This is a fragment of the author’s manuscript with corresponding page numbers of the published

version. The publisher’s version may be available through the publisher’s web site or your
institution’s library.

Igor M. Arievitch

BEYOND THE BRAIN: AN AGENTIVE ACTIVITY PERSPECTIVE ON MIND,

DEVELOPMENT AND LEARNING

CHAPTER 2: THE MIND IS NOT IN THE BRAIN

Citation for the book: Arievitch, I. M. (2017). Beyond the Brain: An Agentive Activity
Perspective on Mind, Development, and Learning. Rotterdam/Boston: Sense Publishers.

Publisher’s link: https://www.sensepublishers.com/catalogs/bookseries/bold-visions-in-

educational-research/beyond-the-brain/

TABLE OF CONTENTS of the book

Acknowledgements………………………………………………………………………………vii
Chapter 1: Introduction…………………………………………………………………………..1
The Goals and Starting Points of the Book…………………………………………………1
The Structure and Main Topics of the Book………………………………………………..4
Chapter 2: The Mind Is Not in the Brain…………………………………....................................7
A New Wave of Brainism in Psychology and Education…………………………………...7
Recent Criticism of Brainism……………………………………………………………….9
Summary of Arguments Against Brainism and “Mindless Neuroscience”………………..20
Chapter 3: The Mind Is the Form of the Individual’s Activity: The Emergence of the Active
Agent……………………………………………………………………………………………..25
Historical Context of Research on Non-Automaticity…………………………………….28
James’s Concept of the “Efficacity of Consciousness”……………………………..30
Dewey’s Notion of Coordination of Self-Guided Activity………………………….31
An Activity-Based Approach to Mind…………………………………………………….33
Background of Galperin’s Work……………………………………………………33
The Concept of Orienting Activity………………………………………………….35
The New Type of Causality…………………………………………………………39
The Mind is the Embodied Agent’s Activity, not the Brain Functioning…………...40
Comparison to Other Recent Attempts to Introduce an Agentive Approach to Mind…….42
Chapter 4: The Developmental Trajectory of Cultural Mediation (I): From Joint Activity to
Semiotic Mediation………………………………………………………………………………55
Approaches to Semiotic Mediation………………………………………………………..57
Vygotsky on Semiotic Mediation………………………………………………………….60
Taking a Broader View on Mediation: Pre-history of Semiotic Mediation……………….64
From Earlier Forms of Cultural Mediation to Semiotic Mediation:The “Magic of Signs” 72
Chapter 5: The Developmental Trajectory of Cultural Mediation (II): From Semiotically
Mediated Activity to Psychological Process…………………………………………………….77
The Internalization Controversy…………………………………………………………..77
An Activity-based Approach to Internalization…………………………………………...81
Focusing on External Activity………………………………………………………81
Mental Processes as Activities………………………………………………………86
Mental Processes are the Agent’s External Actions………………………………...91
Demystifying the Process of Mediation by Cognitive Tools……………………………...95
Reframing the Mediation Research…………………………………………………95
Cognitive Tools are Directed toward External Objects, not “Inward”……………...99
Broadening the Non-Mentalist Framework………………………………………………103
Neo-Piagetian Theorizing of Mental Processes and Internalization……………….104
The Human Agent: Adapting Organism or Inherently Social Actor?......................106
“Internal” Processes as Acting with Social Meanings…………………………….109
Chapter 6: The Quality of Cognitive Tools and Development of the Mind…………………..115
Development and Learning: The Relevance of Culturally Evolved Cognitive Tools……116
The Role of Learning in Cognitive Development………………………………………..120
Types of Learning………………………………………………………………….120
Traditional learning………………………………………………………….121
Systemic-empirical learning…………………………………………………123
Systemic-theoretical learning………………………………………………..125
Types of Learning and Cognitive Development…………………………………...132
Implications for Developmental Studies…………………………………………………137
Developmental Teaching and Learning………………………………………………….140
An Illustration: Bloom’s Taxonomy from the DTL Perspective…………………..142
Chapter 7: Conclusion: Overcoming the Contemplative Fallacy by Adopting the Agentive
Activity Perspective…………………………………………………………………………….147

References……………………………………………………………………………………...153

*****
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CHAPTER 2

THE MIND IS NOT IN THE BRAIN

A NEW WAVE OF BRAINISM IN PSYCHOLOGY AND EDUCATION

This book is not about the brain or the role of brain studies in psychology and education. Instead,
it is about understanding the mind as a property of the active agent and as a form in itself of the
agent’s external activity, as well as the critical educational implications of such an understanding.
So why start with a review of recent criticism of the “brain-based” approach that claims to provide
full and complete explanations of consciousness, behavior and learning exclusively in terms of
brain functioning? The first reason is my strong belief that the steadily rising wave of “brainism”
coming from the “neuromarketing” branch of neuroscience, by generating misguided expectations
while at the same time depleting valuable resources in these disciplines, poses a seriously
detrimental threat to psychology, and in particular to education. This “brainism” is promoted with
mind-boggling confidence by many authors in research and media who declare that there is
“overwhelming evidence” that the causes of behavior and mind can be traced to brain processes,
and announce the advent of neuro-explanations of all things human (e.g., Dennett, 1991; Kandell,
2007, 2016; Pinker, 2003, 2009). In education such claims divert attention and resources away
from explorations into the dynamics of teaching and learning as meaningful activities that require
far more than focus on the brain.
The second reason to start with such a review is my belief that the current pushback by
psychologists and educators who are skeptical about the surge of “brainist” neuro-explanations is
inadequate and needs to be more conceptually deep and far-reaching. The final reason – and the
most important one in the context of this book – is my hope that a more consistent, non-
reductionist, and at the same time non-mentalist understanding of mind, mental development, and
learning can emerge from deeper conceptual elaborations on and intensification of the growing
opposition to “mindless neuroscience.” In this chapter, I will review these recent critical advances
that oppose “brainism” and offer a number of points that can further strengthen and unify this
opposition.
A substantial criticism of brain reductionism has recently emerged in philosophy,
psychology and education, as well as within neuroscience itself. Notable skeptical voices coming
from neuroscience include, for example, the recent books by Lengrenzi and Umilta (2011) and
Satel and Lilienfeld (2013). These authors eloquently challenge overly enthusiastic claims from
pop-neuroscience and neuro-marketers, in actuality not supported by evidence, about the alleged
link between certain mental activities and specific brain areas and processes. Conversely, the

