
cannot testify as to matters learned in
confidence in the following cases:
(b) An attorney cannot, without the
consent of his client, be examined as to
any communication made by the client to
him, or his advice given thereon in the
course of, or with a view to, professional
employment, nor can an attorney's
secretary, stenographer, or clerk be
examined, without the consent of the
client and his employer, concerning any
fact the knowledge of which has been
acquired in such capacity.
The information requested by petitioners is not
privileged. The petitioners are only asking for
the disclosure of the amount of the sale or
account for the proceeds. Petitioners certainly
have the right to ask for such information since
they own the property as co-heirs of the late
Ramon E. Saura and as co-administrators of
the property. Hence, respondent cannot
refuse to divulge such information to them and
hide behind the cloak of the attorney-client
relationship.
GLORITO VS MATURAN
Spouses Antonio and Gloria Casquejo
instituted their son-in-law, Glorito V. Maturan as
their attorney-in-fact through a (SPA). Said SPA
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authorized Maturan to file ejectment cases
against squatters as well as criminal cases
against the latter for violation of P.D. 772.
Respondent, Atty. Conrado Gonzales,
prepared and notarized said Special Power of
Attorney.
Glorito Maturan engaged the services of
respondent in ejecting several squatters. While
said lot was registered in the name of Celestino
Yokingco, Antonio Casquejo had, however,
instituted a case for reconveyance of property
and declaration of nullity against the former.
As a consequence of his engagement by
petitioner, respondent Gonzales filed an
action for Forcible Entry and Damages against
several individuals. A judgment was rendered
in favor of petitioner. Petitioner, through
respondent, filed a motion for issuance of a
writ of execution.
While the motion for issuance of a writ of
execution was pending, and without
withdrawing as counsel for petitioner,
respondent filed, on behalf of Celestino
Yokingco an action to annul the judgment
rendered in Civil Case No. 2067. The action
was predicated on the lack of authority on the
part of petitioner to represent Antonio and
Gloria Casquejo, as no such authorization was
shown to be on record. On August 24, 1983,
respondent, on behalf of Celestino Yokingco,
et al., also filed for injunction with a prayer for
preliminary injunction, with damages, against
petitioner.
Aggrieved by respondent's acceptance of
professional employment from their adversary
in Civil Case No. 2067, and alleging that
privileged matters relating to the land in
question had been transmitted by petitioner to
respondent in Civil Case 1783-11, petitioner
filed an administrative complaint against the
former for immoral, unethical, and anomalous
acts and asked for his disbarment.
Respondent denied having committed any
malicious, unethical, unbecoming, immoral, or
anomalous act against his client. Respondent
declared that he was of the belief that filing a
motion for issuance of a writ of execution was
the last and final act in the lawyer-client
relationship between himself and petitioner,
A LO | B A JA O | B E RM U D O
and that his formal withdrawal as counsel for
the Casquejos was unnecessary in order to
sever the lawyer-client relationship between
them. Furthermore, he alleged that his
acceptance of employment from Yokingco
was for him, an opportunity to honestly earn a
little more for his children's sustenance.
ISSUE
Whether or not there exists a conflict of
interest.
YES
It is improper for a lawyer to appear as counsel
for one party against the adverse party who is
his client in a related suit, as a lawyer is
prohibited from representing conflicting
interests or discharging inconsistent duties. He
may not, without being guilty of professional
misconduct, act as counsel for a person whose
interest conflicts with that of his present or
former client. That the representation of
conflicting interest is in good faith and with
honest intention on the part of the lawyer does
not make the prohibition inoperative.
Respondent's actuations violative of Canon 6
of the Canons of Professional Ethics which
provide in part:
It is unprofessional to represent conflicting
interests, except by express consent of all
concerned given after a full disclosure of the
facts. Within the meaning of this canon, a
lawyer represents conflicting interests when, in
behalf of one client, it is his duty to contend for
that which duty to another client requires him
to oppose.
A lawyer-client relationship is not terminated
by the filing of a motion for a writ of execution.
His acceptance of a case implies that he will
prosecute the case to its conclusion. He may
not be permitted to unilaterally terminate the
same to the prejudice of his client.
ACCORDINGLY, respondent is suspended from
the practice of law for TWO (2) YEARS.
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PEOPLE VS SANDIGANBAYAN,
HONRADA, ET AL.
Respondent Honrada was the Clerk of Court
and Acting Stenographer of the First Municipal
Circuit Trial Court, San Francisco-Bunawan-
Rosario in Agusan del Sur. Respondent Paredes
was successively the Provincial Attorney of
Agusan del Sur, then Governor of the same
province, and is at present a Congressman.
Respondent Sansaet was a practicing
attorney who served as counsel for Paredes in
several instances pertinent to the criminal
charges involved in the present recourse.
Respondent Sansaet served as counsel of
Paredes involving a patent and perjury.
Paredes was charged with a violation of
Section 3(a) of Republic Act No. 3019, as
amended. However, a motion to quash filed
by the defense was later granted in
respondent courts resolution and the case was
dismissed on the ground of prescription.
Teofilo Gelacio, a taxpayer who had initiated
the perjury and graft charges against
respondent Paredes, sent a letter to the
Ombudsman seeking the investigation of the
three respondents herein for falsification of
public documents. He claimed that
respondent Honrada, in conspiracy with his
herein co-respondents, simulated and
certified as true copies certain documents
purporting to be a notice of arraignment and
transcripts of stenographic notes supposedly
taken during the arraignment of Paredes on
the perjury charge.
In a so-called Affidavit of Explanations and
Rectifications, respondent Sansaet revealed
that Paredes contrived to have the graft case
under preliminary investigation dismissed on
the ground of double jeopardy by making it
appear that the perjury case had been
dismissed by the trial court after he had been
arraigned therein.
For that purpose, the documents which were
later filed by respondent Sansaet in the
preliminary investigation were prepared and
falsified by his co-respondents in this case in
the house of respondent Paredes. To evade
responsibility for his own participation in the
A LO | B A JA O | B E RM U D O
scheme, he claimed that he did so upon the
instigation and inducement of respondent
Paredes. This was intended to pave the way for
his discharge as a government witness in the
consolidated cases, as in fact a motion
therefor was filed by the prosecution pursuant
to their agreement.
Ombudsman approved the filing of
falsification charges against all the herein
private respondents. The proposal for the
discharge of respondent Sansaet as a state
witness was rejected by the Ombudsman as
the testimony of Atty. Sansaet on the facts
surrounding the offense charged in the
information is privileged.
ISSSUE
Whether or not the projected testimony of
Sansaet, as proposed state witness, is barred
by the attorney-client privilege.
NO
As already stated, respondent
Sandiganbayan ruled that due to the lawyer-
client relationship which existed between
herein respondents Paredes and Sansaet
during the relevant periods, the facts
surrounding the case and other confidential
matters must have been disclosed by
respondent Paredes, as client, to respondent
Sansaet, as his lawyer. Accordingly, it found
"no reason to discuss it further since Atty.
Sansaet cannot be presented as a witness
against accused Ceferino S. Paredes, Jr.
without the latter's consent."
The attorney-client privilege cannot apply in
these cases, as the facts thereof and
actuations of both respondents therein
constitute an exception to the rule.
1. It may correctly be assumed that there
was a confidential communication made by
Paredes to Sansaet in connection with
Criminal Cases Nos. 17791-93 for falsification
before respondent court, and this may
reasonably be expected since Paredes was
the accused and Sansaet his counsel therein.
Indeed, the fact that Sansaet was called to
witness the preparation of the falsified
documents by Paredes and Honrada was as
eloquent a communication, if not more, than
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verbal statements being made to him by
Paredes as to the fact and purpose of such
falsification. It is significant that the evidentiary
rule on this point has always referred to "any
communication," without distinction or
qualification.
There is no particular mode by which a
confidential communication shall be made by
a client to his attorney. The privilege is not
confined to verbal or written communications
made by the client to his attorney but extends
as well to information communicated by the
client to the attorney by other means.
Nor can it be pretended that during the entire
process, considering their past and existing
relations as counsel and client and, further, in
view of the purpose for which such falsified
documents were prepared, no word at all
passed between Paredes and Sansaet on the
subject matter of that criminal act. The
clincher for this conclusion is the undisputed
fact that said documents were thereafter filed
by Sansaet in behalf of Paredes as annexes to
the motion for reconsideration in the
preliminary investigation of the graft case
before the Tanodbayan. Also, the acts and
words of the parties during the period when
the documents were being falsified were
necessarily confidential since Paredes would
not have invited Sansaet to his house and
allowed him to witness the same except under
conditions of secrecy and confidence.
It is true that by now, insofar as the falsifications
to be testified to in respondent court are
concerned, those crimes were necessarily
committed in the past. But for the application
of the attorney-client privilege, however, the
period to be considered is the date when the
privileged communication was made by the
client to the attorney in relation to either a
crime committed in the past or with respect to
a crime intended to be committed in the
future. In other words, if the client seeks his
lawyer's advice with respect to a crime that
the former has theretofore committed, he is
given the protection of a virtual confessional
seal which the attorney-client privilege
declares cannot be broken by the attorney
without the client's consent. The same
privileged confidentiality, however, does not
attach with regard to a crime which a client
A LO | B A JA O | B E RM U D O
intends to commit thereafter or in the future
and for purposes of which he seeks the
lawyer's advice.
