History of India 1750-1950

Analyse the rise and growth of communalism in India between 1920-47.

The religious bigot considers me an infidel

And the infidel deems me to be Muslim!
-Muhammad Iqbal (1877-1938)

Communalism is the belief that people who follow the same religion have common secular interests,
that is, common political, economic, social, and cultural interests. Thus, such religion-based socio-
political communities are seen as the fundamental units of Indian society. (This was also how the
colonial state viewed Indian society.) These different communities are alleged to have their own
leaders. It is also understood that the secular interests of one religious community are dissimilar and
divergent from that of other communities. In the ultimate stage of communal ideology, the interests of
different communities are seen to be mutually incompatible, antagonistic and hostile. For some, this
represents the essentialist view of Indian society: Hindu-Muslim antagonism was thus embedded in the
historical logic of India. The proponents of the two-nation theory and of ‘Hindi, Hindu, Hindustan’
belong to this group. However, there has been a historiographical shift from essentialist to historicist
beliefs. The construction of a ‘community’ cannot be dated before the twentieth century. Gyanendra
Pandey argues that communalism may be seen as a form of colonialist knowledge. He believes that
communalism and nationalism were part of the same discourse.

Communalism is a modern phenomenon. It emerged as the consequence of the emergence of modern

mass-based politics based on popular participation and mobilization. It is not uniquely Indian; it was
not an inevitable or inherent product of India’s peculiar historical and social development. Communal
consciousness arose as a result of the transformation of Indian society under the impact of colonialism
and the need to struggle against it.

Communal identities are often constructed around specifically religious (or ‘sacred’) symbols, such as
the issue of music before mosques, go korbani (‘cow slaughter’) or cow protection, the desecration of
idols, clashes over the observance of religious festivals, over ‘sacred space’ and ‘sacred time’. These
issues have often sparked off communal riots, and therefore, they have been assumed to be potent
symbols of communal identity. Sandra Freitag speaks of the construction of communal identity as ‘the
process by which activists could isolate out of religious practice particular symbols and could develop
around these symbols an idiom, a specialized vocabulary, to express the vision of community’.
Gyanendra Pandey, however, points to the specifically colonial construction of riots that such an
approach unquestioningly accepts. Joya Chatterji cogently points out that most ‘sacred symbols’ have
generally emerged recently.

Voluntary communal organizations and propaganda by the print and publication media played an
important role in the rise and growth of communalism. Riots, rampant between 1920-47, provided great
scope for publicity and vilification. The politics of language and linguistic identity formed another
facet of the struggle for identities of communities bounded by religion. Perceptions of ‘self’ and ‘other’
that were already gaining ground were further strengthened. In the twentieth century, with the
expansion of the area of conflict especially post-1937, power struggles linked up with struggles for
identity. With the development of communal identities, conflicts were frozen and used as propaganda to
perpetuate the idea of communalism.

In the Marxist perspective, represented by Bipan Chandra and others, communalism was one of the by-
products of the colonial character of the Indian economy, of colonial underdevelopment. The economic
stagnation under colonial rule led to widespread unemployment. As a result there was uneven economic
development and intense competition for jobs, especially in the field of government employment.
Group identities such as caste, province, and religion were used to enhance competitive capacity. The
main appeal and social base of communalism lay among the middle classes; in fact, it is seen as the
logic of middle class nationalism. Stagnant agriculture restricted opportunities in the countryside, and
rural youth too competed for jobs. This widened the social base of communalism to cover the rural
upper strata of peasants and landlords. In this framework communalism represented the ‘false
consciousness’ of a section of the middle classes, who were searching for short-term solutions to larger
economic problems. Communalism often distorted social tension and class conflict between exploiters
and the exploited belonging to different religions as communal conflict. It developed as a weapon of
economically and politically reactionary social classes and political forces. British rule and its policy of
‘divide and rule’ supported communalism and used it to counter and weaken the growing national
movement. The pronounced Hindu tinge in much of nationalist thought and propaganda in the
beginning of the twentieth century also contributed to the growth of communalism.

The Marxist analysis highlights the uneven development of the middle classes, competition for jobs,
and communalization of the class structure. C.A. Bayly in his work on the pre-history of communalism
in north India argues for the slow decline of the Muslim service gentry of the qasbah and the rise of the
Hindu mercantile community of the ganj. On the other hand, Paul Brass and Francis Robinson have
shown how it was the threat of becoming backward, rather than backwardness itself, which encouraged
Muslims in UP to organize separately. Such writings have nuanced the issue of uneven economic
development and it is clear that there was no uniform decline of the Muslim community. However
uneven development continues to be a valid analytical tool. Similarly the argument that class
antagonism became communalized over a period of time and that this was accentuated by the strategies
of mobilization has also been qualified. Communalism was understood to have radiated out from urban
centers to the countryside. As Partha Chatterjee points out while communalism as an ideology was
imported into the countryside, ‘the very nature of peasant consciousness…is religious.’ Religion to a
peasant community provides ‘an ontology, an epistemology… and a practical code of ethics.’ Such a
community is more tolerant of insider exploitation than outsider exploitation: in Bengal, Chatterjee
posits, Muslim rent-receivers were considered part of the peasant community whereas Hindu zamindars
and talukdars were not. Rafiuddin Ahmed in his study of the Bengal Muslims too argues for a complex
record for the evolution of Hindu-Muslim identities and relations in the countryside. He emphasizes the
role of revivalism and the process of ‘Ashrafisation’ that led to a neglect of popular syncretic culture.

In the nationalist perspective, the role of British policy in encouraging communalism is emphasized. It
is argued that the institutionalization of differences by colonial legislation allowed communities to live
in isolation. Muslim separatism and the fear of decline in position of Muslim elites are also
underscored. The nationalist perspective has been critiqued for downplaying the role of Hindu
communalism or majoritarianism, which is emphasized in the communitarian view.

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The roots of communalism, both Hindu and Muslim, can be traced to the end of the nineteenth century.
In 1880s, Sir Syed Ahmed Khan counter posed communalism to the national movement initiated by the
foundation of the Indian National Congress in 1885. In 1907 the All India Muslim League was founded
as a loyalist, communal, and conservative political organization. In the face of growing perception of
the threat posed by a Hindu majority, the League raised the slogan of separate Muslim interests,
demanded separate electorates and safeguards for Muslims in government services. Simultaneously,
Hindu communalism was also being born. It found expression in the anti cow-slaughter propaganda of
the 1890s and the Hindi-Urdu controversy. The All India Hindu Mahasabha was founded in 1915. The
introduction of separate electorates in the Morley-Minto Reforms of 1907 by the colonial state
institutionalized communal differences. The system of reservation of seats and weightage in
legislatures, government services, educational institutions, etc. also had the same consequences.

The Lucknow Pact of 1916 accepted separate electorates and the system of weightage and reservation
of seats for the minorities in the legislatures. Implicit was the Congress recognition of communal
politics. The years of the Khilafat- Non-Cooperation agitation (1920-22) marked a brief phase of
Hindu-Muslim unity. There was a resurgence of communalism post-1922. The League once again
became active; the Hindu Mahasabha was revived in 1923. Sangathan and shuddhi movements among
Hindus and tanzeem and tabligh movements among Muslims, for communal consolidation and
religious conversion emerged forcefully. The formation of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) in
1925 was another landmark in communal politics. The Congress efforts to negotiate with Hindu,
Muslim, and Sikh communal leaders in the form of the Indian National Pact (1923), the C.R. Das Pact
(1923), and the Nehru Report (1928) proved a complete failure. By negotiating with communal leaders,
the Congress legitimized their politics and made them respectable. Likewise, Gandhi’s ‘Ram-Rahim’
approach and his initiative in the form of fasts did not improve deteriorating communal relations.

