The Rise and Fall

of
Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis

By
Khalid Shakir Hussein

1
1. Introduction
In 1966 Kaplan wrote a paper about the “cultural thought patterns in inter-cultural
education”. The paper simply highlights the significance of recognizing that teaching reading and
compositional writing skills in English to foreign students (non-Americans) is fundamentally
different from teaching the same skills to American students. The reason for this, according to
Kaplan, lies in the fundamental and well-established differences between the rhetorical thinking
patterns of the American and those of the other nations.

After analyzing approximately 700 compositional texts of 700 foreign students, Kaplan puts a
clear-cut graphic image representing the patterns of ideas rhetorical movement in the writing habits
of those testees. The graphic image is divided into four major ethnic or linguistic families: the
Semitic family (Represented by Arabic), the Oriental family (represented by Chinese and Korean),
the romantic family (represented by French and Spanish), as well as the Russian family as shown in
the figure below.

Figure (1)

Patterns of Ideas Rhetorical movement in Writing Habits (taken from Kaplan, 1966:21)

Kaplan believes that the main obstacle to foreign students' learning of academic writing skills
in (American English) is that the rhetorical formulas and patterns of ideas movement in the native
languages of those students differ substantially from those of American English. This explains,
according to Kaplan, the reactions of American professors to the theses, letters and papers of their
foreign students. In their comments on the drafts of what foreign students write, those professors
often see: "everything seems to be here, but something is missing... is rather distracted," "writing
lacks order and coherence" (Kaplan, 1966:13).

This confusion in the American reader's reaction to what the foreign student writes is due to the
failure of the foreign student to satisfy this reader's expectations concerning certain types of expected
rhetorical patterns of ideas movement that is usually anticipated to go on according to the familiar

2
limitations of the usual logical format of the English text in its American version. But what exactly
are these limitations in the written texts of each language?

Kaplan (1966:13-14) claims that the American reader is governed by a series of "linear" and
direct sequences of ideas movement, which is a logical hallmark of English grammar (see the figure
above). This linear pattern of English is fundamentally at odds with the pattern of Arabic (as a
Semitic language), for example. In its grammatical and codification structure, Arabic is not based on
showing a direct (linear) series of ideas, but rather encourages a series of parallel and often
rhetorically recurrent structures.

So does the contrast of the logical movement of ideas in Chinese and Korean. The pattern of
logical movement of ideas in the text written in these two languages reveals a kind of what Kaplan
calls "indirection." Therefore, the development of ideas in every academic text written by a Chinese
or Korean student takes a path wrapped in a kind of excessive whirlpool. The ideas written in these
two languages revolve around the basic idea of the academic text and go through it from angles that
revolve around that central idea, not from angles that fall on it directly and linearly, as it is the case
with American English.

As for the academic texts written in French and Spanish (the Romance Family), they are largely
governed by a logical progress with a sort of discursive style in addressing the basic idea. This
pattern is based on the creation of a series of deviations and digressions that move away from dealing
with the central idea of the text. Despite the importance of these elaborations, they do not create any
substantive and structural illustrations of the basic idea of the text, in the words of Kaplan.

Similarly, with regard to the thought paths of the Russian written texts, Kaplan finds that the
rhetorical logic of this language is based on a pattern very similar to the discursive in French and
Spanish. The texts of the Russian language move away from the course of the central idea in a kind
of digression, which is nothing more than a structural elaboration of sub-ideas approaching the
central idea of the text without touching it directly.

To sum up, Kaplan, like many other researchers, believes deeply that each language has its own
logical format that governs the ideas path of its speakers, and controls how these ideas flow through
the writing process."

The controversy of the vague relationship between language and the alleged thought format of
the language spoken from birth takes on extremely strange and extreme forms, but it always tries to
deal with one specific problem: what is the extent to which our view of the world is governed by the
nature of the language we receive from our parents and our societies. Are we born with a mind
similar to a soft piece of clay, free of any symbolic and taxonomic formations already printed on it
and then the language, passed simply by our parents and communities, begins to leave its fingerprints
and molds on that wet clay?

The conclusion of the myth that we will address in this paper is that we are completely at the
mercy of language in our thinking, in the nature of the views that we adopt about the world, in the
way we classify the entities around us, and even in our understanding of pure and grand scientific
facts such as time, place, and velocity. But how did this myth begin?

3
 Before going into this thorny and complex relationship between language and thought, we
must avoid being drawn behind the terminological complexities of philosophy and psychology in
determining the sense of the word (thought). Here we use the term 'thought' very simply within the
context of the knowledge we gain from the social and cultural environment in which we are born. It
is a set of values and concepts organized in a well-knit network which is held around our minds in a
way that our view of the world is conditioned only by the predetermined openings of this network.

2. Wittgenstein: the limits of language and the limits of our world

Ludwig Wittgenstein's (2018:5.6 1) famous phrase (the limits of my language are the limits of
my world) stands at a crossroads in the issue of the relationship between language and thought. Since
1900, no philosopher has had the courage to engage directly in this issue. Not surprisingly, he is the
philosopher of language, mathematics, and logic, in an exceptional way.

Thinking that the limits of language constitute the limits of our world is an explicit statement by
Wittgenstein (ibid.) that the language we speak draws the logical boundaries of the world as we see
it. Since the limits he speaks of are logical, they are governed by the concept of propositions within
the context of philosophical reasoning. A proposition is any statement that has truth-values. Thus,
every human language becomes a set of logical propositions that can be true or false or even
possible. Wittgenstein therefore believes that all human languages share a great deal in having a
logical structure of propositions that overshadows and even shapes the whole conceptual structure of
the speakers' world. However, these languages differ only in terms of the semantic content of these
propositions.

There is a logical structure that governs both the language and the world, and thought, according
to Wittgenstein, is but the logical picture of the facts and concepts present in the states of affairs.
Thought therefore draws its logical pictures only within the limits of what language permits.
Language then is characterized by a reflexive and parallel relationship with the world on the ground
that both are complex, that is, both are analyzable into other elementary elements (see Hulster, 2015:
13-34). The compositional structure of the world is coupled with another equivalent compositional
structure of the language itself:

Language Structure World Structure

1
Wittgenstein's Tractatus is not written with traditional page numbers but with a complex numbering system of
paragraphs, thus, (5.6) is the number of the paragraph and not the page.

4
 Propositions Facts
(Expressing an idea or a (Actual and Possible)
claim about the world)

Primary Propositions

Names States of affairs

Things (Objects)

Figure (2) The Correspondence between the Logical Structures of Language and World

Wittgenstein's case is as simple and rigorous as this: the structure of language reflects the
structure of the world in a sort of logical relationship which he calls (picture theory) in his famous
book Tractatus. The structure of the world is based on (actual and possible) facts, both of which are
reflected in the structure of language through (propositions) that express a factual event in the world.
These facts are not just a list of things in the world, but a particular way of organizing things in the
world. This relationship of organization is also reflected in the language through the joints of
propositions that create logical images of those facts in the language body. Likewise, in the case of
states of affairs, being the primary and essential elements of the facts (Wittgenstein, 2018: 2), they
are reflected in the structure of language through the primary propositions. Then comes the role of
things that constitute the states of affairs and are reflected in the picture of names in the language.
The result is very simply, the combination of nouns in any primary proposition within language is
a picture of the combination of things in any state of affairs within the world (ibid: 3.142).

Thus, the world is connected to the language and the language is connected to the world
through a pattern of pictorial representations. Language depicts the world through representation.
The picture of a single proposition in the language represents that of the fact in the world. In this
context, one should remember that the picture Wittgenstein speaks of is not the photographic one
but the logical one (ibid:2.181). The consequence is more serious than the mere pictorial reflection
between language and the world, but the meaning of the proposition itself in the language becomes

5
the very fact that the proposition pictures in the world. The result is that when we speak a language
we create then pictures for ourselves that govern the logic of the facts that surround us from all sides
in the world in which we have been born. The logical picture of language as a whole becomes a
model that pictures the reality in which we have immersed ourselves in its multifaceted states from
the very first moments of birth.

3. Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis: Language Determinism and Relativity

Having thought that linguistic meaning lies in the logical picture of the world represented by
language, Wittgenstein moved on to a completely different stage in his philosophy of language. This
new stage was characterized by an appeal to target the linguistic meaning in use rather than in
picture within the context of what he calls language game (Wittgenstein,1986 : 64). However, the
relationship between language and thought became more controversial to the extent that Wittgenstein
explicitly stated that the grammar of everyday language is shaped by the practical nature of our needs
that we try to meet every day (ibid:132).