Statements and communications regarding
the commission of a crime already committed,
made by a party who committed it, to an
attorney, consulted as such, are privileged
communications. Contrarily, the unbroken
stream of judicial dicta is to the effect that
communications between attorney and client
having to do with the client's contemplated
criminal acts, or in aid or furtherance thereof,
are not covered by the cloak of privileges
ordinarily existing in reference to
communications between attorney and
client.
In the present cases, the testimony sought to
be elicited from Sansate as state witness are
the communications made to him by physical
acts and/or accompanying words of Parades
at the time he and Honrada, either with the
active or passive participation of Sansaet,
were about to falsify, or in the process of
falsifying, the documents which were later filed
in the Tanodbayan by Sansaet and
culminated in the criminal charges now
pending in respondent Sandiganbayan.
Clearly, therefore, the confidential
communications thus made by Paredes to
Sansaet were for purposes of and in reference
to the crime of falsification which had not yet
been committed in the past by Paredes but
which he, in confederacy with his present co-
respondents, later committed. Having been
made for purposes of a future offense, those
communications are outside the pale of the
attorney-client privilege.
Furthermore, Sansaet was himself a conspirator
in the commission of that crime of falsification
which he, Paredes and Honrada concocted
and foisted upon the authorities. It is well
settled that in order that a communication
between a lawyer and his client may be
privileged, it must be for a lawful purpose or in
furtherance of a lawful end. The existence of
an unlawful purpose prevents the privilege
from attaching. In fact, it has also been
pointed out to the Court that the "prosecution
of the honorable relation of attorney and
client will not be permitted under the guise of
privilege, and every communication made to
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an attorney by a client for a criminal purpose
is a conspiracy or attempt at a conspiracy
which is not only lawful to divulge, but which
the attorney under certain circumstances may
be bound to disclose at once in the interest of
justice."
March 25, 2019
STEPHANIE PUBLICO
Quiz
What is the most important factor in determining
the existence of forum shopping (Benguet vs Atty
Flores)?
The most important factor in determining
the existence of forum shopping is the "vexation
caused the courts and parties-litigants by a party
who asks different courts to rule on the same or
related causes or grant the same or substantially
the same reliefs."
RULE ON MULTIPLICATION OF SUITS
AND FORUM SHOPPING
BENGUET ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE VS ATTY
FLORES
The profession of law exacts the highest
standards from its members and brooks no
violation of its code of conduct. Accordingly,
a lawyer who trifles with judicial processes,
engages in forum shopping and blatantly lies
in his pleadings must be sanctioned.
This is an administrative complaint against Atty.
Ernesto Flores filed by Benguet Electric
Cooperative, Inc. (BENECO) seeking his
removal or suspension from the bar for forum
shopping, which amounted to "grave
misconduct, . . . unduly delaying the
administration of justice, and violating with
impunity his oath of office and applicable laws
and jurisprudence."
On February 25, 1993, Labor Arbiter Irenarco
Rimando issued a Writ of Execution to enforce
the decision rendered by the Supreme Court.
A LO | B A JA O | B E RM U D O
After issuance of the writ of execution, the
respondent, as new counsel for the losing
litigant-members of the BENECO Board of
Directors, filed a Motion for Clarification.
Thereafter, the respondent instituted a suit
seeking to enjoin the defendants Clerk of
Court, et al. from levying on their properties in
satisfaction of the said writ of execution. The
Office of the Clerk of Court proceeded to levy
on the properties of the losing board members
of BENECO.
Respondent claims that Branch 7, motu
proprio, dismissed Civil Case No. 2738-R for lack
of jurisdiction on March 18, 1993, which
dismissal was [sic] became final due to
respondent's failure to perfect an appeal
therefrom which claim according to the
complainant, constitute[s] deliberate
misrepresentation, if not falsehood, because
the respondent indeed interposed an appeal.
On May 26, 1993, respondent again filed for
Abundio Awal and Nicasio Aliping separate
complaints for Judicial Declaration of Family
Home Constituted, Ope Lege, and thus
Exempt from Levy and Execution the subject
properties with Damages, which are essentially
similar actions to enjoin the enforcement of the
judgment rendered in NLRC Case No. RAB-1-
0313-84. He also filed an urgent Motion Ex-
parte praying for temporary restraining order
in these two (2) cases.
The complainant further alleges that
respondent's claim for damages against the
defendant Sheriff is another improper and
unprocedural maneuver which is likewise a
violation of respondent's oath not to sue on
groundless suit since the said Sheriff was merely
enforcing a writ of execution as part of his job.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is forum shopping.
YES
Forum Shopping
Circular No. 28-91, 5 dated September 4, 1991
which took effect on January 1, 1992, requires
a certificate of non-forum shopping to be
attached to petitions filed before this Court
and the Court of Appeals. This circular was
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revised on February 8, 1994. The IBP found that
the respondent had violated it, because the
complaint he filed before the RTC of Baguio
City "lack[ed] the certification required by
Supreme Court Circular No. 28-91.
We distinguish. Respondent's failure to attach
the said certificate cannot be deemed a
violation of the aforementioned circular,
because the said requirement applied only to
petitions filed with this Court and the Court of
Appeals. Likewise inapplicable is
Administrative Circular No. 04-94 dated
February 8, 1994 which extended the
requirement of a certificate of non-forum
shopping to all initiatory pleadings filed in all
courts and quasi-judicial agencies other than
this Court and the Court of Appeals. Circular
No. 04-94 became effective only on April 1,
1994, but the assailed complaint for injunction
was filed on March 18, 1993, and the petition
for the constitution of a family home was
instituted on May 26, 1993.
Be that as it may, respondent is still guilty of
forum shopping. In Chemphil Export and
Import Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, this
Court declared that "(t)he rule against forum
shopping has long been established and
subsequent circulars of this Court merely
formalized the prohibition and provided the
appropriate penalties against transgressors."
The prohibition is found in Section 1(e) of Rule
16 and Section 4 of Rule 2 of the 1964 Rules of
Court.
In a long line of cases, this Court has held that
forum shopping exists when, as a result of an
adverse opinion in one forum, a party seeks a
favorable opinion (other than by appeal
or certiorari) in another, or when he institutes
two or more actions or proceedings grounded
on the same cause, on the gamble that one or
the other court would make a favorable
disposition. The most important factor in
determining the existence of forum shopping is
the "vexation caused the courts and parties-
litigants by a party who asks different courts to
rule on the same or related causes or grant the
same or substantially the same reliefs."
After this Court rendered its
Decision in Benguet Electric Cooperative,
Inc. vs. National Labor Relations Commission,
et al. and upon motion of BENECO, Labor
A LO | B A JA O | B E RM U D O
Arbiter Irenarco R. Rimando issued a writ of
execution ordering the clerk of court and ex
officio city sheriff of the Municipal Trial Court of
Baguio City to levy on and sell at public
auction personal and real property of the
members of the Board of Directors of BENECO.
On March 18, 1993, Respondent Flores, acting
as counsel for BENECO Board Members Victor
Laoyan, Nicasio Aliping, Lorenzo Pilando and
Abundio Awal, filed with the RTC an injunction
suit praying for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order (TRO) "to preserve the status
quo as now obtaining between the parties," as
well as a writ of preliminary preventive
injunction ordering the clerk of court and
the ex officio city sheriff of the MTC of Baguio
to "cease and desist from enforcing by
execution and levy the writ of execution from
the NLRC-CAR, pending resolution of the main
action raised in court."20
When this injunction case was dismissed,
Respondent Flores filed with another branch of
the RTC two identical but separate actions
both entitled "Judicial Declaration of Family
Home Constituted, ope lege, Exempt from
Levy and Execution; with Damages, etc.,"
docketed as Civil Case Nos. 93-F-0414 and 93-
F-0415.21 The said complaints were
supplemented by an "Urgent Motion Ex
Parte" which prayed for an order to
temporarily restrain Sheriff Wilfredo V. Mendez
from proceeding with the auction sale of
plaintiffs' property "to avoid rendering
ineffectual and functus [oficio] any judgment
of the court later in this [sic] cases, until further
determined by the court."
We remind the respondent that, under the
Code of Professional Responsibility, he had a
duty to assist in the speedy and efficient
administration of justice. The Code also enjoins
him from unduly delaying a case by impeding
the execution of a judgment or by misusing
court processes.
Falsehood
The investigating commissioner also held
respondent liable for committing a falsehood
because, in this administrative case, he stated
in his comment that he had not "perfected an
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appeal on the dismissal" of his petition for
injunction.
