APIT , SARAH T. JD-3 ADR ATTY .

Lawrence Louie Uy

CASE DIGEST 2

1) G.R. No. L-60367 September 30, 1982

ATTY. VENUSTIANO T. TAVORA, petitioner,
vs. HON. ROSARIO R. VELOSO, in her capacity as the Presiding Judge of Branch III of the City
Court of Manila, and JULIETA CAPATI, respondents.

A resident of Marikina, Metro Manila files an ejectment case against a tenant in Quiapo,
Manila, leading to a dispute over jurisdiction between the city court and the barangay court.
The Supreme Court rules in favor of the city court, stating that the barangay court has no
authority over disputes involving parties from different cities, allowing the ejectment case to
proceed.

Decision Date. 1982-09-30. A resident of Marikina, Metro Manila files an ejectment case against
a tenant in Quiapo, Manila, but the city court dismisses the case for lack of jurisdiction due to
failure to bring the dispute to the barangay court, leading to a Supreme Court ruling that the
dismissal was erroneous.

Facts:
 Petitioner, Atty. Venustiano T. Tavora, filed an ejectment case against respondent, Julieta
Capati, who was leasing his apartment in Quiapo, Manila.
 Petitioner alleged that respondent violated the lease agreement by subleasing the property
without authorization and failing to pay rent.
 Petitioner is a resident of Marikina, Metro Manila.
 Respondent filed a motion to dismiss the case, arguing that the city court lacked jurisdiction
because the petitioner failed to bring the dispute to the barangay court for possible amicable
settlement.

Issue:
 Whether the city court judge is barred from taking cognizance of the ejectment case due to the
petitioner's failure to bring the dispute to the barangay court for settlement.

Ruling:
 The Supreme Court held that the city court erred in dismissing the ejectment case.
 The court ruled that there was no need for settlement at the barangay level because the parties
involved were not actual residents of the same barangay, nor of different barangays within the
same city or municipality, nor of adjoining barangays of different cities or municipalities.
 The court granted the petition, set aside the order of dismissal, and directed the respondent
city judge to hear and decide the ejectment case on its merits.
 The court based its decision on the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1508, which governs
the jurisdiction of barangay courts.
 The court interpreted the relevant provisions of the decree to mean that the Lupon (barangay
court) has no authority over disputes where the parties are not actual residents of the same city
or municipality, except in cases where the barangays in which they reside adjoin each other.
 The court clarified that the provision stating that disputes involving real property should be
brought in the barangay where the property is situated should be understood as a proviso that
restricts or varies the rule on venue prescribed in the principal clauses of the decree.
 In this case, since the petitioner and respondent resided in different cities, no Lupon was
authorized to take cognizance of their dispute.
 Therefore, the city court judge should have heard and decided the ejectment case on its merits.

2) G.R. No. 176405 August 20, 2008

LEO WEE, petitioner,
vs. GEORGE DE CASTRO (on his behalf and as attorney-in-fact of ANNIE DE CASTRO and
FELOMINA UBAN) and MARTINIANA DE CASTRO, respondents.

