PLATO: STATESMAN

with translation and commentary by

C. J. Rowe
 Λ (Bequestfrom the
(Research Library c f
(TrevorJohn Saunders,
Lecturer in Classicsfrom 1965,
(Professor ofgree^!978-1999.

£ugust2004
 PLATO

STATESMAN

Edited with an Introduction, Translation & Commentary

by

C. J. ROWE

ARIS & PHILLIPS LTD - WARMINSTER - ENGLAND

0 .5
C.J. Rowe 199S. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or stored
a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means including photocopying without
the prior permission of the Publishers in writing.

British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data

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ISBNs 0 85668 612 3 (cloth)

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Printed and published in England by Aris & Phillips Ltd. Teddington

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 Ill

Contents
Preface v

INTRODUCTION 1

Bibliography 21

GREEK TEXT & TRANSLATION 27

COMMENTARY 177

Index 246
 V

Preface
Attitudes towards the Statesman arc typically mixed. On the one hand, it is generally
regarded as a pivotal work in the development of Plato's political thinking, and also -
thanks to the great myth of the reversal of the universe - as important for our
understanding of his view of the physical world. But the proportion of the dialogue
which is occupied with these topics is relatively small; a much larger part is taken up
with painstaking applications of the procedure of 'division', which it is easy to find
tedious. The main character in the dialogue, the *Eleatic Stranger', himself raises
questions on more than one occasion about the amount of time which he and his
respondent (a younger namesake of Socrates') have spent on such things - admittedly,
for the most part, in order to dismiss the idea that it is excessive. But for some readers,
of some stretches of the dialogue, there have certainly seemed to be too many words
deployed to too liulc effect The result is that until recently, at least in modem times, the
work as a whole has been relatively neglected, and whatever attention has been paid to it
- with some honourable exceptions - has been directed to its more obviously attractive
and interesting parts. But this is in my view unfortunate. Modem readers may well not
feel in need of the lesson in Platonic dialectic which appears to constitute the main point
of the divisions themselves, but those passages which they have tended to find
interesting arc not fully intelligible except in the context of the whole, including the
divisions; and indeed it will be my contention that some of those passages have been
radically misunderstood, in a way that has seriously distorted our view of Plato's later
thinking. I should also claim that the laborious search for the definition of the statesman
is in fact essential reading for anyone interested in his metaphysics, his ontology, or his
conception of philosophy in general. Once its point, and its principles, are properly
grasped, it is also a good deal less tedious, and more subtle, than it has often been taken
lobe.
My own original encounter with the dialogue was in the company of J.B. Skcmp's
translation, which in different versions has been the most widely used in the English-
speaking world for the last forty years. Subsequently, I used the Skcmp translation in
teaching undergraduate courses in ancient political theory; but over the years my
disagreements with it about the handling over some key passages and terms became
gradually more extensive, and the very elegance of its English seemed increasingly
unsuiled to the needs of the students, who looked for a more direct way in to Plato's
arguments. They also evidently required more help of other sorts, in the form of
continuous notes on what is on any account a difficult work, whether in English or in
Greek. The present volume is meant partly as an immediate response to such needs,
though it is by no means intended exclusively for student use; it inevitably reflects
something of my own battles to understand Plato's text, and the reporting of these may
on occasion be more detailed than any undergraduate, or indeed graduate, student might
require. Another of the proximate causes of the volume was the Third Symposium
Platonicum, which look place in Bristol in 1992 on the subject of the Statesman: many
of the ideas contained in the commentary were originally conceived in the course of the
editing of the Proceedings of that meeting (published in 199S under the title Reading the
Statesman).
VI

I should like to express my thanks to Adrian Phillips for his enthusiasm Tor taking on
the project; to the University of Bristol, whose award to me οΓ a University Fellowship
in 1993-4 enabled me to start and complete most of it; to the University of Wisconsin-
Madison, and to the University's Institute for Research in the Humanities in the Old
Observatory above Lake Mendota, where - as holder of a Friedrich Solmscn Fellowship
- 1 finished the work in the late summer and autumn of 1994; and finally to several
people who have read and discussed parts of the volume with me, especially Terry
Penner in Madison and Luc Brisson in Paris. It is dedicated to Joe Skemp, who would
have liked nothing better than to have continued to discuss his second favourite
dialogue. I hope he would have approved.
Madison, November 1994
 Introduction
1. The subjects) of the dialogue

The Statesman sets out - formally - to reach an account or definition, agreed between
the two protagonists, of what in Greek is referred to as the π ο λ ίτ ικ ο ? (Latinized as
'Politicus'), and π ο λ ίτ ικ η , terms which arc traditionally translated into English as
'statesman' and 'statesmanship'. The second term is short for π ο λ ιτ ικ ή τ έ χ ν η or
πολιτική επ ισ τή μ η , which is that body of specialized expertise or knowledge, whatever
it may be, in virtue of which a man (in this work, at least, Plato assumes it will be a man
and not a woman) will be called π ο λιτικ ό ?. The expertise in question turns out not to
belong to any of those who currently occupy themselves with die affairs of stale, in any
city; if anyone did possess it, it would justify the abandonment of all existing forms of
political arrangement - democracies, oligarchies, and the rest - in favour of the expert
rule of this individual. In other words, what turns out to be defined is someone who, if
he exists at all, is not actually in power at all (it is agreed that the mere possession of the
requisite knowledge is a sufficient condition of being a πολιτικ ό?). He is, as we might
put it, the (Platonic) ideal ruler. To modem readers, who suppose - because they have
been told so - that the dialogue is about the 'statesman', or statesmen, this is likely to be
a surprising discovery, in so far as we recognize all sorts of people as statesmen, if
usually elder ones, so that we arc likely to suppose that these, or their essential
characteristics, arc going to be the object of the inquiry. But Plato's original audience
would probably have been less surprised, since the term π ο λ ιτικ ό ? , as applied to an
individual, is not one in regular use, and may well itself be a Platonic innovation. As
Hansen points out in his 1983 article (sec bibliography), there arc plenty of Greek
equivalents for 'politician', in the sense of 'person involved in the affairs of the city'
(ί>ήτωρ, π ο λιτευό μ ενο ?, Βΐ^συ'μβουλο?; 'political leaders' arc ρήτορε? και σ τρ α τη γ ο ί,
'orators and generals', or simply £ ή το ρ ε ? ); but he discovers only one instance of
π ολιτικ ό? used by a non-philosophical writer, and that occurs in a speech dating from a
time after Plato's death (Aeschines, On the Embassy 184). Plato uses the term without
apology,1 and may even be taken as suggesting that it is in current usage: in the Sophist,
which first introduces the subject of the π ο λιτικ ό ? for discussion,23the question which
introduces it - addressed by the elder Socrates to the 'Elcalic Stranger' (216 d - 217 a)J -

1 Often in the sense of '(so-called) politician/political expert', as c.g. at Apology 21 c: see

below, and Skemp, in the original Introduction to his translation of the Statesman, p.19.
2 Along with the 'sophist' (sec below) and the philosopher; the first is treated in the Sophist,
but the philosopher - for whatever reason - never receives separate treatment. (The
conversation fictionally recorded in the Sophist is supposed to have taken place in the
morning, the discussion of the Statesman in the afternoon of the same day - with the
Theaetetus treatment of knowledge on the day before. But the important connections of the
Statesman arc all with the Sophist, to which it refers, under the guise of referring to that
conversation, more than once.)
3 '216 d’, etc. is the standard way of referring to Platonic texts: ^ Ιό ' represents the page
number in the relevant volume of H.Stcphanus' 1378 edition of Plato, and 'd' the fourth of
2 INTRODUCTION
is about what it is that people in his part of the world would apply the name to.
However that may be, the Greek term πολιτικό? would have had a rather less well-
defined reference than our 'statesman'. The question 'what is a πολιτικό??' is not so
much a request for a definition of an actual feature of the world (as 'what is a statesman?’
could be, in so far as it might be answerable with reference to actual statesmen), more an
invitation to consider the proper specifications for someone charged with running, or
helping to run, a city-state or polis.45
This point about the remoteness, or distance, of the definiendum from the actual
world is reinforced by the alacrity with which the younger Socrates, who takes on the
task of responding to the Stranger in the Statesman, accepts the proposition that
'statesmen'3 possess a kind of expertise, that of 'statesmanship'. It would certainly not
have been a normal assumption, in the context within which Plato was writing, that
involvement in politics required any specialist qualifications; after all, the basis of
Athenian democracy was that any adult male citizen was qualified to contribute to the
processes of deliberation and decision-making just by virtue of being a citizen. What
may help to condition young Socrates' acceptance of the proposition is the very form of
the word πολιτικό?. Adjectives ending in -iko? (which like other adjectives can be
made into substantives, as in the case of [6] πολιτικό?) mark out a particular area of
specialism, with its associated expertise or τεχνη/έπιστημη - though the kind of expert
knowledge involved may not be of a very high order, and feminine substantives ending
in πκη (sc. τέχνη, i.e. '[the art]6 of Φ-ing', where 'Φ-ing' stands for something people do
in an organized way) will often refer primarily to the relevant activity, as c.g. in the ease
of Ρητορική, 'rhetoric', or αριθμητική', 'arithmetic'. In the ease of the 'sophistry', which
is die formal subject of the Sophist, the Stranger gets Theaetetus to agree on independent
grounds that the sophist ought to be an expert of some sort: the title of 'sophist' itself
suggests it (sc. because it suggests the epithet σοφό?, 'wise', and in fact σοφιστή'?,

what arc usually five sections of that page (the line number in the section may also be
given).
4 This is what Socrates' question to the Stranger in the Sophist probably amounts to, rather
than a request to be told about usage in the Greek colony of Elea in southern Italy: Td be
glad to discover from our guest ... what people in that region thought these things [sc.
sophist, πολιτικό?, and philosopher] were when he was there, and what they called by these
names'.
5 'Statesman' will hereafter function as the equivalent of the Greek πολιτικό?; but of course
the caveats just introduced must continue to be borne in mind.
6 'Art' is one of the traditional translations of τέχνη (or Επιστήμη, "knowledge', where —as for
the most part in the Statesman - this refers to a specific type of knowledge and so functions
as a synonym of τέχνη); 'craft' is another (sometimes 'skill'). But some of the things which
can be treated as τε'χναι, as we soon discover from the Statesman, arc neither 'arts' nor
'crafts' in our sense: e.g. mathematics, or the playing of games. The generic concept is that
of expert, specialized knowledge, and for this reason I have usually chosen to translate
τέχνη as 'expertise' (plural kinds of expertise'; Επιστήμη is ‘expert knowledge'). But in
contexts like 'the τέχνη o f ...', I have retained 'art o f as a substitute for the gymnastics which
would be needed to bring in 'expertise'.
 INTRODUCTION 3
before Plato, can itself mean simply 'expert1).7 The first definition is then stated in terms
of 'sophistic' (223 b: i.c. σοφ ιστική [τέχνη]); by the end of the conversation, it is clearly
established that sophists arc in fact ignorant (267 c, 268 b), and yet the Stranger goes on
referring to him by using -iko? and -ικη forms. But when in the Statesman Socrates
agrees, at least provisionally, that the πολιτικό? is 'one of the experts’, it is apparently on
the basis of nothing except the name.8
In the ease of the statesman, this initial assumption not only turns out not to be
disturbed, but actually becomes a vital premiss in the argument which the Stranger
mounts to demonstrate the difference between the real statesman and those who
currently occupy positions of power in cities (292 b).9 By the end of the dialogue, some
kind of definition of the statesman has been offered, together with an extended
description of his central function in 'weaving together' the elements of a city (see
Section S below). But this is not the only, or perhaps even the main, purpose of the
S ta te sm a n . If it were, then the long series of divisions and expositions of
methodological points which has preceded would seem excessive. In fact, we find the
Stranger and young Socrates agreeing that the aim of the search for the statesman is at
least as much for the sake of their becoming better dialecticians, belter able to discuss
important topics in a methodical and productive way (285 c - 286 b). This is not by any
means to suggest that the formal subject of inquiry is a mere training exercise, or to deny
that significant results arc in fact reached about the nature of 'statesmanship', and the
proper way to run a city (or state).10 But readers need to be warned in advance that
despite its title, this is not an exclusively political dialogue. It is also in part a
demonstration lesson in method, and in precision. This is what accounts for its apparent
laboriousness: moving carefully means moving slowly, and the degree of tedium which
we feel at the pedestrian speed with which the Stranger sometimes moves will (or so he
suggests) be in inverse proportion to our devotion to philosophy. Being the inventive
and versatile writer that he is, Plato frequently laughs at his own procedures, and

7 What Plato is defining is, of course, quite a different animal: two obvious examples who fit
his final definition in the Sophist arc the two verbal prestidigitators of the Euthydemus, the
brothers Euthydemus and Dionysodorus.
8 258 b. 'Now tell me,' the Stranger says to young Socrates: 'should we posit in the ease of
this person too that he is one of those who possess knowledge, or what assumption should
we make?' This person too', i.e. as well as the sophist, who has just been mentioned. The
Stranger might perhaps be taken as arguing a fortiori (if we began in the other ease by
supposing that the sophist was an expert of some sort, surely we should suppose the same to
be true of the statesman?). But there is no positive indication of this, whereas the linguistic
argument - however inconclusive - looks ready to hand.
9 Young Socrates is asked at this point whether the assumption should be retained; and by this
time he has had ample grounds (if arguments from analogy arc worth anything) for saying
that it should. If caring for human beings is at all like caring for other living things -
statesmanship has been described as a kind of ‘caring for the human herd' - then we should
indeed expect it to involve specialist knowledge.
10 The conclusions of the dialogue, of course, relate cxplicidy and directly to the entity of the
polis or city-state; but the very generality of those conclusions, which claim to propose
something superior to any and every other (possible) form of political organization, invites
us to consider their applicability also within the very different context of the modem nation­
state.
4 INTRODUCTION
introduces suitably laborious jokes into the argument. But it is a mistake to suggest, as
many have done,11 that the divisions themselves arc not to be taken seriously. Parodying
a method is hardly by itself a good way of teaching it, and if we arc inclined to think it
merely amusing when man-herding is left bracketed with pig-herding, it is Plato who
might well have the last laugh (cf. Clark's essay on 'Herds of free bipeds').

2. Forms, classes, and division

One of the most difficult issues in the Statesman (and about its companion dialogue, the
Sophist) is aboul exactly what it is that the celebrated method of 'division' is supposed to
be dividing.12 A rough idea of what the method is will emerge from the initial moves in
the dialogue. Once the statesman is agreed to be one of those who possess expert
knowledge, the next step taken is to divide the different kinds of expert knowledge into
two, i.c., roughly, practical and theoretical; since statesmanship seems to belong more to
the second sort than to the first (because it has more to do with use of the intellect than
actual production), the former is discarded, and the sorts of theoretical expertise arc then
divided, again into two; those which arc purely theoretical, and those which have an
overseeing role, like that of the master-builder. Statesmanship belongs in this group
rather than in the purely theoretical one, so this one is taken up and itself divided; and so
on. The final definition, when it emerges, will in its full form mention all the items that
were not pul aside in the process, so that in the present ease statesmanship will emerge
as a kind of expert knowledge, of the theoretical sort, of the sort that oversees ...
(Division will not always be into two, but will always be into the lowest possible
number 287 b-c.13) But what is the ontological status of the 'dividend' (i.c. the thing
being divided) in each ease? Or, more simply, what kind of thing is it?
One answer that has been given to this question is that it is a Platonic 'form' (or
'Form'). What exactly a 'form' is, and indeed whether or not Plato still believed in such
things as he did before the Statesman, is a matter of considerable dispute; but on one
reading, it is an eternal object, existing separately from, and independently of, the things
in the ordinary world which 'partake'14 in it and share its name (so that c.g. there will be
a 'Form of Knowledge' to which all actual instances of knowledge relate, and which
somehow explains what they arc, while existing over and above them). It is also

11 See c.g. Rosen, ’Plato's myth of the reversed cosmos', pp.66-7.

12 The use of the method in the Sophist is in fact somewhat peremptory and unsystematic by
comparison with that in the Statesman; the latter contains by far the most extended example
of the application of division in the Platonic corpus.
13 That [division] is dichotomous in large parts of the Sophist and Statesman is not surprising.
For [Plato] is not here seeking to bring to light the structure of a whole genus, but to achieve
a definition of a particular species. For this purpose the important thing is at each stage to
hit on the relevant sub-genus of the superior genus; the irrelevant sub-genus can be thrown
away - and it doesn't matter if [t]hcrc arc some other (irrelevant) sub-genera we have not
mentioned' (Ackrill, 'In defense of Plato's division', p.384).
14 Or 'participate' (μοέχ««')> which is Plato's standard expression for the relationship between
particulars and forms (a relationship whose nature he himself evidently finds difficulty in
pinning down).
 INTRODUCTION 5
frequently supposed, more puzzlingly, but with some encouragement from Plato himself,
that a 'form' perfectly exemplifies whatever it is a 'form' of. It is things like this which
Skemp, c.g., means by "Forms' when he says that '[t]hc notion of a "world" of Forms, i.e.
of a Reality which is a kind of area occupied by Forms and susceptible of a dialectical
Ordnance Survey, is fundamental'.15 Such interpretations16 tend to represent the
separateness of forms from particulars in terms of a kind of religious transcendence; and
it is certainly true both that Plato sometimes calls the forms 'divine', and that he is
capable of describing the philosopher's progress towards knowledge in terms of a
religious initiation (as he docs c.g. in the Symposium, drawing on the rites of Elcusis).
But if this, quasi-religious, aspect is supposed still to be part of the conception of 'forms'
attributed to the Statesman, it must be a serious question why over and over again young
Socrates is asked to think about familiar types of things, and to respond on the basis of
his experience of them. If what he and the Stranger arc talking about is really a set of
visionary objects, that (with the possible exception of one passage, for which see below)
could only be gathered by importing what we think we know about what Plato says in
other dialogues.
On the other hand, there arc certainly some important elements of truth in this
reading of division. In particular, whatever else it might be, the method is not simply a
way of making a taxonomic classification of the world of experience; for otherwise the
Stranger would not be able to use it to reach the conclusions he docs about the
'statesman'. As we have seen, what he defines as statesmanship is something essentially
different from anything that is instantiated in any actual city. There may be some actual
(true) statesmen living out their lives as private citizens, people who fulfil the sole
requirement of possessing the relevant expertise; but even if there did not exist any such
people, the Stranger's conclusion would not be affected in the least - this would still be
what statesmanship, really and genuinely, is. Any account of the Statesman will have to
do justice both to this point and to the plain fact that what the Stranger and young
Socrates arc actually discussing is nevertheless, for the most part, the familiar world
around us.
The situation is not made easier by some aspects of the language of the Statesman.
The Stranger’s name for what is divided, and what it is divided into, is cISo?, or ye νος,
with a supporting role played by l6ca (φΟλον, φυσι?, χόρο? and σχήμα arc other
possibilities: Plato rarely likes to lie himself to a fixed technical vocabulary). Now the
first and third of these terms arc actually regularly employed, in other dialogues, for
'forms'; and yet here, as I have said, what is divided docs not look much like the
traditional forms - not only is no effort made to distinguish or separate the <ΐδη
divided17 from individual objects, but it frequently looks as if the dividend is actually

15 Introduction to Plato, The Statesman, p.74, n.3. Skemp refers for the idea to Comford
(F.M.Comford, Plato's Theory o f Knowledge, London 1957), with whom this type of
interpretation is most closely associated.
16 Possibly including Skemp's, though in the 'Postscript' to the second edition of Plato, The
Statesman (1987), he shows some signs of resisting the claim - directed against him by
Owen - that he discovers 'Forms as transcendent entities' in the Statesman; his position is
that 'the Forms arc still an order of real things objective and permanent' (p.241).
17 That form s should be 'divided', even logically or theoretically, is normally regarded as
inconsistent with die doctrine of dialogues earlier than the Sophist and Statesman; in such
6 INTRODUCTION
individual objects themselves, albeit as Tailing under general types (see c.g. Statesman
264 b-d, where the Stranger uses young Socrates' familiarity with actual eases oT fish-,
goose- and crane-rearing to persuade him of the need to divide caring for herds into
water-based herd-rearing and land-based herd-rearing). This is a highly complex and
disputed matter, but I propose the following as one way of interpreting the text What is
divided at each stage is to be envisaged as something like a class, i.c. a class of
particular items; thus the ct6o? of all 'knowledges' or kinds of expert knowledge, with
which the divisions begin, is the class or set of all actual and possible instances or eases,
or, more economically, of all actual or possible practitioners of all kinds of expert
knowledge (the addition of 'or possible' is needed, of course, to allow - among other
things - for eases like that of statesmanship: that cities happen to lack true statesmen is,
again, not a reason for leaving such individuals out, if the argument shows them to be
part of the proper scheme of things). All subsequent divisions involve the identification
of smaller and smaller parts of this large number of items, i.c. sub-classes, until we are
left only with 'statesmen'. The divisions, if properly done, take place 'in accordance with
είδη' (see e.g. 285 a): that is, each class separated off will be characterized by some
property which distinguishes it from what it is being separated from in some way
relevant to identifying the essential characteristics of the thing being defined. It is here,
if anywhere, that there will be room for 'forms', in so far as the members of each class
and sub-class will be characterized by some particular property, in virtue of which it is
being treated as a class (or sub-class); and some of the features associated with
properties certainly closely resemble those that Plato typically attributes to forms.18
Now this is not to say that Platonic forms are properties; nor that what Platonic
division divides is classes - and not even that it always divides things that arc class-like.
Further, even if we do not jib at the prospect of classes with possible members, the
necessity to introduce such things (on Plato's behalf, and it is not clear that he would
thank us for it) clearly raises the question whether the discussion in such eases is not in
fact rather about the properties - or property-like things - which characterize the classes
rather than the classes themselves.19 In fact, there is fairly direct evidence that it is these
in which the Strangcr's/Plalo's ultimate interest lies. 'All of what is now being said', the
Stranger says at 286 a, apparently looking back generally at the preceding discussion, 'is
for the sake of these things' - where 'these things' are 'the things that arc without body,
which arc finest and greatest'. These things arc, or include, 'the just, the fine, and the
good' (see commentary ad loc.); and if they arc 'without body', what must be meant is the
properties, or forms, themselves, not their extensions, the particulars corresponding to

dialogues they arc typically treated as unitary, or μοι-οαβή (as c.g. at Phaedo 78 d). But the
Sophist, with its idea of the ‘communion of forms', can readily be seen as preparing the way
for this particular change.
18 Among the various treatments of division accessible to the reader through the bibliography,
the account so far suggested is closest to what Cohen, in his commentary on Moravesik's
1973 essay, labels the 'supcrclcan' model of the logical and ontological structure of division.
(In general, I have found this exchange between Moravesik and Cohen one of the most
rewarding items in the literature on the subject.)
19 Or, put more bluntly (and as Terry Penner put it to me), how could we even pretend to
examine statesmanship by investigating members of the class of statesmen whose existence
is at best presumed?
 INTRODUCTION 7
them. However, the immediate context is all about the use of the perceptible to help us
with our inquiry into the bodiless; specifically, about the use of die example or analogy
of weaving to help us understand statesmanship (which, if not actually one of 'the finest
and greatest things', is surely up there with them - and is probably also txxiilcss', qua
imperceptible, probably just because it is not plainly instantiated); and I suggest that the
dialogue as a whole is deliberately operating at this level, for the same reasons. Of
course, reference to experience, and to the 'world' of particulars, may always be
important in the investigation of any subject. But the Statesman seems particularly
directed towards this world, and away from the more complex sort of metaphysical and
ontological scheme which we find directly, if somewhat obscurely, broached in, say, the
Philebus. It is this feature of the dialogue, in my view, which makes its particular
treatment of division by and large susceptible to the analysis suggested above, in terms
of something like 'classes'. This view is reflected in the translation of the Statesman in
the present volume: throughout the translation, 'class' is used fairly consistently for είδος
and γ έ ν ο ς when these refer to the dividend.20 Readers should be aware that what they
arc being offered in such eases is more heavily burdened with interpretation than usual.
But the same would, of course, be true of any rendering of the terms in question which
was not a mere place-filler.
'Division' describes only one half of the dialcctial method favoured by the Statesman;
the other half is 'collection' or 'bringing together' (cf. note on 282 b 6-7). Any example
of division will involve a prior collection of whatever is to be divided; in the ease where
division aims at the definition of a particular item, the process has to begin with the
identification of a higher ε ίδ ο ς (as the Statesm an starts with 'kinds of expert
knowledge'), which implies recognizing similarities between the definiendum and a
whole range of disparate items - which arc 'brought together' in the first dividend. But
'collection' is not restricted to this function, any more than division is restricted to the
business of defining. The essential purpose of the method as a whole is to introduce
clarity into our thinking (whatever the ontological status of the things we arc thinking
about it), as the Stranger suggests: '... the rule is that when one perceives first the
community of the many things, one should not desist until one sees in it all those
differences that arc located in classes, and conversely, with the various unlikcncsscs,
when they are seen in multitudes, one should be incapable of pulling a face and stopping
before one has penned all the related things within one likeness and surrounded them in
some real class' (Statesman 285 a-b).21 Being able to think clearly about things means
being able to identify both the similarities and the differences between them. Here

20 The term είδος also appears to be used to refer to what I have called the identifying property
of a class or sub-class (in which case it will de facto, on the account I have suggested, come
close to its use elsewhere for 'form'); similarly with ΐδε'α: see 258 c 3-7,262 a 8 - b 1. Cf.
Cohen on 'the supcrclcan model': '[tjo push (the model] through all the way one would have
to hold, I think, that Plato uses eidos (and idea) in a systematically ambiguous way, some­
times meaning Form, sometimes meaning extension of a Form ...' (p.184). The term is, I
believe, in any ease used ambiguously; this is perhaps minor evidence in favour of the
account proposed.
21 This may well be one place where the translation 'class' for είδος and γένος (referring to the
thing divided) is less than completely happy; but with the justification of this translation
given above, the sense should be reasonably clear.
g INTRODUCTION
Skcmp's notion of an Ordnance Survey map of reality may be helpful; and particularly in
that it fixes on the notion that for Plato what the dialectician will be trying to map is
’objective and permanent'. Complete knowledge, if such a thing were possible for
someone who is merely mortal, would consist in understanding both where all the
boundary-lines were, and what was contained within those boundaries.22

3. Philosophy and the writing of philosophy

The Statesman offers us an example - albeit a written one - of philosophy in action.

Philosophy, for Plato, if we are to take seriously what he puts into Socrates' mouth in the
Phaedrus, is a matter of conversation between two (or more) individuals, in which
progress is made through the challenging of one person's statements by another;23 a
written dialogue can give us only a static representation of such a conversation. But
evidently Plato still thought it a useful exercise. In the Phaedrus, Socrates says of the
knowledgeable writer that he will

sow his gardens of letters and write for amusement, when he docs
write, laying up a store of reminders both for himself, when he
"reaches a forgetful old age", and for anyone who is following the
same track, and he will be pleased as he watches their tender
growth; and when others resort to other sorts of amusements,
watering themselves with drinking-parties and the other things
which go along with these, then he, it seems, will spend his lime
amusing himself with the things I say (Phaedrus 276 d).

