new

 adjective
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\ ˈnü  , chiefly British  ˈnyü, in place

names usually  (ˌ)nu̇   or  nə  or  (ˌ)ni  \

Definition of new
 (Entry 1 of 3)
1: having recently come into
existence : RECENT, MODERNI saw
their new baby for the first time.
2a(1): having been seen, used, or
known for a short time : NOVELrice
was a new crop for the area
(2): UNFAMILIARvisit new places
b: being other than the former or olda
steady flow of new moneyHe bought
a new car.
3: having been in a relationship or
condition but a short time new to the
joba new wife
4a: beginning as the resumption or
repetition of a previous act or
thinga new daythe new edition
b: made or become freshawoke
a new person
c: relating to or being a new moon
5: different from one of the same
category that has existed
previouslynew realism
6: of dissimilar origin and usually of
superior qualitya new strain of hybrid
corn
7capitalized : MODERN SENSE
3especially : having been in use after
medieval timesNew Greek

new
adverb
 

Definition of new (Entry 2 of 3)
: NEWLY, RECENTLY —usually used in
combination

New
geographical name
 

\ ˈnü  , ˈnyü \

Definition of New (Entry 3 of 3)
river flowing 320 miles (515 kilometers)
from northwestern North Carolina north
across Virginia into West Virginia,
where it joins the Gauley River to form
the Kanawha River

Other Words
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about  new
Other Words from new
Adjective

newish \ ˈnü-ish  , ˈnyü- \ adjective
newness noun

Synonyms & Antonyms for new

; and (2) jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of... agrarian
reform, except those falling under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
Department of Agriculture and the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources.
the DAR is vested with the primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate
agrarian reform matters and shall have the exclusive jurisdiction over all
matters involving the implementation of the... agrarian reform program.
Under Section 3 (d) of R.A. No. 6657 (CARP Law), "agrarian dispute" is defined to
include "(d) . . . any controversy relating to tenurial arrangements, whether
leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or otherwise over lands devoted to agriculture,
including disputes concerning... farmworkers associations or representation of
persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or seeking to arrange
terms or conditions of such tenurial arrangements. It includes any controversy
relating to compensation of lands acquired under this Act and other terms and...
conditions of transfer of ownership from landowners to farmworkers, tenants a

utive Director of the DAR Adjudication Board for proper administrative valuation. Acting on the
CACF's, on September 10, 1990, the Board promulgated a resolution asking the office of the
Secretary of Agrarian Reform (DAR) to first resolve two (2) issues before it proceeds with the
summary land valuation proceedings.13

The issues that need to be threshed out were as follows: (1) whether the subject parcels of land fall
within the coverage of the Compulsory Acquisition Program of the CARP; and (2) whether the
petition for land conversion of the parcels of land may be granted.

On December 7, 1990, the Office of the Secretary, DAR, through the Undersecretary for Operations
(Assistant Secretary for Luzon Operations) and the Regional Director of Region IV, submitted a
report answering the two issues raised. According to them, firstly, by virtue of the issuance of the
notice of coverage on August 11, 1989, and notice of acquisition on December 12, 1989, the
property is covered under compulsory acquisition. Secondly, Administrative Order No. 1, Series of
1990, Section IV D also supports the DAR position on the coverage of the said property. During the
consideration of the case by the Board, there was no pending petition for land conversion specifically
concerning the parcels of land in question.

On February 19, 1991, the Board sent a notice of hearing to all the parties interested, setting the
hearing for the administrative valuation of the subject parcels of land on March 6, 1991. However, on
February 22, 1991, Atty. Ma. Elena P. Hernandez-Cueva, counsel for SRRDC, wrote the Board
requesting for its assistance in the reconstruction of the records of the case because the records
could not be found as her co-counsel, Atty. Ricardo Blancaflor, who originally handled the case for
SRRDC and had possession of all the records of the case was on indefinite leave and could not be
contacted. The Board granted counsel's request and moved the hearing to April 4, 1991.

On March 18, 1991, SRRDC submitted a petition to the Board for the latter to resolve SRRDC's
petition for exemption from CARP coverage before any administrative valuation of their landholding
could be had by the Board.

On April 4, 1991, the initial DARAB hearing of the case was held and subsequently, different dates
of hearing were set without objection from counsel of SRRDC. During the April 15, 1991 hearing,

he Treason and Sedition Law. In other words, as will later appear, we think that the words of the
accused did not so much tend to defame, abuse, or insult, a person in authority, as they did to raise
a disturbance in the community.

In criminal law, there are a variety of offenses which are not directed primarily against individuals,
but rather against the existence of the State, the authority of the Government, or the general public
peace. The offenses created and defined in Act No. 292 are distinctly of this character. Among them
is sedition, which is the raising of commotions or disturbances in the State. It is a revolt against
legitimate authority. Though the ultimate object of sedition is a violation of the public peace or at
least such a course of measures as evidently engenders it, yet it does not aim at direct and open
violence against the laws, or the subversion of the Constitution. (2 Bouvier's Law Dictionary, 974;
U.S. vs. Abad [1902], 1 Phil., 437; People vs. Cabrera [1922], 43 Phil., 64.)

It is of course fundamentally true that the provisions of Act No. 292 must not be interpreted so as to
abridge the freedom of speech and the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the
Government for redress of grievances. Criticism is permitted to penetrate even to the foundations of
Government. Criticism, no matter how severe, on the Executive, the Legislature, and the Judiciary, is
within the range of liberty of speech, unless the intention and effect be seditious. But when the
intention and effect of the act is seditious, the constitutional guaranties of freedom of speech and
press and of assembly and petition must yield to punitive measures designed to maintain the
prestige of constituted authority, the supremacy of the constitution and the laws, and the existence of
the State. (III Wharton's Criminal Law, pp. 2127 et seq.; U.S. vs. Apurado [1907], 7 Phil., 422;
People vs. Perfecto, supra.)

Here, the person maligned by the accused is the Chief Executive of the Philippine Islands. His
official position, like the Presidency of the United States and