G.R. No.
125359 September 4, 2001 relation to Section 34 of the Central Bank Act
ROBERTO S. BENEDICTO and HECTOR T.
RIVERA, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. GUILLERMO L.
LOJA, SR., PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT OF MANILA, BRANCH 26, and PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Statement of the case:
Assailed in this petition is the consolidated decision
rendered on May 23, 1996, by the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 35928 and CA-G.R. SP No. 35719. CA-
G.R. SP No. 35928 had affirmed the order dated
September 6, 1994, of the Regional Trial Court, Manila,
Branch 26, insofar as it denied petitioners’ respective
Motions to Quash the information in twenty-five (25)
criminal cases for violation of Central Bank Circular
No. 960. Therein included were information involving:
(a) consolidated Criminal Cases Nos. 91-101879 to 91-
101883 filed against Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos, Roberto S.
Benedicto, and Hector T. Rivera; (b) consolidated
Criminal Cases Nos. 91-101884 to 91-101892 filed
against Mrs. Marcos and Benedicto; and (c) Criminal
Cases Nos. 92-101959 to 92-101969 also against Mrs.
Marcos and Benedicto. Note, however, that the Court
of Appeals already dismissed Criminal Case No. 91-
101884.
Statement of the facts:
On December 27, 1991, Mrs. Imelda Marcos and
Messrs. Benedicto and Rivera were indicted for
violation of Section 10 of Circular No. 960 1 in
1
(Republic Act No. 265, as amended) in fi ve
information fi led with the Regional Trial Court of
Manila. Docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 91-101879 to
91-101883, the charge sheets alleged that the trio
failed to submit reports of their foreign exchange
earnings from abroad and/or failed to register with
the Foreign Exchange Department of the Central
Bank within the period mandated by Circular No.
960. Said Circular prohibited natural and
juridical persons from maintaining foreign exchange
accounts abroad without prior authorization from the
Central Bank. On August 11, 1994, petitioners moved
to quash all the Information filed against them in
Criminal Cases Nos. 91-101879 to 91-101883; 91-
101884 to 91-101892, and 91-101959 to 91-
101969. Their motion was grounded on lack
of jurisdiction, forum shopping, absence of a
preliminary investigation and extinction of criminal
liability with the repeal of Circular No. 960.On
September 6, 1994, the trial court denied petitioners'
motion. A similar motion filed on May 23, 1994 by Mrs.
Marcos seeking to dismiss the dollar-salting cases
against her due to the repeal of Circular No. 960
had earlier been denied by the trial court in its
order dated June 9,1994. Petitioners then filed a
motion for reconsideration, but the trial court likewise
denied this motion on October 18, 1994.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the Court of Appeals
erred in denying the Motion to Quash for
absence of a valid preliminary investigation.
2. Whether or not the repeal of Central
Bank Circular No. 960 and Republic Act
 N o . 2 6 5   b y Circular No. 1353 and Republic Act
No. 7653 respectively, extinguish the criminal
liability of petitioners.
 
HELD:
1. NO. Preliminary investigation is
not part of the due process
g u a r a n t e e d b y   t h e Constitution. It is an
inquiry to determine whether there is
sufficient ground to engender a well-founded
belief that a crime has been committed
and the respondent is probably guilty
thereof. Instead, the right to
a preliminary investigation is  personal. It
is aff orded to the accused by statute, and
can be waived, either expressly or by
implication. When the records of the case
were disclosed to them, in opting to enter
their respective pleas to the charges, and filed
various motions and pleadings, they are
deemed to have made an express waiver of
their right to have a preliminary investigation.
2. NO. In the instant case, it must be noted
that despite the repeal of Circular No.
960, Circular No. 1353 retained the same
reportorial requirement for residents receiving
earnings or profi ts from non-trade foreign
exchange transactions. Even the most
cursory glance at the repealing circulars,
Circular Nos. 1318 and 1353 shows that
both contain a saving clause, expressly
providing that the repeal of Circular No.
960 shall have no effect on pending actions
2
for violation of the latter Circular. A saving
clause operates to except from the effect of
the repealing law what would otherwise be
lost under the new law. In the present case,
the respective saving clauses of Circular Nos.
1318 and 1353 clearly manifest the intent to
reserve the right of the State to prosecute and
punish offenses for violations of the repealed
Circular No. 960, where the cases are either
pending or under investigation
 