Facts:
Respondents alleged that they are the registered owners of the subject property, a two-storey
building erected on a parcel of land .Respondents rented out the subject property to petitioner
on a month to month basis for P9,000.00 per month. Both parties agreed that effective 1
October 2001, the rental payment shall be increased from P9,000.00 to P15,000.00. Petitioner,
however failed or refused to pay the corresponding increase on rent when his rental obligation
for the month of 1 October 2001 became due. The rental dispute was brought to the Lupon
Tagapagpamayapa to amicably settle the matter but the parties failed to reach an
agreement.Respondent George de Castro sent a letter to petitioner terminating their lease
agreement and demanding that the latter vacate and turn over the subject property to
respondents. Since petitioner stubbornly refused to comply with said demand letter,
respondent filed the Complaint for ejectment before the MTC. That although the Complaint
stated that it was being filed by all of the respondents, the Verification and the Certificate of
Non-Forum Shopping were signed by respondent George de Castro alone. He would
subsequently attach to his position paper filed before the MTC on 28 October 2002 the Special
Powers of Attorney (SPAs) executed by his sisters Annie de Castro and Felomina de Castro Uban
dated authorizing him to institute the ejectment case against petitioner. Petitioner, on the
other hand, countered that there was no agreement between the parties to increase the
monthly rentals and respondents' demand for an increase was exorbitant. The agreed monthly
rental was only for the amount of P9,000.00 and he was religiously paying the same every
month.
After the submission of the parties of their respective Position Papers, the MTC, on 21
November 2002, rendered a Decision [10] dismissing respondents' Complaint in Civil Case No.
1990 for failure to comply with the prior conciliation requirement before the Barangay Lupon.
On appeal the RTC affirming the dismissal of respondents' Complaint for ejectment after finding
that the appealed MTC Decision was based on facts and law on the matter.
The RTC declared that since the original agreement entered into by the parties was for
petitioner to pay only the sum of P9.000.00 per month for the rent of the subject property, and
no concession was reached by the parties to increase such amount to P15.000.00, petitioner
cannot be faulted for paying only the originally agreed upon monthly rentals.
Finally, the RTC decreed that respondents' Complaint failed to comply with the rule that a co-
owner could not maintain an action without joining all the other co-owners.
Undaunted, respondents filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with the Court of Appeals
Respondents argued in their Petition that the RTC gravely erred in ruling that their failure to
comply with the conciliation process was fatal to their Complaint, since it is only respondent
George de Castro who resides in Alaminos City, Pangasinan, while respondent Annie de Castro
resides in Pennsylvania, United States of America (USA); respondent Felomina de Castro Uban,
in California, USA; and respondent Jesus de Castro, now substituted by his wife, Martiniana,
resides in Manila.
Finally, respondents posited that the fact that only respondent George de Castro signed the
Verification and the Certificate of Non-Forum Shopping attached to the Complaint was
irrelevant since the other respondents already executed Special Powers of Attorney (SPAs)
authorizing him to act as their attorney-in-fact in the institution of the ejectment suit against
the petitioner.
The Court of Appeals rendered a Decision granting the respondents' Petition and ordering
petitioner to vacate the subject property and turn over the same to respondents
Issues:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT THE FILING OF THE
COMPLAINT OF RESPONDENT GEORGE DE CASTRO WITHOUT JOINING ALL HIS OTHER CO-
OWNERS OVER THE SUBJECT PROPERTY IS PROPER.
Petitioner next argues that respondent George de Castro cannot maintain an action for
ejectment against petitioner, without joining all his co-owners.
Ruling:
ART. 487. Any one of the co-owners may bring an action in ejectment.
This article covers all kinds of action for the recovery of possession, i.e., forcible entry and
unlawful detainer (accion interdictal), recovery of possession (accion publiciana), and recovery
of ownership (accion de reivindicacion).
A co-owner may bring such an action, without the necessity of joining all the other co-owners
as co-plaintiffs, because the suit is deemed to be instituted for the benefit of all. If the action is
for the benefit of the plaintiff alone, such that he claims possession for himself and not for the
co-ownership, the action will not prosper.
The Court declared that a co-owner is not even a necessary party to an action for ejectment,
for complete relief can be afforded even in his absence, thus In sum, in suits to recover
properties, all co-owners are real parties in interest. However, pursuant to Article 487 of the
Civil Code and the relevant jurisprudence, any one of them may bring an action, any kind of
action for the recovery of co-owned properties.
Therefore, only one of the co-owners, namely the co-owner who filed the suit for the recovery
of the co-owned property, is an indispensable party thereto.
The other co-owners are not indispensable parties.Moreover, respondents Annie de Castro and
Felomina de Castro Uban each executed a Special Power of Attorney, giving respondent George
de Castro the authority to initiate Civil Case No. 1990.
A power of attorney is an instrument in writing by which one person, as principal, appoints
another as his agent and confers upon him the authority to perform certain specified acts or
kinds of acts on behalf of the principal. The written authorization itself is the power of attorney,
and this is clearly indicated by the fact that it has also been called a "letter of attorney.
Even then, the Court views the SPAs as mere surplusage, such that the lack thereof does not in
any way affect the validity of the action for ejectment instituted by respondent George de
Castro. This also disposes of petitioner's contention that respondent George de Castro lacked
the authority to sign the Verification and the Certificate of Non-Forum Shopping.
We likewise hold that the execution of the certification against forum shopping by the attorney-
in-fact in the case at bar is not a violation of the requirement that the parties must personally
sign the same. The attorney-in-fact, who has authority to file and who actually filed the
complaint as the representative of the plaintiff co-owner, pursuant to a Special Power of
Attorney, is a party to the ejectment suit. In fact, Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court
includes the representative of the owner in an ejectment suit as one... of the parties authorized
to institute the proceedings.
Failure by respondent George de Castro to attach the said SPAs to the Complaint is innocuous,
since it is undisputed that he was granted by his sisters the authority to file the action for
ejectment against petitioner prior to the institution of Civil Case.
 3)
[G.R. No. L-62339. October 27, 1983.]
SPOUSES MARIA LUISA P. MORATA AND JULIUS MORATA, Petitioners, v. SPOUSES
VICTOR GO and FLORA C. GO and HON. VALERIANO P. TOMOL, JR., Judge, Court of
First Instance of Cebu, Branch XI, Respondents.