Shortly after Wittgenstein's death, Sapir-Whorf hypothesis emerged in the linguistic domain and
took on a purely linguistic form away from the vague philosophical formulations of Wittgenstein.
Nevertheless, Wittgenstein's arguments have undoubtedly contributed much to the demarcation of
the problem of language-thought relationship.

The hypothesis is associated with the names of the Americans Edward Sapir and Benjamin Lee
Whorf. Whorf, in particular, left his exceptional mark on the hypothesis. He is the dominant
shareholder in the formulation of this hypothesis, as Sapir's name was mentioned only because
Whorf was greatly influenced in his propositions on language and thought by Sapir's approaches in
linguistics.

Sapir's approaches (1929) of anthropological linguistics were based on the hypothesis that man is
inevitably at the mercy of language that he uses as a means of social communication. The world, in
all its realities, is but a linguistic construct largely established by the sum of the linguistic habits of a
particular society (see Sapir, 1916). Sapir believes that it is impossible to find two languages that
reflect or represent the same truth or the same social reality. No one can perceive or recognize the
experiences of the reality that he lives in away from the structural characteristics of the language he
uses every day. So the linguistic structure has an evident role in shaping the cognitive capacities
through which we view the world around us.

In his study of Native American languages, Pinker (2010: 59) illustrates one of Sapir's findings
in this regard by showing that the variations in the languages we speak lead us to look at variant
dimensions of the world under the influence of the different grammatical properties of these diverse
languages. For example, the English take great care of the morphological suffix (-ed) of the past
time, which resulted in a keen interest in the concept of the relative time of the event described in the
language as well as the necessity to determine the nature of the relationship between the moment of
speaking and the details of that event. Consequently, the Englishman finds himself obliged to take
care of the time (tense) and the sequence of the events occurrence. Therefore, he thinks that this
temporality is quite crucial in realizing the happenings in the world around him. As for the Wintu, the
way the verbs in their language are formed does not have as much significance for the concept of

6
time as for the "source of knowledge" being transmitted by that language: is the source of knowledge
a matter of direct observation of the event being reported or is it merely a matter of rumors?
Therefore, the Wintu language tends to be rich with a variety of verbal morphological suffixes
indicating the source of knowledge .

What is more, the grammar of the Burmese pays a special attention to the nouns through a sort
of suffixes called classifiers. When referring to the name (river) in the Burmese language, for
example, you should then use a certain taxonomic suffix attached to that name indicating whether
this name is a place (we might go towards it in our journey), or just a line on a map, or a sector in a
region (a fishing sector), or a liaison area (connecting two villages), or something sacred (in
mythology), or just a general concept (Becker, 1995: 236). The importance of these taxonomic
suffixes in the Burmese comes from the urgent need to define the context in which the names appear.
Thus, just as the Englishman needs time markers in his verbs to help him realize the world in a way
conditioned strictly by the chronology of events, the Burmese also needs those taxonomic suffixes to
help him realize his own world in a way grounded on a strict taxonomic contexts for names (ibid.).

After studying Sapir's views related to the profound influence the language has in programming
and shaping our cognitive paths in realizing the nature of the world we live in, Whorf tried in all
creative and imaginational ways to find out what Sapir's propositions could prove, and he even took
them too much further than Sapir himself could have imagined.

Whorf was a chemical engineer and worked as a fire protection inspector at an insurance
company. The nature of his work was the source of one of the most important proofs that Whorf put
forth with great enthusiasm in support of Sapir's propositions. By virtue of his work, Whorf analyzed
a large number of reports that attempted to monitor how some fires had broken out. For example, one
of the workers caused a huge explosion after he threw his cigarette into a drum of gasoline he
thought it to be empty, but it was in fact full of gasoline vapors. Another worker lit a welding torch
near what he thought was a water basin, but it was in fact a tanning tank of decaying waste which
was emitting flammable gases (Whorf, 1941: 135).

Of course, at first, Whorf thought that only physical factors could explain why the fires broke
out. However, Whorf's vast imagination led him to look closely at those reports, which often end up
with conflicting and traditional findings regarding workers' cautious behavior towards what they
consider to be "full petrol drums" and reckless and irresponsible behavior towards what they
consider to be "empty petrol drums". Their assessment of the level of risk of these drums seems to
have nothing to do with the facts of the physical reality. The empty Gasoline drums are physically
much more dangerous than full ones because they are more vulnerable to the explosion potential due
to the compressed gasoline vapors (ibid:140).

Whorf believes that what constitutes people's awareness of these levels of risk arises not from
their awareness of the physical reality, but from their awareness of the linguistic predetermined
reality which classifies gasoline drums into two categories: full and empty, with every lexical item
associated with these two words. The linguistic connotations (not the physical) of the word full are
usually related to (abundance, exuberance, and danger), this is in the case of the full drums, and the
word empty is usually related semantically to (decreasing, vacuum, absence, and safety), this is in
the case of the empty drums. The following figure may help establish the fundamental difference
7
between physical reality and linguistic reality with respect to these gasoline drums (Pinker, 2010 :
60).

Linguistic Reality Physical Reality

Gasoline Drums Gasoline Drums
Empty Full
Safe Dangerous Full of Gasoline Full of Gasoline
(No Worries) )Caution is Vapor Liquid
(Super dangerous) (Dangerous)
Required.) Super Caution is Caution is
Required. Required.

Figure (3) Linguistic reality shaping thought at the expense of physical reality

The individual's daily behavior towards the danger of gasoline drums seems to be completely
governed by his perception of "the linguistic reality" with no consider whatsoever to "the physical
reality". Whorf argues that this is entirely explained by the fact that language is the sole actor in
shaping and molding our view of the world as well as our perception of its nature, even if this
perception is false and lacks any scientific ground.

Whorf (1945) not only did his laboratory investigations of fire reports and the causes of fire
(due to his specialty in chemical engineering), he decided to also practice a serious type of the so-
called field work in the desert of the state of Arizona for four years, trying to investigate the syntax
of the (Hopi) language. The Hopi language is spoken by Native Americans in Arizona. This field
study ended up with surprising results that led Whorf to raise fundamental questions such as: do

8
some of the basic concepts and axioms in the Western world have a role in shaping other views of
the world and the universe? These basic and great concepts and axioms are related to time, speed,
and matter. Do languages differ in their formulations and representations of these core concepts?

In this context Whorf (1940: 216) jumps into one of the strangest classifications of human
languages. He speaks of the Hopi language as a timeless language versus the time languages in the
Western world. The Hopi language lacks completely any concept that deals with time as a linear,
measurable extension that is liable to be divided into units as it is the case in any other spatial
dimension. So, for example, Whorf argues that the Hopi language does not borrow any spatial
terminology to refer to time phenomena as commonly used in European languages: (before the wall
- before morning, between Baghdad and Damascus - between 4 and 6 pm, at home - at noon, etc.).

The Hopi language lacks even phrases that divide time into measurable numerical units such as
(seven days). Not only that, but Whorf also noted that the verb form in this language does not
permit any morphological patterns that could recognize tense (the grammatical time) which is found
in all European languages. The absence of the concept of "time" in the Hopi language has other
dramatic and serious repercussions which tend to be more harmful to the nature of the world view
reflected in this language. The absence of the concept of time inevitably leads to the absence of
another physically related concept which is speed being defined as the ratio of distance to time.
Accordingly, Whorf emphasizes the absence of the word (fast), for example, in the Hopi language,
and the closest sentence in this language parallel to the English sentence (he runs fast) is (he very
runs). As usual, Whorf always jumps to extremely radical conclusions. Thus, he wonders: how
contemporary physics would be if developed by the people of the Hopi rather than by the Europeans?
Inevitably, physics will be quite different from what we know today. It would be a Physics that fits
into a view and a pattern of thinking quite different from that of the Europeans (Sampson, 2012: 86).