DISPOSITION:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED.
The assailed consolidated Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated May 23, 1996, in CA-G.R. SP No. 35928
and CA G.R. SP No. 35719, is AFFIRMED WITH
MODIFICATION that the charges against deceased
petitioner, Roberto S. Benedicto, particularly in
Criminal Cases Nos. 91-101879 to 91-101883, 91-
101884 to 101892, and 92-101959 to 92-101969,
pending before the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 26, are ordered dropped and that any criminal
as well as civil liability ex delicto that might be
attributable to him in the aforesaid cases are declared
extinguished by reason of his death on May 15, 2000.
No pronouncement as to costs.
G.R. No. 120468      August 15, 2001
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
LOPE LIWANAG y BUENAVENTURA, SANDY
SIMBULAN y GARCIA and RAMIL VENDIBIL y
CASTRO, accused,
LOPE LIWANAG y BUENAVENTURA, accused-
appellant.
G.R. No. 128045               August 24, 2000
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ROMMEL DEANG, MELVIN ESPIRITU, and
NICSON (or NIXON) CATLI, accused-appellant.
G.R. No. 130399            September 20, 2001
PUBLIC UTILITIES DEPARTMENT, OLONGAPO
CITY, petitioner,
vs.
HON. TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR., Secretary of
the Department of Justice, and CONRADO L.
TIU, respondents.
Facts:
Private respondent Conrado L. Tiu is the owner and
manager of Contis Plaza, a supermarket located at
Rizal Avenue corner 21st Street, Olongapo City, and
another establishment located at No. 46 Fendler
3
Street, EastTapinac, Olongapo City. The electric power
consumption of private respondent is supplied by
petitioner Public Utilities Department.
Petitioner claimed that pursuant to its Power Loss
Reduction Program, implemented with the assistance
of Meralco, a digital recording ammeter, or load logger,
was installed on November 25, 1992 at the primary line
of Contis Plaza to monitor its actual power utilization.
It was later discovered that the KWH electric meter of
Contis Plaza failed to register the actual amount of its
power consumption. The power loss to petitioner was
computed at 86.08%. For the purpose of pinpointing
the source of the power loss, private respondent was
informed by petitioner that the KWH electric meter,
current transformers and metering facilities of Contis
Plaza would be inspected.
On March 17, 1993, the KWH electric meter installed
at respondent Tius building located at No. 46 Fendler
Street, East Tapinac, Olongapo City, was found to
register 0-0 consumption. After a thorough inspection,
it was discovered that the potential link of the KWH
meter installed at the second floor of the said building
was disengaged. The KWH meter thus did not register
any consumption.
Subsequently, petitioner filed a complaint for violation
of City Ordinance No. 23, Series of 1989, and of
Presidential Decree No. 401 for theft of electricity
against private respondent.
After preliminary investigation, the office of the State
Prosecutor dismissed the complaint.
On appeal, then Acting Secretary of the Department of
Justice Demetrio Demetria concurred with the office of
the State Prosecutors findings that the violation of City
Ordinance No. 23 had prescribed but found sufficient
evidence to hold private respondent liable for theft of
electricity.[2] Upon private respondents filing of a
motion for reconsideration, respondent Secretary of
Justice reversed the said ruling and directed the
withdrawal of the information against private
respondent for theft of electricity. This prompted
petitioner to file a petition for certiorari with the Court
of Appeals.
On August 22, 1997, the Court of Appeals promulgated
its decision dismissing the petition for lack of merit.
Hence, the present petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in ruling
that the respondent Secretary of Justice did not commit
grave abuse of discretion in issuing the Resolution of
November 6, 1995.
Petitioner alleges that the Court of Appeals committed
grave and serious reversible error in dismissing the
petition for certiorari since the petitioner has
established a prima facie case to prosecute private
respondent for two (2) counts of theft of electricity.
Petitioner argues that the purpose of a preliminary
investigation is not to determine whether the accused
is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged,
but merely whether there existed a probable cause for
his prosecution, i.e., whether there is sufficient ground
to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been
4
committed; that the respondent is probably guilty
thereof and should be held for trial. Petitioner submits
that it is sufficient to adduce evidence which inclines
the mind to believe, without necessarily leaving room
for doubt, that the accused is guilty of a crime and
should be held for trial.
Ruling:
The Court finds the instant petition to be without merit.
The holding of a preliminary investigation is a function
of the Executive Department and not of the Judiciary.
The primary objective of a preliminary investigation is
to free a respondent from the inconvenience, expense,
ignominy and stress of defending himself/herself in the
course of a formal trial, until the reasonable probability
of his or her guilt has been passed upon in a more or
less summary proceeding by a competent officer
designated by law for that purpose. Secondly, such
summary proceeding also protects the state from the
burden of unnecessary expense and effort in
prosecuting alleged offenses and in holding trials
arising from false, frivolous or groundless charges.[6]
The decision whether or not to dismiss the complaint
against private respondent is necessarily dependent on
the sound discretion of the prosecuting fiscal and,
ultimately, that of the Secretary of Justice.[7]
