DRAFT REPORT

“Between Abundance and Redundance”.

Mediation initiatives in Central Mali

Introduction
The situation in central Mali has seriously started to deteriorate in 2015 after Jihadi militants attacked
several district centres in the Region of Mopti. For long, the Malian government and its key partners
have neglected the centre. They rather focused on the troubled North and the delicate peace process in
Algiers. Yet, as trouble spread to new districts and the civilians’ death toll continued to increase, it
became impossible to ignore that a second major crisis spot was developing in Mali. Today, while
Northern Mali is going through a precarious respite, an increasing number of actors - from the state to
international partners to non-state actors - are shifting their attention toward the Centre.
What was initially a militant insurgency limited to a few districts in the inner Niger Delta has now
turned into a widespread, complex crisis. In central Mali, jihadist activities and counter-insurgency
operations dangerously intersect with rising intercommunal violence. The Malian government and its
main partners have initially relied on a military focused strategy to contain a fast deteriorating situation.
Yet almost four years of counter-insurgency operations have not allowed the state to recover much
territory outside the main district centres, many of which are under siege by militants. Worryingly,
violence is on the rise, affects an increasing number of civilians (much more than in the North) and
expands towards new territories (especially the regions of Ségou and, more recently, Koulikoro).
While military operations are stalling and intercommunal violence is on the rise, calls for more political
dialogue are gaining weight. In central Mali, there is nothing like the Algiers peace process facilitated
by a strong international mediation team. In the absence of a such a unified dialogue framework, local
mediation initiatives have literally mushroomed. Multiple actors with multiple agendas and different
methodological approaches to mediation and dialogue have developed initiatives in the Mopti region
and to a lesser extend in the Segou region.
This report is an attempt to make sense of this diversity and to identify the most important and most
promising mediation initiatives. The definition of mediation intervention has been a challenging issue:
many would agree that “the goal of mediation is for a neutral third party to help disputants come to a
consensus on their own”.1 Yet, In a complex crisis like central Mali, the neutrality of third parties is
an extremely sensitive issue. For instance in a context where multiple armed actors (Jihadists but also
ethnic based groups) challenge the legitimacy of the state, can mediation initiatives be successful if they
associate or work closely with government institutions like the Malian Ministry of National
Reconciliation? Moreover, western partners who support counter-insurgency efforts also fund
mediation initiatives in central Mali. In this context, can such western funded mediation NGOs be
regarded as neutral third parties by local actors? Conversely some promising mediation initiatives
develop without clearly defining third parties. For instance, malian religious scholars are directly

1
https://www.pon.harvard.edu/daily/dispute-resolution/what-are-the-three-basic-types-of-dispute-resolution-
what-to-know-about-mediation-arbitration-and-litigation/

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engaged in conversations with militants over the legitimacy of Jihad and Jihadi governance fostering
an interesting form of dialogue that does not really include any designated mediator.
In order to reflect the diversity of initiatives in central Mali, this report adopts a broad definition of
mediation and dialogue initiatives. It explores mediation projects aiming at alleviating intercommunal
tensions - which are largely seen legitimate forms of intervention - as well as mediation initiatives
targeting radical militants - a much more sensitive and disputed issue in Mali. This report also chose
to include informal forms of micro-mediation as well as more formalised and ambitious mediation
projects managed by international NGOs, UN agencies or government programs.
The report includes three main sections. Section one analyses the crisis in central Mali, giving an
overview of the main actors, the root causes of the conflicts and the different forms of violence. Section
two describes mediation actors and describes their main activities in central Mali. It distinguishes five
categories of mediation actors and/or initiatives: (1) informal/micro-level mediations (2) mediation
efforts by ethnic-based associations and politicians (3) professional mediators (international and
national mediation NGOs) (4) religious actors (5) government initiatives. Section three reflects on the
challenges, limitations but also opportunities of mediation work in central Mali. The report concludes
on an attempt to define a few options that the United Kingdom (UK) may consider supporting as
possible complementary mediation initiatives in central Mali.

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Outline

Section 1 - An Overview of the Situation in central Mali: Jihad, the War on Terror and Rising
Intercommunal Tensions
1.1 Jihadist insurgency
1.2 Growing inter-communal tensions
1.3 The malian state and its partners in central Mali: counter-terrorism… and beyond

Section 2 - Main Mediation Initiatives in central Mali (2016-2019)

2.1 ‘A society of permanent dialogue’: Informal/micro-level mediations
2.2. Linking the local and the national: the rolem of ethnic-based associations and ‘big men’
2.3 Professional mediators: International and national mediation NGOs
2.4 Religious actors
2.5 Government initiatives

Section 3 - Reflecting on Mediation Initiatives in central Mali: challenges and opportunities

3.1 A culture of dialogue turned into a business
3.2 A crowded field of intervention
3.3 Questionable added value? From mediation to action
3.4 Imbalanced mediation: the limitations of the terrorism framework

Conclusion - What niche for the United Kingdom?

***

Annex A: Database: main mediation initiatives in central Mali (initiators, donors, targeted
communities/communes, and delivery timelines)

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Section 1 - An overview of the situation in central Mali: jihad, the war on
terror and rising intercommunal tensions

Initially neglected, central Mali has become the new epicentre of the violence. Both the Malian state
and international actors have initially focused on addressing the crisis in northern Mali. Even after a
new jihadi group developed in 2015 and attacked several district in the centers, it took time before
international actors understood that they could not ignore anymore this region.2 While there are clear
links between armed groups in both northern and central regions - especially but not exclusively
between jihadi groups - understanding the singular dynamics that affect the central region is key for any
organization willing to develop specific mediation initiatives.
Central Mali does not have any fixed boundaries and actually covers different areas affected by different
logics of violence. It is important to differentiate between the rich and fertile inner Niger delta (often
refer as zones inondables) and its different surroundings (refers as zones exsondées) that include areas
(“terroirs”) such as Mema, Farimake, Seeno, Hayre, etc. Without entering into the same level of details
that have been previously presented (see previous report), the following section introduces, updates and
analyses the current situation in central Mali with a specific focus on (1) jihadist insurgency (2) counter-
terrorist operations and (3) the rise of intercommunal tensions.

1.1 Jihadist insurgency

The Katiba Macina (KM), initially nicknamed “Front de Liberation du Macina”, has developed since
2015 under the leadership of Hamadoun Diallo, aka Hamadoun Kouffa, a Fulani preacher. In a few
years, the group managed to take control over a large part of the rural countryside, mostly in the Inner
Delta region. KM has expelled state representatives form many rural areas especially the Youwarou
and Tenenkou districts although the Malian state has so far been able to maintain its presence in every
cercles.
Jihadists have been successful mostly because they have learned to manipulate at their own benefit local
grievances against the state and/or local tensions over access to natural resources (both inter- and intra-
community). For instance, they have initially facilitated access to pastoral resources for nomadic Fulani
groups coming from the zones exsondées and often in conflict with other (but more sedentary) Fulani
groups who claim historical rights over land access in the Inner Delta. Pre-existing tensions, especially
around access to land and natural resources, is an important factor that explains the development of
jihadist groups. Mediation initiatives dealing with the jihadist insurgency would have to integrate these
local dynamics of conflict, that often requires a deep understanding of micro-politics and micro-
economic of conflict.
Jihadists have overtly exploited popular resentment against the Malian state and its representatives.
There is indeed a long history of state abuses especially extortions against Fulani nomadic communities
in central Mali. Significant segments of the local population has lost confidence in the state, its justice
and its security forces. Here again, this is an important dynamic to keep in mind, as any form of local
mediation would also have to include initiatives to reconcile the State and its own citizens.

2
Minusma extended its mandate regarding the protection of civilians (PoC-) to Central Mali only in June 2018
with the adoption of UN Resolution 2423.

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Many in the Inner Delta have initially welcomed the jihadists because they succedeed in restoring forms
of justice and security that the state has been unable to provide for years. For instance, since 2015,
jihadist groups have been providing security to protect transhumance. Some sources claim that thanks
to their active fight against banditry, cattle stealing almost disappeared in regions like the border area
between Mauritania and Mali. Yet other sources also mention that these services do not come free of
charge. First, some pastoralists have started to complain that jihadists have imposed excessive religious
taxes (zakat) on cattle that sometime exceed “what the state took from us”. Second, jihadists have also
imposed their own version of the sharia rules moral, creating tensions over sensitive issues (closing
western schools, prohibiting festivities during wedding, etc.). Therefore, local resistance to jihadists’
presence have also developed. In reaction, KM has imposed blockade upon villages that reject sharia
rules or refuse to collaborate with jihadist groups. The most famous example is Kouakourou, a village
as well as an important market that was besieged by jihadists for months in 2017-2018.
Although they have forced the Malian administration to withdraw from many rural areas, it does not
seem that jihadists have developed any serious form of direct administration in the zones they control.
There is nothing like a formalised attempt to establish a real caliphate (so far at least). Instead, they
have developed forms of indirect rule/management of the villages under their influence, sending
emissaries to preach and communicate their version of the sharia to the local population. They also
identify sympathisers and actively recruit new militants who are subsequently trained in bush camps.
Understanding KM’s internal structure, a key feature for any mediation initiative, is a challenge. In
terms of hierarchy, Katiba Macina, has one well known leader, Hamadoun Kouffa, who himself
recognizes the authority of Iyad ag Ghaly, leader of the Jama'at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM)
officially. Kouffa has officially joined the JNIM when it was created in March 2017 but his connection
with Ag Ghaly goes back to the early 2010s when both men adhered to a local branch of the Tablighi
Jamaat.
A religious council (called the shura) assists Kouffa but the number and identity of its members is
uncertain and a matter of debate. Each military district under the control of KM is called a markaz
headed by a zone commander (many of whom appear to come from the nomadic Fulani groups). The
level of control and obedience is unclear. Some sources support the idea that some local commanders
have their own agenda and could defect if put under strong military pressure. Others sources are less
optimistic and believe that the jihadists’ hierarchy tightly controls markaz commanders, closing the
door to any form of local mediation with them.
Actually different dynamics have to be taken into consideration. The Inner Delta appears as Kouffa’s
stronghold, his authority over jihadists’ militants appears unquestioned (and even more since the failed
attempts to kill him by French forces in November 2018) and the KM appears very well organised and
coherent. In the zones exsondées where Kouffa appears less influential, the situation is somewhat
different. Other jihadist organizations (like ISGS or Ansaroul Islam) or other JNIM’s Katiba seem to
collaborate but also sometime to compete for the control of groups and territories. This is especially
true for the border area between Mali and Burkina Faso (namely the eastern part of Douentza cercle).
Here again the level of coherence of jihadist organizations in a specific area is an important element to
evaluate before launching any mediation initiative.

1.2 Growing inter-communal tensions

The rise in inter-communal violence adds to the complexity of the crisis in central Mali. For long, ethnic
groups have competed but also collaborated to access and exploit natural resources. More recently
tensions have taken precedence over collaboration and deteriorated into open inter-communal violence,
including localised episodes of large-scale violence such as in Ogossagou in March 2019 (resulting in

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over 160 deaths the vast majority of whom were Fulani civilians). Actually, inter-communal violence
is now taking a heavier toll on civilians than jihadist groups although both issues are intimately related.
Indeed, in central Mali, jihadists tend to predominantly – but not exclusively - recruit among Fulani.
Facilitated access to firearms for these militants in turn aggravates intercommunal tensions. For
instance, in Douentza in 2012, jihadists destroyed the Toguna, a traditional palaver house, along with
Dogon’s masks and other mystical objects. While similar destructions of ritual objects also affected the
Fulani, it was locally interpreted as a hostile act against the Dogon communities. Later, targeted killings
of Dogon figures such as Souleymane Guindo (killed in 2017), a respected and influential Dogon
hunter, further exacerbated local tensions. Similar acts of violence attributed to jihadists from the Fulani
communities pushed members of other ethnic groups, especially among Bambara and Dogon, to create
their own self-defence groups, predominantly the Dozos (hunters associations increasingly turned into
ethnic based armed groups).
Malian security forces did not oppose the rise of this so-called self-defence. They actually rely on them
for intelligence gathering and they started to use a few Dozos as informants and guides during
operations in rural areas. They did not object much when Dozos opened ‘bases’ sometime very close
to Malian forces’ barracks. When it appeared clear that Dozos were getting access to weapons of war
and becoming more autonomous, some military tried to resist their rise and to disarm them in vain.
After the massacre in Ogossagou, for which the Dozos were pointed as the main responsible, the
government officially disbanded the Hunters’ association but, on the ground, Malian security forces
proved unable and sometime unwilling to disarm and/or arrest those contravening the government’
decision.
As the next section demonstrates it, inter-communal violence further complicates any attempt to
establish viable forms of reconciliation dialogues in central Mali. It reflects an increased pressure on
natural resources in a wider context of demographic pressure, land degradation and climatic change. It
also reveals the weak capacity of state institutions to peacefully manage local conflicts over land and
natural resources. Last but not least, inter-communal tensions both contribute to trivializing violence
and lead an increasing number of young men, many of whom are probably school droppers, to live by
the gun.

1.3 The Malian state and its partners in central Mali: counter-terrorism… and beyond
On the paper, the Malian state has officially reacted to the fast deteriorating situation by designing and
starting to implement a comprehensive plan for stabilizing central Mali. The Plan de Securisation
Integree des Regions du Centre (PSIRC) was designed in 2017 and, in theory, includes three main
interdependent pillars (security, development and governance). In reality, Malian state’s initiatives in
the centre have been mostly driven by security considerations and military operations. The PSIRC itself
is coordinated by the ministry of Security and supported by the EU partly via the security-focused
PARSEC (Programme d’Appui au Renforcement de la Securite).
Malian authorities are well aware that they need to redeploy state presence in the centre but many
believe the state should force its way back using the military to defeat the jihadists. So far this has not
been a successful strategy. Since 2016, Malian authorities have announced several military surges and
large-scale operations against the jihadists. So far, they have failed to claim back territories although,
on 2018, they managed to redeploy security forces and civilian administration in some communes that
were abandoned in 2016-2017 like Dialloube.
Not only has the Malian military been unable to defeat the jihadists but it has taken a lot of hits including
recent major blows in Dioura (march 2019) and Guire (April 2019). Moreover, part of the local
population, especially among the Fulani, believes the military are part of the problem as much as an

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element of solution. Yet there has been less report of massive Human Rights abuses by Malian security
forces in the last few months compared to the previous years (and compared to the current situation in
Burkina Faso). It is premature to make any conclusion but this is an interesting trend that should be
monitored.
Compared to northern Mali, international forces are less present and active in the centre. French
operation Barkhane has recently reinforced its presence in the Gourma but officially it has no ongoing
operations and ground facilities in the Inner Delta. French sources claim that on late 2017, President
IBK told president Marcon that Malian forces would take care of the centre. Yet French forces have
organised punctual air strikes and/or Special Forces operations in the centre, including a failed attempt
to eliminate Hamadoun Kouffa on November 2018. Several sources mentioned that jihadists are getting
paranoid about spy infiltrations and this further complicates attempts to establish communication lines
with them.
Meanwhile the Minusma has recently reinforced its presence in central Mali as its latest mandate
extends the protection of civilians in this region. Yet unlike northern Mali, sources told that Minusma
struggles to define its role in the centre as it lacks a political framework similar to the inert-Malian
peace agreement that defines its role. Officially, the Minusma comes in support to Malian authorities
(as well as to the G5) but it struggles to define its role within the state-driven PSIRC. As for the G5
Sahel, the attack on its headquarter in Sevare forced the force to move its HQ far away from the frontline
in Bamako. In terms of concrete operations, the G5 contingents do not play a significant role in central
Mali. Joint missions at the border with Burkina Faso or Mauritanian forces have yet to prove any
sustainable impact on local security.
Beyond military, the Malian state and its international partners are trying to restore public services and
support the population with development projects (many through the G5 or the Alliance Sahel). Here
again, there is a huge gap between ambitious projects on paper and poor implementation on the ground.
Persistent high levels of insecurity prevent development organizations as well as state technical services
to safely return and work in many rural areas of central Mali. Some interlocutors, both among Malians
and internationals, argue that the security-development nexus would remain difficult to materialize
without any local forms of political dialogue intended to rebuild local trust in the Malian government
and to reconcile the populations, the insurgents and the state.

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Section 2 - Main mediation initiatives in central Mali (2016-2019)

This section analyses the different categories of mediation actors and the main mediation initiatives
developed in central Mali since the crisis deteriorated in 2015-2016. Although it is impossible to be
exhaustive (especially when it comes to micro-level and informal forms of mediation), this report
classifies mediation actors/initiatives in four broad categories: (1) informal/micro-level mediations (2)
ethnic-based associations and politicians (“big men”) serving as intermediaries (3) local and
international NGOs specialised in mediation (including support by UN agencies and/or MINUSMA)
(4) government initiatives.

2.1 A society of permanent dialogue: informal/micro-level mediations

Jihadists are often depicted as mere terrorists or pitiless barbarians. This simplistic view obscures the
daily interactions between jihadist groups and local populations. If jihadist groups prove violent against
some communities that resist their rule including through targeted killing of leaders or suspected spies,
they also engage in informal dialogues with other communities in areas under their influence. For
instance, sources from the Inner Delta said that local chiefs and/or clan elders discuss local issues
regarding the management of pastoral lands with jihadists groups. This includes attempts to
accommodate local traditions – like traditional rights on pastural land – with jihadists understanding of
shariah laws on the same issue. Surprisingly it appears that some markaz leaders are rather pragmatic.
They are open to accommodating local demands when it supports their interest and facilitate for instance
recruitment or increase popular support.
These forms of dialogue between civilians and jihadist militants are too informal and localised to be
included in a database on mediation attempts. They are also rather limited in their ambition: most of
these conversations aim at working out pragmatic ways for both militant groups and civilians to coexist
on a daily basis. Yet they should not be neglected for at least two reasons. First they indicate that militant
groups are engaged in some forms of dialogue whatever limited forms it takes. Second there could be
an interest for more structured and politically motivated mediation initiatives to identify these local
informal mediators as they can facilitate contacts with interesting segments of the jihadist insurgency.
A last point to consider when dealing with micro-level mediation in central Mali is the role played by
jihadist groups themselves. As surprising as it may sound, jihadist militants do mediate in local conflicts
in the area under their influence. In Douentza for instance, they settled a dispute between two muslim
groups, one malekite and another wahhabite, who got in a fight for the control of a mosque. In Mondoro
(Douentza cercle), they fixed rules of access to a well for which local Dogon and Fulani communities
were violently competing. In many cases, jihadists mediate local conflict by bringing in a qadi (islamic
judge) who makes an immediate judgement and take no money for rendering justice. Once again this
is not to say that jihadist groups are popular everywhere in central Mali – far from that -, but they do
deliver forms of justice, that is both immediate and free of charge, a crucial advantage over the Malian
administration.

2.2 Linking the local and the national: the role of ethnic-based associations and ‘big men’
There are numerous civil society organisations (CSO) active in Mali. A significant part of them is
organised on an ethic basis like Tabital Pulaku, an organization created in the 1990s representing Fulani
communities, and Ginna Dogon, an association that claims to represent Dogon communities. While

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such ethnic-based, CSOs often claim that their main aim is to promote culture and traditions, but they
also have political agendas. The educated elite that controls these associations, many of whom are
urbanised civil servants, former military officers and/or politicians, often claim to bridge the gap
between local communities and the state.
At the beginning of the crisis in 2012, communities affected by violence like the nomadic Fulani in
central Mali who have little contact in the capital, asked these associations to mediate with the state.
They were hoping that associations like Tabital Pulaku could use their connections in Bamako to
establish some form of dialogue with the government as well as with security forces. Indeed since 2013
nomadic Fulani have been suffering from repeated violence and abusive arrests by Malian security
forces. Key members of Tabital Pulaku managed for instance to provide assistance to Fulani suspects
arrested in central Mali and later transferred to the Camp 1 in Bamako.
Conversely, as violence developed in the Mopti region, international actors like Minusma, the EU and
other western partners reached out to associations like Tabital Pulaku to understand the situation and
improve their interventions. As most western partners had little contact in the Mopti region and a very
limited understanding of what was going on, they hoped they could rely on these associations based in
Bamako but enjoying a strong network in central Mali. Soon after the attack against Tenenkou and
Youwarou on early 2015, the Minusma convened the first meetings in Bamako to deal with the
deteriorating situation in central Mali. Prominent Tabital Pulaku’s figures along with local
representatives and MPs from the Mopti region played a key role in this first international attempt to
lower the tensions in central Mali. Later on, other non-Fulani organizations like Ginna Dogon were
associated to these discussions, especially when it became clear after 2016-2017 that troubles were
extending to the so-called ‘Pays Dogon’ and that intercommunal violence was a serious risk.
Yet while the situation in central Mali has continued to deteriorate, the influence of these Bamako-
based associations has also seriously eroded. First, the aging elite controlling ethnic associations like
Ginna Dogon and Tabital Pulaku has been increasingly accused of being more interested in
accumulating wealth, power and privilege than in genuinely defending the communities they are coming
from. Second, internal competition led to the creation of new associations based on ethnicity. For
instance, the quasi monopole that Tabital Pulaku has long enjoyed over the representation of Fulani
culture and communities have been progressively disputed by a rising number of associations like Kisal,
Dawral Pulaku, Dental Pulaku, etc. The same process is also ongoing among the Dogon communities.
Local associations, that claim to be closer from local communities, feel they are being sidelined by
Ginna Dogon and are trying to take back initiative. For instance, l’association pour le développement
du Séno-Bankass, one of the local development associations created a few years ago when the state
requested communes to elaborate their own development plan, has organised mediation meeting
between communities a week after the massacre in Koulogon (1 January). Some of these associations
are eager to express more authentic, local, younger or simply different voices. Yet others appear as
instruments in the hands of big men or local politicians willing to compete for the control of resources
associated to the Mediation business.
Yet Malian authorities seem willing to associate these ethnic based associations to discussions on ways
to mitigate the crisis in Central Mali. On the one hand, Malian authorities seem to understand that these
associations can become powerful allies in order for the state to regain its legitimacy and rebuild its
presence in the Mopti region. On the other hand, authorities are also suspicious of the autonomy theses
associations enjoy and their freedom of speech can become a concern. For instance, an association like
Kisal has been extremely active in denouncing abuses by security forces. Moreover, these associations
develop mediation projects without associating government officials, which can in turn create some
tensions. For instance, in April 2018, young Malians from central Mali organised in Bamako a mixed
commission to establish forms of dialogue between Tabital Pulaku’s youth and Ginna Dogon’s youth.
At first, meetings were self-funded but government officials form the Prime Minister’s cabinet quickly

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offered to fund the initiative. According to a source sitting in the mixed commission, the government
was afraid that this initiative would exclude any official. Funding the initiative was a way for the PM’s
cabinet not only to keep an eye on the initiative but also possibly to influence its future actions.
Besides associations, influential politicians from the Mopti region are also trying to facilitate and even
sometime initiate mediation activities especially when inter-communal tensions threaten their
constituencies. Members of the Parliament from the Mopti region have also taken multiple initiatives
to mediate between communities, trying to bridge the gap between local communities and the state in
Bamako. This is a role they have been playing for years but which is complicated by increasing
insecurity. Some armed groups, especially among the jihadists, threaten them for their proximity with
state institutions. In October 2017, the convoy of a local MP, Abdourahmane Niang – also president of
the Justice High Court - was ambushed while he was visiting his constituency between Dia and
Diafarabé (six persons were killed and the MP was wounded). While intercommunal tensions are on
the rise especially in the Koro and Bankass cercles, MPs who are still traveling in these districts
complain they only visit the communities there are coming from as others consider them with hostility
and suspicion. Fulani MPs also deplore that while traveling to maintain the link with their
constituencies, security forces tend to accuse them of maintaining links with jihadist groups.
Other local politicians, especially mayors, are trying to mediate in intercommunal conflicts. Soon after
the massacre in Ogossagou (march 2019), two Dogon mayors from the Bandiagara district started to
organize meetings between local representatives to find ways to avoid further massacres. They
attempted to establish links with Dozos militias to prevent further violence and also pressed central
authorities to increase their presence and restore security. The mayors insist their initiative is local and
meetings are organised without external support. Yet, in their own words, the two mayors recognize
that they were only able to gather Dogon representatives. While Fulani were invited to attend meetings,
they declined to join and support the initiative. This example illustrates both the potential and the
limitation of local mediation initiatives in a context of rising inter-ethnic violence.

2.3 Professional mediators: international and national mediation NGOs

International NGOs specializing in mediation have developed activities in central Mali. Some have
developed their activities in support to existing local initiatives, trying to assist them with resources and
providing specific training. Other are more directly engaged in facilitating or organizing mediation
events.
The most active and most visible mediation NGO in central Mali is the Center for the Humanitarian
Dialogue (HD). They initially started their activities during the 2012 crisis with a specific focus on
northern communities. Around 2014-2015, they also developed a specific program targeting pastoral
communities at the tri-border area (Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger) to facilitate communications and
prevent banditry over cattle. This later facilitates their work with nomadic Fulani communities in central
Mali starting in 2015-2018. On early 2018, prime minister Soumeilou Boubeye Maiga officially gave
HD an official mandate to mediate between local communities in central Mali. This mediation work
was seen as complementary to the government plan to restore order and security in the region (based
on the PSICR). Yet the PM explicitly excluded the possibility for HD to mediate between actors that
would include jihadists insurgents.
HD’s mediation work became highly visible when they played a key role in facilitating the signing of
a cease fire in central Mali on early July 2018 after months of negotiations with state officials and local
actors from the Dan nan Ambassagou, an armed group mostly recruiting among Dogon communities in
the districts of Koro, Douentza Bankass and Bandiagara. Less than two months later, HD facilitating
the signing of another agreement: this second document was more ambitious and signed by more than
30 villages chiefs and notables this time from both the Fulani and Dogon Communities. Yet the Dan na

10
Ambassagou’s military chief of staff, Youssouf Toloba, rejected this agreement a few days only after
his signing. In opposition to Dan na Ambassagou’s main political representative (David Tembiné),
Toloba criticized the agreement for not involving armed actors in charge of protecting local Dogon
communities against so called “terrorists”.
On late September, HD finally managed to get Youssouf Toloba sign a unilateral ceasefire. Yet it only
took a a few days for Dan na Ambassagou’s leadership to split again as one influential military leader
announced that he would not respect the ceasefire any longer. HD’s difficulty to bring the most
influential Fulani armed leaders to the negotiation table partly explains the weakness of this mediation
process: agreements are signed either unilaterally (by Dogon representatives) or by both Fulani and
Dogon community leaders but involve weak Fulani actors who lack legitimacy to influence their own
community. The most influential leaders are too close to jihadists organization to be involved in an
official process. The government still refuses any initiative publicly engaging groups considered as too
close to transnational terrorist networks.
Beside this visible yet controversial action, HD has engaged in multiple and less visible local mediation
work. For instance, they have facilitated talks between communities in the village of Koula (Tominian
cercle) allowing Fulani herders to safely return the area after they were chased away by Bobo farmers.
In Sofara, in November 2018, they were able to quickly intervene to calm down local tensions after
suspected Fulani jihadists stole cattle from Bambara communities. They managed to prevent retaliation
and convinced Fulani communities to return (or compensate for) the stolen cattle. Key to HD
intervention is their local network that allows the organization to get quick information on incidents
that threaten local stability and to intervene through local intermediaries who already know the work of
the iNGO.
In Kouakourou, a village under jihadist siege for over a year in 2018, HD has initiated mediation
activities between Bozo (mostly fishermen) and Fulani (mostly herders) communities. HD initially
delocalized the first meetings in Mopti for security reasons, then was able to organize an important
meeting in Kouakourou while the siege was still going on. After months of talks, they succeeded in
negotiating the partial re-opening of Kouakourou to local population while Fulani communities from
the surrounding were authorized to access again the market and the health center. While they failed to
negotiate the end of the blockade, this example illustrates that HD is able to talk to people very close to
if not members of local jihadist groups.
HD also organizes preventive mediation in areas where they believe intercommunal violence could
quickly spiral. For instance, they facilitate talks between hunters, herders and farmers in the Djenne
cercle to prevent conflict around access to natural resources to develop. Like other preventive
intervention, it is hard to evaluate the success of these initiatives. Yet HD claims that there has been no
significant attack against Fulani herders in the part of the Djenne cercle where they have developed
their action (it was not possible to crosscheck this information).
Promediation is another significant mediation NGO active in Mali. The NGOs, whose leadership left
HD in 2014, started its activities in Mali with the support of Norway. At first, they focused on supporting
the inter-Malian peace process, including activities with signatory armed groups. Like other NGOs,
Promediation developed activities in central Mali after the situation deteriorated in the Mopti region in
2015. Promediation team seems to focus its activities on the border area between Mali and Burkina
Faso, and more particularly the Douentza cercle. To a certain extent, Promediation activities in
Mondoro may appear complementary to HD’s activities which focus on other communes (see above).
Like HD, they work on inter-communal mediation, with a strong focus on Dogon and Fulani
communities. They do not work directly with the main ethnic based SCO established in Bamako like
Tabital Pulaku or Ginna Dogon. They bypass these associations by establishing direct connections with
local leaders in the Douentza district (more specifically the Mondoro commune). According to

11
Promediation local leaders are themselves eager to emancipate from SCO established in the capital.
They do not officially include local jihadists group active in this border area (especially Ansaroul Islam)
in their mediation effort but they have developed a network that allow to communicate with them or at
least to circulate messages.
Yet in Bamako and in Mopti, Promediation also works closely with Kisal, a recently created CSO that
claims to mostly represent the Fulani youth. They support Kisal activities in trying to prevent extension
of violence in central Mali. Their objective is less to start direct mediation between local communities
than to foster, through local dialogue, better conditions for a redeployment of state services, including
security. This approach actually risks creating some tensions with HD that has developed a different
approach in the same area (except for the Mondoro area, both organizations are likely to extend
competing activities in the same areas of central Mali). Some observers wonder how differences in
approach (and actually rivalry between the two NGOs) can interfere and actually weaken specific
mediation activities. For instance, in September 2018, a key member of Kisal, that is supported by
Promediation, publicly criticized the signing of a local peace agreement in which HD has played a
pivotal role in August 2018. He particularly argued that mediation NGO cannot substitute for any
governmental strategy aimed at reconciliating local communities (“L’État ne peut pas déléguer”).
Beyond Promediation and HD whose activities fully focus on mediation activities, several other
organizations have developped initiatives in central Mali that at least partly include some mediation
work. One of the most important one is Search for Common Ground. In central Mali, their main strategy
is to include more young people and women “to take the lead in finding solutions to their collective
problems”.3 Although they seem less directly involved in promoting inter-communal dialogue, they
have developed specific activities aimed at mediating between Malian security forces and local
communities. This is indeed an issue that other NGOs, like Human Right Watch, have identified as a
key factor in explaining the rise of violent extremism in central Mali.
The Danish Demining Group (DDG) is one of the first NGOs to have developed activities in central
Mali as early as 2014. DDG focuses on the management of border areas in 6 trans-border areas in three
countries (Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso). In central Mali, DDG focuses on two border communities
(Bih and Kiri) in the Koro district with a base in the town of Koro. DDG does not only focus on
mediation but include mediation initiatives in a set of tools intended to promoter better and peaceful
management of border areas in the Sahel. In terms of mediation, DDG has developed two important
tools. First it supports local peace resolution mechanisms, including through training in mediation
(partly provided for by the Canadian Institute for Conflict resolution) as well as the development or
strengthening of information sharing mechanisms between communities across borders. Second, DDG
organises a number of local meetings intended to promote better mutual understanding between security
forces and local communities. Yet the rise of insecurity in border areas in both central Mali and in
northern Burkina Faso, complicates access to the field and follow up to assess the impact of activities,
including mediation.
Other NGOs involved in mediation activities include Think Peace (which organise inter-communal
meetings, including between security forces and local population, in 14 communes in the region of
Mopti and 10 in the region of Segou), Delta Survie (a Malian NGO based in Mopti-Sévaré which mostly
works on access to public services among nomads but that also received the Tamani D'Or Prize for
Peace in 2014 for its local mediation work).
It is also worth mentioning the role of the Minusma in mediation activities in central Mali. Indeed, it’s
mandate has changed in June 2018 to include more activities in support of protection of civilians in
central Mali. Beyond increased military and police presence in the Mopti region, the Minusma has also
developed some mediation activities in support of inter-communal reconciliation. First, and accordingly

3
https://www.sfcg.org/mali/

12
to their mandate, the Minusma and other UN agencies like Unesco support government-led mediation
efforts in central Mali (for details see following sections). The Minusma has also developed its own
mechanism at a local level. While the Minusma Mediation unit mostly focus on facilitating the
implementation of the Algiers peace agreement – that hardly deals with central Mali - another section
of the UN Mission, the Civil Affairs’ section, is active in promoting forms of dialogue at a sub-national,
local level. In the region of Mopti, the section actually works with a group of implementing partners
(Imadel, Search for common grounds, International Alert, Secours Islamique) to promote “micro-
dialogue” aimed at preventing local conflict. The impact of these micro-dialogues is extremely hard to
assess in the scope of this study, but these initiatives are clearly less visible than initiatives developed
by specialised mediation NGOs like Promediation and HD.
Another Minusma section, the Stabilization & Recovery Section (SRS), has also invested in mediation
initiatives although its main mandate is to help the restoration of state authority. With the financial
support of the UN peace building fund, SRS promotes the participation of women and the youth to local
inter-communal dialogue. In 2018-2019, Minusma’ SRS pIans on supporting such local dialogue in 25
communes in the regions of Mopti and Segou,
Following a worrying rise in intercommunal violence in the last months of 2018, The Minusma regional
office in Sévaré has also developed its own mediation & reconciliation process with a focus on the Koro
district, where inter-communal tensions between Dogon and Fulani appear particularly concerning. The
Minusma office in Sévaré is funding the Joint Justice and Reconciliation Pilote Project, that organises
inter-communal dialogue in three remote villages of the Koro District (Am, Yourou and Dangaténé).
The project started in 2018 but has increased activities after the Koulogon and Ogossagou massacres
on early 2019. The UN mission is providing support to local mediation actors, namely griots (local
bards) and blacksmith, who according to local traditions have the social capacity and expertise in
fostering local dialogue. Yet this mediation initiative is also the only one that works under the protection
of a military force. Indeed, each meeting organised under this pilot project requires the presence of
dozens of blue helmets based in Sévaré. Some sources expressed scepticism regarding the relevance
and sustainability of mediation initiatives that need the constant support of an armed force.

2.4 Religious Actors

Religious actors were probably the most difficult group to approach. Yet their role in mediation seems
very important. This report keeps this form of mediation distinct from local/micro level mediations
because actors engaged in forms of dialogues are not necessarily local actors. As matter of fact, some
who engaged in religious dialogue with violent actors in central Mali live sometime far away from the
Mopti.4
In central Mali, religious forms of mediation focused on the issue of armed jihad’s legitimacy. Indeed,
many scholars, including both sufi and salafi preachers, dispute the legitimacy of jihadist groups and
the version of Islam they seek to spread in the Mopti region. Religious disputes represent an ancient
classic form of discussion in Islam but Whatsapp-like application have provided these religious disputes
an incredibly large audience. Messages are shared through Whatsapp groups and messages in Arabic
and/or in Fulfude (and even in Bambara and Dogon).
In one recent documented case, religious scholars engaged in a dispute with Hamadoun Koufa regarding
the execution of civilians in a remote village by Katiba Macina (in April-May 2019). Civilians, from
the Fulani community, have apparently been executed after requesting protection from armed Dozos
from the Dogon community. Two local scholars (one Dogon and one Fulani) recorded the same message

4
A contact mentioned a Malian religious scholar living in Cairo and engaged in heated dialogue with the katiba
Macina’s leadership through whatsapp messages.

13
in three local languages (Bambara, Dogon and Fulfulbe) to challenge Koufa’s decision and refute his
vision of Islamic justice. Kouffa responded to these messages trying to explain his decision and inviting
scholars to come and discuss directly with him.
This form of “disputatio” remains partly problematic because of its informality and its decentralized
character. Understanding the potential of these religious scholars, some mediation organizations like
HD and attempted to formally organize them in the Mopti region (through the creation of a network of
religious scholars from different obedience). The success of this initiative remains unclear up to now.
It seems that HD has shifted the focus of its activities toward inter-communal dialogue (see above).
More recently (March 2019), some religious scholars have attempted to formalize their mediation
initiatives through the creation of the Association des Prédicateurs pour l’Unité et la Paix sociale
(Preachers’ association for Unity and Social Peace). It is too soon to evaluate the impact of such an
attempt by Muslim scholars to organize their own role in promoting peace and dialogue in central Mali.
Although very different from formalised forms of negotiation, this form of religious disputatio should
not be dismissed by mediation initiatives. As a matter of fact, the next section describes how the Malian
government attempted to use a small group of influential Muslim scholars to foster forms of dialogue
with jihadist groups.

2.5 Government Initiatives

The Malian government has also developed initiatives aimed at fostering mediation and reconciliation
processes. The most important initiative was the creation of a Ministry of National Reconciliation as
soon as 2013. The creation of this Ministry reflects, at least partially, an attempt from Malian authorities
to channel non-state initiatives and resources related to mediation and put them under some form of
bureaucratic control. From that point of view, the success of the Ministry is mixed. Many partners
cooperate with the Ministry, from sharing information about activities to funding state sponsored
regional mediation team (see below), but many initiatives toward mediation and dialogue also stand
largely beyond the control of the Malian administration.
Since its beginnings, and even more after the signing of the inter-Malian peace agreement in 2015, the
Ministry of National Reconciliation has focused most of its activities and projects in the North. Three
prominent figures who ran the Ministry of National Reconciliation were ethnic Arab or Tuareg from
Northern Mali (Zahabi ould Sidi Mohamed, Mohamed el Moktar and Mohamed ag Erlaf). The current
Minister is a southerner but he previously served as General Secretary at the Comité national de
Coordination de la mise en œuvre de l’Accord pour la paix et la reconciliation.
Yet as the situation deteriorates in central Mali and intercommunal violence is on the rise, the Ministry
of National reconciliation also develops initiatives in the centre. Since 2017, the Minister has created
a Mission d’appui à la réconciliation nationale that includes regional reconciliation teams locally
known as Equipes régionales d’appui à la reconciliation (ERAR). These ERAR associate local
religious figures and traditional chiefs. The Ministry has extended reconciliation mechanism to the
regions of Mopti and Segou, partly thanks to the support of Unesco’s funding. Each ERAR supports
local reconciliation committees (Comités municipaux de réconciliation). The first local committees
have been created in December 2018 in central Mali. They stand as efforts to use and support local
mechanisms to deal with local issues. A good idea on the paper, it remains to be seen how these
committees can work in a highly deteriorated security environment.
Apart from the Ministry of National reconciliation, Malian prime ministers have also developed specific
mechanisms to promote mediation work and reconciliation in central Mali. These initiatives are more
political in nature and more autonomous from international donors (although they do not necessarily
exclude foreign partners). Prime minister Abdoulaye Idrisssa Maiga appointed on 10 April 2017, took
the first initiative soon after the Conference d’Entente Nationale, held in Bamako from 27 March to 2

14
April 2017. Indeed, the conference officially recommended to promote dialogue between the Malian
government and Malian jihadists leaders, including Iyad ag Ghali and Hamadoun kouffa while
preserving the secular nature of the Malian state. A.I. Maiga created a Missions des bons offices and
appointed Imam Mahmood Dicko, head of the High Islamic Council, as its lead coordinator.
The Mission des bons offices was in charge of establishing dialogue lines with non-signatory armed
groups. In the second half of 2017, Dicko organised several well attended forums in Bamako, Ségou,
Sévaré and Kidal using a network of muslim scholars to establish forms of dialogue including with
sympathisers if not member s of jihadists groups. Yet dialogue with these groups remain a highly
controversial issue both within the Malian secular elite and Mali’s key western partner. When
Soumeilou Boubeye Maiga (SBM) was appointed prime minister on 31 December 2017, he quickly put
an end to the Mission des bons offices. In a public statement on early 2018, president IBK also stated
that he personally never believed that establishing dialogue with jihadists through the Mission des bons
offices was a good idea. Sources also say that western partners, including France, may have put pressure
on president IBK to contain Imam Dicko’s growing political influence through his role on inter-Malian
dialogue.
In 2018, prime minister SBM developed a very different approach to mediation and dialogue in central
Mali. He did not support – at least not in an official way – any attempt to establish formal dialogue
with Jihadists groups. Yet he supported the idea of mediation between communities in central Mali.
He officially gave a mandate to the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue to promote such intercommunal
dialogue although excluding jihadists groups for these initiatives. As previously analysed, these efforts
at promoting intercommunal dialogue without the jihadists have so far not yielded very convincing
results.

15
Section 3 - Reflecting on mediation initiatives in central Mali: challenges and
opportunities

3.1 A culture of dialogue turned into a business

Although it is hard to evaluate the cumulated budget that foreign partners invest in mediation, it
represents a huge amount of coveted resources for local communities at the centre of many mediation
initiatives. For instance, the UNPF invests 1,4 billion Francs CFA (about 220,000€.) in support to
Minusma’s SRS mediation effort in central Mali alone. Although it appears a modest contribution when
compared to other aid budget like food aid, this represents a substantial amount of resources for the
communities that are targeted by this project in central Mali.
Some fear that traditional institutions that have long fostered a culture of peace and mediation in Mali,
are now being perverted by external funding. As one interlocutor from northern Mali said: “Inter-
communal forums are becoming a business in Mali. Nobody cares about what comes out the meeting,
what matters is the per diem you get”. While important local figures such as blacksmiths and griots,
used to play a role of mediation as a part of their social duties, they are now increasingly tempted to see
mediation as a lucrative business.
Increasing funding for mediation in war-torn central Mali not only generates competition between local
actors, it also fuels rivalry between NGOs and bigger actors, all eager to capture these resources for
good reason (getting money for starting a project) and sometimes less so (personal enrichment,
diversion of aid). To a certain extent, the Malian Ministry of national reconciliation is also an attempt
– not at all illegitimate - to channel mediation resources toward the government’s budget. Some
estimates that this competition for resources aggravates the lack of coordination between mediation
actors and result in a rising number of duplicated activities in central Mali (two or more mediation
actors involved in the same district).
Other believe that such competition for resources is a real issue but is nothing specific to mediation. All
the aid industry suffers from it. Yet as it is much harder to monitor the impact of mediation activities -
how to evaluate the impact of a meeting? -, this complicates accountability and conversely facilitates
diversion of resources.

3.2 A crowded field of intervention …. for unclear agendas

In their recent report on the situation in Mali, the independent observer, the Carter Center, deplored that
the implementation of the peace agreement’s article 46 on National Reconciliation is not only extremely
slow, but also suffers from a problematic lack of coordination (“les multiples efforts de réconciliation
sont souvent dispersés”). Indeed, mediation actors are extremely diverse (from local traditional
mechanisms to specialised INGOs to government led structures like ERAR). As suggested in the
previous section, their intervention sometime overlaps: several INGOs working in the same district.
Very similar workshops or training are being provided to the same population.
If anything, mediation suffers from an excessive number of actors rather than a lack of them. For
instance, in the district of Douentza, multiple mechanisms and iNGOs have been activated since 2016:
International Alert, Promediation, HD and the government supported ERAR. By contrast, some districts
or communes of central Mali like Nampala in the Niono district (Segou region) surprisingly receive
very little support for mediation. It is hard to explain why mediation actors, especially local and
international NGOs, tend to focus on the same districts and neglect others. Because it is their raison
d’être but also because it facilitates donors’ support, INGOs probably tend to focus on areas that appear

16
as the most vulnerable or already suffer from widespread violence: needs are real in these areas but
specialised NGOs risk duplicating each other’s activities. Some iNGOs like HD have nonetheless
developed preventive mediation activities in districts that are perceived at risk of falling into
intercommunal violence.
The lack of coordination also raises the issue of State’s control over mediation initiatives. Despite the
creation of a Ministry of National Reconciliation back in 2013, the Malian government appears to have
little control over many mediation initiatives. Mediation NGOs do not work outside any form of control
(especially at the local level where they have to inform governors and security forces about their
movement). They also officially register their activities in Mali but the government appears to have
little control over NGOs initiatives. A few organizations like HD work more closely with the
government in central Mali (at least under PM Maiga) but most design their own action plan without
really consulting with Malian authorities or other partners but their donors. This becomes even more
problematic as mediation actors’ agenda remain unclear to many Malians (including government
officials) which in turn fuel some suspicion. For instance, some NGOs are suspected to serve the interest
of foreign countries in Mali, including through sharing information about jihadist groups or by using
dialogue as a way to legitimate some armed actors while weakening or excluding others.

3.3 Questionable added value? From mediation to action

Although mediation appears as a “crowded field of intervention”, some specialists as well as some
donors interviewed in Bamako are doubtful of its added value. They argue that it is extremely hard to
evaluate the impact of such intervention. One significant western donor stated: “Would the situation in
central Mali be worse without all these mediation initiatives? We don’t know but we prefer to focus on
concrete assistance: education, water and sanitation, health….”. When asked about accountability and
impact, some mediation NGOs stress the number of meetings and even sometime the number of
attendees as proof of their impact. Yet they admit that it is extremely difficult if not invain to make any
link between the number of workshops and training on mediation and local levels of violence.
A better way for mediation actors to evaluate their impact is to use the concrete outcome of their
activities. For instance, HD evaluates its impact on the situation in central by stressing the different
local agreements and ceasefires the organisation has facilitated. Yet even this form of impact can be
questionable: the previous section has demonstrated that agreements are not necessarily respected
and/or that there some discrepancy between signatories and militants/combatants.
Interestingly, some mediation actors argue that the main issue is not the limitations of mediation
activities per se, it is the lack of follow-up, especially by the Malian administration. For instance,
agreement signed between different communities often formulate a number of recommendations to
make sure reconciliation would be sustainable. These recommendations often call for the state and/or
sometime the Minusma to redeploy and improve their presence on the field: for instance, they ask for
more security forces that incorporate members of local communities to improve the relationship
between the population and the Malian armed forces; they also ask for speeding up the DDR process in
central Mali so to quickly disarm the various armed groups. As a Mayor from the Koro district said
“Les recommandations sont pertinentes mais elles ne sont pas mises en place/ recommandations are
relevant but they are not implemented ».
Mediation efforts have undeniably a potential for appeasing local tensions. Yet their impact would
remain limited and short-term as long as they are not connected to a broader action plan that effectively
deals with the root causes of the violence. For instance, mediation effort can ease tensions between
communities when they compete for access to pasture land in central Mali, a major cause for
intercommunal violence. Yet, this impact would remain fragile as long as the Malian administration
would not seriously reform and implement the pastoral code and better protect pastoralist communities.

17
Mediation workshops can also temporarily ease tensions between local communities and Malian armed
forces. Yet as long as Malian military forces are improperly use to maintain law and order, as long as
Malian security forces do not recruit among locals from all communities, the relationship between local
communities and their armed forces are very likely to remain extremely problematic and conflictual.
To this extend, the main issue is not that mediation work in central Mali does not work well enough and
should be improved, it is that too much is expected from it.

3.4 Imbalanced mediation: the limitations of the terrorism framework

While mediation initiatives aimed at alleviating inter-communal tensions flourish in central Mali, there
are much less initiatives that include dialogue with radical groups, especially the Katiba Macina. For
instance, organizations like HD have been officially engaging with armed groups such as Dan nan
Ambassagou, but they have not been allowed to engage similarly with jihadist militants. This weakens
any attempt at establishing ceasefire attempt and promote reconciliation between communities.
The reluctance to engage jihadist militants is particularly problematic when it comes to engaging
influential representatives of Fulani communities from central Mali. Indeed, these communities have
developed ties with jihadist groups more than any other local communities, although it should be
stressed that this relationship is not exempt of many tensions and generate violence (including threats
against and executions of influential Fulani leaders hostile to the Katiba Macina). The narrative that
associates Jihadi insurgents to terrorism is not only inappropriate to understand the crisis in central
Mali5, it also seriously limits options for dialogue. Even after the national Conference of Understanding
(Conférence d’Entente Nationale), recommended in mid-2017 dialogue with Malian Jihadists, both the
Malian state and its key western partners have so far remained extremely reluctant to politically engage
jihadist insurgents.
Yet recent developments indicate that resistance to dialogue with jihadist may soften. For instance, the
new government formed in May 2019 includes a Minister of Foreign Affairs (Tiebile Drame) who
publicly recommended such dialogue with Malian jihadists. A recent Crisis Group’s report (May 2019)
has also documented that resistance to dialogue are coming from all sides but that there is room for
opening channels of communications, especially through religious leaders. It remains to be seen if
growing calls for more inclusive dialogue and mediation would change this situation. Once again, most
analysts stress that resistance to dialogue between government and jihadist groups come from both
sides. As jihadist groups expand, they may have even less reason to engage in such talks.

5
Some Jihadists from central Mali do indeed engage in terrorist actions, but most of them are more adequately
described a insurgents or militants rather than terrorists.

18
Conclusion - what niche for the United Kingdom?
Mediation is an active business in Mali and in the central region of the country more particularly. As
described above, it represents a crowded field of interventions characterized by lack of coordination
between implementing partners and, as a consequence, serious risks of duplicated activities.
Problematic accountability is also a major issue: assessing impact on the ground remains challenging
for security reasons but also because of the nature of mediation intervention itself.
The most efficient mediation actors already seem well funded although they always seem in need to
secure more funding to sustain their activities. Conversely donors are hesitant to invest in government
structures, especially those connected to the Ministry of National Reconciliation. On the hand, these
bureaucratic machines clearly lack flexibility. Their impact on the field is questionable: it is unclear
how far they really venture outside the air-conditioned offices in Bamako. On the other hand, bypassing
the state in mediation activity is a mistake: there is no sustainable solution to the protracted crisis in
central Mali without involving the Malian state.
In recent months, while the situation kept deteriorating, Mali’s partners have also been looking for
supporting alternate or complementary forms of mediation. Involving religious scholars in inter-
communal dialogue as well as in forms of engagement with radical groups is probably one of the most
currently discussed options. While religious scholars’ involvement in dialogue seems promising, this
report calls western donors to adopt a cautious approach. Supporting islamic scholars remain a sensitive
issue that can backfire with consequences not only on donors but also on religious mediators
themselves. Western support to a selected pool of religious leaders is likely to be seen as a suspicious
intrusion on the religious domain, an attempt by western partners to promote forms of Islam they believe
are more compatible with their own views and agendas. In this context, western support to religious
forms of mediation can actually endanger rather than empower those among religious figures who
received this support.
In this sensitive context, it is hard for any donor to identify interesting and innovative opportunities and
carve out its niche of activities. However, there are a few options that the UK may consider supporting
as possible complementary mediation initiatives.

1. A first option is to invest the remaining gaps in the coverage of local mediation initiatives in
central Mali. Two or three areas would probably gain from receiving more support:

1/ According to the present survey, the border area with Mauritania, especially the area going
from Nara, Diabaly, Nampala and (up to) Léré, is underserved because of access issues but also
because the tri-border area (Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger) is seen as a bigger priority. Any
mediation project in this border area would probably have to develop activities in
Bassikounou’s refugee camps in Mauritania. Therefore, NGOs with experience working across
borders like HD and DDG are probably better positioned for this kind of project.

2 / The southern part of the region of Segou - and probably the region of Koulikoro recently
affected by attacks against police stations - could also benefit from mediation activities in a
preventive approach. Preventive mediation work, for instance between Bambara and Fulani
communities in the region of Segou, could reduce opportunities for jihadist groups to
instrumentalize local tensions to expand geographically.

19
 3/ Along the same lines, recent attacks in south-western Burkina Faso, suggest it could be useful
to explore possibilities for supporting preventive mediation efforts in the region of Sikasso, and
more specifically at the border with Burkina Faso and Ivory Coast where a local jihadist group
(nicknamed ‘Ansar Eddine sud’ was dismantled by Malian security forces only a few years ago.

2. A second and complementary option would be for the UK to lobby for the creation of a
coordination structure (with representation at both national and regional levels) that would
gather mediation actors on a regular basis. The purpose of such structure would be to share
experiences and general information about on-going mediation initiatives, avoid duplication of
activities, and possibly give more coherence to interventions. Such a coordination body should
include government officials (possibly including security agencies) but should not be
subordinated to any particular ministry. In parallel to this coordination effort, the UK could also
lobby for the creation of a pool fund to give more coherence to donors ‘activities and avoid
duplication in the field of mediation.

3. Finally, UK’s experience in dealing with home grown forms of terrorist organizations and/or
political armed groups, including through dialogue and negotiations (like during the Northern
Ireland peace process), could be usefully shared with Malian authorities. Although the
situations are without any doubt very different, Malian state officials and other actors engaged
in mediation would probably learn a lot from other experiences, especially cases of armed
insurgencies that were dealt with through a mix of coercion and dialogue.

20
Annex A: Main mediation initiatives in central Mali

NGOs / IGOs
Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue HD
Date marker : 2-3 May 2017
Targeted localities : Mopti and Ségou regions
Activity / Event : Meeting of the actors in the
Partnership : Mandate received from the Malian Prime Minister
Funding : Canada

Date marker : 3 July 2018

Targeted localities : Mopti and Ségou regions
Activity / Event : The leaders of the Dan Nan Ambassagou armed group, representing the Dogon
community, have declared a unilateral ceasefire
Partnership : Mandate received from the Malian government
Funding : Canada

Date marker : November 2018

Targeted localities : Sofara
Activity / Event : Mediation to solve a Bambaras Vs Fulanis conflit

Date marker : 26th of March 2019

Targeted localities : Youwarou
Activity / Event : Loca peace forum

Targeted localities : Mondoro

Activity / Event : Non-agression agreement between Peuls and Dogons

Targeted localities : Kouakourou

Activity / Event : Initiatives to lift the blockade puted in place by djihadists

Targeted localities : Koula (cercle of Tomininan)

Activity / Event : Series of meetings to solve a Fulani Vs Bobo conflit

21
Targeted localitées : Ké-Macina
Activity / Event : Diagnostic meeting held to understand the dynamics and the actors, with security
forces, Fulanis, Bambaras and local elected

Targeted localitées : Cercle of Djenné

Activity / Event : process is underway. Peul villages threatened

Promediation
Date marker : Since January 2018.
Targeted localitées : Cercle of Mondoro
Activity / Event : Meeting of eight dogon leaders and eight fulani leaders, after which a comité de
pilotage was created with members linked to militias
Funding : Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Date marker : Septembre 2018

Targeted localitées : Cercle of Mondoro
Activity / Event : Participants agreed on new stages of dialogues involving djihadists, following the
principle of not to “submit to the jihadists but that they do not prevent the efforts of dialogue between
Dogons and Peuls.”
Funding : Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Search for Common Grounds

Targeted localities : Niono - Diabaly - Ke Macina – Badiangara – Douentza – Djenne-Youwarou –
Tenenkou.
Activity / Event : Dialogue facilitation and not mediation. Activities linked to (1) cohesion-
reconciliation between communities (2) restoration of confidence bewteen communities and security
forces (3) support to the State regarding the understanding of the peace agreement (4) electoral
conflict prevention and crisis management.
Funding : United Kingdom, Danemark, USAID.

Think Peace
Targeted localitées : 14 communes in the Mopti region (notably Togué Morari, Tenekou, Youwarou,
Macina…) + 10 communes in the Ségou region.
Activity / Event : Capacity building of CSOs, community dialogues, research and recommendations to
the Malian authorities for a way out of the crisis in Mali

22
Funding : United Kingdom, Danemark, USAID.

The Danish Demining Group (DDG)

Targeted localitées : Bih and Kiri (cercles of Koro and Douentza)

Activity / Event : (1) upport local peace resolution mechanisms, including through training in
mediation as well as the development or strengthening of information sharing mechanisms between
communities across borders. (2) Local meetings intended to promote better mutual understanding
between security forces and local communities. Yet the rise of insecurity in border areas in both
central Mali and in northern Burkina Faso, complicates access to the field and follow up to assess the
impact of activities, including mediation.
Partners : Canadian Institute for Conflict resolution

Minusma
Joint Justice and Reconciliation Pilote Project / “Koro project“
Date marker : June-July 2018
Targeted localities : Cercle of Koro (Am, Dangaténé and Yorou).

Civil Affairs division

Date marker : 2018/2019
Targeted localities : Mopti region
Activity / Event : 12 intercommunity and intra-community dialogues in the in order to resolve specific
conflicts identified in collaboration with local communities and implementing partners.

Unesco
Date marker : 4-7 June 2018, workshop on the development of the Training and Activity Planning
Manual of the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) Program, called "Young Actors for Peace and National
Reconciliation".
Targeted localities : 25 municipalities in the Ségou and Mopti regions (3,400 direct beneficiaries)
Activity / Event : The program aims to strengthen the commitment of young people and women as
peace actors in order to strengthen social cohesion, community dialogue, living together and
developing the potential of young people.
Funding partner : Minusma Stabilization & Recovery Section (1.4 billions FCFA)

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Government initiatives6
Date marker : 22-25 March 2019
Targeted localities : 8 cercles of the Mopti
Activity / Event : Local forums in the eight cercles of the Mopti

Date marker : “Before the end of June”

Targeted localities : 8 cercles of the Mopti
Activity / Event : National conference in Mopto to restorce peace, with the participation of local,
regional and national elected officials, religious and traditional leaders, fighters willing to laydonw
their weapons

Date marker : 2-3 June 2016

Targeted localities : Niono
Activity / Event : Inter-communal meetings in Niono bewteen fulani herder and dogon farmers
peulhs. Signature of a charte pour la paix.

Date marker : 8-11 June 2017

Targeted localities : Karwassa
Activity / Event : Organisation of an inter-communal forum
Partners / Funding : MCSPRN and Pnud

… and also
9-13 July 2014, Mopti city, Douentza, Kona
14-15 January 2015, Mopti city
8 November 2015, cercle of Tenenkou, Djoura village
15-20 décembre 2017, cercles of Koro, Bandiagara, Bankass
February 2019, Mopti city

Other actors / initiatives

Religious actors (Mahmoud Dicko)
Date marker or Event : 2016 (unofficially) 2017 (officialy)

6
According to the Ministère de la Réconciliation nationale. The activities may duplicates with other already
mentioned.

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Targeted localities : Centre
Activity / Event : Mission de bons offices. Establishing dialogue lines with non-signatory armed
groups
Partners / Funding : Malian government

Community actors
Names: Tabital Pulaaku & Ginna Dogon
Date marker : 27 July – 2 August 2017
Targeted localities : cercle of Koro, Nawadié, Tafadala and Goundogrou villages
Activity / Event : Mission of sensibilisation and reconciliation at villages.
Partnership : MCSPRN; Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue HD

Others
Names : Mouvement pour l’union des Maliens
Date marker : 24 February 2018 – 10 March 2018
Targeted localities : 8 cercles of the Moption region
Activity / Event : Sensitization and mobilisation caravane for the Cohésion Sociale et la Paix
Partners / Funding : MCSPRN and GIZ

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