In one of the many objections raised against Whorf's conclusions about the Hopi language, the
American philosopher Max Black presents the issue of the expressive variety in talking about
concepts (ibid.). The Hopi people may adopt the same European concept of time, but simply talk
differently about it. For example, the phrase "he very runs" might be their own way of saying the
same thing as in "he runs fast", and therefore the meaning of both sentences sound exactly the same
and all what one can say is that expressing (Speed) varies from one language to another. Hence, the
difference that Whorf observed in talking about time in the Hopi and English becomes just a
variation in the formal mode to talk about the same concept of time. In other words, Max Black
believes that this variation is just a superficial variation in the form of language, and not a deep
variation that extends down to the roots of the conceptual system of time (ibid: 86-87).

However, some argue that it is much more than a formal variation in the surface of the
language but goes beyond and becomes a fundamental and inherent difference in the concept of time
itself. They would claim that some of the daily behaviors attributed to the Hopi people are closely
related to the nature of their timeless orientation in life. Sampson (ibid: 87), for example, talks about
how difficult it is for Indians from the Hopi tribe to retain their jobs in the Southwest Reserve. It
seems difficult for the members of this tribe to realize well the necessity and importance of adhering
to the timetable of work in the economies of the white man. Therefore, they often miss the buses that
take them to the workplace and even lack any capacity to adhere to a schedule that limits attendance

9
and departure. So what we are dealing with here is not just a case of individuals who are lazy and
indifferent so that they miss the buses that take them to their place of work. It is deeper that this
marginal interpretation, rather it is a struggle between two different world views: a time view and a
timeless view, a view that plunges the whole world in a carefully calculated time context and another
one that disregards this context all together (Whorf, 1941: 148, 153).

The Eskimos case also played a prominent role in the midst of this conflict. Whorf firmly
believes that we interpret the world around us and classify its surrounding assets according to the
analytical and taxonomic formats that already and predominantly exist in our language rather than
according to the objective and physical reality of this world.

Away from its objective reality, snow is one of those assets subject to the dissector of language
classifications that vary from one language to another. While English offers its speakers only one
word to refer to snow, the languages of Eskimos, called Aleut, especially the Yubik and Anot
languages, provide their speakers with a broad-spectrum taxonomic framework with many roots (or
lexemes) that could be primary or lexically separate from each other. The number of these so-called
roots ranges between (15-50) different roots: (aniu / falling snow, apun / snow on the ground,
muruaneq / soft snow, qetrar / crust snow, nutaryuk / fresh snow, qanisqineq / snow floating on
water, etc.) (Whorf, 1940: 216 ).

We cannot explain this enormous difference between the two ways the English and Eskimos deal
with snow under the naive interpretation that the material snow looks physically different for the
English from the way it looks for the Eskimos. The snow has the same physical properties and
characteristics in both cases since the physical reality of snow is still the same. Nevertheless, the
linguistic reality of snow is completely incompatible with its physical reality, according to Whorf.
While the English people stare at ice through, so to speak, a single lexical lens called snow; the
Eskimo people stare at the same material through (15-50) different lexical lenses.

What the Englishman calls snow, wherever he looks at this white material, is classified by the
Eskimo into diverse and rich categories:

Englis Eskimo
h

Snow Aniu (falling snow)

Snow Apun (snow on the ground)

Snow Muruaneq (soft snow)

Snow Qetrar (crust snow)

Snow Nutaryuk (fresh snow)

Snow Qanisqineq (snow floating on

10
 water)

etc.

Table (1) A Comparison between English and Eskimo snow vocabulary

This so-called fundamental difference in the linguistic perception and classification of snow
constitutes a compelling and crucial evidence for Whorf's argument that language powerfully
predominates and shapes our ideas about the world in which we live.

The American anthropologist Brent Berlin, and linguist Paul Kay have also contributed to the
creation of another domain of research which has generally ended up with the same conclusions of
Whorf on the different linguistic classifications of a particular entity of our world regardless of its
evident physical nature. These two researchers put forward the controversial case of color spectrum
or the case of color terminology in their famous book "Basic Color Terms" in 1969.

Berlin and Kay (1969) noted that all individuals, regardless of the language they speak, have
normally the physical and visual capability of recognizing and viewing all the primary colors of the
visual spectrum, but they differ extensively in their linguistic classifications that cut the color spaces
variously across the visual spectrum. What is more, the speakers utilize certain types of color
terminology lexicon that varies in size from one language to another. The people of New Guinea,
for example, speak a language called Tok Pisin, whose color lexicon includes only two terms, black
and white, despite their physiological ability to see all the primary colors 2 of the natural color
spectrum (REFREE). The Eskimo language ( Inuit) in Greenland offers another color terminology
that differs from that of New Guinea consisting of black and white in addition to red, green, and
yellow ( See Pinker 2010, Sampson 2007, Berlin and Kay 1969). Arabic cuts the color spectrum into
six primary terms: white, black, red, green, blue, and yellow3. As for English color lexicon, it is
based on eleven primary color terms, in addition to the five color terms of Eskimo (Inuit) we find
blue, brown, purple, pink, orange, and gray.

This difference between languages in their color lexicons undoubtedly casts a shadow over the
way we perceive the phenomenon of color spectrum in our world. However, the physical nature of
that spectrum is still constant and alike despite the apparent differences among the color
terminologies across human languages.

The effects of Sapir-Whorf hypothesis still exist even today. Many contemporary feminist
movements, for example, lay blame on the grammatical patterns of language for having their own
2
Berlin and Kay specified the primary colors of the spectrum with eleven color terms: white, black, red, green, yellow,
blue, brown, purple, pink, orange, and grey.

3
See Hasan, A., Al-Sammeria, N., and Kadir, F. "How colours are semantically constructed in the Arabic and English
Culture: a comparative study". In English Language Teaching Journal. Vol. 4, No. 3; Sept.2011.

11
gender categorizations of pronouns specifically. Most of these feminist movements believe that such
entrenched categorizations and classifications in language constitute the real motive behind gender
biased orientations in most of the human societies. This type of association between language-
gender and thought-gender resulted in many reformist movements that called for a neutralization of
the gender biased systems of pronouns across languages as a first step in addressing the gender
biased patterns of thinking as well. Among the gender-neutral alternatives that these movements
have suggested to be used in the male-biased systems of pronouns are: na, thon, he'er, xe, ve, jhe,
co, tey, Po, heshe, E), and many others (see Robson, et al., 2005, and Corbett, et al. 2011).

4. Overwhelming Refutations
Since Whorf has published his views in the journal of Science and Linguistics4 published by
Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1940, numerous studies have gone through the various claims
of his hypothesis verifying its validity. Exposing the criticism addressed against Sapir-Whorf
hypothesis is a very arduous and complex task. This criticism came not only from linguists, but also
from philosophers, psychologists and even artificial intelligence scientists, not to mention the
researchers in the fields of cognitive sciences with all their diverse interests. Nevertheless, we can
classify these criticisms into three primary categories: theoretical, experimental, and field.

4.1 Theoretical Criticism

The British linguist Geoffrey Sampson (2007) and the American psychologist Steven Pinker
(2010) were amongst the most prominent researchers who produced a comprehensive theoretical
criticism of Sapir-Whorf hypothesis. Much of their criticism of the hypothesis was based on some
sort of logical and contemplative reasoning and argumentation based on linguistic, physical, and
even physiological grounds.

If we consider the consequences that the hypothesis, if legitimate, will most definitely lead to,
we will find a lot of drawbacks and reservations that would extremely undermine the very basic
validity of this hypothesis. For example, it would be impossible to have any radical changes in the
way we look at the world around us, since, as this hypothesis claims, we are extremely tied up to the
solid, cognitive, and conceptual molds that are firmly entrenched in the nature of the language we
speak. But as soon as we take a quick look at the history of the scientific theories, we immediately
recognize the magnitude of the cognitive and epistemological variations of the Western world that
have torn apart our world view over and over again. Accordingly, the West was ruled by Descartes's
mathematical and physical view of the world, and then Newton came up with a completely different
physical view that had dominated the various domains of physics for a century kicking out Descartes'
old model. As the twentieth century came, Einstein undermined all the foundations of the Newtonian
physical model of the world and redefined the great concepts of physics especially time, mass, and
velocity. All of these scientific revolutions that have changed many of the features of our world view
have all occurred within the European societies. Such societies and communities speak relatively
comparable languages, and have not experienced any conceptual changes in both grammatical and

4
Whorf, B., (1940), "Science and linguistics", Technology Review (MIT) 42, 6- (April), 229-231,247-248. Reprinted in
Carroll, ed., 207-219.

12
semantic forms in a way that might coincide with these aforementioned scientific changes in the
historical track of contemporary physical theory (Sampson, 2007: 85-88).