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authors discuss ample evidence that various brain areas and processes in fact support multiple and
very different human activities, including different mental activities and problem solving, which
makes establishing such direct links difficult if not impossible. Unfortunately, most of these
sobering critiques developed within neuroscience do not articulate any philosophically viable
alternatives to such unfettered brain reductionism on ontological grounds. Moreover, they express
hope and even confidence that, with more effort and research, sometime in the future such a direct
mind-brain link will be discovered. In their conviction that neuroscientific discoveries are on their
way to this, many researchers call for patience, noting that contemporary neuroscience does not
yet know even the most elementary facts about how the brain actually works (e.g., how the brain
“recognizes” a straight line), let alone the relationships between the brain processes and the more
complex mental states (e.g., see Marcus, 2012; Mausfeld, 2012). Yet, as many authors observe
(Jarrett, 2015; Willis, 2015), so far these calls for caution and patience fall on the deaf ears of
aggressive neuro-marketers (and, unfortunately, some neuroscientists and psychologists) who
continue to spread, with great fanfare, numerous simplistic interpretations and outright neuro-
myths.
Other neuroscientists, as well as psychologists and philosophers, have raised more general
concerns about the explanatory value of the reductionist brain-based approaches for understanding
the mind and behavior (Bem, 2001; Bissell, 1998; Carmeli & Blass, 2013; De Vos & Pluth, 2016;
Harré, 2012; Hruby, 2012; Gazzaniga, 2011; Gold & Stoljar, 1999; Miller, 2008; Rose & Abi-
Rached, 2013; Tallis, 2011; Uttal, 2001). These authors argue that neuro and biological
reductionism misrepresents and simplifies human nature by claiming that it can be derived from
and attributed to brain physiology. They point out that such complex social constructs as free will
or responsibility, as well as presumably more “simple” meaningful actions and behaviors (such as
driving a car), have no meaning in the “materialistic” and ‘deterministic” context of the brain
processes.
Many critics point out that educational claims putatively derived from neuroscience are
largely oversold and not supported by rigorous evidence. Indeed, the actual educational
recommendations that can be derived from recent neuroscientific research are strikingly
disappointing and, moreover, merely translate into fashionable neuroscientific terminology what
has long already been known, thus producing an illusion of new discoveries (e.g., Bruer, 1997;
2006; Fischer, Goswami, & Geake, 2010; Varma, McCandliss & Schwartz, 2008). These
observations have been echoed by the findings that mere insertion of neuroscientific terms and
references to brain research has a powerful convincing effect on non-experts’ judgments about
factually flawed and even nonsensical claims and recommendations (including guidelines for
teaching and learning), masking otherwise obvious weakness of these statements and
recommendations (cf. McCabe & Castel, 2008; Weisberg, Keil, Goodstein, Rawson, & Gray,
2008).
In mass literature and media, “brain” is routinely inserted into recommendations which, upon
closer examination, at best repeat commonplace knowledge bearing

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no relation to actual brain studies and findings. This exploitation of flippant neuro-references have
reached such egregious levels that one could suspect that the real reason behind is that it is a cheap
way to impress with “cutting-edge science.” Alternatively, it is often an outright commercial ploy,
since today “brain” is like “sex” – it sells. Take for example a recent book which in its title
announces nothing less than the “Education Revolution,” and in its subtitle claims to explain “how
to apply brain science to improve instruction” (Sanzes, 2017). Although educational
recommendations provided by the author are either stunningly trivial or nonsensical, the book is
full of bizarre yet confident statements about brain research “findings.” For example, the author
proclaims that “the amygdala, the part of the brain in charge of emotions, has three universal needs:
The need to feel safe, the need to feel wanted, and the need to be successful” (ibid, p. 99). The
educational recommendation that follows is that teachers have to test what they teach on the
criterion “that the amygdala must value it” (ibid., p. 152). Or consider the author’s “innovative”
explanation of higher order thinking, which presumably would not be possible without the cutting-
edge brain research: “Higher level thinking is simply defined as the brain making connections,
which allow students to link new information to old… based on their prior knowledge” (ibid, p.
54). Such pieces of “revolutionary” pop-science could be just shrugged off and forgotten were they
not polluting the public discourses with fake explanations and false promises in the critically
important area of education.

RECENT CRITICISM OF BRAINISM

An elaborate critical analysis of neuroscientific interpretations of psychological processes

has been offered by Bennett and Hacker (2003; 2007). These authors argue that psychological
attributes cannot be ascribed to the brain. Instead, processes such as remembering, thinking, and
decision-making are done by people, not brains. They point to the confusion between levels of
analysis in brain-related educational literature, such as in routine references to the “learning brain”
(for one of the recent examples, see Sousa, 2011). They identify this error as the mereological
fallacy, in which characteristics of the whole entity (in this case, the person) are mistakenly
attributed to a part of the whole (in this case, the brain). This is a very important line of
argumentation. However, its development by the authors, as well as an alternative that they offer,
are presented mostly from the perspective of linguistic philosophy, discourse analysis, references
to “psychological predicates,” and the “normative connections of logic” rather than from a position
that is concerned with the ontological legitimacy of mental processes and their distinct role in
behavior. The authors’ legitimate and valuable point is that neuroscience cannot in principle shed
any light on many non-empirical, epistemological aspects of mind as

an a priori enquiry into the web of epistemic concepts that is formed by the
connections, compatibilities and incompatibilities between the concepts of knowledge,
belief, conviction, suspicion, supposition, conjecture, doubt,