However, despite the intensified activities of communal groups during the1920s, communalism was not
yet pervasive. Its social base remained narrow. The Communal Award (1932) and the elections of 1937
altered this significantly. The Government of India Act of 1935 extended the franchise to the upper
stratum of peasants and granted provincial autonomy. The devolution of power enlarged the scene of
provincial politics to the national arena, and presented hitherto absent problems of power sharing. The
stakes of power were significantly raised in this scenario, since with the notion of an All India
Federation, center-state relations became important for the first time. The political discourse post-1935
focused on this relationship. Conceptions of the nation-state, unitary nationalism, and majority-
minority communities now had to be addressed.

Anil Seal and Ayesha Jalal point out that separate electorates had shielded Muslim politicians from
appealing to a wide electorate. Prior to 1937, there was no perceived Congress threat. After 1937
communalism acquired a popular base. As a consequence of the growth of the national movement and
especially the Civil Disobedience movement (1930-34), the Congress emerged as the dominant
political force in the elections of 1937. In the United Provinces, Bihar, Bengal and the Punjab,
threatened by the Congress and the Left, various dominant groups – landlords and zamindars,
merchants and moneylenders – shifted their allegiance to communal forces. Communalism also
became, after 1937, the only political recourse of colonial authorities and their policy of divide and
rule. This was further accentuated by the outbreak of World War II and the subsequent resignation of
the Congress ministries in 1939. The League was recognized as the sole spokesman for Muslims and
given the power to veto any political settlement.

Farzana Shaikh argues that the evolution of ‘Muslim politics’ and ultimately the demand for Pakistan
were driven by a long history of ideas that saw the Muslims as an exclusive political entity separate
from others. She underlines the significance of the ideological dichotomies between Islam and western
liberalism that provide radically different images of society. According to Shaikh, an awareness of the
ideal of Muslim brotherhood, a belief in the superiority of Muslim culture, and recognition of the belief
that Muslims ought to live under Muslim governments provided the ideological basis for ‘Muslim
separatism’.

The United Provinces formed the heartland of Muslim culture – representative of high culture, adab,
and learning. Aligarh was an important educational center. UP also proved to be a breeding ground for
communalism. The League gained its earliest foothold in UP and the demand for Pakistan was
strongest here. The Hindi-Urdu controversy, anti-cow slaughter movement, and the role of the Arya
Samaj had contributed to the decline of the Urdu culture of elites. While the initial discourse of the
Arya Samaj had targeted sanatan dharma, over time the discourse came to center on Hindu identity
and community. Though not intended to be combative, the assertion of identity proved divisive. The
Hindi movement of the late nineteenth century was associated with a degree of revivalism. It has been
pointed out that the adoption of Hindustani in Devnagari may have helped resolve the conflict of
cultural identities in the early twentieth century. All these factors combined to produce a sense of
anxiety among the Muslims. Sir Syed Ahmed Khan, who began as a modernizer and reformer of Islam
later adopted a conservative stance due to social reasons of anxiety.

In the elections of 1937, the League was soundly defeated. In UP, the group was made to dissolve its
identity and join the Congress coalition, causing much social resentment.
William Gould, Gyanaendra Pandey and Mushirul Hasan have drawn attention to the preoccupation of
political groups with Hindu religiosity, which increased Muslim insecurity. A new approach to resolve
the communal impasse and draw Muslims into the Congress fold was pursued by the Congress between
1937-39 in the form of the Muslim Mass Contact program. K.M. Ashraf was placed at its helm. Newly
mobilized groups like the Ahrars, the Khudai Khidmatgars, and the Socialists spearheaded the program
in NWFP and the Punjab. It had a significant impact upon various groups in UP, Delhi, Bihar and
Bengal. However, the failure of mass contact was evident in the limited nature of Congress
mobilization. Local Congress leaders showed limited enthusiasm; they were interested in Muslim mass
contact only up to the point that it did not upset their own support base. The right wing within the
Congress, in alliance with the Hindu Mahasabha proved to be its strongest opponent. The Mass Contact
campaign was Congress’s last serious attempt to mobilize Muslims in a joint struggle against
colonialism.

Colonial policies played an important role in the growth of communalism in the Punjab. The province
was acquired only in 1849, and was the largest recruiting ground for the British Indian Army. David
Gilmartin and Ian Talbot have explored the links between landlords, religious shrines (dargahs), Sufi
pirs and custodians (sajjda nashins) that helped the colonial state to consolidate its power. The kinship
group (biraderi), the Sufi religious network, and the relationship between the landlord and his tenant
clients formed the three traditional channels for mobilizing political support in the Punjab countryside.

While religion was important in Punjab politics, the major factor was the rural-urban divide. The sturdy
peasant community was provided protection from urban moneylenders and merchants by the Punjab
Land Alienation Act (1901). The 1919 Montagu-Chalmsford Reforms completed the
institutionalization of the division between the province’s rural and urban communities. Rural elites,
cutting across communities, were organized into the Punjab Unionist Party in 1923 by the efforts of
Chhotu Ram and Fazl-i-Husain. This development was peculiar to the Punjab. Muslim landlords
dominated provincial politics post-1919, and unlike the UP Muslims, they were not insecure of their
power base. There was a phenomenal growth of the Muslim League in Punjab between 1937-47, taking
over the support base of its rival, the Unionist Party. This was made possible by winning over the
support of the landlords and pirs who controlled the socio-political networks of power and had earlier
supported the Unionists. Communalism in the Punjab was also shaped by the presence of three
religious communities: Hindus, Muslims, and Sikhs. From the early twentieth century, Punjab
witnessed a movement for Sikh revivalism – eg: the Singh Sabhas - and assertion of an identity
autonomous of Hindu affiliations. The Punjab was also the stronghold of the Arya Samaj movement.

In Bengal, it is argued that communal conflicts were not typical of the region. Violence was allegedly
imported from the Hindustani-speaking belt. This is an exaggeration. Late nineteenth century Bengal
witnessed the spirit of Hindu and Muslim revivalism, represented in works like Bankimchandra’s
Anandmath, and movements like Wahabi and Farazi. As discussed earlier, Partha Chatterjee has
pointed to the religious consciousness of the peasantry. The focus in most works has been on the
growth of Muslim separatism. The issue of ‘music before mosques’ became especially explosive from
the 1920s. The Praja (or tenants) movement gathered force. C.R. Das’s death in 1925, widespread
Hindu-Muslim riots in 1926-27, and the 1928 amendment to the Bengal Tenancy Act further
radicalized the situation. The All Bengal Praja Samiti was formed in 1929 (known as the Krishak Praja
Party from 1936) and emerged as a major player in Bengal politics. It formed a coalition ministry with
the Muslim League in 1937, but failed to enact radical reforms. The failure of Fazlul Huq’s KPP led to
a sudden shift in popular support to the Muslim League, under the energetic leadership of Suhrawardy,
which swept the 1946 elections. Suranjan Das traces the growth of communal identities and politics in
Bengal over a period of time. He argues for a progressive development of communalism from 1930s, to
1946 (the Great Calcutta Killing), to 1947 (Partition of Bengal).

Joya Chatterji, on the other hand, has emphasized the growth of Hindu communalism in bhadralok
politics after the Communal Award (1932). She explores the reorientation of bhadralok politics from
nationalism to communalism. The bhadralok movement had a narrow social base and was shunned by
the Muslims of Bengal. The self-image of the bhadralok as a cultured and enlightened class, heir to the
‘Bengal Renaissance’, and standard bearer of progress and modernity, in the 1930s-40s, served to
justify the demand that Hindus should continue to dominate Bengal, and eventually that Bengal be
partitioned. This self-perception promoted a powerful sense of cultural superiority over the Muslims of
Bengal, who were numerically superior. Under Sarat Chandra Chattopadhyaya, there was an attempt to
forge a greater Hindu political community by reaching out to lower caste Hindus and tribes. After the
Communal Award and Poona Pact, sangathan and shuddhi took on a new significance. The Hindu
Mahasabha became very active from the 1930s. This culminated in an organized and well- supported
campaign among Hindus for the partition of Bengal in 1946-47. Though Partition is generally believed
to have been a consequence of Muslim separatism, in Bengal, Hindus evolved a parallel separatism of
their own.