Sampson (ibid.) interestingly reflects on Whorf's hypothetical question: What would

contemporary physics look like if we assumed it had evolved in an environment full of Hopi rather
than its usual European environment? Sampson addresses the question ingeniously and simply:
instead of saying that physics would have looked very different from what it is today if it had
developed by the Hopi, we could say that if physics developed by members of that tribe, it would
have simply changed the world view of the members of this tribe (ibid.).

Tracking the damaging consequences of Sapir-Whorf hypothesis could make even the act of
translation impossible. A translation act cannot be a viable format unless it can transform the
language and sentences of the source text (which are logically true to the author) into the language
and sentences of the target text while maintaining the same logical truth of the original sentences. A
sentence that is true or false in the logical context of the source language must be translated, while
maintaining the same logical truthfulness values, into the target language. This ability to translate
from one language to another greatly reduces the possibility of any enormous or fundamental
differences between the cognitive and thought patterns of different communities (ibid: 92-94; Pinker,
2010:58).

The terms of the logical values of the translation act reflect a common and inevitably shared
ground of facts and values (or ideas) that combine source language and target language together.
Even if the probability of a non-translatable language of a particular society exists at the mere
logical level, it comes as a very low probability, especially in light of the total number of
approximately 7,000 languages around the world. Strictly speaking, what we deny in this context is
not the possibility of a non-translatable (albeit virtually non-existent) language, but the possibility of
a language whose speakers differ with us in terms of the basic and axiomatic principles of logic such
as, for example, the law of non-contradiction (ibid: 90-91).

4.1.1 What about the empty oil drums and the color lexicons?

The case of the empty oil drums in Sapir-Whorf hypothesis involves a tricky fallacy: people do
not exercise caution in their behavior when they are close to the empty oil drums not because of the
linguistic connotations of the word empty itself, with all the consequent implications of this word
such as decreases, emptiness, absence, safety, etc., but it is actually due to another completely
different reason. Their indifferent and reckless behavior comes as an inevitable and direct result of
the physiological and physical constraints that govern the functioning of the human eye. People
usually do not pay much attention to the danger of the empty oil drums for a very simple reason
related to a failure of the human eye, that is to say, the human eye lacks the ability to see the oil
gases and vapors compressed in, or leaked from, those drums that seem to be empty of anything.
These gases and vapors are invisible and have no color and no way to see them with the naked eye.
This is certainly the reason behind the phenomenon of the empty oil drums and the whole thing is
not related to the linguistic realization of those drums which categorizes them as empty containers
and thus safe, as purported by Whorf (Pinker, 2010: 60).

13
 As for the case of color segmentation of the spectrum, it is more challenging and considered
one of the most compelling evidence of the validity of Sapir-Whorf hypothesis. There is no doubt
that languages differ greatly in terms of their own color lexicons, despite the constant physical reality
that brings all the visible colors together in one light spectrum that everyone can see regardless of
the type of language they speak. The temptation seems enormous and invites us to jump directly to
one rigid and rigorous conclusion: our diverse languages once again shape and mold the mechanism
by which we classify the colors of the visible spectrum regardless of the stable and constant physical
nature of those colors. Is there any doubt about this?

Berlin and Kay's study (1969) is the first attempt to question Whorf's claim that it is language, and
not physical reality, that has an extreme power in determining how we perceive and classify the light
spectrum. They (Berlin and Kay) acknowledge the differences that already exist among the
terminology of the color lexicons of human languages, but they also believe that these lexicalized
color differences are only marginal and superficial under which there are other deep principles
shared by most of the color lexicons of our diverse languages. In other words, Berlin and Key turned
the table upside down on Whorf, as what caught their attention were not the slight and marginal
differences noticed in the color terminology of those languages, but rather the amazing
commonalities among them with respect to their color lexicons. After examining (20) languages and
testing their native speakers, the researchers found that each language generally had two types of
color terms: basic and marginal. The first type includes only the primary colors of the light
spectrum, such as red, and at the same time excludes the derivative degrees and shades of these
primary colors, such as scarlet being a color derived from the red. The second type of the color
terms is usually concerned with the shadows and derivations of the primary colors and is somewhat
complex in morphological terms. Its terms are often borrowed from other languages. Therefore,
while the words Ahma'ar (red), Aswad (black) and Abyaad (white) are fairly simple in the
morphology of Arabic, the words Samaey (light blue), Kuhly (dark blue) and Urguwany (purple) are
relatively complex. What is more, some of the marginal color terms in Arabic, such as Maroon and
Khaki, are originally borrowed from languages other than Arabic ( see Katunar, et al., 2019:381-
384). Maroon is taken from French and Khaki from Hindi and Persian. Berlin and Kay noted
insightfully that the terminological differences related to colors among languages are all subject to a
common pattern of color predictions calculated with extreme mathematical precision. This patterning
shows what might be called the universal hierarchy of color term patterns (see Lund, 2005:15-16)

Dual System

Black White

Triple System

14
 Quadruple System

Quintuple System
Black White Red

Black White Red Yellow or Green

Sixfold System

Sevenfold System
Black White Red Yellow Green

Black White Red Yellow Green Blue

Black White Red Yellow Green Blue Brown

etc.

Figure (4) the universal hierarchy of color term patterns

All known human languages so far are subject to this hierarchy of the color term patterns, and
the sequence of the rigorous color predictions continues beyond the sevenfold system in figure (4)

15
above by adding the following colors respectively: purple, pink, orange, and gray (Lyons, 2009:
315).

So how can Sapir-Whorf hypothesis explain all these enormous commonalities between the
color term patterns of different languages?

Nevertheless, a question should be raised whether Berlin and Kay's study could be claimed as a
complete and decisive refutation of Whorf's interpretations of the diversity of color terminologies
across languages. Apart from the reservations usually raised about the nature of the data addressed in
Berlin and Kay's investigation, the study was limited to address only (20) languages, ignoring (78)
other languages under a justification that the researchers could not find any native speakers of those
languages in the surrounding of their university. Also away from the reservations some researchers
might have about the variables of hue and tone as they are insufficient variables to separate the
primary degree of a color from its secondary shades, Berlin and Kay ignored saturation as an
important and effective variable in this context (see Sampson, 2007:96 -102). Above all, Berlin and
Kay are still in full agreement with Whorf's argument about the close relationship between the nature
of language and the way its speakers recognize the world around them. All that Berlin and Kay have
done so simply is alerting Whorf and urging his followers not to focus solely on the differences and
diversities between languages and how these differences are reflected in the recognition patterns of
their speakers. What is more, they called on Whorf and his followers to stop believing that these
differences are absolute with no room or space for the presence of relative commonalities lying deep
beneath the surface of these floating and noticeable differences.

4.1.2 Color Boundaries between Physics and Physiology

Color terminology is most definitely a diverse topic and somewhat out of reach of this article.
However, this diversity is highly anticipated for a simple reason related to the multifaceted nature of
the very phenomenon of color itself. Color and color terminology occupy prominent positions in the
investigation framework of a variety of disciplines such as linguistics, physics, psychology,
philosophy, and many others.

I think at this stage we need to summarize the color case rigorously and accurately so that we
can fully understand the proof that we will put forward to undermine the basis of Sapir-Whorf
hypothesis.

The key to this complex issue lies in the very concept of color boundaries. The lexicons of
different languages place different color boundaries and categorizations among the colors of the light
spectrum. Whorf draws on the physics of light in his rejection of this concept and emphasizes that
there is no physical foundation for the alleged boundaries of colors.

Physically speaking, at the strict level of the physical nature of the pigments wavelengths, there
are no definite and decisive boundaries between one color and another in a way that makes us aware
of the moment we pass from one particular color area to another. Actually colors transition is
enormously imperceptible and takes the form of a continuum that makes the linguistically alleged
boundaries undetectable physically (Lyons, 2009: 312) (see Figure 5 below).

16
 Figure (5) The Physical absence of any visible boundaries between the colors of the spectrum

As for physiology, the human eye possesses the cellular structure necessary to make an
excellent response to the reflections of the wavelengths of the primary colors and a weak and
somewhat ambiguous response to the shades of these primary colors. That is, our eyes, for example,
show definite responses physiologically and categorically to the boundaries of the red against a
background of green, and to the boundaries of the blue against a background of yellow, and the
same goes on with the boundaries of the black against a background of white. Our eye's
physiological response is somewhat weak in distinguishing the boundaries of the secondary colors
and their infinite shades (Pinker, 2010: 62-63).