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certainty, memory, evidence and self-evidence, truth and falsehood, probability,
reasons and reasoning, etc. (Bennett & Hacker, 2003, p. 406)

The authors do argue that consciousness, as well as other psychological states and processes,
“are bound to behavioral grounds,” not the brain. Yet again, their point is that consciousness can
be legitimately ascribed to an individual exhibiting a particular behavior and not to the brain;
therefore the focus is on the rules of attributing mental states to the individual or to the brain (in
the context of linguistic and epistemological discourse) rather than on whether, how, and why
consciousness is distinct from brain processes in functional and developmental terms.
Particularly notable is the criticism of different aspects of brain reductionism recently put
forth by Bakhurst, Gergen, Noë, and Joldersma. These works offer many refreshing insights about
critically important differences between the brain and the mind, about the embodied mind, and
other related concepts. To clarify what these authors suggest, their ideas are discussed in more
detail below.
David Bakhurst (2008; 2011) criticizes what he calls “brainism” (reducing the mind to the
brain) and advocates “personalism” by drawing on the insights of Russian philosopher Evald
Ilyenkov and a number of contemporary Western thinkers, particularly John McDowell. Both
Ilyenkov and McDonnell develop an argument that the brain is “not a candidate” for explaining
the mind because mental processes belong not to the physiological realm of the brain but to the
individual’s activity in the world. In so doing, Bakhurst draws on Ilyenkov’s position according to
which looking into the brain for an explanation of the mind is a fallacy. As Ilyenkov put it,

[T]he substance of mind is always [the individual’s] external activity . . . and the brain
with its inborn structures is only its biological substrate. This is why studying the brain
tells you as little about the mind as analyzing the physical properties of gold, silver, or
banknote paper tells you about the nature of money. (Ilyenkov, 2002, p. 98; italics in
the original)

Along the same lines, personalists maintain that the brain creates the possibility for, but does
not determine, psychological processes – in other words, brain functioning enables “mindedness,”
but is not constitutive of it. Following McDowell (1994), Bakhurst explores an important
distinction between two different types of explanations, one of which is relevant to the brain
(physiological processes), and the other – the mind (psychological processes). That is, the brain
belongs to the realm of natural-scientific causal explanations, whereas the mind belongs to the
“realm of reasons.” According to Bakhurst,

Since there is no possibility of reducing the items that occupy the space of reasons to
those that populate the realm of law, it follows that psychological talk represents a
fundamentally different discourse from talk of the brain, and these discourses have
fundamentally different subjects. With this view of rationality in place, we can say that
the qualitative transformation in the child occurs when it becomes an inhabitant of the
space of reasons, a being whose life-activity

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must be understood by appeal to rational, rather than merely causal-scientific,
considerations. For McDowell, what is crucial is the acquisition of conceptual
capacities...Such a creature is a rational agent, a person. This conception of development
consolidates the view that the person is the centerpiece of rational explanation, not her
brain.” (Bakhurst, 2008, p. 425)

One important conclusion from this line of reasoning is worth repeating, since several
misguided assumptions and misleading language have immensely polluted educational and popular
discourse: Brains do not think, perceive, believe, and do not make decisions (and, one could add,
neither do amygdalae “need” or “feel” anything). These and similar processes do not take place in
the brain and are inapplicable to brain processes. It is persons with brains who do all these activities
and therefore are responsible for the consequences of their decisions and actions. What Bakhurst
actually touches upon here (though does not elaborate in detail) is not just a matter of different types
of logic or different levels of incompatible “discourses” (causal vs. rational). Rather, it is a
fundamental question about ontologically different types of causality. One of these types is
mechanical (physical, physiological) causality, which is applicable to all brain processes. Another
type is qualitatively different non-mechanical causality (a sort of “non-deterministic determinism”)
which emerges in evolution with the advent of embodied active agents who (not their brains)
consider various “reasons” for action and act upon them. I will come back to this important point in
the next chapter where I discuss the emergence of a new level of activity regulation – the non-
automatic (psychological) regulation.
To reiterate, one issue with Bakhurst’s account is that although he appears to imply the active
agent (person) in his discussion, he does this in mostly general and indirect terms, and in the context
of different “discourses” rather than in relation to the agents’ meaningful activity. The second issue,
closely related to the first one, is that his perspective on agency and first-person perspective critical
to agency seems to have a traditional mentalist flavor. For example, in commenting on how brainism
struggles to make sense of the first-person perspective, Bakhurst writes that
 [a] person does not typically stand to her own mental states as to objects of observation.
…The attitude we take to our own mental lives is one of agency: we are the authors of
our orientation to the world, responsible for what we think and do and our attitude to
our own beliefs is never one of passive observation. Indeed, even in cases where our
minds are passive recipients, as they are in perception, we are nevertheless under a
standing

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obligation to evaluate the veracity of what we take ourselves to see, hear and so on.
(ibid. p. 423)