The indelible fact, however, is that respondent
did file an appeal which was perfected later
on. The original records of the injunction suit
had been transmitted to the appellate
court. Moreover, the Court of Appeals issued a
resolution dismissing the appeal.35 Thus, in
denying that he had appealed the decision of
the RTC, respondent was making a false
statement.
Respondent argues that the withdrawal of his
appeal means that no appeal was made
under Section 2 of Rule 50 of the Rules of Court.
Respondent's explanation misses the point.
True, he withdrew his appeal. But it is likewise
true that he had actually filed an appeal, and
that this was perfected. False then is his
statement that no appeal was perfected in
the injunction suit. Worse, he made the
statement before this Court in order to
exculpate himself, though in vain, from the
charge of forum shopping.
A lawyer must be a disciple of truth. Under the
Code of Professional Responsibility, he owes
candor, fairness and good faith to the
courts. He shall neither do any falsehood, nor
consent to the doing of any. He also has a duty
not to mislead or allow the courts to be misled
by any artifice.
Respondent Ernesto B. Flores is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a
period of ONE (1) YEAR and, for violating his
oath and the Canon of Professional
Responsibility to do no falsehood, he is
SUSPENDED for another period of ONE (1)
YEAR, resulting in a total period of TWO (2)
YEARS, effective upon finality of this Decision.
Was it really forum shopping or an offshoot?
An offshoot, Sir.
What was the lawyer doing here?
To delay the implementation of the writ of
execution, the lawyer files several cases to the
point that he questioned that some of the
properties cannot be attached.
A LO | B A JA O | B E RM U D O
What was the ruling as to the failure to attach
certification?
Respondent's failure to attach the said
certificate cannot be deemed a violation of the
circular, because the said requirement applied
only to petitions filed with this Court and the
Court of Appeals. Likewise inapplicable is
Administrative Circular No. 04-94 which extended
the requirement of a certificate of non-forum
shopping to all initiatory pleadings filed in all
courts and quasi-judicial agencies other than this
Court and the Court of Appeals. Circular No. 04-
94 became effective only on April 1, 1994, but the
assailed complaint for injunction was filed on
March 18, 1993, and the petition for the
constitution of a family home was instituted on
May 26, 1993.
Although not required during that time
because it would not probably have affected
the case, still the court concluded that the
lawyer here is guilty of forum shopping.
When is there forum shopping?
In a long line of cases, this Court has held
that forum shopping exists when, as a result of an
adverse opinion in one forum, a party seeks a
favorable opinion (other than by appeal
or certiorari) in another, or when he institutes two
or more actions or proceedings grounded on the
same cause, on the gamble that one or the other
court would make a favorable disposition. The
most important factor in determining the
existence of forum shopping is the "vexation
caused the courts and parties-litigants by a party
who asks different courts to rule on the same or
related causes or grant the same or substantially
the same reliefs."
Similarity of cases does not automatically
mean there is forum shopping. You have to
consider the existence of similar causes of action
and issues. Basically, it is one and the same and
you are just filing it before different forum.
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Would that be completely considered forum
shopping?
No, it will not be considered forum
shopping as forum shopping because what the
court considers as forum shopping is that where
the party seeks a favorable opinion other than an
appeal or certiorari.
What violation was also committed by the
lawyer?
Falsehood. The investigating
commissioner also held respondent liable for
committing a falsehood because, in this
administrative case, he stated in his comment
that he had not "perfected an appeal on the
dismissal" of his petition for injunction.
The indelible fact, however, is that respondent
did file an appeal which was perfected later on.
The original records of the injunction suit had
been transmitted to the appellate
court. Moreover, the Court of Appeals issued a
resolution dismissing the appeal. Thus, in denying
that he had appealed the decision of the RTC,
respondent was making a false statement.
However, the question has already become
moot and academic since the permits of the
parties have already expired.
ROSALINA BUAN VS OIC LOPEZ JR.
FIRST CASE FILED:
On July 7, 1986 there was filed in the Regional
Trial Court of Manila, docketed as Civil Case
No. 86-36563, a special civil action of
"prohibition with preliminary injunction" against
Acting Manila City Mayor Gemiliano Lopez, Jr.
It was filed by Samahang Kapatiran Sa
Hanapbuhay Ng Bagong Lipunan, Inc."
(hereafter, simply "Samahan") composed,
according to the petition, of "some 300
individual owners and operators of separate
business stalls ... mostly at the periphery
immediately beyond the fence of the Quiapo
Church." The president of the Samahan is
Rosalina Buan and its Press Relations Officer,
Liza Ocampo.
A LO | B A JA O | B E RM U D O
SECOND CASE FILED:
On August 5, 1986 petitioners instituted in the
Supreme Court a special civil action for
prohibition to the end that respondent
Gemiliano C. Lopez, Jr., acting as Mayor of the
City of Manila, be "perpetually prohibited from
arbitrarily, whimsically and capriciously
revoking or cancelling ... their licenses or
permits (as hawkers or street vendors) and
threatening the physical demolition of their
respective business stalls in the places
specified in such licenses or permits It has to be
noted that Rosalina Buan and Liza Ocampo
are two of the five petitioners in the RTC case
and thise described in the petition before the
Supreme Court as suing "for themselves and all
others similarly situated as themselves": i.e.,
vendors "around the Quiapo Church." The
three other petitioners also appear to be
Samahan members.
ISSUE
Is there forum shopping?
YES
The petition in Case No. 86-36563 is grounded
on the same facts as those in the case at bar:
the members of the Samahan had been
legitimately engaged "in their respective
business of selling sundry merchandise, more
particularly religious articles, flowers and
ornamental plants, and medicinal herbs;" they
had been religiously paying "the
corresponding license and permit fees
imposed by prevailing ordinances of the City
of Manila," but this notwithstanding they had
been given written notice dated May 3, 1986
emanating from the Mayor's Office, advising of
the cancellation of their permits and their
possible relocation to another site; and these
acts "are unjust, illegal arbitrary, oppressive
and constitute grave abuse of discretion on
the part of the respondent.
There thus exists between the action before this
Court and RTC Case No. 86-36563 Identity of
parties, or at least such parties as represent the
same interests in both actions, as well as
Identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for,
the relief being founded on the same facts,
and the Identity on the two preceding
particulars is such that any judgment rendered
in the other action, will regardless of which
party is successful, amount to res adjudicata in
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the action under consideration: all the
requisites, in fine, of auter action pendant.
Indeed, the petitioners in both actions,
described in their petitions as vendors of
religious articles, herbs and plants, and sundry
merchandise around the Quiapo Church or its
"periphery," have incurred not only the
sanction of dismissal of their case before this
Court in accordance with Rule 16 of the Rules
of Court, but also the punitive measure of
dismissal of both their actions, that in this Court
and that in the Regional Trial Court as well
Quite recently, upon substantially Identical
factual premises, the Court en banc had
occasion to condemn and penalize the act of
litigants of hearing the same suit in different
courts, aptly described as "forum-shopping."
It would seem that after the filing by Rosalina
Buan and Liza Ocampo of the petition in this
case, "for themselves and all others similarly
situated as themselves" (i.e., the members of
the Samahan; who are vendors in the area of
Quiapo Church) they came to the belated
that in view of the pendency of the Identical
action filed by them (Case No. 86-36563), they
were vulnerable to the accusation of "forum
shopping," and thus amenable to its dire
consequences.
This explains the filing in this Court by their
lawyers of a "MANIFESTATION WITH AFFIDAVIT
OF WITHDRAWAL", another "MANIFESTATION
AND MOTION", and an "URGENT
MANIFESTATION AND MOTION TO STRIKE-OUT
THE NAME ROSALINA BUAN AND LIZA
OCAMPO". In these manifestations the case is
made that the five (5) petitioners in the action
before this Court who are members of
the Samahan "were forcibly brainwashed and
guarded by ... (Atty. Reynaldo Aralar) and his
associates to accede to the invitation of the
said counsel ... to appear for them and file the
case before the Honorable Court knowingly
(sic) that he was furnished the status quo-
order of the same case pending before the
Regional Trial Court Branch 45 of Manila,"
and/or said Atty. Aralar and his associates had
perpetrated "piracy" of clients and "should be
condemned and suspended for committing
act of shopping for courts." The claim does not
inspire belief. It is so out of the ordinary as to
require clear and convincing evidence of its
actuality, which is lacking in this case. It is also
belied by the fact that Rosalina Buan and Liza
A LO | B A JA O | B E RM U D O
Ocampo themselves were among those who
verified the petition at bar before a notary
public. And the claim is undermined by the
misrepresentation in Buan's and Ocampo's
"Joint Affidavit of Withdrawal" that the status
quo order in RTC Case No. 8636563 was still
subsisting and the case still pending trial when
in truth, the case had already been dismissed
and the restraining order lifted by Order of July
27, 1986.
FAR EASTERN SHIPPING VS CA AND
PPA
Sometime in 1980, M/V PAVLODAR, owned
and operated by the Far Eastern Shipping
Company, arrived at the Port of Manila. When
the vessel reached the landmark, Gavino
ordered the engine stopped and anchor
dropped which was relayed by Kavankov to
the crew. However, the anchor did not take
hold and the bow of the vessel rammed into
the apron of the pier.