Decisions or resolutions of prosecutors are subject to
appeal to the Secretary of Justice who, under the
Revised Administrative Code, exercises the power of
direct control and supervision over said prosecutors;
and who may thus affirm, nullify, reverse or modify
their rulings.[8]
When the respondent Secretary of Justice, in his
Resolution of November 6, 1995, reversed the findings
of Acting Secretary of Justice Demetria, in the
Resolution dated May 18, 1995, it was done in the
exercise of his power of review, which rests upon his
sound discretion.
The Resolution of the Secretary of Justice may be
reviewed by the court. However, the court is without
power to directly decide matters over which full
discretionary authority has been delegated to the
legislative or executive branch of the government. It is
not empowered to substitute its judgment for that of
the Congress or of the President when they did not act
in grave abuse of discretion.
Thus, although it is entirely possible that the
investigating fiscal may erroneously exercise the
discretion lodged in him by law, this does not render
his act amenable to correction and annulment by the
extraordinary remedy of certiorari, absent any showing
of grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of
jurisdiction.[9]
This Court finds that the Court of Appeals did not err in
ruling that the respondent Secretary of Justice did not
act in grave abuse of discretion in directing the Acting
City prosecutor of Olongapo City to move for the
withdrawal of the informations against the private
respondent for theft of electricity.
Findings of the Secretary of Justice are not subject to
review unless shown to have been made with grave
abuse.[10]
5
We reiterate the ruling of this Court in Quiso vs.
Sandiganbayan[13] and in Jacob vs. Puno,[14] that
certiorari will not lie to compel the respondent
Secretary of Justice to file a case if he thinks the
evidence does not warrant it. Otherwise, he will be
committing a dereliction of duty.
WHEREFORE, there being no showing of grave abuse
of discretion on the part of public respondent which
would warrant the overturning of its decision, the
instant petition is DISMISSED and the assailed
Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED.
G.R. No. 154920               August 15, 2003
RODNEY HEGERTY, Petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ALLAN
NASH, Respondents.
G.R. No. 153176             March 29, 2004
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. ZEIDA AURORA B. GARFIN, In her capacity
as Presiding Judge of RTC, Branch 19, of the City
of Naga and SERAFIN SABALLEGUE, respondents.
FACTS:
On June 22, 2001, private respondent was charged with
violation of the "Social Security Act,". That on or about
February 1990 and up to the present, in the City of
Naga, Philippines, within the functional jurisdiction of parties, the Court believes and so resolves that the
SSS Naga Branch and the territorial jurisdiction of this Information has not been filed in accordance with
Honorable Court, the above named accused, while Section 4, par. 3 of Rule 112 of the 2000 Rules on
being the proprietor of Saballegue Printing Press, did Criminal Procedure‘Rule 112, Section 4 x x x x x x No
then and there willfully, unlawfully, and criminally complaint or information may be filed or dismissed by
refuse and fail and continuously refuse and fail to remit an investigating prosecutor without the prior written
the premiums due for his employee to the SSS in the authority or approval of the provincial or city
amount of (P6,533.00), representing SSS and EC prosecutor or chief state prosecutor or the Ombudsman
premiums for the period from January 1990 to or his deputy.’ Expresio unius est exclusio alterius.
December 1999 (n.i.), and the 3% penalty per month
for late remittance in the amount of ELEVEN The Information will readily show that it has not
THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED FORTY-THREE PESOS complied with this rule as it has not been approved by
and 28/100 (P11,143.28) computed as of 15 March the City Prosecutor.
2000, despite lawful demands by letter in violation of This Court holds that the defendant’s plea to the
the above-cited provisions of the law, to the damage Information is not a waiver to file a motion to dismiss
and or to quash on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. By
prejudice of the SSS and the public in general. express provision of the rules and by a long line of
decisions, questions of want of jurisdiction may be
The case was raffled to Branch 19 of the Regional Trial raised at any stage of the proceedings.
Court of Naga City.
ISSUE:
Accused Serafin Saballegue pleaded not guilty to the Whether the approval of the city or provincial
charge and the case was set for pre-trial.5 Three days prosecutor is no longer
thereafter, the accused filed a motion to dismiss6 on required.
the ground that the information was filed without the
prior written authority or approval of the city HELD:
prosecutor as required under Section 4, Rule 112 of the
Revised Rules of Court. No. Under Presidential Decree No. 1275. The Regional
State Prosecutor is clearly vested only with the power
After considering the arguments raised, the trial court of administrative supervision. As administrative
granted the motion to dismiss in its first questioned supervisor, he has no power to direct the city and
Order dated February 26, 2002, to wit: After provincial prosecutors to inhibit from handling certain
considering the respective arguments raised by the cases. At most, he can request for their inhibition.
6
Hence, the said directive of the regional state the respondent judge did not err in dismissing the case
prosecutor to the city and provincial prosecutors is for lack of jurisdiction. WHEREFORE, premises
questionable to say the least. considered, the petition is DENIED.