From this and later passages it is apparent that Bakhurst is still wavering between two
radically different positions: one which posits an active agent and mind, and another that is rooted
in the traditional mentalist paradigm about the mind. The latter position transpires in Bakhurst’s
claims that in perception “our minds are passive recipients...” and that only after perceiving
something “we are under a standing obligation to evaluate the veracity of what we take ourselves
to see, hear, and so on” (ibid., p. 423). Interpreting the mind as a recipient of external information
or experience is clearly an instance of the traditional mentalist and cognitivist (information-
processing) framework. Therefore, one can conclude that although Bakhurst raises important
concerns with regard to brainism and articulates some potentially promising points for a possible
“personalist” alternative, his overall account is contradictory, since it still operates with the
elements of the traditional mentalist paradigm, which assumes that the mind passively receives
information to process it “in the head.” Consequently, in his further elaborations Bakhurst ends up
claiming that there is “no reason to assume a priori that causal factors relevant to explaining a
person’s… ability” do not come from the brain and that “there are no a priori grounds to declare
brain science irrelevant to educational issues” (Bakhurst, 2008, pp. 427-428). This conclusion by
Bakhurst seems inconsistent given that he spends the larger part of his article arguing that from
the personalist perspective, which he seems to share, there are actually very serious theoretical
grounds to assume exactly that – namely, that the brain is irrelevant in terms of “causal factors” in
behavior and that the “brain is not a candidate” for explaining the mind and mental processes.
Several topics raised by Bakhurst in his discussion of brainism resonate with the critique
of cortical explanations of human behavior put forth by Kenneth Gergen (2010), who also adds
several important threads to critiquing and potentially debunking brainism. Gergen claims that
looking into the workings of the brain by using imaging technology, however sophisticated, can
actually tell us very little, if anything at all, about the human mind, behavior, and learning.
According to Gergen, the “causes” of behavior are not in the brain but in the outside world, which
for humans is their social and cultural world. The human brain (and more broadly the nervous
system) enables all forms of cultural activities and behaviors due to its enormous plasticity, but
the brain is not responsible for human behavior because it is not the cause of behavior.
 Based on evidence from neuropsychological research, Gergen makes a compelling case that
human activity is unintelligible in terms of neural processes and that the brain’s primary function is
to serve as an enabling tool for achieving socially originated goals. Accordingly, Gergen articulates
the conceptual premise that the brain processes can be only viewed as a necessary organismic
precondition for mental processes and abilities, but in no way as their causes or determinants. He
points to the intractable conceptual problem with understanding the brain as the causal source of the
mind states:

The distinction is represented primarily in the assumption that the brain is a causal source
of both mental states and behavior. We thus commonly speak of the neural basis, source,
or grounds of cognition, emotion, altruism, aggression, and so on. Yet this assumption
of the brain as a causal source raises major difficulties. There is, at the outset, Descartes’
intractable problem of how

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brain states affect mind states. If mind states are not material, then how are we to
conceptualize the causal link between material and non-material worlds? (Gergen, 2010,
p. 802)

Gergen further states that the brain should be viewed not as causing behavior (and therefore
not as being somehow “responsible” for specific behavior) but instead, as an “organ” that supports
all kinds of activities:

There are dramatically different social implications between the conclusion that “my
brain made me do it, and “my brain prevents my doing it.” In the latter case, there is
considerable utility in determining whether a given incapacity, for example, is cortically
determined. It would be useful to know if symptoms characterized as autism resulted
from neurological as opposed to social factors – or some combination. (ibid, p. 811)

Instead of deriving behavior from the “programs” contained in the brain, Gergen suggests
viewing the function of the brain as “preparatory” – that of preparing the individual for an infinite
variety of actions (in the form of what he terms “protean action”) which implies innovation and
continuous adjustment to ever-changing environmental conditions. In this context, Gergen points to
the brain’s enormous plasticity as its most important property for human life that requires the
individual to be prepared for an infinite variety of activities that cannot be predetermined from the
beginning. He further draws attention to these requirements being cultural in origin, and sums his
position as follows,

In this context, it seems far more reasonable to view the brain not as prophetic, but as
preparatory in function. That is, it is an organ specifically preparing the individual for
 protean action, for continuously responding, innovating, and initiating, as the conditions
of life unfold over time. It is at just this point that an enormous body of evidence for
neural plasticity becomes relevant.” (ibid. p. 806)

Insisting that efforts to find explanations of behavior in the brain are misguided, Gergen makes
a point that is similar to Ilyenkov’s reasoning (as discussed by Bakhurst) – that these explanations
should be looked for not in the realm of physiology but in the realm of culture and human meanings.
He discusses what resonates with Ilyenkov’s example (quoted earlier in this chapter) about the
futility of trying to discover the nature of money by examining the physical composition of
banknotes, explaining why the concept of time cannot be found in the mechanism of the clock itself.
In Gergen’s words,

The physical mechanism of a clock may be fully understood; the functioning of its parts
wholly predictable… Yet, there is nothing about the physical functioning of the clock
that yields information about time. That a clock furnishes us the time of day is entirely
dependent upon shared agreements within the culture… To return to the earlier issue of
causality, it makes little

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sense to say that the working of the clock as a physical instrument is the causal basis (a
“hard-wired origin”) of the time. We are dealing here not with cause and effect, but with
two functionally distinct discourses. (ibid. p. 809)

Gergen also convincingly argues that it makes no sense to view the brain in isolation from the
nervous system and the whole body, as well as from its behavior, and instead suggests the broader
“body-in-environment” system as a more viable alternative and core focus of analysis. This shift in
focus eliminates the traditional distinction between brain and behavior and, likewise, refutes the
view of the brain as a cause of behavior:

... [T]he brain is but a constituent part of the nervous system as a whole, and, separated
from the remainder of the system, bodily movement is severely attenuated. In effect, it
makes little sense to view the “brain as behavior” separated from the broader system of
which it is a part. It is also apparent that the neural system is scarcely independent of the
pulmonary system; each depends on the other for its functioning. And, too, neither of
these could function effectively without the digestive system, skeletal structure, and so
on. Remove any part of the system and “behavior” is essentially negated. Given that
what we commonly distinguish as the brain acquires its function within the bodily
system as a whole, it defies common meaning to assert that the movement of the body
represents behavior, for which the brain is a cause. It is the functioning of the full array
of interdependent bodily systems that is synonymous with behavior itself. Remove the
 functioning of this systemic process and there is no behavior; remove behavior and there
is nothing remaining to be called the body. The traditional distinction between brain and
behavior is erased, and likewise the view that the brain is a cause or basis of behavior.
(ibid., p. 804)

