The finality of the Second World War, for contemporaries, held a sense of inevitability.

Nazi Germany was

defeated on land by the Russians and the Anglo-American forces. As the combined Anglo-American armies landed
on the beaches of Normandy on June 6, 1944, liberating countries in their sweep east toward Germany, a sense of
poetic justice prevailed. The fact that Anglo-American forces succeed in gaining a foothold in France during
Operation OVERLORD, contributed to the perception that the Allied campaigns in North Africa and Italy were an
unfortunate distraction from the creation of a second front. It can only be considered a distraction if it detracted
from a viable plan. Through exploring factors and events prior to the 1944 Normandy landing, the purpose of this
essay is to argue that the North African and Italian Campaigns were not only the necessary steps that allowed the
eventual success of the landings in France, but that they served the purpose of a creating a second front, as request
by the Russians.

Josef Stalin had requested Western Allies create a Second Front in Europe in 1942. Stalin argued that the best
German forces had been diverted to the Eastern Front, and that no real advantage would be gained by postponing
(what? The second front? A battle?) until 1943. Stalin, in a memorandum dated August 13, 1942, condemned
Churchill's unwillingness to engage in a European invasion that year. 1 Conflicting agendas plagued the Allied
leadership with respect to a cohesive approach in defeating Germany, as well as how to support Stalin's request for a
Second Front. The British under Churchill supported an attrition based approach; the United States favoured a more
direct blow through France at the earliest timetable; all the while, the surprise German attack on the Soviet Union in
June 1941 created the demand for a "Second Front" by the Russians to divert German strength from the Eastern
Front.2 However, three factors were the crucial products of the North African and Italian campaigns. These three
factors enabled the success of France in 1944. First, and most significantly, were psychological factors; these
impacted the British most greatly of all, and became the basis for much of the future Allied decisions and policies.
Second were political factors; these political factors both drove the North African and Italian campaign and shaped
those that stemmed from it. The final factor was the logistical considerations that affected both the Anglo-American
force and Germans.

Psychology

The key factor which shaped Prime Minister Winston Churchill's British strategy and swayed the Anglo-American
strategy was his psychological barrier and bias. Winston Churchill toted the same character, the hardy spirit and
stubborn determination of the lower ranking British soldiers during the First World War. At the outbreak of the
Second World War, Churchill had no great expectations of his higher military leadership's ability. His opinion
became that of distrust after the defeat in Greece with the fall of Crete and the reverses in North Africa. 3 Since the
Fall of France, the British army had been plagued with a series of disasters in the Far East. Singapore quickly fell to
the Japanese offensive in February 1942, and Burma was occupied; the War Cabinet was preparing for the worst
should the Japanese threaten a landing in Madagascar or the oil refineries in western Iran. 4 In addition, having
witnessed the stalemate of the First World War as both sides dug in, Churchill had advocated for a break through the
Dardanelles. He strategized that, should the effort succeed and they were able to defeat the Ottoman-Turks , this
would (?) allow the western allies to provide help to the Russians. 5 Therefore, from Churchill's perspective, "the
extraordinary fight efficiency of the German Army" 6 was not something that would be desirable to challenge head
on with his Anglo-American force. It was thought that Germany could not be defeated on the continent through the
direct application of force. Only indirect attrition from the air, sea, and subversion, would Germany collapse due to
war attrition, and mass uprisings of conquered population. At that point, a small force could be dispatched to the
Continent to ensure the final capitulation of Germany and to provide stability. This fanciful strategy was reflective
of the desperate situation for Britain in late 1940s to early 1941.7

1
https://iowaculture.gov/history/education/educator-resources/primary-source-sets/world-war-ii/memo-joseph-
stalin-about
2
Ben-Moshe, 505
3
Ben-Moshe, 534
4
Calvocoressi, 400
5
Lawton, 4
6
Ben-Moshe 536
7
Ben-Moshe, 506
North Africa was not the intended place for a clash between the British and the Germans. The short (abridged?)
reason the Second World War spread from Europe to North Africa, is that the Italians had imperial designs of a new
Roman Empire in Africa. The Italian ambition embroiled the British, and their subsequent failures in 1940-41
embroiled the Germans.8 Despite some early defeats suffered by the British, one major, (positive) psychological
impact North Africa had was to prove that the Germans could be beaten; most importantly they could be beaten by
the British. The psychological success in shattering the illusion of the invincibility of the German Army on land was
crucial for further campaigns. Further to this, the lessons learned in Africa demonstrated that the Germans could be
beaten, but only if western allies had every advantage possible, especially logistical ones. In 1943 during the Casa
Blanca conference, Churchill would confidently tell reports that, "the events in North Africa have altered the whole
strategic aspect of the war, making the Germans and Italians fight under conditions of great difficulty ”, he declared.
He described General Field Marshal Erwin Rommel as a fugitive from Libya and Egypt now trying to pass himself
off as the liberator of Tunis."9 The victory against the Italian-German force in North Africa gave the Anglo-
American forces the confidence to prevail against Germany.

Policy

From a perspective of Germany policy, Hitler never understood global warfare. An example - when the German
reinforcements he sent to North Africa (to strengthen the beleaguered Italians) met with unexpected success, he was
unable to exploit the opportunity. In June 1942 General Erwin Rommel and his Afrika Korps had captured Tobruk
and were racing towards El Alamein. Had Hitler reinforced the Afrika Korps, Rommel may have been able to drive
north to the oil fields of the Middle East, through the Caucasus, and link up with German armies in Russia. 10
However, Rommel only reached El Alamein with thirteen operational tanks, and was quickly repulsed by General
Bernard Law Montgomery and his Eight Army.11

United States entered the war due to the provocation of the Japanese. Therefore, at the beginning of 1942, the
American people and the army had their hearts on the crisis in the Pacific and the Philippines. 12 When Churchill
managed to convince President Franklin Roosevelt of the "Europe First" plan, the Americans who were mistrustful
of the seemingly gun-shy British demanded an invasion of Europe, preferably in 1943 if not 1942. In April 1942,
the US Army Chief of Staff, George C. Marshall suggested that there was no other way to defeat Germany other
than to defeat the Germany army with a superior army on Continental Europe. The Marshall plan was simple:
Western Europe was most logistically suitable for joint Anglo-American offensive. From there, the shortest route
would be a landing on the French coast, through France and Belgium and directly into Germany and its industrial
war centre, the Ruhr. Only Britain had enough harbours and port installations to quickly muster a large American
army, and Atlantic route between the United States and Britain was the shortest one. If another centre of gravity
was chosen for Anglo-American operations, then the allies would be forced to divert shipping to protect the Atlantic
sea route and other shipping routes. Marshall wanted to concentrate a million US troops in thirty divisions,
combined with the eighteen British divisions. This force would land on the French coast between Le Havre and
Boulogne on April 1, 1943. The inevitable German army reinforcements could be neutralized by the Allied air
superiority. There would also be the contingency of a small limited offensive to seize a bridgehead on the French
coast on 1942 should there signs of a Russian or German collapse.13

The British, which had been launching commando raids since June 1940, often sustaining grim casualties, "pointed
to reams of studies that showed the Allies lacked enough bombers, fighters, warships, landing crafts, or trained
soldiers to successfully launch an amphibious attack, let alone supply it against the inevitable German
counterattack."14 The British had always had a more global policy. The failures of the Scandinavian campaign and
the fall of France in 1940, left the only remaining move feasible the Mediterranean area. 15 On October 31, 1940
Churchill outlined his strategic view to his military advisors. He would transfer approximately twenty-five to thirty

8
Calvocoressi, 372
9
https://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/learning/general/onthisday/big/0114.html
10
Shirer, 912
11
Shirer, 913
12
Ben-Moshe, 509
13
Ben-Moshe, 510
14
Cook, 252
15
Ben-Moshe, 504
of the proposed fifty British divisions, once at its full complement, to the Middle East as soon as possible. He would
then strike at Italian forces in North Africa and Sicily with the express aim of removing Italy from the war. Finally,
he would establish a joint military front with the Balkan states. However, British defeats in the Balkans in 1941
altered that strategy.16 At the end of October 1942, the British Chief-of-Staff stated that experience had shown that a
large invasion of northern France would not be possible unless the German military strength had been greatly
reduced. The British believed only the Russians are able to slow down the Germans and defeat them on land.
Therefore, the Anglo-American focus should be to assist the Russians and to increase strategic bombings. "Limited
amphibious operations would be carried out in the Mediterranean theatre in the course of 1943 and in 1944, aimed at
"extending" and pinning down the German forces in that theatre and turning Italy into a burden on Germany. At the
same time the build-up of the Anglo-American forces in Britain must be continued." 17 For the British, the critical
component of the Second Front, as they saw it, could be achieved through bomber offensives against German cities.
The bombers would allow the allies to strike at the heart of Nazi Germany. The full weight of bomber offensive in
1943 slowed German production and undermined their war effort. 18 To the British's dismay, when the division for
Operation TORCH was to take place in 1943 rather than a cross-channel invasion, the Americans once more
diverted resources to the Pacific and slowed the concentration of men and equipment in Britain.19

The Casa Blanca conference treated the Invasion of Sicily as a continuation of the North African Campaign that
began in November 1942; a by-product of Mussolini's declaration of war in 1940. When the Germans fled across the
Strait of Messina the first aim of the Allied strategy had been achieved. The western Allies had cleared shipping
without interruption. The invasion of Italy was the next European strategy that was to culminate in the invasion of
the West and the final destruction of the German armies. The Mediterranean theatre would no longer receive the first
priority in resource allocation as the focus shifted to the pending invasion from Britain. 20 Churchill nevertheless was
optimistic of the opportunities offered in the Mediterranean as a viable second front strategy. In April 1943,
Churchill wrote to his Chief of Staff that the conquest of Sicily would be a springboard towards a landing in
Southern Italy. If the Germans decided to abandon Italy, the Italian resistance could collapse and the Allies would
be able to advance as far as the Brenner Pass. 21 The May 1943 Washington Trident conference took the decision to
launch a major attack on Europe from the Britain in early summer 1944. Therefore, the Supreme Allied
Commander in the Mediterranean, Harold Alexander, was instructed to plan an operation to conquer Sicily. This
operation should eliminate Italy from the war and contain the maximum number of German divisions; which
operations would be mounted after was to be decided by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. The operation was not
defined by geographical objectives, but rather by political ends, and the indefinable containment of maximum
number of German divisions. This is not what Stalin had in mind for a Second Front, however, it served the same
intent: the diversion of German strength from vital points of Channel coast and the strength of the Eastern Front.
The removal of Italy from the war meant the loss of fifty-nine divisions, or two million men, to the Axis. 22 The
success of the Sicily invasion on July 10 convinced even Marshall and Eisenhower of the inner logic of the Italian
campaign; they should take advantage of the expected collapse of Italy with an invasion of the Italian mainland and
pin down the German forces in this theatre at the moment of the invasion of Western Europe. 23 In speaking of the
Italian Campaign, Alexander defended that "the invasion of the West was never deprived of any resources in men or
materials by the needs of the operations in Italy. The Italian campaign fulfilled its function in the strategic scheme
of the war against Germany, and I am convinced that no other possible strategy would have fulfilled that function so
well."24 Churchill differed from the American view that an invasion of Northern France could only be carried out in
1944 when the condition would be ripe for it. 25 As a concession, the Dieppe raid was launched to appease both the
Americans and the Soviets, both whom demanded action. Dieppe Raid by the Canadians was a resounding failure,
but it did confirm the difficulties of their undertaking. Amphibious attackers had to bring everything to be self-
sufficient in battle until further reinforced. It also creates further complexity of inter-service coordination. If

16
Ben-Moshe, 505
17
Ben-Moshe, 512
18
Book, 421
19
Ben-Moshe, 517
20
Alexander, 93
21
Ben-Mosher, 520
22
Alexander, 94
23
Ben-Mosher, 522
24
Alexander, 96
25
Ben-Moshe, 503
Dieppe served any purpose, it strengthened Churchill's resolve: in order for the invasion to succeed, the logistical
conditions must be right, and until Battle of the Atlantic has won –this makes the last part of this sentence a
fragment –until the battle of the atlantic was won…?? What happens? They didn’t have the right logistical
conditions? . The raid also relieved some of the American pressure on Churchill for an invasion of Europe in the
short term. 26

There may also have been some other under-laying agenda for Churchill to pursue the Mediterranean strategy. In
1918, Western Europe attempted to set up a buffer zone to protect it from Bolshevism. 27 Churchill had considered
Stalin and the Bolshevik state as "the mortal foe of civilized freedom" prior to the rise of Nazi Germany. Churchill's
Balkan interest was, alternatively, one of containing the spread of Communism and establishment of a pro-West
government.28 At the same time, Churchill may have wished for the Germans and the Russians to bleed each other
white. To give context, prior to OVERLORD, Russians were engaging over 180 Nazi divisions while the Anglo-
Americans were engaging fewer than 10. Of the three million Germans killed in the Second World War, the Soviets
were responsible for 85 percent of them. 29 Churchill's proposal of the soft underbelly strategy, and post-war
ramifications, were not supported by the Americans because of their paranoid view of British colonial interests, the
fixation of a cross channel invasion, and trying to keep the Russians fighting the Germans. 30 Both Marshall and
Eisenhower refused to use military means for pure political gain. American political naivety failed to grasp the post-
Second World War political picture, and merely saw it as "British imperialistic adventure." 31

Logistic

The battles of the Second World War may have been won with the bravery of men, but the campaigns were
determined by logistic. Even Hitler acknowledged in the summer of 1942 to General Paulus of the Sixth Army just
before the summer offensive, "If I do not get the oil of Maikop and Grozny...then I just end this war." 32 Logistically
speaking, North Africa and Italy can be considered as an integral part of the Balkan strategy. As the Dieppe raid had
shown, the Western Allies needed considerable logistical advantage over the Germans to ensure the defeat of
Germany. In 1942, German submarines sank 6,250,000 tons of Allies shipping that was bound for the
Mediterranean or Britain, a number that far surpassed the capacity of Western shipyards to replace. However, by
1943, through a combination of long-range aircraft, aircraft carriers, and equipping surface vessels with radars that
could spot the enemy submarines in advance, allies gained an upper hand over the German U-Boats. The rate loss
suffered by the Germany Navy was one they could not sustain, and by end of May 1943, Germany's Grand Admiral
Doenitz withdrew all submarines from the North Atlantic. 33 With the North Atlantic route secured, the western
allies were able to concentrate forces in Britain for the cross channel invasion, since at the beginning of 1943 there
were practically no American forces in Britain. 34 Churchill was of the opinion that twenty-seven divisions would
not be sufficient for a cross channel invasion "in view of the extraordinary fighting efficiency of the German
Army."35 By May 1943, there were only two American divisions in Britain, and of the thirty British divisions, only
nineteen were combat divisions; it was a far cry from the thirty divisions envisioned in the Marshall plan. In the
Mediterranean and Middle East however, there were nine American and twenty-nine British divisions; most of them
were combat divisions. There were also sixty-one American divisions in the United States, most of which had
completed their training.36 Continuing operations and seizing opportunities in North Africa and Italy made logical
sense. At Hitler's insistence, a quarter of a million German and Italian troops were sent to reinforce the remnants of
the Afrika Korps in Tunisia in the winter of 1942; all of them would be lost by spring of 1943. 37 To carry out the
offensive in the Mediterranean following Sicily, still a crucial factor in defeat Germany in Europe, played into the

26
Cook, 283-4
27
Lawton, 5
28
Lawton, 7
29
Lawton, 6
30
Lawton, 18
31
Lawton, 9
32
Shirer, 909
33
Shirer, 1007
34
Ben-Mosher, 520
35
Ben-Mosher, 523
36
Ben-Moshe, 520-1
37
Shirer, 925
strategy of diverting resources from the Eastern front. Italy, in the summer of 1943, still performed important
garrison duty for the Axis in the Mediterranean theatre. The Italians had seven divisions in Southern France as far
west as Marseilles; thirty-two divisions in the Balkans, along with non-divisional anti-aircraft and coastal defence
units in both theatres. If Italy was removed from the war, these forces would have to be replaced by German
troops.38 The Italian contribution was by no means negligible. Even as the weaker of the Axis partners, the Italians
contributed more men than the Germans and roughly equal amount of armour during the North African campaign.
However, the Anglo-American historians perpetuated the view that only German efforts counted in North Africa. 39

On July 25, 1943, Benito Mussolini was summoned to the royal palace by the King, summarily dismissed and
incarcerated; the news forced Hitler to hastily assemble eight German divisions from France and southern Germany
to secure the Alpine passes between Italy and Germany, and Italy and France. 40 For a few days in summer of 1943
the German situation in central and southern Italy appeared extremely critical, as Five Italian divisions faced two
German divisions in the vicinity of Rome. Had the Allies taken advantage of their overwhelming air superiority and
complete command of the sea, the course of war in Italy would have turned out differently, and the final capitulation
of the Third Reich might have occurred a year earlier. Both the American and British chiefs of staff, General
George C. Marshall and Field Marshal sir John G. Dill, complained that General Eisenhower, who commanded the
overall operation, did not show sufficient initiative and press his advantage. 41 Had the Allies succeeded in breaking
through the Italian mainland towards Germany, maybe Churchill's soft-underbelly strategy may have been viewed
more positively. Nevertheless, a force of 1,000 aircrafts, mostly from the Russian front, were diverted to Italy under
the supreme command of Field Marshall Albert Kesselring. 42 As Hitler chose to defend Italy with German troops
until the bitter end, the Italian campaign(-or hitler?) fulfilled intended objectives of draining Axis men and materiel
from other theatres of war with only the slenderest margin of superiority. As Field Marshall Harold Alexander
would put it, "The Italian campaign fulfilled its function in the strategic scheme of the war against Germany, and I
am convinced that no other possible strategy would have fulfilled that function so well."43

The original intent of the second front request by Stalin was to divert German men and war materiel from the
Eastern front, particularly in 1942 when the Soviet Russian's position was tenuous at best. A cross-channel invasion
became synonymous with the second front strategy not only because it was what the Russians had requested, but it
was also the strategy proposed by the Americans to defeat Germany. ( combined with American's mistrust of British
interests in the Mediterranean, and the stiff resistance encountered by the Allied forces faced in Italy) I am not quite
sure what this means – this was not a strategy but created an attitude that contributed to the Germany defeat, or to
the second front or?. Churchill's “soft underbelly” is often dismissed as an unfortunate distraction of a "real" second
front. However, the fact remains that North Africa, and subsequently Italy, were natural next steps in the war, and it
was not until 1944 that the Anglo-American forces had the appropriate conditions to mount a full-scale cross
channel invasion. Only when the psychological, policy, and logistical factors were fully developed could a channel
invasion have any hope of success. All the while, North Africa and Italy served the purpose of a second front,
diverting, destroying or fixing considerable German and Italian forces, ultimately contributing to the fall of the
Third Reich.

38
Alexander, 95
39
Sadkovich, 44
40
Shirer, 999
41
Shirer, 1001
42
Calvocoressi, 379
43
Alexander, 96