Revisionist writings have emphasized the alternative choice of linguistic identity available to Bengalis.
Such arguments are relevant in the analysis of the United Bengal Plan put forth by Sarat Chandra Bose
in 1947. However, by then violence had probably polarized the religious communities too far.

The political developments of 1937-47 led to further polarization between communities, and by 1947,
Partition was accepted by the Congress. The Lahore Resolution of 1940 in nationalist accounts is
portrayed as the call for Pakistan. Ayesha Jalal has contested this perception. She argues that the
resolution called for autonomous zones in the northwest and the east. According to her, Jinnah did not
want Partition. He wished to safeguard the interests of the Muslims in the minority provinces of UP and
Bihar by using the strong position of the Muslims in the majority provinces of Bengal and Bihar. This
could only be achieved by emphasizing the fear of Hindu domination and raising the cry of ‘Islam in
danger’. In the general elections of 1946-47 the Congress did extremely well in the Hindu
constituencies, but it failed to substantiate its claims to represent the Muslims of India. The Muslim
League attracted the majority of the Muslim votes at the center and the provinces. However,
communalism intensified in the 1940s, and restricted the choices for national leaders. The call for
Direct Action by the League in 1946 was the final seal.

Ayesha Jalal aims at exploring and interpreting the historical processes through which the relationship
between the Muslim individual and community of Islam was reconfigured in colonial South Asia. She
reconceptualizes the formation of religiously informed identities by using a communitarian model. She
problematizes the relationship between colonialism and assertions of cultural differences in a context
where there were competing definitions of identity and multiple claims to nationhood. Jalal repudiates
the opposition between ‘communalism’ and ‘nationalism’ that dominates South Asian historiography.
For her, ‘the pejorative connotations of ‘communalism’ implies that all assertions of cultural difference
in the face of a rational and inclusionary nationalism are bigoted and therefore illegitimate’. She
questions the validity of the notion of ‘Muslim separatism’ at a time when the idea of an Indian nation
was itself in the process of being forged, negotiated and contested. The nationalist narratives authored
by Hindus and Muslims of different regions and classes displayed considerable variety and evoked
multiple visions of nationhood. In her opinion, what has been branded ‘separatism’ may well represent
exclusion on the part of that variant of the nationalist discourse that rose to apposition of dominance.
Jalal argues that Indian Muslims in certain regions displayed a healthy skepticism of an inclusionary
nationalism unable to shed the premises of its religious majoritarianism.

In traditional nationalist accounts, the blame for the growth of communalism is firmly placed on
‘Muslim separatism’ and Jinnah and the League. Jalal has attempted to question and revise this
position. The emergence of communalism may probably be located in the varied attempts at imagining
different visions of the larger national community, and the discrepancies between these visions.
Stepping away from purely historical concerns, perhaps the significance of twentieth century
communalism lies in its legacy for post-colonial India, which appears at regular intervals in
contemporary Indian society and politics – be it the case of Ramjanmabhoomi/Ayodhya or communal
violence in Gujrat. The unsettled relationship between ‘nationalism’ and ‘communalism’, ‘self’ and
‘other’ continues.

BIBLIOGRAPHY:

Bipan Chandra, Communalism in Modern India.

Mushirul Hasan edited, India’s Partition.
Mushirul Hasan, Introduction
Farzana Shaikh, Muslims and Political Representation in Colonial India
Mushirul Hasan, The Muslim Mass Contacts Campaign
David Gilmartin, Religious Leadership and the Pakistan Movement in the Punjab
Ian Talbot, The Growth of the Muslim League in the Punjab, 1937-46
Partha Chatterjee, Bengal Politics and the Muslim Masses, 1920-47
Gyanendra Pandey, The Construction of Communalism in Colonial North India.
Ranajit Guha edited, Subaltern Studies I.
Partha Chatterjee, Agrarian Relations and Communalism in Bengal, 1926-1935
Joya Chatterji, Bengal Divided, Hindu Communalism and Partition, 1932-1947.
Ayesha Jalal, Self and Soverignty, Individual and Community in South Asian Islam Since 1850.