Petitioner argues that the word "may" is permissive.

Hence, there are cases when prior written approval is
not required, and this is one such instance. This is too
simplistic an interpretation. Whether the word "may" is
mandatory or directory depends on the context of its
use. We agree with the OSG that the use of the
permissive word "may" should be read together with
the other provisions in the same section of the Rule.
The paragraph immediately preceding the quoted
G.R. No. 149148      April 5, 2002
provision shows that the word "may" is mandatory. It
states: Sec. 4, Rule 112. – x x x Within five (5) days SUSAN MENDOZA-ARCE, petitioner,
from his resolution, he (investigating prosecutor) shall vs.
forward the record of the case to the provincial or city HONORABLE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN
prosecutor or chief state prosecutor, or to the (VISAYAS), PRIMO C. MIRO, DEPUTY
Ombudsman or his deputy in cases of offenses OMBUDSMAN, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT ROXAS
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan in the exercise of its CITY, EXECUTIVE JUDGE, HONORABLE
original jurisdiction. They shall act on the resolution SALVADOR GUBATON, OFFICE OF THE CITY
within ten (10) days from their receipt thereof and shall FISCAL, HONORABLE JULIUS ABELA, SANTIAGO
immediately inform the parties of such action. B. VILLARUZ, respondents.
(emphasis supplied)
  NATURE Petition for Certiorari
In sum, we hold that, in the absence of a directive from PETITIONERS Susan Mendoza-Arce
the Secretary of
Justice designating State Prosecutor Tolentino as RESPONDENTS Office of the Ombudsman, et. al.
Special Prosecutor for SSS cases or a prior written DOCTRINE. The elements of the offense under Sec.
approval of the information by the provincial or city 3(e) are: 1) That the accused are public officers or
prosecutor, the information in Criminal Case No. RTC private persons charged in conspiracy with them; 2)
2001-0597 was filed by an officer without authority to That said public officers committed the prohibited
file the same. As this infirmity in the information acts during the performance of their official duties or
constitutes a jurisdictional defect that cannot be cured,
7
in relation to their public positions; 3) That they
caused undue injury to any party, whether the
Government or a private party; 4) That such injury is
caused by giving unwarranted benefits, advantage or
preference to such parties; and 5) That the public
officers have acted with manifest partiality, evident
bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.
FACTS.
 There was a Special Proceeding to for the will of
Remedios Bermejo-Villaruz and Santiago Villaruz
was one of the oppositors. The said case was
assigned to the sala of Judge Patricio
 Santiago was initially the administrator of the estate
of Remedios but he was removed for patent neglect.
His eldest brother Nicolas Villaruz, Jr. replaced him
and he filed a motion for the approval of his bond as
administrator.
 The motion was opposed by Jose Maria, another
brother, and attached to their opposition was a
certification executed by Remedios, which
authorized Santiago to take possession of her nipa,
lands and gave Santiago the option for leasing such
lands.
 Judge Patricio issued an order recognizing the
validity of the certification and the administration of
the new administration was subject to them but this
was not reflected in the dispositive portion of the
order.
8
 The case was, in the meantime, reassigned to Judge
Pestaño who approved Nicolas’ bond. After this
receiving Judge Pestaño’s order, Susan Mendoza-
Arce, prepared a Letter of Administration (LOA) in
favor of Nicolas and this was based on the form