The case of Morata v. Go involves the interpretation of the Katarungang Pambarangay Law and
addresses whether it applies to actions cognizable by regional trial courts or only to cases falling
within the exclusive jurisdiction of metropolitan and municipal trial courts. The Supreme Court
rules that the conciliation process at the barangay level applies to all types of disputes,
regardless of the amount involved or the nature of the original dispute.

Facts:
 The case involves the interpretation of the Katarungang Pambarangay Law.
 The petitioners, Spouses Maria Luisa P. Morata and Julius Morata, filed a motion to dismiss a
complaint filed against them by Spouses Victor Go and Flora C. Go for recovery of a sum of
money plus damages.
 The petitioners argued that the complaint should have undergone the barangay conciliation
process required by the Katarungang Pambarangay Law before being filed in court.
 The motion to dismiss was denied by the respondent judge.
 The petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Supreme Court.

Issue:
 Whether the conciliation process at the barangay level applies to all types of disputes,
regardless of the amount involved or the nature of the original dispute.

Ruling:
 The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the petitioners.
 The conciliation process at the barangay level applies to all types of disputes, except for those
specifically excluded by the law.
 The purpose of the conciliation process is to avoid animosity generated by protracted court
litigations and to discourage indiscriminate filing of cases in court.
 The law does not distinguish between the classes of civil disputes that should be compromised
at the barangay level.
 The authority of the Lupon (barangay council) is not limited to cases exclusively cognizable by
inferior courts.
 A circular issued by Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando directed all judges, including those of
regional trial courts, to desist from receiving complaints, petitions, actions, or proceedings in
cases falling within the authority of the barangay Lupons (conciliation panels).
 The conciliation process at the barangay level, prescribed by the Katarungang Pambarangay
Law, is compulsory for cases falling under the jurisdiction of metropolitan, municipal, and
regional trial courts.
 The order of the respondent judge denying the motion to dismiss was set aside.
 The respondent judge was restrained from conducting further proceedings in the case, except
to dismiss it.

4) G.R. No. 153567 February 18, 2008

LIBRADA M. AQUINO, petitioner,vs. ERNEST S. AURE1, respondent.

A dispute over a parcel of land in Quezon City leads to a legal battle over jurisdiction and the
requirement of barangay conciliation in an ejectment case, ultimately resulting in the Supreme
Court affirming the jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Court and ruling that non-compliance
with barangay conciliation does not warrant dismissal.

Facts:
 The case involves a parcel of land in Roxas District, Quezon City.
 Aure and Aure Lending filed a complaint for ejectment against Aquino.
 Aure and Aure Lending alleged that they acquired the property from Aquino through a Deed of
Sale.
 Aquino refused to vacate the property after receiving payment.
 Aquino countered that the sale was governed by a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) and that
she did not receive the proceeds from the loan secured by Aure.
 The Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) initially dismissed the complaint for non-compliance with
barangay conciliation and other grounds.
 The Regional Trial Court (RTC) affirmed the dismissal.
 The Court of Appeals reversed the decision and remanded the case to the MeTC for further
proceedings.
 Aquino appealed to the Supreme Court.

Issue:
1. Whether non-compliance with barangay conciliation proceedings is a jurisdictional defect that
warrants the dismissal of the complaint.
2. Whether an allegation of ownership deprives the MeTC of jurisdiction over an ejectment case.

Ruling:
 Non-compliance with barangay conciliation is not a jurisdictional flaw and does not affect the
court's jurisdiction over the case.
 Aquino's failure to raise this objection in her answer to the complaint constitutes a waiver of
such defense.
 The MeTC has jurisdiction over the ejectment case based on the allegations in the complaint,
even if the question of ownership is raised.
 The issue of ownership in ejectment cases is only resolved to determine the issue of possession.
 The Supreme Court held that non-compliance with barangay conciliation is not a jurisdictional
defect. The purpose of barangay conciliation is to promote amicable settlement of disputes and
to reduce the caseload of the courts. However, failure to comply with this requirement does
not deprive the court of its jurisdiction over the case. Aquino's failure to raise this defense in
her answer to the complaint constitutes a waiver of such defense.
 The court also clarified that the MeTC has jurisdiction over the ejectment case based on the
allegations in the complaint. The MeTC has jurisdiction over cases involving possession or
forcible entry and unlawful detainer. The issue of ownership is only resolved to determine the
issue of possession. In this case, the allegations in the complaint establish a cause of action for
ejectment, and the MeTC has jurisdiction to hear and decide the case.
 The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals, ruling that the MeTC has
jurisdiction over the ejectment case and that non-compliance with barangay conciliation does
not warrant dismissal. The case was remanded to the MeTC for further proceedings to
determine the substantive rights of the parties.