International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction 36 (2019) 101120

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/ijdrr

Appraising the interactions between public-sector procurement policy and T

disaster preparedness
John Kwesi Buor
Management Science Department, GIMPA Business School, Ghana Institute of Management and Public Administration, P.O. Box AH 50 Achimota, Accra, Ghana

A R T I C LE I N FO A B S T R A C T

Keywords: Disasters can be disruptive to the smooth flow of resources even in the most robust supply chains. Unfortunately
Disaster management while disaster caused disruptions and casualty numbers continue to increase, the capacity to judiciously procure
Public procurement and deploy relief/emergency resources in real time dwindles. This paper explores how the over exploitation of
Causal loop mapping public-sector procurement policy can influence strategic national disaster preparedness and response.
Specifically, we highlight the interdependent relationships between procurement policy induced behaviours and
the capacity to prepare and respond to disasters. Results from interviews with individual senior managers of a
disaster management organisation, and the derived cognitive maps suggest that: inapposite procurement prac-
tices, excessive political intrusion, resource mismanagement, and unclear national disaster management policy
(plan), are some of the causes underpinning poor disaster preparedness and response in Ghana. Our research
therefore attempts to explain the apparent inverse relationship between the rise in disaster incidents and the
decline in capacity to manage disasters. This article could serve as one of the empirical basis that would prompt
policy-makers to review Ghana's policy on emergency procurement. The models in this research could provide
the needed insight into the underlying structures as well as alert managers that their procurement decisions or
behaviours can potentially produce unintended consequences that may affect future operations.

1. Introduction to limit the disaster management organisations' operations to emer-

Researchers [1–3] suggest that, entity's response to disaster and
mass emergency management depends on the level of preparedness
towards that event. This assertion is based on studies from incidents
including the 2011 Japanese earthquake and the aftermath nuclear
crisis in Fukushima, and also from four cases of hurricanes in Florida –
USA. Nation states may establish specific organisations to manage
disaster incidents within their jurisdiction. Tried as those organisations
do, the gap between disaster occurrences and resource availability (in
many cases) seems to grow wider due to demand-supply mismatch. For
instance in Ghana, there is established a National Disaster Management
Organisation (NADMO) with the objective to manage disasters and si-
milar emergencies in the country. Currently, other disaster manage-
ment organisations with the national outlook include the Ghana Na-
tional Fire Service (GNFS), and the Ghana National Ambulance Services
(GNAS). However, based on their fading capacity to respond to disaster
incidents in real time, the frequent reports of equipment failure, and the
display of many other operational inefficiencies, there is growing public
view that the disaster management entities in Ghana do not have the
capability to help the public to anticipate, resist, cope with, and recover
from the impact of contemporary disasters. Resource constraints appear
gency relief functions only, while the preventive functions remain
fuzzy. Disaster relief functions involve the provision of food, shelter and
related emergency services immediately after a natural or made-made
disaster [4], with the aim to alleviate the impact of that incident and to
reduce the suffering of the affected [5]. On the other hand, disaster
preventive functions include all activities and measures designed prior
to an event in order to reduce hazards, their effects, and to provide
permanent protection from their impacts [6]. Unfortunately, even the
major national disaster management agencies, on many occasions, have
to rely on internal (local donations) and external (regional and inter-
national) donor support even at the least event occurrence (see Ref.
[7]).
Extant literature suggests that while the occurrence of disasters
appear to increase in magnitude, number of casualties, and complexity
[8,9], the level of preparedness, and the capacity to respond to disasters
continue to decrease [10]. Consistent with Barney's [11] postulation,
we think that an organisation's resource base is a precursor to its ca-
pacity to manage disasters. The resource-based view (RBV) assumes
that organisations have, and may use mix resources [12–15] which
remain imperfectly mobile over a time frame [11]. These physical ca-
pital resources (consisting of assets, technology equipment, plants,

E-mail address: jbuor@gimpa.edu.gh.

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijdrr.2019.101120
Received 13 November 2018; Received in revised form 18 March 2019; Accepted 20 March 2019
Available online 03 April 2019
2212-4209/ © 2019 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
J. Kwesi Buor
geographical location and access to relief materials), human capital
resources (made up of managerial and employee capabilities in terms of
experience, judgement, intelligence, competence and relationships),
and organisational capital resources (i.e. formal and informal planning,
control and coordination systems, the formal reporting structures, and
the informal inter/intra-organisational relationships) are unique attri-
butes [16]; the procurement and efficient deployment of which disaster
management organisations can leverage on to execute a particular
project. The ensuing discourse suggests that to be disaster prepared,
there is need for procurement of requisite disaster management capital
resources, proper planning and coordination of relief policy and inter-
vention strategies well in advance of disaster occurrence. Thus our re-
search enquires whether there could be a link between infractions of the
public procurement policy and the capacity to prepare and respond to
disasters by a disaster management organisation. The main objective of
this research therefore, is to highlight the interdependent relationships
between public procurement policy induced behaviours and the capa-
city to prepare and respond to disasters in Ghana.
The paper is presented in five parts. The introductory part sets the
background for the research, including the apparent managerial di-
lemma underpinning the need for the current study. The second part is
a review of relevant literature on key constructs relative to the current
study. The third and fourth parts dwell on the methodological approach
suitable to this study and the data analysis processes respectively.
Finally we discuss the research findings and draw conclusions to the
study.
2. Literature
Various authors [8,17,18] define the term “disaster” in various
contexts. In this study, “a disaster is an extreme event of a natural, tech-
nological, or social cause that has consequences in terms of casualties, de-
struction, damage and disruption” [19]. According to the World Health
Organisation (WHO): “Disaster is a result of vast ecological breakdown in
the relationship between man and his environment, a serious sudden or slow
onset disruption, on such a scale that the stricken entity [individual,
community, organisation, society or state nations] needs extraordinary
efforts to cope with it, often resulting in dependence on outside help or in-
ternational aid”.
Beyond definitions, Nikbakhsh et al. [20] categorised disasters into
natural (as consequences of natural phenomena including storms,
floods, and epidemics) and man-made (as direct consequences of
human activities deliberate or non-deliberate including infrastructural
failure, waste mismanagement, and industrial accidents). Whatever the
categorisation, disasters are characteristically the main cause of major
supply chain disruptions. Disruptions in any supply chain have adverse
impact on the distribution system of an organisation [21–25]. One will
also note that the greater the level of vulnerability to any kind of dis-
aster caused disruptions, the higher the interest in managing it [26]. In
Ghana's case, the country has not been susceptible to high risk natural
disasters such as earthquakes, tsunamis, or hurricanes (Okoampa, 2007
cited in Ref. [7]). Therefore, the tendency to learn from such events and
possibly transfer the knowledge to managing the few hybridised man-
made-natural disasters such as infrastructural failure, waste misman-
agement related floods, road traffic accidents, land degradation and
pollution, appears not to gain much attention. It appears that such
growing weakness or vulnerability resulting from the lack of pre-
paredness for disasters could viciously increase the impact of a dis-
astrous event on the Ghanaian society.
Since disaster issues are multifarious, comprising multitude of per-
formance impacting elements, it requires all stakeholders' involvement
in preparedness [27]. Disaster preparedness can be conceived as the
state of readiness to respond constructively to environmental threats
[28] in such a way as to minimise the negative impacts on health and
safety of entity, and the structure it depends on for survival. From the
discourse, it appears that being alert to respond to disasters is
2
International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction 36 (2019) 101120
dependent on the fitness of the procurement functions of the organi-
sation, including: planning, training, and the acquisition of required
resources for human survival. We would be aware that while procure-
ment for disaster preparedness can take relatively longer period in
advance within a long time span, and which is appropriate for spec-
ulative and slow-onset disasters, procurement for emergency is for
rapid-onset, unpredicted, and sometimes chaotic events that require
different demand and process planning, or no specific plan for a short
time span. It is under this latter scenario that single sourcing procure-
ment strategy can apply. This paper is not particularly focused on the
procurement processes and the cycle. Neither are we interest in
dwelling on details of a particular disaster and the stages/phases of its
development. Our focus is to highlight some of the current procurement
behaviours in the public sector and the potentially unintended con-
sequences that such ‘strategic’ decisions may have on the capacity to
fight disasters in Ghana. We note that services yielded by resources
procured are a function of the way in which the resources are used [16]
which may also depend on the advanced preparations made even before
the resource acquisition. Thus, procurement is considered in this paper
as one of the supply chain activities with the greatest potential impact
on organisational performance [29].