The Statesman is perhaps, among other things, 'a store of reminders' about how to do
philosophy itself (though there is also an austere amusement to be got from it in many
places); and how better to do it than by mimicking the form of a conversation, through
the use of written dialogue?
However, the Statesman may well seem to fail to live up to the paradigm of
philosophy proposed by the Phaedrus, not just because it is a mere written imitation, but
within the context of the fictional conversation itself:24 if we imagined ourselves as part
of the audience on that day in the gymnasium at Athens, we should still come away
disappointed. What is missing, at least for the most part, is that element of givc-and-

22 Ackrill (1980) gives a persuasive defence of the usefulness of the Platonic method of
division in general, against Ryle's assault on it; on its versatility, see also especially Lloyd
(1952), and Philip (1966).
23 The challenging, however, must be done in a co-operative and not a competitive spirit. The
motivation behind the exercise of dialectic - the (joint) discovery of truth - is what chiefly
distinguishes it from sophistic or 'eristic' discourse of the type practised by Euthydemus and
Dionysodorus (cf. n.7 above).
24 See my forthcoming essay on The Politicus: structure and form'.
 INTRODUCTION 9
take which the Phaedrus makes an essential part of the dialectical process.25 The young
Socrates allows the Stranger to have his own way virtually throughout, only occasionally
making any significant contribution of his own - once (293 c) to make a serious
objection, once (297 c) to ask for an explanation of something which the Stranger would
surely have needed to explain in any case. To this extent, the dialogue is perhaps only
partly successful in teaching the methodology of philosophy: on the one hand, it tells us
about the need for clarity and precision, and about how we may be able to achieve this,
but on the other it fails to make the point, which receives so much stress in the
Phaedrus, about the role in dialectic of the testing and challenging of ideas.26 One
response to this might be that challenge will only be necessary when something is said
that needs challenging, and that the essential requirement is for the partners in the
conversation to move forward together (something that is repeatedly stressed in the
Statesman: see c.g. 258 c-d, 260 b, 286 a).2728 But increasingly, as the dialogue proceeds,
we are likely to feel that the Stranger ought to be challenged, when he is not; his
conclusions particularly about non-ideal constitutions, although argued, are - he knows
- outrageous and provocative, and not merely at the point where young Socrates makes
his objection (an objection which itself turns out to be convenient for the Stranger's
exposition2* of his case).
This amounts to the suggestion that the Statesman fails as a piece of literature, that is,
by failing to be quite what it sets out to be (a co-operative dialogue, involving real
interchange between the characters). It is often suggested that late dialogues like the
Statesman arc typically unsuccessful in this way - that Plato has grown tired of the
dramatic form which he had earlier used so successfully, and is merely going through

25 'Dialectic is 'the art of conversation', and functions more or less as a synonym of

'philosophy', in so far as philosophy is a matter of conversation - of a particular kind, about
particular subjects (ultimately, 'the finest and greatest').
26 There is of course no absolute requirement that the philosophical conversations represented
in any other dialogue should follow the model suggested by the Phaedrus. But since it is the
fullest and most explicit account that we have of the nature of real, as opposed to written,
dialectic, and since its general conditions seem to chime in with Plato's more general
characterizations of philosophy elsewhere, it seems reasonable to use it as a starting-point
for comparison. An additional justification for doing so is that it helps to explain the change
in style between the so-called 'Socratic' and aporctic dialogues, dominated by Socrates'
'elenchus' or examination of others, and those with apparently more positive content, usually
emanating from the character who leads the dialogue.
27 The Stranger's suggestion at Sophist 217 d that conversation is an 'easier' medium if one's
respondent is 'easy to handle and isn't a trouble-maker' (in While's translation) should not be
taken as suggesting the need for someone who is easily led; rather the requirement is for
someone who can easily be reined in if he begins gelling out of hand. (Nor, if the possibility
is raised that the Strangcr might give a monologue, does this imply that he might give a
simple exposition, after the manner of the orators, which everybody else would simply
applaud. The difference between the two options he proposes is between a procedure which
allows for assent or challenge at each step, and one much more like a modem discussion-
paper, where questions follow the complete account.)
28 This is a fair description of the dialogue at this point; yet the conversation is typically
described as a joint search, or hunt (for the statesman).
10 INTRODUCTION
the motions.29 The Laws, written right at the end of Plato's life, may give some
credibility to such a view; the Philebus, apparently finished not so long before the Laws,
shows it to be certainly false. Nevertheless in some eases - and the Statesman seems to
be one - Plato's skills as a dramatic writer arc less in evidence than in others. Nor
should there be anything particularly surprising about this. There is a considerable
diversity in the use of the dialogue form among the various parts of the corpus, and not
least in the degree of dramatic development we find in them, which is perhaps generally
in inverse proportion to the technicality of the subject-matter; and there is a good deal of
technical matter in the Statesman.
Two systematic attempts have been made to defend the Statesman from the charge of
dramatic failure, the first by Miller (1980), the second by Scodcl (1987).30 Both of these
authors discover drama by identifying tensions between characters and attitudes which
are. on their account, played out within the space of the dialogue: thus Scodcl secs the
bulk of the argument as a parody of the Eleatic Stranger, who speaks not for Plato - as I
have assumed - but against him, while for Miller there is an antagonism between
Theodorus, the famous geometer, who resists the call of philosophy, and old Socrates;
the Elcalic Stranger acts as a kind of mediator between philosophy and the non-
philosopher, represented by young Socrates, pupil of Theodorus (cf. Theaetetus 147 c-
d). Socrates himself is silent, but eloquently so, for the dialogue is a kind of
philosophical parallel to the forensic trial which he is about to face (Jheaetetus 210 d).31
Both Miller and Scodcl arc here asking some important questions: c.g. why docs the
Elcalic Stranger take over the leading role, in the Sophist and the Statesman, which old
Socrates had 'yesterday' (i.c. in the Theaetetus)? What significance should we attach to
the selling of the dialogue in the period surrounding Socrates' trial (however little seems
to be made of this, in any explicit way, in the Statesman)? What docs the 'Elcalic
Stranger’ stand for? However the very elaborateness of the answers that these authors
give, in contrast to to the paucity of the evidence on which they have to rely, is not in my
view persuasive; and in Scodcl's ease there is a serious question about the point of the
whole exercise, if it is indeed what he thinks it is: why should Plato go to such lengths to
refute the Stranger, who in himself has no clear identity? Readers themselves must
judge.
Meanwhile, some simpler answers suggest themselves. There might be difficulties
about having Socrates lead a discussion about either sophists or statesmen; sophists,
because of a certain resemblance, which Plato himself rccogni/cs (Sophist 230 a - 231
b), between the Socratic 'elenchus' and one sort of sophistry, and statesmen, because of
the claim, made explicitly in the Gorgias (521 d - 522 a), and implicit in the Statesman,
that Socrates is himself the ideal statesman. Investigations like his, indeed, arc in my
view treated in this dialogue as the very essence of any real expertise in government, and

29 On the general issue of ihc use and abuse of conclusions (reached mainly on stylomctric
grounds) about the chronology of ihc Platonic dialogues, see Kahn, T he place of the
Statesman in Plato's later work', 49-51.
30 For a defence of a different kind, sec Gill, 'Rethinking constitutionalism in Slateman 291-
303' (and for a reply, my forthcoming essay on 'Structure and form').
31 For other interpretations of the dramatis personae of the Statesman, see Brisson, 'Inter­
pretation du mythe du Politique', 349 n.2.
 INTRODUCTION 11
his execution is implicitly used as a demonstration οΓ the lack οΓ that expertise on the
part of the democracy (see below). As for the Stranger, he is introduced as the
representative of the tradition of those other famous Elcatics, Parmenides and Zeno
(Sophist 216 a). Plato thinks highly of Parmenides, as we can judge from the fact that
he allows him to criticize Socrates, in the dialogue named after him; indeed, there is
probably no other philosopher whom he would have been inclined to compliment in this
way. The Stranger is another lofty figure in the same tradition. That he docs not stand
for one of the 'masters of antinomy and the reductio ad absurdum’ described by Scodcl
(166) is surely clear from Sophist 216 b-c, where he is specifically distinguished from
'the enthusiasts for debating', and it is actually Socrates who is made to look more like
them.
If so, then the Stranger from Elea is a representative par excellence of philosophy,
which indeed is how he appears; he knows, above all, about the rules of dialectic, which
he proceeds to leach young Socrates. Whether or not Socrates is supposed to be a pupil
of Theodorus’, he is certainly a suitable pupil for the Stranger. He may make mistakes,
and show a certain impetuosity, but he is sometimes also sharp, and shows
understanding - especially by his responses at 283 b and 285 d (he docs not need the
lesson about what to treat as excessive, and is already aware of the wider purpose of
what he is doing). We might wish that he would be less compliant, and more
challenging, but that is another matter. Meanwhile, Socrates sits by in silence,
contributing only at the beginning, and, perhaps, at the end, when (on the interpretation I
have adopted) he gives his approval to what has transpired between the other two. What
Theodorus adds, apart from an opportunity for an initial joke, is not clear. But we
should notice that it is actually he and not Socrates who sets up the discussion, and who
urges the Stranger 'not to give up doing us favours', by following up the treatment of the
sophist (Statesman 257 b-c). If there is any 'antagonism' between mathematics and
philosophy, this context surely docs not show it.

4. The myth (268 e - 274 e)

The myth is one of the most attractive, but also one of the most puzzling, parts of the
Statesman. The Stranger claims to introduce it in order to help with the process of
defining the statesman, which at this point has run into the sand, and by and large this is
a reasonable explanation. It docs not quite justify the sheer bulk of the story, as the
Stranger comes close to recognizing (277 a-b, 286 b-c), but then he originally announced
that he was going to bring in 'a large part of a great story' (268 d); he also talked in the
same place about its involving an 'element of play', which should prevent us from
complaining if the myth docs not appear to be completely functional in character, or as
embedded in the argument as we might expect. Over and above its function within the
argument, it is a story told for its own sake, and with a characteristic urbanity. It also
serves to provide us both with an account of the world-order to which the microcosm of
individual human communities or cities belongs, and with a response to the democratic
myth of origins related by Protagoras in the dialogue Plato names after him. According
to Protagoras, what separates us from brute nature is a gift of civilizing virtues in which
all can and must share; according to the Stranger, it is rather expertise which enables us
12 INTRODUCTION
to survive - and expertise, as he later explicitly argues, is something which belongs at
most to a Tew. (The myth thus partly anticipates the political argument of the dialogue:
see below.)
The detail of the relationship of (he myth to the main argument may be left to the
commentary (see especially the note on 274 c 8 - 27S a S). Here it will be appropriate
simply to give an outline account of the story, and to pick out its main features. It runs
as follows:

A (268 c - 269 c) Three basic ingredients: what we have heard (i) about (he portent of
the reversal of the courses of the sun and the other heavenly bodies, in the quarrel
between Atreus and Thyestes; (ii) about the kingship of Kronos; and (iii) about a
previous time when human beings were bom not from each other, but from the earth.
AU of these things are explained by one and the same stale of affairs, which no one has
yet related.

B (269 c - 270 b) This is that the universe sometimes revolves in its present direction,
sometimes in the opposite direction: the god himself sometimes accompanies it and
guides it on its way, but at certain times he lets it go, and then it moves backwards, as a
consequence of its nature as a corporeal entity.

C (270 b - 271 c) Understandably, such changes at the cosmic level cause great
upheavals on the surface of the earth; animals and human beings alike arc destroyed in
great numbers, and there is also an astonishing reversal in the direction of growth, so
that living creatures appear to grow younger rather than older. Paralleling this shift, new
living things come into existence from the dead, emerging from the ground - and this is
the origin of the talc of the earth-born.

D (271 c - 272 d) Prior to these changes, there was (and will be again) the lime of
Kronos, when gods eared for all our needs, and there was no strife or dissent, no political
organization, nor any getting of wives or children, because everyone came back to life
out of the earth; and the earth also spontaneously gave up its fruits without the need for
agriculture...

E (272 d - 273 a) At the appointed time, when each soul had undergone the requisite
number of rebirths, falling as a seed into the earth, the greatest god let go of the steering
oars, withdrawing to his observation-post; and the subordinate deities also ceased their
control of the parts of the world. Then the universe turned back on itself, impelled by
innate desire, causing earthquakes and destruction.

F (273 a-d) After some time, confusion and disturbance gave way to calm, and the
universe began to move on its accustomed course, exercizing control over itself and the
things within it; and at first things went well, because it remembered its maker's
teaching. But later on forgetfulness always sets in, and (he quality of what it produces
gradually decays, until it is in danger of collapsing entirely.
 INTRODUCTION 13
G (273 d-c) At that point, seeing it in difficulty, the god resumes his position at the
steering oars, and sets everything to rights once more.

H (273 c - 274 c) As for what is relevant to our demonstration of the nature of the king
or statesman, it will be enough for us to take up the story from an earlier point. When
the universe turned back again on to its present course, the direction of growth of living
things also reversed, and everything changed, in imitation of the change at the cosmic
level; in particular, living creatures were no longer pul together by other agencies in the
earth, but had to provide for conception, birth and rearing by themselves. But, deprived
of everything which they had once had without effort, and with animals turning wild and
preying on them, human beings found themselves in dire straits. This is why we have
what have always been called the gifts of the gods - fire from Prometheus, crafts from
Hephaestus and Athena, and everything else which has helped to establish human
existence...

The traditional way of taking the myth is to see it as involving a cycle of two stages
only; one in which the god is in control (the 'age of Kronos*), and the present age, when
everything is reversed (the 'age of Zeus'). I believe, however, that the evidence of the
text is firmly in favour of a three-stage cycle, with the period of reversal sandwiched
between the age of Kronos and that of Zeus:32 in the outline given above, C describes the
(relatively brief) period of reversal, with E and F explaining respectively its beginning,
with the god's withdrawal, and its end, as the universe sets itself in order in accordance
with what it learned from him; G gives us the return to the age of Kronos, after the end
of the age of Zeus (the history of which is charted in the main part of F), while H takes
us back once more to the start of this latter age (and the beginning of F). One important
consequence is that the universe which has to fend for itself (ours) will now travel in the
same direction as the universe controlled by the god, rather than in the opposite
direction; and this seems appropriate, given that it is supposed to be a rational creature
(269 d). If it were the ease that it always went in the reverse direction when left to itself,
its claim to rationality would look weak, given that on any account it is its non-rational
elements (body, 269 d-c; 'its allotted and innate desire', 272 c 5-6) which cause the
reversal. For a possible (and attractive) reading of the general import of the cosmic
myth, suggested by Brisson, see note on 274 c 1; that it is to be taken as a literal,
historical account seems scarcely likely.33

32 Such an interpretation was first suggested by Lovejoy and Boas, and has been defended by
Brisson (cf. note on 270 b 7-8); however my own version will differ in some important
details from theirs.
33 There arc, however, large issues involved here, including that of the relationship between the
Statesman story and the cosmological account of the Timaeus, which is itself described as a
’myth* or 'story' (’a likely μύθο·,-', 29 d).
14 INTRODUCTION
5. Political theory

The main part of the dialogue which deals directly with political theory is even more
firmly embedded than the myth in the series of divisions leading to the statesman. The
whole work, in fact, can be described as a single (but complex) procedure of division
with passages on related topics inset into iL34 So the first set of divisions (2S8 b - 267
a), which issues in a first preliminary definition of the statesman (267 a-c), is briefly
interrupted by an important passage about the difference between 'classes' and parts (262
a - 264 b); after the discussion of this first definition, and the myth and its aftermath (all
of which itself strictly forms part of that discussion), we then get a new definition which
apparently takes care of the problems of the first (276 c). But that loo then turns out to
be inadequate: like the first one, it is partly right, but in so far as it is right it is also
incomplete. In order to move ahead, the Stranger now proposes to analyze something
which is more ready to hand than statesmanship, but which has an analogous structure,
so that it can be used as a model; he chooses the weaving of woollen cloth. Before he
starts on that, he gives a brief explanation and justification of the use of models (277 d -
278 c). The division of weaving (279 a - 283 a) gives rise to a passage (283 a - 287 b)
which distinguishes two sorts of measurement, and two corresponding sorts of excess
and defect: something can be either just larger or smaller than something else, or larger
or smaller than it should be, according to some relevant criterion. The treatment of
weaving might have appeared longer than needed, but in fact - the Stranger and young
Socrates agree - it will have contributed towards their larger as well as their more
immediate goal. After this, they once more resume the search for the statesman, dividing
according to the pattern discovered in the ease of weaving; until, at 291 a, the Stranger
catches sight of an odd crowd of people, which turns out to consist of all existing
politicians. If all those previously divided off in some sense 'lay claim to' the title of
statesman, because their expertise is somehow related to (while also being different
from) his, this new class lay claim to it in the more direct sense that they actually occupy
that space within the city that belongs to him. But, says the Stranger, they arc to a man
impostors: magicians and sophists, masters of illusion. The long ensuing passage (291 a
- 303 d), which contains most of the political meat of the dialogue, sets out to establish
this point. If existing politicians arc indeed mere impostors, then they loo can safely be
divided ofT from the statesman.
The argument runs like this. Existing forms of constitution arc distinguished from
each other by various factors. These arc the number of people who hold power (one,
few, or many); whether they arc rich or poor; whether they rule with or without consent
of those ruled; or whether or not they rule in accordance with established law. But it
was originally agreed that statesmanship was a kind of expert knowledge, and this seems
to be different from any of these other criteria. No existing constitution can, or docs,
operate on the basis of such knowledge. But the only constitution worthy of the name
will be one that functions without reference to anything except whether it acts 'to
preserve the city on the basis of expert knowledge and what is just, making it belter than
it was' (293 d 8 - c 1); actual 'constitutions' arc only imitations of this one, whether they

34 For a more detailed demonstration of this point, see my Introduction to Reading the
Statesman (and The Politicus: structure and form').
 INTRODUCTION 15
imitate it for the better or for the worse. At this point young Socrates makes his
objection: can it really be true that the best constitution will dispense with laws - which
arc, after all, normally synonymous with good government (293 c)? In principle, yes,
the Stranger claims, because the laws do not have the flexibility to deal with actual
situations, which arc too varied and changeable to be embraced by a single set of fixed
prescriptions. Only the knowledgeable individual himself can do that. It would be
absurd to suggest that he should be bound by what he had previously laid down, if he
sees something better, although clearly he will have to make general prescriptions if he
cannot be there in person, for example, if he is going to be away for a time (but it is also
the ease that even when at home, he still could not be everywhere at once: 295 a-b). Nor
will he need to persuade his city of the need for change. Once again, knowledge is
established as the only criterion, and constitutions not based on knowledge written off as
either better or worse imitations. Young Socrates here makes his second major
intervention (297 c), saying that he docs not understand this idea any belter than he did
when the Stranger first introduced it. The Stranger obliges with a full but highly
complex explanation, part of which I discuss separately below. However the general
relevance of the passage to the proposition to be demonstrated - that existing politicians
arc impostors - is clear enough: if the constitutions under which they rule arc themselves
mere 'imitations', then they themselves must be the illusionists. After a brief account of
the relative difficulty of 'living with' each (301 b - 303 b) of the various forms of
constitution, the conclusion is finally drawn (303 b-d).
The part of this section which has attracted the most attention is from 297 c - 302 b,
on 'imitation' of the best constitution. The Stranger's basic strategy is, first, to suggest
that the principle of slicking precisely to established law is intelligible, but absurd: just
think, he tells young Socrates, what medicine or seamanship would be like, if they were
run according to the same principles, with rules for them set up in an assembly, on
advice from any and every source; with officers to oversee them who were chosen from
the mass of the citizens; with annual audits of the officers, to make sure they had kept
strictly to the laws during their period of olTicc; and with research and investigation into
health or the weather treated as a capital offence. On the other hand, to have officers -
whether in this imagined situation, or in the city - acting without regard for the laws,
and for their own personal motives, would be far, far worse. This suggestion, at 300 a,
together with the passage immediately following, is normally taken as signalling a
reconciliation with existing forms of government (despite all the critical things that have
been said about them), on the one condition that they follow the principle of strict
adhesion to law.
The passage in question, in Skemp's translation, as modified by Oslwald, runs:

Sir. The laws which have been laid down represent the fruit of
long experience - one must admit that. Each of them incorporates
the clever advice of some counselor who has persuaded the public
assembly to enact it. Any man who dares by his action to infringe
these laws is guilty of a wrong many times greater than the wrong
done by strict laws, for such transgression, if tolerated, would do
even more than a written code pervert all ordered activity.
Y.S. Yes of course it would.
16 INTRODUCTION
Sir. Then so long as men enact laws and written codes governing
any department οΓ lire, our second-best method of government is
to forbid any individual or any group to perform any act in
contravention of these laws.
Y S. True.
Sir. Then laws would seem to be written copies of scientific truth
in the various departments of life they cover, copies based as far as
possible on the instructions received from those who really
possess the scientific truth on these matters.
YS. Yes, of course (300 b 1 - c 7).

However it appears to me difficult to take the fust of the Stranger's contributions as quite
so complimentary to oligarchy and democracy (since these are the constitutions which
have been the main objects of his attack). Moreover, the characterization of laws given
- on this translation35- in his third contribution comes close actually to contradicting the
account of actual legislative processes which has just been offered: if it is true that the
existing laws of cities arc "based as far as possible on the instructions received from
those who really possess the scientific truth on these matters', it is only to the extent (if
we are to believe what the Stranger has just said) that they arc not based on such
instructions at all, because access to them, under present conditions, is actually
impossible. The source of existing laws is the assembly, acting on 'the clever advice of
some counselor', who according to 298 c will not typically be an expert (and since
experts arc very rare, their voices would be drowned out even if they were present).
I propose a different translation:

E.S.: Yes, for if, I imagine, contrary to the laws that have been
established on the basis of much experiment, with some advisers
or other having given advice on each subject in an attractive way,
and having persuaded the majority to pass them - if someone
dared to act contrary to these, he would be committing a mistake
many times greater than the other, and would overturn all expert
activity to a still greater degree than the written rules.
Y.S.: Yes - how would he not?
E.S.: For these reasons, then, the second-best method of
proceeding, for those who establish laws and written rules about
anything whatever, is to allow neither individual nor mass ever to
do anything contrary to these, anything whatsoever.
Y.S.: Correct.
E.S.: Well, imitations of the truth of each and every thing would
be these, wouldn't they - the things issuing from those who know
which have been written down so far as they can be?
Y.S.: Of course.

35 Skemp's translation is, however, thoroughly representative of those available: only one of
those I have consulted, that of Fraccaroli (1911), shows any clear signs of dissent from the
general interpretation Skemp suggests.
 INTRODUCTION 17

That the laws arc based on 'much experiment', and because 'some advisers or other* have
persuaded the assembly to adopt them, is surely not meant as a positive recommendation
of them; what would be needed for that would be precisely the knowledgeable advice
which is not available. The 'second-best' course is second-best (sc. lo the direct rule of
the ideal king or statesman) just because it is so obviously better than the third option.
What arc described as 'imitations of the truth' are not, and do not include, the laws we
have now; rather they arc just whatever is in fact written down on the basis of
knowledge, which is (only) an 'imitation of the truth' just in so far as laws can only
inadequately grasp it (294 a-b). In other words, this kind of 'imitation' is a third type,
different from both the 'better' and the 'worse' sorts which the Stranger has set out lo
explain.
About what it is to imitate the best constitution 'for the worse', or badly, there is little
disagreement: it is when people without knowledge try to do what the ideal ruler docs
just because he has it, i.c. to act contrary to established law on the grounds that
something else will be belter (300 d-c). But what is it to imitate it 'for the better'? The
Stranger says m erely'... if [such inferior constitutions] arc going to imitate well that true
constitution ..., they must never - given that they have their laws - do anything contrary
lo [them]' (300 e l l - 301 a 3). This is no doubt consistent with the usual answer, that
'good imitation' means mirroring the laws of the best stale as far as possible; but that
interpretation seems to rely wholly on the support of 300 b 1 - c 7, which is no longer
available (and in any ease, it would still be appropriate lo ask exactly how these inferior
constitutions could have got access, or even approximated, to the laws of the best).
Rather, I propose, imitating the best constitution well means simply sticking lo
established laws, which is just what the best city itself will do under the situation which
always obtains in the inferior ones - namely when there is no knowledgeable person
present to show what changes should be made. The distance that may separate these
inferior constitutions from the best is presumably considerable, in so far as their laws
may be bad ones; and indeed the Stranger goes on lo express his surprise at how long
cities actually survive, not only those which tum their backs on their legal tradition, but
those which do not (301 c - 302 b).
This reading of the Statesman,36 if correct, would have considerable consequences
for our understanding of Plato's later political theory. The dialogue is typically seen as a
bridge between the utopian and anti-democratic Republic, on the one hand, and the more
compromising mood of the Laws on the other, in which Plato has the Athenian Stranger
even accept democracy as a necessary ingredient in all constitutions (693 d-c), and
seems to abandon more radical speculation in favour of detailed reflection about what a
good legal code might contain. This view of the Statesman as intermediate is all the
more plausible in that the Laws seems to place itself squarely behind the view that the
rule of law, even if in principle less desirable than the rule of an excellent individual, is
likely to be the best we can realistically aim at: see especially 894 c - 895 d, which itself
calls 'order founded on law' a second best, sums up the general criticism levelled at laws

36 For which see also the essays referred to in n.34 above.

18 INTRODUCTION
in the Statesman, and suggests a practical solution.37 Yet if the second-best of the
Statesman involves adhering even to bad laws, then it is essentially different from the
second-best that the Laws recommends; and what the Laws means by democracy is not
that form of constitution which figures in the argument of the Statesman, but rather the
principle that the citizens should be involved so far as possible in the government of the
city. In the ease of Magnesia, the imaginary city of the Laws, their involvement is
allowed to be considerable, but that is at least partly because they have been pre­
selected. Such a position docs not in itself suggest any softening in Plato's altitude
towards actual democracies, like the one under which he lived at Athens. In general,
some rethinking of current views about the development of Plato's political theory would
seem to be useful.3*
In the remaining part of the Statesman, the Stranger separates off three more sorts of
expertise from statesmanship, those which he thinks closest to it: rhetoric (that is, a
reformed rhetoric, which will be subordinate to the decisions of the statesman),
generalship, and the 'art of the judge'. For the significance of the first two of these, see
Section 1 (the leaders of the democracy, in Plato's lime, were precisely 'orators and
generals'; by implication, they are not qualified to lead). In 30S e, we finally reach the
long-awaited definition of the statesman:

... the [expertise] that controls all of these [i.c. the 'arts' of the
orator, the general and the judge], and the laws, and cares for
every aspect of things in the city, and weaves everything together
in the most correct way - this, embracing its capacity with the
appellation belonging to the whole, we would, it seems, most
appropriately call statesmanship [i.c. politike. the 'art' which deals
with the whole of the polis].

If we arc inclined to find this a disappointing result for so long a discussion, we should
remember that it is merely an abbreviated version, and should properly include a
reference to each of the many divisions39 which have led up to it, beginning from the
original division of kinds of expertise. This idea of statesmanship as a sort of expertise,
on all fours with medicine and seamanship, itself remains one of the most provocative
aspects of Plato's political theory. On the interpretation I propose, the Statesman gives
what is probably the most uncompromising statement of the idea in the Platonic corpus.
The subject of the expert knowledge in question is the good, or 'health', of our souls; in
the closing pages of the Statesman (306 a - 311 c) the Stranger gives us a glimpse of the
kind of social healing - or 'weaving together’, since as the definition at 305 c shows, the

37 The pessimism of the Laws passage about the possibility of finding someone who could
remain uncorruptcd by power, however, has no parallel in the Statesman (cf. Vlastos on
‘Socralic knowledge and Platonic “pessimism"').
38 Cf. section ΠΙ of Gill's essay on 'Rethinking constitutionalism in Statesman 291-303'. Such
grounds as there might have been for making detailed connections between the Statesman
and what little we think we know about Plato's biography (see c.g. Skemp's Introduction,
pp.26 ff.) will also now look even less firm.
39 Or rather, of those that were successful; several were, of course, discarded along the way.
 INTRODUCTION 19
model of weaving is nol forgotten - which the ideal statesman will carry out for the sake
of the good city and good souls.

6. The text

The text printed is essentially that of Burnet's in the Oxford Classical Texis series
(1900/1905), but I have introduced some changes, the majority of them supported, or
occasionally suggested, by Robinson in his paper on The new Oxford Text of Plato's
Statesman: editor's comments'. All differences from Bumcl, except for minor changes to
punctuation, arc indicated in the abbreviated apparatus. The sigla used in the apparatus
arc as follows: 'm', indicating the reading of the manuscripts generally, or of what arc
counted as the primary manuscripts; 'n', indicating at least some manuscript support for a
reading; 'c', indicating a reading preferred or proposed by at least one editor but lacking
manuscript support; and 'O', indicating Bumet's reading in the original Oxford text

7. The translation

The translation attempts to reproduce, so far as possible, something of the structure of

the original Greek, and generally to be as literal as is consistent with a reasonable degree
of readability. For the rendering of the key terms τ<ίχνη/ίπιστήμη Ccxpcrtisc’, 'expert
knowledge' - and also 'art', when understood with forms ending in - ik o j ) , and cl6o? and
idea (usually 'class'), see above. Because of the differences between English and Greek
word-order, the Stephanus references given alongside the translation C257' [= 257 al],
'a5', etc.) will often be a slightly imprecise locator in relation to the facing text.

8. The commentary

The notes in the commentary arc almost always keyed to the translation, although some
help is given, in second place, with difficult aspects of the Greek. Considerable
attention is paid to the structure of individual arguments, and to the way in which they
contribute to the general progress of the dialogue: Plato's writing is complex, but highly
ordered and organized, and it is a fair working rule that failure to see how a sentence or
larger passage might (it into the whole will be the fault of the reader. But the notes
claim no particular authority; the usefulness of the interpretations they propose of course
depends on the value of the reasons adduced for adopting them.

9. Abbreviations

References in the commentary to items in the bibliography arc by author's name and
year of publication, with the exception that other frequently mentioned commentaries
and translations arc referred to by the author's surname only; so loo arc J.D.Dcnnislon's
The Greek Particles (2nd edition, Oxford 1954), and David Robinson's paper on The
20 INTRODUCTION
new Oxford Text of Plato's Statesman'. Other abbreviations: 'DK' = H.DicIs (cd.),
revised by W.Kranz, Die Fragmente der Vorsokraliker, 6lh edition, Berlin 1961;
'Goodwin, M T = W.W.Goodwin, Syntax o f the Moods and Tenses o f the Greek Verb,
London 1889; 'LSJ' = H.G.Liddcll, R.Scott, revised by H.S Jones, A Greek-English
Lexicon, 9lh edition, Oxford 1940; 'Plt' = 'Politicus' = Statesman'; 'RS' = CJ.Rowc, cd.,
Reading the Statesman (Proceedings o f the Third Symposium Platonicum), Sankl
Augustin 1995; 'SP' = P.Nicholson and CJ.Rowc, edd., Plato's Statesman: Selected
Papers from the Third Symposium Platonicum, Polis 12.1/2 (1993).
 Bibliography
1. Commentaries
Apclt, O. Platons Dialog Politikos oder Vom Staalsmann, 2nd cdn, Leipzig 1922
(includes translation).
Bcnardctc, S. The Being o f the Beautiful: Plato's Theaetetus, Sophist, and Statesman,
Chicago 1984 (includes translation).
Campbell, L. The Sophistes and Politicus o f Plato, Oxford 1867.
Slallbaum, G. Platonis Politicus et incerti auctoris Minos, Gotha 1841.

2. Translations
Andrcac, W. Platons Staalschrifien: 3., Der Staalsmann, Jena 1926.
Di&s, A. Platon: Oeuvres completes., vol. 9.1, Paris 1960 (with introduction).
Fowler, H.N. and Lamb, W.R.M. Plato, The Statesman, Philebus, Ion (Statesman 1r. by
Fowler), Cambridge, Mass. 1962.
Fraccaroli, G. Platone: II sofista e Tuomo politico, Turin 1911.
Jowctt, B. The Dialogues c f Plato, vol. Ill, Oxford 1871.
Petit, A. Platon, le politique, Paris 1980.
Rufcncr, R. Platon, Spatdialoge (Jheaitetos, Der Sophist, Der Staalsmann, Kratylos),
Zurich 1965.
Skcmp, J.B. Plato, The Statesman, London 1952 (with introduction and notes); 2nd cdn
with Postscript, Bristol 1987; translation, with corrections, in Hamilton, E. and Cairns,
H., The Collected Dialogues o f Plato, Princeton 1961, and revised (with new
introduction) by M. Ostwald, New York 1957 (Indianapolis 1992).
Taylor, A.E. Plato: The Sophist and The Statesman (cd. by R. Klibansky and Elizabeth
Anscombc), London 1961 (includes long introduction).
Warrington, J. Plato: Parmenides, Theaitetos, The Sophist, The Statesman, London
1961.