Undoubtedly the human eye perceives the colors of the world around it according to the same
physiological mechanism regardless of the differences of our languages, races and cultures. We all
see the same different color degrees regardless of the variations among our languages; nevertheless,
we differ linguistically only in the naming context within which we use various lexical names to call
various color degrees.

This is then the simplified physical and physiological nature of how we perceive objects with
different colors depending on the wavelength of the light reflected from those objects. But what
human languages do not realize is that this wavelength in its physical reality is merely a gradual and
continuous spectrum of colors, some of which are in fact an extension of others. The color boundary,
for example, between red and yellow is simply a linguistic illusion that has no foundation in the
physical reality of the world around us. Yet, under the influence of these linguistically delusional
boundaries, everyone speaks of colors as if they were clear-cut light spaces confined within strict,
and high-resolution color boundaries (see Figure 6 below).

17
 Figure (6) the linguistically delusional color boundaries in American English and Japanese

The question we pose in this context is quite simple: is the concept of color boundaries a mere
linguistic illusion of no other basis besides physical reality?

This time Physiology comes to put physics in a very narrow and critical corner. Generally
speaking, the physiology of the human eye supports the existence of the color boundary
phenomenon and highlights its visual reality, which in turn is reflected in the color lexicon of the
language. How could this be?

The backward part of the human eye holds a nerve network known as retina, an inner layer of
nerve tissue containing three types of conical cells. These conical cells receive light- bands reflected
from the objects and can distinguish between the different wavelengths of light. Each of these three
conical cells includes a pigment that is sensitive to a specific wavelength and color stimuli. They are
the blue, green and red cells each absorbs light photons at specific wavelengths. These conical cells
are also associated with neurons, which act to transmit the optical nerve signals to the brain. The way
the conical cells are connected to the neurons makes the latter fully capable of responding efficiently
to light and color stimuli at varying degrees and amounts of light intensity. Neurons, for example,
respond perfectly to the visual stimulus of red against a green background or vice versa and their
responses are based on a visually perceptible distinction between the color pairs of red-green, blue-
yellow, and black-white, . . . etc. No matter how different the color lexicons of our languages are,
the way the retina cells and neurons are connected is still intact. This connection is still the same for
all people regardless of the different languages they speak. Languages do not mess or manipulate
with the board of this connection in a way that suits their color lexicons (ibid.).

Accordingly, whether we speak Arabic, English or New Guinea, it has little effect on the fact
that all of our eyes possess the extraordinary cellular and neurological structure necessary to make
them react effectively to the wavelengths of the various primary colors. This neurological

18
infrastructure of our eyes makes them as well somewhat weak or blurred in recognizing the shadows
of those primary colors (see Sun, 2009:58).

So there is a solid scientific and factual basis for the existence of the phenomenon of color
boundaries in the visible light spectrum. This greatly supports the case of color boundaries not only
as a linguistic fact but as a purely scientific and physiological fact.

But the question is still unanswered: If we all see the same different colors, no matter how
different our languages, races and cultures are, then how can we explain this great difference in the
color terminology in our languages? What is the reason behind this terminological difference in the
designation of color spectrum areas? Where does it come from? Why do the people in New Guinea
find only two words in their color lexicon: black and white, while those who speak English had at
least 11 lexical items at hand to name only the primary colors?

It seems self-evident to believe that this difference in the color terminology of languages is due to
the nature of the environment and the cultural needs that vary from one community to another.
Languages design their terminological networks in accordance with the nature and complexity of the
practical and cultural needs of their communities. In a community characterized by a primitive and
rather simplistic culture, this network might be restricted to only two words: black and white,
resulting in a sort of justified neutralization of other color variations for which there is no cultural
necessity. This neutralization and terminological simplification occurs through a broad lexical
inclusion that puts each dark color under the umbrella of the lexical field of the word black, and
each light color under the umbrella of the lexical field of the word white.

However, if the community is characterized by a rather complex societal and technological

culture, then the network of the color terminology expands and produces a sort of anti-
neutralization process. This process leads to a refinement that encodes these color divergences in
the language lexicon in response to the virtual and cultural needs of that community. Therefore, the
complex technological culture of the English society, for example, requires a parallel expansion of
the color terminology to meet the scientific and everyday life needs of that culture. The more the
technological prosperity is evident in everyday life, the more the language responds with a parallel
terminological divergence that assimilates the color diversity of, for example, electrical wires,
computer monitors and various chemical liquids, as well as the manifestations of social luxury
represented by fashion currents and the trendy orientations of food and clothing (Sampson,
2007:100).

4.2 Experimental Criticism

Eleanor Rosch and Karen Wynn are perhaps among the most prominent scientific figures who
have examined Sapir-Whorf hypothesis on a purely empirical level, away from any prior
assumptions or other philosophical or logical reflections.

19
 As a psychologist, Eleanor Rosch (1972) became famous after her active contribution in refuting
Sapir-Whorf hypothesis insofar as the domain of color terminology differences is concerned. Rosch
(1972) conducted a smart experiment on the ability of the Dani people in New Guinea to learn new
color terms that are not already available in their lexicon, which contains only two terms: black for
all dark colors, and white for all light ones.

The experiment involved three groups of children in the schools of the Dani people. Rosch tried
to teach them eight completely new words in their language and help them associate the new words
with a range of colors. Without going through the many details of this complex experiment, Rosch
concluded that these children succeeded in adding new terms to their color lexicon that they could
use to refer to dark or light shades (of course, along with the words black and white already available
in the their language). This in turn contributed to the expansion of the children's color lexicon which
is not limited any more to only two words (black and white) (see Rosch, 1972: 448- 466).

This experiment is generally taken to be a fatal blow to Sapir-Whorf hypothesis which takes
human beings for mice locked in the cage of the language they speak. It proved that the human being
is quite capable of releasing himself out of the so-called predetermined bars of the language-cage via
learning. That is to say, the technique of learning toppled Whorf's table upside down making
language itself a hostage in the cage of human thought and not vice versa.

As for Karen Wynn, an evolutionary psychologist, she conducted a series of amazing and
genius experiments. Wynn (1992) addressed a very difficult question that can be formulated as: can
we think without going through language? Or are there any certain types of thinking that we humans
experience in our childhood before we acquire any language?

Wynn demonstrated experimentally that babies, five months old, can show a noticeable ability
to practice a simple form of mental exercise. In her experiments, she used an experimental method
familiar to researchers interested in studying cognitive development of children. This method
involves displaying a range of things in front of the infant's eyes within a specific period of time
sufficient to create a state of boredom in the child as a result of the repeated presentations of those
same things to him. One of the most important signs and indicators of the emergence of this boredom
in the child is when the child himself starts to change the angle of his view away from those things
displayed in front of his eyes. The child moves his eyes away after being seized by boredom of
watching the same things as they repeat their movements monotonously. In this particular moment,
the researcher suddenly and intentionally makes some sort of a change in the scene of the things
displayed, if the child returns to watch the scene again, this is considered then a response from the
child himself and an evidence of his awareness of the change in the scene under investigation (see
Wynn, 1992: 749-750).

One of the surprising findings of this type of experiments is that five-month -old infants have
exceptionally shown some kind of response to digital changes. This was evidently observed by
Wynn when she showed a rubber doll of Mickey Mouse on a small stage in front of a group of
babies, and continued to show that doll in front of them until they were bored and their eyes began to
sneak away from the puppet scene on display. At this moment in particular Wynn placed a
transparent barrier in front of the Mickey Mouse doll and then a hidden hand sneaked from behind
the barrier (or the screen) and while jumping the hand left another doll of Mickey Mouse. When
20
Wynn lifted that transparent barrier, if the babies find two dolls of Mickey Mouse, they gaze at them
for a short while, but if they find only one doll, they would stare at the scene for a longer period of
time, although this same particular scene has caused them boredom before laying the transparent
barrier (Pinker, 2010: 68-69).

Wynn also had another group of children in the same experiment, but with a slight difference:
after the transparent barrier was placed in front of the dolls, a hand appears from behind the barrier
taking one of the dolls outside the screen limits. Wynn found that if she puts one doll after lifting the
barrier, the children would gaze at the scene reluctantly and with no much care, but if they find two
dolls after lifting the barrier, their faces would be puzzled and stare inquisitively at the mysterious
scene of the two dolls (ibid: 69).