prescribed in the Manual for Clerk of Courts. Acting
on the LOA, Nicolas took possession of the entire
estate of Remedios including the nipa lands, which
were leased to Santiago.
 Santiago filed a letter-complaint to the Ombudsman
claiming that Mendoza violated Article 171 of the
RPC and Sec. 3(e) of RA 3019 for showing manifest
partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable
negligence.
 The Ombudsman found sufficient basis for the filing
of the information against Mendoza.
 Mendoza claims she was not guilty of the crimes and
she merely issued the LOA based on the Manual.
ISSUES & RATIO.
1. WON Mendoza violated Sec. 3(e) of RA 3019. –
NO.
There is no probable cause for the filing of information
for violation of Sec. 3(e) of RA 3019. The elements of
the offense under Sec. 3(e) are: 1) That the accused are
public officers or private persons charged in conspiracy
with them; 2) That said public officers committed the
prohibited acts during the performance of their official
duties or in relation to their public positions; 3) That
they caused undue injury to any party, whether the
Government or a private party; 4) That such injury is
caused by giving unwarranted benefits, advantage or
preference to such parties; and 5) That the public
officers have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad
faith or gross inexcusable negligence.
All of elements must prove, however, in this case the
issuance of the LOA there is no basis for finding of
Mendoza to have acted with “partiality” or bias or “bad
faith”, nor with “gross negligence”. The work of a Clerk
of Court, although an officer of the Court, a public
officer, and an officer of the law, is not that of a judicial
officer but essentially a ministerial one.
The LOA issued by Mendoza was performed as a
ministerial duty. She merely copied substantially the
form for letters of administration prescribed in the
Manual for Clerks of Courts. The LOA is not accurate
for lack of reference to the lease agreement in favor of
Santiago but this does not equate to gross negligence
or from some corrupt motive. She used the phrases in
the Manual prescribed by the Court, instead of
employing her own words.
DECISION.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the
resolution dated April 20, 2001, of the Graft
Investigation Officer, as approved by the Office of the
Ombudsman, and his order, dated June 29, 2001, are
hereby SET ASIDE and the complaint of respondent
9
Santiago B. Villaruz against petitioner Susan Mendoza-
Arce for violation of R.A. No.
NOTES.
“Partiality” or bias, which excites a disposition to see
and report matters as they are wished for rather than
as they are.
“Bad faith” which connotes not only bad judgment or
negligence but also a dishonest purpose or conscious
wrongdoing, a breach of duty amounting to fraud
“Gross negligence” which is negligence characterized
by the want of even slight care, acting or omitting to
act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not
inadvertently but willfully and intentionally, with a
conscious indifference to consequences as far as other
persons are concerned
G.R. No. 143547           June 26, 2002
JOEY POTOT y SURIO, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and LOLITO
DAPULAG, respondents.
[G.R. No. 135912. October 11, 2001]
ODIN SECURITY AGENCY,
INC. vs. SANDIGANBAYAN, et al.
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 155451             April 14, 2004
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
DAVID S. ODILAO, JR., respondent.

[A.M. No. RTJ-01-1610. October 5, 2001.]

ATTY. EDGAR H. TALINGDAN, Complainant, v.

JUDGE HENEDINO P. EDUARTE, RTC-Br. 20,
Cauayan, Isabela, Respondent.

[ GR No. 217787, Sep 18, 2019 ]

SOCORRO F. ONGKINGCO v. KAZUHIRO
SUGIYAMA +

10