In this passage, in addition to its main line of argument that the functioning of the brain cannot
be separated from the functioning of the body as a whole and that, therefore, claims about the brain
causing behavior are unsubstantiated and misleading, one can also identify at least an implicit hint
to what other authors (Joldersma, 2013; Noë, 2008, among others) refer to as the embodied agent
who acts in the world, including various cultural environments. However, this important concept has
not been further developed by Gergen, which leads to the following problems with his account.
From the very beginning of the discussion, Gergen considers two types of factors as possible
candidates for determinants of the individual’s behavior: the physiological factors (brain processes)
and cultural factors. Having established these two alternatives, Gergen clearly chooses “cultural
conditions” as more suitable:

It is not the brain that brings about problem solving, but the cultural conditions in which
the very idea of solving problems and the kind of behavior defined as problem solving
are nurtured. In this case the brain is simply a conduit that carries the cultural tradition.
(ibid., p. 803)

--- Page 15 ---

The problem with Gergen’s interpretation, however, is that it appears that cultural factors
somehow act directly and shape behavior by themselves. In other words, Gergen seems to view
cultural conditions themselves as determinants of behavior: “The brain does not determine the
contours of cultural life; cultural life determines what we take to be the nature and importance of
brain functioning” (p. 813). Therefore, the physiological causes of behavior are replaced by Gergen
with cultural causes. As a result, there is no clearly defined human agent in Gergen’s account. In
some parts of the discussion, such as the passage above, the agent is seemingly presumed but is
neither explicitly identified nor theorized in any detail as a potentially key concept to theorizing the
mind and the role of the brain. In turn, this leads to an implicit assumption about a direct relationship
between the brain and the outside world (which, in the case of humans, is the predominantly cultural
world). This assumption shows up right in the title of Gergen’s (2010) article – The Acculturated
Brain, which not so tacitly implies a position that the brain itself is directly connected to culture and
even “acculturated” by it. In addition, expressions like “brain as culture carrier” (p. 805) also point
to the same problematic assumption about the direct synergy and immediate connection between the
brain and culture.
Quite paradoxically, in such an account, assuming a direct connection between the brain and
culture means that there is no clear place for the mind as something distinctly different from the
brain. Consequently, one is bound to have a hard time explaining how cultural factors (Gergen’s
version of the causes of behavior) in synergy with the brain allow for the individual’s “protean”
(ever-changing) or any other type of meaningful actions in the dynamic cultural and social
environment. That is, omitting the human agent as the defining part of the relationship between the
brain and cultural factors makes a productive conceptualization of the role of the mind
(psychological processes) very difficult, if not impossible. As I discuss in the following chapters,
the concept of active agents and their meaningful goal-directed activities in the world is central to
understanding the mind’s function as irreducible to the brain processes and to resolving old dualistic
dichotomies between the brain and the mind, the mind and the body, the physiological and cultural
processes, and so on. My brief comment about Gergen’s view here is that while brains themselves
do not “carry” culture, neither do cultural conditions, nor cultural artifacts themselves carry culture.
Rather, real people (enabled by human brains and bodies) as they engage in their cultural practices
do.
A compelling case against ‘brainism’ has been recently made by Alva Noë. In his thought-
provoking book Out of Our Heads (2009), Noë criticizes mainstream neuroscience and cognitive
science for promoting the view that the brain is the seat of the mind and that the brain generates
consciousness. His charge is that these views are misguided, unsustainable and have no empirical
support:

Brains don’t think. The idea that a brain could represent the world on its own doesn’t
make any more sense than the idea that mere marks on paper could signify all on their
own (that is, independently of the larger social practice of

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reading and writing). The world shows up for us thanks to our interaction with it. It is
not made in the brain or by the brain.” (Noë, 2009, p. 164)

Noë forcefully argues that consciousness (which for him in most cases is identical to the
mind) does not “take place” in the brain in the way digestion takes places in the stomach. The mind
is not what we have; it is what we do in the world when being engaged with the environment. The
mind is embodied and engaged with the world – there is no “Mission Control” somewhere in the
brain because the mind is not a “thing”; instead, it is relational. As Noë states, “[c]onsciousness of
the world around us is something that we do: we enact it, with the world’s help, in our dynamic
living activities. It is not something that happens in us” (ibid., p. 65).
Since Noë’s own research focus has been visual perception, his most convincing points come
from the studies of perception. For example, he draws on the experiments involving rewiring the
brains of newborn ferrets by wiring up their eyes to the parts of the brain normally used for hearing.
It turned out that the ferrets were able to see with their auditory brains, and Noë rightfully concludes
that “this teaches us that there isn’t anything special about the cells in the so-called visual cortex that
makes them visual. Cells in the auditory cortex can be visual just as well” (ibid., p. 54). Such findings
illustrate the brain’s plasticity, as well as an important proposition that there are no direct neural
correlates of mental cognitive functions that could by themselves generate these functions because
cognition does not “happen” inside the brain. In Noë’s words,

Seeing is … a bodily activity. Seeing is not something that happens in us. It is not
something that happens to us or in our brains. It is something we do. It is an activity of
exploring the world making use of our practical familiarity with the ways in which our
own movement drives and modulates our sensory encounter with the world. Seeing is a
kind of skillful activity.” (ibid., p. 60)

Noë criticizes the mechanistic model of visual perception, which holds that initially the
retinal image (which is “on its way” to the brain) is turned upside down due to optical laws, and
then the brain, in the process of “analyzing” that image, turns it back into the upright position. Noë
argues that this model is fundamentally misleading. The retinal “image” is not a picture that is
somehow scrutinized by the mind’s eye, or by the brain. The brain does not see the retinal image.
The claim that the brain “adjusts the inversion of the retinal image” (because the retinal image is
“upside down”) does not make sense; it is based on the misguided assumption that the retinal image
is a picture, that is, a representation that needs to be interpreted by some observer. From this
perspective,