The PPA, through the OSG, filed a complaint
for a sum of money against the FESC, Capt.
Senen C. Gavino and the Manila Pilots
Association, praying that the defendants
therein be held jointly and severally liable to
pay for damages which the court granted.
Thecounsels of FESC filed several motion for
extension of time to file petition totaling to 210
days, and 180 days for the OSG before the
comment was filed to the court and copies
where not furnished to the parties involved; the
certification against forum shopping is also
defective.
ISSUE
Whether or not there was forum shopping.
Sec. 2, Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure incorporates the former Circular
No. 28-91 which provided for what has come
to be known as the certification against forum
shopping as an additional requisite for
petitions filed with the Supreme Court and the
Court of Appeals with the end in view of
preventing the filing of multiple complaints
involving the same issues in the Supreme Court,
Court of Appeals or different divisions thereof
or any other tribunal or agency.
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The records show that the law firm of Del
Rosario and Del Rosario through its associate,
Atty. Herbert A. Tria, is the counsel of record for
FESC in both G.R. No. 130068 and G.R. No.
130150.
G.R. No. 130068 commenced with the filing by
FESC through counsel of a verified motion for
extension of time to file its petition for thirty (30)
days. Said motion contained the following
certification against forum shopping signed by
Atty. Herbert A. Tria as affiant:
CERTIFICATION
AGAINST FORUM SHOPPING
I/we hereby certify that I/we have not
commenced any other action or proceeding
involving the same issues in the Supreme Court,
the Court of Appeals, or any other tribunal or
agency; that to the best of my own knowledge,
no such action or proceeding is pending in the
Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or any
other tribunal or agency; that if I/we should
thereafter learn that a similar action or
proceeding has been filed or is pending before
the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or any
other tribunal or agency, I/we undertake to
report that fact within five (5) days therefrom to
this Honorable Court.
Reviewing the records, we find that the
petition filed by MPA in G.R. No. 130150 then
pending with the Third Division was duly filed
on August 29, 1997 with a copy thereof
furnished on the same date by registered mail
to counsel for FESC. Counsel of record for MPA.
Atty. Jesus P. Amparo, in his verification
accompanying said petition dutifully revealed
to the Court that
Petitioner has not commenced any other action
or proceeding involving the same issues in this
Honorable Court, the Court of Appeals or
different Divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or
agency, but to the best of his knowledge, there
is an action or proceeding pending in this
Honorable Court, entitled Far Eastern Shipping
Co., Petitioner, vs. Philippine Ports Authority and
Court of Appeals with a Motion for Extension of
time to file Petition For Review by Certiorari filed
sometime on August 18, 1987. If undersigned
counsel will come to know of any other pending
action or claim filed or pending he undertakes to
report such fact within five (5) days to this
Honorable Court.
When FESC filed its petition in G.R. No. 130068
on September 26, 1997, it would already have
received a copy of the former and would then
have knowledge of the pendency of the other
petition initially filed with the First Division. It was
therefore incumbent upon FESC to inform the
A LO | B A JA O | B E RM U D O
Court of that fact through its certification
against forum shopping. For failure to make
such disclosure, it would appear that the
certification accompanying the petition in
G.R. No. 130068 is defective and could have
been a ground for dismissal thereof.
Even assuming that FESC had not yet received
its copy of MPA's petition at the time it filed its
own petition and executed said certification,
its signatory did state "that if I should thereafter
learn that a similar action or proceeding has
been filed or is pending before the Supreme
Court, the Court of Appeals or any other
tribunal or agency, I undertake to report the
fact within five (5) days therefrom to this
Honorable Court." We find that no
manifestation concordant with such
undertaking was then or at any other time
thereafter ever filed by FESC nor was there any
attempt to bring such matter to the attention
of the Court. Moreover, it cannot feign non-
knowledge of the existence of such other
petition because FESC itself filed the motion for
consolidation in G.R. No. 130150 of these two
cases on April 24, 1998.
The certification against forum shopping
ordained under the Rules is to be executed by
the petitioner, and not by counsel. Obviously it
is the petitioner, and not always the counsel
whose professional services have been
retained for a particular case, who is in the
best position to know whether he or it actually
filed or caused the filing of a petition in that
case. Hence, a certification against forum
shopping by counsel is a defective
certification. It is clearly equivalent to non-
compliance with the requirement under
Section 2, Rule 42 in relation to Section 4, Rule
45, and constitutes a valid cause for dismissal
of the petition.
Hence, the initial certification appended to
the motion for extension of time to file petition
in G.R. No. 130068 executed in behalf of FESC
by Atty. Tria is procedurally deficient. But
considering that it was a superfluity at that
stage of the proceeding, it being unnecessary
to file such a certification with a mere motion
for extension, we shall disregard such error.
Besides, the certification subsequently
executed by Teodoro P. Lopez in behalf of
FESC cures that defect to a certain extent,
despite the inaccuracies earlier pointed out. In
the same vein, we shall consider the
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verification signed in behalf of MPA by its
counsel, Atty. Amparo, in G.R. No. 130150 as
substantial compliance inasmuch as it served
the purpose of the Rules of informing the Court
of the pendency of another action or
proceeding involving the same issues.
What is the undertaking of a party in a CNFS?
a) that I/we have not commenced any
other action or proceeding involving the
same issues in the Supreme Court, the
Court of Appeals, or any other tribunal or
agency;
b) that to the best of my own knowledge, no
such action or proceeding is pending in
the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals,
or any other tribunal or agency; and
c) that if I/we should thereafter learn that a
similar action or proceeding has been
filed or is pending, I/we undertake to
report that fact within five (5) days
therefrom to this Honorable Court
Who is responsible for filing the certificate?
The certification against forum shopping
ordained under the Rules is to be executed by
the petitioner, and not by counsel. It is the
petitioner, and not always the counsel whose
professional services have been retained for a
particular case, who is in the best position to
know whether he or it actually filed or caused the
filing of a petition in that case.
A certification against forum shopping by
counsel is a defective certification. It is clearly
equivalent to non-compliance with the
requirement under Section 2, Rule 42 in relation
to Section 4, Rule 45, and constitutes a valid
cause for dismissal of the petition.
What was the name of the law firm?
The law firm of Del Rosario and Del
Rosario.
A LO | B A JA O | B E RM U D O
Aside from their lawyers, who else was
sanctioned by the Supreme Court?
The Solicitor General. It took the OSG an
inordinately and almost unreasonably long
period of time to file its comment, thus unduly
delaying the resolution of these cases. It took
several changes of leadership in the OSG — from
Silvestre H. Bello III to Romeo C. dela Cruz and,
finally, Ricardo P. Galvez — before the comment
in behalf of PPA was finally filed.
This undeniably dilatory disinclination of
the OSG to seasonably file required pleadings
constitutes deplorable disservice to the tax-
paying public and can only be categorized as
censurable inefficiency on the part of the
government law office. This is most certainly
professionally unbecoming of the OSG.
Another thing that baffles the Court is why
the OSG did not take the inititive of filing a motion
for consolidation in either G.R. No. 130068 or G.R.
No. 130150, considering its familiarity with the
background of the case and if only to make its
job easier by having to prepare and file only one
comment. It could not have been unaware of
the pendency of one or the other petition
because, being counsel for respondent in both
cases, petitioner is required to furnish it with a
copy of the petition under pain of dismissal of the
petition for failure otherwise.
We find here a lackadaisical attitude and
complacency on the part of the OSG in the
handling of its cases and an almost reflexive
propensity to move for countless extensions, as if
to test the patience of the Court, before favoring
it with the timely submission of required
pleadings.
It must be emphasized that the Court can
resolve cases only as fast as the respective
parties in a case file the necessary pleadings. The
OSG, by needlessly extending the pendency of
these cases through its numerous motions for
extension, came very close to exhausting this
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Court's forbearance and has regrettably fallen
short of its duties as the People's Tribune.
The OSG is reminded that just like other
members of the Bar, the canons under the Code
of Professional Responsibility apply with equal
force on lawyers in government service in the
discharge of their official tasks. These ethical
duties are rendered even more exacting as to
them because, as government counsel, they
have the added duty to abide by the policy of
the State to promote a high standard of ethics in
public service. Furthermore, it is incumbent upon
the OSG, as part of the government
bureaucracy, to perform and discharge its duties
with the highest degree of professionalism,
intelligence and skill and to extend prompt,
courteous and adequate service to the public.
What was the ruling of the court as to the counsel
of petitioner?
Counsel for FESC, the law firm of Del
Rosario and Del Rosario, specifically its associate,
Atty. Herbert A. Tria, is REPRIMANDED and
WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar
acts of heedless disregard of its undertakings
under the Rules shall be dealt with more severely.
The original members of the legal team of
the Office of the Solicitor General assigned to this
case, namely, Assistant Solicitor General Roman
G. Del Rosario and Solicitor Luis F. Simon, are
ADMONISHED and WARNED that a repetition of
the same or similar acts of unduly delaying
proceedings due to delayed filing of required
pleadings shall also be dealt with more
stringently.
The Solicitor Genral is DIRECTED to look
into the circumstances of this case and to adopt
provident measures to avoid a repetition of this
incident and which would ensure prompt
compliance with orders of this Court regarding
the timely filing of requisite pleadings, in the
interest of just, speedy and orderly administration
of justice.
A LO | B A JA O | B E RM U D O
So reprimand, warning and admonition
are forms of penalties.
SUB-JUDICE RULE
EDUARDO MARTELINO VS JOSE
ALEJANDRO
This case presents another aspect of the court-
martial proceedings against the petitioner,
Major Eduardo Martelino, alias Abdul Latif
Martelino, of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, and the officers and men under
him, for violation of the 94th and 97th Articles
of War, as a result of the alleged shooting on
March 18, 1968 of some Muslim recruits then
undergoing commando training on the island
of Corregidor. Once before the question was
raised before this Court whether the general
court-martial, convened to try the case
against the petitioners, acquired jurisdiction
over the case despite the fact that earlier, on
March 23, a complaint for frustrated murder
had been filed in the fiscal's office of Cavite
City by Jibin Arula.
The petitioners sought relief against certain
orders of the general court-martial.
Martelino sought the disqualification of the
President of the general court-martial,
following the latter's admission that he read
newspaper stories of the Corregidor incident.
The petitioner contended that the case had
received such an amount of publicity in the
press and other news media and in fact was
being exploited for political purposes in
connection with the presidential election as to
imperil his right to a fair trial. After deliberating,
the military court denied the challenge.
The petitioners therefore filed this petition for
certiorari and prohibition, to nullify the orders of
the court-martial denying their challenges.
ISSUE
Whether the court-martial failed to protect the
accused from prejudicial publicity.
NO
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The petitioner's counsel referred to a news item
appearing in the July 29, 1969 issue of the Daily
Mirror and cited other news reports to the
effect that "coffins are being prepared for the
President (of the Philippines) in Jolo," that
according to Senator Aquino "massacre
victims were given sea burial," and that
Senator Magsaysay, opposition Vice President
candidate, had gone to Corregidor and
"found bullet shells." In addition the petitioners
cite in this Court a Manila Times editorial of
August 26, 1969 which states that "The Jabidah
[code name of the training operations] issue
was bound to come up in the course of the
election campaign. The opposition could not
possibly ignore an issue that is heavily loaded
against the administration." The petitioners
argue that under the circumstances they
could not expect a just and fair trial and that,
in overruling their challenge for cause based
on this ground, the general court-martial
committed a grave abuse of discretion.
Due process requires that the accused receive
a trial by an impartial jury free from outside
influences. Given the pervasiveness of modern
communications and the difficulty of effacing
prejudicial publicity from the minds of the
jurors, the trial courts must take strong
measures to ensure that the balance is never
weighed against the accused. And appellate
tribunals have the duty to make an
independent evaluation of the circumstances.
Of course, there is nothing that proscribes the
press from reporting events that transpire in the
courtroom. But where there is a reasonable
likelihood that prejudicial news prior to trial will
prevent a fair trial, the judge should continue
the case until the threat abates, or transfer it to
another county not so permeated with
publicity. In addition sequestration of the jury
was something the judge should have sua
sponte with counsel. If publicity during the
proceeding threatens the fairness of the trial, a
new trial should be ordered. But we must
remember that reversals are but palliatives; the
cure lies in those remedial measures that will
prevent the prejudice at its inception. The
courts must take such steps by rule and
regulation that will protect their processes from
prejudicial outside interference. Neither
prosecutors, counsel for defense, the
accused, witnesses, court staff nor
A LO | B A JA O | B E RM U D O
enforcement officers coming under the
jurisdiction of the court should be permitted to
frustrate its function. Collaboration between
counsel and the press as to information
affecting the fairness of a criminal trial is not
only subject to regulation, but is highly
censurable and worthy of disciplinary
measure.
In contrast the spate of publicity in this case
before us did not focus on the guilt of the
petitioners but rather on the responsibility of
the Government for what was claimed to be a
"massacre" of Muslim trainees. If there was a
"trial by newspaper" at all, it was not of the
petitioners but of the Government. Absent
here is a showing of failure of the court-martial
to protect the accused from massive publicity
encouraged by those connected with the
conduct of the trial either by a failure to control
the release of information or to remove the trial
to another venue or to postpone it until the
deluge of prejudicial publicity shall have
subsided. Indeed we cannot say that the trial
of the petitioners was being held under
circumstances which did not permit the
observance of those imperative decencies of
procedure which have come to be identified
with due process.
At all events, even granting the existence of
"massive" and "prejudicial" publicity, since the
petitioners here do not contend that the
respondents have been unduly influenced but
simply that they might be by the "barrage" of
publicity, we think that the suspension of the
court-martial proceedings has accomplished
the purpose sought by the petitioners'
challenge for cause, by postponing the trial of
the petitioner until calmer times have returned.
The atmosphere has since been cleared and
the publicity surrounding the Corregidor
incident has so far abated that we believe the
trial may now be resumed in tranquility.
TIMOTEO CRUZ VS FRANCISCO SALVA
This case involved the killing of Manuel Monroy
in 1953. A number of persons were accused as
involved and implicated in said crime.
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The respondent here, Fiscal Salva was tasked
to conduct a reinvestigation of the case. As
part of such investigation, Fiscal Salva called
upon Timoteo Cruz to appear and testify
before him at the scheduled preliminary
investigation.
The investigation was conducted not in
respondent's office but in the session hall of the
Municipal Court of Pasay City evidently, to
accommodate the big crowd that wanted to
witness the proceeding, including members of
the press. A number of microphones were
installed. Reporters were everywhere and
photographers were busy taking pictures. In
other words, apparently with the permission of,
if not the encouragement by the respondent,
news photographers and newsmen had a filed
day. Not only this, but in the course of the
investigation, as shown by the transcript of the
stenographic notes taken during said
investigation, on two occasions, the first, after
Oscar Caymo had concluded his testimony
respondent Salva, addressing the
newspapermen said, "Gentlemen of the press,
if you want to ask questions I am willing to let
you do so and the question asked will be
reproduced as my own"; and the second, after
Jose Maratella y de Guzman had finished
testifying and respondent Salva, addressing
the newsmen, again said, "Gentlemen of the
press is free to ask questions as ours."
The newspapers certainly played up and gave
wide publicity to what took place during the
investigation, and this involved headlines and
extensive recitals, narrations of and comments
on the testimonies given by the witnesses as
well as vivid descriptions of the incidents that
took place during the investigation. It seemed
as though the criminal responsibility for the
killing of Manuel Monroy which had already
been tried and finally determined by the lower
court and which was under appeal and
advisement by this Tribunal, was being retried
and redetermined in the press, and all with the
apparent place and complaisance of
respondent.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was undue publicity to the
prejudice of the alleged offenders?
Yes. It seemed as though the criminal
responsibility for the killing of Manuel Monroy
which had already been tried and finally
A LO | B A JA O | B E RM U D O
determined by the lower court and which was
under appeal and advisement by this Tribunal,
was being retried and redetermined in the
press, and all with the apparent place and
complaisance of respondent.
Salva committed what was regard a grievous
error and poor judgment for which we fail to
find any excuse or satisfactory explanation. His
actuations in this regard went well beyond the
bounds of prudence, discretion and good
taste. It is bad enough to have such undue
publicity when a criminal case is being
investigated by the authorities, even when it
being tried in court; but when said publicity
and sensationalism is allowed, even
encouraged, when the case is on appeal and
is pending consideration by this Tribunal, the
whole thing becomes inexcusable, even
abhorrent, and this Court, in the interest of
justice, is constrained and called upon to put
an end to it and a deterrent against its
repetition by meting an appropriate
disciplinary measure, even a penalty to the
one liable.
RE: SUSPENSION OF ATTY ROGELIO BAGABUYO
Crim. Case No. 5144 was originally raffled to
the sala of Judge Floripinas C. Buyser. In an
Order dated March 14, 2002, Judge Buyser
denied the Demurrer to the Evidence of the
accused, declaring that the evidence thus
presented by the prosecution was sufficient to
prove the crime of homicide and not the
charge of murder. Consequently, the counsel
for the defense filed a Motion to Fix the
Amount of Bail Bond. Respondent Atty. Rogelio
Z. Bagabuyo, then Senior State Prosecutor and
the deputized prosecutor of the case,
objected thereto mainly on the ground that
the original charge of murder, punishable with
reclusion perpetua, was not subject to bail
under Sec. 4, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court.
Judge Buyser inhibited himself from further
trying the case because of the "harsh
insinuation" of Senior Prosecutor Rogelio Z.
Bagabuyo that he "lacks the cold neutrality of
an impartial magistrate," by allegedly
suggesting the filing of the motion to fix the
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amount of bail bond by counsel for the
accused.
