C. J. Rowe, Plato. Phaedo. Cambridge 2001 (19931), σελ.

118-119
COMMENTARY:59e8-60b4
πολύν χρόνον, accusative of duration of time). e8 ούν logically belongs with είσιόντε? rather than κατελαμβάνομεν:
'[he told us to go in,] so we went in, and as we did we found ...'
6oaa το καιδίον βύτοϋ: according to Ap. 34d, S. had two sons who were still παιδία, i.e. (probably) under seven (see
also Phd. n6b); presumably this one was the younger (cf. ay-8n.). «3 ούν 'Well, ...'; cf. 58b4n. άνηυφήμησε 'shrieked'
(see Burnet). *4~5 τοιοΰτ* αττα clncv, οία δη είώθασιν αϊ γυναΐχ€ς 'she said some things of just (δη) the sort which
women usually do, [to the effect] that...' (or 'with the effect of...': δτι is regularly though illogically followed by direct
statement). The dismissive or disparaging note which GP (220) finds in 6ή here would clearly be present even without
it. In Rep., P.'s S. suggests that some women may possess the capacity to become rulers; but that is consistent with his
accepting the usual Greek view of women -as he does here - as typically emotional rather than rational. A$ δη is
emphatic ('the very last time ...'). a7~8 άκαγέτω τις αυτήν olxa6e: S.'s curt dismissal of the distraught Xanthippe, with
his infant son, recalls his refusal at his trial to 'make appeals to the dikasts, with floods of tears, bringing on his infant
children to achieve the maximum of pity, and many of his other relatives and his friends besides' (Ap. 34c). Here, of
course, P. has done just that on his behalf; but the last word goes to S., who will not be pitied. ·9 τιν€ς των του
Κρίτωνος 'some of Crito's people', i.e. of his slaves? ag-bi βοώσάν rt χαΐ χοπτομ-ένην 'crying out and lamenting',
'crying out in lament'; κόπτεσθαι ('beat oneself, sc. in grief) seems to have come to mean no more than 'grieving', as
perhaps at Rep. 6igc.
bi-a άναχαθιζόμ€νος €ΐς την κλίνη ν 'sitting up onto (είς) the bed', so that both his feet are on it (see 6ic-d). Since ε!$
implies motion towards something, he was evidently not already on the bed; or perhaps he had been sitting with his feet
on the floor (to allow his chains to be removed?). b3 τρίβων άμα 'as he rubbed [it]', bj τούτο ft χαλοϋ-σιν ol Ανθρωποι
ηδύ 'this thing (Pstate: see c6n.) which people call "pleasant"': in Rep. (583b~585a) and in other dialogues the question
is raised whether the kind of'pleasure' referred to here (i.e. the experience of relief from pain, a category which turns
out to include virtually all varieties of physical enjoyment) really is pleasant, and not jrather an intermediate state
which only appears pleasant in contrast to the
COMMENTARY: 60b5-60c3
119
preceding pain. 'Real' pleasure is something which one enjoys in the absence of any pain, whether antecedent or
consequent (Rep. 584^. This set of ideas is sufficient to explain most of S.'s present speech (b3-c7), if not quite all of it
(see C3n.). bs το δοχοΰν εναντίον clvai, το λυπηρόν 'what seems to be [its] opposite, the painful', i.e. the state which
people call painful. But there is no indication that they are wrong in their description of this state (cf. Rep. 584e-585a).
What is at issue is whether this painful state is really the opposite of the one they call 'pleasant'; if the latter is not really
pleasant, then this is not a genuine instance of the (real) opposition between pleasure and pain. Strictly, then, the
present passage has no positive bearing on the later passages which make use of the idea of Opposites' (7od~72e, iO2b-
1073). το άμα χτλ. 'the fact that ...' The construction is loose but intelligible: S. has remarked on the strangeness of the
relationship between the two things (ούτω, b6: i.e. the painful state, on the one hand, and the (supposedly) pleasant
state on the other); he now describes that relationship. b6 μη 6&civ 'are not willing', 'refuse'. b6-7 εάν δε τις χτλ.ί it is
clear enough that people 'pursue' and try to 'catch' physical pleasure; but there will also be cases where someone could
be said to be 'pursuing' pains, e.g. where he or she chooses to submit to a painful operation, which will (they hope) be
followed by 'pleasure'. S.'s own experience in a way fits the same pattern: he might be said at least to have chosen the
pains of imprisonment - now temporarily relieved - in so far as he had the option of avoiding them (cf. Cr.). b8-ci
ώσπερ 4χ μιας χτλ.: i.e. joined at the head like Siamese twins. This does not cancel-out the qualification σχεδόν τι (cf.
5938) in b7: S. is only describing what the relationship between the two things is like: it seems that they are like
Siamese twins, because they so often go together.
C2 μϋθον αν συνθεϊναι: sc. αυτόν. 6 θεός: not God, but whichever god was responsible, διαλλάξαι 'reconcile'. 03
πολεμοϋντο: it is difficult to give any literal sense to this idea except in terms of the general opposition between
pleasure and pain - in which case both the two things would after all have to be genuine instances of their kind (see
b4n., 5n.). Or perhaps it is sufficient that they appear to be opposites: people do in fact pay attention to both of them,
and weigh them against each other (cf. 6ga) - so that there is a natural 'hostility