3. Other works
Accallino, P. 'ί'ά ρ χ ή del Politico', RS 203-12 (with commentary by G. ArrighcUi, 223-
4).
Ackrill, J.L. 'In defense of Plato's division', in Wood, O.P. and Pitcher, G., cdd., Ryle,
New York 1970,373-92.
Arcnds, J.F.M. 'Survival, war and unity of the polis in Plato’s Statesman’, SP 154-87.
Ashbaugh, F. Plato's Theory o f Explanation. A Study o f the Cosmological Account o f
the Timaeus, New York 1988.
Barker, E. Greek Political Theory: Plato and his Predecessors, 3rd cdn, London 1947.
Bobonich, C. 'The virtues of ordinary people in Plato's Statesman ’, RS 313-29.
Braguc, R. 'L'isolation du sage. Sur un aspect du mylhc du Politique’, in id., Du temps
chez Platon et Aristote, Paris 1982,73-95.
Brandwood, L. The Chronology o f Plato's Dialogues, Cambridge 1990.
Brickhousc, T.C. and Smith, N.D. Ή μαντική τ<τχνη: Statesman 260 c 1 and 290 c 4-
6', SP 52-63.
22 BIBLIOGRAPHY
Brisson, L. Le mime el I'autre dans la structure onlologique du Timie de Platon, Paris
1974.
Brisson, L. Interpretation du mylhc du Politique', RS 349-63 (with commentary by M.
Erlcr, 375-8).
Caronc, G.R. 'Cosmic and human drama in Plato's Statesman: on cosmos, God and
microcosm in the myth', SP 99-121.
Cascrtano, G. 'II problema del rapporto nomc-cosa-discorso ncl Politico 277-87', RS
141-54.
Cavini, W. 'Naming and argument: Diacrclic logic in Plato’s Statesman', RS 123-38
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43.
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 BIBLIOGRAPHY 23
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24 BIBLIOGRAPHY
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 BIBLIOGRAPHY 25
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(Philologus Supplcmcnlband XXXI.3), Leipzig 1938.
 PLATO

STATESMAN
(.ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΟΣ)
28

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ *Η πολλήν χάριν όφ€ΐλω σοι τής· θ€αιτητου 257

γνωρίσ€ως, ώ θ€οδωρ€, άμα και τή ς του ξόνου.
ΘΕΟΔΩΡΟΣ Τάχα δ€ γ€, ώ Σωκρατ€ς, όφ€ΐλήσ€ΐς τούτης*
τριπλασίαν, 4π€ΐδάν τον τ€ πολιτικόν άπ€ργάσωνταί σοι και
τον φιλόσοφον. 5
ΣΩ. Ei€V ούτω τούτο, ώ φίλ€ θ€θδωρ€, φήσομ€ν άκηκοότ€ς
€ΐναι τού π€ρι λογισμούς* και τα γ€ωμ€τρικά κρατιστου;
ΘΕΟ. Πώς*, ώ Σώκρατ€ς; b
ΣΩ. Των άνδρών έκαστον θ€ντος τής· ίσης* αξίας, οι τη τιμή
πλόον άλλήλων άφ€στασιν η κατά την αναλογίαν την τής·
ύμ€Τ€ρας τέχνης*.
ΘΕΟ. Ευ γ€ νή τον ήμότ€ρον θ€0ν, ώ Σώκρατ€ς, τον 5
"Αμμωνα, και δικαίως*, και πάνυ μνημονικώς* έπόιληξά ς μοι τό
π€ρι τοίις* λογισμούς* αμάρτημα, και ok μέν άντι τούτων €ΐς
αύθις* μ€Τ€ΐμι* σύ δ ’ ήμΐν, ώ ξόν€, μηδαμώς* άποκάμης*
χαριζόμβνος, άλλ' έξης*, €ΐτ€ τον πολιτικόν άνδρα πρότ€ρον c
€ΪΤ€ τον φιλόσοφον προαιρη, προ€λόμ€νος* δΐ€ξ€λθ€.
ΞΕΝΟΣ Τ α υ τ \ ώ θ€0δωρ€, ποιητόον, έπ€ΐπ€ρ άπαξ γ€
έγκ€χ€ΐρήκαμ€ν, και ούκ άποστατόον πριν αν αυτών προς* τό
τέλο ς €λθωμ€ν. αλλά γάρ π€ρι θ€αιτήτου τουδ€ τ ί χρή δραν 5
μ€;
ΘΕΟ. Του π€ρΐ;
ΞΕ. Δι αναπαυ'σω μ€ν α υ τό ν μ € τα λ α β ο 'ντ€ ς α υ το ύ τ ο ν
συγγυμναστήν τόνδ€ Σωκράτη; ή πώς* συμβουλ€0€ΐς;
ΘΕΟ. Καθάπςρ €ΐπ€ς, μ€ταλάμβαν€* νόω γάρ όντ€ £$ον 10
οΐσ^τον πάντα πόνον άναπαυομόνω.
ΣΩ. Καί μην κινδυν€υ€τον, ώ ξόν€, άμφω ποθέν έμ οι d
συγγ€ν€ΐαν €χ€ΐν τινά. τον μόν γ€ ούν ύμΛς* κατά την τοΟ
προσώπου φύσιν όμοιον έμοι φαίν€σθαί φατ€, του δ ’ ήμίν ή
κλήσις* όμώνυμος* ούσα και ή πρόσρησις* πα ρόχ€ταί τιν α 258
ο’ικ€ΐότητα. δ*ΐ δη τούς γ€ συγγ€νΛς ήμας* aci προθύμων διά

a 3 6c yc η: 6<ί η,Ο | b 6 πάνυ μνημονικώς c: πάνυ μέν ουν

μνημονικώς m, Ο | C 4 καί ούκ η: ούκ η, Ο
 29

257 Socrates: I ’m really much indebted to you, Theodorus, for introducing

me to Theaetetus, and also to our visitor.
Theodorus: And perhaps, Socrates, your debt will be three Omes as
*5 great, when they complete both the statesman and the philosopher for
you.
Soc.: Yes and no: shall we say, my dear Theodorus, that we’ve heard
the best arithmetician and geometer putting it like this?
bi Thcod.: How do you mean, Socrates?
Soc.: Because you assumed that each of the three were to be assigned
equal worth, when in fact they differ in value by more than can be
expressed in terms of mathematical proportion.
b5 Thcod.: Well said, Socrates, by our god Ammon; a just rebuke -
you’ve remembered your arithmetic very well, to bring me up on my
mistake like that. As for you, I’ll get my own back for this on another
occasion; but turning to our guest - don’t you give up at all on
ci obliging us, but, whether you choose the statesman first or the
philosopher, choose him and go through them in turn.
Elcatic Stranger That, Theodorus, is what we must do, since we have
tried our hand once, and we must not desist until we come to the end
cS of what we have in hand. But I have a question: what should I do
about Theaetetus here?
Thcod.: In what respect?
E.S.: Should we give him a rest and substitute for him [the younger]
Socrates here, who trains with him? Or what’s your advice?
cio Thcod.: As you say, make a substitution; since they are young, they’ll
put up with any sort of exertion more easily if they take a rest,
di [Older] Soc.: What’s more, my friend, both of them seem somehow
to have a certain kinship with me. One of them you say is like me in
25 S the way he looks; as for the other, the fact that he is called and
designated by the same name as I am produces a certain rclatcdncss.
Well, we must always be eager to recognize those akin to us by
30
λόγων άναγνωρίξειν. θ εα ιτή τψ μέν ούν αυτό? τ« συνέμειξα (258)
χθε? διά λόγων καί νυν άκήκοα άποκρινομένου, Σωκράτου? δέ
ουδέτερα· δ€ΐ δε σκέψασθαι κα\ τοΟτον. έμοι μέν ούν cl? 5
αύθι?, σόί 6c νυν άποκρινέσθω.
ΞΕ. Τ αυτ’ Ισται. ώ Σωκρατε?, ακούει? δή Σωκράτου?;
ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ Ο ΝΕΩΤΕΡΟΣ Ναί.
ΞΕ. Συγχω ρει? ουν όΐ? λέγει;
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Πάνυ μέν ουν. 10
ΞΕ. Ου τά σά κωλύειν φαίν€ται, δει 6k ϊσω? Ι τ ι ήττον b
τάμα διακωλυ€ΐν. άλλά δή μετά τον σοφιστήν άναγκάΐον, ώ?
έμοι φαίνεται, τον πολιτικόν άνδρα διαζητεΐν νψ ν καί μοι
λέγε πότερον των επιστημόνων τ ιν ’ ήμιν καί τούτον θετέον,
ή πώ?; 5
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Οΰτω?.
ΞΕ. Τ ά ? έπ ισ τή μ α ? άρα δια λη πτέον, ώ σπερ ήνίκα το ν
πρότερον έσκοπουμεν;
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Τ ά χ ’ άν.
ΞΕ. Ού μέν δή κατά ταύτόν γε, ώ Σώκρατε?, φ α ίνετα ι μοι 10
τμήμα.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Τ ί μην;
ΞΕ. Κ ατ’ άλλο. c
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Έ οικε'ν γε.
ΞΕ. Τήν ούν πολιτικήν άτραπόν πή τι? άνευρήσεί; δει γάρ
αυτήν άνευρεΐν, και χωρι? άφελόντα? άπό των άλλων Ιδέαν
αυτή μίαν έπισφραγίσασθαι, και τα ι? άλλαι? έκτροπα!? εν 5
άλλο ειδο? έπισημηναμένου? πάσα? τά? έπιστήμα? ώ? ουσα?
δύο είδη διανοηθήναι τήν ψυχήν ήμών ποιήσαι.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Τ ουτ’ ήδη σόν οίμαι τό έργον, ώ ξένε, άλλ’ ούκ
έμόν γ ίγ ν ε τ α ι.
ΞΕ. Δ ει γε μην, ώ Σωκρατε?, αυτό είνα ι και σόν, όταν d
έμφ ανέ? ήμΐν γένη τα ι.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Καλώ? είπε?.
ΞΕ. *Αρ’ ούν ούκ άριθμητική μέν καί τινε? έτεραι ταύτη
συγγενεΐ? τέχνα ι ψιλαι τών πράξεων είσι, τό δέ γνώναι 5

b 3 τόν πολιτικόν άνδρα η: πολιτικόν τόν άνδρα η: πολιτικόν [τόν

άνδρα]Ο
 31
(25*) talking to them. Theaetetus I myself had a verbal encounter with
yesterday, and I have just now heard him answering questions,
•5 whereas neither applies in Socrates’ ease; we must try him out too.
He’ll answer to me on another occasion; for now let him answer you.
E.S.; I’ll go along with that. Socrates, do you hear what Socrates
says?
Young Socrates; Yes.
E.S.; Then do you agree with it?
•to Y.S.: Absolutely.
bi E.S.: It seems that there is no obstacle on your side, and perhaps there
should be even less on mine. Well then, after the sophist, it seems to
me that the two of us must search for the statesman. Now tell me;
should we posit in the ease of this person too that he is one of those
hs who possess knowledge, or what assumption should we make?
Y.S.: That's what we should assume.
E.S.: In that ease we must divide the kinds of knowledge, as we did
when we were considering the previous individual?
Y.S.: Perhaps so.
bio E.S.; But it’s not in the same place, Socrates, that I think I see a cut.
Y.S.: Why not?
ei E.S.: It’s in a different place.
Y.S.: Yes, apparently.
E.S.; So in what direction will one discover the path that leads to the
statesman? For we must discover it, and after having separated it
c5 from the rest we must impress one character on it; and having
stamped a single different form on the other turnings we must make
our mind think of all kinds of knowledge as being two forms.
Y.S; That, I think, is actually for you to do, Stranger, not for me.
ai E.S.; But, Socrates, it must also be a matter for you, when it becomes
clear to us what it is.
Y.S.: You’re right.
E.S.; Well then; isn't it the ease that arithmetic and some other kinds
as of expertise that arc akin to it don’t involve any practical actions, but
simply provide knowledge?
32
παρόσχοντο μόνον;
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Έ σ τ ιν ούτως*.
ΞΕ. Αΐ δ€ γ€ τΐ€ρι Τ€κτονικήν αυ και συμπασαν χ€ΐρουργίαν
ώστΐ€ρ έν ταΐς* ττραξ€σιν ένουσαν σύμφυτον τη ν έπισ τή μ η ν
κ ό κ τη ν τα ι, και σ υ να π οτ€λουσ ι τα γ ιγ ν ό μ € ν α ύττ’ α υ τώ ν c
σώματα πρότ€ρον ούκ όντα.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Τ ί μην;
ΞΕ. Ταύτη τοίνυν συμπάσας* έπιστήμας* διαίρ€ΐ, την μέν
πρακτικήν προσ€ΐπών, την δέ μόνον γνωστικήν. 5
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. *Έστω σοι ταυθ’ ώς* μιας* έπιστήμης* τής* όλης* €ΐδη
δυο.
ΞΕ. Πότ€ρον ούν τον πολιτικόν και βασιλόα και δ€σπότην
και € τ * οίκονο'μον θησ ομ€ν ώς· £ν π α ν τ α τ α υ τ α
προσαγορ€υοντ€ς*, ή τοσαυτας* τόχνας* αύτάς* €ΐναι φώμ€ν 10
όσαπ€ρ ονόματα έρρήθη; μάλλον δό μοι δ€υρο €που.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Πή;
ΞΕ. Τήδ€. €ΐ τφ τις* των δημοσΐ€υόντων ιατρών ικανός* 259
συμβουλ€υ€ΐν ίδιωτ€ΐίων αυτός*, α ρ ’ ούκ άναγκαΐον αύτφ
προσαγορ€υ/€σθαι τουνομα τής* τέχνης* τα ύ τ ό ν όπ€ρ ($
συμβουλ€υ€ΐ;
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Ναι. 5
ΞΕ. Τί δ*; όστις* βασιλ€ΐίοντι χώρας* άνδρι παραιν€ΐν δ€ΐνός*
ιδιώτης* ών αυτός*, άρ* ου φήσομ€ν € χ€ ΐν α υ τό ν τ η ν
Επιστήμην ήν ?δ€ΐ τον άρχοντα αυτόν κ€κτήσθαΐ;
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Φήσομ€ν.
ΞΕ. 'Αλλά μην ή γ€ αληθινού βασιλ€ως* βασιλική; b
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Ναι.
ΞΕ. Ταύτην δέ ό κ€Κτημόνος* ούκ, αντ€ αρχών αντ€ ιδιώτης*
ών τυγχάνη, πάντως* κατά γ€ την τόχνην αυτήν βασιλικός*
όρθώς* προσρηθήσ€ταΐ; 5
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Δίκαιον γουν.
ΞΕ. Και μήν οικονόμο? γ€ και δ€σπότης* ταύτόν.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Τ ί μήν;
ΞΕ. Τί δό; μίγάλης* σχήμα οικήσ€ως* ή σμικρας* αυ πόλ€ως*

β2συναποτίλο0σαν 6 | b 5 (-8) ... προσρηΟήσ<:ται; ΝΕ.ΣΩ. Τ ί μήν;

ΞΕ. Τ ήν άρα πολιτικήν κα\ πολιτικόν και βασιλικήν και βασιλικόν
Α ς τα ύτόν ώ ς 2ν πάντα ταΟτα συνΟήσομ<:ν; c (transposed from d 2-4)
I b 6 (-9) Δ ίκαιον γουν. HE. Τ ήν Spa ... ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Δήλον c (transposed
from d 3-5)
 33
Y.S.: That’s so.
E.S.: Whereas for their part those kinds of expertise involved in
carpentry and manufacture as a whole have their knowledge as it were
ei naturally bound up with practical actions, and use it to complete those
material items they cause to come into being from not having been
before?
Y.S.: What of that?
E.S.: Well, divide all kinds of knowledge in this way, calling the one
e5 practical knowledge, the other purely theoretical.
Y.S.: I grant you these as two kinds of knowledge taken as a single
whole.
E.S.: Then shall we posit the statesman and king and slave-master,
and the manager of a household as well, as one thing, when we refer
eio to them by all these names, or arc we to say that they arc as many
kinds of expertise as the names we use to refer to them? Or rather, let
me take this way, and you follow me.
Y.S.: What way is that?
259 E.S.: This one. If someone who is himself in private practice is
capable of advising a doctor in public employment, isn’t it necessary
for him to be called by the same professional title as the person he
advises?
«5 Y.S.: Yes.
E.S.: Well then, won’t we say that the person who is clever at giving
advice to a ruler of a country himself has the expert knowledge that
the ruler himself ought to have possessed?
Y.S.: We will.
bi E.S.: But the knowledge that belongs to the true king is the
knowledge of kingship?
Y.S.: Yes.
E.S.: And isn’t it the ease that the person who possesses this, whether
he happens to be a ruler or a private citizen, in all circumstances, in
t>5 virtue of his possession of the expertise itself, will correctly be
addressed as an expert in kingship?
Y.S.: That’s fair.
E.S.: Next, a household manager and a slave-master arc the same
thing.
Y.S.: Of course.
E.S.: Well then, surely there won’t be any difference in relation to
34
όγκος* μών τ ι προς* αρχήν διοίσ€Τον; (259)
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Ούδέν. 11
ΞΕ. ΟύκοΟν, δ νυνδή δΐ€σκοπούμ€θα, φαν€ρόν ώς* έπιστήμη c
μία τΐ€ρ\ π ά ντ’ έστι ταυτα* ταύτην δέ ε ίτε βασιλικήν €ΐτ€
π ο λ ιτ ικ ή ν €ΪΤ€ οικονομ ική ν τις* ονο μ ά ζ€ ΐ, μ ηδέν αυτα}
διαφ€ρωμ€θα.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Τί γάρ; 5
ΞΕ. Άλλα μήν τόδ€ γ ε δήλον, ώς· βασιλεύς άπας* χ€ρσι καί
σιίμπαντι τψ σώματι σμίκρ’ άττα ε \ς το κατέχ€ΐν τήν αρχήν
δύναται προς* τήν τι\ς ψυχής* συν€θΐν και {κόμην.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Δήλον.
ΞΕ. Τής* δή γνωστικής* μάλλον ή τής* χ€ΐροτ€χνικής* καί 10
δλως: πρακτικής* βούλ€ΐ τον βασιλέα φώμ€ν οΙκ€ΐότ€ρον είναι; d
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Τί μήν;
ΞΕ. Τήν αρα πολιτικήν και πολιτικόν και βασιλικήν και
βασιλικόν €ίς* ταύτόν ώς* €ν πάντα ταυτα συνθήσομ^ν;
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Δήλον. 5
ΞΕ. Ούκουν πορ€υοίμ€θ’ αν έξής*, ci μ€τά τα υ τα τή ν
γνωστικήν διοριζοίμεθα;
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Πάνυ γε.
ΞΕ. Πρόσ€χ€ δή τον νουν αν αρα έν αυτή τινα διαφυήν
κατανοήσωμ€ν. 10
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Φρα£€ ποιαν.
ΞΕ. Τοιάνδ€. λογιστική που τις* ήμΐν ήν τέχνη. c
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Ναι.
ΞΕ. Των γνωστικών γ ε οΐμαι παντάπασι τ€χνών.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Πώς* δ’ ου;
ΞΕ. Γνοιίση δή λογιστική τήν έν τοΐς* άριθμοΐς* διαφοράν 5
μών τι πλέον έργον δωσομεν ή τα γνωσθέντα κρΐναι;
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Τί μήν;
ΞΕ. Και μήν άρχιτέκτων γ ε πας* ούκ αυτός* έργατικός* άλλ’
έργατών αρχών.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Ναι. 10
ΞΕ. Παρ€χόμ€νδς* γέ που γνώσιν άλλ’ ου χ€ΐρουργίαν.

d 2—5: see b 5-6 | σ8κα\ μήν η: καί γάρ η, Ο

 35
(299) ruling between the character of a large household, on the one hand,
bio and the bulk of a small city on the other?
Y.S.: None.
ei E.S.: So, in answer to the question we were asking ourselves just now,
it’s clear that there is one kind of expert knowledge concerned with all
these things; whether someone gives this the name of expertise in
kingship, or statesmanship, or household management, let’s not pick
any quarrel with him.
c5 Y.S.: I agree - why should we?
E.S.: But this much is clear, that the power of any king to maintain his
rule has little to do with the use of his hands or his body in general in
comparison with the understanding and force of his mind.
Y.S.: Qcarly.
cio E.S.: Then do you want us to assert that the king is more closely
<11 related to the theoretical kind of knowledge than to the manual or
generally practical kind?
Y.S.: Of course.
E.S.: In that ease we shall put all these things together - the
statesman’s knowledge and the statesman, the king’s knowledge and
the king - as one, and regard them as the same?
<»5 Y.S.: Qcarly.
E.S.: Well, would we be proceeding in the right order, if after this we
divided theoretical knowledge?
Y.S.: Certainly.
<no E.S.: So look closely in ease we detect some break in it.
Y.S.: Of what sort? Tell me.
ei E.S.: Of this sort. We agreed, I think, that there is such a thing as an
art of calculation?
Y.S.: Yes.
E.S.: And I suppose it belongs absolutely among the theoretical kinds
of expertise.
Y.S.: Quite.
e5 E.S.: Because once it recognizes that there is a difference between
numbers, there surely isn’t any further job we’ll assign to it than
judging what it has recognized?
Y.S.: No, certainly not.
E.S.: And all master-builders too - they don’t act as workers
themselves, but manage workers.
*io Y.S.: Yes.
E.S.: In so far - I suppose - as what the master-builder provides is
36
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Ούτως*.
ΞΕ. Δικαίως* δή μ € τέχ€ ΐν δν λ έγο ιτο τής* γνωστικής* 260
έτιιστήμης.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Πάνυ γ€.
HE. Τούτφ δέ γ€ οιμαι *προσήκ€ΐ κρίναντι μή τέλος έχ€ΐν
μηδ* ά τιη λλα'χθα ι, καθα'τκρ ό λογιστής* άττη'λλακτο, 5
ττροστάττ€ΐν δέ έκάστοις των έργατών τό γ€ ττρόσφορον 4'ως
αν άτΐ€ργάσωνται τό τιροσταχθέν.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Όρθώς*.
ΞΕ. Ούκουν γνωστικαι μέν αϊ Τ€ τοιαυται σύμττασαι και
όττόσαι συνέτιονται τή λογιστική, κρίσβι δέ και €*πιτάξ€ΐ 10
διαφέρ€τον άλλήλοιν τουτω τώ γένη; b
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Φαίν€σθον.
ΞΕ. *Αρ’ οΰν συμπασης* τής* γνωστικής* €ΐ τό μ έν
έτιιτακτικόν μέρος, τό δέ κριτικόν διαιροιίμ€νοι ττροσ€ΐτιοιμ€ν,
έμμ€λώς αν φαΐμςν διηρήσθαι; 5
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Κατά γ€ την έμήν δόξαν.
ΞΕ. Άλλα μην τοΐς* γ€ κοινή τ ι πράττουσιν αγαπητόν
όμονο€ΐν.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Πώς* 6' οΰ;
ΞΕ. Τούτου τοίνυν μέχριτΐ€ρ αν αυτοί κοινωνώμ€ν, έατέον 10
τά γ€ των άλλων δοξάσματα χαίρ€ΐν.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Τί μην;
ΞΕ. Φέρ€ δή, τούτοιν τόίν τέχναιν ήμΐν τον βασιλικόν έν c
ττοτέρq. θ€τέον; αρ’ έν τή κριτική, καθάτΐ€ρ τινά θ€ατήν, ή
μάλλον τής* έπιτακτικής ώς* όντα αυτόν τέχνης* θήσομ€ν,
δ€στιόζοντά γ€;
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Πώς* γάρ ου μάλλον; 5
ΞΕ. Την έτιιτακτικήν δή τέχνην τιάλιν αν €ΐη θ€ατέον €ΐ
πη διέστηκ€ν. καί μοι δοκ€ΐ τή δ έ πη, καθάτΐ€ρ ή τών
κάτι ήλων τέχνη τής* τών αύτοττωλών διώρισται τέχνης, και τό
βασιλικόν γ έ ν ο ς coikcv άτιό του τώ ν κηρυ'κων γ έν ο υ ς d
άφωρίσθαι.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Πώς;
 37
understanding rather than manual labour.
Y.S.: Just so.
260 E.S.: It would be right to say, then, that he has a share in the
theoretical kind of knowledge.
Y.S.: Certainly.
E.S.: But it belongs to him, I think, once he has given his professional
«5 judgement, not to be finished or to take his leave, in the way that the
expert in calculation took his, but to assign whatever is the
appropriate task to each group of woikcrs until they complete what
has been assigned to them.
Y.S.: That’s correct.
E.S.: So both all kinds of knowledge of this sort and all those that go
along with the art of calculation arc theoretical, but these two groups
bi differ from each other in so far as one makes judgements, while tlx:
other directs?
Y.S.: They appear to do so.
E.S. So if we divided off two parts of theoretical knowledge as a
whole, referring to one as directive and the other as making
bs judgements, would we say that it had been divided suitably?
Y.S.: Yes, at least according to my view.
E.S.: But if people arc doing something together, it is enough if they
agree with one another.
Y.S.: Quite.
bio E.S.: So for as long as we arc sharing in (he present task, we should
say goodbye to what everybody else may think.
Y.S.: Of course.
'ei E.S.: So tell me: in which of these two kinds of expertise should we
locate the expert in kingship? In the one concerned with making
judgements, as if he were some sort of spectator, or shall we rather
locale him as belonging to the directive kind of expertise, seeing that
he is master of others?
c5 Y.S.: In the second, of course.
E.S.: Then we should need to look at the directive kind of expertise in
its turn, to see if it divides somewhere. And to me it seems that it
docs so hereabouts: in the way that the expertise of the retail-dealer is
distinguished from that of the producer who sells his own products, so
at the class of kings is set apart from the class of heralds.
Y.S.: How so?
38
ΞΕ. Πωληθέντα τιου πρότέρον 2ργα άλλότρια παραδέχόμένοι
δέύτέρον πωλοΰσι πάλιν οΐ κάπηλοι. 5
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Πάνυ μόν ουν.
ΞΕ. Ούκουν και τδ κηρυκικόν φυλον έ π ιτ α χ θ έ ν τ ’ άλλότρια
ν ο ή μ α τα π α ρ α δ έχ ο μ έν ο ν α υτό δέύ τέρ ο ν έ π ι τ ά τ τ έ ΐ π ά λ ιν
έτέρ ο ις.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Αληθέστατα. 10
ΞΕ. Τ ι ουν; els* ταύτόν μέΐζομέν βασιλικήν έρμηνέυτική,
κέλέυστική, μαντική, κηρυκική, και πολλαΐς έτέραις τούτων e
τέ χ ν α ις συγγένέσιν, αι σύμπασαι το γ ’ έπ ιτά ττέΐν έχουσιν;
ή β ο ύ λ έΐ, κ α θά π έρ ή κ ά ζ ο μ έ ν νυνδη', καί το ύ ν ο μ α
παρέΐκάσωμέν, έπέίδή και σχέδόν ανώνυμον ον τυγχάνέΐ τό
των αύτέπιτακτών γένος*, και ταύτη ταυτα δΐέλώμέθα, τό μόν 5
των βασιλέων γένος* έΐς την αύτέπιτακτικήν θέντές, του δέ
άλλου παντός* ά μέλήσαντές*, ό νο μ α έΤ έρον αύτοίς*
παραχωρήσαντές* θέσθαι τινά; του γάρ άρχοντος ένέκα ήμΐν
ή μέθοδος* ήν άλλ' ούχι του έναντίου. 261
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Πάνυ μέν ουν.
ΞΕ. Ούκουν έπέίδή τούτο μέτρίως άφέστηκέν α π' έκέίνων,
άλλοτριότητι διορισθέν προς οίκέΐότητα, τούτο αυτό πάλιν αυ
διαιρέΐν άναγκαΐον, έΐ τινα τομήν έτι έχομέν ύπέίκουσαν έν 5
τούτφ;
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Πάνυ γέ.
ΞΕ. Και μήν φαινόμέθα έ χ έ ΐν άλλ' έπακολουθών σύντέμνέ.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Πή;
ΞΕ. Π ά ντα ς όπόσους αν ά ρχοντα ς διανοηθώμέν έ π ιτ ά ζ έ ΐ 10
τιροσχρωμένους ά ρ ' ούχ έύρήσομέν γ έν έσ έώ ς τ ίν ο ς ένέκα b
προσ τά ττοντα ς;
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Πώς δ' οΰ;
ΞΕ. Και μήν τά γέ γιγνόμένα πάντα δίχα διαλαβέιν ου
παντάπασι χαλέπόν. 5
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Πή;
ΞΕ. Τά μέν άψυχα αυτών έστ£ που συμπάντων, τά δ'
έμψυχα.

