Professional Documents
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Cases On Parties
Cases On Parties
FACTS: PURA KALAW OWNED A LOT IN QUEZON CITY. THE PROPERTY WAS
ADJACENT TO A LOT OWNED BY LISING BUT LATER ON SOLD TO PETITIONER
SPS OQUILA. Sometime in 1969, Pura Kalaw Ledesma filed a complaint,
docketed as Civil Case No. Q-12918,
with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City against Herminigilda Pedro and
Mariano Lising
for allegedly encroaching upon Lot 689. On August 21, 1991, the trial court
finally adjudged defendants Pedro and Lising jointly and
severally liable for encroaching on plaintiffs land. As a result, in February
1998, the Deputy Sheriff of Quezon City directed petitioners, through
an alias writ of execution, to remove the house they constructed on the land
they were
occupying. Considering that the decision rendered in the instant case had
become final and executory, the
Court, in its Order of November 14, 1997, directed the issuance of an alias
writ of execution for
the enforcement of the said decision. To prohibit Judge Vivencio Baclig of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City from issuing a
writ of demolition and the Quezon City sheriff from implementing the alias
writ of execution,
petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for prohibition with
prayer for a
restraining order and preliminary injunction on April 17, 1998. 5 Petitioners
alleged that they
bought the subject parcel of land in good faith and for value, hence, they
were parties in interest.
Since they were not impleaded in Civil Case No. Q-12918, the writ of
demolition issued in
connection therewith cannot be enforced against them because to do so
would amount to
deprivation of property without due process of law. The Court of Appeals
dismissed the petition on January 28, 1999. It held that as buyers and
successors-in-interest of Mariano Lising, petitioners were considered privies
who derived their
rights from Lising by virtue of the sale and could be reached by the execution
order in Civil
Case No. Q-12918. Thus, for lack of merit, the petition was ordered
Dismissed
ISSUE: THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
DECISION IN
CIVIL CASE NO. Q-12918 CAN ALSO BE ENFORCED AGAINST THE PETITIONERS
EVEN
IF THEY WERE NOT IMPLEADED AS PARTIES THERETO.
RULING: GRANTED. Medina markedly differs from the present case on major
points. First, the petitioner
in Medina acquired the right over the houses and lot subject of the dispute
after the original
action was commenced and became final and executory. In the present case,
petitioners
acquired the lot before the commencement of Civil Case No. Q-12918.
Second, the right over the
disputed land of the predecessors-in-interest of the petitioner in Medina was
based on a title of
doubtful authenticity, allegedly a Titulo de Composicion Con El Estado
issued by the Spanish
Government in favor of one Don Mariano San Pedro y Esteban, while the right
over the land of
the predecessors-in-interest of herein petitioners is based on a fully
recognized Torrens
title. Third, petitioners in this case acquired the registered title in their own
names, while the
petitioner in Medina merely relied on the title of her predecessor-in-interest
and tax
declarations to prove her alleged ownership of the land. We must stress that
where a case like the present one involves a sale of a parcel of land under
the Torrens system, the applicable rule is that a person dealing with the
registered property
need not go beyond the certificate of title; he can rely solely on the title and
he is charged with
notice only of such burdens and claims as are annotated on the title. 9 It is our
view here that
the petitioners, spouses Victor and Honorata Orquiola, are fully entitled to the
legal protection
of their lot by the Torrens system, unlike the petitioner in the Medina case
who merely relied
on a mere Titulo de Composicion.
Under this ruling, either of the spouses Go may bring an action against
Navarro to recover
possession of the Kargo Enterprises-leased vehicles which they co-own. This
conclusion is
consistent with Article 124 of the Family Code, supporting as it does the
position that either
spouse may act on behalf of the conjugal partnership, so long as they do not
dispose of or
encumber the property in question without the other spouse’s consent.
On this basis, we hold that since Glenn Go is not strictly an indispensable
party in the action
to recover possession of the leased vehicles, he only needs to be impleaded
as a pro-forma party
to the suit, based on Section 4, Rule 4 of the Rules, which states:
Section 4. Spouses as parties. – Husband and wife shall sue or be sued jointly,
except as
provided by law.
Non-joinder of indispensable parties not ground to dismiss action
Even assuming that Glenn Go is an indispensable party to the action, we
have held in a number
of cases26 that the misjoinder or non-joinder of indispensable parties in a
complaint is not a
ground for dismissal of action. As we stated in Macababbad v. Masirag:
Rule 3, Section 11 of the Rules of Court provides that neither misjoinder nor
nonjoinder of
parties is a ground for the dismissal of an action, thus:
Sec. 11. Misjoinder and non-joinder of parties. Neither misjoinder nor non-
joinder of parties is
ground for dismissal of an action. Parties may be dropped or added by order
of the court on
motion of any party or on its own initiative at any stage of the action and on
such terms as are
just. Any claim against a misjoined party may be severed and proceeded with
separately
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. EDUARDO M.