The case was transferred to Branch 29
presided by Judge Jose Manuel P. Tan. Judge
Tan favorably resolved the Motion to Fix the
Amount of Bail Bond.
Instead of availing himself only of judicial
remedies, respondent caused the publication
of an article regarding the Order granting bail
to the accused in the August 18, 2003 issue of
the Mindanao Gold Star Daily. The article,
entitled "Senior prosecutor lambasts Surigao
judge for allowing murder suspect to bail out."
The said Order stated that contrary to the
statements in the article, Judge Buyser
described the evidence for the prosecution as
not strong, but sufficient to prove the guilt of
the accused only for homicide. Moreover, it
was not true that Judge Buyser inhibited
himself from the case for an unclear reason.
Judge Buyserdeclared in open court in the
presence of respondent that he was inhibiting
himself from the case due to the harsh
insinuation of respondent that he lacked the
cold neutrality of an impartial judge.
Despite the citation of indirect contempt,
respondent presented himself to the media for
interviews in Radio Station DXKS, and again
attacked the integrity of Judge Tan and the
trial court's disposition in the proceedings of
Crim. Case No. 5144.
RTC of Surigao City, Branch 29, required
respondent to explain and to show cause why
he should not be held in contempt for his
media interviews that degraded the court and
the presiding judge, and why he should not be
suspended from the practice of law for
violating the Code of Professional
Responsibility, specifically Rule 11.05 of Canon
118 and Rule 13.02 of Canon 13.9
ISSUE
Whether Atty. Bagabuyo violated the Canons
and the Lawyer’s Oath.
Yes.
Respondent violated Rule 11.05 of Canon 11
when he admittedly caused the holding of a
A LO | B A JA O | B E RM U D O
press conference where he made statements
against the Order dated November 12, 2002
allowing the accused in Crim. Case No. 5144
to be released on bail.
Respondent also violated Canon 11 when he
indirectly stated that Judge Tan was displaying
judicial arrogance in the article entitled, Senior
prosecutor lambasts Surigao judge for allowing
murder suspect to bail out, which appeared in
the August 18, 2003 issue of the Mindanao
Gold Star Daily. Respondent's statements in the
article, which were made while Crim. Case No.
5144 was still pending in court, also violated
Rule 13.02 of Canon 13, which states that "a
lawyer shall not make public statements in the
media regarding a pending case tending to
arouse public opinion for or against a party."
In regard to the radio interview given to Tony
Consing, respondent violated Rule 11.05 of
Canon 11 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility for not resorting to the proper
authorities only for redress of his grievances
against Judge Tan. Respondent also violated
Canon 11 for his disrespect of the court and its
officer when he stated that Judge Tan was
ignorant of the law, that as a mahjong
aficionado, he was studying mahjong instead
of studying the law, and that he was a liar.
Respondent also violated the Lawyer's Oath,
as he has sworn to "conduct [himself] as a
lawyer according to the best of [his]
knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity
as well to the courts as to [his] clients."
As a senior state prosecutor and officer of the
court, respondent should have set the
example of observing and maintaining the
respect due to the courts and to judicial
officers.
The Court is not against lawyers raising
grievances against erring judges but the rules
clearly provide for the proper venue and
procedure for doing so, precisely because
respect for the institution must always be
maintained.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Rogelio Z. Bagabuyo is
found guilty of violating Rule 11.05, Canon 11
and Rule 13.02, Canon 13 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, and of violating the
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Lawyer's Oath, for which he is SUSPENDED from
the practice of law for one (1) year effective
upon finality of this Decision, with a STERN
WARNING that the repetition of a similar
offense shall be dealt with more severely.
RE: SHOW CAUSE ORDER IN THE DECISION
IN REPUBLIC VS MARIA LOURDES SERENO
An impeachment complaint was lodged
before the Committee on Justice of the House
of Representatives against respondent for
culpable violation of the Constitution,
corruption, high crimes, and betrayal of public
trust. Having learned of respondent's
disqualification as a Chief Justice from the
House Committee on Justice's hearings, the
Republic of the Philippines (Republic), through
the Office of the Solicitor General, filed a
petition for quo warranto against respondent,
basically questioning her eligibility for the Chief
Justice position.
The Court observed that since the filing of the
impeachment complaint, during the
pendency of the quo warranto case, and
even after the conclusion of the quo
warranto proceedings, respondent
continuously opted to defend herself in public
through speaking engagements before
students and faculties in different universities,
several public forums, interviews on national
television, and public rallies. Instead of
participating in the judicial process and
answering the charges against her truthfully to
assist in the expeditious resolution of the
matter, respondent opted to proceed to a
nationwide campaign, conducting speeches
and accepting interviews, discussing the merits
of the case and making comments thereon to
vilify the members of the Congress, cast
aspersions on the impartiality of the Members
of the Court, degrade the faith of the people
to the Judiciary, and falsely impute ill motives
against the government that it is orchestrating
the charges against her. In short, as the Court
stated in the said decision, respondent chose
to litigate her case before the public and the
media instead of the Court.
The Court was disquieted as doubts against
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the impartiality and dignity of the Court and its
Members emerged, and the obfuscation of
the issues in the quo warranto proceedings
resulted from such out-of-court discussions on
the merits of the case. Worse, the Court was
perturbed by the fact that respondent, not
only being a member of the Bar but one who
was asserting her eligibility and right to the
highest position in the Judiciary, significantly
participated in such detestable and blatant
disregard of the sub judice rule.
Consequently, having great regard of judicial
independence and its duty to discipline
member of the Bar to maintain the dignity of
the profession and the institution, the Court in
its decision in the quo warranto case, ordered
respondent to show cause why she should not
be sanctioned for violating the Code of
Professional Responsibility (CPR) and the New
Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine
Judiciary (NCJC) for transgressing the sub
judice rule and for casting aspersions and ill
motives to the Members of this Court.
ISSUE
May respondent be held administratively
liable for her actions and public statements as
regards the quo warranto case against her
during its pendency?
YES
First. This Court cannot subscribe to
respondent's position that she was merely a
party-litigant in the quo warranto case, not a
counsel nor a judge, hence, should not be
judged on the exacting standards expected
of a member of the Bar or of the Court.
Respondent argues that she had no obligation
to be an impartial judge where she does not
act as one. Respondent then remarked that
just because she is a lawyer and a judge does
not mean that she is less affected by the
tribulations of a public trial than an ordinary
litigant.
Lawyers must conduct themselves with great
propriety, and their behavior must be beyond
reproach anywhere and at all times, whether
they are dealing with their clients or the public
at large. Lawyers may be disciplined for acts
committed even in their private capacity for
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acts which tend to bring reproach on the legal
profession or to injure it in the favorable opinion
of the public. There can be no distinction as to
whether the transgression is committed in
lawyers' private lives or in their professional
capacity, for a lawyer may not divide his
personality as an attorney at one time and a
mere citizen at another. "Any departure from
the path which a lawyer must follow as
demanded by the virtues of his profession shall
not be tolerated by this Court as the
disciplining authority for there is perhaps no
profession after that of the sacred ministry in
which a high-toned morality is more
imperative than that of law."
The Court is, thus, reluctant to accept
respondent's position that she should be
treated as an ordinary litigant in judging her
actions. The fact that respondent was not the
judge nor the counsel but a litigant in the
subject case does not strip her off of her
membership in the Bar, as well as her being a
Member and the head of the highest court of
the land at that time.
Second. Respondent argues that the public
statements attributed to her must have
created a serious and imminent threat to the
administration of justice to warrant
punishment.
Sub judice is a Latin term which refers to
matters under or before a judge or court; or
matters under judicial consideration. In
essence, the sub judice rule restricts
comments and disclosures pertaining to
pending judicial proceedings. The restriction
applies to litigants and witnesses, the public in
general, and most especially to members of
the Bar and the Bench. Sub judice rule finds
support in the provision on indirect contempt
under Section 3, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court.
Discussions regarding sub judice often relates
to contempt of court. In this regard,
respondent correctly pointed out that the
"clear and present danger" rule should be
applied in determining whether, in a particular
situation, the court's contempt power should
be exercised to maintain the independence
and integrity of the Judiciary, or the
Constitutionally-protected freedom of speech
should be upheld.
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For a comment to be considered as contempt
of court "it must really appear" that such does
impede, interfere with and embarrass the
administration of justice. What is, thus, sought
to be protected is the all important duty of the
court to administer justice in the decision of a
pending case. The specific rationale for
the sub judice rule is that courts, in the decision
of issues of fact and law should be immune
from every extraneous influence; that facts
should be decided upon evidence produced
in court; and that the determination of such
facts should be uninfluenced by bias,
prejudice or sympathies.
From the foregoing, respondent may be
correct in arguing that there must exist a "clear
and present danger" to the administration of
justice for statements or utterances covered
by the sub judice rule to be considered
punishable under the rules of contempt.
The case at bar, however, is not a contempt
proceeding. The Court, in this case is not
geared towards protecting itself from such
prejudicial comments outside of court by the
exercise of its inherent contempt power.