Seeing is active. Vision is not an internal process in the sense like digestion. When we
give up the misguided assumption that the brain generates vision, we lose the feeling
of puzzlement about how the brain does it. (ibid., p. 145)

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One of the most provocative arguments by Noë is directed towards the information-
processing view – the presumed “commonplace knowledge” that the brain, and its “visual areas”
in particular, is an organ for processing information about the environment. According to this
disputable though widely shared view, the visual system in the brain performs an information-
processing task – it extracts information about the environment from the retinal image, thus
constructing an internal representation of that environment. Noë contends that there are serious
reasons to question such a theory because the brain itself does not interpret information in any
way:

When a detective extracts information about an intruder from a footprint, or when an

oceanographer gathers information about a prehistoric climate by studying fossils of
unicellular organisms that she dredges up from today’s ocean floor – these are nice
examples of “extracting information” about one thing from another… Things are
different when it comes to the brain and the retinal image. No doubt the retinal image
is rich in information about the scene before the eyes…But the brain is no scientist or
detective; it doesn’t know anything and it has no eyes to examine the retinal image. It
 has no capacity to make inferences about anything, let alone the remote environmental
causes of the observable state of the retina.” (ibid., p. 161)

To reiterate, in this sense the brain is not an information processing device, since the brain
does not “know” the operations it is performing, just as a clock knows nothing about time. This
argument sounds convincing, especially if one assumes that information processing includes
making sense of that information rather than just “processing” it for abstract algorithms, formulaic
consistencies, and combinatorial logistics and patterns.
Criticizing the mentalist model of cognition, Noë argues that it is a mistake to think that the
brain builds up an internal picture of the world. Rather, cognition can be construed in terms of
“access to the world”:

What I see is never the content of a mental snapshot; the world does not seem to be
reproduced inside me. Rather – and this is the key – the world seems to be available to
me. What guarantees its availability is, first of all, its actually being here, and second,
my possessing the skills needed to gain access to it. I gather the detail as I do it by
turning my head or shifting my attention… The world doesn’t show up for me as
present all at once in my mind. It shows up as within reach, as more or less nearby, as
more or less present.” (pp. 140-141, italics in the original)

The theme about “skillful access” to the world as a basis for perception, which resonates
with Gibson’s (1979) idea of affordances, is prominent is Noë’s account. However, the subsequent
important questions that follow from this position are never discussed or even raised – namely,
what exactly are those skills that are needed to gain access to the world, how do they develop and
what does this imply for understanding the mind? These questions and a whole set of related issues
lead

--- Page 18 ---

to the problem of defining and analyzing different types of the agent’s actions and to the notion of
internalization in its reconceptualized form as a major avenue of human mental development,
which is the main topic of Chapter 5 of this book.
In addition, although in contrast to the mentalist accounts Noë (2004) explains perception
as connected to external action, he seems to conceptualize action itself in a quite narrow, sensory-
motor way, as a merely physical movement of the biological organism adapting to the
environment. Along the same line of narrowly biological reasoning, Noë posits that human mind
and activity are biologically based, and claims that “the goal is to understand the biological basis
of consciousness” (Noë, 2009, p. 161). Such a biologically-driven view leads Noë to argue that
the mind is everywhere where there is life – even in bacteria: “The bacterium is not merely a
process; it is an agent, however simple; it has interests...Where we discern life, we have everything
we need to discern mind” (ibid., p. 41). Paradoxically, in such a radical form of a blanket
generalization, the call for a biological perspective turns out to be non-evolutionary at its core,
since there is no acknowledgement of any qualitative changes and developmental trajectories
across forms of life and mind (from snails to mammals), let alone of the unique features of human
mental development. These unique features will be discussed in Chapters 4 and 5 of this book.
To summarize, in Noë’s works there is an explicit and forceful rejection of brainism and, as
an alternative, an implicit move towards the notion of the active embodied agent. However, due to
Noë’s understanding of practically all living beings as agents, the specific properties of active
agents and the distinct and qualitative characteristics that differentiate them from non-agents are
not discussed. The analysis of such differences and their fundamental implications for action-based
conceptualization of the mind is the main topic of Chapter 3 of this book.
Another important line of arguments against brainism has been recently advanced by
Clarence Joldersma (2013) from the perspective of the radical embodiment model of mind. The
idea of embodied cognition has been advanced by a number of authors (e.g., Clark, 2008; Overton,
Müller & Newman, 2008; Varela, Thompson & Rosch, 1991), but Joldersma used it in the most
systematic way to challenge the brain reductionism. Not surprisingly, many themes in Joldersma’s
account are similar to those raised by the authors discussed above. For example, Joldersma argues
that mental process and behavior do not “supervene” on the brain – that is, they are not determined
by the brain; brain processes do not determine actions but rather “modulate” sensorimotor patterns
based on sensory feedback:

Localized sensory feedback adjusts and adapts general motor dynamic patterns while,
conversely, neural states participate as a bodily-subsystem in the entire bodily
subject’s action as informed by the network of affordances. That is, the relations
between neural activity and the sensorimotor elements of embodied environmental
interaction are modulating. (Joldersma, 2013, p. 266; italics in the original)

--- Page 19 ---

The radical embodiment model adopted by Joldersma seeks to conceptualize the mind as
“embodiedness,” including its embeddedness in the world: “The human mind is embodied in the
entire bodily subject and embedded in the world, and hence is not reducible to structures inside
the head” (ibid., p. 266; for similar arguments, see Marshall, 2009). This model is non-
representational (no internal pictures are assumed to exist under the skull), just as are the similar
views of Noë, and it also employs Gibson’s notion of affordances. Accordingly, this model also
holds that there is no one-to-one correspondence between neural processes and mental states.
An introduction of the active agent in this model leads to the potentially fundamental idea
that underlying all cognition is the agent’s activity, even when the active component of cognition
is not explicit:

Even in settings where action is not obvious, evidence indicates that certain sensory
and motor actions are simply bracketed while running on the same neural machinery.
 Cognition remains subtended by the same neuronal dynamics that support general
patterns of sensorimotor skills. This means that cognition centrally involves something
that we do, aptly characterized by Noë as a “temporally extended process of skillful
probing” in which “the world makes itself available to our reach. (Joldersma, p. 267)

However, although Joldersma claims that the model is action-based, in reality he (as well as
other proponents of embodied cognition, e.g., Núñez, 2004) typically reduces actions to physical
movements (“moving around”). Consequently, he interprets the integration of action and
perception just as “sensorimotor” coordination. I would argue that such a narrow understanding of
action and activity (at least in Joldersma’s account) substantially inhibits the ability of the
embodied cognition perspective to elaborate a radically novel alternative to brainism.
As pointed out in the foregoing discussion in this chapter, the general non-mentalist and
non-reductionist thrust in the embodied cognition framework is indeed much needed and
productive. However, apart from the references to the “extension to the world” and statements that
we “experience ourselves as minds by being bodily oriented to the world,” there is no specific and
detailed explanation of the mind’s role in the life conduct and behavior which would be irreducible
to brain functioning. That is, the function of the mind as distinct from that of the brain is blurred
in Joldersma’s account. In my view, this is exactly because in discussing the role of both the brain
and the mind, Joldersma remains solely at the sensorimotor level of regulation, which in his
description looks as entirely physiological level. As a result, the need for a qualitatively different
level of regulation – psychological regulation (i.e., the mind, as will be elaborated in the next
chapter) – remains unspecified.
The reduction of all cognition to the sensorimotor level in Joldersma’s discussion of the
embodied view of cognitive functioning is evident when he states that

[i]n radical embodiment, cognition is understood not only as an active process, but also
as being dependent on being a body with certain patterns

--- Page 20 ---

of sensorimotor actions. At minimum, some argue that cognition simply is
sensorimotor coordination...This means that in its basic form cognition involves
coordinating the sensorimotor behavior of the organism by coupling sensory and motor
patterns and capacities. (Joldersma, 2013, p. 267; italics in the original)

Even human cognition, according to Joldersma, is no different because “human cognition

also centrally still involves patterns of sensorimotor coordination” (p. 267). For example, speaking
about thinking and mathematical concepts, Joldersma argues that the underlying mechanisms are
sensorimotor in their basis:

In abstract thinking, cognition remains geared for action, although with interesting and
marked modifications. Even, for example, in mathematical abstractions, cognition
 remains enmeshed in sensorimotor dynamisms, even though there is no overt
sensorimotor activity. (ibid. p. 268)

With such a narrow focus on sensorimotor components, where even human action is
basically interpreted just as sensorimotor movement, it remains unclear which specific functions
of cognition (as a psychological level of regulation) cannot be reduced to brain processes. When
action is understood largely in a physiological way, the embodied cognition model, at least in
Joldersma’s elaboration, paradoxically misses the all-important part: the agent’s activity (as
different from “moving around” and using “sensors and effectors”), which is mediated by
meanings and goals and therefore necessitates a qualitatively new form of regulation –
psychological regulation.
In summary, with all the very important and well-reasoned arguments put forth against
brainism, Joldersma’s account of embodied cognition blurs the fundamental difference between
merely physiological regulation and cognitive (psychological) regulation, such as perception. It is
difficult to elaborate the critically important concept of the embodied agent in a consistent way
while remaining confined to essentially physiologically-based theorizing, level of analysis, and
language. Whatever is generally claimed about the irreducibility of the mind to the brain, the
physiological level of analysis inevitably leads to the conclusion that the only true reality is not
the intentional agent, but an organism (“body-in-environment”) with its dominating physiological
forms of regulation, into which brain processes fit perfectly. Consequently, it is difficult for this
account to discern the functional difference between brain processes and the mind, the latter
understood as the qualitatively new ability of embodied agents to regulate their activity in the
world.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS AGAINST BRAINISM AND “MINDLESS

NEUROSCIENCE”

Wrapping up the discussion of recent criticism aimed at countering the new wave of
brainism, the most important points of this discussion could be summarized as follows.

--- Page 21 ---

1. The “neuromarketing” trend in contemporary neuroscience, as well as many “neuro-
minded” psychologists, make increasingly bold claims concerning the possibility of explaining
mind and behavior by looking exclusively into brain processes. Nevertheless, despite confident
statements about “overwhelming evidence” for neurological roots of all things human, a careful
scrutiny of these claims reveals that they are largely unfounded. On the contrary, analysis points
to very vague or even non-existent evidence for establishing the presumed connections between
mental activities and brain processes. But regardless of the cautioning of many scholars, including
in neuroscience itself, the inflated promises of neuro-explanations are being perpetuated with great
fanfare, especially by the media. This wave of “neuromania” is detrimental to research in
psychology – because it cannibalizes resources for studying anything else but the brain – and
especially to education, since it generates misguided expectations of the upcoming educational
“revolution” based on studies of the brain.
2. The practical recommendations from neuroscience to other areas and disciplines,
especially for education, are shallow at best, as compared to its spectacular promises and claims.
Moreover, although these recommendations are typically presented as being based on “cutting
edge” research and scientific discoveries, a careful look reveals that many of them merely
parasitize on already- existing bodies of knowledge in other areas, and often just on common sense.
These “brain-based” recommendations actually add very little to what is already well known about
behavior, development and learning – they just rephrase that knowledge, framing it in neurological
terms and adding the “magical” particle neuro- to every interpretation, accompanied by fancy brain
images, thus creating an illusion of new compelling findings. In reality, the original contribution
of neuroscience to education is extremely limited, except for specialized cases when learning
difficulties are indeed partly caused by deficiencies in brain processes.
3. Neuroscientific and educational discourses take place at dramatically different levels that
are philosophically and ontologically incompatible. The language of neuroscience is too “atomic”
to support useful generalizations for education. Education researchers would gain practically
nothing from translating their concepts into the terminology of neuroscience.
4. Connecting different aspects of cognition to different brain areas and functions
(questionable as it is in itself) does not and cannot inform educational practice, contrary to
expectations and the hype of recent years. Even if such localization is ultimately established, which
is highly improbable, knowing the “location” of cognitive processes, such as memory and
attention, tells us practically nothing about how to organize, support, and design teaching and
learning in order to develop these processes. For example, when we learn to drive a car, we
obviously learn not how to fire one group of neurons and inhibit another group of neurons, but
how to switch gears or how to detect