The most likely explanation, according to Wynn, of children's behaviors and responses in both
experiments should be related to a sort of observation they make of the total number of dolls
displayed behind the screen of the transparent barrier. What is more, they adjust their numerical
expectations concerning the number of the dolls located behind the barrier, whether in the case of
addition (adding a doll) or subtraction (hiding a doll). Thus, if the resulting number is different from
their numerical expectation, they take a closer and longer look at the scene examining its parts
carefully as if they were looking for an explanation of what happened (Wynn, 1992: 749).

This level of logical thinking shown by those infants seems to be completely independent of any
linguistic structure or grammatical phenomenon as these children have not yet acquired any
definitive language. This type of experiments undermines the basic claims of Sapir-Whorf
hypothesis. If this hypothesis were correct, Wynn would not have been able to detect any sign of
logical processing (or thought) in children and they would have been, in this case, just little creatures
with minds completely empty of any logical processing no matter how primitive this processing was.
This is simply because, according to the claims of the hypothesis, the children would not acquire
thought unless they first acquire their mother tongue.

4.3 Field Criticism: The Knockdown

It was only by linguistic field investigation that Sapir-Whorf hypothesis was crushed to pieces.
All the criticism that we have surveyed so far has not directly verified the validity and credibility of
the two most important claims made by this hypothesis: the Hopi timeless language, and the
Eskimos' lexicon that is exceptionally rich with hundreds of snow lexemes and roots.

These two claims constitute, so to speak, the lungs through which Sapir-Whorf hypothesis has
been breathing so far. Therefore, approaching these two claims via field work has been extremely
crucial and indispensable. It is the last blow that might threaten the very existence of the whole
hypothesis and knocks it down forever.

4.3.1 The Myth of the Hopi Timeless Language

Gipper (1971), a German linguist and philosopher, was the first to examine via field work
Whorf's claims about the timelessness of the Hopi language. Gipper adopts a Kantian understanding
of the relationship between language and thought. Generally speaking, Emmanuel Kant addresses the
concepts of time and space as general concepts and are essentially common to all types of human

21
thought regardless of cultural and social differences (see Leavitt, 2011). Under the influence of this
Kantian background, Gipper went to the Hopi National Park in Arizona and began collecting
linguistic data from the indigenous population of the reserve. Gipper eventually ended up writing a
stinging critique of Whorf's principle of linguistic relativity. In his 1971 critique, he put forward a
field refutation of Whorf's claims on the Hopi language and cited hundreds of Hopi phrases and
clauses which he himself wrote them down accompanied with their German translations. What is
really strange is that all of these phrases and clauses included many lexical items and expressions
indicating unambiguous time units as well as a definite distinction between the past and present
tenses. Gipper's study was a devastating strike to Whorf's hypothesis to the extent that this study
caused the whole hypothesis to be out of the academic credibility of field linguistics.

Despite the ground breaking findings of Gipper's field study, it was not sufficiently
comprehensive, so the German anthropologist Ekkehart Malotki (1979), a student of Gipper, carried
out another field study which came to be more comprehensive than his professor's. It was full of
authentic details taken directly from the Hopi speakers in their own reserve. After spending four
years in the field survey of time and spatial indicators of the Hopi language, in 1983 Malotki
published his 600 pages book entitled simply Hopi Time. This study came with a huge series of
linguistic data written directly from the mouth of the Hopi speakers. These data were extremely in
opposition to Whorf's claims about the Hopi language a matter that put everything Whorf reported
about that language into doubt. Accordingly, Malotki undermined one of the most stubborn myths of
the twentieth century linguistics.

In his aforementioned book, Malotki made it clear that the Hopi people had a realization and an
individualistic recognition of time as a spatial extension starting from the past, passing through the
present, and heading towards the future ( see Malotki, 1983). It also emphasized that the grammatical
difference of the concept of time in both languages (English and Hopi) lies in the fact that the
former's tense system relies on a distinction between (past / non-past) while the latter is based on a
distinction between (future / non-future). Throughout his study, Malotki proved two central issues:

1. The Hopi language is full of terms, words and structures that refer to time.

2. The members of the Hopi community recognize time mentally through a kind of physical spatial
metaphorical expressions, that is, they use such spatial metaphors in their language to refer to
specific units and periods of time.

It is really interesting how Malotki decided to start his book with a sentence quoted from the
hundreds of data he reported in his comprehensive field work. This sentence is full of time words and
expressions (Malotki, 1983: vii):

"Then [pu’] indeed, the following day, quite early in the morning at the hour when people pray to the sun, around
that time then [pu’] he woke up the girl again."

(Italics mine)

4.3.2 The Hoax of Eskimos' Snow Lexicon

22
 In 1982, the anthropologist Laura Martin presented her paper "Eskimo words for snow": A
case study in the genesis and decay of an anthropological example," at the annual meeting of the
American Anthropological Society. In spite of this research paper in which Martin has entirely
refuted the myth of the snow lexicon among the Eskimos, a month would not have passed by without
printing and issuing a research paper or a textbook confirming and supporting the traditional claims
about the exceptional richness of the Eskimo's complex system of snow concepts. "Hundreds of
words for different grades and types of snow", a wondrous and rich winter lexicon, a fundamental
and advanced demonstration of how the (primitive mind) classifies the world around us and is quite
different from what is prevalent in contemporary European and industrial societies (Pullum,
1989:275).

These lexical luxury claims seem to have been in full harmony with the general cultural
atmosphere in America and Europe at the time and aimed at portraying several aspects of perverted
behaviors of the Eskimo. Thus, they are portrayed as rubbing their noses, calling strangers to have
their wives, leaving grandma out to be preyed by the polar bear (ibid: 276). So, as Martin (1986:
419) puts it, "we are prepared to believe almost anything about such an unfamiliar and peculiar
group." The laymen and the academicians were driven by their underlying racial tendencies not only
at the populist level but also at the academic level. Therefore, the wide range of acceptability given
to Whorf's claims by the anthropological and linguistic academic curricula of the time could be the
best proof of how far the academic and social atmospheres were prejudiced and impartial.

Martin's tale relates to the absurdity and popular desire to accept any odd and anomalous
allegations about the languages and customs of other peoples without regard for the scientific
credibility of those claims. Martin believes that the issue of the multiple words used by the Eskimo to
refer to snow is a mythical claim that is not grounded on almost any solid scientific evidence
(Pullum, 1989: 276).

The story comes, according to Martin (1986:420), from allegations made by the famous
American anthropologist Franz Boas in a study he wrote entitled Introduction to a booklet on the
Indians of North America in 1911 and all that Boas has presented in his introduction was just a vague
and loose discussion of the independent terms in comparison to the derived terms to designate things
in different languages. He believes that as English uses separate (independent) roots to refer to
different forms of water (liquid, lake, river, brook, rain, dew, wave, foam), these independent roots
might all be derived from a single root that means water in a language other than English. Likewise,
according to Boas, the Eskimo also use completely separate (independent) roots to refer to different
forms of snow: aput 'Ground snow', qana 'falling snow', piqsirpoq 'drifting snow', and qimuqsuq 'a
snow drift'.

Everything that Boas has simply put in this context does not go beyond the claim that English
speaks of these different types of snow by using phrases that always include the root snow, but the
whole thing can happen otherwise. That is, it is likely to have another language that produces the
same English words of (lake, river, etc.) but by using phrases that include the root water (see Boas,
1911).

Has the story stopped over there? Well, it has gone through a process of many transformations
in which the number of the snow words in Eskimo lexicon was getting bigger and bigger day by day.
23
Whorf was the first to make unverified additions to the number unleashing the myth of the Eskimos
snow lexicon. He utilized, in a rather vague way, Boas' example in a paper published in one of the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology's academic journals entitled Science and Linguistics (1940) as
we mentioned earlier (see p.13).

Strangely and irresponsibly, Whorf maximized the number from four words, mentioned by Boas,
to six words at once. Thus, he (1940, cited in Carroll, 1956:216) writes in his aforementioned paper:

“We have the same word for falling snow, snow on the ground, snow packed hard like ice, slushy snow, wind-
driven flying snow – whatever the situation may be. ”

His paper was soon republished and mentioned over and over again in numerous textbooks whose
basic purpose is to introduce contemporary linguistics to the students in the various departments of
linguistics all over the world.