Rather, in this administrative matter, the Court
is discharging its Constitutionally-mandated
duty to discipline members of the Bar and
judicial officers.
As We have stated in Our decision in the quo
warranto case, actions in violation of the sub
judice rule may be dealt with not only through
contempt proceedings but also through
administrative actions. This is because a lawyer
speech is subject to greater regulation for two
significant reasons: one, because of the
lawyer's relationship to the judicial process;
and two, the significant dangers that a
lawyer's speech poses to the trial process.
Thus, contrary to respondent's argument, the
"clear and present danger" rule does not find
application in this case. What applies in this
administrative matter is the CPR and NCJC,
which mandate the strict observance of
the sub judice rule both upon members of the
Bar and the Bench.
Respondent undoubtedly violated the above-
cited provisions of the CPR and the NCJC. The
Court, in the quo warranto case, enumerated
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some of the instances where respondent
openly and blatantly violated the sub
judice rule: These public utterances did not
only tend to arouse public opinion on the
matter but as can be clearly gleaned from the
tenor of the statements, such comments,
speeches, and interviews given by the
respondent in different forums indisputably
tend to tarnish the Court's integrity and unfairly
attributed false motives against its Members.
Particularly, in several occasions, respondent
insinuated the following: (i) that the grant of
the quo warranto petition will result to
dictatorship; (ii) in filing the quo
warranto petition, the livelihood and safety of
others are likewise in danger; (iii) that the
people could no longer rely on the Court's
impartiality; and (iv) that she could not expect
fairness from the Court in resolving the quo
warranto petition against her.
Third. Respondent then proceeded to
advance the argument that her public
statements were actually aimed to discharge
her duty as a Justice and a lawyer to uphold
the Constitution and promote respect for the
law and legal processes pursuant to the CPR
and the NCJC.
Respondent's actions and statements are far
from being an innocent discharge of duty of
upholding the Constitution, the laws, rules, and
legal processes. On the contrary, they were
direct and loaded attacks to the Court and its
Members, which constitute a blatant
disrespect to the institution. Respondent
cannot justify her attacks against the Court
under the guise of merely discharging her
duties as a Justice and a member of the Bar.
No matter how passionate a lawyer is towards
defending his cause or what he believes in, he
must not forget to display the appropriate
decorum expected of him, being a member
of the legal profession, and to continue to
afford proper and utmost respect due to the
courts.
The tenor of the statements made by the
Solicitor General, as well as the newsman, was
never made to challenge the Court's authority
or to undermine its ability to pass judgment
with impartiality. Neither were those
statements aimed at criticizing the professional
competence and responsibility of the
magistrates as well as the Court as a collegial
A LO | B A JA O | B E RM U D O
body. Put differently, those statements had
nothing to do with assailing the capacity of this
Court to render justice according to law,
which is what the respondent has been doing
through her public speeches.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing,
respondent Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno is found
guilty of violating CANON 13, Rule 13.02, and
CANON 11 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, Sections 3, 7, and 8 of CANON 1,
Sections 1 and 2 of CANON 2, Sections 2 and 4
of CANON 3, and Sections 2 and 6 of CANON
4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the
Philippine Judiciary. Thereby, after deep
reflection and deliberation, in lieu of
suspension, respondent is meted the penalty
of REPRIMAND with a STERN WARNING that a
repetition of a similar offense or any offense
violative of the Lawyer's Oath and the Code of
Professional Responsibility shall merit a heavier
penalty of a fine and/or suspension or
disbarment.
Ang buhay ng abogado both in public
and private should reflect integrity and honesty.
You are not supposed to distinguish our public
and private life.
What happened to Sereno here? What was the
penalty given?
She was actualy disqualified and was
removed from her position. Moreover,
Respondent Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno was
found guilty of violating CANON 13, Rule 13.02,
and CANON 11 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, Sections 3, 7, and 8 of CANON 1,
Sections 1 and 2 of CANON 2, Sections 2 and 4 of
CANON 3, and Sections 2 and 6 of CANON 4 of
the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the
Philippine Judiciary. Thereby, after deep
reflection and deliberation, in lieu of suspension,
respondent is meted the penalty
of REPRIMAND with a STERN WARNING that a
repetition of a similar offense or any offense
violative of the Lawyer's Oath and the Code of
Professional Responsibility shall merit a heavier
penalty of a fine and/or suspension or
disbarment.
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You know what’s the danger of what
she’s doing that time? Ikaw ang CJ. Di ka pa
naman na-unseat. You are saying these things.
You are giving the public the impression that you
cannot trust the court system that you are
actually in. CJ mismo yung nagsasabi na may
problem yung ating justice system. Yung mga
nakaupo dito kayang hawakan sa ilong. So ikaw
ngayon, bakit pa ako pupunta sa court? EJK na
lang ako. This is a manifestation that there is a
lack of trust in the justice system. Buti na lang
friends kaya reprimand lang.
FINANCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY
MARILI RONQUILLO VS ATTY CEZAR
Complainants seek the disbarment or
suspension of respondent from the practice of
law for unlawful, dishonest, immoral and
deceitful conduct. They allege that
respondent sold them a piece of property over
which he has no right nor interest, and that he
refuses to return to them the amount they have
paid him for it.
For the price of P1.5M, respondent transferred,
in favor of the complainants, his rights and
interests over a townhouse unit and lot.
Respondent also obligated himself to deliver to
complainants a copy of the Contract to Sell he
executed with Crown Asia, the townhouse
developed. Upon full payment of the
purchase price, respondent further undertook
to have Crown Asia execute a Deed of
Absolute Sale over the property in favor of the
complainants.
Respondent received from
complainants P750,000.00 upon execution of
the Deed of Assignment. The balance was to
be paid by complainants in four equal
quarterly installments of P187,500.00 each.
Thus, complainants issued in favor of
respondent four postdated checks.
Respondent was able to encash the first
check.
Complainants subsequently received
information from Crown Asia that respondent
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has not paid in full the price of the townhouse
at the time he executed the Deed of
Assignment. Respondent also failed to deliver
to complainants a copy of the Contract to Sell
he allegedly executed with Crown Asia.
Respondent did not make good his promise to
pay Crown Asia in full, or return the amount
paid by complainants.
Complainants’ counsel sent respondent a
second letter demanding the return of the
amount of P937,500.00, including legal interest,
for failing to comply with his promise. The
demand was unheeded.
Hence, this administrative complaint that
respondent engaged in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct. Allegedly,
respondent violated his oath under Rule 1.01,
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and he ought to be disbarred or
suspended from the practice of law.
IBP found respondent guilty of dishonest and
deceitful conduct proscribed under Rule 1.01,
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. She recommended that
respondent be suspended from the practice
of law for a period of three (3) years.
ISSUE
Whether Atty Cezar violated the CPR.
YES
Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules
of Court, a member of the Bar may be
disbarred or suspended on any of the following
grounds: (1) deceit; (2) malpractice or other
gross misconduct in office; (3) grossly immoral
conduct; (4) conviction of a crime involving
moral turpitude; (5) violation of the lawyer’s
oath; (6) willful disobedience of any lawful
order of a superior court; and (7) willfully
appearing as an attorney for a party without
authority. Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility provides that "A
lawyer shall not engage
in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct."
"Conduct," as used in this rule, does not refer
exclusively to the performance of a lawyer’s
professional duties. This Court has made clear
in a long line of cases that a lawyer may be
disbarred or suspended for misconduct,
whether in his professional or private capacity,
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which shows him to be wanting in moral
character, honesty, probity and good
demeanor, or unworthy to continue as an
officer of the court.
In the instant case, respondent may have
acted in his private capacity when he entered
into a contract with complainant Marili
representing to have the rights to transfer title
over the townhouse unit and lot in question.
When he failed in his undertaking, respondent
fell short of his duty under Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility. It
cannot be gainsaid that it was unlawful for
respondent to transfer property over which
one has no legal right of ownership.
Respondent was likewise guilty of dishonest
and deceitful conduct when he concealed
this lack of right from complainants. He did not
inform the complainants that he has not yet
paid in full the price of the subject townhouse
unit and lot, and, therefore, he had no right to
sell, transfer or assign said property at the time
of the execution of the Deed of Assignment.
His acceptance of the bulk of the purchase
price amounting to (P937,500.00), despite
knowing he was not entitled to it, made
matters worse for him.
By his actuations, respondent failed to live up
to the strict standard of morality required by
the Code of Professional Responsibility and
violated the trust and respect reposed in him
as a member of the Bar, and an officer of the
court.
Respondent’s culpability is therefore clear. He
received a letter from complainants’ counsel
demanding the execution of the Deed of
Absolute Sale in favor of the complainants, or,
in the alternative, the return of the money paid
by complainants. In reply to said letter,
respondent acknowledged his obligation, and
promised to settle the same if given sufficient
time.