CACAYURAN, Respondent,
MUNICIPALITY OF AGOO, LA UNION, Intervenor
FACTS: The instant case arose from two (2) loans (Subject Loans) entered
into by the Municipality with
LBP in order to finance the Redevelopment Plan of the Agoo Public Plaza
(Public Plaza).
Through Resolution Nos. 68-20057 and 139-2005,8 the Sangguniang Bayan of
the Municipality
(Sangguniang Bayan) authorized its then-Mayor Eufranio Eriguel (Mayor
Eriguel) to enter into
a P4,000,000.00-loan with LBP, the proceeds of which were used to construct
ten (10) kiosks at
the Public Plaza. Around a year later, the SB issued Resolution Nos. 58-2006 9
and 128-
2006,10 this time authorizing Mayor Eriguel to obtain a P28,000,000.00-loan
from LBP for the
construction of a commercial center named "Agoo People's Center" within the
premises of the
Public Plaza. In order to secure the Subject Loans, the Municipality used as
collateral, among
others, a 2,323.75-square meter lot situated at the south eastern portion of
the Public Plaza
(Plaza Lot).11
However, a group of residents, led by respondent Eduardo M. Cacayuran
(Cacayuran), opposed
the redevelopment of the Public Plaza, as well as the funding therefor thru
the Subject Loans,
claiming that these were "highly irregular, violative of the law, and
detrimental to public
interests, and will result to wanton desecration of the [Public Plaza]." the
municipal officers moved for the outright dismissal of the complaint, which
was
denied, thus constraining them to file their respective answers. For its part,
LBP asserted, inter
alia, that Cacayuran did not have any cause of action since he was not privy
to the loan
agreements entered into by LBP and the Municipality. 16
During the pendency of the proceedings, the construction of the Agoo
People's Center was
completed. Later on, the Sangguniang Bayan passed Municipal Ordinance
No. 02-
200717 declaring the area where such building stood as patrimonial property
of the
Municipality. RTC DECLARED THE RESOLUTION AS ULTRA VIRES. THEY
ELEVATED THE CASE TO CA WHICH AFFIRMED ALSO THE RULING OF THE RTC.
ISSUE: The core issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the
Municipality should be
RULING. The Court rules in the affirmative.
Section 7, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court mandates that all indispensable
parties should be joined
in a suit, viz.:
SEC. 7. Compulsory joinder of indispensable parties. - Parties-in-interest
without whom no
final determination can be had of an action shall be joined either as plaintiffs
or defendants.
"An indispensable party is one whose interest will be affected by the court's
action in the
litigation, and without whom no final determination of the case can be had.
The party's interest
in the subject matter of the suit and in the relief sought are so inextricably
intertwined with
the other parties' that his legal presence as a party to the proceeding is an
absolute necessity.
In his absence, there cannot be a resolution of the dispute of the parties
before the court which
is effective, complete, or equitable."37Thus, the absence of an indispensable
party renders all
subsequent actions of the court null and void, for want of authority to act, not
only as to the
absent parties but even as to those present.
The non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for the dismissal of
an action . At any
stage of a judicial proceeding and/or at such times as are just, parties may be
added on the
motion of a party or on the initiative of the tribunal concerned. If the plaintiff
refuses to implead
an indispensable party despite the order of the court, that court may dismiss
the complaint for
the plaintiffs failure to comply with the order. The remedy is to implead the
non-party claimed
to be indispensable.
Be that as it may, the Court is not precluded from taking cognizance of the
Municipality's status
as an indispensable party even at this stage of the proceedings. Indeed, the
presence of
indispensable parties is necessary to vest the court with jurisdiction 44 and,
corollarily, the issue
on jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceedings. 45 Thus, as it
has now come to the
fore that any resolution of this case would not be possible and, hence, not
attain any real finality
due to the non-joinder of the Municipality, the Court is constrained to set
aside all subsequent
actuations of the courts a quo in this case, including that of the Court's, and
remand the case
all the way back to the RTC for the inclusion of all indispensable parties to the
case and its
immediate disposition on the merits.46 With this, the propriety of the
Municipality's present
intervention is now mooted.
DIVINIGRACIA VS PARILLA 753 SCRA 87 (2015)
VENUE OF ACTIONS: REAL ACTIONS, PERSONAL ACTIONS
DISTINCTION BETWEEN JURISDICTION AND VENUE
PACIFIC CONSULTANTS INTERNATIONAL ASIA, INC. and JENS PETER
HENRICHSEN, Petitioners,
vs.
KLAUS K. SCHONFELD, Respondent.
FACTS: