QRA WC-UI Oct 2019

WCP PROGRAM UNIVERSITAS INDONESIA
PRINCIPLE OF QUANTITATIVE
RISK ASSESSMENT (QRA)
Prof Dr Azmi Mohd Shariff

Universiti Teknologi PETRONAS
azmish@utp.edu.my
Principle of Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA)

WCP Program Universitas Indonesia
October 2019
Why QRA?

October 2019
Bhopal

October 2019
Bhopal

October 2019
Bhopal

October 2019
Flixborough

October 2019
Flixborough

October 2019
Piper Alpha

October 2019
Piper Alpha

October 2019
Process Safety
Focused on :
• The most common accidents
• The causes of the largest accidents
• The hardware involved in the largest

accidents

October 2019
The Most Common Accidents

October 2019
The Causes of The Largest
Accidents

October 2019
The Hardware involved in the
Largest Accidents

October 2019
Major Questions in QRA
 What can go wrong ?
 How bad is it ?
 How often can it happen ?
 So What ?
 What do I do ?

October 2019
What can go wrong ?
Leak
Toxic Release
Leak
Pool Fire
Leak Leak
Jet Fire BLEVE
Leak
Leak Cloud Fire
Vapour Cloud Explosion

October 2019
What can go wrong ?
Pool Fire & BLEVE
L
P
G
Leak

October 2019
What can go wrong ?
Cloud Fire
UEL LEL
L
P
G
Leak

October 2019
What can go wrong ?
Vapour Cloud Explosion
UEL LEL
L
P
G
Leak

October 2019
What can go wrong ?
Dispersion of toxic gas
IDLH
N
H
3
Leak

October 2019
Risk
Assessment
Process Description
Process
Hazard Identification
Scenario identification
Accident Probability Accident Consequences
Risk Assessment
no
Risk Acceptable ? Modify Design
yes
Build and/or Operate Process

October 2019
What can go wrong ?
Identify Hazards
• Reported accidents (literature)
• Plant experience (inspection & maintenance records)
• Hazard and Operability Studies (HAZOP)
• Structured What If Technique (SWIFT)
• Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA)
• Accident databases (MHIDAS, FACTS,…)
TSH
XSV0011 XSV0012 FSL
Réactif A
Réactif B
XSV0021 XSV0022 TRC
K1100

October 2019
A scenario…
You and your family are on a road trip by using a car in the
middle of the night. You were replying a text message while
driving at 100 km/h and it was raining heavily. The car hits a
deep hole and one of your tire blows. You hit the brake, but
due to slippery road and your car tire thread was thin, the
car skidded and was thrown off the road.
What is the cause of the accident?
What is the consequence of the event?
What can we do to prevent all those things to happen in the

first place?
October 2019
Can we make it more systematic?

October 2019
HAZOP
Refer to reactor system shown.

Cooling
Coils The reaction is exothermic. A cooling
Monomer
Feed system is provided to remove the
excess energy of reaction. In the event
Cooling Water to of cooling function is lost, the
Sewer
temperature of reactor would increase.
This would lead to an increase in
Cooling reaction rate leading to additional
Water In energy release.
The result could be a runaway reaction

with pressures exceeding the bursting
pressure of the reactor. The
temperature within the reactor is
TC measured and is used to control the
Thermocouple cooling water flow rate by a valve.
Perform HAZOP Study

October 2019
HAZOP
Guide Word Deviation Causes Consequences Action

NO Cooling Temperature
increase in
reactor
REVERSE Cooling Failure of
flow water source
resulting in
backward flow
MORE Cooling Instruct
flow operators on
procedures
AS WELL AS Reactor Check
product in maintenance
coils procedures
and schedules
OTHER THAN Another Water source
material contaminated
besides
cooling
water
October 2019
HAZOP
Guide Word Deviation Causes Consequences Action
NO Cooling Cooling water Temperature Install high

valve increase in reactor temperature
malfunction alarm (TAH)
REVERSE Cooling flow Failure of water Less cooling, Install check
source resulting possible runaway valve
in backward flow reaction
MORE Cooling flow Control valve Too much cooling, Instruct

failure, operator reactor cool operators on
fails to take procedures
action on alarm
AS WELL AS Reactor More pressure in Off-spec product Check
product in reactor maintenance
coils procedures and
schedules
OTHER THAN Another Water source May be cooling If less cooling,
material contaminated ineffective and TAH will detect.
besides effect on the If detected,
cooling water reaction isolate water
source. Back up
Principle of Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) water source?
October 2019
How bad is it ?
 Calculation of consequences :
• explosion - overpressure
• fire - thermal radiation
• toxic release - toxic load
• leak of product dangerous for environment (water, soil,..)
QRA
• Use of computer models (PHAST, FRED etc)

October 2019
Consequences Analysis Procedure
Loss of containment
•Rupture or break in pipeline
Selection of a Release Incident •Hole in a tank or pipeline
•Runaway reaction
To describe release accident •Fire external to vessel
•Total quantity released
Selection of a Source Model
•Release duration
•Release rate Neutrally buoyant models
Results from the models
Selection of a Dispersion Model •Downwind concentration
•Area affected
•Duration
Models Flammable/Toxic
•TNT Equivalency
•Multi-Energy Explosion •Response vs dose
•Fireball •Probit model
Selection of Fire Selection of •Toxic response
Results
& Explosion Model Effect Model •No. of individuals affected
•Blast overpressure
•Radiant heat flux •Property damage
•Escape
•Emergency Response Mitigation Factors
•Containment dikes
•PPE
Consequence Model

October 2019
Source Model
WIND Release of vapor and liquid
Liquid Vapor
Vapor
Vapor
Liquid
Liquid
Liquid
Various types of limited Released of vapor or/and liquid

aperture releases

October 2019
Example of Source Model
Flow of Liquid Discharge through a Hole
 Equation for velocity of fluid exiting the leak through a

small hole: Co is a discharge coefficient
2 gc Pg gc is a gravitational constant
u  Co Pg is a gauge pressure
 р is the fluid density
 Mass flow rate Qm resulting from a hole of area A:
Qm   uA  ACo 2  g c Pg
 The total mass of liquid spilled depends on the total
time that the leak is active.
October 2019
Dispersion Model
Plume – continuous release Puff – instantaneous release
Parameters affected atmospheric dispersion

- Wind speed  C  C    C 
- Atmospheric stability  uj  Kj 
t x j x j  x j 
- Ground conditions (buildings, water, trees)
- Height of release above ground level Neutrally Buoyant Dispersion Models with
- Momentum and buoyancy of initial appropriate boundary and initial conditions,
material released forms fundamental basis for dispersion
modeling

October 2019
Fire - Incident Thermal Radiation
 Level of exposure to thermal radiation at certain
distance is termed as incident thermal radiation, q (J/s).
 For a point source model, the incident thermal radiation
is  S = distance from the mid point of the flame, (m)
 FQ
q tau = atmospheric transmissivity, (typically )
4  S2 Q = total heat released, (kJ/s)
F = propotion of heat transferred by radiation (0.2)
Radiation intensity, I = q/A Q  m H C

HF  m A 
0.61
m  m A A
 42  0.5 
DF 
 air  g D F  
HF
S mA = mass burning rate, (kg/s).g
DF Distance from fire

edge (e.g. tank wall)
October 2019 32
Explosion
Overpressure can be estimated using Damage estimates for common
an equivalent mass of TNT, (mTNT) structures based on overpressure
The equivalent energy of TNT is 1120

cal/g = 4686 kJ/kg = 2016 Btu/lb.
r = distance from the blast (m)
r
ze  1/3 Ze = scaled distance
m TNT (m/kg^(1/3))
  ze  
2
1616 1    
po   4 . 5  

pa  ze 
2
 z 
2
 z 
2
1   1  e  1  e 
 0 . 048   0 . 32   1 . 35 
po Ps = Scaled overpressure
ps  Po = Peak side-on overpressure
pa
Pa = Ambient pressure
n = Explosion efficiency
mH c
m TNT  (~ 0.02)
E TNT ∆HC = Heat of combustion
(kJ/kmol)
October 2019
How bad is it ?
•The impact from the consequences : people, structure,

environment
 Calculation of impact :
• fatality
• irritation
• 1st, 2nd and 3rd degree burns
• environmental impact
• business interruption, loss of image
QRA
• Use of computer models
• Information required : number of population, possible
ignition sources, local of meteorological conditions etc
October 2019
Probit Analysis
The Probit variable

can be computed from :
Y = k1 +k2 ln V
Where
V is the causative
variables

October 2019
Probit Analysis
The relationship between percentages (fraction), P
and Probit variable, Y.

October 2019
How often can it happen ?
• Accidents Probability calculation via ETA
& FTA
QRA
Small Leak (10 mm) = 8.1
• Often use of generic failure frequencies x 10-5/yr
• Data sources
• literature Medium Leak
• accident databases (OREDA, (35 mm)
FACTS,…)RBI : generic data modified = 5.2 x 10-5/yr
to reflect impact of material
degradation mechanisms Large Leak (100 mm) =
9.7 x 10-6/yr
e.g. generic data for Catastrophic Rupture
LPG storage spheres = 1 x 10-6/yr

October 2019
Event Tree Analysis (ETA)
Brake fails = 0.005+0.015+0.045+0.135+0.02+0.06+0.18 = 0.46

October 2019
Fault tree Analysis (FTA)
OR
AND

October 2019
Failure Probability Reliability Failure Rate
P1 R1 μ1
OR P OR R OR μ
P2 R2 μ2
P  1  (1  P1 )(1  P2 ) R  R1 R2   1   2
n n n
P  1   (1  Pi ) R   Ri    i
i 1 i 1 i 1
Series Link of Components: The failure of either component adds to the

total system failure
P1 R1
AND P AND R
P2 R2
 Ln( R )
P  P1 P2 P  1  (1  R1 )(1  R2 ) 
t
n n
P   Pi P  1   (1  Ri )
i 1 i 1
Parallel Link of Components: The failure of the system requires the
failure of both components. Note that
there is no convenient way to combine the
failure
WCP Program rate.Indonesia
Universitas
October 2019
Failure Rate Data
Instrument Faults/year
Flow measurements (fluids) 1.140
Level measurements (liquids) 1.700
Pressure measurement 1.410
Pressure relief valve 0.022
Thermometer temperature measurement 0.023

October 2019
Quantification of Risk
 Risk can be calculated using the following

correlation:
(probability of death) x (accident probability)

= (risk of death)

October 2019
So What?
 Individual Risk Contours
Residential
Area
10-8/year
10-7/year
10-6/year
Storage Process
Area Plant

October 2019
So What?
Risk Results from QRA
F(N) Curve for Societal Risk
1.E+00 Risk contours
Cumulative frequency (1/yr)
1.E-01
1
0-
5
1
0-
6
1.E-02
1 10 100 1000
Number of fatalities Risk assessment can be extended to

calculate Societal Risk by including
population density distribution
October 2019
So What?
Risk Assessment Principle
High Risk
Risk cannot be justified

Unacceptable region save in extraordinary
circumstances
Tolerable only if risk reduction is

The ALARP or Tolerability impracticable or if its cost is grossly
disproportionate to the improvement
region gained
(Risk is undertaken only if
Tolerable if cost of reduction would
a benefit is desired) exceed the improvement value
Broadly acceptable region Necessary to maintain assurance

(No need for detailed working to that risk remains at this level
demonstrate ALARP)
Negligible risk

October 2019
So What?
Risk Acceptance Criteria QRA
People
Tolerability Criteria (/year)
Location Description Undesired Tolerable Desired
Outside in process installations >10-3 10-3 - 10-4 <10-4
Inside the plant In buildings >10-4 10-4 - 10-5 <10-5
Boundary of the plant >10-5 10-5 - 10-6 <10-6
Outside the plant Residential areas >10-6 10-6 - 10-7 <10-7
Assets
Tolerability Criteria (/year)
Location Description Undesired Tolerable Desired
Inside the plant Escalation risk to other unit >10-4 10-4 - 10-6 <10-5
Inside the plant Escalation risk within unit >5 x 10-3 5 x 10-3 - 5 x 10-4 <5 x 10-4

October 2019
So What?
Acceptable Risk Criteria

October 2019
What do I do ?
QRA
• Calculated risk at tolerable region :
•  no further risk reducing measures needed
• Calculated risk in tolerable region if ALARP

•  further analysis of risk can be done if needed
•  risk reducing measures to be considered if economically
justified

October 2019
What do I do ?
Calculated risk at intolerable region :
 mitigation by eliminating or reducing risk to acceptable level using layer of
protection strategies
 recalculate consequences for principal contributing scenarios using
consequence models
 determine specific event frequency for principal contributing scenarios
using probability techniques (FTA,ETA etc)
 recalculate risk based on recalculated consequences and event
frequencies
 Check risk if it is within the tolerable region
 If not, introduce new strategies to eliminate or reduce the risk and follow
the above steps again
 If risk cannot be eliminated or minimized, change the plant or target
location

October 2019
What do I do ?
Layers of Protection
Focus on hazard
identification and
control
Effective Risk
Reduction Strategies
LOP increase the safety of the

process. However, proper
selection of mitigation should
be carefully done to ensure
minimum cost of safety
protection

October 2019
Strategies for Reducing Risk
Presented in order of reliability!
INHERENT Eliminating the hazard by using materials and process
conditions which are nonhazardous
PASSIVE Minimizing the hazard by process equipment design

features which reduce either the probability or
consequence of the hazard without active functioning
ACTIVE Using controls, safety interlocks, and emergency

shutdown systems to detect and correct process
deviations (engineering controls)
PROCEDURAL Using operating procedures, administrative checks,

emergency response, and other management approaches
to prevent incidents, or to minimize the consequences
(administrative controls)

October 2019
Mitigation Measures
Mitigation Measures
Typical measures for mitigation and recovery from major accidents are as
follows:
· Inventory control ESD/EDP (design and operations measures)
· Layout (e.g. protection of utilities)
· Physical barriers (fire and/or explosion resistant)
· Combustion product control and containment
· Escape and evacuation arrangements
· Emergency procedures and plans
· Fire and gas detection measures
· Alarm systems and communications
· Fire control and extinguishment (fixed systems)
· Fire control and extinguishment (mobile systems and fire service)
· Pre-fire planning
· Training and drills
· Salvage.

October 2019
Acceptable Risk Criteria
Before mitigation measure
After mitigation measure

October 2019
Thank You

October 2019

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WCP PROGRAM UNIVERSITAS INDONESIA

Prof Dr Azmi Mohd Shariff

Principle of Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA)

Principle of Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA)

Principle of Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA)

Principle of Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA)

Principle of Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA)

Principle of Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA)

Principle of Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA)

Principle of Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA)

Principle of Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA)

• The causes of the largest accidents

• The hardware involved in the largest

Principle of Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA)

Principle of Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA)

Principle of Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA)

Principle of Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA)

Principle of Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA)

Leak Cloud Fire

Vapour Cloud Explosion

Principle of Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA)

Principle of Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA)

Principle of Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA)

Principle of Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA)

Accident Probability Accident Consequences

Principle of Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA)

Principle of Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA)

What is the cause of the accident?

What is the consequence of the event?

What can we do to prevent all those things to happen in the

Principle of Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA)

Refer to reactor system shown.

The result could be a runaway reaction

Perform HAZOP Study

Guide Word Deviation Causes Consequences Action

NO Cooling Cooling water Temperature Install high

MORE Cooling flow Control valve Too much cooling, Instruct

Principle of Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA)

Principle of Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA)

WIND Release of vapor and liquid

Various types of limited Released of vapor or/and liquid

Principle of Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA)

 Equation for velocity of fluid exiting the leak through a

 Mass flow rate Qm resulting from a hole of area A:

Parameters affected atmospheric dispersion

Principle of Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA)

Radiation intensity, I = q/A Q  m H C

DF Distance from fire

The equivalent energy of TNT is 1120

•The impact from the consequences : people, structure,

The Probit variable

Principle of Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA)

Principle of Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA)

Principle of Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA)

Brake fails = 0.005+0.015+0.045+0.135+0.02+0.06+0.18 = 0.46

Principle of Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA)

Series Link of Components: The failure of either component adds to the

Principle of Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA)

 Risk can be calculated using the following

(probability of death) x (accident probability)

Principle of Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA)

Principle of Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA)

Number of fatalities Risk assessment can be extended to