To be sure, complainants gave respondent
sufficient time to fulfill his obligation. It was only
after almost two years had passed, after
respondent promised to pay Crown Asia or
return to complainants the amount they paid
him, that complainants sent respondent a
second letter demanding solely the return of
the amount of P937,500.00, including legal
interest. By this time, it was indubitable that
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respondent would not be able to perform his
end of their agreement.
The practice of law is not a right but a privilege.
It is granted only to those of good moral
character. The Bar must maintain a high
standard of honesty and fair dealing. Lawyers
must conduct themselves beyond reproach at
all times, whether they are dealing with their
clients or the public at large, and a violation of
the high moral standards of the legal
profession justifies the imposition of the
appropriate penalty, including suspension and
disbarment.
Atty. Homobono T. Cezar is SUSPENDED from
the practice of law for a period of THREE (3)
YEARS.
Is the transaction done by the lawyer in his
professional capacity?
It was done not in his professional
capacity but as an ordinary citizen, in his private
capacity.
What happened to the lawyer?
When he failed in his undertaking,
respondent fell short of his duty under Rule 1.01,
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. It cannot be gainsaid that it was
unlawful for respondent to transfer property over
which one has no legal right of ownership.
Respondent was likewise guilty of dishonest and
deceitful conduct when he concealed this lack
of right from complainants. He did not inform the
complainants that he has not yet paid in full the
price of the subject townhouse unit and lot, and,
therefore, he had no right to sell, transfer or assign
said property at the time of the execution of the
Deed of Assignment.
Thus, Atty. Homobono T. Cezar
is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a
period of THREE (3) YEARS.
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BELLEZA VS MACASA Rule 16.02 – A lawyer shall keep the funds of

Dolores Belleza to avail of Atty. Macasa’s legal each client separate and apart from his own
services in connection with the case of her son, and those others kept by him.
Francis John Belleza, who was arrested by
policemen of Bacolod City earlier that day for The fiduciary nature of the relationship
alleged violation of Republic Act (RA) 9165. between counsel and client imposes on a
Respondent agreed to handle the case for lawyer the duty to account for the money or
P30,000. property collected or received for or from the
client. When a lawyer collects or receives
The following day, Belleza made a partial
money from his client for a particular purpose
payment of P15,000 to Atty. Macasa thru their
(such as for filing fees, registration fees,
mutual friend Chua. On November 17, 2004,
transportation and office expenses), he should
she gave him an additional P10,000. She paid
promptly account to the client how the money
the P5,000 balance on November 18, 2004.
was spent. If he does not use the money for its
Both payments were also made thru Chua. On
intended purpose, he must immediately return
all three occasions, respondent did not issue
it to the client. His failure either to render an
any receipt.
accounting or to return the money (if the
intended purpose of the money does not
On November 21, 2004, respondent received
materialize) constitutes a blatant disregard of
P18,000 from complainant for the purpose of
Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional
posting a bond to secure the provisional liberty
Responsibility.
of her (complainant’s) son. Again, respondent
did not issue any receipt. When complainant
Moreover, a lawyer has the duty to deliver his
went to the court the next day, she found out
client’s funds or properties as they fall due or
that respondent did not remit the amount to
upon demand. His failure to return the client’s
the court.
money upon demand gives rise to the
presumption that he has misappropriated it for
Complainant demanded the return of the
his own use to the prejudice of and in violation
P18,000 from respondent on several occasions
of the trust reposed in him by the client. It is a
but respondent ignored her. Moreover,
gross violation of general morality as well as of
respondent failed to act on the case of
professional ethics; it impairs public
complainant’s son and complainant was
confidence in the legal profession and
forced to avail of the services of the Public
deserves punishment. Indeed, it may border
Attorney’s Office for her son’s defense.
on the criminal as it may constitute a prima
facie case of swindling or estafa.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Macasa violated the
Respondent never denied receiving P18,000
Code/Canons
from complainant for the purpose of posting a
bond to secure the provisional liberty of her
Yes. Atty. Macasa is guilty of violation of Rule
son. He never used the money for its intended
1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
purpose yet also never returned it to the client.
which provides:
Worse, he unjustifiably refused to turn over the
amount to complainant despite the latter’s
Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in
repeated demands.
unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or deceitful
conduct.
How much was the attorney’ fees?
He is also guilty of violation of Rules 16.01 and
16.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility: P30,000 as acceptance fee. Ito para ma-
inspire kayo, nag-release ang IBP Davao ng new
Rule 16.01 – A lawyer shall account for all rates. Criminal cases within the jurisdication of
money or property collected or received for or MTC - 50,000; within the jurisdiction of RTC, CTA,
from the client.
SB, penalty is more tha 6 years – 75,000. Pag non-

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bilable – 100,000. Tapos ang appearance fees filed the instant administrative case against
ngayon within Davao, 3000. Dapat sana per respondent before this Court.
kilometer.
ISSUE
For a total of 48,000, what happened to him? Whether respondent should be held
administratively liable for violating the
He was disbarred. That is not even worth CPR.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
the semester here in AdDU. Wag tularan. Mag
YES
cost-benefit analysis ka na.
A lawyer's neglect of a legal matter entrusted
to him by his client constitutes inexcusable
SPOUSES JONATHAN AND ESTHER LOPEZ negligence for which he must be held
VS ATTY LIMOS administratively liable, as in this case.
Complainants alleged that sometime in June
In this relation, respondent also violated Rules
2006, and while living abroad, they secured
16.01 and 16.03, Canon 16 of the CPR when
the services of respondent as counsel in
she failed to return the amount of P75,000.00
connection with their intention to adopt a
representing legal fees that complainants paid
minor child, Ethan Benedict Victore. In
her.
consideration therefor, complainants, through
a representative,paid respondent the
The highly fiduciary nature of this relationship
aggregate amount of P75,000.00, which was
imposes upon the lawyer the duty to account
duly received by the latter. A few months later,
for the money or property collected or
or on October 6, 2006, they purposely came
received for or from his client. Thus, a lawyer's
back to the Philippines for a two (2)-week stay
failure to return upon demand the funds held
to commence the filing of the adoption case
by him on behalf of his client - as in this case -
before the proper court. However, despite
gives rise to the presumption that he has
payment and submission of all the required
appropriated the same for his own use in
documents to respondent, no petition was
violation of the trust reposed in him by his
filed during their stay.
client. Such act is a gross violation of general
morality, as well as of professional
Complainants, through Jonathan's employer,
ethics.cralawred
received respondent's letter requesting that
complainants be allowed to come home to
Even worse, respondent misrepresented to
the Philippines to appear and testify in court for
complainants that she had already
the adoption case she purportedly filed on
commenced an adoption proceeding on
behalf of complainants before the Regional
behalf of the latter. He requested that he,
Trial Court. Thus, complainants returned to the
together with her wife, Ester, be allowed to
Philippines in June 2007, only to find out that:
come home to the Philippines to appear and
(a) Spl. Proc. Case No. 2890 referred to a
testify in court. She even provided them with a
petition for the declaration of the presumptive
case number, Spl. Proc. Case No. 2890, which
death of another person filed by another
was purportedly pending before the RTC. Such
lawyer; and (b) respondent had yet to file a
misrepresentation resulted in complainants
petition for adoption on their behalf. Utterly
going through the trouble of coming back to
dismayed, complainants withdrew all their
the Philippines, only to find out that: (a) Spl.
documents from respondent's custody and
Proc. Case No. 2890 referred to a petition for
hired another lawyer to handle the filing of the
the declaration of the presumptive death of
adoption case. Moreover, complainants
another person filed by another lawyer; and
demanded the return of the amount of
(b) respondent had yet to file a petition for
P75,000.00 given as legal fees. However,
adoption on their behalf. These deceitful acts
respondent refused to return such money,
of respondent clearly violate Rule 1.01, Canon
retorting that as a standard operating
1 of the CPR. Indubitably, respondent fell short
procedure, she does not return "acceptance
of such standard when she committed the
fees." In view of the foregoing, complainants

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 PROBLEM AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS
BASED ON THE LECTURES OF ATTY ARNOLD ABEJARON
2019 MANRESA III

afore-described acts of deception against

complainants. Such acts are not only
unacceptable, disgraceful, and dishonorable
to the legal profession; they reveal basic moral
flaws that make him unfit to practice
law.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

To aggravate further respondent's

administrative liability, the Court notes that it
repeatedly required her to comment on
complainants' petition, but respondent
ignored such commands. Similarly, when the
instant case was referred to the IBP for
investigation, report, and recommendation,
respondent again disregarded the directives
of the Investigating Commissioner to attend
the mandatory conference and to submit a
position paper. Such audacity on the part of
respondent - which caused undue delay in the
resolution of the instant administrative case -
contravenes Canon 11 and Rule 12.04, Canon
12 of the CPR.

Atty. Sinamar E. Limos is found GUILTY of

violating Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, Canon 11, Rule
12.04 of Canon 12, Rules 16.01 and 16.03 of
Canon 16, and Rule 18.03 of Canon 18 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility.
Accordingly, she is hereby SUSPENDED from
the practice of law for a period of three (3)
years.

- END -

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