Porter and Millar [30] assert that procurement is not a primary
activity of an organisation, it is a distinct support and/or a strategic
function rather than an operational function [31]. In the public sector,
procurement refers to the acquisition for public consumption [32] in
the form of goods, works, and services for all territorial or functional
subdivisions of a nation state. In Ghana's Public Procurement Manual
[33] “Public Procurement” is defined as “the acquisition of goods, works
and services at the best possible total cost, in the right quantity and quality,
at the right time, in the right place for the direct benefit or use of government,
corporations, or individuals, generally via a contract”. The Public Pro-
curement Act of 2003 (Act 663) [34], and its amendment of 2016 (Act
914), bids all acquisitions that draw from public funds to be done
through a specified, and harmonised process in order to attain trans-
parency, accountability, equality, and value for money. The general aim
of public procurement therefore, is to acquire improved quality re-
sources for the state at reduced total cost.
2.1. Theoretical link between procurement and disaster preparedness
There is strong causal link between disaster preparedness and the
capacity to respond to disastrous events [35]. This current research also
contends that the capacity to prepare and sustainably respond to dis-
asters in real-time, is dependent on the procurement and possession of
certain key resources that have characteristics such as value and ap-
propriability. Resources are defined as “all assets, capabilities, organi-
zational processes, attributes, information, knowledge, etc. controlled
by a firm” [11]. Following from the definition of disaster preparedness
by Perry and Lindell [28], it appears that procurement of resources for
disaster management is a strategic purchasing process involving plan-
ning, evaluating, implementing, and controlling highly important rou-
tine sourcing decisions [36].
Scholars generally attribute two goals to procurement [37–40]:
firstly to ensure an uninterrupted flow of materials at the lowest total
cost; and secondly to improve quality of the final product (emergency
delivery) and to react rapidly to market changes (disaster response).
Disasters cause disruptions in the supply chain of a system. The pro-
curement and possession of requisite logistical resources can improve
one's capability to confront the challenges of a disaster. Chamberlin
[41] identified some key capabilities of organisations (including tech-
nical know-how, reputation, the ability of managers to work together,
and others) on which they can earn profits (or improve performance).
Furtherance to the goals of procurement, but in the perspective of
the RBV and applying the Value Rarity Imitability Organisation (VRIO)
framework, Ordanini and Rubera [42] suggest two capabilities in the
procurement domain: first is ‘process efficiency capability’ which is
J. Kwesi Buor
inside looking and focuses on the procurement department of an or-
ganisation and its core activities that aim at cost reduction whiles still
maintaining relationships with external partners and the internal ac-
tivities that complement purchasing transactions. This appears to be
analogous to a self-reflection of a disaster management organisation in
terms of its readiness to timeously respond to disastrous event within its
jurisdiction. The second capability looks at ‘process integration’ which
focuses on how effectively the procurement function of an organisation
is incorporating the entire supply chain, reducing time-to-market, and
increasing the fit with market needs. Apparently, this examines how the
procurement function of a disaster management organisation is able to
coordinate stakeholder activities before, during, and after disaster op-
erations in order to be able to meet the needs and requirements of the
disaster affected victims.
Though the RBV is criticised for being inward focused, besides the
high risks to ignoring the nature of market demands [43], its con-
tributions in ‘strategy’ literature highlights the links between internal
resources and market conditions [44,45]. The RBV emphasises the fact
that there are some capabilities that can only be developed within the
organisation [46]. For example, Hart's [47] model of the RBV shows
that procurement, technology, design, production, distribution and
service are capabilities of a firm, and further allude that the purchasing
function can be an important capability of an entity. These unique as-
sets and capabilities make the difference in the execution of a duty. It is
therefore evidenced that resources are acquired through procurement.
Therefore, procurement management is an important strategic activity
that ensures availability of sufficient resources and services for the
smooth operations [48] and management of a disaster situation. With
emphasis placed on strategic choice, the RBV appears to charge disaster
management organisations to identify, develop and deploy key re-
sources if only they aim at optimal efficiency.
Traditionally, it is not uncommon for organisations to take opera-
tional and procurement decisions independently. The potential effect is
that any uncertainty in demand of independent resources could disrupt
both the operational plan and procurement process of the organisation.
Hence there is need to develop a resiliently sustainable system that
considers integrating operational activities and procurement decisions
in a more holistic manner. In this regards literature acknowledges the
contributions made by several authors in their attempt to fill the gap in
such operational-procurement decision integration, using models.
Authors [49–56] have proposed different deterministic models for
sourcing product mix under uncertainty. Furthermore, [57,58,59,60]
call for the need to jointly consider production and procurement models
rather than the traditional independent optimisation approaches.
It sounds factual therefore that procurement is a toolkit to mitigate
risks of supply chain disruption during disaster or disaster relief op-
erations [61]. A disaster management organisation's supply chain must
be resilient not only in terms of avoiding disruptions in the routine
orders, but also in handling emergency orders. Subsequent to this
concept, [62] propose a procurement model that incorporate emer-
gency orders with given capacity constraints. In an empirical analysis
on supply chain management, [63] considered procurement as one of
the key functional areas of chain resilience. Earlier, Pereira et al. [64]
have identified the role of procurement in the intra/inter-organisational
supply chain resilience. They assert that procurement has enlarged its
scope to include achieving a competitive advantage in the current vo-
latile market such that it seeks to align and synchronise internal re-
quirements to external resources so as to achieve organisational target.
Perl and Daskin [65] and Elluru et al. [57], postulate that facility
location and vehicle routing could be the two major decisions that
bother a distribution network. The authors propose the Location-
Routing Model that provide time windows using proactive and reactive
approaches. Whereas the proactive approach considers risk factors as
preventive measures for disaster caused disruptions, the reactive ap-
proach sees disruptions as caused by facility breakdown, route
blockages, and delivery delays with their cost penalties. Tayal and
3
International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction 36 (2019) 101120
Singh [66] have employed qualitative-quantitative models to model the
layout problem for disaster relief operations. In their work, qualitative
component provide layouts based on maximisation of closeness rating
while quantitative part involves the minimisation of material handling
cost. In this instance, it appears that the facility layout problem is ad-
dressed from the point of demand based disaster relief operations. The
risks associated with the disaster caused supply chain disruption needs
to be carefully addressed while planning [67]. It seems that increasing
responsiveness and continuous planning can mitigate the ill-effects of
disruptions [68] as well increase visibility and collaboration. Thus a
careful balance between organisations' planning and reaction mechan-
isms can turn an unexpected challenge into an opportunity of compe-
titive advantage. The proposition by Khalili et al. [69] and Manopi-
niwes and Iroshara [70] to employ stochastic models to handle
operational risks in case of disruptions by considering back-up in-
ventory and emergency route planning is also very intriguing. However,
in as much as we agree with most of these models, we fail to adopt the
hard model approach at this juncture because it appears that those
articles focused on business logistics or (to some extent), on private
supply chain procurement systems which apparently have quite dif-
ferent administrative structure and approach - different from public
procurement system. Though operational similarities such as the con-
siderations of resource mix, cost minimisation, and planning under
uncertainty may be common to both public and private procurement
systems, the public sector (in many countries) operates strictly under
rules and managerial webs of different complexities and motives, much
more complex than the private enterprise which in most instances, has
profit as a prior motivation. While all these models are credible at some
instances, they appear not to take a holistic view in their analysis and
fail to consider the consequence of policy induced behaviours that in-
fluence public procurement and disaster preparedness. We therefore
propose the systems sciences’ view, using the causal loop mapping
(CLM) approach [71–76] to provide insight into the consequences of
current procurement policy induced behaviours and the future capacity
of national disaster preparedness and response.
Literature has revealed that humans are not able to cope with dy-
namically complex systems [77–80]. Humans also fail to recognise
causal feedback relationships that are distant in time and space [81,82].
Therefore we employ mental models to explain a dynamically complex
system including the use of feedback loops to bring understanding of a
complex phenomenon such as the relationship we seek to establish in
this paper. Cognitive mapping [83,84] or causal loop mapping (CLM) is
a diagramming research methodology (tool, or technique) that is good
for conceptualising feedback systems [85] as well as a tool for brain-
storming [86]. CLMs can be used to explain a system's behaviour [87]
which provides a holistic thinking during problem identification and
problem solving. According to Morecroft [85], CLM is a powerful as
well as a concise way of conveying the concept of feedback structure,
and it can also be used as a tool for behaviour analysis and policy de-
sign. CLM and feedback loops are normally used to illustrate structure
and behaviour of a system over a time period [88–91]. We therefore
adopt CLM models as an illustrative method that can impact on what
problem owners think, and how they communicate their intensions to
others [92,93].
2.2. A review on the case organisation
Disaster management entities including the NADMO, Ghana
National Fire Service (GNFS), the Ghana National Ambulance Services
(GNAS) and others, appear to becoming highly vulnerable to risks of
incapacity to execute their core duties. For instance, sections 1 and 2 of
Ghana's Act 517 of 1996 state:
1 (1) “There is established by this Act a National Disaster Management
Organisation (NADMO)……”
2 (1) “The object of the organisation is to manage disasters and similar
J. Kwesi Buor
emergencies in the country. The Organisation shall: (a) prepare national
disaster plans for preventing and mitigating the consequences of disasters;
(b) monitor, evaluate and update national disaster plans; (c) ensure the
establishment of adequate facilities, technical training and the institute of
educational programmes to provide public awareness warning systems
for its staff and the general public; (d) ensure that there are appropriate
and adequate facilities for the provision of relief, rehabilitation and re-
construction after disaster; (e) coordinate local and international support
for disaster or emergency control relief services and reconstruction….