Pullum (1989:277) asserts that all the claims made by Whorf in his paper that English has one
word for all the types of snow are simply ungrounded and false: this material is called snow in
English when it is fluffy and white, it is called slush when it is partially dissolved, sleet when it falls
in a state of partial melting, and blizzard when it clashes hardly that makes driving risky.

But it is still somewhat under control as long as the alleged size of Eskimo snow lexicon ranges
between (four) and (seven) lexical items. So, it is not that much harmful so far. The problem is that
Boas' example has been handed over to the hands of many other writers who have little regard for
any academic restrictions that might shape the increasing number of the snow words they cite in their
works: In the play fifth of July, by Lanford Wilson (1978), the number rises to fifty, and in one of the
editorials of the New York Times (1984) the number jumps to one hundred, and the number even
becomes two hundred in one of the TV weather programs in Cleveland city of America (ibid: 278).

It is unfortunate that the academic discourse comes to be in harmony with the populist media
discourse in promoting such allegations without any careful scrutiny and investigation. The
American linguist Pullum (ibid:280) invites us to confront anyone who promotes and circulate this
kind of claims and allegations, whether in a lecture or a seminar, by standing up and shouting at him:

" C.W. Schultz-Lorentzen's Dictionary of the West Greenlandic Eskimo Language (1927) gives just two
possibly relevant roots: qanik, meaning 'snow in the air' or 'snowflake', and aput, meaning 'snow on the
ground'. "

5. What is left?
Now, what is left of Sapir-Whorf hypothesis after all?

After all the criticism that has approximately undermined this hypothesis, whether on the
theoretical, experimental or field level, two American researchers sought to restore life in a
remarkable way to the body of this hypothesis. In 1991, psychologists Hunt and Agnoli proposed
their cognitive approach to Sapir-Whorf hypothesis5. These researchers believe very simply that
5
see Hunt, E. and Agnoli, F. (1991). "The Whorfian hypothesis: a cognitive psychological perspective". Psychological
Review, 98, 377–389.

24
different languages exert a kind of mental influence on their speakers, making some ideas easier to
deal with or sometimes making them even more difficult and complicated. So they think that some
ideas or ways of thinking seem easier in one language than in another. Hunt and Agnoli use the term
computational cost to refer to the relative ease of ideas. This computational cost affects the
likelihood of thinking in one way at the expense of another. So, a word or phrase may sound smooth
or natural in one language, but it sounds difficult to understand and to deal with in another language.

To clarify this point of view, Hunt and Agnoli (1991) deals with the word mokita for example in
New Guinea language which means "the truth that everyone knows and no one talks about". This
word appears to be more succinct and brief than it's equivalent in English. Although the English
speakers can understand this term, it seems easier to use for the New Guinean speakers. The same
logic applies to the German word schadenfreude, which means "happiness that results from a
calamity afflicting another person" or simply "damage-joy" (see
https://www.vocabulary.com/dictionary/Schadenfreude. The same applies to, for example, the word
"Khʔaban" in the Iraqi Arabic, which means "the person who can finish any job very quickly". It
seems that, according to Hunt and Agnoli, the computational cost exerted by the German mind and
the Iraqi mind in dealing with the words schadenfreude and khʔaban is less and easier than what the
English mind exerts when it tries to deal with the meanings and connotations of these two words.

The result is that some languages go into making some ideas more difficult or mentally
stressful and vice versa. What is more, Hunt and Agnoli provides a different example this time, that
is to say, it is not related to words and concepts, but rather to what they call arithmetic capability and
its variations among the speakers of the different languages. For example, the children who speak
English must learn a large number of numerical terms starting from (0 - 9, 10, 100 ... etc.), as well as
learn individual terms to indicate numbers that are between (11-19) and to indicate the numbers of
the tens (20, 30, 40, etc.).

This is an enormous burden of mind for the arithmetic capability of an English-speaking child.
But what about another language like Chinese? The Chinese language exposes the arithmetic
capability of children for a lower computational cost, as a Chinese-speaking child should learn only
fourteen basic numerical terms: (0-10, 100, 1000, 10,000). So, the number (11), for example, lacks
any numerical term of its own and is expressed in Chinese like this (10 plus 1). While English-
speaking children struggle with difficulties in their early learning of the range of numerical terms
ending in the suffix ( -teen), Chinese does not expose its children to this type of numerical burden.
Therefore Hunt and Agnoli believe that the language here exerts a kind of influence on the mental
ability of the individual by exposing him to different degrees of mental burden to address the
different ways of expressing numerical values.

Numerous studies have pursued Hunt and Agnoli's arguments shedding lights on further
examples and many other cases that prove the mental and computational cost that languages exert
over their speakers (see Hoffman et al. 1986; Pederson et al. 1998; Boroditsky 2001). Nevertheless,
all attempts ended up with a total failure regarding the development of a strict mathematical estimate
of the computational cost that constitutes the underlying ground of the arguments raised by these two
researchers (see Eysenck and Keane 2000). This, of course, makes the entire arguments in a position
of a hypothesis that lacks any rigorous scientific evidence, not to mention the ambiguity surrounding

25
the concept of computational cost and the real trigger of its so-called effect. The question is still
raised whether this effect is really triggered by the mother tongue of the child or by the cultural
milieu in which the child finds himself in?

6. Is there any light at the end of the tunnel?

There are really many arguments about the nature of the relationship between language and
thought, and we cannot review them all in this study because it seems endless. In our viewpoint, it is
only a vicious circle. Also, many researchers and scientists, of heavy caliber, have tried their hands at
this thorny issue without producing any strict and scientific outputs that could help us develop a final
solution to the entire issue once and for all. The Swiss psychologist Piaget, the Russian psychologist
Vygotsky, and the American linguist Chomsky, and many others, have each grabbed one particular
end of the problem and went on looking as much as they could around its vague facets. Piaget (1950,
1967), for example, believed that the way we think is what determines the paths of linguistic use,
because language for him is only a product of the mental development of the individual and thus it is
thought that drives language and not the other way around.

Vygotsky (1962) held the stick at both ends and proposed a complex theory suggesting an
interchangeable relationship between language and thought. He believes that language and thought
are in a state of complete independence from one another throughout the first stage of the child's
mental development. Therefore, thought at this stage lacks any real language form and is mainly
based on images while language is in a priori stage that precedes thinking and is not related to
thought at all. Until the child is two years old, some bonds appear between language and thought,
and the child begins to use language in his thinking. The child's speech then begins to represent his
thoughts. Only then will language greatly overlaps thought (see Vygotsky 1962, and Vygotsky
1972).

As for Chomsky, he stands at the crossroads of language and thought arguments and assures the
complete independence of language from thought. He believes that the human cognitive systems are
embodied in several other cognitive forms, each of which is distinguished by certain cognitive
characteristics independent of each other in structure but not in function. Language is but one of
these cognitive systems and appears as a cognitive faculty isolated from the rest of the other faculties
such as intelligence. Chomsky observed that almost all children acquire their mother tongue at the
same age, regardless of their varying levels of intelligence, and even regardless of the different
methods and techniques of learning, not to mention the existence of many cases in which children
suffer from huge learning disabilities in different scientific fields, but they, nevertheless, do not
suffer from any linguistic difficulties or obstacles. This is a solid and rigorous evidence, according to
Chomsky, that language is an independent faculty and it does not constitute a part of our thinking
and other logical assets (see Chomsky 1959, 1986).

Are there any more arguments? Certainly, the basket is full and the problem would never run
short of such arguments. Thus, more researchers and scientists went on with their insightful
viewpoints: Fodor, Putnam, Pinker, Dennett, Korzybski, etc.

It seems that the tunnel is full of pathfinders and each one of them carries a small torch trying
to find you a way out of this darkness, but it looks like a wild goose chase.

26
 I think what we really need to do first and foremost is to feel the tunnel itself, to feel its
existence. Is it real or do we just imagine its existence? Perhaps this huge amount of theoretical and
empirical investigations has just portrayed the image of this tunnel in our imagination without having
any real presence in the outside world.

