Background on Hong Kong’s Quest

for Democracy
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October 1, 2014

The current prodemocracy protests in Hong Kong came in

response to an August decision by the Beijing government to limit voters’ choices in future
elections for the autonomous territory’s chief executive. The move effectively ended a 17-
year period in which Chinese leaders attempted to retain control of Hong Kong politics while
still holding out the promise of eventual universal suffrage.

Democracy activists have also raised concerns about growing encroachments on Hong
Kong’s civil liberties, including media freedom. The territory received its worst score in a
decade in Freedom House’s most recent Freedom of the Press report. (For more on media
freedom developments over the past four years, see the China Media Bulletin.)

The following summary, drawn largely from Freedom House’s annual Freedom in the
World report, provides a historical overview of Hong Kong’s incremental and ultimately
illusory political reforms under Chinese rule.
 

Hong Kong Island was ceded in perpetuity to Britain in 1842; adjacent territories were
subsequently added, and the last section was leased to Britain in 1898 for a period of 99
years. In the 1984 Sino-British Joint Declaration, London agreed to restore the entire colony
to China in 1997. In return, Beijing—under its “one country, two systems” formula—pledged
to maintain the enclave’s legal, political, and economic autonomy for 50 years.

Under the 1984 agreement, a constitution for the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region,
known as the Basic Law, took effect in 1997. The Basic Law stated that universal suffrage
was the “ultimate aim” for Hong Kong, but it initially allowed direct elections for only 18 of
60 seats in the Legislative Council (Legco), and provided for the gradual expansion of
elected seats over the subsequent years. After China took control, it temporarily suspended
the Legco and installed a provisional legislature that repealed or tightened several civil
liberties laws during its 10-month tenure.

Tung Chee-hwa was chosen as Hong Kong’s chief executive by a Beijing-organized election
committee in 1997, and his popularity waned as the central government became
increasingly involved in Hong Kong’s affairs, raising fears that civic freedoms would be
compromised. Officials were forced to withdraw a restrictive antisubversion bill after it
sparked mass protests in July 2003.

In 2005, with two years left to serve, the deeply unpopular Tung resigned. He was replaced
by career civil servant Donald Tsang, and China’s National People’s Congress (NPC) decided
that Tsang would serve out the remainder of Tung’s term before facing election. Tsang won
a new term as chief executive in 2007, garnering 82 percent of the votes in the mostly pro-
Beijing election committee.

Also in 2007, the NPC ruled that universal suffrage could be adopted as early as 2017 for
chief executive elections and 2020 for the Legco, in keeping with the Basic Law’s stated goal
of expanding the franchise.

Meanwhile, pro-Beijing parties retained control of the Legco in elections held in 2004 and
2008, though few of their members were elected by popular vote. Instead, most won seats
determined by about 200,000 “functional constituency” voters—representatives of various
elite business and social sectors, many with close ties to Beijing.

In 2010, amendments to the Basic Law—set to take effect in the 2012 elections—added 10
seats to the Legco, giving it a total of 70 seats. While 30 members would still be elected by
the functional constituency voters, 35—up from 30—would be chosen through direct
elections in five geographical constituencies. Hong Kong’s 18 district councils would
nominate candidates for the remaining 5 Legco seats from among themselves, and the
nominees would then face a full popular vote. The Basic Law continued to restrict the
Legco’s lawmaking powers, prohibiting legislators from introducing bills that would affect
Hong Kong’s public spending, governmental operations, or political structure.

The 2010 reforms also slightly altered the system for electing the chief executive. He would
be chosen by a 1,200-member election committee, up from 800 members, but the group
would largely retain its existing composition. The functional constituency voters would elect
900 of the committee’s members, and the remaining 300 would consist of Legco members,
Hong Kong delegates to China’s NPC, religious representatives, and members of the Chinese
People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), an advisory body to the NPC. Candidates
for chief executive had to be nominated by at least 150 members of the election committee.

In March 2012, the election committee chose Leung Chun-ying, a member of the CPPCC, as
the new chief executive. He won 689 of the 1,050 valid votes cast following an usually
competitive race against two other candidates—Henry Tang, a high-ranking Hong Kong civil
servant who took 285 votes, and Democratic Party leader Albert Ho, who secured 76. Tang
was initially Beijing’s preferred candidate, but after his popularity fell due to a series of
scandals, the central government switched its backing to Leung. Officials from China’s
Liaison Office reportedly lobbied members of the election committee to vote for Leung and
castigated media outlets for critical coverage of him. Leung took office in July.

During the Legco elections in September 2012, which drew a high turnout of 53 percent,
pro-Beijing parties won 43 seats, though only 17 of those were directly elected.
Prodemocracy parties took 27 seats, enabling them to retain a veto on constitutional
changes.

Leung faced growing public discontent in 2013 over his close ties to the Chinese
government and stalled discussions on political reforms that would allow universal suffrage
for future chief executive and Legco elections. He survived an impeachment attempt
initiated by prodemocracy members of the Legco.

In September 2013, the director of Beijing’s Liaison Office in Hong Kong publicly rejected the
open nomination of candidates for the next chief executive election in 2017—the clearest
indication yet that the central government would not permit major electoral reforms.

Finally, on August 31, 2014, the NPC’s Standing Committee issued its decision regarding
reforms for the 2017 chief executive election. Nominations would require a majority vote by
a committee selected in the same way as the existing Beijing-friendly election committee, a
much higher hurdle than the current nomination threshold of just 150 members of the
1,200-member panel. Only candidates chosen in this way would then be presented for a
popular vote, effectively ensuring that viable prodemocracy candidates would never appear
on the ballot. The prodemocracy minority in the Legco could still block the reform, but they
would then be left with the existing system.