….”
Though these have been boldly written in the Act, the gap in cap-
abilities and functions of these major national disaster management
entities have been well illustrated in paragraph (1) of the introductory
part of this paper. Wagner, Padhi and Bode [94] provide various pro-
curement processes among which entities could employ in the public
sector. Yet, it appears that almost all Ghanaian public entities seem to
overly depend on the single sourcing procurement strategy. Single
sourcing is the procurement strategy where a buyer chooses a single
supplier even though other comparable suppliers exist in the supplier
base [95]. The strategy by itself is not a bad one looking at conditions
under which Ghana's Act 663 allows its application (including emer-
gency, research, security, special technological requirement, public
interest, etc.). According to Treleven and Schweikhart [96], the goal for
single sourcing is for an organisation to have at most, one supplier for
each inventory item. Other research [97] cite higher quality at lower
total cost to the buyer and higher levels of buyer–supplier cooperation
as some benefits of single sourcing. However, single sourcing strategy
appears not to favour organisations in most cases, due to the high
tendencies to create or worsen supply chain disruptions (see examples
in Ref. [98]) if not well managed. Thus the over dependence on single
sourcing procurement could have grim consequences on organisational
performance in the long-run.
3. Methodology
This research highlights on the interdependent relationships be-
tween resource availability through strategic procurement practices (or
behaviours) of a national disaster management organisation and its
capacity to respond to disasters in Ghana. Urban floods blameable on
solid waste mismanagement and infrastructural failure; pollution of
water bodies through unscientific mining activities; deforestation; and
road traffic accidents are regularly occurring and potential disaster
incidents in Ghana. For over two decades after the enactment of Act 517
as stated in section (2.2) above, it would be of interest to gain insight
into why the national disaster management organisation continue to
find it difficult to curb the recurrence of the same problem over the
years.
3.1. Research approach/design
The exploratory nature of this research arrogates the paper a qua-
litative approach, for it to afford the study an opportunity to learn what
underlies the actor's behaviour, instead of relying on hard statistical
figures [99]. By this approach, the study is able to leverage on the
spontaneous adaptive interactions between the researcher and the re-
spondents. Thus we exploit the strength of qualitative research to
provide complex descriptions of how a typical public organisation
carries out its procurement functions and how the unintended con-
sequences of such strategies can influence the preparedness, and sub-
sequent response to emergency operations. The author is aware of the
inability of qualitative research to generalise findings from data over a
larger population due to its perceived lack of rigor [100]. However, we
think that qualitative study would rather allow the research to acquire
rich data and also understand data complexity in a specific social
context [101] which typically takes precedence over educed data that
4
International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction 36 (2019) 101120
can be generalized over a large population.
In order to obtain results based on empirical evidence, the research
employed open – ended questioning instrument which gives the inter-
viewer the opportunity to ask follow-up questions to enhance clarity of
thoughts in a relaxed environment [99,102]. Thus semi-structured in-
terviews [103], in the form of face-to-face conversation was employed
in data collection. The research preferred this method because inter-
view data are deemed rich, and may include descriptions of decisions
and theories that explain events. According to Nisbett and Wilson
[104], people both know more than they will tell; they can invent ra-
tionales and even incidents to justify their believes (through inter-
views), which provides important data that they themselves may not
know they have provided. The triangulation of interview results from
different individual respondents helped this research to gain insight
into the structure of problems and the potentially complex decision
outcomes of management. Authors such [105,106] and many others
have employed this approach to investigate various complex events.
3.2. Data collection
Prior to the interview protocols [107], the investigator delivered a
letter to the headquarters of one of the major national disaster man-
agement organisations requesting for access and permit to conduct re-
search interviews with selected senior managers who were in-charge of
some key units. Attached to the request was a guide which specifies the
purpose, theme, and scope of the research. Each interview was con-
ducted (on different occasions at the convenience of the respondent) in
the board room of the case organisation in the manner as described
earlier in the preceding paragraph. Before the commencement of each
interview process, the respondent's consent was sort to record the
conversation. The investigator pledged respondent anonymity, and
explained how the data will be used and protected. On the average,
each interview session lasted between 70 and 120 min, depending on
whether a particular response required follow-up questions or not. The
research limited its data source to headquarters of only one national
disaster management organisation, because of resource constraints
[108,109] and also because of the apparent centralised procurement
system the organisation operates.
Various authors in qualitative research have argued, yet there seem
to be no conclusion on the exact number (minimum or maximum) of
interviewees that is enough for saturation of knowledge [110]. How-
ever, Guest et al. [111] suggest that interview structure and content,
and group heterogeneity, are two conditions which could determine the
number of interviews to conduct. To meet these conditions, the inter-
view questions for this study were semi-structured, with little varia-
bility except when there is a follow-up question. Also our interview
respondents were basically selected from the same organisation
(homogeneous group). Thus, nine (9) senior managers at the head-
quarters was deemed good enough for pattern (theme) emergence and
also for knowledge saturation.
3.3. Data analysis
The level of analysis in this study is nine (9) individual senior
managers, who have worked with the case organisation for two (2)
years or more. These consent individuals were purposely selected be-
cause the research considered them to possess a considerable wealth of
knowledge, expertise and requisite experience which the study could
extract for the purposes of analysis. The selected senior managers have
performed, or have supervised functions including: emergency response
operations, first aid, procurement, budget and finance, or distribution
services in the course of duty. After the data collection protocol (as
described in section 3.2), each recorded voice data was transcribed and
selectively coded. The study used open coding [112] to analyse each
interview question at a time. We compared thematic responses, ex-
cerpts of some of the most compelling ones were selectively quoted (in
J. Kwesi Buor
section 4.0). The open and axial coding [113–115] yielded emergent
themes [116] that represented the respondents’ mental model of the
procurement practices and the apparent unintended consequences that
those behaviours could impose on organisational capacity to manage
contemporary disasters as per the narration.
4. Results and analysis
The first part of this section (4.0) presents and analyses excerpts
from interview respondents as we attempt to relate some procurement
practices (behaviours) to the general disaster preparedness and re-
sponse of a national disaster management organisation. In the second
part (4.1), respondents’ mental models, and the potential consequences
of some policy decisions were represented in causal loop diagrams. We
expect that the diagrams would provide insight into how the over ex-
ploitation of a well-intended policy such as single sourcing procurement
can affect national disaster management in the long term.
For a start, the research wanted to find out if there is any organi-
sation backed by law to manage disasters in Ghana. To this question, all
respondents replied that the NADMO (section 2.2 above) was estab-
lished for the purposes to assist the public to anticipate, prevent, and
mitigate all kinds of disasters within the national borders of Ghana. The
general response states:
“… The National Disaster Management Organisation was established to
coordinate all disaster management resources, both governmental and
non-governmental, or local and international …. It is responsible to lead
in managing every disaster situation in Ghana”
The above assertion by respondents seems to confirm the first
paragraph of section 2.2 of this write-up, and at the same time raises
questions about whether the disaster management organisations are
really fulfilling their core business. Though the main respondents ap-
peared to avoid or become defensive towards this follow-up question,
public perception suggests that the national disaster management or-
ganisations have gradually shifted focus. The NADMO for instance,
seems to have rather metamorphosed into a quasi-political agency
which is subject to serious manipulation by the regimes in power over
the years. Evidence can be cited in the manner of appointment or re-
placement of the top echelons of NADMO following the 2000, 2008 and
2016 general elections in Ghana. These shakeups usually lead to re-
cruitment of new staff, replacement of old staff with unemployed party
activists, or the withdrawal of experienced staff from perceived sensi-
tive departments in the manner that this author calls “Local Political
Dynamics”, which can be analogous to the political effects notion of
Cohen and Werker [117].
It also emerged that one big challenge which hinders national dis-
aster preparedness is the lack of requisite disaster management material
resources for operational purposes. One respondent is quoted here (of
which majority also implied):
“… we need material resources to manage disaster. If you lack resources,
you cannot manage disasters with your own ability. You may have the
people … i.e. the human resource can be there, but if you don't have the
material resource that are very vital to assist the people, your outcome
will be something else …”
The issue about material resource deficiency (equipment and facil-
ities) appears to be a true reflection of the disaster management
agencies in Ghana and a major operational constraint. For example, one
newspaper headline reads: “NADMO overstretched in resources”
(Ghana News Agency, 18 March, 2011). Based on the definition of re-
sources in Barney [11], their acquisition, management, and deployment
is a function of procurement which stands to determine the level of
disaster preparedness as inferred from the narrator above.
On the causes of delays and their inability to meet public expecta-
tions, our respondents mentioned three delays in their business pro-
cesses as public organisation. One relates to professional qualifications
5
International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction 36 (2019) 101120
of procurement officers. Staff (especially the political implants) may
have general academic qualifications, but they may lack the requisite
professional training and experience to perform certain tasks. These
staff can create delays in the procurement process (through mistakes,
inefficiencies, and several reworks) particularly when they are assigned
technical activities such as the preparation of tender documents, con-
tract negotiation, or contract management. For instance, the censorship
move by the PPA, the implementation of the Procurement Act (Act
663), and the occasional directives by donor agencies are sometimes
misinterpreted, misapplied, or are unclear to such new recruits who are
usually planted in the organisations to enforce political agenda whether
favourable or not. These often lead to delays, and/or sponsorship
withdrawals if the project is donor sponsored. The second delay relates
to government's timeous release of funds for disaster management or-
ganisations to meet their budgetary requirements. The third cause of
delay is the rather unusually long and bureaucratic processes associated
with competitive tendering [118]. According to some respondents:
“ …. we (implying the disaster management organisation) often rely
on series of ad-hoc committees to expedite approval..., or we have to
depend on donor support and directives, to carry out our functions
…”
The above responses suggest that policy gaps could be the cause for
which the disaster management organisations resort to unpopular
procurement strategies and the consequential lack of preparedness for
disasters in Ghana. Cohen and Werker [117] speaks about political and
bailout effects of disasters. ‘Political effect’ occurs where government
uses disaster as a means to redistribute power by favouring regions and
people who are politically aligned to the regime. The ‘bailout effect’ on
the other hand, is the situation where government underinvest in dis-
aster prevention so that they will get bailed out by donors and inter-
national community when a disaster occurs. An extreme case of the
bailout effect leads to ‘racket effect’ where government or its agencies
may leverage on disasters to attract and steal humanitarian aids meant
for disaster affected people. The long term effect of these schemes is
that donors may pull out of a disaster management programme when
they learn about those unpopular behaviours.
On the question concerning procurement and stock management
practices, all respondents appear to favour the centralised procurement
system, stating that it is rather a good practice since it seems to reduce
corruption and malfeasants in their organisation. The centralised
system also seems to reduce the task of inspection as compared to
dealing with numerously scattered offices across the country.
Furthermore, it is easier for the regulatory authority to conduct regular
audits in the centralised system. However, a few respondents intimated
that it could be good to allow some percentage of localised (decen-
tralised) procurement at regional and/or district levels. Apart from the
significant delays caused by the centralised procurement system to
deliver supplies, it also makes it difficult to deliver to the last-mile in
real-time when disaster strikes. The practice also places the local (and
rural) economies at a disadvantage, potentially causing slow recovery
and rehabilitation of disaster victims. This research thinks that the
current practice could be a recipe for resource mismanagement, di-
version, and pilferage of goods in transit, and thus increase the “local
political dynamics” or the political effects [117] on disaster manage-
ment.
The interviewer also enquired if there is a national policy with re-
gards to procurement for emergency. Unanimously, all respondents
know that the single sourcing strategy [95,98] makes room for pro-
curement under emergency conditions. However, a large majority of
respondents alluded that it does not give them enough room to procure
without going through the laborious procurement cycle. For example, a
manager at the case organisation states:
“… our hands are tied behind us by the requirements and procedures …
the bureaucratic procedures that one has to go through …. the long list of
J. Kwesi Buor
interest groups …. , all limits us in the procurement of the needed relief
items ….. Unless there is direct intervention by a powerful political figure
for suppliers to release needed supplies, it is difficult sometimes for us to
carry out our functions smoothly”.
Literature appears to take a contrary view from the claim by the
above respondent. For example section 40 (2) of Ghana's Act 663 states:
“A procurement entity may engage in single-source procurement with the
approval of the Board after public notice and time for comment where
procurement from a particular supplier or contractor is necessary in
order to promote a policy specified in section 59(4) (c) [i.e. effects of
transaction on the economy], (d) [i.e. security reasons], or 69(2) (c)
(i) [i.e. effects on the balance of payments position], and procure-
ment from another supplier or contractor cannot promote that policy”.
What seems to prevail in most public institutions is the abuse of this
provision (single sourcing strategy). According to Glover [119] the
award of contracts (in Ghana) is highly subject to political manipula-
tions, where preferred candidates are usually card bearing party func-
tionaries of the ruling regime in power. Our finding also suggests that
most public contract owners deliberately delay the invitation to tender
till a few days, or even few hours, to the intended deadline. Whiles
covertly concealing call for tender, insider trading activities [120] are
carried out. Thus giving advantage to the preferred candidate who can
get documents submitted under such short notice to make him/her the
only candidate to qualify for the contract usually at inflated cost. Other
fraudulent practices in the public sector procurement, including ma-
verick buying, dis-aggregation of project contracts, lack of co-ordina-
tion, and clandestinely fictitious interpersonal relationships which are
in contravention of Act 663, have been recorded in Peprah [121]. Such
consistently inappropriate transactions defeat the purpose of the public
procurement policy, besides it resulting in low-value procurement
which may escalate inefficiencies. Additionally, the practice does not
only affect disaster preparedness and response, it has the potential to
throw transaction costs out of proportion to the value of the items
purchased [122]. By implication, it seems that the exploitation of the
single-sourcing procurement strategy/policy could be cited as one of
government and its agencies’ activities that expose the state to risks of
waste, fraud, corruption, and malfeasants. Donors such as the Adventist
Development and Relief Agency (ADRA), CARE International, World
Vision International, UNHCR, Catholic Relief Services, and local NGOs
play very important role in providing physical support and advisory
services in most cases. Thus among other thing, the models in the next
section assess the scenarios where these major players decide to reduce
or withdraw their services due to unsatisfactory behaviour by the local
disaster management agencies and the likely effects that this reaction
can have on disaster management.
4.1. Visualisation of findings
This section employs causal loop diagrams (CLM) to help in visua-
lising how extracts from data (interviews and/or literature review) in-
terrelate. By using CLM to create stories about complex issues, the
paper can make understanding of the interrelationships within the
system's structure holistically more explicit. The resulting diagrams can
also provide a visual representation that managers can use in commu-
nicating with others. Thus, management can become more adept at
telling systems stories that help in recognising the multiple inter-
dependent effects of their actions. Therefore the diagrams below vi-
sually provide the internal structural and mental models from the data
analysis in section 4.0 above.
For the detail, let Frequency and Severity of Disasters and Risk
Vulnerability (resulting from the over exploitation and abuse of single-
sourcing procurement policy) be two nodes (or variables); and the link
(edge) be the line connecting these two nodes. Furthermore, let a plus
sign (“+”) indicate that both nodes change in the same direction. That
6
International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction 36 (2019) 101120
Fig. 1a. Causal interrelationship between Risk vulnerability and Frequency/
severity of disaster.
Fig. 1b. Causal interrelationship between Donor agency role in disaster man-
agement and Local political dynamics.
is to say that all things being equal, an increase in the Frequency and
Severity of Disasters will cause Vulnerability Risk to increase more than
it would have been (Fig. 1a). Alternatively, an increase in Disaster
Preparedness and Response will increase public Perception of Systemic
Security more than it would have been.
Contrarily, a minus sign (“-“) indicates that two nodes move in
opposite directions. For instance under the scenario in last paragraph of
4.0, donors and development partners of Ghana may become aware that
government is using their support to gain from political and bailout
effects [117]. When they increase their role in disaster management, it
can cause “Local Political Dynamics” to decrease (i.e. reduce excesses of
local political influence and interference in procurement, allocation of
resources, and general operations of disaster management) lower than
it would have been (Fig. 1b). Or, alternatively, increasing the role of
Donor Agency in Disaster Management can reduce ambiguities in pro-
curement policies and practices (i.e. reduce Unclear Local Procurement
Policies) lower than it would have been.
Several pieces of statements (such as those above) have been picked
from respondents’ narratives and selectively coded [112] to form the
models that follow. To give meaning to the models, we assume that
delays are naturally occurring between time for decision-making and
the consequent decision outcome. Thus unless the delays can sig-
nificantly affect the system, they will not be indicated. We also assume
that all other factors are held constant except those under consideration
(all things being equal).
In figure (2), R1 represents the feedback loop describing occurrence
and impact of disaster on a community over a time frame. R1 is
therefore a key loop that strategically pushes a disaster management
organisation beyond its limits of preparedness and real-time response to
disasters, towards eventual collapse because of the recurrence of a ty-
pical local event (e.g. flood or waste disposal), unless the cause of this
behaviour was proactively identified and solved. Thus R1 suggests that
Disaster Preparedness and Response is causally influence by Perceived
Systemic Security, Anthropogenic Activities, Risk Vulnerability, Fre-
quency and Severity of Disasters, and Procurement for Emergency
Purposes. This relationship was inspired by the definition of disaster
management [19], the RBV theory [11–16,123], plus excerpts from the
field data (section 4.0 above). A Walk through the loop suggests that an
increase in disaster preparedness and response can increase people's
perception about systemic safety and security [+], which could in-
crease anthropogenic socio-economic activities beyond acceptable
Fig. 2. The dynamics of disaster occurrence and impact on a community.
J. Kwesi Buor
Fig. 3. The dynamics of disaster relief operations through supplies.
levels [+] (e.g. waste generation, disposal and management; poor in-
frastructural planning; non-renewable resource extraction; water/air/
soil pollution; and disregard for environmental laws). As these an-
thropogenic activities increase, so does the risk vulnerability (i.e. ex-
posure to environmental risks) [+], the frequency and severity of dis-
asters [+], the need to procure for emergency [+], and the need for
organisations to preparedness and respond to disasters [+] more than
it would have been. The total effect of the walk round the loop is a
positive growth (reinforcing) in a vicious or an undesirable cycle. This
structural behaviour is an undesirable cycle because of the potentially
negative impact that disaster caused disruptions can have on the society
and the general economy of a country.
Figure (3) is the feedback loop describing the expected spirally in-
creasing inefficiency in disaster relief supplies (resources). The loop is
derived from the WHO's definition of disaster, the RBV construct, and
the procurement capability goals [42], as reviewed in the literature.
Thus R2 is another key loop that strategically pushes a disaster man-
agement organisation, the government, and donor agencies beyond
their limits such that it becomes difficult to meet demand requirements,
unless the cause of this vicious behaviour was proactively identified and
solved. Tracing round R2, it suggests that an attempt to increase Dis-
aster Preparedness to a desired level can trigger inapposite (Bad) Pro-
curement Practices and Resource Mismanagement [+]. The inapposite
behaviours may include unreasonable and arbitrary use of single-
sourcing procurement, inappropriate stock/inventory management
practices due to the chaotic situations presented by disasters, diversion
of relief aid, and political interference among others. Over a time
period, donor agencies become aware about the increasing resource
mismanagement in the system, and may take initiatives to increase
Donor Agency Role in Disaster Management [+] (by taking direct
control of the flow of donor aids, training field personnel, planning,
regulations, contributions, and asset management). This in turn will
increase Disaster Preparedness and Response [+] more than it would
have been. It should be noted that it takes longer time (delay) for bad
procurement behaviours to be detected when they occur in a system.
The total effect of this loop is also a positive growth (reinforcing) in a
vicious cycle. The cycle is vicious because of the long-term negative
effects that bad procurement behaviours and resource mismanagement
can have on the general economy, standard of living and future disaster
management operations.
In figure (4), B1 is a balancing loop that represents a scenario where
one attempts to solve a problem, or to achieve an objective (such as to
continually improve on disaster risk reduction, prevention and miti-
gation), or to achieve the goals of procurement [37–40,124]. This de-
sired goal serves as a reference on which the system bases its actions,
and is determined externally. For instance, high level risk alertness and
timely response to disaster, is the discrepancy between the set goal and
state of the system determined magnitude and direction of corrective
actions to be taken. It is the desired level (ideal state) of preparedness
that the public/society would wish to exist, and is usually determined
by exogenous variables such as the amount of humanitarian aids and
7
International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction 36 (2019) 101120
Fig. 4. The dynamics of local political influence and the procurement of
emergency resources for disaster operations.
services available at a time, review and change in government policy,
attitudinal change, etc. A walk through B1 suggests that an increase in
Local Political Dynamics (i.e. political and bailout effects [117]) could
cause increase in Unclear Procurement Policy [+] (i.e. deliberately, or
otherwise, creating ambiguities in the purpose, processes, and inter-
pretation of procurement policy). The increase in ambiguity (i.e. Un-
clear Procurement Policy) could increase Bad Procurement Practices
and Resource Mismanagement [+] more than it would have been. As
Bad Procurement Practices and Resource Mismanagement increase,
donor agency support may increase [+] initially. However, once the
increasing malfeasants are noticed, donor agencies and development
partners would increase their roles through direct or indirect involve-
ment in disaster activities, and support programmes. An example is the
request/support from African Development Bank and the IMF for public
procurement policies in sub-Sahara Africa to be reviewed and re-
structured (see the [125] assessment report). The increase in such in-
terventions could reduce the excesses in Local Political Dynamics [−]
less than it would have been. The total effect of the walk through the
loop (B1) is negative (i.e. balancing) or a goal seeking loop with the
primary objective to correct the malfeasant practices in a procurement
system.
In figure (5), B2 is also a balancing loop that represents how the
internal indirect effects of bad procurement behaviour and resource
mismanagement can influence disaster preparedness and response. A
walk through the loop suggests that the more Unclear Procurement
Policies become, the higher the tendency for Bad Procurement Practices
and Resource Mismanagement [+], and the more the donor agencies
would increase their role in an attempt to standardise public procure-
ment policies [+] more than they would have done. Increasing Donor
Role in Disaster Management could restructure the system to reduce the
ambiguities in procurement policies lower than it would have been
[−]. Note that delay on this link indicates that it takes relatively longer
time for donor agencies to detect leakages and bad procurement prac-
tices in a system. The total effect of the walk through the loop (B2) is
negative (i.e. balancing). The objective of this loop will aim at cor-
recting procurement policy related effects (influence) on disaster
management.
In figure (6), the diagram attempts to summarise the dynamics
Fig. 5. The dynamics of internal procurement policies (including maverick
buying) and supply of emergency relief items.
J. Kwesi Buor International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction 36 (2019) 101120

Fig. 6. The internal dynamics of disaster preparedness and procurement policy induced behaviour of an emergency relief agency.

(interactions) in disaster management and public-sector procurement that whatever decision (intervention) is taken now could feed back into
policy as endogenous consequences of feedback structures [74]. This the system to escalate or worsen the effects of a disaster in the future.
figure combines all the previous feedback loops into one giant figure This type of growth, as suggested in the reinforcing loop (R1) is un-
that summarises the entire interrelationship between the variables. desirable and require that management finds corrective measures to
Thus in brief, figure (6) explicitly states (in pictorial terms) how end the worsening situations. For example, urban cities in Ghana battle
structure and complex policy decisions generate behaviour [126] in an with perennial floods which are often attributed to poor infrastructural
organisation. design/layout, and poor waste management as the cities expand in
terms of land area coverage and population growth without proper
planning. Other issues, such as those concerning settlement and cultural
5. Discussion
practices, including pollution, wild fires, and annual displacement of
settler farmers along the White Volta River banks, keep recurring on
The research objective is to highlight the interdependent relation-
seasonal basis with increasing trend of impacts. Stakeholders (including
ships between resource availability (through procurement practices, or
the government, land commission, engineers, landowners and research
behaviours) and disaster preparedness and response. Thus we inquired
institutions) need to be deeply engaged in infrastructural design and
if there could be a link between public procurement policy abuse (in-
community planning to facilitate accessibility and disaster manage-
fraction) and the capacity to prepare and respond to disasters in real
ment.
time. We engaged a major national disaster management organisation
We note that ‘without market discipline, civil servants (disaster
in Ghana, as a case organisation. One of our findings suggest that the
management organisations) have no incentive to control costs and are
case organisation is not able to meet public expectations in terms of
likely to expand spending beyond socially optimum levels to maximise
executing its core obligations. Some authors [120,121,125,127] have
their own rewards in terms of status, power, and income [129,130]. For
blamed the inefficiencies, and poor disaster management, on the lack of
example, our model in R2 suggest that the vicious feedback loop in-
requisite relief resources, delay or non-availability of funding from
volving bad procurement practices (behaviours) and resource mis-
government and other stakeholders, maverick buying, systemic cor-
management could persist if stakeholders do not find ways to dis-
ruption, and excessive political interference. These behaviours/prac-
courage the growth. Therefore in order to improve disaster
tices can affect the acquisition and deployment of physical capital,
preparedness and response, there is need to delink the disaster man-
human capital and organisational capital resources [11]. A carefully
agement organisations from political wing activities of ruling govern-
developed disaster relief intervention prior to disaster occurrence is a
ments. Also, there is need to have national, regional, and district level
necessity for disaster preparedness and response in real time. Our re-
policy on disaster management; enforce the laws; make asset declara-
sults also indicate that some delays (as narrated in section 4.0) and the
tion before and after assumption of public office compulsory and
subsequent over reliance on ad-hoc committees to expedite approval for
public; introduce sanctions that are deterrent enough (possibly in-
procurement under emergency could be deliberate and a potential in-
cluding seizure of assets from the malefactors, their nuclear and ex-
itiative to warrant single-source procurement.
tended families, and friends, if the acquisition was found to link with
‘A successful humanitarian operation mitigates the urgent needs of a
the assumption of office by their kinsman). Achieving these then be-
population with a sustainable reduction of their vulnerability in the
comes the set goals or objective for the balancing loops (B1 and B2) and
shortest amount of time and with the least amount of resources’ [128].
the possible means to improve resource accumulation towards disaster
The physical, human and organisational capital resources [11] are
management.
unique assets [16] that the national disaster management organisations
It seems that the perceived systemic security (R1) could rather be
can leverage on to safe life and property. However, our findings suggest
explained as a direct consequence of low risk awareness by the citizenry
that the manner in which these resources are procured and deployed
(evidenced from the consistently increasing reckless behaviour) which
can have unintended consequences on the disaster management orga-
increases their vulnerability to risks and the increasing need to procure
nisation's capacity to prepare and respond to disasters. The complex
for emergency purposes. To improve upon these, there is need to assess
model (Fig. 6) suggests that disaster management interventions need to
risk vulnerability and disaster impact at zonal and national levels, in
incorporate all plausible variables, and the consequences that could
order to build big data base and impact assessment catalogue that can
result from current behaviour/decision, as managers attempt to address
guide the disaster management agencies in procurement and stocks
current problems. For instance, the reinforcing loops (R1, R2) suggest

8
J. Kwesi Buor
management. The mandated disaster management agencies need to
intensify education based on zonal records. There is need to engage the
National Commission for Civil Education (NCCE) and the local media
on information dissemination concerning early warning programmes
and risk awareness.
In conclusion, this research attempts to provide insight into the
interdependent relationships between policy-induced behaviours re-
lative to public sector procurement for capital resources under emer-
gency and national disaster preparedness and response. Whiles the
single sourcing procurement policy [95] is well intended for special
purposes and in the interest of the state, it is unfortunate that this same
provision is often over exploited and consistently abused by regimes
and officials in power. Given that disaster occurrence is increasing in
frequency, magnitude, complexity, and unpredictability
[8,9,17,131,132], it is also evidenced that the capacity to be disaster
prepared and respond in real-time is falling. Strategic procurement and
proper deployment of requisite capital resources is a requirement.
Consistent with Heinrich and Hodess [125] which alludes that some
provisions in the Public Procurement Acts of most developing countries
have proven to be ineffectual, lacked clear procedures for emergency
procurement, and exhibit slow pace in regularising draft regulations,
we echo the call for review of Ghana's public sector procurement policy
to bring about the necessary adjustments or modifications.
The implication of this research to managers is that every strategic
decision could produce some unintended consequences some of which
could impact seriously on future operational capabilities. Our models
therefore provide a holistic view and an insight into such unintended
consequences that the national disaster management organisations may
encounter as a result of the over exploitation of single-sourcing pro-
curement strategy (section 40 of Ghana's Act 663). In consistence with
[125] recommendations, the findings herein serve as one of the em-
pirical documents, the basis for which policy-makers would review the
emergency procurement policy. Specifically, tougher sanctions and
strict policy enforcement structures/procedures would be built into the
new public procurement policy to deter infractions of the single sour-
cing policy. Review of the emergency public procurement policy and
improvement in disaster management strategy could impact sub-
stantially on the economy of Ghana with a resultant improved safety
and security of citizenry and the environment, budgetary savings, and
efficiency in government expenditures. Corruption could be eliminated
or minimised, thereby creating wealth, reducing poverty, and im-
proving standard of living.
This research could be limited by our inability to do exhaustive
iterative data collection for the case organisation to own the mental
models as recommended in the Grounded Theory approach
[105,112,133]. We also think that the use of single case organisation at
the headquarters level could affect our attempt to generalise results.
However we believe we followed due process as in Ref. [111] which we
think is sufficient enough to enhance knowledge saturation and hence
the provision of good report.
Future research could look at how best the disaster management
agencies could collaborate with national and international organisa-
tions (including but not limited to the Meteorological Services,
Geological Services, Environmental Protection Agency, Ghana Health
Services, the engineering regiment of the military), to build the capacity
that is capable to predict disasters accurately in order to strengthen the
anticipation and prevention component of their core business.
References
[1] C. Davis, V. Keilis-Borok, V. Kossobokov, A. Soloviev, Advance prediction of the
March 11, 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake: a missed opportunity for disaster
preparedness, Int. J. Disaster Risk Reduct. 1 (2012) 17–32.
[2] O. Norio, T. Ye, Y. Kajitani, P. Shi, H. Tatano, The 2011 eastern Japan great
earthquake disaster: overview and comments, Int. J. Disaster Risk Sci. 2 (1) (2011)
34–42.
[3] N. Kapucu, Culture of preparedness: household disaster preparedness, Disaster
9
International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction 36 (2019) 101120
Prev. Manag. Int. J. 17 (4) (2008) 526–535.
[4] J.R. Hess, M.J.G. Thomas, Blood use in war and disaster: lessons from the past
century, Transfusion 43 (11) (2003) 1622–1633.
[5] C. Kelly, A framework for improving operational effectiveness and cost efficiency
in emergency planning and response, Disaster Prev. Manag. Int. J. 4 (3) (1995)
25–31.
[6] J. Weichselgartner, Disaster mitigation: the concept of vulnerability revisited,
Disaster Prev. Manag. Int. J. 10 (2) (2001) 85–95.
[7] G. Kovács, K. Spens, Identifying challenges in humanitarian logistics, Int. J. Phys.
Distrib. Logist. Manag. 39 (6) (2009) 506–528.
[8] T.E. Drabek, Disaster planning and response by tourist business executives, Cornell
Hotel Restaur. Adm. Q. 36 (3) (1995) 86–96.
[9] P.E. Murphy, R. Bayley, Tourism and disaster planning, Geogr. Rev. (1989) 36–46.
[10] G.A. Zsidisin, L.M. Ellram, J.R. Carter, J.L. Cavinato, An analysis of supply risk
assessment techniques, Int. J. Phys. Distrib. Logist. Manag. 34 (5) (2004) 397–413.
[11] J. Barney, Firm resources and sustained competitive advantage, J. Manag. 17 (1)
(1991) 99–120.
[12] A.A. Alchian, H. Demsetz, Production, information costs, and economic organi-
zation, Am. Econ. Rev. 62 (5) (1972) 777–795.
[13] T.T. Coates, C.M. McDermott, An exploratory analysis of new competencies: a
resource based view perspective, J. Oper. Manag. 20 (5) (2002) 435–450.
[14] S. Royer, Strategic Management and Online Selling: Creating Competitive
Advantage with Intangible Web Goods, Routledge, 2013.
[15] W.S. DeSarbo, C.A. Di Benedetto, M. Song, A heterogeneous resource based view
for exploring relationships between firm performance and capabilities, J. Model.
Manag. 2 (2) (2007) 103–130.
[16] E. Penrose, E.T. Penrose, The Theory of the Growth of the Firm, Oxford university
press, 2009.
[17] E.L. Quarantelli, More and Worse Disasters in the Future: the Social Factors
Involved, (1991).
[18] A. McFarlane, F. Norris, Definitions and concepts in disaster research, Methods
Disaster Ment. Heal. Res. 3–19 (2006).
[19] R.W. Perry, E.L. Quarantelli, ‘What Is a Disaster? More Perspectives’, Xlibris,
Philadelphia Google Sch., 2004.
[20] E. Nikbakhsh, R.Z. Farahani, S. Rezapour, L. Kardar, Humanitarian logistics
planning in disaster relief operations, Logist. Oper. Manag. Concepts Model. 291
(2011).
[21] J. Chen, A.S. Sohal, D.I. Prajogo, Supply chain operational risk mitigation: a col-
laborative approach, Int. J. Prod. Res. 51 (7) (2013) 2186–2199.
[22] M.S. Sodhi, B. Son, C.S. Tang, Researchers’ perspectives on supply chain risk
management, Prod. Oper. Manag. 21 (1) (2012) 1–13.
[23] S. Mandal, An empirical investigation into supply chain resilience, IUP J. Supply
Chain Manag. 9 (4) (2012) 46.
[24] T. Sawik, Selection and protection of suppliers in a supply chain with disruption
risks, Int. J. Logist. Syst. Manag. 15 (2–3) (2013) 143–159.
[25] L. Huang, J.-S. Song, J. Tong, Supply chain planning for random demand surges:
reactive capacity and safety stock, Manuf. Serv. Oper. Manag. 18 (4) (2016)
509–524.
[26] T.E. Drabek, Human System Responses to Disaster: an Inventory of Sociological
Findings, Springer Science & Business Media, 2012.
[27] R. Bhamra, S. Dani, K. Burnard, Resilience: the concept, a literature review and
future directions, Int. J. Prod. Res. 49 (18) (2011) 5375–5393.
[28] R.W. Perry, M.K. Lindell, Preparedness for emergency response: guidelines for the
emergency planning process, Disasters 27 (4) (2003) 336–350.
[29] D.M. Lambert, M.C. Cooper, J.D. Pagh, Supply chain management: implementa-
tion issues and research opportunities, Int. J. Logist. Manag. 9 (2) (1998) 1–20.
[30] M.E. Porter, V.E. Millar, How Information Gives You Competitive Advantage,
Harvard Business Review Cambridge, MA, 1985.
[31] P. Kraljic, Purchasing must become supply management, Harv. Bus. Rev. 61 (5)
(1983) 109–117.
[32] F. Weiss, Public Procurement in European Community Law vol. 4, Athlone Pr,
1993.
[33] PPA Manual, Public Procurement Act, (2003), p. 2007. Act 663.
[34] The Public Procurement Act 2003 (Act 663). Accra: Assembly Press.
[35] J. Kwesi-Buor, D.A. Menachof, R. Talas, Scenario analysis and disaster prepared-
ness for port and maritime logistics risk management, Accid. Anal. Prev. (2016),
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.aap.2016.07.013.
[36] A.S. Carr, L.R. Smeltzer, An empirically based operational definition of strategic
purchasing, Eur. J. Purch. Supply Manag. 3 (4) (1997) 199–207.
[37] D.M. Lambert, M.C. Cooper, Issues in supply chain management, Ind. Mark.
Manag. 29 (1) (2000) 65–83.
[38] T. Skjøtt-Larsen, H. Kotzab, M. Grieger, Electronic marketplaces and supply chain
relationships, Ind. Mark. Manag. 32 (3) (2003) 199–210.
[39] M. Christopher, J. Gattorna, Supply chain cost management and value-based
pricing, Ind. Mark. Manag. 34 (2) (2005) 115–121.
[40] J.D. Wisner, A structural equation model of supply chain management strategies
and firm performance, J. Bus. Logist. 24 (1) (2003) 1–26.
[41] E.H. Chamberlin, Theory of Monopolistic Competition: A Re-orientation of the
Theory of Value, Oxford University Press, London, 1949.
[42] A. Ordanini, G. Rubera, Strategic capabilities and internet resources in procure-
ment: a resource-based view of B-to-B buying process, Int. J. Oper. Prod. Manag.
28 (1) (2008) 27–52.
[43] G. Hooley, A. Broderick, K. Möller, Competitive positioning and the resource-
based view of the firm, J. Strateg. Mark. 6 (2) (1998) 97–116.
[44] R. Amit, P.J.H. Schoemaker, Strategic assets and organizational rent, Strateg.
Manag. J. 14 (1) (1993) 33–46.
J. Kwesi Buor
[45] D.J. Collis, C.A. Montgomery, Competing on resources: strategy in the 1990s,
Knowl. Strateg. (1995) 25–40.
[46] C. Oliver, ‘Sustainable competitive advantage: combining institutional and re-
source‐based views’, Strateg. Manag. J. 18 (9) (1997) 697–713.
[47] S.L. Hart, A natural-resource-based view of the firm, Acad. Manag. Rev. 20 (4)
(1995) 986–1014.
[48] P. Bolton, The use of government procurement as an instrument of policy, S.
African LJ 121 (2004) 619.
[49] W.-H. Tsai, H.-C. Chen, J.-D. Leu, Y.-C. Chang, T.W. Lin, A product-mix decision
model using green manufacturing technologies under activity-based costing, J.
Clean. Prod. 57 (2013) 178–187.
[50] M. Faccio, The impact of production mix variations and models varieties on the
parts-feeding policy selection in a JIT assembly system, Int. J. Adv. Manuf.
Technol. 72 (1–4) (2014) 543–560.
[51] K. Das, A.H. Chowdhury, Designing a reverse logistics network for optimal col-
lection, recovery and quality-based product-mix planning, Int. J. Prod. Econ. 135
(1) (2012) 209–221.
[52] R. Kee, C. Schmidt, A comparative analysis of utilizing activity-based costing and
the theory of constraints for making product-mix decisions, Int. J. Prod. Econ. 63
(1) (2000) 1–17.
[53] R.L. Chapman, C. Soosay, J. Kandampully, Innovation in logistic services and the
new business model: a conceptual framework, Int. J. Phys. Distrib. Logist. Manag.
33 (7) (2003) 630–650.
[54] L. Zavanella, S. Zanoni, ‘A one-vendor multi-buyer integrated production-in-
ventory model: the “Consignment Stock”case’, Int. J. Prod. Econ. 118 (1) (2009)
225–232.
[55] A.H.I. Lee, H.-Y. Kang, W.-P. Wang, Analysis of priority mix planning for the
fabrication of semiconductors under uncertainty, Int. J. Adv. Manuf. Technol. 28
(3–4) (2006) 351–361.
[56] J. Mula, R. Poler, J.P. García-Sabater, F.C. Lario, Models for production planning
under uncertainty: a review, Int. J. Prod. Econ. 103 (1) (2006) 271–285.
[57] S. Elluru, H. Gupta, H. Kaur, S.P. Singh, Proactive and reactive models for disaster
resilient supply chain, Ann. Oper. Res. (1–26) (2017).
[58] G.R. Nasiri, R. Zolfaghari, H. Davoudpour, ‘An integrated supply chain pro-
duction–distribution planning with stochastic demands’, Comput. Ind. Eng. 77
(2014) 35–45.
[59] M. Díaz-Madroñero, J. Mula, D. Peidro, A mathematical programming model for
integrating production and procurement transport decisions, Appl. Math. Model.
52 (2017) 527–543.
[60] S.A. Hoseini Shekarabi, A. Gharaei, M. Karimi, Modelling and optimal lot-sizing of
integrated multi-level multi-wholesaler supply chains under the shortage and
limited warehouse space: generalised outer approximation, Int. J. Syst. Sci. Oper.
Logist. (1–21) (2018).
[61] H. Kaur, S.P. Singh, Heuristic modeling for sustainable procurement and logistics
in a supply chain using big data, Comput. Oper. Res. 98 (2018) 301–321.
[62] H. Huang, N. Zeng, H. Xu, Procurement mechanism for dual sourcing and emer-
gency production under capacity constraint, Comput. Ind. Eng. 119 (2018)
204–218.
[63] V. Jain, S. Kumar, U. Soni, C. Chandra, Supply chain resilience: model develop-
ment and empirical analysis, Int. J. Prod. Res. 55 (22) (2017) 6779–6800.
[64] C. Roberta Pereira, M. Christopher, A. Lago Da Silva, Achieving supply chain re-
silience: the role of procurement, Supply Chain Manag. Int. J. 19 (5/6) (2014)
626–642.
[65] J. Perl, M.S. Daskin, A warehouse location-routing problem, Transp. Res. Part B
Methodol. 19 (5) (1985) 381–396.
[66] A. Tayal, S.P. Singh, Formulating multi-objective stochastic dynamic facility
layout problem for disaster relief, Ann. Oper. Res. (2017) 1–27.
[67] S. DuHadway, S. Carnovale, B. Hazen, Understanding risk management for in-
tentional supply chain disruptions: risk detection, risk mitigation, and risk re-
covery, Ann. Oper. Res. (2017) 1–20.
[68] C. Duhamel, A.C. Santos, D. Brasil, E. Châtelet, B. Birregah, Connecting a popu-
lation dynamic model with a multi-period location-allocation problem for post-
disaster relief operations, Ann. Oper. Res. 247 (2) (2016) 693–713.
[69] S.M. Khalili, F. Jolai, S.A. Torabi, ‘Integrated production–distribution planning in
two-echelon systems: a resilience view’, Int. J. Prod. Res. 55 (4) (2017)
1040–1064.
[70] W. Manopiniwes, T. Irohara, Stochastic optimisation model for integrated deci-
sions on relief supply chains: preparedness for disaster response, Int. J. Prod. Res.
55 (4) (2017) 979–996.
[71] J.D.W. Morecroft, Strategic Modelling and Business Dynamics: A Feedback
Systems Approach, John Wiley & Sons, 2015.
[72] M. Schaffernicht, Causal loop diagrams between structure and behaviour: a critical
analysis of the relationship between polarity, behaviour and events, Syst. Res.
Behav. Sci. 6 (27) (2010) 653–666.
[73] G. Montibeller, V. Belton, ‘Causal maps and the evaluation of decision options—a
review’, J. Oper. Res. Soc. 57 (7) (2006) 779–791.
[74] J.D. Sterman, Business Dynamics: Systems Thinking and Modeling for a Complex
World, (2000), p. 2000 no. HD30. 2 S7835.
[75] J.W. Forrester, ‘The” model versus a modeling “process’, Syst. Dyn. Rev. 1 (1)
(1985) 133–134.
[76] S.N. Groesser, M. Schaffernicht, Mental models of dynamic systems: taking stock
and looking ahead, Syst. Dyn. Rev. 28 (1) (2012) 46–68.
[77] J.D. Sterman, Modeling managerial behavior: misperceptions of feedback in a
dynamic decision making experiment, Manag. Sci. 35 (3) (1989) 321–339.
[78] E. Moxnes, Not only the tragedy of the commons: misperceptions of feedback and
policies for sustainable development, Syst. Dyn. Rev. J. Syst. Dyn. Soc. 16 (4)
10
International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction 36 (2019) 101120
(2000) 325–348.
[79] J. Sterman, System Dynamics: Systems Thinking and Modeling for a Complex
World, (2002).
[80] L.B. Sweeney, J.D. Sterman, Thinking about systems: student and teacher con-
ceptions of natural and social systems, Syst. Dyn. Rev. J. Syst. Dyn. Soc. 23 (2‐3)
(2007) 285–311.
[81] J.D. Sterman, Risk communication on climate: mental models and mass balance,
Science (80-. ) 322 (5901) (2008) 532–533.
[82] E. Moxnes, Misperceptions of basic dynamics: the case of renewable resource
management, Syst. Dyn. Rev. J. Syst. Dyn. Soc. 20 (2) (2004) 139–162.
[83] C. Eden, F. Ackermann, Cognitive mapping expert views for policy analysis in the
public sector, Eur. J. Oper. Res. 152 (3) (2004) 615–630.
[84] T. Williams, F. Ackermann, C. Eden, Structuring a delay and disruption claim: an
application of cause-mapping and system dynamics, Eur. J. Oper. Res. 148 (1)
(2003) 192–204.
[85] J.D.W. Morecroft, A critical review of diagramming tools for conceptualizing
feedback system models, Dynamica 8 (1) (1982) 20–29.
[86] H.V. Haraldsson, Introduction to System Thinking and Causal Loop Diagrams,
Department of Chemical Engineering, Lund University, 2004.
[87] E.F. Wolstenholme, System dynamics in perspective, J. Oper. Res. Soc. 33 (6)
(1982) 547–556.
[88] C. Binder, J. Hinkel, P. Bots, C. Pahl-Wostl, Comparison of frameworks for ana-
lyzing social-ecological systems, Ecol. Soc. 18 (4) (2013).
[89] E.F. Wolstenholme, Towards the definition and use of a core set of archetypal
structures in system dynamics, Syst. Dyn. Rev. 19 (1) (2003) 7–26.
[90] P. Senge, The Fifth Discipline: the an and Practice of the Learning Organization,
New York Duubeday Curr., 1990.
[91] G.P. Richardson, ‘Problems with causal‐loop diagrams’, Syst. Dyn. Rev. 2 (2)
(1986) 158–170.
[92] G. Ossimitz, Teaching system dynamics and systems thinking in Austria and
Germany, System Dynamics Conference in Bergen, Norway, 2000.
[93] C. Lapp, G. Ossimitz, Proposing a classification of feedback loops in four types, Sci.
Inq. 9 (1) (2008) 29–36.
[94] S.M. Wagner, S.S. Padhi, C. Bode, The procurement process, Ind. Eng. 45 (2)
(2013) 34–39.
[95] R.G. Newman, Single sourcing: short-term savings versus long-term problems, J.
Purch. Mater. Manag. 25 (2) (1989) 20–26.
[96] M. Treleven, S.B. Schweikhart, A risk/benefit analysis of sourcing strategies: single
vs. multiple sourcing, J. Oper. Manag. 7 (3–4) (1988) 93–114.
[97] P.D. Larson, J.D. Kulchitsky, Single sourcing and supplier certification: perfor-
mance and relationship implications, Ind. Mark. Manag. 27 (1) (1998) 73–81.
[98] H. Yu, A.Z. Zeng, L. Zhao, Single or dual sourcing: decision-making in the presence
of supply chain disruption risks, Omega 37 (4) (2009) 788–800.
[99] J.W. Creswell, C.N. Poth, Qualitative Inquiry and Research Design: Choosing
Among Five Approaches, Sage publications, 2017.
[100] I. Newman, C.S. Ridenour, C. Newman, G.M. De Marco, A Typology of Research
Purposes and its Relationship to Mixed Methods in Social and Behavioral
Research, EE. UU. Sage, Thousand Oaks, CA, 2002, pp. 167–188.
[101] B. Hancock, E. Ockleford, K. Windridge, An Introduction to Qualitative Research,
Trent focus group Nottingham, 1998.
[102] A. Bryman, Why do researchers integrate/combine/mesh/blend/mix/merge/fuse
quantitative and qualitative research, Adv. Mix. Methods Res. (2008) 87–100.
[103] R. Longhurst, Semi-structured Interviews and Focus Groups, Key methods Geogr.,
2003, pp. 117–132.
[104] R.E. Nisbett, T.D. Wilson, Telling more than we can know: verbal reports on
mental processes, Psychol. Rev. 84 (3) (1977) 231.
[105] B.G. Glaser, A.L. Strauss, Discovery of Grounded Theory: Strategies for Qualitative
Research, Routledge, 2017.
[106] J.D.W. Morecroft, et al., Modeling for Learning Organizations. Productivity,
Incorporated, (1994).
[107] M.Q. Patton, Qualitative Research and Evaluation Methods, Cal. Sage Publ,
Thousand Oaks, 2002.
[108] I. Seidman, Interviewing as Qualitative Research: A Guide for Researchers in
Education and the Social Sciences, Teachers college press, 2013.
[109] S. Kvale, Doing Interviews, Sage, 2008.
[110] D. Bertaux, From the life-history approach to the transformation of sociological
practice, Biogr. Soc. Life Hist. Approach Soc. Sci. (1981) 29–45.
[111] G. Guest, A. Bunce, L. Johnson, How many interviews are enough? An experiment
with data saturation and variability, Field Methods 18 (1) (2006) 59–82.
[112] A. Strauss, J. Corbin, Open coding, Basics Qual. Res. Grounded theory Proced.
Tech. 2 (1990) (1990) 101–121.
[113] T. Gallicano, An Example of How to Perform Open Coding, Axial Coding and
Selective Coding, PR Post, 2013.
[114] M. Cope, Coding transcripts and diaries 27, Key Methods Geogr. 440 (2010).
[115] S.H. Khandkar, Open Coding vol 23, Univ. Calgary, 2009, p. 2009.
[116] G. Terry, N. Hayfield, V. Clarke, V. Braun, Thematic Analysis, Sage Handb. Qual.
Res. Psychol., 2017, pp. 17–37.
[117] C. Cohen, E.D. Werker, ‘The political economy of``Natural’’Disasters’, J. Confl.
Resolut. 52 (6) (2008) 795–819.
[118] A. Erridge, R. Fee, J. McIlroy, An assessment of competitive tendering using
transaction cost analysis, Publ. Money Manag. 19 (3) (1999) 37–42.
[119] J.T. Glover, Procurement Management as a Strategic Tool for Achieving
Organizational Goals: a Case Study of Ga East Municipal Assembly, (2014).
[120] A. Cox, D. Chicksand, P. Ireland, Overcoming demand management problems: the
scope for improving reactive and proactive supply management in the UK health
service, J. Public Procure. 5 (1) (2005) 1.
J. Kwesi Buor
[121] J. Peprah, Trajectories of maverick buying in the district assemblies in Ghana, Eur.
J. Logist. Purch. Supply Chain Manag. 3 (4) (2015) 42–61.
[122] T. Søreide, Corruption in Public Procurement. Causes, Consequences and Cures,
Chr. Michelsen Intitute, 2002.
[123] R. Makadok, ‘Toward a synthesis of the resource‐based and dynamic‐capability
views of rent creation’, Strateg. Manag. J. 22 (5) (2001) 387–401.
[124] S. Piramuthu, Knowledge-based framework for automated dynamic supply chain
configuration, Eur. J. Oper. Res. 165 (1) (2005) 219–230.
[125] F. Heinrich, R. Hodess, Measuring corruption, Handb. Glob. Res. Pract. Corrupt.
(2011) 18–33.
[126] G.P. Richardson, A.I. Pugh III, Introduction to System Dynamics Modeling with
DYNAMO, Productivity Press Inc., 1981.
[127] E. Osei-Tutu, S. Mensdah, C. Ameya, The Level of Compliance with the Public
Procurement Act (Act 663) in Ghana, (2011).
11
International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction 36 (2019) 101120
[128] R.M. Tomasini, L.N. Van Wassenhove, A framework to unravel, prioritize and
coordinate vulnerability and complexity factors affecting a humanitarian response
operation, INSEAD, Fac. Res. (2004) 1–15.
[129] R. McMaster, Competitive tendering in UK health and local authorities: what
happens to the quality of services? Scot. J. Polit. Econ. 42 (4) (1995) 409–427.
[130] K. Walsh, Public Services and Market Mechanisms: Competition, Contracting and
the New Public Management, Macmillan, 1995.
[131] P. Blaikie, T. Cannon, I. Davis, B. Wisner, At Risk: Natural Hazards, People's
Vulnerability and Disasters, Routledge, 2014.
[132] B. Richardson, Socio-technical disasters: profile and prevalence, Disaster Prev.
Manag. Int. J. 3 (4) (1994) 41–69.
[133] D.L. Rennie, Grounded theory methodology as methodical hermeneutics: re-
conciling realism and relativism, Theor. Psychol. 10 (4) (2000) 481–502.