d 7 έπιταχΟ ό ντα άλλότρια η: έπιταχΟ έν τάλλότρια η

 39
E.S.: The retailer, I think, takes over someone cIsc’s products, which
as have previously been sold, and sells them on, for a second time.
Y.S.: Absolutely.
E.S.: Well then, the class of heralds takes over directions that have
been thought up by someone else, and itself issues them for a second
time to another group,
dio Y.S.: Very true.
E.S.: So - shall we mix together the expertise of the king with that of
ei the interpreter, the person who gives the time to the rowers, the seer,
the herald, and many other kinds of expertise related to these, just
because they all have the feature of issuing directions? Or do you
want us to make up a name in line with the analogy we were using
c5 just now, since in fact the class of ‘self-directors’ happens pretty
much to be without a name of its own, and should we divide these
things this way, locating the class of kings as belonging to the ‘self-
directing’ type of expertise, and taking no notice of all the rest,
leaving someone else to propose another name for them? For we set
261 up our investigation in order to find the person who rules, not his
opposite.
Y.S.: Absolutely.
E.S.: Well then, since this is at a certain distance from them,
distinguished by difference in relation to kinship, we must in turn
«5 divide this loo, if we still Find some cut yielding to us in it?
Y.S.: Certainly.
E.S.: And what’s more, we seem to have one: follow on and make the
cut with me.
Y.S.: Where?
bt E.S.: All those in control of others that we can think of as employing
directions - we shall Find them issuing their directions, won’t we, for
the sake of something’s coming into being?
Y.S.: Of course.
bs E.S.: And it’s not at all difficult to separate into two all of those things
that come into being.
Y.S.: How?
E.S.: I imagine that, of all of them taken together, some arc inanimate
and some arc animate.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Ναί.
HE. Τούτοις* δέ γ€ αύτοΐς* τό του γνω στικού μέρος*
Επιτακτικόν δν, cincp βουλόμ€θα τ έ μ ^ ιν , Τ€μοΟμ€ν.
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τάττοντ€ς*, τό 6' Επ\ ταΐς* τών Εμψύχων* κα\ παν ούτως* ήδη
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ΞΕ. Τό μΕν τοίνυν αυτών παραλίπωμ€ν, τό δ' άναλάβωμ€ν,
άναλαβόντ€ς* δΕ μ€ρισώμ€θα €ΐς* δύο τό σύμπαν.
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ΞΕ. Πάντως* που τό π€ρι τά ζφα Επιτακτικόν, ου γάρ δή
τό γ€ τής* βασιλικής* Επιστήμης* Εστί ποτ€ τών αψύχων
Επιστατούν, όιον άρχιτ€κτονικόν, άλλα γ€νναιότ€ρον, Εν τοΐς*
ζφοις* και ncpi αύτά ταυτα την δύναμιν ά€ΐ Κ€Κτημένον.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Όρθώς*.
ΞΕ. Την γ€ μην τών ζψων γέν€σιν και τροφήν την μέν τις*
αν ΐδοι μονοτροφίαν ούσαν, τη ν δΕ κοινή τώ ν Εν ταΐς*
άγέλαις* θρ€μμάτων Επιμέλ€ΐαν.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Όρθώς*.
ΞΕ. \Αλλ' ου μην τόν γ€ πολιτικόν €υρήσομ€ν Ιδιοτρόφον,
ώσπ€ρ βοηλάτην ή τινα ιπποκόμον, άλλ’ ίπποφορβφ τ€ καί
βουφορβφ μάλλον προσ€οικότα.
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κ ο ιν ή ν τρ ο φ ή ν ά γ € λ α ιο τ ρ ο φ ία ν ή κ ο ιν ο τρ ο φ ικ ή ν τ ιν α
όνομάζωμςν;
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Όπότ€ρον αν Εν τφ λόγψ συμβαίνη.
ΞΕ. Καλώς* γ€, ώ Σώκρατ€ς* καν διαφύλαξης* τό μή
σπουδάζ€ΐν Επι τοΐς· όνόμασιν, πλουσιώτ€ρος* €ΐς* τό γήρας*
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 41
Y.S.: Yes.
bio E.S.: And it’s by these very things that we’ll cut the part of the
theoretical which is directive, if indeed we wish to cut it
Y.S.: How?
ei E.S.: By assigning part of it to the production of inanimate things,
part to that of animate things; and in this way it will all immediately
be divided into two.
Y.S.: I agree absolutely.
E.S.: So then let’s leave one of these parts to one side, and take up the
c5 other, and then let’s divide the whole of it into two parts.
Y.S.: Which of the two parts do you say we should take up?
E.S.: I suppose it must be the one that issues directions in relation to
living creatures. For surely it is not the ease that the expert
knowledge that belongs to a king is ever something that oversees
inanimate things, as if it were the knowledge of the master-builder, it
di is something nobler, which always has its power among living
creatures and in relation to just these.
Y.S.: Correct.
E.S.: Now, as one can observe, either the production and rearing of
as living creatures is done singly, or it is a caring for creatures together
in herds.
Y.S.: Correct.
E.S.: But we’ll certainly not find the statesman rearing individual
creatures, like some ox-driver or groom, but rather resembling a
horse-breeder or cowherd,
dio Y.S.: It certainly seems so, now you say it.
ei E.S.: Well then: when it comes to rearing living creatures, arc we to
call the shared rearing of many creatures together a sort of ‘herd-
rearing’ or ‘collective rearing’?
Y.S.: Whichever turns out to fit, in the course of the argument.
c5 E.S.: Well said, Socrates; and if you persevere in not paying serious
attention to names, you will be seen to be richer in wisdom as you
advance to old age. But now we must do just as you instruct; and do
you see how by showing the collective rearing of herds to be twin in
262 form one will make what is now being sought in double the field then
to be sought in half of that?
42
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Προθυμήσομαι. καί μοι δοκέϊ τών μέν άνθρώπων (262)
έτέρα τις* έΐναι, τών 6' αύ θηρίων άλλη τροφή.
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μή μέντοι τουτό yc €ΐς* αύθις* κατά δυναμιν πάσχωμ€ν.
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 43
(242) Y.S.: I shall try my hardest. It seems to me that there is a different
sort of rearing of human beings, and in turn another sort where
animals arc concerned.
•5 E.S.: Yes, absolutely, you’ve made a very keen and courageous
division! But let’s try to avoid this happening to us again.
Y.S.: What sort of thing?
E.S.: Let’s not lake off one small part on its own, leaving many laigc
bi ones behind, and without reference to classes; let the part bring a class
along with it. It’s a really fine thing to separate off immediately what
one is searching for from the rest, if one gets it right - as you thought
you had the right division, just before, and hurried the aigumcnt on,
t>s seeing it leading to human beings; but in fact, my friend, it’s not safe
to make thin cuts; it’s safer to go along cutting through the middle of
things, and that way one will be more likely to encounter classes,
ct This makes all the difference in relation to philosophical
investigations.
Y.S.: What do you mean by this, Stranger?
E.S.: I must try to tell you still more clearly, Socrates, out of good will
towards your natural endowments. In the present circumstances, I
c5 have to say, it is impossible to show what I mean with absolute
completeness; but I must bring it just a little further forward for the
sake of clarity.
Y.S.: Well then, what sort of thing arc you saying that we weren’t
doing right just now in our divisions?
cto E.S.: This sort of thing: it’s as if someone tried to divide the human
dt race into two and made the cut in the way that most people here carve
things up, taking the Greek race away as one, separate from all the
rest, and to all the other races together, which arc unlimited in
number, which don’t mix with one another, and don’t share the same
d5 language - they call this collection by the single appellation
‘barbarian’, and because of this single appellation they expect it to be
a single family-class too; another example would be if someone
thought that he was dividing number into two classes by cutting off
et the number ten-thousand from all the rest, separating it off as a single
class, and in positing a single name for all the rest supposed here too
that through getting the name this class too came into existence, a
second single one apart from the other. But I imagine the division
44
άρτίψ και π€ριττψ τι? τόμνοι, το 6k αύ των ανθρώπων γόνο? 5
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και μόρο? €υρ(σκ€ΐν 4κάτ€ρον των σχισθόντων. 263
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τ ι? γόνο? και μόρο? έναργόστ€ρον γνοίη, ώ? ού ταύτόν
όστον άλλ’ ότ€ρον άλλήλοιν;
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ή μ € ΐ? μέν και νυν μακροτόραν του δόοντο? άπό τού
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ποτ€ παρ' έμου δόξη? αύτό έναργώ? διωρισμόνον άκηκοόναι.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Το ποιον;
HE. Είδό? τ€ και μόρο? ότ€ρον άλλήλων €ΐναι. 5
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Σώκρατ€?, άόί φάθι λόγ€ΐν. 10
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Τ αυτ’ όσται.
ΞΕ. Φράσον δη μοι τό μ€τά τούτο. c
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Ποιον;
ΞΕ. Τό τη? άποπλανήσ€ω? όπόθ€ν ήμα? δ€ΰρ' ήγαγ€ν. οίμαι
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καταλιπ€ΐν τό λοιπόν αύ πάντων γόνο? όν, ότι πασι ταύτόν
έπονομάζ€ΐν όσχ€? όνομα, θηρία καλόσα?. d
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. *Ην και ταύτα ού'τω?.
ΞΕ. Τό δό γ€, ώ πάντων άνδρ€ΐότατ€, τ ά χ ’ αν, €Ϊ που

b9cl6o? c: οΐδου? m
 45
would be done better, more by classes and more into two, if one cut
eS number by means of even and odd, and the human race in its turn by
means of male and female, and only split off Lydians or Phrygians or
anyone else and ranged them against all the rest when one was at a
263 loss as to how to split in such a way that each of the halves split off
was simultaneously class and part.
Y.S.: Quite right; but this very thing - how is one to see it more
plainly, that class and part are not the same but different from each
other?
as E.S.: An excellent response, Socrates, but what you demand is no
light thing. We have already wandered far away from the discussion
we proposed, and you arc telling us to wander even more. Well, as
for now, let’s go back to where we were, which seems the reasonable
bi thing to do; and these other things we’ll pursue like trackers on
another occasion, when we have the time. However, there is one
thing you must absolutely guard against, and that is to suppose that
you have ever heard from me a plain account of the matter.
Y.S.: Which?
bs E.S.: That class and part arc different from each other.
Y.S.: What should I say I have heard from you?
E.S.: That whenever there is a class of something, it is necessarily
also a part of whatever thing it is called a class of, but it is not at all
necessary that a part is a class. You must always assert, Socrates, that
bio this is what I say rather than the other way round.
Y.S.: I shall do just that,
ei E.S.: Tell me, then, about the next thing.
Y.S.: What’s that?
E.S.; The point from which our digression brought us to where we arc
now. I think it was pretty much the point at which you were asked
c5 how to divide herd-rearing, and you said with great keenness that
there were two classes of living creatures, one human, and a second
single one consisting of all the rest - the animals - together.
Y.S.: True.
E.S.: And to me you appeared then to think that in taking away a part
you had left behind the rest as in its turn a single class, consisting of
at all of them, because you had the same name, ‘animals’, to apply to
them all.
Y.S.: This loo was as you say.
E.S.: And yet, my courageous friend, maybe, if by chance there is
46
φρόνιμόν έστί τ ι ζφον ?τ€ρον, όϊον δοκ€ΐ τό τών γ€ράνων, η
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αυτά πάσχωμ€ν.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Ούδέν γάρ δ€ΐ. 5
ΞΕ. Και γαρ ουν και τότ€ ήμαρτάν€Τ0 ταύτη.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Τ ί δη;
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του ζφοτροφικου γόνου?, αγελαίω ν μην ζφων. ή γάρ;
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Ναί. 10
ΞΕ. Διήρητο τοίνυν ήδη και τότ€ σύμτταν τό ζφον τ<$ 264
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και Ιστιν, έπι τοΐ? άγ€λαίοι? μην ζητητόα θρόμμασιν.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Ναί.
ΞΕ. Μή τοίνυν διαιρώμ€θα ώσττ€ρ τδ τ€ προ? ά π α ντα
άποβλόψαντ€?, μηδέ σπ€υσαντ€?, Χνα δή ταχύ γ€νώμ€θα προ?
τή πολιτική. π€ποίηκ€ γάρ ήμα? και νυν παθ€ΐν τό κατά τήν b
παροιμίαν πάθο?.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Ποιον;
ΞΕ. Ούχ ήσυχου? €υ διαιρουντα? ήνυκόναι βραδυτ€ρον.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Και καλώ? γ€, ώ ξένε, π€ποίηκ€. 5
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π€ΐρώμ€θα δ ια ιρ € ΐν ΐσω? γάρ και τούτο δ συ πρόθυμη
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ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Ποιον δή; 10

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 47
some other animal which is rational, as for example the crane seems
<15 to be, or some other such creature, and which perhaps distributes
names on the same principles as you, it might oppose cranes as one
class to all other living creatures and give itself airs, taking all the rest
together with human beings and putting them into the same category,
ei which it would call by no other name except - perhaps - ‘animals’.
So let’s try to be very wary of everything of this sort.
Y.S.: How?
E.S.: By not dividing the class of living creatures as a whole, in order
to lessen the risk of its happening to us.
«5 Y.S.: Yes, we must certainly avoid it.
E.S.: Yes; and we were going wrong in this way just at that point.
Y.S.: How so?
E.S.: Of that theoretical knowledge which was directive we had a
part, I think, of the class concerned with rearing living creatures, one
which was concerned with creatures living in herds. True?
«>o Y.S.: Yes.
264 E.S.: Well then, living creatures as a whole together had in that ease
already at that point been divided by the categories of domesticated
and wild; for those that have a nature amenable to domestication arc
called tame, and those who resist it arc called wild.
Y.S.: Right.
•s E.S.: But the knowledge we arc hunting had to be and still is
concerned with tame things, and must be looked for with reference to
herd animals.
Y.S.: Yes.
E.S.: Well then, let’s not divide in the way we did then, looking at
bl everything, or in a hurry, just in order to get quickly to statesmanship.
It has already put us in the proverbial situation.
Y.S.: What situation is that?
E.S.: That by not quietly getting on with dividing properly we have
got to our destination more slowly.
** Y.S.: Yes, Stranger, and a fine situation it is!
E.S.: If you say so. In any ease, let’s go back and try again from the
beginning to divide collective rearing; perhaps, as we go through it in
detail, the argument itself will be better able to reveal to you what you
arc so keen to find. Tbll me this.
b»° Y.S.: What?
48
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ονομάζοντας*, τό δ' €Τ€ρον ξηροτροφικόν;
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. *Έμοιγ€.
ΞΕ. Και μην και τό βασιλικόν ούτως* ού ζητη'σομ€ν
όποτέρας* έστι τής* τέχνης** δήλον γάρ δη παντί. e
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Πώς* δ’ ού;
ΞΕ. Πας* μέν δη τό γ€ ξηροτροφικόν τής* άγ€λαιοτροφίας*
διέλοιτ' αν φυλον.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Πώς:; 5
ΞΕ. Τφ πτηνφ Τ€ και π€ζψ διορισάμ€νος*.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Αληθέστατα.
ΞΕ. Τί δέ; τό πολιτικόν ού π€ρι τό π€ζόν ζητητέον; ή ούκ
οΐ€ΐ και τον άφρονέστατον ώς* έπος* €Ui€iv δοξάζ€ΐν ούτως*;
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Έ γωγ€. 10
ΞΕ. Την δέ π€ζονομικη/ν, καθάικρ άρτιον αριθμόν, δ€ΐ
Τ€μνομένην δίχα άποφαίν€ΐν.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Δήλον.
ΞΕ. Και μην έφ’ δ γ€ μέρος* ώρμηκ€ν ήμΐν ό λόγος*, έ π ’ 265
€Κ€ΐνο δύο τινέ καθοραν όδώ τ€ταμένα φαίν€ται, την μέν

d 4 δ ιχ ά ζ α ν η: δίχα σ χ ίζ α ν η | c 1 γάρ δή η: δή γάρ η: [δη] γάρ Ο

I c8ou ncp\ c: ή Ticpl c, Ο: ώστκρ m | c 11 άρτιον m: άρτι τόν c, 0
 49
E.S.: This - I wonder if perhaps you’ve heard about it from others?
cl You certainly haven’t yourself any direct acquaintance, I know, with
the instances of fish-rearing in the Nile and in the King’s ponds. In
ornamental fountains, at any rate, you may perhaps have seen them.
Y.S.: Absolutely - I’ve both seen these and heard about the others
cs from many people.
E.S.: And again, examples of goose-rearing and crane-rearing - even
if you haven’t travelled over the plains of Thessaly, you’ve certainly
heard about these and believe that they exist.
Y.S.: Of course.
«η E.S.: Look, it’s for this purpose that I’ve asked you all this: of the
rearing of herd animals, some has to do with creatures living in water,
some also with creatures that live on dry land.
Y.S.: It docs.
E.S.: Do you agree, then, that we must split the expert knowledge of
collective rearing into two in this way, allocating one of its two parts
to each of these, calling one aquatic rearing, the other dry-land-
rcaring?
Y.S.: I do.
E.S.: And we certainly shan’t ask, in this ease, to which of the two
ci kinds of expertise kingship belongs; it’s quite clear to anyone.
Y.S.: Quite.
E.S.: Everybody would divide the dry-land-rcaring sort of herd­
rearing.
c5 Y.S.: How?
E.S.: By separating it by reference to the winged and what goes on
foot.
Y.S.: Very true.
E.S.: Well then - mustn't we look for statesmanship in relation to
what goes on foot? Or don’t you think that practically even the
simplest of minds supposes so?
eio Y.S.: I do.
E.S.: And the expertise to do with the management of creatures that
go on foot - we must show it being cut into two, like an even number.
Y.S.: Clearly.
265 E.S.: Now it seems that there arc two routes to be seen stretching out
in the direction of the part towards which our argument has hurried,
50
θάττω, προς* μόγα μέρος* σμικροί/ διαιρουμένην, τήι/ δέ, δτΐ€ρ <265)
έν τφ πρόσθ€ν έλέγομ€ν δτι δ€ΐ μ€σοτομ€Ϊν ώς* μάλιστα,
τ ο υ τ' έχουσαν μάλλον/, μακροτέραν γ€ μην. έξ€στιν ουν 5
όποτέραν αν βουληθωμ€ν, ταιίτην πορ€υθήναι.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Τί δέ; άμφοτέρας* αδύνατον;
ΞΕ. "Αμα γ \ ώ θαυμαστά* έν μέρ€ΐ γ€ μήν δήλον δτι
δυνατόν.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Έν μέρ€ΐ τοίνυν έγωγ€ άμφοτέρας* αίρουμαι. b
ΞΕ. 'Ρόδιον, έπ€ΐδή το λοιπόν βραχνί* κατ' άρχάς* μήν και
μ€σ ουσιν ά μ α τής* πορ€ΐας* χα λ € π ό ν α ν ήν ή μ ιν το
πρόσταγμα, νυν δ', έπ€ΐδή δοκ€ΐ ταιίτη, την μακροτέραν
π ρ ότ€ρον ιω μ € ν ν€ α λ έσ τ€ ρο ι γ ά ρ δντ€ς* pqov α υ τ ή ν 5
πορ€υσόμ€θα. την δέ δη διαίρ€σιν δρα.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Λέγ€.
ΞΕ. Τά π€ζά ήμιν των ήμέρων, δσαπ€ρ άγ€λαΐα, διηρημένα
έστι φιίσ€ΐ δίχα.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Τίνι; 10
ΞΕ. Τφ τ ω ν μ έ ν τ η ν γέν€σ ιν ά κ ςρ ω ν €ΐναι, τ ω ν δέ
Κ€ρασφόρον.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Φαίνεται. c
ΞΕ. Την δη π€ζονομικήν δΐ€λών άποδος έκατέριμ τφ μέρςι,
λόγψ χρωμ€νος*. αν γάρ όνομάζ€ΐν αυτά βουληθής*, έσται σοι
π€ριπ€πλ€γμένον μάλλον του δέοντος*.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Πώς* ούν χρή λέγ€ΐν; 5
ΞΕ. Ώδ€* τής* π€ζονομικής* έπιστήμης* δίχα διαιρ€θ€ΐσης* το
μόριον θάτ€ρον έπ ι τφ Κ€ρασφόρψ μέρ€ΐ τφ τής- αγέλης*
έπιτ€τάχθαι, το δέ erepov έπι τφ τής* άκ€ράτου.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Ταυτ* έστω ταιίτη λ€χθέντα* πάντως· γάρ ικανώς* d
δ€δήλωται.
ΞΕ. Και μήν δ γ€ βασιλ€υς* ήμιν αυ καταφανής* δ τι κολοβόν
τιν α αγέλην άκςράτων νομ€υ€ΐ.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Πώς* γάρ ου δήλος*; 5
ΞΕ. Ταιίτην τοίνυν καταθραυσαντ€ς* τδ γιγνόμ€νον αύτφ
π€ΐρωμ€θα άποδουναι.

d 3-4 κολοβόν τινα άγέλην άκρατων η: κολοβόν άγέλην τινά

κεράτων η, Ο | άόγιγνόμίνον c: Kivoupcvov m
 51
(265) one of them quicker, dividing a small part off against a large one,
while the other more closely observes die principle we were talking
•5 about earlier, that one should cut in the middle as much as possible,
but is longer. We can go down whichever of the two routes we like.
Y.S.: What if I were to ask if it is impossible to follow both?
E.S.: An extraordinary suggestion, if you mean both at once; but
clearly it is possible to take each in turn,
bi Y.S.: Then I opt for taking both, in turn.
E.S.: That’s easy, since the part that remains is short; if we had been
at the beginning or in the middle of our journey, the instruction would
have been difficult to carry out. As it is, since you think we should
bs take this option, let’s go down the longer route first; while we arc
fresher we’ll travel it more easily. Observe the division.
Y.S.: Tell me what it is.
E.S.: Of tame things that live in herds, we find those that go on foot
naturally divided into two.
bio Y.S.: By what?
E.S.: By the fact that some of them come into being without horns,
some with homs.
ei Y.S.: Evidently.
E.S.: Well then, divide the management of creatures that go on foot by
assigning it to each of these two parts, using a description for the
results of the division. For if you want to give them names, it will be
more complicated than necessary.
c5 Y.S.: How then should it be put?
E.S.: Like this: by saying that when the knowledge that has to do with
the management of creatures that go by fool is divided into two, one
section is allocated to the homed part of the herd, the other to the
hornless part.
ai Y.S.: Let it be put like this; in any ease it’s sufficiently clear.
E.S.: Now, as for the next step, it’s perfectly obvious to us that the
king tends a stunted herd of hornless creatures.
<15 Y.S.: How couldn’tit be clear?
E.S.: So by breaking this up let’s try to assign what falls to him.
52
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Πάνυ yc.
ΞΕ. Πότ€ρον ουν βούλ€ΐ τφ σχιστφ Τ€ καί τφ καλούμένψ
μώνυχι διαιρέίν αυτήν ή τή κοινογονίςι Τ€ κα\ Ιδιογονίςι; 10
μανθάν€ΐς* γάρ που.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Το ποιον;
ΞΕ. 'Ό τι το μέν των ίππων και δνων πέφυκ€ν εξ άλλήλων e
ycvvav.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Ναί.
ΞΕ. Το δέ γ€ λοιπδν έτι τής* λείας α γ έ λ ες των ημέρων
αμιγές* γέν€ΐ προς* άλληλα. 5
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Ώώς 6' ου;
ΞΕ. Τί δ ’; ό πολιτικός* αρ' έπιμέλ€ΐαν έχ€ΐν φαίν€ται
πότ€ρα κοινογ€νους* φύσ€ως* ή τίνος* Ιδιογ€νους*;
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Δήλον ότι τής* άμ€ΐκτου.
ΞΕ. Ταύτην δή δ€ΐ καθάπςρ τά έμπροσθ€ν, ώς* έοιΚ€ν, ημάς* 10
δίχα διαστέλλ€ΐν.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Δ€ΐ γάρ ουν.
ΞΕ. Και μην τό γ€ ζφον, δσον ήμ€ρον και άγ€λαΐον, σχ€δόν 266
πλήν ycvoiv δυοΐν παν ήδη κατακ€Κ€ρμάτισται. τό γάρ των
κυνών ούκ έπάξιον καταριθμ€ΐν γένος* ώς* έν άγ€λαίοις*
θρέμμασιν.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Ου γάρ ουν. αλλά τίνι δή τώ δύο διαιρώμεν; 5
ΞΕ. *Ωιπ€ρ και δίκαιόν γ ε θ€αίτητόν τ ε και σε διανέμ€ΐν,
έπ€ΐδή και γ€ωμ€τρίας* άπτ€θθον.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Τφ;
ΞΕ. Τή διαμέτρφ δήπου καί πάλιν τη τής* διαμέτρου
διαμέτρφ. 10
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Πως ε ιν ε ς ;
ΞΕ. Ή φύσις*, ήν τό γένος: ήμών τών ανθρώπων κέκτηται, b
μών άλλως πως* €ΐς* τή ν πορ€ΐαν πέφυκ€ν ή καθάπ€ρ ή
διάμ€τρος* ή δυνάμ€ΐ δίπους*;
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Ούκ άλλως*.
ΞΕ. Και μήν ή γ ε του λοιπού γένους* πάλιν έστι κατά 5
δύναμιν αύ τής* ήμ€τέρας* δυνάμαος* διάμ€τρος\ €ΐπ€ρ δυοΐν

d 10 t Q η: πη n I a 5 6iaip<3pcv n: 6iaipo0pcv n, 0
 53
Y.S.: Yes, certainly.
E.S.: Well, do you want to divide it by the splil-hoovcd and the so-
dio called ‘singlc-hoovcd’, or by interbreeding and non-interbreeding? I
think you grasp the point.
Y.S.: What’s that?
ei E.S.: That horses and donkeys arc naturally such as to breed from one
another.
Y.S.: Yes.
E.S.: Whereas what is still left of the smooth-fronted herd of tame
eS creatures is unmixed in breeding, one with another.
Y.S.: Quite.
E.S.: So: docs the statesman, then, seem to take care of an
interbreeding or of some non-interbreeding sort?
Y.S.: Qcarly, of the non-mixing sort.
eio E.S.: This, then, it seems, we must separate into two, as we did in the
previous eases.
Y.S.: Indeed we must.
266 E.S.: Now those living creatures that arc tame and live in herds have
pretty well all now been cut into their pieces, except for two classes.
For it is not worth our while to count the class of dogs as among
creatures living in herds.
«5 Y.S.: No indeed. But what arc we to use to divide the two classes?
E.S.: Something that is absolutely appropriate for Theaetetus and you
to use in your distributions, since it’s geometry the two of you engage
in.
Y.S.: What is it?
E.S.: The diagonal, one could say, and then again the diagonal of the
»io diagonal.
Y.S.: What do you mean?
bi E.S.: The nature which the family-class of us humans possesses surely
isn’t endowed for the purpose of transporting itself any differently
from the diagonal with a potency of two feet?
Y.S.: No.
t>s E.S.: And what’s more the nature of the remaining class is in its turn
in potency a diagonal of our potency, if indeed it is endowed with two
54
γέ έσ τι ποδοΐν δ ις π€φυκυΐα. (266)
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Πώς* δ ’ ούκ Ισ τί; και δή καί σχ€δόν ο βούλ€ΐ
δηλουν μανθάνω.
HE. Προς* δή τούτοις έτ€ρον αύ τ ι των προς γέλω τα 10
€ύδοκιμησα'ντων αν, ώ Σώ κρατ€ς, άρα καθορώμ€ν ή μ ΐν
γ€γονός kv το ις διηρημένοις; c
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Το ποιον;
ΞΕ. Τ ά νθ ρ ώ π ιν ο ν η μ ώ ν α μ α γ έ ν ο ς σ υ ν € ΐλ η χ ό ς κα ι
συνδ€δραμηκός γέν€ΐ τφ των δντων γ€νναιοτάτψ και άμα
€υχ€ρ€στάτφ. 5
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Καθορώ και μάλ’ άτόπως συμβαΐνον.
HE. Τί δ'; ούκ €ΐκός ύ'στατα άφικνέϊσθαι τα βραδύτατα;
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Ναι, τούτο γ€.
ΞΕ. Τόδ€ δ€ ούκ έννοουμ€ν, ώς έτι γ€λοιότ€ρος ό βασίλ€υς
φ α ίν € τ α ι μ€τά τής* α γ έ λ η ς συνδιαθέω ν καί σύνδρομα 10
π€πορ€υμένος τφ των άνδρών αύ προς- τον €ύχ€ρή βίον
άριστά γ^γυμνασμένφ; d
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Παντάπασι μέν ούν.
ΞΕ. Νυν γάρ, ώ Σώκρατ€ς, έκέινό έστι καταφανές* μάλλον
το ρηθέν τότ* kv τη π€ρι τον σοφιστήν ζητήσ€ΐ.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Τδ ποιον; 5
ΞΕ. "Οτι τή τοι$δ€ μ^θοδφ των λόγων οΰτ€ σ€μνοτέρου
μάλλον έμέλησ€ν ή μή, τον Τ€ σμικρότ€ρον ούδέν ήτίμακ€
προ του μ€ΐζονος, άέι δέ καθ’ αύτήν π€ρα(ν€ΐ τάληθέστατον.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. ΈοιΚ€ν.
ΞΕ. Ούκουν μ€τά τούτο, ΐνα μή μ€ φθής έρωτήσας τήν 10
βραχύ τέραν οδόν ή τις τότ€ ήν έπι τόν του βασιλέων όρον, c
αύτός σοι πρότ€ρον έλθω;
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Σφοδρά γ€.
ΞΕ. Λέγω δή δ€Ϊν τότ€ €ύθυς το π€ζόν τφ δίποδι προς* τό
τ€τραπουν γένος* διανέΐμαι, κατιδόντα δέ τάνθρώπινον έτι 5
μόνφ Τφ πτηνφ συναληχδς τήν δίποδα αγέλην πα'λιν τφ ψιλφ
κα\ τφ πτ€ροφυ€ΐ τέμν€ΐν, τμηθ€ΐσης δέ αύτής κα\ τότ* ήδη
τής* ά νθρω πονομικής δηλωθ€ΐ'σης τέχνης*, φ έρ ο ντα τό ν

C 6 μ α λ ’άτόπ ω ς c: μάλα τό πώ ς m | d 10 pc φθής c: μ ’ίφΟης η:

μίμφΟής η
 55
(2ίβ) Umcs two feet.
Y.S.: ΟΓ course it is - and I actually almost understand what you want
to show.
bio E.S.: And there’s more - do we see, Socrates, that there’s something
ct else rcsulUng in our divisions that would itself have done well as a
comic turn?
Y.S.: What’s that?
E.S.: That our human family-class has shared the field and run
c$ together with the noblest and also most easy-going class of existing
things?
Y.S.: I see it turning out very oddly indeed.
E.S.: Well, isn’t it reasonable to expect the slowest - or sow-cst - to
come in last?
Y.S.: Yes, I can agree with that.
cio E.S.: And don’t we noUcc that the king looks even more ridiculous,
when he continues to run, along with his herd, and has traversed
convergent paths, with the man who for his part is best trained of all
<n for the easy-going li fc?
Y.S.: Absolutely right.
E.S.: Yes, Socrates, and what we said before, in our inquiry about the
sophist, is now plainer,
as Y.S.: What was that?
E.S.: That such a method of argument as ours is not more concerned
with what is more dignified than with what is not, and neither docs it
at all despise the smaller more than the greater, but always reaches the
truest conclusion by itself.
Y.S.: It seems so.
<iio E.S.: Well then, after this, so that you don’t get in before me and ask
ei what the shorter way is - the one we spoke of earlier - to the
definition of the king, shall I go first and show you the way?
Y.S.: Very much so.
E.S.: Then I say that in this ease one must immediately distribute
cS what goes on foot by opposing the two-footed to the four-fooled class,
and when one sees the human still sharing the field with the winged
alone, one must go on to cut the two-footed herd by means of the non-
fcathcrcd and the feathered; and when it has been cut, and the
56
•πολιτικόν καί βασιλικόν ο\ον ηνίοχον €ΐς* αυτήν Ενστήσαντα,
•παραδουναι τ α ς τής* πόλ€ως* ήνίας* ώς* οΙκ€ΐας* κα\ αύτφ 10
ταιίτης* οΰσης* τής* Επιστήμης*.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Καλώς και καθαπ€ρ€\ χρέος άπΕδωκάς* μοι τον 267
λόγον, προσθ€\ς* τήν Εκτροπήν οΤον τόκον κα\ άναπληρώσας*
αυτόν.
ΞΕ. ΦΕρ€ δή και συν€ΐρωμ€ν Επαν€λθόντ€ς* Επι τήν αρχήν
μΕχρι τής* τ€λ€υτής* το ν λόγον του όνόματος* τής* τοΟ 5
πολίτικου τΕχνης*.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Πάνυ μΕν ουν.
ΞΕ. Τής: γνωστικής* τοίνυν Επιστήμης* ήμΐν ήν κατ' άρχάς*
μΕρος* Ε π ιτ α κ τ ικ ό ν το υ το υ δΕ άπ€ΐκασθΕ ν τό μόριον
αύτ€πιτακτικόν Ερρήθη. ζφοτροφική δΕ πάλιν αύτ€πιτακτικής* b
ου τό σμικρότατον τών γ€νών άπ€σχίζ€Τθ* και ζφοτροφικής*
€ΐδος* άγ€λαιοτροφικόν, άγ€λαιοτροφικου δ ’ αυ π€ζονομικόν
του δΕ π€<ονομικου μάλιστα άπ€τΕμν€Τθ τΕχνη τής* άκ€ράτου
φιίσ€ως* θρ€πτική. ταιίτης* δ ’ αυ τό μΕρος* ούκ Ελαττον 5
τριπλουν συμπλΕκ€ΐν άναγκαΐον, αν €ΐς* Εν τις* αυτό όνομα
σ υ ν α γ α γ € ΐν βουληθή, γ€νΕσ€ως* ά μ € ΐκ το υ νο μ €υτική ν
Επιστήμην προσαγορ€ΐίων. τό δ ' από τουτου τμήμα, Επι
ποίμνη δίποδι μΕρος* άνθρωπονομικόν Ετι λ€ΐφθΕν μόνον, τουτ’ c
αυτό Εστιν ήδη τό ζητηθΕν, άμα βασιλικόν ταύτόν κληθΕν καί
πολιτικόν.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Παντάπασι μΕν ουν.
ΞΕ. *Αρά γ \ ώ Σώκρατ€ς*, αληθώς* ήμΐν τούτο καθάπ€ρ σύ 5
νυν €ΐρηκας* ούτως* Εστι και π€πραγμΕνον;
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Τό ποιον δή;
ΞΕ. Τό παντάπασιν Ικανώς* €ΐρήοθαι τό προτ€θΕν. ή τοΟτ’
αυτό και μάλιστα ή ζήτησις* Ελλ€ΐπ€ΐ, τό τον λόγον €ΐρήσθαι
μΕν πως*, ου μήν παντάπασι γ€ τ€λΕως* άπ€ΐργάσθαΐ; d
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Πώς: €ΐπ€ς*;
ΞΕ. ’Εγώ νφν πςιράσομαι τουτ’ αυτό δ διανοοΟμαι νΟν Ετι
μάλλον δηλώσαι.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. ΛΕγοις* αν. 5

οΙΟκαΙ αύτφ η: αύτφ η | 67όμοίκτου c: μικτοΟ m | νομ<:υτικήν c:

νομουτικής m
 57
expertise of human-herding has then and there been brought into the
light, one must lift the expert in statesmanship and kingship like a
eto charioteer into it and instal him there, handing over the reins of the
city as belonging to him, and because this expert knowledge is his.
267 Y.S.: That’s well done, and as it were you’ve paid me the account I
asked for as if it were a debt, adding the digression as a kind of
interest, making up the sum.
E.S.: Come on, then: let’s go back to the beginning and gather
•5 together from there to the end our account of the name of the
expertise of the statesman.
Y.S.: Absolutely.
E.S.: Well then: of theoretical knowledge, we had at the beginning a
bi directive part; and of this, the section we wanted was by analogy said
to be ‘self-directing’. Then again, rearing of living creatures, not the
smallest of the classes of self-directing knowledge, was split off from
it; then a herd-rearing form from rearing of living creatures, and from
that, in turn, rearing of what goes on foot; and from that, as the
b5 relevant part, was cut off the expertise of rearing the hornless sort. Of
this in turn the part must be woven together as not less than triple, if
one wants to bring it together into a single name, calling it expert
knowledge of rearing of non-interbreeding creatures. The segment
cl from this, a part relating to a two-footed flock, concerned with rearing
of human beings, still left on its own - this very pan is now what we
were looking for, the same thing we call both kingly and
statesmanlike.
Y.S.: Absolutely.
c5 E.S.: Is it really the ease, Socrates, that we have actually done this, as
you have just said?
Y.S.: Done what?
E.S.: Given a completely adequate response to the matter we raised.
Or is our search lacking especially in just this respect, that our
di account of the matter has been stated in a certain way, but has not
been finished off to complete perfection?
Y.S.: How do you mean?
E.S.: I shall try now to show, for both of us, still more clearly just
what I am thinking of.
as Y.S.: Please go ahead.
58
SE. Ούκούν τών νομ€υτικών ήμιν πολλών φαν€ΐσών άρτι
τ€χνώ ν μία τ ι ς ήν ή πολιτική κα\ μ ιδ ς τίν ο ς α γ έλ η ς
έπιμέλ€ΐα;
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Ναι.
ΞΕ. Ταυτην δέ γ€ διώριζ€ν ό λόγος ούχ ίππων €ΐναι 10
τροφόν ούδ' άλλων θηρίων, άλλ' ανθρώπων κοινοτροφικήν
έπιστήμην.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Ούτως*.
ΞΕ. Τό δή τών νομέων πάντω ν διάφορον και το των e
βασιλέων θ€ασώμ€θα.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Τό ποιον;
HE. Ελ τις τών άλλων τφ, τέχνης άλλης όνομα έχων, κοινή
τή ς αγέλης σύντροφος €ΐναί φησι και προσποΐ€ΐται. 5
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Πώς φής;
ΞΕ. όΐον οι τ€ έμποροι καί γ€ωργοι και σιτουργοι πάντ€ς,
και προς τούτοις γυμνασται και τό τών Ιατρών γένος, όίσθ’
ό τ ι τ ο ΐς π€ρΙ τά ανθρώ πινα νομ€ύσιν, ους π ο λ ιτικ ο ύ ς
έκαλέσαμ€ν, π α ν τα π α σ ι τφ λόγφ δ ια μ ά χ ο ιν τ' αν ούτοι 268
συ μτταΐ'Τ€ς, ώ ς σ φ € ΐς τ ή ς τ ρ ο φ ή ς έ π ιμ € λ ο υ ν τ α ι τ ή ς
ανθρώπινης, ού μόνον άγ€λαίων ανθρώπων άλλα και τή ς τών
αρχόντων αυτών.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Ούκούν όρθώς αν λέγοΐ€ν; 5
ΞΕ. "Ισως. και τούτο μέν έπισκ€ψόμ€θα, τόδ€ δέ ΐσμ€ν, ότι
βουκόλφ γ€ ούδέίς άμφισβητήσ€ΐ π€ρι τούτων ούδ€νός, άλλ'
αυτός τή ς άγέλης τροφός ό βουφορβός, αυτός Ιατρός, αυτός
όιον νυμφ€υτής και π€ρι τούς τών γιγνομένων τόκους καί
λοχ€ΐας μόνος έπιστήμων τή ς μαΐ€υτικής. έτι τοίνυν παιδιας b
κα\ μουσικής έφ’ όσον αυτού τά θρέμματα φυσ€ΐ μ€Τ€ΐληφ€ν,
ούκ άλλος κρ€ΐττων παραμυθέίσθαι και κηλών πραΐίν€ΐν, μ€τά
Τ€ οργάνων και ψιλψ τψ στόματι την τή ς αυτού ποίμνη?
άριστα μ€ταχ€ΐριζόμ€νος μουσικήν, και δή και τών άλλων 5
πέρι νομέων ό αυτός τρόπος, ή γάρ;
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. 'Ορθότατα.
ΞΕ. Πώς ούν ήμΐν ό λόγος ορθός φανέιται και άκέραιος ό

c7oi tc n: οΐ η, Ο | βόόμφισβητήσα η: όμφισβητ<Λ η

 59
E.S.: Well then, of the many kinds of expertise to do with rearing
herds that appeared in our view just now, statesmanship was one, and
was care of some one sort of herd?
Y.S.: Yes.
«no E.S.: And our account defined it not as rearing of horses, or of other
animals, but as knowledge of the the collective rearing of human
beings.
Y.S.: Just so.
ei E.S.: Then let us look at the difference between all herdsmen, on the
one hand, and kings on the other.
Y.S.: What’s that?
E.S.: Let us see if in the ease of any other herdsman anyone who has
c5 the title of another expertise claims or pretends to share the rearing of
the herd with him.
Y.S.: What do you mean?
E.S.: Like this: that merchants, farmers, millers and bakers, all of
them, and gymnastic trainers too, and doctors as a class - all of these,
268 as you well know, would loudly contend against the herdsmen
concerned with things human whom we called statesmen that it is
they that care for human rearing, not merely for that of human beings
in the herd, but for that of the rulers.
«5 Y.S.: Well, would they be right?
E.S.: Perhaps. That we’ll consider, but what we know is that with a
cowherd no one will dispute about any of these things, but the
herdsman is by himself rearer of the herd, by himself its doctor, by
himself its matchmaker, as it were, and sole expert in the midwife’s
bi art when it comes to the births of offspring and confinements. Again,
to the extent that the nature of his charges allows them to partake in
play and music, no one else is more capable of comforting them and
soothing them with his incantations, performing best, as he docs, the
b$ music that belongs to his flock with instruments or with unaccom­
panied voice. And it’s the same way with all other herdsmen. True?
Y.S.: Quite right.
E.S.: So how will our account of the king appear to us right and
60
τΐ€ρι του βασιλόως*, δταν αύτόν νομόα κα\ τροφόν άγόλης* c
ανθρώ πινης* θώ μ€ν μ δνο ν όκκρίνοντ€ς· μ υρίω ν άλλω ν
άμφισβητουντων;
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Ούδαμώς*.
ΞΕ. Ο υκουν ορθώς* ο λ ίγ ο ν €μ προσ θ€ν ό φ ο β ή θη μ € ν 5
ύποπτ€υ'σαντ€ς· μή λόγοντ€ς· μόν τ ι τυγχά νοιμ€ν σχήμα
βασιλικόν, ού μην άπ€ΐργασμόνοι γ€ ζιμ έν πω δ ι’ άκριβ€ΐας·
τον πολιτικόν, όως* αν τούς* π€ρικ€χυμόνους* αύτφ κα\ τής*
συννομής* αύτφ αντιποιούμενους· Π€ρΐ€λόντ€ς* και χωρίσαντ€ς:
α π ’ €Κ€ΐνων καθαρόν μόνον αυτόν άποφήνωμ€ν; 10
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Όρθότατα μόν ούν. d
ΞΕ. Τούτο τοίνυν, ώ Σώκρατ€ς\ ήμΐν ποιητόον, €ΐ μή
μόλλομ€ν cm τφ τόλ€ΐ καταισχυναι τον λόγον.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Ά λλα μην ούδαμώς* τούτο γ€ δραστόον.
ΞΕ. Πάλιν τοίνυν έξ άλλης· αρχής· δ€ΐ καθ’ έτόραν οδόν 5
πορ€υθήναί τινα.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Ποιαν δή;
ΞΕ. Σχεδόν παιδιάν όγκ€ρασαμόνους·* συχνφ γάρ μόρ€ΐ δ€ΐ
μ€γάλου μυθου προσχρήσασθαι, και τό λοιπόν δή, καθάπ€ρ όν
τοις· πρόσθ€ν, μόρος· άόΐ μόρους* άφαιρου μόνους· έπ ' άκρον e
άφικν€ΐσθαι τό ζητοιίμ€νον. ουκουν χρή;
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Πάνυ μόν ούν.
ΞΕ. Άλλα δή τφ μιίθψ μου πάνυ πρόσ€χ€ τον νουν, καθάπ€ρ
οί παιδ€ς·* πάντως* ού πολλά €κφ€ΐίγ€ΐς* παιδιάς· ότη. 5
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Λόγοις· άν.
ΞΕ. *Ην τοίνυν και ότι όσται των πάλαι λ€χθόντων πολλά
τ€ άλλα και δή και τό π€ρι την Άτρόως* τ€ καί θυόστου
λ€χθ€ΐσαν όριν φάσμα, άκήκοας· γάρ που και άπομνημον€υ€ΐς*
ό φασι γ€νόσθαι τότ€. 10
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. To π€ρι τής: χρυσής* άρνός* ίσως* σημ€Ϊον φράζ€ΐςτ.
ΞΕ. Ούδαμώς*, άλλα τό ncpi τής: μ€ταβολής· δυσ€ως* Τ€ κα\ 269
ανατολής* ήλιου και των άλλων άστρων, ώς· άρα όθ€ν μόν
άνατόλλ€ΐ νυν €ΐς· τούτον τότ€ τον τόπον έδυ€Τ0, άνότ€λλ€ δ’
έκ του έναντίου, τότ€ δό δή μαρτυρήσας* άρα ό θ€0ς· Άτρ€ΐ

(13μόλλομ<:ν c: μόλλοιμ<:ν m | c 5 παιδιάς c: παιδιας n: παιδοίας n:

παιδίας n .c
 61

cl complete, when we posit him as sole herdsman and rearer of the

human herd, separating him off on his own from lens of thousands of
others who dispute the title with him?
Y.S.: There’s no way in which it can.
c5 E.S.: Then our fears a little earlier were right, when we suspected that
we should prove in fact to be describing some kingly figure, but not
yet accurately to have finished the statesman off, until we remove
those who crowd round him, pretending to share his herding function
cio with him, and having separated him from them, we reveal him on his
own, uncontaminated with anyone else?
<n Y.S.: Yes, absolutely right.
E.S.: Well then, Socrates, this is what we must do, if we arc not going
to bring disgrace on our argument at its end.
Y.S.: That is something we must certainly avoid doing at all costs.
d5 E.S.: Then we must travel some other route, starting from another
point.
Y.S.: What route is that?
E.S.: By mixing in, as one might put it, an element of play: we must
bring in a large part of a great story, and as for the rest, we must then
ci - as in what went before - take away part from part in each ease and
so arrive at the furthest point of the object of our search. So should
we do it?
Y.S.: Absolutely.
e5 E.S.: In that ease, pay complete attention to my story, as children do;
you certainly haven’t left childish games behind for more than a few
years.
Y.S.: Please go ahead.
E.S.: Then I’ll begin. There have occurred in the past, and will occur
in the future, many of the things that have been told through the ages;
one is the portent relating to the quarrel between Atreus and Thyestes,
eio I imagine you remember hearing what people say happened then.
Y.S.: You’re referring, perhaps, to the sign of the golden lamb.
269 E.S.: Not at all; rather to that of the changing of the setting and rising
of the sun and the other stars - it’s said that they actually began
setting in the region from which they now rise, and rising from the
opposite region, and that then after having given witness in favour of
62
μ€Τ€βαλ€ν αύτδ έπ ι το νυν σχήμα. (269)
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Λέγ€ται γάρ ουν δή και τοΟτο. 6
HE. Και μην αύ και την γ€ βασιλ€ΐαν ήν ήρξ€ Κρόνος*
πολλών ακηκόαμ€ν.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Πλ€ΐστων μέν ουν. b
HE. Τ ι δέ; το τούς* έμπροσθ€ν φυ€θθαι γηγ€ν€ΐς* και μή έξ
άλλήλων γ€ννάσθαΐ;
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Και τούτο δν των πάλαι λ€χθέντων.
HE. Ταυτα τοίνυν έστι μέν σιίμπαντα έκ ταύτου πάθους*, 5
και προς* τούτοις* ?τ€ρα μύρια και τοιίτων έ τ ι θαυμαστότ€ρα,
διά δέ χρόνου πλήθος τά μέν αυτών άπέσβηκ€, τα δέ
δΐ€σπαρμένα €ΐρηται χωρίς* έ'καστα α π' άλλήλων. δ δ' έστιν
πασι τουτοις- αίτιον το πάθος- ούδ€ΐς* €ΐρηκ€ν, νυν δέ δή c
λ€κτ€ον els* γάρ την του βασιλέως* άπόδ€ΐξιν πρέψ€ΐ ρηθέν.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Κάλλιστ' €ΐπ€ς*, και λέγ€ μηδέν έλλ€ΐπων.
ΞΕ. Άκούοις* αν. τδ γάρ παν τόδ€ τοτέ μέν αύτός; ό θ€ος*
συμποδηγ€ΐ πορ€υόμ€νον και συγκυκλ€ΐ, τοτέ δέ άνήκ€ν, δταν 5
αι Π€ρίοδοι του προσήκοντος* αύτφ μέτρον €ΐλήφωσιν ήδη
χρόνου, τδ δέ πάλιν αυτόματον €ΐς* τάναντία Π€ριάγ€ται,
ζφον δν και φρόνησιν €ΐληχός* έκ του συναρμόσαντος- αύτδ d
κατ'άρχάς*. τούτο δέ αύτφ τδ άνάπαλιν Ιέναι διά τόδ’ έ ί
άνάγκης- έμφυτον γέγον€.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Διά τδ ποιον δή;
ΞΕ. Τδ κατά ταύτά και ώσαύτως* Ιχ€ΐν ά€ΐ και ταύτδν 5
€ΐναι τοΐς* πάντων θ€ΐοτάτοις* προσήκ€ΐ μόνοις-, σώματος* δέ
φύσις* ου ταύτης* τής* τάξ€ως*. δν δέ ούρανδν και κόσμον
έ π ω ν ο μ ά κ α μ ς ν , πολλώ ν μ έν κα ι μ α κα ρίω ν παρά του
γ€ννήσαντος: μ€Τ€ΐληφ€ν, άτάρ ουν δή κ€κοινώνηκέ γ€ και
σώματος- όθ€ν αύτφ μ€ταβολής* άμοιρφ γίγν€σθαι διά παντός· c
άδυνατον, κατά δύναμίν γ€ μην ότι μάλιστα έν τφ αύτφ
κατά τα ύ τά μίαν φοράν κιν€ΐται* διό τη ν άνακυ'κλησιν
€ΐληχ€ν, ότι σμικροτάτην τής* αύτου κινήσ€ως* παράλλαξιν.
αύτδ δέ έαυτδ στρέφ€ΐν ά ύ σχ€δόν ούδ€ν\ δυνατόν πλήν τφ 5
τών κινουμένων αύ πάντων ήγουμένφ* Kivciv δέ τούτψ τοτέ

ο4αύτο0 m: πρδ τοΟ c: ταύτοΟ c

 63
(269) Atreus the god changed everything to its present configuration.
»6 Y.S.: Yes indeed, they do say this as well.
E.S.: And what’s more, we’ve also heard from many about the
kingship exercized by Kronos.
bi Y.S.: Yes, from a great many.
E.S.: And what of the report that earlier men were bom from the earth
and were not reproduced from each other?
Y.S.: This too is one of the things that have been told through the
ages.
t5 E.S.: Well, all these things together are consequences of the same
state of affairs, and besides these thousands of others still more
astonishing than these; but through the great lapse of time since then
some have been obliterated, while others have been reported in a
scattered way, each separate from one another. But as for the state of
ci affairs that is responsible for all of these things, no one has related it,
and we should relate it now; for once it has been described, it will be
a filling contribution towards our exposition of the king.
Y.S.: I very much like what you say; go on, and leave nothing out.
E.S.: Listen then. This universe the god himself sometimes
c5 accompanies, guiding it on its way and helping it move in a circle,
while at other times he lets it go, when its circuits have completed the
measure of the time allotted to it, and of its own accord it revolves
di backwards, in the opposite direction, being a living creature and
having had intelligence assigned to it by the one who fitted it together
in the beginning. This backward movement is inborn in it from
necessity, for the following reason.
Y.S.: What reason, exactly?
E.S.: Remaining permanently in the same state and condition and
being permanently the same belongs only to the most divine things of
all, and the category of body is not of this order. Now the thing to
which we have given the name of ‘heavens’ and ‘world-order’
certainly has a portion of many blessed things from its progenitor, but
ci on the other hand it also has its share of body, in consequence it is
impossible for it to be altogether exempt from change, although as far
as is possible, given its capacities, it moves in the same place, in the
same way, with a single motion; and this is why it has reverse rotation
c5 as its lot, which is the smallest possible variation of its movement. To
turn itself by itself for ever is, I dare say, impossible for anything
except the one who guides all the things which, unlike him, arc in
64
μέν άλλω ς, αυθι? 6€ έναντίω ? ού $4\ης. έκ π ά ν τω ν δή
τούτων τον κόσμον μήτ€ αυτόν χρή φάναι στρόφ€ΐν έαυτόν
aci, μήθ' δλον aci (mo 0coO στρέφ€σθαι διττά ? και έναντία?
π€ριαγωγά?, μήτ' αύ δυο τινέ θcώ φρονουντ€ έαυτοΐ? έναντία 270
στρόφ€ΐν αυτόν, άλλ' oircp άρτι έρρήθη και μόνον λοιπόν,
to tc μέν ύπ' άλλη? συμποδηγ€ΐοθαι Ocia? αίτια?, τό ζην
πάλιν έπικτώμ€νον και λαμβάνοντα αθανασίαν έπισκ€υαστήν
παρά του δημιουργού, to tc δ' όταν avcGfj, δι' έ αυτοί) αυτόν 5
ic v a i, κατά καιρόν ά φ €θέντα τοιουτον, ώστ€ ά ν ά π α λ ιν
πορ€υ€σθαι πολλά? π€ριόδων μυριάδα? διά δη τό μέγιστον ον
κα\ Ισορροπώτατον έπι μικροτάτου βαΐνον ποδό? Icvai.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Φ αίνεται γουν δη και μάλα cikotio? α,ρήσθαι π ά ν θ ' b
όσα δΐ€λήλυθα?.
HE. Λογισάμ€νοι δη συννοήσωμ€ν τό πάθο? έκ των νυν
λ€χθ€ντων, ο πάντων έφαμ€ν civai των θαυμαστών αίτιον.
Ισ τι γάρ ουν δη τουτ’ αυτό. 5
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Τό ποιον;
ΞΕ. Τό τη ν του π α ντό ? φοράν totc μέν έφ ' ά νυν
κυκλ€ΐται φέρ€σθαι, totc δ’ έπι τάναντία.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Πω? δή;
ΞΕ. Τ αιίτην τη ν μcτaβoλήv ή γ ^ σ θ α ι δ€ΐ τω ν π€ρι τον 10
ουρανόν γ ιγ ν ο μ έ ν ω ν τρ οπώ ν πα σ ώ ν c iv a i μ c γ ίσ τ η v καί c
τcλcω τάτηv τροπήν.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Έ οικ€ γουν.
ΞΕ. Μ ίγίστα? τοίνυν και μcτaβoλά? χρή ν ο μ ί^ ιν γίγν€σθαι
totc τοί? έντο? ήμΐν οίκουοιν αυτου. 5
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Και τούτο €ΐκό?.
HE. Μ €ταβολά? δέ μ €γάλα ? και πολλά? καί π α ν τ ο ία ?
σ υμ φ cp o μ cv a? ά ρ ’ ούκ ΐσ μ € ν τ η ν τώ ν ζο^ων φυ'σιν ό τ ι
χαλ€πώ? avcxcTai;
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Πώ? δ* οίί; 10
ΞΕ. Φθοραι τοίνυν έξ ανάγκη? totc μέγισται συμβαίνουσι
τών tc άλλων ζψων, και δή και τό τών ανθρώπων γένο? d
ολίγον τ ι TicpiXcuicTai' π€ρι δέ τουτου? άλλα tc παθήματα

ο9μή0* όλον η: μητ* au όλον η, Ο | a 7 διά δή c: διά δέ η: διά η

 65
movement; and for this to cause movement now in one way, now in
the opposite way is not permitted. From all of these considerations, it
follows that one must not say either that the cosmos always turns
itself by itself, or in any way that it is turned by god in a pair of
270 opposed revolutions, or again that two gods tum it whose thoughts are
opposed to each other, but rather what was said just now and is the
sole remaining possibility, that at limes it is helped by the guidance of
another, divine, cause, acquiring life once more and receiving a
aS restored immortality from its craftsman, while at other times, when it
is let go, it goes on its own way under its own power, having been let
go at such a time as to travel backwards for many tens of thousands of
revolutions because of the very fact that its movement combines the
effects of its huge size, perfect balance, and its resting on the smallest
of bases.
bt Y.S.: It certainly seems that everything you have gone through is very
reasonable.
E.S.: Then drawing on what has just been said, let’s reflect on the
state of affairs we said was responsible for all those astonishing
b5 things. In fact it’s just this very thing.
Y.S.: What’s that?
E.S.: That the movement of the universe is now in the direction of its
present rotation, now in the opposite direction.
Y.S.: How do you mean?
bio E.S.: We must suppose that this change is, of the turnings that occur
ci in the heavens, the greatest and the most complete turning of all.
Y.S.: Yes, it certainly seems so.
E.S.: We must then suppose that the greatest changes, too, occur then
c5 for us who live within the universe.
Y.S.: That too seems likely.
E.S.: And don’t we recognise that living creatures by their nature
have difficulty in tolerating changes that arc simultaneously large,
great in number, and of all different sorts?
cio Y.S.: Certainly we do.
E.S.: Necessarily, then, there occur at that time eases of destruction of
di other living creatures on a very large scale, and in particular human­
kind survives only in small numbers; many new and astonishing
66

πολλά και θαυμαστά κα\ καινά συμπίπτ€ΐ, μέγιστον δέ τόδ€

κα\ συν€πόμ€νον τη του παντός* άν€ΐλίξ€ΐ τότ€, όταν ή τής*
νυν καθ€στηκυίας* έναντία γίγνη τα ι τροπή. 5
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Το ποιον;
ΞΕ. "Ην ηλικίαν έκαστον έίχ€ των ζψων, αυτή πρώτον μέν
έστη πάντων, και έπαύσατο παν δσον ήν θνητόν έπ'ι τό
ycpaiTcpov ίδ€ΐν πορ€υόμ€νον, μ€ταβάλλον δέ πάλιν έπΐ
τουναντίον όΐον vcioTcpov και άπαλώτ€ρον έφύ€το* και των e
μέν πρ€σβυτέρων αΐ λ€υκαι τρίχ€ς* έμ€λαίνοντο, των δ' αυ
γ € ν € ΐώ ν τ ω ν α ί π α ρ € ΐα Ι λ ε α ιν ό μ ^ ν α ι π ά λ ιν έ π ΐ τ η ν
παρ€λθουσαν ώραν έκαστον καθίστασαν, των δέ ήβώντων τά
σώματα λ€αινόμ€να καί σμικρότ€ρα καθ' ημέραν και νύκτα 5
έκάστην γιγνόμ€να πάλιν cis* την του vcoycvoOs* παιδός·
φύσιν άπη€ΐ, κατά τ€ την ψυχήν και κατά τό σώμα
άφομοιούμ€να* τό δ' έντ€υθ€ν ήδη μαραινόμ€να κομιδή τό
πάμπαν έζηφανίζ€Τθ. τών δ' αυ βιαίως* τ€λ€υτώντων έν τφ 10
τότ€ χρόνψ τό του ν€κρου σώμα τά αυτά ταυτα πάσχον 271
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τρόπον έζ άλλήλων έγ€ννώντο;
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τή τότ€ φύσ€ΐ γ€ννώμ€νον, τό δέ γηγ€νές* έίναί ποτ€ γένος* 5
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προγόνων τώ ν πρώτων, οι τ€λ€υτώση μέν τή προτέρ<$
περιφορά τον έξης* χρόνον έγ€ΐτόνουν, τήσδ€ δέ κατ' άρχάς* b
έφύοντο· τούτων γάρ ούτοι κήρυκ€ς* έγένονθ' ήμΐν τών λόγων,
οι νυν υπό πολλών ούκ όρθώς* άπιστουνται. τό γάρ έντ€υθ€ν
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c IO to toO vcKpoO σώμα n: τό τοΟ vcKpoO n | b4 4n0pcvov c:

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 67
things happen to them, but the greatest is the one I shall describe, one
that is in accordance with the rctrogradation of the universe at the
d5 time when its turning becomes the opposite of the one that now
obtains.
Y.S.: What kind of thing do you mean?
E.S.: First, the visible age of each and every creature, whatever it was,
stopped increasing, and everything that was mortal ceased moving in
ei the direction of looking older, but changing back in the opposite
direction grew as it were younger, more tender, the white hairs of
older men became black, while in turn the checks of those who had
their beards became smooth again, returning each to his past bloom,
e5 and the bodies of those in their puberty, becoming smoother and
smaller each day and night, went back to the form of new-bom
children, becoming like them both in mind and in body; and from
then on they proceeded to waste away until they simply disappeared
cio altogether. As for those who died a violent death at that lime, the
27i body of the dead person underwent the same effects and quickly
dissolved to nothing in a few days.
Y.S.; But, Stranger, how did living creatures come into being in that
time? And in what way were they produced from each other?
a5 E.S.: It’s clear, Socrates, that reproduction from one another was not
part of the nature of things then, but it was the earth-born race which
has been said to have existed at one time that was the one that existed
then, returning again from the earth; it was remembered by our first
bi ancestors, who bordered on the ending of the previous period, living
in the succeeding time, and grew up at the beginning of this one; they
became our messengers for the accounts of the earth-born, which arc
nowadays wrongly disbelieved by many people. For I think we must
reflect on what is implied by what we have said. It follows on the
bs passage of old men to childhood that from the dead, lying in the earth,
men should be put together again there and come back to life,
following the direction of the reversal, with coming-into-bcing
turning round with it to the opposite direction, and since they would
ct according to this argument necessarily come into existence as earth-
68

λόγον, όσους* μη Geos* αυτών €ΐς* άλλην μοίραν έκόμισ€ν.

ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Κομιδή μέν ούν τούτο γ€ έ'π€ται το ις έμπροσθ€ν.
άλλα δή τον βίον ον έπι τής* Κρόνου φής* έίναι δυνάμ€ως,
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HE. Καλώς* τψ λόγφ συμπαρηκολούθηκας. δ δ' ήρου Π€ρι του
τιάντα αυτόματα γίγν€σθαι Tots* άνθρώποις, ήκιστα τής* νυν d
έστι καθ€στηκυίας φοράς*, άλλ’ ήν και τούτο τής* έμπροσθ€ν.
τότ€ γάρ αυτής* πρώτον τής* κυκλήσ€ως* ήρχ€ν έπιμ€λουμ€νος
όλης* ό θ€0ς, ώς* δ' αύ κατά τόπους ταύτόν τούτο, ύτιό θ€ών
αρχόντων τιάντη τα του κόσμου μέρη δΐ€ΐλημμένα* και δή 5
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άλλήλων έδωδαί, πόλ€μός τ€ ούκ ένήν ουδέ στάσις* τό
τταράτιαν* άλλα θ’ όσα τής· τοιανίτης* έστι κατακοσμήσ€ως
έτιόμ€να, μυρία αν €ΐη λέγ€ΐν. τό δ ’ ουν τών ανθρώπων
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έν€μ€ν αυτούς* αυτός* έτηστατών, καθά*Π€ρ νυν άνθρωποι, ζψον
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γυναικών και παίδων, έκ γής* γάρ άν€βιώσκοντο πάντ€ς*, 272
ούδέν μ€μνημένοι τών πρόσθ€ν* άλλά τά μέν τοιαυτα άπήν
πάντα, καρπούς* δέ άφθονους* €ΐχον άπό τ€ δένδρων καί
πολλής* ύλης- άλλης·, ούχ υπό γ€ω ργίας φυομένους, άλλ’
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θυραυλουντ€ς* τά πολλά ένέμοντο* τό γάρ τών ώρών αύτοΐς*
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γής* πόας* άφθονου, τον δή βίον, ώ Σώκρατ€ς, άκου^ις* μέν b
τον τών έπι Κρόνου* τόνδ€ δ ’ δν λόγος* έπι Διός* €ΐναι, τον
ν υ ν ί, πα ρ ώ ν αυτός· ή σ θ η σ α ι. κ ρ ϊν α ι δ ’ α ύ τ ο ϊν τ ο ν
€ύδαιμονέστ€ρον αρ’ αν διίναιό τ€ και έθ€λήσ€ΐας*;
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Ούδαμώς*. 5

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 69
bom, would thus acquire the name and have the report told about
them - all those of them, that is, whom god did not lake ofT to another
destiny.
Y.S.: Yes, quite; this docs seem to follow on what went before. But as
for the life which you say there was in the time of Kronos’ power -
c5 was it in those turnings or in these? For it is clear that it falls out that
the change affecting the stars and the sun occurs in each set of
turnings.
E.S.: You have been keeping up with the argument well. As for what
<n you asked, about everything’s springing up of its own accord for
human beings, it belongs least to the movement that now obtains; it
too belonged to the one before. For then the god began to rule and
take care of the rotation itself as a whole, and as for the regions, in
as their turn, it was just the same, the parts of the world-order having
everywhere been divided up by gods ruling over them; moreover
divine spirits had divided living things between them, like herdsmen,
ei by kind and by herd, each by himself providing independently for all
the needs of those he tended, so that none of them was savage, nor did
they cat each other, and there was no war or internal dissent at all; and
as for all the other things that belong as consequences to such an
arrangement, there would be tens of thousands of them to report. But
c5 to return to what has been reported about a life for human beings
without toil, the origin of the report is something like this. A god
tended them, taking charge of them himself, just as now human
beings, themselves a kind of living creature, but different and more
divine, pasture other kinds of living creatures more lowly than them­
selves; and given his tendance, they had no political constitutions, nor
272 acquired wives and children, for all of them came back to life from
the earth, remembering nothing of the past; but while they lacked
things of this son, they had an abundance of fruits from trees and
many other plants, not growing through cultivation but because the
•5 earth sent them up of its own accord. For the most part they would
feed outdoors, naked and without bedding; for the blend of the
seasons was without painful extremes, and they had sod beds from
t>i abundant grass that sprang from the earth. What I describe, then,
Socrates, is the life of those who lived in the lime Kronos; as for this
one, which they say is in the time of Zeus, the present one, you arc
familiar with it from personal experience. Would you be able and
willing to judge which of the two is the more fortunate?
b5 Y.S.: Not at all.
70
ΞΕ. BoiiXci βήτα έγώ σοι τρόπον τινά διακρίνω;
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Πάνυ μέν ούν.
ΞΕ. El μέν τοίνυν οι τρόφιμοι τοΟ Κρόνου, παροιίση? αυτοί?
ουτω πολλή? σχολή? καί δυνάμ€ω? προ? το μή μόνον
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μ € τά τ € θηρίω ν κα ί μ € τ ' ά λλή λω ν ό μ ιλ ο υ ν τ € ? , καί
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Ιχουσ α ήσθ€τό τ ι διάφορον τω ν άλλων ci? συναγυρμόν
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€υδαιμονίαν διέφ€ρον cl 6' έμπιμπλάμ^νοι σίτων άδην και
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ταυτα μέν άφώμ€ν, co>? αν ήμιν μηνυτή? τι? Ικανό? φανή,
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τ ο ύ τ ο Xcktcov , ίν α τό μ €τά τ ο ύ τ ο c i? τό πρόσθ€ν
Π€ραίνωμ€ν. έτΐ€ΐδή γάρ πάντων τούτων χρόνο? έτ€λ€ωθη και
μcτaβoλήv c0ci γίγν€σθαι, και δη και τό γήινον ήδη παν
άνήλωτο γένο?, πάσα? έκάστη? τή ? ψυχή? τά ? y e v i o e i? e
άποδζδνκυίας, όσα ήν έκάστη προσταχθέν τοσαυτα cl? γήν
σπέρματα Π€σουση?, totc δη του παντό? ό μέν κυβ€ρνήτη?,
οιον πηδαλίων οΐακο? άφέμcvo?, cl? την αυτού π€ριωπήν
άπέστη, τον δέ δη κόσμον πάλιν άνέστρ€φ€ν clμaρμέvη tc 5
κάι σιίμφυτο? έπιθυμία. πάντ€? ούν οΐ κατά τού? τόπου?
συνάρχοντ€? τ($ μ€γίστιρ δαίμονι 0coi, γνό ντ€ ? ήδη τό
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και τ€λ€υτή? έναντίαν όρμήν όρμηθ€ΐ?, σ€ΐσμόν πολύν έν
έαυτφ ποιών άλλην αύ φθοράν ζψων παντοίων άπηργάσατο.
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 71
E.S.: Then do you want me to make some sort of decision for you?
Y.S.: Absolutely.
E.S.: Well then, if, with so much leisure available to them, and so
bio much possibility of their being able to get together in conversation not
ci only with human beings but also with animals - if the nurslings of
Kronos used all these advantages to do philosophy, talking both with
animals and with each other, and inquiring from all kinds of creatures
whether any one of them had some capacity of its own that enabled it
to see better in some way than the rest with respect to the gathering
c5 together of wisdom, the judgement is easy, that those who lived then
were far, far more fortunate than those who live now; but if they spent
their time goring themselves with food and drink and exchanging
di stories with each other and with the animals of the sort that even now
arc told about them, this loo, if I may reveal how it seems to me, at
least, is a matter that is easily judged. But however that may be, let us
leave it to one side, until such lime as someone appears who is
qualified to inform us in which of these two ways the desires of men
as of that time were directed in relation to kinds of knowledge and the
need for talk; we must now state the point of our rousing our story
into action, in order to move forward and bring what follows to its
end. When the time of all these things had been completed and the
ci hour for change had come, and in particular all the earth-born race
had been used up, each soul having rendered its sum of births, falling
to the earth as seed as many times as had been laid down for each, at
that point the steersman of the universe, after letting go, as it were, of
cS the bar of the steering-oars, retired to his observation-post, and as for
the world-order, its allotted and innate dcsirc turned it back again in
the opposite direction. So all the gods who ruled over the regions
together with the greatest divinity, seeing immediately what was
273 happening, let go in their turn the parts of the world-order that
belonged to their charge; and as it turned about and came together
with itself, impelled with opposing movements, both the one that was
beginning and the one that was now ending, it produced a great
tremor in itself, which in its turn brought about another destruction of
«5 all sorts of living things. After this, when sufficient time had elapsed,
it began to cease from noise and confusion and attained calm from its
tremors, and set itself in order, into the accustomed course that
72
κατακοσμούμ€νος* η€ΐ, έπιμέλ€ΐαν και κράτος* έχων αύτός: των b
έν αύτφ Τ€ και έαυτού, την του δημιουργού και πατρός*
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συνακολουθούντα τφ τού παντός* παθήματι, και δή και τδ τής* 274

b 8 πάντα καλά η: πάντα τά καλά η | d 7 πόντον c (from c.g.

Simplicius): τόπον m
 73
bi belongs to it, itself taking chaigc of and mastering both the things
within it and itself, because it remembered so far as it could the
teaching of its craftsman and father. At the beginning it fulfilled it
more accurately, but in the end more dimly; the cause of this was the
b5 bodily element in its mixture, its accompaniment since its origins long
in the past, because this element was marked by great disorder before
entering into the present world-order. For from the one who put it
cl together the world possesses all fine things; but from its previous
condition, everything that is bad and unjust in the heavens - this it
both has itself from that source, and produces in its turn in living
creatures. So while it reared living creatures in itself in company with
c5 the steersman, it created only slight evils, and great goods; but in
separation from him, during all the lime closest to the moment of
letting go, it manages everything very well, but as lime moves on and
<n forgetfulness increases in it, the condition of its original disharmony
also takes greater control of it, and, as this time ends, comes to full
flower, and the goods it mixes in arc slight, but the admixture it
causes of the opposite is great, and it reaches the point where it is in
danger of destruction, both of itself and of the things in it. It is for
<•5 this reason that now the god who ordered it, seeing it in difficulties,
and concerned that it should not, storm-tossed as it is, be broken apart
et in confusion and sink into the boundless sea of unlikcncss, takes his
position again at its steering-oars, and having turned round what had
become diseased and been broken apart in the previous rotation, when
it was left to itself, orders it and by setting it straight renders it
immortal and ageless. What has been said, then, is the end-point of
everything; as for what is relevant to our showing the nature of the
es king, it is sufficient if we take up the account from what went before.
When the world-order had been turned back again on the course that
leads to the kind of coming-into-bcing which obtains now, the
movement of the ages of living creatures once again slopped and
produced new effects which were the opposite of what previously
happened. For those living creatures that were close to disappearing
cto through smallness began to increase in size, while those bodies that
had just been bom from the earth already grey-haircd began to die
again and return into the earth. And everything else changed,
274 imitating and following on the condition of the universe, and in
74
κυήσ€ως· και γ€ννήσ€ως* κα\ τροφής· μίμημα συν€ΐπ€το τοΐ? (274)
πάσιν ύ π ’ ανάγκης** ού γάρ έξήν έ τ ' έν γή δ ι’ έτέρων
συνιστα'ντων φυ€σθαι ζφον, αλλά καθάπίρ tuJ κόσμφ
προσ€τέτακτο αύτοκράτορα €ΐναι τής* αύτου πορ€ΐας·, οΰτω 6ή 5
κατά ταύτά και τοΐς* μέρ€σιν αύτοΐς· δι' αυτών, καθ' δσον
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vino τής· όμοιας· αγωγής·, ου δε ενεκα δ λόγος* ώρμηκ€ πάς*, b
έ π ’ αύτφ νυν έσμέν ήδη. π€ρι μεν γάρ ιώ ν άλλων θηρίων
πολλά αν και μακρά δΐ€ξ€λθ€ΐν γίγνοιτο, εξ ών έ'καστα καί
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αυτών, και έ τ ' αμήχανοι και άτ€χνοι κατά τούς· πρώτους* c
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πορίζ^σθαι δέ ούκ έπιστάμ€νοί πω διά τό μηδ€μίάν αυτούς*
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μέν παρά Προμηθέως-, τέχνα ι δέ παρ' Ηφαίστου και τής*
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γέγον€ν, έπ€ΐδή τό μέν έκ θ€ών, όπ€ρ έρρήθη νυνδή, τής*
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διαγωγήν και την έπιμέλ€ΐαν αύτούς* αυτών έχ€ΐν καθάιΐ€ρ 5
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α υ τό ν ποιησ ομ^θα προς· τό κ α τιδ € ΐν ό'σον ήμα'ρτομ€ν
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ήμΐΐ';

d 1 άλλων c: άλλήλων m
 75
(274) particular, there was a change to the mode of conception, birth and
rearing, which necessarily imitated and kept pace with the change to
everything; for it was no longer possible for a living creature to grow
•5 within the earth under the agency of others’ pulling it together, but
just as the world-order had been instructed to be master of its own
motion, so too in the same way its parts were instructed themselves to
perform the functions of conception, birth and rearing so far as
bi possible by themselves, under the agency of a similar impulse. We
arc now at the point that our account has all along been designed to
reach. To go through the changes that have occurred in relation to
each kind of animals, and from what causes, would involve a
description of considerable length; those that relate to human beings
b5 will be shorter to relate and more to the point. Having been deprived
of the god who had us as his own and pastured us, and since for their
part the majority of animals - as many as had an aggressive nature -
had gone wild, human beings, by themselves weak and defenceless,
ct were preyed on by them, and in those first times were still without
resources and without expertise of any kind, because although their
spontaneous supply of food was no longer available to them, they did
not yet know how to provide for themselves, in the absence of any
c5 need to do so previously. As a result of all of this they were in great
difficulties. This is why the gifts from the gods, of which we have
ancient reports, have been given to us, along with an indispensable
requirement for teaching and education: fire from Prometheus, crafts
at from Hephaestus and his fcllow-craftworkcr, and again seeds and
plants from others; and everything that has helped to establish human
life has come about from these things, since care from the gods, as
has just been said, ceased to be available to human beings, and they
as had to live their lives through their own resources and take care for
themselves, just like the world-order as a whole, which we imitate
and follow for all time, now living and growing in this way, now in
ct the way we did then. As for the matter of our story, let it now be
ended, and we shall put it to use in order to see how great our mistake
was when we gave our account of the expert in kingship and
statesmanship in our preceding argument.
c5 Y.S.: So how do you say we made a mistake, and how great was it?
76
HE. Τή μέν βραχύτ€ρον, τή 6έ μάλα ycvvaiov κα\ πολλφ
μ€ΐζον κα\ πλέον ή τότ€.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Πώς*;
ΞΕ. 'Ό τι μέν έρωτώμ€νοι τον έκ τής* νυν π€ριφοράς* κα\ 10
γ€νέσ€ως* βασιλέα και πολίτικοι/ το ν έκ τ ή ? έναντίας*
π€ριόδου ποιμένα τής* τότ€ ανθρώπινης* Αγέλης* €ΐπομ€ν, κα'ι 275
ταυτα θ€ον άντ\ θνητού, ταύτη μέν πάμπολυ παρηνέχθημ€ν*
δτι δέ συμπάσης* τής* πόλ€ως* άρχοντα αύτδν άπ€φήναμ€ν,
δντινα δέ τρόπον ού δΐ€ΐπομ€ν, ταιίτη δέ αυ τό μέν λ€χθέν
αληθές*, ού μην δλον γ€ ουδέ σαφές* έρρη'θη, διό και 5
βραχύτ€ρον ή κατ' έκ€ΐνο ήμαρτήκαμ€ν.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. 'Αληθή.
ΞΕ. Δέΐ τοίνυν τον τρόπον, ώς* έοικ€, διορίσαντας* τής*
άρχής* τής* πόλ€ως* οΰτω τ€λέως* τον πολιτικόν ήμΐν €ΐρήοθαι
προσδοκάν. 10
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Καλώς*.
ΞΕ. Δ ιά τα υ τα μην καί τον μύθον παρ€θέμ€θα, ινα b
ένδ€ΐξαιτο π€ρι τής* άγ€λαιοτροφίας* μη μόνον ώς* παντ€ς*
αυτής* άμφισβητουσι τψ ζητουμένψ τα νυν, άλλα κάκέίνον
αυτόν έναργέστ€ρον ΐδοιμ€ν, ον προσήκ€ΐ μόνον κατά τό
παράδ€ΐγμα ποιμένω ν τ€ κα'ι βουκόλων τής* Ανθρώπινης* 5
έπ ιμ έλ € ΐα ν έχο ντα τροφής* του'του μόνον άξιω θήναι του
προσρήματος*.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Όρθώς*.
ΞΕ. Οιμαι δέ γ', ώ Σώκρατ€ς*, τούτο μέν έτι μ€ΐζον ή κατά
βασιλέα €ΐναι τό σχήμα τό του θ€ΐου νομέως*, τους* δ ’ ένθάδ€ c
νυν όντας* πολιτικούς* τοΐς* άρχομένοις* όμοιους* τ€ €ΐναι
μάλλον πολύ τάς* φυσ€ΐ£ και παραπλησιαιτ€ρον παιδ€ΐας*
μ€Τ€ΐληφέναι και τροφής*.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Πάντως* που. 5
ΞΕ. Ζητητέοι γ€ μην ούδέν αν €Ϊησαν οΰθ’ ήττον οΰτ€
μάλλον, €ΐθ' ούτως* € ΐτ' έκ€ΐνως· π€φύκασιν.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Πώς* γάρ ου;
ΞΕ. Τήδ€ δη π ά λ ιν έπανέλθω μ€ν. ήν γά ρ έφ αμβν

c 9 τήδί c: τί δέ m
 77
E.S.: In one way it was lesser, in another it was very high-minded,
and much greater and more extensive than in the other ease.
Y.S.: How so?
eio E.S.: In that when asked for the king and statesman from the present
rotation and mode of generation we replied with the shepherd from
275 the opposite period, the one of the human herd that existed then, and
that a god instead of mortal - in that way we went very greatly astray;
but in that we revealed him as ruling over the whole city together, but
did not specify in what manner, in this way, by contrast, what was
•5 said was true, but the whole of it was not said, nor was it clear, which
is why our mistake was lesser than in the other respect.
Y.S.: True.
E.S.: So we should define the manner of his rule over the city; it’s in
this way that we should expect our discussion of the statesman to
aio reach its completion.
Y.S.: Right.
bi E.S.: It was just for these reasons that we introduced our story, in
order that it might demonstrate in relation to herd-tearing not only
that everyone now disputes this function with the person we are
looking for, but also in order that we might see more plainly that very
b5 person, whom alone, in accordance with the example of shepherds
and cowherds, having charge of human tearing, it is appropriate to
think worthy of this name alone.
Y.S.; Correct.
ei E.S.: But in my view, Socrates, this figure of the divine herdsman is
still greater than that of a king, and the statesmen who belong to our
present era arc much more like their subjects in their natures and have
shared in an education and nunurc closer to theirs.
c5 Y.S.: I suppose you must be right.
E.S.: Yet they will be neither less nor more worth looking for, whether
their natures arc of the latter or of the former kind.
Y.S.: Quite.
E.S.: Then let’s go back by the following route. The kind of expertise
78
αύτ€πιτακτικήν μέν έίναι τέχν η ν έπ\ ζψοις*, ού μήν \6ί$ γ€ 10
άλλα κοινή την έπιμέλ€ΐαν Ιχουσαν, και προσ€ΐπομ€ν δή τότ€ d
γ€ €ύθύς* άγ€λαιοτροφικήν - μέμνησαι γάρ;
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Ναι.
ΞΕ. Ταύτης* τοίνυν πη διημαρτάνομ€ν τον γάρ πολιτικόν
ούδαμου συν€λάβομ€ν ούδ' ώνομάσαμ€ν, άλλ’ ημάς Ιλαθ€ν 5
κατά την ονομασίαν έκφυγών.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Πώς*;
ΞΕ. Του τάς* άγέλας* έκάστας* τρέφ€ΐν τοΐς* μέν άλλοις* ττου
πασι μέτ€στι νομ€υσι, τφ πολιτικφ δέ ού μ€τδν έπηνέγκαμ€ν
τοΰνομα, δέον των κοινών έπ€ν€γκ€ΐν τι σύμπασιν. e
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Αληθή λέγ€ΐς\ €in€p έτύγχανέ γ€ δν.
ΞΕ. Πώς* δ' ούκ ήν τ<5 γ€ θ€ραττ€υ€ΐν που πασι κοινόν,
μηδέν διορισθ€ΐσης* τροφής* μηδέ τινο£ άλλης* πραγματ€ΐας*;
άλλ* ή τινα άγ€λαιοκομικήν ή θ€ραπ€υτικήν ή καί τινα 5
€πιμ€λη τική ν α υτή ν όνομάσασιν ώς* κατά πά ντω ν έξ η ν
π€ρικαλυπτ€ΐν και τον πολιτικόν άμα τοΐς* άλλοις, έπ€ΐδή
δ€ΐν τοϋτ’ έσήμαιν€ν ό λόγος*.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Όρθώς*. άλλ* ή μ€τά τούτο διαίρ€σις* αύ τίνα 276
τρόπον έγίγν€τ* αν;
ΞΕ. Κατά ταύτά καθ’ ά'π€ρ έμπροσθ€ν διηρουμ€θα την
άγ^λαιοτροφικήν π€ζοΐς* τ€ και άπτήσι, κα\ άμ€ΐκτοις* Τ€ καί
άκ€ρατοις*, τοΐς* αύτοΐς* άν που τουτοις* διαιρουμ€νοι και την 5
άγ€λαιοκομικήν την Τ€ νυν και την έπι Κρόνου βασιλ€ΐαν
π€ρΐ€ΐληφότ€ς* άν ήμ€ν όμοίως* έν τφ λόγφ.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Φαίν€ται* ζητώ δέ αύ τί τό μ€τά τούτο.
ΞΕ. Δήλον δτι λ€χθέντος: ουτω του τής* άγ€λαιοκομικής*
ονόματος* ούκ αν ποτ€ έγέν€θ’ ήμΐν τό τινας* άμφιοβητέιν ώς* b
ούδ’ έπ ιμ έλ ^ ια τό παράπαν έσ τίν, ώσπ€ρ τότ€ δικαίως*
ήμφ€σβητήθη μηδ€μίαν clvai τέχνην έν ήμΐν άζίαν τούτου
του θρ€πτικού προσρήματος*, ci δ ’ ούν τις* €Ϊη, πολλοΐς*
πρότ€ρον αύτής* και μάλλον προσήκ€ΐν ή τινι τών βασιλέων. 5
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Όρθώς*.
ΞΕ. Έ πιμ έλ€ΐα δέ γ€ άνθρωπίνης* συμπάσης* κοινωνίας*

(11-2τότ€ yc n: totc η, Ο
 79
cio wc said was sclf-dirccting in the ease of living creatures, but which
di took its care of them not as individuals but in groups, and which wc
then went on immediately to call herd-rearing - you remember?
Y.S.: Yes.
E.S.: Well, wc missed in a way in our aim at this; for wc did not at all
ds succeed in grasping the statesman along with the rest or name him,
but he eluded us in our naming without our noticing.
Y.S.: How so?
E.S.: All the other kinds of herdsmen, I think, share the feature of
rearing their several herds, but although the statesman docs not wc
ei still applied the name to it, when wc should have applied to all of
them one of the names that belongs in common to them.
Y.S.: What you say is true, if indeed there is such a name.
E.S.: And how would - perhaps - ‘looking after’ not have been
common to them all, without any specification of it as ‘rearing’, or
eS any other sort of activity? By calling it some kind of expertise in
‘herd-keeping’ or ‘looking after’, or ‘caring for’, as applying to them
all, wc could have covered the statesman too as well as the rest, given
that this was the requirement our argument indicated.
276 Y.S.: Correct. But in what way would the division following this be
made?
E.S.: In the same way as wc previously divided herd-rearing by
«5 footed and wingless, and non-interbreeding and hornless - by
dividing herd-keeping too by these same things, I think, wc would
have included in our account both the present kind of kingship and
that in the time of Kronos alike.
Y.S.: It seems so; but again I ask what step follows this.
E.S.; It’s clear that if wc had used the name ‘herd-keeping’ like this,
bi no one would ever have contended with us on the grounds that there
is no such thing as caring at all, as then, justly, it was contended that
there was no kind of expertise available that deserved this appellation
of ‘rearing’, but if there really were such a thing, that many people
bs had a prior and belter claim to it than any of our kings.
Y.S.: Correct.
E.S.: But care of the whole human community together - no other
80
ούδ€μία άν €θ€λήσ€ΐ€ν έτέρα μάλλον καί προτέρα τή ? (27φ
βασιλική? φάναι και κατά πάντων ανθρώπων αρχή? €ΐναι c
Τ€χνη.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Λέγ€ΐ? όρθώ?.
HE. Μ^τά ταυτα δέ γ€, ώ Σωκρατ€?, αρ' έννοουμ€ν δτι
προ? αύτφ δή τφ τέλ€ΐ συχνόν αύ διημαρτάν€το; 5
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Το ποιον;
ΞΕ. Τόδ€, ώ? αρ’ €ΐ και δΐ€νοήθημ€ν δτι μάλιστα τή ?
δίποδο? αγέλη ? €ΐναί τινα θρ€πτικήν τέχνη ν, ούδέν τ ι
μάλλον ήμα? έδ€ΐ βασιλικήν αυτήν €υθίι? και πολιτικήν ώ?
άποτ€Τ€λ€σμ€νην προσαγορ€υ€ΐν. 10
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Τ ί μην;
ΞΕ. Πρώτον μέν, δ λέγομ€ν, τουνομα μ€τασκ€υωρήσασθαι,
προ? τήν έπιμέλ€ΐαν μάλλον προσαγαγόντα? ή τήν τροφήν, d
2π€ΐτα ταύτην τέμν€ΐν ου γάρ σμικρά? αν έχοι τμήσ€ΐ? €τι.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Ποια?;
HE. rHi Τ€ τον θέίον αν που δΐ€ΐλομ€θα νομέα χωρι? καί
τον ανθρώπινον έπιμ€λητήν. 5
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Όρθώ?.
ΞΕ. Αυθι? δέ γ€ τήν άπον€μηθ€ΐσαν έπιμ€λητικήν δίχα
τέμν€ΐν άναγκαιον ήν.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Τίνι;
ΞΕ. Τφ βιαίφ Τ€ και έκουσίφ. 10
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Τί δή;
ΞΕ. Και ταύτη που τδ πρότ€ρον άμαρτάνοντ€? €υηθέστ€ρα c
του δέοντο? €i? ταύτόν βασιλέα και τύραννον συνέθ€μ€ν,
άνομοιοτάτου? δντα? αυτού? τ€ και τον τή? αρχή? έκατέρου
τρόπον.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. 'Αληθή. 5
ΞΕ. Νυν δέ γ€ πάλιν έπανορθούμςνοι, καθάικρ έιπον, τήν
άνθρωπίνην έπιμ€λητικήν δίχα διαιρώμ€θα, τφ βιαίφ Τ€ και
έκουσίφ;
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Πάνυ μέν ούν.
ΞΕ. Και τήν μέν γέ που των βίαιων τυραννικήν, τήν δέ 10

5 8 προτέρα c: πραοτίρα η: πραοτέρα η

 81
(276) kind of expertise would be prepared to say that it had a better and
ci prior claim to being that than kingly rule, which is over all human
beings.
Y.S.: What you say is correct.
c5 E.S.: But after that, Socrates, do we see that at the very end of our
account we again made a latgc mistake?
Y.S.: What sort of mistake?
E.S.: It was this, that even if we had been quite convinced that there
was some expertise dealing with the rearing of the two-footed herd,
we should certainly not for that reason immediately have called it that
cio of the king and statesman, as if that were the end of the matter.
Y.S.: What should we have done?
E.S.: First of all, as we arc saying, we should have altered the name,
<n aligning it more with caring for things than with rearing, and then we
should have cut this; for it would still offer room for cuts of no small
size.
Y.S.: Where would they be?
E.S.; I imagine, where we would have divided off the divine
45 herdsman, on one side, and the human carer on the other.
Y.S.: Correct.
E.S.: But again we ought to have cut the ait of the carer resulting from
this apportionment into two.
Y.S.: By using what distinction?
dio E.S.: That between the enforced and the voluntary.
Y.S.: Why so?
d E.S.: I think we made a mistake before in this way too, by behaving
more simple-mindedly than we should have, putting king and tyrant
into the same category, when both they themselves and the manner of
their rule arc very unlike one another.
e5 Y.S.: True.
E.S.: But now should we set things to rights again, and, as I said,
should we divide the expertise of the human carer into two, by using
the categories of the enforced and the voluntary?
Y.S.: Absolutely.
cio E.S.: And should we perhaps call tyrannical the part that relates to
82