We believe very simply that the solution to the problematized relationship between language
and thought lies only in the disappearance of the dichotomy (language/thought) itself. Language
itself is thought and thought itself is language. All we need is a mirror of a special kind, a mirror that
makes us look at language in more liberal and broader contexts than those of the traditional linguistic
lesson. If we think of language as a coding system of some sort that is not exclusively limited to
written or spoken words, but also includes mental and visual images, only then we fully realize the
futility of separating language from thought. How can we ever imagine a person thinking with
himself without resorting to language, even the children in their pre-stage of language in Wynn's
experiments do not practice any kind of logical thinking, no matter how simple and primitive this
thinking was, without resorting to some sort of mental codification accompanying those mental
processes. We often define language when we speak aloud as nothing but thinking aloud, and when
we look silent and drown in a whirlpool of our own internal thoughts, we are often described to be in
a mysterious verbal state usually called silent monologue.

We cannot under any circumstances and in any context imagine any case of silent monologue
without the involvement of some sort of language. Regardless of the monologue topic whether it was
mathematical, biological, physical, chemical, linguistic, or artistic, this process of silent thinking is
still required to proceed through a system of mental, mathematical, pictorial, literal, or color
symbols.

This solution of the problem might sound irrelevant and could be rejected by other scholars for
no reason but that solving the problem by denying its existence is a lazy and irresponsible response
because it simply does not care about the hard results and investigations conducted by many scholars
in this regard. We can remind such scholars of the very fact that even if we admit, for the sake of
argument, the existence of the dichotomy of language/thought, they would be exposed to a huge and
intuitive fallacy that overrides the distinction between using language as an indicator or clue on one
side and using language as a cause or origin on the other side.

We can always take shelter in analyzing linguistic structures as an indicator or a key that helps
us enter the realm of the human mind and exploring its working mechanisms. Language in this
context provides us with a valuable physical entrance (whether in its visual or audible form) to the
worlds of the human mind. It cannot be employed as a reason or origin for the mental worlds but
rather as a product of such worlds. My language is the product of my mind machine, not the other
way around. Nevertheless, this product can certainly have a very slight impact on the parts of this
machine, but it will never change anything fundamental in the way it works. When I was born in a
given linguistic environment, I inevitably and initially embrace and adopt the cognitive molds that
my grandparents cast in their language that I speak now. However, this does not mean at all that I am
incapable of breaking or reformulating these molds, not to mention my capability to get out of their
predetermined maps and redesigning other entirely new ones. What is more, I can also employ these

27
new molds to reshape and redefine my language in line with the propositions and concepts
encapsulated within their cognitive frameworks.

The bottom line is that my language reflects the worldview that resides inside my mind in the
same way a mirror reflects my face complexion. Nevertheless, my face is still growing, and changing
the way it looks, and the mirror cannot help but reflecting all this as it goes on and on.

References
Becker, A. (1995). Beyond Translation: Essays Toward a Modern Philology. Ann Arbor:
University of Michigan Press.
Berlin, B., and Kay, P. (1969). Basic Color Terms. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of
California Press.
Boas, F. (1911). "Introduction to The Handbook of North American Indians", Vol. I, Bureau of
American Ethnology Bulletin 40, Part 1, Smithsonian Institution, Washington, D.C. Reprinted by
Georgetown University Press, Washington D.C. (c. 1963) and by University of Nebraska Press,
Lincoln, Nebraska (1966).

28
 Boroditsky, L. (2001). "Does language shape thought?: Mandarin and English speakers’
conceptions of time". Cognitive Psychology, 43, 1–22.
Carroll, B., (ed.). (1956). Language, Thought, and Reality: Selected Writings of Benjamin Lee
Whorf. Cambridge and Massachusetts: MIT Press.
Chomsky, N. (1959). "Review of ‘Verbal Behavior’ by B.F.Skinner". Language, 35, 26–58.
Chomsky, N. (1986). Knowledge of Language. New York: Praeger.
Corbett, G. (2011). "Sex-based and non-sex-based gender systems". In Dryer, Matthew S.;
Haspelmath, Martin (eds.). The World Atlas of Language Structures Online. Munich: Max Planck
Digital Library.
Eysenck, M.W. and Keane, M.T. (2000). Cognitive Psychology. Hove: Psychology Press.
Gipper, H. (1971). "Is there a linguistic relativity principle?". In a Colloquium on the Sapir-
Whorf Hypothesis at the University of Ghent (Belgium) in winter 1971. Cf. R. Pinxten (ed.):217-
228. Frankfurt am Main: S. Fischer Verlag.
Hasan, A., Al-Sammeria, N., and Kadir, F. (2011) "How colours are semantically constructed in
the Arabic and English Culture: a comparative study," English Language Teaching Journal,
4(3):206- 213.
Heider, E. (1972). “Probabilities, sampling, and ethnographic method: The case of Dani color
names,” MAN, 7(3): 448-466.
Heider, E. and Donald, C. (1972). "The structure of the color space in naming and memory for
two languages," Cognitive Psychology, 3(2):337–354.
Hoffmann, C., Lau, I. and Johnson, D.R. (1986). "The linguistic relativity of person cognition".
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 51, 1097–1105.
Hulster, F. (2015). Introduction to Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (O'hea, W.
Trans.). Berlin: Leibniz Company.
Kaplan, R. (1966). "Cultural thought patterns in inter-cultural education," Language Learning, 16
(1-2): 11- 25.
Katunar, D., Barbara, K., Nawar, M. (2019). "From object to color and back: Seeing the world in
color in Croatian, Turkish, and Arabic". In Raffaelli, I., In Katunar, D., & In Kerovec, B. (2019).
Lexicalization patterns in color naming: A cross-linguistic perspective. Amsterdam: John Benjamins
Publishing Company.
Lund, K. (2005). Language and Thought. London and New York: Routledge.
Leavitt, J. (2011). Linguistic Relativities: Language Diversity and Modern Thought.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Lyons, J. (2009). Language and Linguistics: An Introduction. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Malotki, E., (1983). Hopi Time: A Linguistic Analysis of the Temporal Concepts in the Hopi
Language. Berlin, New York and Amsterdam: Mouton Publishers.

29
 Martin, L. (1986). "Eskimo words for snow": A case study in the genesis and decay of an
anthropological example,' American Anthropologist, 88(2): 418-423.
Paul, K., and Kempton, W. (1984). "What is the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis?", American
Anthropologist, 86:65–79.
Pederson, E., Danziger, E., Wilkins, D., Levinson, S., Kita, S., and Senft, G. (1998). "Semantic
typology and spatial conceptualization". Language, 74 (3): 557-589.
Piaget, J. (1950). The Psychology of Intelligence. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
_______ .(1967). "Language and intellectual operations". In H.Furth (ed.) Piaget and
Knowledge. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall.
Pullum, G. (1989). "The great Eskimo vocabulary hoax". Natural Language and Linguistics
Theory, 7: 275-281.
Pinker, S. (2010). Language Instinct: How the Mind Creates Language. London: Penguin
Books.
Robson, M., & Stockwell, P. (2005). Language in Theory: A resource book for students.
London: Routledge.
Sampson, G. (2007). Schools of Linguistics. London, Melbourne, Sydney: Hutchinson.
Sapir, E. (1916). Time Perspective in Aboriginal American Culture: A Study in Method. Ottawa:
Government Printing Bureau.
Sapir, E. (1929). "The study of language as a science", Language, 5: 207–214.
Sun , H-J. ( 2009 ). "The N2pc component in ERP and the lateralization effect of language on
colour perception", Neuroscience Letters, 454: 58–61.
Vygotsky, L. (1962). Thought and Language. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
__________,. (1972). "Thought and language". In P.Adams (ed.) Language and Thinking.
Harmondsworth: Penguin Education.
Whorf, B. L. (1941). "The relation of habitual thought and behavior to language". In Carroll,
J. B. (ed.). (1956). Language, Thought, and Reality: Selected Writings of Benjamin Lee Whorf.
Cambridge, Mass.: Technology Press of Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
Whorf, B., (1940), "Science and inguistics", Technology Review, 42 (6): 216-231.
Wittgenstein, L. (2018). Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (Ramsey, O. Trans.). New York:
Harcourt, Brace.
__________, L. (2010). Philosophical Investigations (Hacker, P. and Schulte, J., Trans.).
Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons.
Wynn, K. (1990).  "Children’s understanding of counting", Cognition, 36: 155-193.
Wynn, K. & Bloom, P. (1992). "The origins of psychological axioms of arithmetic and
geometry", Mind & Language, 7: 409-416.
Wynn, K. (1992). "Addition and subtraction by human infants", Nature. 358 (6389): 749–750.

30