THE IMPACT OF TERRORISM ON SOCIO-ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A CASE

STUDY OF MALI.

BY:

LUDWIG MPONDO

UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY-AFRICA

SUMMER 2018
THE IMPACT OF TERRORISM ON SOCIO-ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A CASE

STUDY OF MALI.

BY

LUDWIG MPONDO

637834

A THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE SCHOOL OF HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL

SCIENCES IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENT FOR MASTERS’

DEGREE IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS.

UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY-AFRICA

SUMMER 2018
DECLARATION

I, undersigned, declare that this is my original work and has not been submitted to any other

college, or university other than the United States International University- Africa for academic

credit.

Signed: _______________________________ Date: ____________________

Ludwig Mpondo (637834)

Student.

This thesis has been presented for examination with my approval as the appointed supervisor.

Signed: _________________________________ Date: ____________________

Dr. Maurice Mashiwa

Supervisor.

Signed: _________________________________ Date: _____________________

Prof. Angelina Kioko

Dean, School of Humanities and Social Sciences.

Signed: _________________________________ Date: _____________________

Ambassador Prof. Ruthie Rono.

Deputy Vice Chancellor Academic Affairs.

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 Table of Contents
DECLARATION.......................................................................................................................................1

1.1 Introduction.................................................................................................................................4

1.2 Background of the study..............................................................................................................4

1.3 Statement of the problem...........................................................................................................16

1.4 Objectives..................................................................................................................................17

1.4.1 General Objective..............................................................................................................17

1.4.1 Specific Objectives............................................................................................................17

1.5 Research Questions....................................................................................................................17

1.6 Significance of the study............................................................................................................17

1.7 Scope of the study......................................................................................................................18

1.8 Definition of terms.....................................................................................................................18

1.9 Chapter Summary......................................................................................................................18

CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW.......................................................................................20

2.1 Introduction...............................................................................................................................20

2.2 The Impact of Terrorism on Economic Development................................................................20

2.2.1 Research Gap.....................................................................................................................24

2.3 The Impact of Terrorism on Social Development......................................................................25

2.4 Manifestation of Terrorism....................................................................................................26

2.4.1 Research Gap.....................................................................................................................30

2.5 Theoretical Framework..............................................................................................................30

2.6 Chapter Summary......................................................................................................................32

CHAPTER THREE: METHODOLOGY............................................................................................33

3.1 Introduction...............................................................................................................................33

3.2 Research Design........................................................................................................................33

3.4 Data Collection Methods...........................................................................................................33

3.4.1 Secondary Data..................................................................................................................33

3.5 Data Analysis.............................................................................................................................34

3.6 Ethical Considerations...............................................................................................................34

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3.7 Chapter Summary......................................................................................................................34

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 CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

1.1 Introduction

Mali is a case that well illustrates the connections between development and conflict. During a

field-based mission by World Development Report (WDR), a range of government, non-

governmental, and diplomatic actors strongly affirmed an essential relationship between

insecurity and development, arguing that the two are empirically inseparable in the Malian

context (Straus, 2011).

There are three central domains of conflict and insecurity in Mali, each of which has analogs in

other countries in the Sahel or is connected directly to conflicts in neighboring countries. First is

the contemporary multi-faceted insecurity in the three Northern regions of Mali (Timbuktu, Gao

and Kidal). The insecurity is a confluence of external and internal factors which includes; a

transnational terrorist activity led by Al Qaeda in the Land of Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) that uses

European kidnapping as a main tactic. Second is the transnational trafficking of illicit goods,

principally drugs and weapons but also people. Third is the presence of armed Malian actors

linked to banditry and to the history of a series of armed rebellions in the region (Straus, 2011).

This Section aims at examining the origin of conflict in Mali to the current situation.

1.2 Background of the study

From the colonial period through the present, most of Mali has been ruled according to various

exceptional regimes that have done little to build durable local governance and a sustainable and

legitimate presence of the central state. The restructuring of the French colonial state in the

1950s gave increasing autonomy to territorial governments in Africa, including in the Soudan

Français, today known as Mali. But it also helped sow the seeds of discontent between the

4
territorial government in Bamako and some northern populations, particularly certain Tuareg

leaders and groupings. In 1960, an independent state of Mali centered on Bamako emerged, but

uncertainties that were already present during the colonial period arose as to the ethnic

composition of the new state. Moreover, late colonial French attempts to carve out a separate

Saharan territory, the Common Organization of Saharan Regions (OCRS), drew support from

some Saharan Arabs and Tuaregs who were opposed to living under black southern Malian rule

(Brill, 2010).

These maneuvers coincided with a looming, troubled, and uncertain succession among the

Ifoghas, a Tuareg tribal confederation that had benefitted under French rule. The Ifoghas were

split as to whether or not to join the new state of Mali, with two brothers of the deceased

confederation leader adopting different positions. Drawing on some of the methods of the French

colonial regime, the new Malian national government intervened to appoint as the new tribal

leader the brother who supported remaining within Mali, even though the Ifoghas tribal council

chose the brother who supported seeking independence. These maneuverings combined with

more long-standing tensions helped spark a rebellion from 1962 to 1964. Although the rebellion

was rather limited in its scope and potency, the new Malian army repressed it brutally (Mann,

2015).

Thus, the Malian national government acquired early on the habit of manipulating tribal affairs

when it found it expedient to do so. Even though the one-party state was officially staunchly

opposed to traditional chiefs that helped control territory during the colonial period, the Bamako-

centered state also maintained the rule of the chiefs in certain northern communities. Thus, in

these places, the Bamako government chose to retain the social and political hierarchies that

were abolished in the rest of the country. This institutional and ideological schism, the distrust of

5
Bamako among northern populations, and physical repression employed by the new state all

strongly reinforced the perceived divisions between northern and southern Mali (Mcgregor,

2012)

Another rebellion erupted in northern Mali in 1990, eventually descending into internecine and

often ethnic-based violence. The issue of local governance played a crucial role not only in the

affiliations that armed groups chose, but in the conflict settlement as well. Even progovernment

militia groups often acted in response to local disputes. The Malian government had only

peripheral influence over some of these matters, even when it provided key support to local

groups, such as the Ganda Koy (Masters of the Land), which represented largely (but not

exclusively) sedentary populations (Thurston & Lebovich,2013).

The 1990 rebellion had at its core fighters who had lived and often received military training and

combat experience in Libya. Many of the fighters had left Mali in the preceding decades in

search of work opportunities following crippling droughts and were given military training

opportunities in camps set up by Moammar Gadhafi. Some even fought with Libyan forces in

Lebanon and Chad. During the 1990 rebellion, many of these fighters joined the Mouvement

Populaire de l’Azawad (MPA) under the leadership of Iyad Ag Ghali. The movement set out an

ambitious nationalist agenda and sought to abolish many of the caste and tribal distinctions that it

argued inhibited the unity of Tuareg populations (Wing & Kassibo, 2014).

The leadership of the rebellion helped prompt a military coup under then-Colonel Amadou

Toumani Touré (known as ATT) that overthrew the dictator Moussa Traoré. The 1992 National

Pact, signed by ATT and a rebel umbrella group, put a formal end to the rebellion, although the

worst violence would come after the rebellion’s technical conclusion. The terms of the deal

included the integration of some rebels into the armed forces; increased autonomy for areas with
6
large Tuareg populations and the creation of a new region in Kidal; and special tax incentives

and development money for the north. The pact also paved the way for a broader decentralization

in Mali (Wing, 2013).

After the pact was signed, however, the rebellion splintered into several groups, each dissatisfied

in their own way with the outcome of the peace deal. Even though each of the groups represented

certain ethnic, tribal, or caste groups, political and power concerns were also high on the groups’

agendas. With the penetration of conflict into Mali’s communities, local populations found it

necessary over time to choose sides and align themselves with armed groups regardless of

whether or not they supported the initial rebellion. These alignments in turn empowered armed

groups to seek greater political concessions for themselves and their constituencies, such as their

families and members of their tribal confederations (Brunet-Jailly,2016).

Reprisals by the Malian army against local populations in the north only exacerbated the

communities’ needs to ally with armed groups to ensure self-protection. In some areas, the

absence of the central state thus helped local populations feel more secure. But the problematic

state presence or outright absence also reinforced armed groups, allowed for a greater presence

of armed actors, and over time deepened, rather than defused, the civil war. In short, the failure

of the state to provide security and conflict resolution support forced local populations into

dependence on local armed groups. The central government thus inadvertently codified their

perceived legitimacy to defend local communities and provide benefits for them. This also

formally removed the state from some aspects of governance in the north without providing

communities the means to pursue real autonomy, instead leading the state to govern through

chosen local actors (Callimachi, 2014).

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The Malian government in the late 1990s and early 2000s proceeded according to its promises in

the 1992 National Pact to integrate ex-combatants from the 1990s rebellion into the armed

services and continue the process of decentralization. But soon after the return of ATT to power

—this time by the ballot box in 2002—the methods and patterns of governance in central and

northern Mali began to shift again. Instead of enforcing and implementing the national accords

negotiated to end the rebellions, ATT and successive Malian governments pursued irregular

policies to maintain order amid growing instability and a rising drug economy. Even the

international community succumbed to this veneer of democratic stability in Mali, ignoring the

deep and increasing governance deficiencies and communal tensions that would continue to fuel

conflict.While the decentralization of institutions, particularly of communal governance, took

place in Mali, the newly-formed administrative districts received few of the promised and

necessary resources to govern. This problem arose in part from the limited wherewithal of the

central state to empower the new decentralized units and in part from the fact that the central

state itself lacked resources and capacity (Morgan, 2012).

This hollowing out of local state institutions came amid the arrival in 2003 of the Algerian

jihadist group, the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), in northern Mali. The

predecessor to al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), the GSPC established a major

kidnapping economy in the region that by 2014 would grow to at least $91.5 million, and

probably more. Local government officials came to play key roles as intermediaries in hostage

negotiations for Europeans kidnapped first by GSPC and later on AQIM. That role made them

invaluable allies for the Malian government, but also strengthened their independent resource

base as they could keep a cut of the ransom revenues. Beyond local officials, local communities

also benefited from ransom income as well as growing narcotics trafficking, so much so that

8
formerly subordinate communities could upend previously dominant social orders, refusing to

pay traditional taxes to elite groups and sometimes kidnapping leaders from these traditionally

dominant groups (Jouve, 2015).

Not just armed anti-state actors, but local officials also became increasingly involved in the

growing drug trafficking economy, which was augmented by the rerouting of cocaine smuggling

to Europe through West Africa. Eventually, national government officials also became deeply

implicated in the region’s various illicit economies. Prominent military leaders like Colonel

Lamana Ould Bou—who helped lead largely Arab fighters organized along ethnic lines—also

became entangled in the illicit economies, and by extension implicated in jihadist networks. Both

local and national government officials found it profitable to tolerate the presence of jihadist

groups like the GSPC and AQIM, even though such groups deeply threatened local order and the

national state (Mahmoud, 2012).

This decay of national and local state institutions, combined with long simmering resentments

and grievances, provided the backdrop to yet another rebellion in the mid-2000s. In 2006, a

Tuareg officer reintegrated into the Malian national military, Hassan Ag Fagaga, deserted with a

group of his men and took up arms against the government. Iyad Ag Ghali, who had assumed a

role as a key interlocutor between the Tuareg and the central government, took charge of the

rebellion in an attempt to bring it to a conclusion. However, other groups persisted with attacks

on government forces. With the national forces proving unable to effectively put down the

rebellion, the ATT government resorted to raising ethnic militias to fight the rebels. One of the

militias was under the leadership of El Hajj Gamou, while the Arab officer Abderrahmane Ould

Meydou led another group. The militias’ extortion of and brutality toward local communities

alienated local populations from local and national elites, and also strained local communal

9
relationships. In an echo of colonial policies for managing conquest in the desert, the state thus

again sought to play tribal and ethnic groups against each other (Shurkin,2013).

These pent-up and growing grievances provided fertile ground for new political entrepreneurs to

mobilize against the national government and local elites aligned with the central state, even

after the 2006 rebellion subsided. In 2010, young northern students and intellectuals established

the National Movement of the Azawad (MNA) and announced their intention to seek the

eventual independence of northern Mali. Embracing the idea of an independent Azawad,

thousands of Malian fighters returning from Libya in late 2011 joined the National Movement

for the Liberation of the Azawad (MNLA), formed in late 2011 after a series of meetings at

Zakak, in northern Mali. That was partially the consequence of the government’s failure to deal

with the returning combatants even-handedly. While Imghad Tuareg fighters were welcomed

back and many immediately reintegrated into the armed forces under the command of El Hajj

Gamou, other Tuareg fighters were not. The MNLA’s ranks were also crucially reinforced by

soldiers deserting the Malian army ( Casin,2008)

On the military battlefield, the MNLA quickly proved successful in seizing territory in northern

Mali. In April 2012, it declared the independent state of Azawad and formed its government,

publishing a list of cabinet appointees. However, the MNLA, too, could not overcome the

fundamental challenges, divisions, and rivalries of the region. Thus, the MNLA was soon swept

aside by a coalition of jihadist groups including AQIM; the Movement for One and Jihad in West

Africa (MUJAO), a splinter group from AQIM;29 and Ansar al-Din, largely composed of

Ifoghas Tuareg (Gries, Krieger & Meierrieks, 2011).

Each of these groups sought to deliver basic governance and provide rudimentary social and

public services, particularly in Kidal and Timbuktu. With resources from the region’s smuggling
10
economies, including the taxation of smuggling convoys, AQIM financed development projects

such as house construction and well digging. AQIM also organized medical clinics for nomadic

populations, handing out medicine and performing free examinations for both people and

animals. The quality of services and governance delivered varied widely among the groups, in

part reflecting the varied physical and social environments where each group ruled, and in part

reflecting the complex relationships between the armed groups and the different cities and towns

that they occupied (Karaduman & Batu, 2011).

To varying extents, the armed groups, MUJAO, also played on local rivalries to recruit fighters.

By joining the jihadist groups, the recruits felt they were protecting their communities from the

alleged abuses committed by MNLA fighters. Despite the purported claims of the jihadists to

represent local communities, and despite the region’s deep and decades-long sense of

marginalization, many members of local communities nonetheless expressed their anger at being

abandoned by the central state in Bamako ( Karagöz, 2016).

Moreover, even with the arrival of ostensibly international or pan-regional jihadist groups,

different political ideologies and social and community cleavages within new and old armed

groups in the region remained salient. Local agendas and local constituencies also continued to

drive the behavior and decisions of the groups. Thus, not surprisingly, alignments remained

fluid, and in turn, divisions among the armed groups proved malleable. Groups would split apart

and fight each other, but even sworn enemies could find a way to come back together and renew

their alliances or form new groupings when it was politically advantageous or when local or

external conditions necessitated it (Meierrieks & Gries, 2012).

The government’s long-term failure to effectively and even-handedly deal with non-jihadist and

jihadist armed groups prepared a fertile ground for the 2012 rebellion, one that emerged from a
11
series of confluent local and regional events. The social and communal tensions that worsened in

the 1990s, and which the Malian national state failed to address, could not be suppressed through

the divide-and rule approach to the ethnic communities that the state had engaged in for years. In

fact, as the state became more dependent on armed proxies and the rule of local strongmen, it

only exacerbated the divisions and their explosiveness (Younas,2015).

The 2012 rebellion and its aftermath in Mali cannot be reduced to simple ethnic or communal

rivalries. Nor can they be reduced to rivalries over trading and trafficking. Although both played

significant roles in fostering and shaping the environment around the rebellion, the social and

political fabric in northern Mali (as well as the country’s center) are more complex. They are

also at times fluid, and thus they defy simplistic characterizations. Nor does the delineation of

northern and central Mali capture the overlapping relationships and migration of individuals and

groups between these geographic and political spaces. Although analysts and even locals use

terms like “the north” and “the center” to delineate complex areas, these terms are at best

approximations and must be understood as such (Uytun, 2009).

Having established this, during the rebellion and after the French intervention in January 2013,

the communal, economic, and political alignments became more concrete and took on new

importance.The intensity of the divisions became apparent in the various peace negotiations and

political stabilization efforts that took place after the French intervention nominally took

northern Mali back from the overt control of jihadists and Tuareg separatists. For example, the

Ouagadougou Accords signed by the MNLA and the movement that ostensibly broke away from

Iyad Ag Ghali’s Ansar al-Din, the High Council for the Unity of the Azawad (HCUA), and the

government of Mali in June 2013 were never meant to provide a permanent resolution to the

rebellion. Instead, they were only intended to pave the way for the 2013 Mali presidential

12
elections, encourage further talks between the government and the rebels, and allow for the

reinsertion of Malian security forces and officials in the north. Although the accord created

enough space for the elections to take place, they failed in the other limited objectives and

reflected the accelerated international push for normalcy in Mali at the cost of a more

deliberative political process (Topal, 2004).

Moreover, a deadly battle between Malian armed forces and proindependence Tuareg and Arab

fighters in Kidal in May 2014 dealt a significant blow to these limited and halting efforts to

reinstall state authority in the north. It also led more directly to the creation of the Groupe

Autodéfense Toureg Imghad et Alliés (GATIA), an Imghad Tuareg militia believed to be led by

loyalist Malian army Colonel El Hajj Gamou. This new militia closely resembled a prior one

constituted to suppress the Tuareg rebellion of 2006. For the following several months amid

political negotiations in Algiers, GATIA as well as an anti-separatist wing of the Arab

Movement of the Azawad (MAA), fought on multiple occasions with units from the MNLA,

HCUA, and the anti-government wing of the MAA. These anti-government forces formed an

umbrella group—the Coordination of Movements of the Azawad (CMA)—in the summer of

2014. In June 2014, the GATIA, the anti-separatist MAA, and several other groups formed a

counter-umbrella body called the Plateforme (Michael, 2007).

Despite this ongoing fighting, the Plateforme and CMA moved in fits and starts toward a peace

deal under at times intense political and financial pressure from the international community.

Especially France and Algeria once again tried to shepherd Mali’s various combatant groups to

negotiate a settlement. Nonetheless the international community never developed adequate

control over the warring parties and their constituencies to force settlements or make them stick (

Öcal, &., Yıldırım).

13
Thus, in May 2015, for example, a peace deal was signed in Bamako between the central

government and Plateforme, but without the CMA present. In June 2015, another deal—the

Algiers Accord—was signed between the two main armed umbrella groups (the Plateforme and

the CMA) and the Malian government. But once again, there were notable absences among other

key militant groups. The deals often ended up being peace arrangements only on paper, with the

armed groups having little inclination to actually make peace. As with previous accords, external

pressure was related to creating a peace deal, with the hope of resolving underlying political and

social tensions afterwards. These piecemeal steps taken to resolve the conflict have in turn

created breakaway groups, spurred more internal violence, and accelerated competition for

access to resources and benefits (Persitz, 2006).

The Algiers Accords offer a wide-ranging set of prescriptions for the future of Mali in line with

past peace accords. These include a revision of Mali’s constitution, increased decentralization

and autonomy, the integration of fighters into Mali’s government and armed forces, and the

eventual return of Malian armed forces and government throughout the north. But these accords

replicated some of the same problematic arrangements established in prior peace deals and

implemented policies that echoed those of ATT. These include a recourse to decentralization as a

solution to all problems, a de facto ceding of political space and territorial governance to armed

groups, and an effort to coopt armed groups by offering them slots in the armed forces. One

example of this troubling continuity is the creation in 2016 of the new regions of Taoudeni and

Ménaka, sparsely populated areas of northern Mali with little to no governing infrastructure. In

fact, in March 2012, Mali’s National Assembly passed a law to establish these new regions, and

already at that time, the move was widely seen as an attempt to buy off powerful traffickers and

businessmen by giving them official governmental posts as well as control over resources and

14
the movement of people and goods within their regions. Yet once again, the Malian government

and the international community did not learn from past mistakes and simply resurrected that

approach four years later (Sezgin, 2003).

Despite the deal, July and August 2015 witnessed brutal combat as well as the capture of the

strategic town of Anéfis by GATIA forces. Fighting continued into September 2015, before a

combination of government pressure and local mediation from community and religious leaders

helped calm tensions and organize a series of local meetings. These meetings subsequently gave

way to a set of local agreements first signed near Anéfis in October 2015 that aimed to settle

differences between different communities through similar joint declarations. Since the Anéfis

Accords, both the Plateforme and CMA have publicly committed themselves to the

implementation of the Algiers Accord. Specifically, they embraced the creation of interim

authorities and the implementation of U.N.-backed processes including joint patrols; operational

mechanisms of coordination (MOC); and disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR)

of former combatants ( Akgün, 2006).

Under these interim authorities, finally put in place in April 2017, each armed movement has

named counselors to support reconstituted regional and local authorities to assist with DDR,

elections organization, and other matters related to the implementation of the Algiers Accord.

These authorities are intended to work alongside governors appointed by Bamako, with mixed

security patrols made up of members from competing armed groups, which started under the

supervision of French and U.N. forces after the deadly bombing in Gao in January 2017

(Lebovich, 2017).

However, these arrangements have already broken down several times and the interim authorities

were at various times delayed due to protests from armed groups and local populations unhappy
15
with the process of establishing the authorities. These protests in some cases physically

prevented the arrival of officials and personnel meant to establish the authorities, while in the

case of Taoudenni the authorities have been established but are not seated in the region itself due

to continuing security threats and lack of physical infrastructure. Some argued that they did not

include a wide enough cross-section of the population, especially in Gao and in Timbuktu, as

well as the resulting composition of the authorities themselves. The decades of on-again, off-

again conflict and problematic approaches to the management of the Malian conflict have

repeatedly produced a set of significant dynamics that have now come to fruition (Wadada,

2017). On of it is underdevelopment of the region. This study aims to investigate how terrorism

in Mali has contributed to this situation (underdevelopment) with a specific focus on social and

economic development.

1.3 Statement of the problem

Based on the above backdrop, terrorism in Mali has become an unavoidable circumstance since

the colonial rule to date. Various policies have been implemented to aid the escalation and to

stop this situation to no avail. Some studies have been undertaken on terrorism in Africa and its

effect on development. Among them is Mohamed (2017) who conducted a research on the

impact of terrorism on development in Kenya. However, no study so far has reviewed the

terrorism situation in Mali and how it has impacted to the social and economic lives of its

citizens. This study aims to fill this puzzle as well as contribute to the literature on terrorism and

its impact on development.

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1.4 Objectives

1.4.1 General Objective

To investigate the impact of terrorism on economic and social development in Mali.

1.4.1 Specific Objectives

1. To assess the impact of terrorism on the economic development of Mali.

2. To examine the impact of terrorism on the social development of Mali.

3. To examine the manifestation of terror in Mali.

1.5 Research Questions

1. How has the advent of terrorism in Mali impacted on its economic development?

2. How has the escalation of terrorism in Mali impacted its social development?

3. How is terrorism manifested in Mali?

1.6 Significance of the study

The importance of this study is that the advent of terrorism in Mali has had unforeseen

conditions and changed the lives of all residents of the region. But these conditions are not

clearly documented, with most of them reported as they occur and soon get forgotten. Many lives

and property have been lost because of terrorism in the region. This study therefore indicated the

specific incidences of terrorism in the area, circumstances under which they occurred and how

the incidents have impacted on the lives of people living in the areas surrounding the attacks.

This situation made it possible for relevant authorities specifically security personnel to come up

with concrete strategies of countering the planned terrorists’ attacks before they take place and

17
the government as whole to come up with strategies of ensuring that vital government services

such as health and education continue to be rendered in spite of the effects of the terrorist attacks.

1.7 Scope of the study

The study is precisely limited to examine the impact of terrorism on the social and economic

development of Mali. The scope of the study is restricted only to terrorism in Mali with a focus

of investigating its impact on social and economic development.

1.8 Definition of terms

Terrorism: Terrorism refers to the calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful

violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the

pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological (Department of Defense

Dictionary of Military Terms). The acts of violence will include grenade attacks, suicide

bombing and Improvised Explosive Device (IEDs) attacks.

Economic Impacts: Economic impacts refers to the consequences of terrorism on the entire

network of producers, distributors, and consumers of goods and services within Mali.

1.9 Chapter Summary

This paper consists of five chapters.

Chapter One gives a brief introduction of the research. It also contains the statement of the

problem, objectives of the study, research questions, significance of the study, definitions of

terms as well as the chapter break down.

Chapter Two looks at the theoretical foundations and literature review. The research gap is also

identified.

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Chapter Three discusses the methodological approaches used to collect data for this study. It

outlines the research design, the population and sample, data collection method, data analysis

method, as well as the ethical considerations for the study.

Chapter Four analyses the data collected and provides the answers to the research questions of

the study.

Chapter five offers the conclusion and recommendations.

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 CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Introduction

This chapter reviews literature on the socio-economic impact of terrorism broadly. The research

gap is identified and theories explaining the variables of the study are also reviewed.

2.2 The Impact of Terrorism on Economic Development

The studies on the impact of terrorism on national economies began in the late 1960s (Ak et al.,

2015). Some researchers take the various countries, groups of countries and the groups around

the world into account while investigating the effects of terrorism on economies. However,

different methods have been used in these studies.

Ak et al. (2015) made a theoretical study that summarizes the literature investigating the

relationship between economic growth and terrorism. As a result of theoretical research, they

have reached the conclusion that there is an inverse relationship between the literature of terror

and the economic growth.

When previous empirical literature is examined, it is seen that empirical studies have generally

adopted two econometric methodologies. Some previous articles presented below address

terrorism and its economic reflections. The first econometric approach is based on the studies

that use time series data analysis. This approach examines different time periods of various

countries. Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) have examined the relationship between terrorism and

GNP in Basque Countries. Their findings conclude that, after the outbreak of terrorism in the late

1960’s, GDP per capita in the Basque Countries declined by about 10 percent in comparison with

a synthetic control region without terrorism in the 1980’s-1990s.

20
Gupta et al. (2004) investigated the effects of armed conflicts and terrorism on low and middle-

income countries. The results show that if there is an armed conflict in a country, lower growth

and higher inflation can be observed, having adverse effects on tax revenues and investment.

Tavares (2004) conducts a systematic investigation of the incidence and economic costs of

terrorist attacks at the country level. Tavares (2004) found that rich countries are the most prone

to suffer from attacks while their democracies become, if anything, less vulnerable than other

countries. Also, a study by World Bank estimates a 4 % GDP decline in the Israeli economy

while the Palestinian territories suffered a 50 % decline in between 1994 and 2002 (Tavares,

2004).

Gries et al. (2011) aim to identify the link between the intensity of domestic terrorism and the

rate of real GDP per capita growth for Western European countries. They found that economic

performance leads to terrorist violence in robust ways only for three out of seven countries. Their

findings indicate that the role of economic performance in determining terrorist violence appears

to have been important for some countries, whereas all attacked economies have been successful

in adjusting to the threat of terrorism.

Uysal et al., (2009) have concluded that terrorism negatively affected the economic growth in

1992-2001. According to Sezgin (2003) that examines the defense spending, terrorism and

economy, the security and stability in countries is the main requirement for economic

development. There are two options for the government to refrain from acts of terrorism. They

can either increase the defense spending or education and health spending in order to upgrade the

welfare of people who might be associated with terrorist acts.

Yıldırım and Öcal (2013) investigate the determinants of provincial terrorism in Turkey taking

spatial dimension into account for the time period of 1990-2006. Their results indicate that
21
increases in income and schooling ratio tend to reduce the provincial average of terrorism,

whereas an increase in unemployment enhances it.

Blomberg et al. (2004) perform an empirical investigation of the macroeconomic consequences

of international terrorism and interactions with alternative forms of collective violence. Their

analysis was based on a rich unbalanced panel data set with annual observations on 177 countries

from 1968 to 2000. They found that, on average, the incidence of terrorism may have an

economically significant negative effect on growth, albeit one that is considerably smaller and

less persistent than that associated with either external wars or internal conflict.

Gaibulloev and Sandler (2009) examine the impact of terrorism on economic growth in Asia for

19702004. Their panel data estimations show that transnational terrorist attacks had a significant

effect on the growth. In other words, Gaibulloev and Sandler (2009) show that an additional

terrorist incident per million persons reduces GDP per capita growth by about 1.5 %. However,

this effect is different between developed and developing Asian countries. Especially for

developing Asian countries, transnational terrorism curbs income per capita growth primarily by

stimulating government security spending, which diverts resources from more productive private

and public investments.

Meierrieks and Gries (2012) investigate the relationship between economic performance of

country and terrorism for 18 Latin American countries from 1970 to 2007. They found that the

link between terrorism and economic growth is different according to the development in

countries. In other words, the terrorism reduces the growth for less developed countries, but this

connection cannot be observed in developed Latin American economies.

22
Akıncı et al. (2014) using a total of 152 countries data from 2002 to 2011, consisting of 45

advanced, 77 emerging and 30 underdeveloped countries, made the twostage least squares

analysis. According to the results, the terrorist attacks in these three groups of countries are

disrupting the growth process by raising the level of inflation. In other words, acts of terrorism

negatively affect the growth of inflation. However, this effect is stronger in developing and

underdeveloped countries.

Younas (2015) investigates whether international openness limits the negative effect of terrorism

on economic growth. The analysis focuses on 120 developing countries over the period of 1976-

2008. The findings show that the positive interaction effect of terrorism and globalization

suggests that the latter ameliorates the adverse impact of the former on growth. Then this result

helps explain why the growth consequences of terrorism vary across nations and hold important

policy implications.

Bezić et al. (2016) examine the impact of terrorism on foreign direct investment of the selected

European Union (EU) and European Economic Area (EEA) countries. They used dynamic panel

data methods over 29 countries from 2000 to 2013. The results indicate that terrorist activities

reduce security and confidence of investors in countries exposed to terrorist activities, reducing

the inflow of foreign direct investment. These results show a negative indirect relationship

between terrorist activities and economy.

Musayev (2016) investigates the potential sources of positive externalities for the relationship

between military spending and economic growth using recent advances in panel data estimation

methods and a large data-set on military expenditure. The results show that the impact of military

23
expenditure on growth is generally negative as in the literature, but that it is not significantly

detrimental for countries facing higher internal threats and for countries with large natural

resource wealth once corruption levels are accounted for.

The studies from Turkey investigating the relationship between terrorism and economic growth

using panel data analysis are limited. The aim of Altay et al. (2013) is looking into the impacts of

terror for the Middle-East countries. They use some macroeconomic variables to identify the

impacts of terror. Within the scope of this study, they use panel data analysis and include the

data between 1996 and 2010. Their results show that the terror negatively affects all economic

variables, especially tourism.

2.2.1 Research Gap

Ak et al. (2015) says that the studies in literature are insufficient, and that they should be

increased through innovative approaches and methods. As can be seen, studies reveal a clear and

unambiguous manner that terrorism has negative effects on the national economy and

macroeconomic variables. This study aims to demonstrate the adverse effects of terrorism on the

country’s economy, which is classified by low, medium and high-income economies. This study

will greatly contribute to the existing literature as it addresses the impact of terrorism on the

economy of Mali. No current or past research has made attempt to investigate the terror situation

in Mali and the consequence it has on the economy of the state. Hence, this study aims to fill this

gap.

2.3 The Impact of Terrorism on Social Development

Securipedia (2013) states that “considerable costs are incurred by terrorism because terrorist

events not only lead to material and immaterial costs for those who have become victimized;
24
but also forces local and national authorities to spend billions on the prevention of terrorism

and the detection, prosecution and punishment of terrorists”. To elucidate on the costs of

terrorism Securipedia states:-

Due to a terrorist event, economic agents suffer losses in physical and human
capital, and, at the same time, they themselves may influence the economy
through their immediate responses to the violent shock that occurs. Also in
general, the economic impacts of terrorism are as a result of interdependent
economic systems in which terrorist attacks cause the disruption of economic
entities, which have not been direct targets of the attack. Therefore, terrorist
events influence three main types of economic actors, namely: Individual
households, the private sector (companies), and the public authorities
(Securipedia, 2013).
To explicate further on the immediate and direct effects of terrorism, Klein (2007) states

that “in addition to the casualties and physical destruction directly caused by their attacks,

terrorists seek to inflict wider psychological, social, political, and economic damage upon

the societies they target”. Therefore, terrorists harm economies in various ways; reducing

consumers and firms expectations for the future, forcing governments and the private

sector to invest in security measures, which reduce efficiency in vulnerable industries

(such as transportation and trade) and redirect investment away from more productive

economic uses. “This in return alters behavior by inducing economic actors (consumers,

investors, businesses) to avoid areas of perceived risk (either sectors, such as aviation,

tourism or geographic areas affected by terrorism) and this may trigger wider geopolitical

conflict, which may cause further economic disruptions” (Klein, 2007).

In Baluchistan, Pakistan terrorism has negatively affects the social aspects of economies.

Spencer (2012) found out that “terrorism results in psychological issues especially among

children with survivors of terrorism leading fearful lives that may turn into anxiety,

feelings of intolerable danger, nightmares and long term social and psychological
25
syndromes”. Moreover, Sabir (2007) states that “terrorism not only directly affects

economic development and prosperity but results in psycho-social repercussions which

heavily damage human personality and the society”.

As a result of terrorism social split widens among people belonging to the

different schools of thought. This split becomes the cause of significant social
division which harms the social fabric and unity negatively. Furthermore, due to
the fear of terrorist attacks people try to escape from their social and professional
responsibilities such that people perform their duties in a state of fear. Lastly,
terrorism affects the social progress and well-being of the people. This is
whereby, terrorism makes businesses and economy of the country suffer, which
directly lessens job opportunities (Sabir, 2007).
Zaman et.al (2012) in their findings stated that one of the worst hit social areas by

terrorism is education and religious practices. In that “respondents claimed that the waves

of terrorism in the province had deprived them of entertainment and refreshment, adding

that people were even afraid of having fun in parks”. Consequently, this reduced social

activity in the area as well as affected the earning capacity of the locals.

2.4 Manifestation of Terrorism

Crenshaw points out that, even if the term terrorism is used objectively as an analytical

tool, it is still difficult to find a satisfactory definition that distinguishes terrorism from

other forms of violent action. The author describes terrorism as preeminently political

and symbolic, and as “deliberate and systematic violence performed by small numbers of

people with the purpose of intimidating a watching audience” (Crenshaw, 2000).

However, the author’s statement that terrorism is meant to hurt and not to destroy, is in

contrast with the view of the new terrorism as also being aimed at mass destruction.

While terrorism as political instrument has been present throughout history, the1960’s

and 1970’s presented two kinds of groups, namely those motivated principally by an anti-

26
capitalist ideology and those motivated by ethno-separatism as an outgrowth of national

liberation struggles. Ideological terrorists seek to change the existing political, social and

economic system. They claimed to be the “vanguard of a people’s revolution” and

created their own rationality which interpreted reality in terms of a revolutionary

ideology. (Wilkinson, 2000) Examples of groups representing ideological terrorism were

the Red Army Faction (RAF) in Germany, the Red Brigades (BR) in Italy, Direct Action

(AD) in France and the Weathermen in the US. (Gearson, 2002).

Traditional groups operated out of defined sanctuaries or safe-havens, their operational

areas were mostly predictable and the threat they posed was limited in consequences and

effect. (Hirschmann, 2000) In terms of choice of weapons traditional terrorism relied on

the use of the bomb and gun as the weapons of choice. Being ideologically motivated,

these groups enjoyed state sponsorship from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

(USSR) and other Eastern European countries who strived to promote Communism

during the Cold War.

Except where traditional movements escalated into an insurgency or civil war, they

maintained the principle of constrained violence. They operated based on the minimum

force necessary and calculated that indiscriminate violence would alienate supporters and

undercut their claims to legitimacy among the broader public (Simon & Benjamin, 2000).

Regarding specific tactics, the following were used: bombings, assassinations, armed

assaults, kidnappings, hijackings and hostage takings. During the 1970’s the seizing of

embassies was a popular tactic, but this has declined as a result of more effective counter

measures by governments.

27
The profound changes in the international political environment during the 1980’s led to

new perceptions of warfare and the use of violence in sub-state conflicts. This included

new interpretations of the motivation and aims of terrorism as a political strategy. After

the end of the Cold War, there was a rediscovery of asymmetrical conflict in US military

thinking. This debate in turn gave rise to the concept of “super terrorism” and the

phenomenon of the “rogue state” and it was suggested that developing states and non-

state groups would select asymmetric means to attack Western interests. Assessments

were made on the likely use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) by terrorist

organizations supported by the weapons programs of rogue states. Thinking behind the

asymmetrical conflict debate during the 1990’s had an important influence on the debate

on a new terrorism and appeared to offer proof that the threat of asymmetrical warfare

from sub-state groups was real. (Gearson, 2002).

The re-emergence of religiously inspired terrorism began after the Islamic revolution in

Iran and spread beyond Islam to other religions. In India the Sikhs sought to establish a

religious state in the Punjab, Jewish terrorists were active in Israel and in the US the

Christian Identity movement, based on racial interpretations of the Bible, emerged.

(Rapoport, 2003) The founding of AL Qaeda, a Sunni-inspired Muslim movement,

marked the rise of a transnational terrorist organization capable of functioning at a global

level.

This period is also characterized by the prevalence of suicide attacks, the opposition

against globalization by terrorist groups, and the increased involvement of terrorist

groups with organized crime, especially drug trafficking. (Lutz, 2005) Analysts became

28
concerned about the possible use of non-conventional weapons by terrorist groups and a

perceived tendency towards indiscriminate mass casualty attacks.

The effectiveness of terrorist techniques has been constrained by the technology and

weaponry available during a particular period. Since the 1980’s terrorism has been

influenced by new technological developments, including in the fields of mass

communication, weaponry and civil aviation. Advances made in the weapons industry led

to the development of weaponry more suitable to the specific needs of terrorist groups.

For example, after the invention of dynamite provided radical groups with the means to

use bombs more effectively, bombing has remained a preferred technique of terrorist

groups. Afterwards the development of plastic explosives like Semtex became an

effective tool of various groups. (Wilkinson, 2000) Modern electronics led to the use of

remote-controlled detonation and other devices benefiting dissident groups and which

provided them with the potential for launching increasingly lethal attacks. (Lutz, 2005).

The importance of civil aviation to terrorism was amply illustrated by the effective use of

airline hijackings by Palestinian groups during the 1970’s and which contributed to make

it the first truly international terrorist organization. (Hoffman, 1998) Since then,

globalization has led to an increase in the volume of civil aviation which facilitated the

ease of international travel. At the same time this has created numerous targets for

terrorists to exploit (Wilkinson, 2000) and by the late 1990’s civilian aircraft has emerged

as part of terrorist armory. Various incidents demonstrated the separate use of the

elements which were eventually used in combination in the September 11 attacks against

the US when civilian aircraft were utilized as bombs. (Carlton, 2005) The success of

these attacks followed after the failure of Project Bojinka which was planned by Muslim

29
radicals in 1995 in the Philippines and which aimed to destroy eleven US passenger

aircraft by using small nitroglycerine bombs. (Reeve, 1999).

2.4.1 Research Gap

Based on the literature review it is evident that limited studies have been undertaken to reveal the

specific economic and social impacts of terrorism particularly in Africa and Mali per say. Thus,

this study endeavors to fill this gap and contribute to the literature on the impact of terrorism in

social and economic development. In addition, the empirical review on the manifestation of

terrorism has been limited to a world view perspective. This study will give a critical review of

the manifestation of terrorism in Mali.

2.5 Theoretical Framework

This study employed Realism and liberal institutionalism. These theoretical approaches are

closely related to such terminology as the balance of power and real politick. Realists believe

that human must undergo political struggle since humans have inbuilt dark side. Political

struggle among humans is inevitable because humans have an inherent dark side, as expressed by

the political philosophers like Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679).

According to Hobbes, humans have inbuilt dark side that urges them to control others. He further

argues that when two men desire something that both cannot get at the same time, enmity

develop between them and they try to obliterate and conquer one another. In the context of

terrorism, the terrorists believe that their view is the most righteous and any other person who

does not agree with their view is an unbeliever that should be eradicated from the world. Thus,

they try to eliminate all the “unbelievers” from earth through mass murders.

30
Additionally, realists also center their contention on the disordered nature of the international

system, based on antagonism among various players, instead of the human nature, as the

structure of international politics. Realists believe that the international system is made up of

autonomous actors (state and non-state) acting on their own impulse and follow their own

objectives and welfare in diverse ways by any possible methods that can help them reach their

end. To them, the use of brutality is the most suitable since the stronger will always win, and the

end justifies the means. In addition, the superior actors are answerable to no one since the

international system lawless, without an overall authority providing security and order. Due to

this, the international players usually resort to war to meet their ends. In the context of terrorism,

the terrorists use violence as the best means of having their way and are answerable to no one.

Thus, this is the best way through which they can achieve their objectives (John, 2002).

Liberal thinkers have consistently emphasized the moral value of the individual. They view that

individuals are endowed with reason and moral responsibility. It is on this basis that liberal

philosophers asserted the general human rights to life, liberty and pursuit of happiness and to the

numerous civil and legal rights and freedoms that are codified in many modern constitutions.

According to Paul Wilkinson, the important features of liberal states are: constitutional

government, rule of law and protection of individual rights and liberties. Liberal political

philosophers in general express their principled opposition to despotic and tyrannical forms of

governments.

Terrorist philosophies and ideologies clearly pose a frontal attack on the liberal values and

principles. Wilkinson argues that terrorism constitutes a direct repudiation of liberal and human

values and principles and that terrorist ideology is inevitably and constantly deployed in a

struggle to defame and discredit liberal democracy. He further argues that terrorists aim to

31
undermine the political will, confidence and morale of liberal governments and citizens so that

they are made more vulnerable to political and social collapse.

In a nutshell, the key ideas of liberal institution are self-restraint, moderation, compromise, peace

and individual rights. Hence, the absence of these ideals which is empirically evident in Pakistan

society has allowed extremist views and attitudes to flourish resulting in surfacing and

proliferation of terrorism and its impact in the region.

2.6 Chapter Summary

The above literature indicates that terrorism has negative effect on both social and economic

development. The research gap has been identified in this section and realism is the best fit to

describe the variable of this study.

CHAPTER THREE: METHODOLOGY

3.1 Introduction

This chapter presents the methodology that was used to attain the study’s objectives and to

answer the research questions. It offers a depiction of the research design, sources of data and the

32
techniques for data collection and analysis. The chapter also inspects the ethical considerations

for the study.

3.2 Research Design

Bryman and Bell (2007) defined research design as an overall plan that proposals a framework

for the choice of data collection methods and data analysis procedures. The study will employ a

case study research design. The study will use qualitative research design with a case study

approach. A case study is an approach in research that emphases on gaining an in-depth

understanding of a unit or event at a specific time. Willig (2008) noted that case studies are not

considered by the approaches used to collect and analyze data, but rather its focus on a unit of

analysis: a case. This study will therefore focus on the terrorism in Mali to assess its impact on

social and economic development. The unit of analysis is the Mali region.

3.4 Data Collection Methods

Secondary data method will be used in this study.

3.4.1 Secondary Data

The secondary data required for this study is longitudinal data on terrorism in Mali. A

longitudinal study is a research design that encompasses repeated observations of the same

variables over long periods of time, often many decades. The study will make use of archival

data from 2000 to 2017 on the impact of terrorism in Mali. The researcher will make use of

online journals, books, blogs, newspapers, United Nations reports to answer the research

questions. The data obtained was used to answer the research questions of the study.

33
3.5 Data Analysis

The data analysis to be used is content analysis where verbal data is categorized for

classification, summarization and tabulation. The approaches used will be both descriptive and

interpretative.

3.6 Ethical Considerations

Use of secondary data is, a highly ethical practice. It exploits the value of any investment in data

collection, it decreases the burden on respondents, it guarantees replicability of study findings

and thus, greater transparency of research actions and integrity of research work. But the value of

secondary data is only fully comprehended if these benefits overshadow the dangers. Hence, the

researcher aims at guaranteeing that the data used in this study will not cause damage or

suffering to the readers and also the researcher endeavors to evade biasness during the analysis

of the study where the researcher can be prompted to offer their views during the analysis of

data. Data will be collected from various secondary sources.

3.7 Chapter Summary

Chapter three has described the research methodology that was employed in the study. The

chapter has outlined the research design, sample and population under study, research methods,

data analysis method and ethical considerations considered for the study. The next chapter,

Chapter Four provides the research findings as per every objective of the study and presents a

platform for the conclusion and recommendations in Chapter Five.

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