έκου'σιον και έκουσίω ν δίποδω ν άγ€λα ιοκομ ική ν ζφ ω ν

προσ€ΐπόντ€ς πολιτικήν, τον έχοντα αύ τέχνην ταυτην κα\
έπιμέλ€ΐαν δντως δντα βασιλέα και πολιτικόν άποφαινώμ€θα;
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Και κινδυν€υ€ΐ γ€, ώ ξέν€, Τ€λέως αν ήμΐν ούτως* 277
?χ€ΐν ή π€ρι τον πολιτικόν άπόδ€ΐζις.
HE. Καλώς αν, ώ Σώκρατ€ς, ήμΐν Ιχοι. δ€ΐ δέ μή σο\ μόνψ
ταυτα, άλλα κάμοι μ€τά σου κοινή συνδοκ€ΐν. νυν δέ κατά γ€
την έμήν οΰπω φαίν€ται τέλ€ον ό βασιλ€ύς ήμιν σχήμα 5
€χ€ΐν, άλλα καθάπ€ρ άνδριαντοποιοι παρά καιρόν ένίοτ€
σπ€ΐίδοντ€ς πλ€ΐω και μ€ΐζω του δέοντος έκαστα τφ έργψ
έπ€μβαλλόμ€νοι βραδιίνουσι, και νυν ήμ€ΐς, ινα δή προς τφ b
ταχύ καί μ€γαλοπρ€πώς δηλώσαιμ€ν το τ ή ς έμπροσθ€ν
αμάρτημα δΐ€ξόδου, τφ βασιλ€ΐ νομίσαντ€ς πρέπ€ΐν μ€γάλα
παραδ€ ίγμ α τα ποΐ€ΐσθαι, θαυμαστόν δγκον άράμ^νοι του
μιίθου, μείζονι του δέοντος ήναγκάσθημ€ν αύτου μέρ€ΐ 5
προσχρήσασθαι* διό μακροτέραν την άπόδ€ΐξιν π€ποιήκαμ€ν
και πάντως τφ μύθφ τέλος ούκ έπέθ€μ€ν, άλλ’ άτ€χνώς ό
λόγος ήμιν ώσπ€ρ ζφον την ?ξωθ€ν μέν π€ριγραφήν €oiK€V c
ικανώς έχ€ΐν, την δέ όιον τόΐς φαρμάκοις και τή συγκράσ€ΐ
των χρωμάτων ένάργ€ΐαν ούκ άπ€ΐληφέναι πω. γραφής δέ κα'ι
συμπάσης χ€ΐρουργίας λέξ€ΐ και λόγφ δηλουν παν ζφον
μάλλον πρέπ€ΐ τοις δυναμένοις €π€σθαι· τοΐς δ’ άλλοις διά 5
χ€ΐρουργιών.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Τούτο μέν όρθώς* δπη δέ ήμΐν ουπω φής Ικανώς
ειρήσθαι δήλωσον.
ΞΕ. Χαλ€πόν, ώ δαιμόνΐ€, μή παραδ€ΐγμασι χρώμ€νον ικανώς d
ένδ€ΐκνυσθαί τι τών μ€ΐζόνων. κινδυν€υ€ΐ γάρ ήμών έκαστος
οΤον δναρ €ίδώς άπαντα πάντ’ αύ πάλιν ώσπ€ρ ΰπαρ άγνο€ΐν.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Πώς τουτ' €Ϊπ€ς;
ΞΕ. Και μάλ' άτόπως έοικά γ€ έν τφ παρόντι κινήσας το 5
π€ρι τή ς έπιστήμη^* πάθος έν ήμΐν.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Τί δή;
ΞΕ. Παραδ€ΐγματος, ώ μακάρΐ€, αύ μοι και τό παράδ€ΐγμα
αυτό δ€δέηκ€ν.

a 7 τφ έργφ c: τών έργων m, Ο

 83
subjects who arc forced, and the herd-keeping that is voluntary and
relates to willing two-footed living creatures that which belongs to
statesmanship, displaying, in his turn, the person who has this
expertise and cares for his subjects in this way as being genuinely
king and statesman?
277 Y.S.: Yes, Stranger, and it’s likely that in this way our exposition
concerning the statesman would reach completion.
E.S.: It would be a fine thing for us, Socrates. But this mustn’t be just
your view alone; I loo have got to share it in common with you. And
as as it is, according to my view our discussion docs not yet seem to
have given a complete shape to the king, but just as sculptors
sometimes hurry when it is not appropriate to do so and actually lose
time by making additions and increasing the si/.c of the various parts
bi of their work beyond what is necessary, so too in our ease, I suppose
in order to give a grand as well as a quick demonstration of the
mistake in the route we previously took, we thought it was
appropriate to the king to give large-scale illustrations, and took upon
bs ourselves an astonishing mass of material in the shape of the story, so
forcing ourselves to use a greater part of it than necessary; thus we
have made our exposition longer, and have in every way failed to
cl apply a finish to our story, and our account, just like a portrait, seems
adequate in terms of its superficial outline, but not yet to have
received its proper clarity, as it were with paints and the mixing
together of colours. But it is not painting or any other kind of
handicraft, but speech and discourse, which constitute the more fitting
cS medium for exhibiting every kind of living creature, for those who are
able to follow; for the rest, it will be through handicrafts.
Y.S.: That much is correct; but show me how you say we have not yet
given an adequate account.
at E.S.: It’s a hard thing, my fine friend, to demonstrate any of the
greater subjects without using models. It looks as if each of us knows
everything in a kind of dreamlike way, and then again is ignorant of
everything as it were when awake.
Y.S.: What do you mean?
as E.S.: I do seem now to have stirred up the subject of what happens to
us in relation to knowledge in a very odd way.
Y.S.; In what way is that?
E.S.: It has turned out, my dear fellow, that the idea of a ‘model’ itself
in its turn also has need of a model to demonstrate it.
84
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Τί ουν; λέγ€ μηδέν έμου γ€ έν€κα άποκνών. e
ΞΕ. Λ€κτέον έπ€ΐδή και συ γ€ έτοιμος* άκολουθ€Ϊν. τούς
γάρ που πα ΐδα ς ϊσμ€ν, όταν ά ρτι γραμμάτω ν έμπ€ΐροι
γίγνωνται —
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Τδ ποιον; 5
ΞΕ. "Οτι των στοιχ€ΐων έκαστον έν τά ίς βραχυτάταις κα\
ράσταις των συλλαβών ίκανώς διαισθάνονται, και τάληθή
φράζ€ΐν π€ρι έκέινα δυνατοί γίγνονται.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Πώς γάρ ου; 278
ΞΕ. Ταύτά δέ γ€ ταυτα έν άλλαις άμφιγνοουντ€ς πάλιν
δόξη Τ€ ψοίδονται και λόγψ.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Πάνυ μέν ουν.
ΞΕ. *Αρ’ ουν ούχ ώδ€ ρ$στον και κάλλιστον έπάγ€ΐν αυτούς 5
έπι τά μήπω γιγνωσκόμ€να;
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Πώς;
ΞΕ. Άνάγ€ΐν πρώτον έ π ’ έκέΐνα έν όις ταύτά ταυτα όρθώς
έδο'ξαζον, ά να γ α γ ο 'ν τα ς δέ τ ιθ έ ν α ι παρά τά μη'πω
γιγνωσκόμβνα, καί παραβάλλοντας ένδ€ΐκνύναι την αυτήν b
ομοιότητα και φιίσιν έν άμφοτέραις ούσαν τα ΐς συμπλοκαΐς,
μέχριπ€ρ αν πασι τοΐς άγνοουμένοις τά δοξαζόμ€να άληθώς
παρατιθέμενα δ€ΐχθή, δ€ΐχθέντα δέ, παραδ€ΐγματα οΰτω
γιγνόμ€να, ποίηση τών στοιχ€ΐων έκαστον πάντων έν πάσαις 5
τάίς συλλαβαΐς τδ μέν έτ€ρον ώς τών άλλων έτ€ρον δν, τδ
δέ ταύτδν ώς ταύτδν delκατά ταύτά έαυ Τ($ e
προσαγορ€υ€σθαι.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Παντάπασι μέν ουν.
ΞΕ. Ο ύκουν το ύ το μ έν ίκ α ν ώ ς σ υν€ΐλή φ α μ € ν, ο τ ι
παραδ€ΐγματός γ ’ έστι τότ€ γέν€σις, δπόταν δν ταύτδν έν 5
έτέρφ δΐ€σπασμένψ δοξαζόμ€νον όρθώς και συναχθέν n€pl
έκάτ€ρον και συνάμφω μίαν άληθή δόξαν άποτ€λή;
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Φαίν€ται.
ΞΕ. θ α υ μ ά ζο ιμ €ν άν ουν €ΐ τα ύ τδ ν τούτο ήμών ή ψυχή
φύσ€ΐ Η€ρι τ ά τώ ν πάντω ν σ τ ο ιχ έ ϊα Π€τιονθυΐα το τ έ μέν ύ π ' d
άληθ€ΐας π€ρι έν έκαστον έν τ ισ ι σ υνίσ τα τα ι, το τ έ δέ n cp\

C 7 καί συνάμφω η: ώς συνάμφω η, Ο | d 2 ? v τισι συνίσταται η: έν

τι συνίσταται η: έν τισιν ϊσταται C
 85
ei Y.S.: How so? Explain, and don’t hold back for my sake.
E.S.: Explain I must, in view of your own readiness to follow. I
suppose we recognize that when children arc just acquiring skill in
reading and writing —
c5 Y.S.: Recognize what?
E.S.: That they distinguish each of the individual letters well enough
in the shortest and easiest syllables, and come to be capable of
indicating what is true in relation to them.
278 Y.S.: Of course.
E.S.: But then once again they make mistakes about these very same
letters in other syllables, and think and say what is false.
Y.S.: Absolutely.
a5 E.S.: Well then, isn’t this the easiest and best way of leading them on
to the things they’re not yet recognizing?
Y.S.: What way?
E.S.: To take them first back to those eases in which they were getting
these same things right, and having done that, to pul these beside what
bi they’re not yet recognizing, and by comparing them demonstrate that
there is the same kind of thing with similar features in both
combinations, until the things that they arc gelling right have been
shown set beside all the ones that they don’t know, and once they
bs have been shown like this, and so become models, they bring it about
that each of all the individual letters is called both different, on the
basis that it is different from the others, and the same, on the basis
ci that it is always the same as and identical to itself, in all syllables.
Y.S.: Absolutely right.
E.S.: Well then, have we grasped this point adequately, that we come
c5 to be using a m odel when being the same thing in something different
and distinct, it is correctly identified, and having been brought
together with the original thing, it brings about a single true
judgement about each separately and both together?
Y.S.: It seems so.
E.S.: Then would we be surprised if our minds by their nature
<ii experienced this same thing in relation to the individual letters of
everything, now collecting themselves in some eases with the aid of
86

άπαντα έν 4τόροι? αυ φόρ€ται, κα\ τα μ4ν αυτών άμή γό πη

τών συγκράσ€ων όρθώ? δοξάζ€ΐ, μ€τατιθόμ€να 6' €l? τά ? τώ ν
πραγμάτων μακρά? και μή ροδίους* συλλαβά? τα ύτά τα υτα 5
πάλιν άγνοόΐ;
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Και θαυμαστόν γ<Ε ουδόν.
ΞΕ. Πώς· γάρ, ώ φίλ€, δυναιτο αν τις* άρχόμ€νο? από δόξη?
ψ€υδου? 4πί τ ι τής* άληθ€ΐα? και μικρόν μόρο? άφικόμ€νο? c
κτήσασθαι φρόνησιν;
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Σχ€δόν ούδαμώ?.
Ξ Ε. Ο ύκ ουν τ α υ τ α €ΐ τα υ 'τη π ό φ υ κ € ν , ο υ δ ό ν δή
πλημμ€λοΐμ€ν αν 4γώ Τ€ και ου πρώτον μ4ν 4πιχ€ΐρη'σαντ€? 5
δλου παραδ€ΐγματο? ίδόίν την φιίσιν 4ν σμικρψ κατά μόρο?
αλλφ παραδ€ΐγματι, μ€τά δ4 ταυτα μόλλοντ€?, 4πι τό του
βασιλόω? μόγιστον όν ταύτόν €ΐδο? α π ' όλαττόνων φόροντό?
ποθ€ν, διά παραδ€ΐγματο? 4πιχ€ΐρ€ΐν αύ την των κατά πόλιν
θ€ραπ€ΐαν τόχνη γνωρίζ€ΐν, ΐνα ΰπαρ ά ν τ' όνβίρατο? ήμιν 10
γίγνη τα ί;
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Πάνυ μ4ν ούν όρθώ?.
ΞΕ. Πάλιν δή τον όμπροσθ€ λόγον άναληπτόον, ώ? 4π€ΐδή 279
τ <$ βασιλική γόν€ΐ τ η ? ncpi τ ά ? πόλ€ΐ? όπιμ €λ€ΐα ?
άμφισβητοΟσι μυρίοι, δ€ΐ δή πάντα? άποχωρίζ€ΐν τουτου? και
μόνον έκ€ΐνον λ€ ΐπ € ΐν και προ? τούτο δή παραδ€ΐγματο?
όφαμ€ν δέΐν τινο? ήμιν. 5
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Και μάλα.
ΞΕ. Τ ί βήτα παράδ€ΐγμά τ ι? αν, όχον τήν αυτήν πολιτική
πραγματ€ΐαν, σμικρότατον παραθόμ€νο? ικανώ? αν €υροι τό
ζητου'μ€νον; βουλ€ΐ προ? Δ ιό?, ώ Σώ κρατ€?, €ΐ μη' τ ι b
π ρόχ€ΐρον €T€pov όχομ€ν, ά λ λ ' ουν τη'ν γ€ υ φ α ν τικ ή ν
προ€λώμ€θα; και ταιίτην, €1 δοκόί, μή ττασαν, άποχρήσ€ΐ γάρ
ισω? ή Π€ρ\ τά 4κ των έρίων ύφάσματα* τά χα γάρ αν ήμιν
και το ύ τ ο τό μόρο? α υ τ ή ? μαρτυρη'σ€ΐ€ προαιρ€θόν δ 5
βουλόμςθα.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Τί γάρ ου;
ΞΕ. Τί δήτα ου, καθάπςρ 4ν τοΐ? όμπροοθ€ τόμνοντ€? μόρη

<Ι8γάρ m: ίρα c | c 6 παραδαγματο? m: πράγματο? c | c 7

μόλλοντ€? m: μίταβάλλοντί? c | a 7 πολιτική c: πολιτικήν m
 87
truth in relation to each single thing, now, in others, all at sea in
relation to all of them, and somehow or other getting the constituents
of the combinations themselves right, but once again not knowing
as these same things when they arc transferred into the long syllables of
things and the ones that arc not easy?
Y.S.: There would be absolutely nothing surprising in it.
ei E.S.: Right, my friend: how could anyone begin from false belief and
get to even a small part of the truth, and so acquire wisdom?
Y.S.: I dare say it’s impossible.
es E.S.: Well, if that’s the way it is, the two of us would not at all be in
the wrong in having first attempted to see the nature of models as a
whole in their turn in the specific ease of a further small model, with
the intention then of bringing, in order to apply it to the ease of the
king, which is of the greatest importance, something of the same sort
from smaller things somewhere, in an attempt once more through the
eio use of a model to recognize in an expert, systematic way what looking
after those in the city is, so that it may be present to us in our waking
state instead of in a dream?
Y.S.: Absolutely right.
279 E.S.: Then we must take up once again what we were saying before,
to the effect that since tens of thousands of people dispute the role of
caring for cities with the kingly class, what we have to do is to
separate all these off and leave the king on his own; and it was just for
>s this purpose that we said we needed a model.
Y.S.: Very much so.
E.S.: So what model, occupied in the same activities as statesmanship,
on a very small scale, could one compare with it, and so discover in a
bi satisfactory way what we arc looking for? By Zeus, Socrates, if we
don’t have anything else to hand, well, there is weaving - do you
want us to choose that? Not all of it, if you agree, since perhaps the
weaving of cloth from wool will suffice; maybe it is this part of it, if
b5 we choose it, which would provide the testimony we want.
Y.S.: I’ve certainly no objection.
E.S.: Why then don’t we do the very same thing we did in what
88

μερών έκαστον διηρούμ€θα, και νυι> περί υφαντικήν ταύτδν

το υ τ' έδράσαμ€ν, και κατά δύναμιν δτι μάλιστα διά βραχέων c
ταχύ π ά ντ’ έπελθδντες1 τιάλιν ήλθομ€ν έπ \ το νΟν χρήσιμον;
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Πώς* λέγ€ΐς*;
ΞΕ. Αυτήν τήν διέξοδον άπόκριοίν σοι ττοιήσομαι.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Κάλλιστ' έίπες·. 5
HE. Έ σ τ ι τοίνυν τιάντα ή μΐν όπδσα δημιουργοΟμεν κα\
κτώμεθα, τά μέν ενεκα του ποιεΐν τι, τά δέ τοΟ μή π ά σ χ ο ν
άμυντήρια* και τών άμυντηρίων τά μέν άλβξιφάρμακα καί
θ€ΐα και άνθρωπινα, τά δέ προβλήματα* τών δέ προβλημάτων d
τά μέν προς: τον πόλ€μον όπλίσματα, τά δέ φράγματα* και
τώ ν φ ρ α γ μ ά τ ω ν τ ά μ έν π α ρ α π € τ ά σ μ α τ α , τ ά δέ προς·
χ€ΐμώναςτ και καύματα άλεξητήρια* τών δέ άλεξητηρίων τά
μέν στ€γάσματα, τά δέ σκ€πάσματα* και τών σκ€πασμάτων 5
ύ π ο π € τ ά σ μ α τ α μ έ ν ά λ λ α , π € ρ ικ α λ ύ μ μ α τ α δέ έ'τ€ρα*
π€ρικαλυμμάτων δέ τά μέν όλόσχιστα, σύνθετα δέ έτερα* τών
δέ συνθέτων τά μέν τρητά, τά δέ άν€υ τρήσεως* συνδ€τά* e
και τών άτρήτων τά μέν ν€υρινα φυτών έκ γτ\ς, τά δέ
τρίχινα* τών δέ τρίχινω ν τά μέν ΰδασι και γή κολλητά, τά
δέ αυτά αυτοίς* συνδετά. τούτοισι δή τοΐς* έκ τών έαυτοΐς*
συνδουμένων εργασθεΐσιν άμυντηρίοις* και σκ€πάσμασι τδ μέν 5
δνομα ίμ ά τια έκ α λ έσ α μ εν τή ν δέ τώ ν Ιμ α τίω ν μ ά λισ τα
έπιμελουμένην τέχνην, ώσπ€ρ τότε τήν τής· πόλεως* πολιτικήν 280
εΐπομεν, ούτω και νυν ταύτην προσείπωμεν ά π ' αύτου του
πράγματος Ιματιουργικήν; φώμ€ν δέ και ύφαντικήν, δσον έπ'ι
τή τών ιματίω ν kpyaoiq, μέγισ τον ήν μδριον, μηδέν
διαφέρειν πλήν όνόματι ταύτης· τής* Ιματιουργικής*, καθάπερ 5
κάκει τότε τήν βασιλικήν τής* πολιτικής*;
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Ό ρθότατά γε.
ΞΕ. Τδ μετά τούτο δή συλλογισώμεθα δτι τή ν ιματίω ν
ύφ α ντικ ή ν ού'τω ρηθεΐσάν τις* τ ά χ ’ Ικανών είρ ή σ θ α ι b
δδξειεν, μή δυνάμενος* συννο€ΐν δτι τών μέν εγγύς* συν€ργών
οΰπω διώρισται, πολλών 6έ έτέρων συγγ€νών άπεμερίσθη.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Ποιων, €ΐπέ, συγγ€νών;
 89
preceded, dividing each thing by cutting parts of parts, now too in
ct relation to weaving, and get back to what is useful in the present
context after covering everything as briefly and quickly as we can?
Y.S.: What do you mean?
E.S.: I shall make my answer to you by just going through it.
c5 Y.S.: An excellent suggestion.
E.S.: Well then: all the things we make and acquire arc either for the
sake of doing something or things that protect us from something’s
at happening to us; of preventives, some arc charms, whether divine or
human, warding things off, others forms of defence; of forms of
defence some arc ways of arming for war, others forms of protection;
of forms of protection some arc screens, others means of warding off
cold and hot weather; of the latter type of protcctives some arc
d5 shelters, others coverings; of coverings one sort consists of things
spread under, a different sort of things put round; of things put round,
some arc cut out in one piece, a different sort arc compound; of the
ei compound some arc perforated, others bound together without
perforation; of the unperforated some are made of the ‘sinews’ of
things growing from the earth, others of hair, of those made of hair,
some arc stuck together by means of water and earth, others arc
themselves bound together with themselves. It is to these preventives
c5 and coverings manufactured from materials that arc being bound
together with themselves that we give the name ‘clothes’; as for the
280 expertise that especially has charge of clothes - just as before we gave
the name of ‘statesmanship’ to the sort of expertise that especially had
charge of the state, so too now shall we call this sort ‘the art of
clothcs-making', from the thing itself? And shall we say that weaving
too, in so far as it represented the largest part in relation to the
a5 manufacture of clothes, docs not differ at all, except in name, from
this art of clothcs-making, just as in that other ease we said that the art
of kingship did not differ from that of statesmanship?
Y.S.: Yes; absolutely correct.
E.S.: As for what comes next, let’s reflect that someone might perhaps
bi suppose that weaving had been adequately described when pul like
this, being unable to grasp that it had not yet been divided off from
those co-operative arts that border on it, while it had been parcelled
off from many other related ones.
Y.S.: Tell me - which related ones?
90
ΞΕ. Ούχ Ιστίου τοΐς* λ€χθ€ΐσιν, ώς* φαίνη* πάλιν ουν coikcv 5
Ιπ α ν ιτέο ν άρχόμ€νον από τ€λ€υτής*. cl γάρ συννο€Ϊς* τήι/
οΙκ€ΐότητα, την μ ίν δΐ€Τ€μομ€ν α π ' αυτής* νυνδή, τή ν των/
στρωμάτων συνθ€σιν π€ριβολή χωρίζοντ€ς* και υποβολή.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Μανθάνω.
ΞΕ. Και μην την έκ των λίνων και σπάρτων κα\ πάντων c
όπόσα φυτών άρτι vcOpa κατά λόγον cinopcv, δημιουργίαν
πασαν άφ€ΐλομ€ν* την tc αυ πιλητικήν άφωρισάμ€θα και τη ν
τ ρ η σ € ΐ κ α ί ρα φ ή χ ρ ω μ έ ν η ν σ υ νθ € σ ιν, ήςτ ή π λ € ΐσ τ η
σκυτοτομική. 5
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Πάνυ μέν ουν.
ΞΕ. Κ αί το ίν υ ν τ η ν τω ν ό λ ο σ χίσ τω ν σκ€πασμα'τω ν
Gcpanciav δ€ρματουργικήν και τάς* των στ€γασμάτων, όσαι
Τ€ έν οίκοδομική και όλη τ€κτονική και έν άλλαις* τέχναις*
ρ€υμάτων στ€κτικάι γίγνονται, συμπάσας* άφ€ΐλομ€ν, όσαι Τ€ d
ncpi τάς* κλοπάς* και τάς* βίςι πράξ€ΐς* διακωλυτικά έργα
π α ρ έ χ ο ν τ α ι τ€ 'χν α ι φραγμα'τω ν, ncpi tc γ€'ν€σιν
έπιθηματουργίας* ουσαι καί τάς* των θυρωμάτων πήξ€ΐς*,
γομφωτικής* άπον€μηθέίσαι μόρια τόχνης** την Τ€ όπλοποιικήν 5
άπ€Τ€μόμ€θα, μ€γάλης* και παντοίας* τής- προβληματουργικής*
τμήμα ούσαν δυνάμ€ως*· και δη και την μαγ€υτικήν την ncpi
τά άλ€ζιφάρμακα κατ' άρχάς* €υθυς* διωρισάμ^θα σιίμπασαν, c
και λ€λοίπαμ€ν, ώς* δόξαιμ^ν αν, αυτήν την ζητηθ€Ϊσαν
αμυντικήν χ€ΐμώνων, cpcoO προβλήματος* έργαστικήν, όνομα
δ€ ύφαντικήν λ€χθ€ΐσαν.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Έ οικ€ γάρ ουν. 5
ΞΕ. Ά λλ' ούκ Ισ τ ι πω τέλ€ον, ώ πάί, τούτο λ€λ€γμένον. ό
γαρ € ν αρχή τής* τω ν Ιμ α τίω ν έργασίας* άπτόμ€νος*
τούναντίον υφή δραν φαίν€ται. 281
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Πώς:;
ΞΕ. Τό μέν τής: υφής* συμπλοκή τις* έσ τί που.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Ναί.
ΞΕ. Τό δέ γ€ τω ν σ υν€σ τώ τω ν καί σ υ μ π € π ιλ η μ έ νων 5
διαλυτική.
 91
bs E.S.: It appears that you didn’t follow what’s been said; so it seems
we must go back again, starting from the end. If you grasp the
kinship in this case, we cut off one ‘related’ expertise from it just
now, separating off the pulling together of blankets by means of the
distinction between putting round and putting under.
Y.S.: I understand.
ei E.S.: What’s more, we took away all craflwork out of flax, esparto,
and all of what we just now by analogy called ‘sinews’ of plants;
again we divided off both the art of felling and the sort of putting
together that uses perforation and sewing, of which the largest is the
c5 art of cobbling.
Y.S.: Absolutely.
E.S.: Still further, working with skins, which looks after coverings cut
in a single piece, and those kinds of activity that look after shelters,
all those involved in building and carpentry in general and, in other
<n kinds of expertise, contriving shelter from inflowing water - all of
these we took away, and all those kinds of expertise in forms of
protection that offer preventive products in relation to thefts and
violent acts, and that have to do with the carrying out of the work of
d5 lid-making, and fixings to doorways, those assigned as parts of the art
of joinery; and we cut away the art of arms-manufacturc, a segment of
that great and varied capacity which is defence-production; and then
ci again our first and immediate move was to divide oil the whole of the
art of magic which is concerned with protective charms, and we have
left behind - as we might suppose - the very expertise we looked for,
which protects us against cold weather, productive of a woollen
defence, and called by the name of weaving.
e5 Y.S.: Yes, that seems to be so.
E.S.: But put like this, my boy, it is not yet complete. The person who
28i puts his hand first to the production of clothes seems to do the
opposite of weaving.
Y.S.: How so?
E.S.: The business of weaving, I suppose, is a kind of intertwining.
Y.S.: Yes.
»5 E.S.: But in fact what I’m talking about is a matter of breaking apart
things that arc combined, even matted, together.
92
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. To ποιον δη; (Ml)
HE. To τή? του ξαίνοντο? τόχνη? όργον. ή τήν ξαντικήν
τολμήσομ€ν υφαντικήν και τον ξάντην ώ? δντα ύφάντην
καλόίν;
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Ούδαμώ?. 10
HE. Και μήν την γ€ αυ στήμονο? έργαστικήν και κρόκη? €Ϊ
τι? υφαντικήν προσαγορ€υ€ΐ, παράδοξόν Τ€ καί ψ€υδο? δνομα
λόγ€ΐ. b
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Πώ? γάρ οΰ;
HE. Τι δό; κναφ€υτικήν συμπασαν και τη ν άκ€στικήν
πότ€ρα μηδ€μίαν έπιμόλ€ΐαν μηδό τινα θ€ραπ€ΐαν έσθήτο?
θώμ€ν, ή και ταΰτα? πάσα? ώ?υφαντικά? λόξομ€ν; 5
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Ούδαμώ?.
ΞΕ. Άλλα μήν τη? γ€ 0€pancia? άμφισβητήσουσιν αυται
οΰμπασαι καί τη ? γ€νόσ€ω? τη ? των ίμ α τίω ν τή τη ?
υφαντική? δυνάμ€ΐ, μόγιστον μέν μόρο? έκ€ΐνη διδουσαι,
μεγάλα δέ και σφίαιν αυται? άπονόμουσαι. 10
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Πάνυ γ€. c
HE. Π ρο? το ίν υ ν τ α υ τ α ι? ό τ ι τ ά ? τω ν ό ρ γα λ € ΐω ν
δημιουργού? τόχνα?, δι' ών άποτ€λ€ΐται τά τή? υφή? έργα,
δοκ€ΐν χρή τό γ€ συναιτία? €ΐναι προσποιήσ€σθαι παντδ?
ύφάσματο?. 5
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. ’Ορθότατα.
ΞΕ. Πότ€ρον ούν ήμΐν ό Π€ρι τή ? υφαντική? λόγο?, ου
προ€ΐλόμ€θα μόρου?, ίκανώ? όσται διωρισμόνο?, έάν άρ' αυτήν
τώ ν έπιμ€λ€ΐών όπόσαι π€ρι τή ν έρςαν έσθήτα, €i? τη ν
καλλίστην και μ€γίστην πασών τιθώ μ€ν ή λόγοιμ€ν μέν αν d
τ ι άληθό?, ου μήν σαφό? γ€ ουδέ τόλ€ον, πρ\ν αν και τα ΰ τα ?
αυτή? πάσα? Π€ριόλωμ€ν;
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Όρθώ?.
ΞΕ. Ούκουν μ€τά ταυτα ποιητόον δ λόγομ€ν, ΐν ’ έφ€ξή? 5
ήμιν ό λόγο? ΐη;
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Πώ? δ’ οΰ;
ΞΕ. Πρώτον μέν τοίνυν δυο τόχνα? οΰσα? π€ρι πάντα τά

C 4 προσποιήσίσΟαι c: προσποιήσασΟαι m
 93
(2*i) Y.S.: What is it you’re referring to?
E.S.: The function of the art of the carder. Or shall we dare to call the
art of carding the art of weaving and the carder as if he were a
weaver?
•10 Y.S.: Certainly not.
E.S.: And then too if someone calls the art of manufacturing warp
bi and weft ‘weaving’, he is using a name that is not only odd but false.
Y.S.: Quite.
E.S.: And what about these eases? Are we to posit the whole of the
art of fulling, and elothes-mending, as being no sort of care for
t>5 clothes, nor as any sort of looking after them, or shall we refer to all
of these too as arts of weaving?
Y.S.: Certainly not.
E.S.: Yet all of these will dispute the role of looking after and the
production of clothes with the capacity of the weaving art, conceding
bio a very large part to it, but assigning large shares to themselves too.
ei Y.S.: Certainly.
E.S.: Then again, in addition to these, we must suppose that the kinds
of expertise responsible for crafting the tools through which what
weaving docs is completed will also lay claim to being at least a
c5 contributory cause of every woven article.
Y.S.: Quite correct.
E.S.: So will our account of that part of the art of weaving we selected
be sufficiently definite, if we tum out to set it down as finest and
«π greatest of all those kinds of care that exist in relation to woollen
clothing; or would we be saying something true, but not clear, or
complete, until such time as we remove all of these loo from around
it?
Y.S.: Correct.
<15 E.S.: Then after this we must do as we say, in order that our account
may proceed in due order?
Y.S.; Quite.
E.S.: Well then, let’s look at two kinds of expertise that exist in
94
δρώμενα θ€ασώμ€θα.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Ύινας; 10
HE.Τήν μέν γ€νέσ€ως* ούσαν συναίτιον, τήν δ’ αυτήν
αιτίαν.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Πώς*;
ΞΕ. "Οσαι μέν τδ πραγμα αύτδ μή βημιουργουσι, τάΐς* δέ e
δημιουργου'σαις* ό ρ γα να παρασκ€υα'ζουσιν, ών μή
παραγ€νομένων ούκ αν ποτ€ 4ργασθ€ΐη τδ προστ€ταγμένον
έκαστη των Τ€χνών, ταύτας* μέν συναιτίους*, τάς* δέ αύτδ τδ
τιραγμα άπ€ργαζομένας* αιτίας*. 5
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Έ χ€ ΐ γουν λόγον.
ΞΕ. Μ€τά τούτο δή τάς* μέν Ticpi τ€ ατράκτους* και
κ€ρκίδας* και ότιόσα άλλα όργανα τής* τΐ€ρι τά άμφιέσματα
γ€νέσ€ως* κοινων€ΐ, τιάσας* συναιτίους* €ΐπωμ€ν, τάς* δέ αυτά
θ€ρατΐ€υουσας* και δημιουργουσας* αιτίας*; 10
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. ’Ορθότατα.
HE. Τών αίτιων δή τιλυντικήν μέν και άκ€στικήν και πάσαν 2β2
τήν T icpi ταυτα θ€ραπ€υτικήν, πολλής* οΰσης* τής* κοσμητικής*,
τούνταυθα αυτής* μόριον €ΐκός* μ ά λισ τα π€ριλαμ βάν€ΐν
ονομάζοντας* παν τή τέχνη τη κναφ€υτική.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Καλώς*. 5
ΞΕ. Και μήν ξαντική γ€ και νηστική καί πάντα αύ τά π€ρι
τήν ποίησιν αυτήν τής* έσθήτος* ής* λέγομ€ν μέρη, μία τις*
έστι τέχνη τών ύπδ πάντων λ€γομένων, ή ταλασιουργική.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Πώς* γάρ οΰ;
ΞΕ. Τής* δή ταλασιουργικής* δυο τμ ή μ α τά έστον, καί b
τουτοιν έκάτ€ρον άμα δυόΐν π€φιίκατον τέχναιν μέρη.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Πώς*;
ΞΕ. Τδ μέν ξαντικδν και τδ τής· κ^ρκιστικής* ήμισυ και όσα
τά συγκ€ΐμ€να ά π ’ άλλήλων άφίοτησι, παν τούτο ώς* έν 5
φράζ€ΐν τής* Τ€ ταλασιουργίας* αυτής* έστί που; και μ€γάλα
τινέ κατά πάντα ήμΊν ήστην τέχνα, ή συγκριτική Τ€ και
διακριτική.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Ναι.