--- Page 22 ---

dangerous conditions on the road. Similarly, when a teacher needs to teach a new concept, knowing
or explaining to students which parts of the brain get activated when someone thinks about this
concept is not going to improve the students’ understanding of the concept. This is not a matter of
just two different “lingos” spoken by different sciences about the same thing (with the language
of neuroscience putatively being “more precise”). Rather, the phenomena themselves that these
disciplines (neuroscience on the one hand, and psychology and education on the other) describe
are at incompatibly different levels. As another illustration, it is possible to describe what is going
on in the brain when an individual buys something, or when an individual decides whether
someone is guilty of some wrongdoing, but it is impossible on this basis to explain the concepts
of exchange value or criminal justice.
 5. Brain functions and psychological processes belong to ontologically different realms also
in terms of radically different types of causality – the realm of mechanical “causes,” in the case of
the brain functions, versus the realm of affordances and “reasons” in the case of psychological
processes (as will be discussed in Chapter 3). Although brain functions create the necessary
physiological support for the mind, these functions can neither determine nor “explain” the mind.
There is no and cannot be one-to-one correspondence between mental states and neural processes.
6. Psychological processes do not occur in the depths of the brain. Rather, they belong to the
embodied agent’s intentional and meaningful interaction with and activity in the external world.
The cutting-edge research in embodied cognition and philosophy of neuroscience explains that we
cannot expect to find representations (little pictures) of external objects under the skull.
7. Brains do not think, perceive, memorize, or learn. It is whole persons as active agents, not
brains, who think, interpret information, decide, and act. And it is persons, not brains, who are
responsible for their actions. The brain does not “care” about what we do and how we do it and
about the outcomes of these actions.

To reiterate, all the works discussed in this chapter make significant contributions to
developing a much-needed alternative to brainism in psychology and education. At the same time,
substantial aspects and considerations seem to be still missing in their criticism of brainism. In
particular, there is a lack of more consistent philosophical and conceptual lines of argumentation
that are needed to expose the inadequacy of neuro-explanations of the mind and human behavior.
Even in the most advanced attempts to overcome brainism, the implicit reduction of psychological
processes to sensory components, and of human actions to physical movements makes it difficult
to arrive at a consistent non-reductionist account of mind and cognition. This leaves the
fundamental task of debunking this misleading wave of brain reductionism

--- Page 23 ---

and of the ambitions of “brain-based” education incomplete. It appears that all the discussed
accounts, while making many important points, stop short of articulating the necessary ontological
and methodological conclusions from these points which would make the assumptions of brainism
irrelevant. As discussed in more detail in the following chapters, the key component that seems to
be missing in these accounts is the question about what the mind really is – beyond the important
arguments that it cannot be reduced to brain functions. A more elaborate and consistent theorizing
is needed in order to conceptualize the mind and its irreducible role in a non-mentalist and, at the
same time, non-reductionist way.
As will be argued throughout the rest of the book, the key argument that needs to be advanced
is that the essential role of the mind is to extend the flexibility of behavior far beyond the limits of
what entirely physiological regulation is able to provide. With the increasing complexity of the
environment, merely physiological regulation (based as it is on previous experience encoded in
the organism’s physiological processes) becomes inadequate for survival and successful acting. In
other words, a line of theorizing is needed to reveal how and why an evolutionary need emerges
for a qualitatively different kind of behavior regulation – the non-automatic (psychological)
regulation employed by an active agent. Without considering this new kind of behavior regulation,
the critically important concept of the active embodied agent itself remains theoretically flawed
and ultimately gets reduced to just “body-in-environment,” while its most defining agentive
characteristic – the agent’s activity in the world – is overlooked.
More generally, one of the main recurring themes in the rest of this book has to do with
addressing the cause of conceptual difficulties in overcoming brainism in order to develop a
consistent non-reductionist and non-mentalist account of the mind and psychological processes, as
well as individual psychological development and meaningful learning. As already mentioned in
the introduction, I see the root cause for these difficulties in the implicit but powerful
contemplative fallacy associated with the contemplative stance (spectator perspective) which still
dominates major theoretical frameworks dealing with mind, development, and learning. This
contemplative fallacy leads to a misguided “objectification” of psychological phenomena – that is,
to viewing psychological phenomena as separate “objects” and processes which in self-observation
seem to exist independently within a special realm that is different from the outside world. It is
exactly the fallacious objectification of psychological processes in our self-observation that creates
an illusion that these processes are something separate from external activity and take place “in
the head” or in the brain. This fallacious placement of psychological processes “under the skull”
was the main topic of this chapter.
In the following chapters, I discuss other aspects of the same contemplative fallacy as they
underlie the fundamental issues in conceptualizing phylogeny (evolutionary development) of the
active agent, human ontogeny (individual development),

--- Page 25 ---

microgenetic development (the development of new ways of acting within a limited time of
structured learning), and the role of learning in cognitive development. I also outline the steps
needed for overcoming the contemplative fallacy by adopting a radically different perspective –
the agentive activity perspective. By doing this, I hope to contribute to developing a consistent
non-mentalist and non-reductionist account of the mind, which requires going far beyond the brain.

--- Page 153 ---

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