a 6 ξαντική ... νηστική c: ξαντικήν ... νηστικήν m | ye n: tc η

I δόκαί μ€γάλα m: και <αμα> μίγάλα c
 95
relation to all the things that arc done,
dio Y.S.: Which arc they?
E.S.: One which is a contributory cause of production, one which is
itself a cause.
Y.S.: How so?
ei E.S.: Those which do not craft the thing itself, but which provide
tools for those that do, tools which, if they were not present, what has
been assigned to each kind of cxpcnisc would never be accomplished
- these arc what I mean by contributory causes, while those that bring
eS the thing itself to completion arc causes.
Y.S.: That seems to make sense.
E.S.: Then as a next step shall we call contributory causes all those
that arc concerned with spindles and shuttles and whatever other tools
share in the process of production in relation to garments, and causes
cio those that look after and craft garments themselves?
Y.S.: Quite correct.
282 E.S.: Then of the causes, washing and mending and the whole
business of looking after clothes in these spheres - given the
extensiveness of the area covered by the art of preparation, it’s
perfectly reasonable to encompass this part of it by calling it all ‘the
art of the fuller’.
«5 Y.S.: Right.
E.S.: Again, carding and spinning and everything relating to the
making of clothes itself, whose parts wc’rc talking about, is some
single expertise among those spoken of by everybody, namely wool­
working.
Y.S.: Of course.
bi E.S.: Next, of wool-working there arc two segments, and each of
these is a part of two kinds of cxpcnisc at once.
Y.S.: How so?
E.S.: What has to do with carding, and half of the an of the shuttle,
bs and all those activities that put apan from each other things that arc
together - all of this we can, I suppose, declare as one and as
belonging to wool-working itself? And there were, we agreed, two
great kinds of expertise in every sphere, that of combination and that
of separation.
Y.S.: Yes.
%
HE. Τή? τοίνυν διακριτική? ή' τ€ ξαντική κα\ τα νυνδή (282)
ρηθέντα άπαντά έ σ τ ιν ή γάρ έν έρίοι? Τ€ κα\ στήμοσι c
διακριτική, κ€ρκίδι μέν άλλον τρόπον γιγνομένη, χ€ρσΙ δέ
Ιτ€ρον, €σχ€ν δσα άρτίω? ονόματα έρρήθη.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Πάνυ μέν ουν.
HE. Α υθι? δή π ά λ ιν σ υ γ κ ρ ιτ ικ ή ? μο'ριον ά μ α καί 5
ταλασιουργία? έν αυτή γιγνόμ€νον λάβωμ€ν* δσα δέ τή?
διακριτική? ήν αυτόθι, μ€θιώμ€ν σύμπαντα, δίχα τέμνοντ€?
την ταλασιουργίαν διακριτική) τ€ κα\ συγκριτική) τμήματι.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Διηρήσθω.
ΞΕ. Τό συγκριτικόν τοίνυν αυ σοι κα\ ταλασιουργικόν άμα d
μοριον, ώ Σώκρατ€?, διαιρ€τέον, €ΐπ€ρ Ικανώ? μέλλομ€ν την
προρρηθ€"ίσαν υφαντικήν αιρήσ€ΐν.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Ούκουν χρή.
ΞΕ. Χρή μέν ουν και λέγωμέν γ€ αυτή? τό μέν €ΐναι 5
στρ€πτικόν, τό δέ συμπλ€κτικόν.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. *Αρ’ ουν μανθάνω; δοκ€ΐ? γάρ μοι τό π€ρι τήν του
στήμονο? έργασίαν λέγ€ΐν στρ€πτικόν.
ΞΕ. Ου μόνον γ€, αλλά και κρόκη?* ή γέν€σιν άστροφόν
τινα αυτή? €υρήσομ€ν; 10
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Ούδαμώ?.
ΞΕ. Δ ιάρισαι δή καί του'τοιν έκάτ€ρον* ΐσ ω ? γάρ ό e
διορισμό? έγκαιρο? άν σοι γένοιτο.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Πή;
ΞΕ. Τήδ€* τών π€ρι ξαντικήν έργων μηκυνθέν τ€ και σχόν
πλάτο? λέγομ€ν €ΐναι κάταγμά τι; 5
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Ναι.
ΞΕ. Τουτου δή τό μέν άτράκτψ Τ€ στραφέν και στ€ρ€ον
νήμα γ€νόμ€νον στήμ ονα μέν φάθι τό νήμα, τ ή ν δέ
άπ€υθυνουσαν αυτό τέχνην €ΐναι στημονονητικήν.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Όρθώ?. 10
ΞΕ. 'Όσα δέ γ€ αυ τήν μέν συστροφήν χαυνην λαμβάν€ΐ, τή
δέ του στήμονο? έμπλέξςι προ? τήν τή? γνάψ€ω? ολκήν
έμμέτρω? τήν μαλακότητα ισχ€ΐ, ταυτ* άρα κρόκην μέν τά

C 7 pcOuDpcv c: μ€τίωμ<:ν m
 97
(2*2) E.S.: Well then, it’s to the art of separation that belong that of carding
ci and all the things just mentioned; for separation in the ease of wool
and the warp, happening in one distinct way by means of a shuttle, in
another by means of the hands, has acquired as many names as we
referred to a moment ago.
Y.S.: Absolutely.
c5 E.S.: Then again, by contrast, let us take hold of a part that is
simultaneously of combination and of wool-working and takes place
in it; and whatever parts there were here of separation, let’s let all of
them go, culling wool-working into two by means of the cut between
separation and combination.
Y.S.: Count it as divided.
di E.S.: Then in its turn, Socrates, you should divide the part that is
simultaneously combination and wool-working, if indeed we are
going to capture the aforesaid art of weaving.
Y.S.; Then I must.
d5 E.S.: Indeed you must: and let’s say that of it part is twisting, part
intertwining.
Y.S.: Do I understand correctly? By twisting, you seem to me to be
talking about what relates to the manufacture of the warp.
E.S.: Not only of the warp, but of the woof too; or arc we going to
dio find some origin for that which doesn’t involve twisting?
Y.S.: Certainly not.
ei E.S.: Well, define each of these two things too; perhaps you might
find defining them timely.
Y.S.: Define them how?
E.S.: Like this: among the products relating to carding, do we say,
e5 when it’s drawn out to a certain length and has acquired breadth, that
there’s a ‘flock’ of wool?
Y.S.: Yes.
E.S.: Well, of this, the yam that has been twisted by the spindle and
made firm you’ll call the warp, and the expertise that guides its
production ‘waip-spinning’.
«io Y.S.: Correct.
E.S.: But those threads that in their turn get a loose twisting, and have
a softness appropriate to the twining in of the warp in relation to the
drawing out in the dressing process, you’ll call these, the products of
98
νηθόντα, τ η ν 6€ ό π ιτ€ τα γ μ ό ν η ν αύτοΐς* € ΐν α ι τ έ χ ν η ν
κροκονητικήν φώμ€ν. 283
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. 'Ορθότατα.
HE. Και μην τό γ€ τη? υφαντικής* μόρος* δ προυθόμ€θα,
π α ν τ ι τιου δήλον ήδη. τό γά ρ συγκριτικής* τής* όν
ταλασιουργίςι μόριον όταν €υθυπλοκί<£ κρόκης* και στημονος* 5
άπ€ργάζηται πλόγμα, τό μόν πλ€χθόν συμπαν όσθήτα cpcav,
την δ' €Τΐι τούτψ τόχνην ουσαν *προσαγορ€υομ€ν υφαντικήν.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. 'Ορθότατα.
ΞΕ. Ει € ν* τ ί δή τιοτ € ούν ούκ €υθύς* άπ€κρινα'μ€θα
ττλ€κτικήν €ΐναι κρόκης* καί στήμονος* υφαντικήν, άλλα b
π€ριήλθομ€ν 4ν κυκλψ πάμπολλα διοριζόμ€νοι μάτην;
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Ουκουν όμοιγ€, ώ ξόν€, μάτην ουδόν των ^ηθόντων
€δοξ€ ρηθήναι.
ΞΕ. Και θαυμαστόν γ€ ουδόν άλλα τά χ ' αν, ώ μακάρΐ€, 5
δό^€ΐ€. προς* δή τό νόσημα τό τοιουτον, αν άρα πολλάκις*
υστ€ρον έτιίη — θαυμαστόν γάρ ουδόν — λόγον άκουσόν τινα
προσήκοντα π€ρι πάντων των τοιούτων ρηθήναι. c
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Λόγ€ μόνον.
ΞΕ. Πρώτον τοίνυν ΐδωμ€ν πάσαν τήν τ€ ύπ€ρβολήν και την
όλλ€ΐψιν, ινα κατά λόγον έπα ινώ μ€ν καί ψόγωμ€ν τά
μακρότ€ρα του δόοντος* έκάστοτ€ λ€γόμ€να και τάναντία π€ρι 5
τάς* τοιάσδ€ διατριβάς*.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Ουκουν χρή.
ΞΕ. Π€ρι δή τούτων αυτών ό λόγος* ήμΐν όιμαι γιγνόμ€νος*
όρθώς* αν γίγνοιτο.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Τίνων; 10
ΞΕ. Μήκους* τ€ πόρι και βραχιίτητος* και πάσης* ύπ€ροχής*
Τ€ και €λλ€ΐψ€ω$:. ή γά ρ που μ€τρητική π€ρι πάντ' έστι d
τα υ τα .
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Ναι.
ΞΕ. Διόλωμ€ν τοίνυν αυτήν δυο μόρη· δόι γάρ δή προς: ο
νυν σπ€ΐίδομ€ν. 5
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Λόγοις* αν τήν διαίρ€σιν όπη.

a 1 κροκονητικήν η: τήν κροκονητικήν η, Ο: τινά κροκονητικήν C |

b 5 [κα\ θαυμαστόν ye ουδόν] C
 99
the spinning, the woof, and the expertise that is set over their
283 production - let’s call it ‘woof-spinning’.
Y.S.: Quite correct.
E.S.: And as for the part o f weaving that we put forward for
investigation, I suppose that’s now clear to anyone. When the part of
•s combination, that combination which is contained in wool-working,
produces something intertwined, by the regular intertwining of woof
and warp, the whole product of the intertwining we refer to as a piece
of woollen clothing, and the expertise that is over this as weaving.
Y.S.: Quite correct.
E.S.: Good; so why ever, then, didn’t we immediately reply that
bi weaving was an intertwining of woof and warp, and instead went
round in a circle defining a whole collection of things to no purpose?
Y.S.: To me at least, Stranger, nothing of what has been said seemed
to have been said to no purpose.
b5 E.S.: And that isn’t at all surprising, 1 may say; but pcihaps, my dear
fellow, it might seem so. So against such a malady, in ease it should
come upon you later (that wouldn’t be at all surprising), listen to
ci something which it is appropriate to say about all such things.
Y.S.; Tell me.
E.S.: First, then, let’s look at excess and deficiency in general, so that
we may distribute praise and censure proportionately on each
c5 occasion when things arc said at greater length than necessary and
when the opposite occurs in relation to such discussions.
Y.S.: That’s what we must do, then.
E.S.: If we talked about these very things, I think we’d be proceeding
correctly.
cio Y.S.: What things?
<*i E.S.: About length and brevity and excess and deficiency in general.
I suppose the art of measurement relates to all these things.
Y.S.: Yes.
E.S.: Then let’s divide it into two parts; that’s what we need towards
<•5 our present objective.
Y.S.; Please tell me how we should divide it.
100
HE. Τήδ€* τδ μέν κατά τήν νρύς άλληλα μ€γέθου£ καί
σμικρότητος* κοινωνίαν, το δέ κατά τή ν τής* γ€νέσ€ως*
αναγκαίαν ούοίαν.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Πώς* λέγ€ΐς·; 10
HE. *Ap' ού κατά φύσιν δοκ€ΐ σοι τδ μβιζον μηδ€νδς* έτέρου
δ€ΐν μ€Ϊζον λέγ€ΐν ή του έλάττονο?, κα\ τοΰλαττον αύ του
μ€ΐζονος* έλαττον, άλλου δέ μηδ^νός*; e
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Έμοιγ€.
ΞΕ. Τ ί δέ; το τη ν του μ€τρίου φύσιν ύπ€ρβάλλον καί
ύτΐ€ρβαλλόμ€νον ύπ' αυτής* έν λόγοις* €ΐτ€ και έν έργοις* άρ'
ούκ αύ λέξομ€ν ώς· όντως* γιγνόμ€νον, έν φ και διαφέρουσι 5
μάλιστα ημών οΐ Τ€ κακοί και οΐ άγαθοί;
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Φαίν€ται.
ΞΕ. Διττάς* άρα ταύτας* ουσίας* και κρίσ€ΐς* του μ€γάλου
και του σμικρου θ€τέον, άλλ' ούχ ώς* έφαμ€ν άρτι πρδς*
άλληλα μόνον δ€ΐν, άλλ' ώσ*Π€ρ νυν €ΐρηται μάλλον τήν μέν 10
προς* άλληλα λ€κτέον, τήν δ ’ αύ προς* τδ μέτριον* ου δέ
Ιν€κα, μαθ€ΐν άρ' αν βουλοίμ€θα;
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Τί μην;
ΞΕ. Ε! προς* μηδέν έτ€ρον τήν του μ€ΐζονος* έάσ€ΐ τις* 284
φύσιν ή προς*τοΰλαττον, ούκ έσται ποτέ προς* τδ μέτριον ή
γάρ;
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Ούτως*.
ΞΕ. Ούκουν τάς* τέχνας* τ€ αύτάς* και τά ρ γα αυτώ ν 5
σύμ παντα διολουμ€ν το ύ τφ τφ λόγφ, κα'ι δη καί τη ν
ζητουμένην νυν πολιτικήν καί τή ν ρηθ^ΐσαν υφαντικήν
άφανιουμ€ν; άπασαι γάρ αί τοιαυταί που τδ του μ€τρίου
πλέον και έλαττον ούχ ώς* ούκ δν άλλ' ώς* ον χαλ€πδν π€ρ'ι
τάς* πράξ€ΐς* παραφυλάττουσι, και τούτφ δή τφ τρόπφ τδ
μέτρον σφζουσαι πάντα αγαθά και καλά άπ€ργάζονται. b
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Τί μην;
ΞΕ. Ούκουν αν τήν πολιτικήν άφανίσωμ€ν, άπορος* ήμΐν ή
μ€τά τούτο έσται ζήτησις* τής* βασιλικής* έπιστήμης;
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Και μάλα. 5

<Ι8τδ δέ κατά η: τδ δέ τδ κατά η | c 6 o l άγαθοί η: άγαθοί η,Ο |

a68ioXo0pcv e: 6icXo0pcv m
 101

E.S.: This way: one part will correspond to the sharing by things in
greatness and smallness in relation to each other, the other to what
producing things necessarily is.
dio Y.S.: What do you mean?
E.S.: Docs it not seem to you that by its nature the greater has to be
said to be greater than nothing other than the less, and the less in its
ei turn less than the greater, and nothing else?
Y.S.: It does.
E.S.: What about this: shan’t we also say that there really is such a
cS thing as what exceeds the class of what is in due measure in what we
say or indeed in what we do, which is just that respect in which those
of us who arc bad and those who arc good most differ?
Y.S.: It seems so.
E.S.: In that ease we must posit that the great and the small exist and
arc objects of judgement in these twin ways, and not as we said just
eio before, that we must suppose them to exist only in relation to each
other, but rather as we have now said, we must speak of their existing
in one way in relation to each other, and in another in relation to due
measure. Do we want to know why?
Y.S.: Of course.
284 E.S.: If someone will admit the existence of the class of the greater in
relation to nothing other than the less, it will never be in relation to
what is in due measure - you agree?
Y.S.: That’s so.
»5 E.S.: Well, with this account of things we shall destroy - shan’t we? -
both the various kinds of expertise themselves and their products, and
in p articular we shall make the one w e’re looking for now,
statesmanship, disappear, and the one we said was weaving. For I
imagine all such kinds of expertise guard against the more and less
than what is in due measure not as something which is not but as
something which is and is troublesome in relation to what they do,
bi and it is by preserving measure in this way that they produce all good
and Fine things.
Y.S.: Of course.
E.S.: If, then, we make the art of statesmanship disappear, our search
after that for the knowledge of kingship will lack any way forward?
b5 Y.S.: Very much so.
102
ΞΕ. Πότ€ρον ουν, καθάπ€ρ έν τψ σοφιστή προσηναγκάσαμ€ν
clvai το μή όν, έπ€ΐδή κατά τούτο διόφυγ€ν ήμδ$τ ό λόγος*,
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ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Τό ποιον;
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αυτό τάκριβές* άπόδ€ΐξιν. ότι δέ προς* τά νυν καλώς* και
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 103
E.S.: Is it the ease then that just as with the sophist we compelled
what is not into being as well as what is, when our argument escaped
us down this route, so now it is that we must compel the more and
less, in their turn, to become measurable not only in relation to each
ci other but also in relation to the coming-into-bcing of what is in due
measure? For if this has not been agreed, it is certainly not possible
for either the statesman or anyone else who possesses knowledge of
subjects relating to things done to have come into being in an
undisputed way.
Y.S.: Then now too we must do the same as much as we can.
c5 E.S.: This task, Socrates, is even greater than the former one - and we
remember what the length of that was; still, it’s very definitely fair to
propose the following hypothesis about the subject in question.
Y.S.: What’s that?
di E.S.: That at some lime we shall need what has now been said
towards the demonstration in relation to the precise truth itself. But
as for what is being shown well and adequately in proponion to our
present concerns, this argument seems to me to come to our aid in
magnificent fashion, namely that we should surely suppose that it is
as similarly the ease that all the various kinds of expertise exist, and at
the same time that greater and less arc measured not only in relation
to each other but also in relation to the coming-into-bcing of what is
in due measure. For both, if the latter is the ease, then so is the
former, and if it is the ease that the kinds of expertise exist, the other
is the ease loo; but if one or the other is not the ease, then neither of
them will ever be.
ei Y.S.: This much is right; but what is it that follows after this?
E.S.: It’s clear we would divide the art of measurement, cutting it in
two in just the way we said, positing as one part of it all those kinds
of expertise lltal measure the number, lengths, depths, breadths and
eS speeds of things in relation to the opposite, and as the other, all those
that measure in relation to what is in due measure, what is filling, the
right moment, what is as it ought to be - everything that removes
itself from the extremes to the middle.
Y.S.: Each of the two sections you refer to is indeed a large one, and
eio very different from the other.
E.S.: Yes, Socrates, and what sometimes many of the sophisticated
2ss say, all the time supposing themselves to be expressing something
wise, to the effect that there is in fact an art of measurement relating
to everything that comes into being - is actually this very thing we
104
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αύτου τούτου προβεβλητα ι μάλλον ή του π€ρι π ά ν τα 5
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(ΠΟ^αδίυς m: ^ δίο ις c | c 1 αΙσΟηταί c: αΙσΟητικαί m

 105
(2*5) have just said. For in a certain way it is the ease that all those things
that arc the products of the various kinds of expertise share in
measurement; but because of their not being accustomed to carrying
a5 on their investigations by dividing according to classes, the people in
question both throw these things together at once, despite the degree
of difference between them, thinking them alike, and correspondingly
they do the opposite of this by dividing other things not according to
bi parts, when the rule is that when one perceives first the community of
the many things, one should not desist until one sees in it all those
differences that arc located in classes, and conversely, with the
various unlikcncsscs, when they arc seen in multitudes, one should be
bs incapable of pulling a face and stopping before one has penned all the
related things within one likeness and surrounded them in some real
class. So let this be sufficient talk about these things, and about
ci modes of defect and excess; and let’s just keep hold of the fact that
two kinds of art of measurement have been discovered in relation to
them, and let’s remember what we say they arc.
Y.S.; We shall remember.
c5 E.S.: After this account, then, let’s admit another one in relation both
to the very things we arc inquiring into and to the whole business of
discussions of this sort.
Y.S.: About what?
E.S.: If someone were to ask us about the session of pupils learning
cio about letters - when one of them is asked what letters make up some
word or other, arc we to say that for him on that occasion (he inquiry
di takes place more for the sake of the question that has been set before
him, and that alone, or for the sake of his becoming more able to
answer all questions relating to letters?
Y.S.: Gcarly for the sake of his being able to answer all.
E.S.: What then about our inquiry now about the statesman? Has it
ds been set before us more for the sake of that very thing, or for the sake
of our becoming more able dialecticians in relation to all subjects?
Y.S.: That’s clear too - for the sake of our being more able in relation
to all.
E.S.: I certainly don’t suppose that anyone with any sense would want
to hunt down the definition of weaving for the sake of weaving itself,
dio But I think the majority of people don’t recognize that to some of the
et things that arc there arc certain perceptible likenesses which arc there
to be easily understood, and which it is not at all hard to point out,
106
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 107
when one wants to make an easy demonstration to someone who asks
for an account of one of these things which involves no trouble and
without recourse to verbal means; conversely, for those things that arc
286 greatest and most valuable, there is no image at all which has been
worked in plain view for the use of mankind, the showing of which
will enable the person who wants to satisfy the mind of an inquirer to
satisfy it adequately by filling it to one of the senses. That is why one
«5 must practise at being able to give and receive an account of each
thing; for the things that arc without body, which arc finest and
greatest, arc shown clearly only by verbal means and by nothing else,
and everything that is now being said is for the sake of these things,
bt But practice in everything is easier in smaller things rather than in
relation to the greater.
Y.S.: Very well said.
E.S.; Well then, let’s remind ourselves of the reasons why we have
said all these things on these subjects,
bs Y.S.: What reasons?
E.S.: Not least because of that disagrccablcncss we fell there was in
the length of our talk about weaving - and of that about the reversal
of the universe, and about the being of the what is not which is the
bio sphere of the sophist, reflecting that it had a rather great length, and in
ci all these eases we rebuked ourselves, out of fear that what we were
saying would turn out to be superfluous as well as long. So, say that
the foregoing was said by us for the sake of all these eases, in order
that we may not suffer any of this sort of misgiving on any future
occasion.
Y.S.: I shall do as you say. Tell me what comes nexL
c5 E.S.: Well, I say that you and I must be careful to remember what we
have now said and distribute censure and praise of both shortness and
length, whatever subjects we happen to be talking about on each
occasion, judging lengths not in relation to each other but, in
dt accordance with the part of the ait of measurement we previously said
we must remember, in relation to what is fitting.
Y.S.: Correct.
E.S.: Well, that’s right, but we mustn’t refer everything to this. For
d5 one thing, we shan’t have any need for a length that fits in relation to
pleasure, except perhaps as an incidental consideration; then again, as
108

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ούκ άποδ€χόμ€νον, ότι χρή τον τοιουτον μη πάνυ ταχύ μηδ’
€υθύς* ουτω μ€θιέναι ψέξαντα μόνον ώς* μακρά τα λ€χθέντα, 2δ7
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γ€νόμ€να τούς* συνόντας* άπηργάζ€Τθ διαλ€κτικωτέρους* καί
τής* τών όντων λόγφ δηλώσ€ως* €υρ€Τΐκωτέρους·, τών δέ άλλων
και προς* άλλ' άττα ψόγων και έπαίνων μηδέν φροντίζ€ΐν 5
μηδέ το παράπαν άκου€ΐν δοκ€ΐν τών τοιοιίτων λόγων, καί
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πολιτικόν ΐωμ€ν πάλιν, τής* προρρηθ€ΐσης* υφαντικής* αύτψ b
φέροντ€ς* τό παράδ€ΐγμα.
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ΞΕ. Ουκουν από γ€ τών πολλών ό βασιλ€ύς* όσαι σύννομοι,
μάλλον δέ από πασών τών π€ρι τάς* άγέλας* διακ€χώρισται* 5
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ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Όρθώς*.
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ώς* όΐμαι, προϊουσιν ούχ ήττον έσ ται καταφανές. c
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c 6 πάνυ η: [πάνυ] Ο
 109
for what contributes towards the inquiry into the subject set before us,
what we have said commits us to making a second and not a first
priority of the question how we might Find it most easily and quickly,
and to give by far the greatest and primary value to the pursuit itself
et of the ability to divide by classes, and in particular, if an account is
very long but renders the hearer better at finding things, to take this
one seriously and not feel at all irritated at its length, and similarly if
conversely a shorter one has the same effect; then again, in addition to
e5 this, if in relation to such discussions someone finds fault with the
length of what is said and will not put up with going round in circles,
287 we must not let such a person go just like that without a backward
glance, having just made the simple complaint that what has been said
has taken a long time, but we should think it right that he should also
demonstrate, in addition, that if it had been shorter it would make the
partners in the discussion better dialecticians and better at finding
how to display in words the things that arc; and our instruction will be
>s to take no notice at all of the other sorts of censure and praise, relating
to some other criteria, nor even to seem to hear such things at all
when they arc said. Now enough of these things, if I have your
bi agreement too; let’s go back again to the statesman, and bring the
model of weaving, which we talked about before, to bear on it.
Y.S.: Well said - let’s do what you say.
E.S.: Well then, the king has been separated off from the many kinds
bs of expertise that share his field - or rather from all of them concerned
with herds; there remain, we arc saying, those in the city itself that are
contributory causes and those that arc causes, which we must first
divide from each other.
Y.S.: Correct.
E.S.: So do you recognize that it is difficult to cut them into two? The
ci cause, I think, will become more evident if we proceed.
Y.S.: Well, then that’s what we should do.
E.S.: Then let’s divide them limb by limb, like a sacrificial animal,
c5 since we can’t do it into two. For we must always cut into the nearest
number so far as we can.
Y.S.: So how arc we to do it in this ease?
E.S.; Just as before: the kinds of expertise that provided tools relating
to weaving - all of them, of course, we put down then as contributory
causes.
Y.S.: Yes.
no
EE. Και νυν' δή ταύτδν μέν τοΟτο, έτι δέ μάλλον ή τόθ' ίο
ήμΐν ποιητέον. δσαι γάρ σμικρδνή μέγα τ ι δημιουργοΟσι d
κατά πάλιν δργανον, θετέον ά π ά σ α ς τα ύ τ α ς ώ ς οΰσας
συναιτίους. άν€υ γάρ τούτων ούκ αν τιοτ€ γένοιτο πάλις ουδέ
πολίτικη, τούτων δ' αύ βασιλικής* έργον τέχνης* ούδέν που
θησομεν. 5
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Ού γάρ.
HE. Και μέν δή χαλεπδν έπιχειρούμεν δράν άποχωρίζοντες
τούτο άπδ τών άλλων το γένος** δτι γάρ ούν των δντων
έστιν ώς* ενός γέ τίνος* δργανον ειποντα δοκ€ΐν ε’ιρηκέναι τ ι
πιθανόν, δμως δέ έτερον αυ τών εν πόλ€ΐ κτημάτων €Ϊπωμ€ν c
τόδ€.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Τδ ποιον;
ΞΕ. Ώς* ούκ έστι ταύτην την δύναμιν έχον. ού γάρ έτιι
γενέσεως αίτiq. πήγνυται, καθάπ€ρ δργανον, άλλ’ ένεκα τού 5
δημιουργηθέντος σωτηρίας*.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Τδ ποιον;
ΞΕ. Τούτο δ δή ξηροίς* και ύγροΐς καί έμπύροις κα'ι
άπύροις* παντοδαπδν είδος* έργασθέν άγγεΐον [ο δή] μι$ κλήσει
προσφθεγγόμεθα, και μάλα γε συχνδν είδος* και τή ζητούμενη ίο
γε, ώς* οιμαι, προσήκον ούδέν άτεχνώς* επιστήμη. 288
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Πώς* γάρ;
ΞΕ. Τούτων δή τρίτον έτερον είδος* κτημάτων πάμπολυ
κατοπτέον πεζδν και ένυδρον και πολυπλανές* και άπλανές*
και τίμιον και άτιμον, εν δε δνομα έχον, διότι παν ένεκά 5
τίνος* έφέδρας εστί, θάκος αεί τινι γιγνδμενον.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Τδ ποιον;
ΞΕ. "Οχημα αύτδ που λέγομεν, ού πάνυ πολιτικής* έργον,
αλλά μ ά λ λ ο ν πολύ τεκ το νικ ή ς* κ α ί κεραμικής* καί
χαλκοτυπικής*. 10
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Μανθάνω.
ΞΕ. Τ ι δε τέταρτον; αρ’ έτερον είναι τούτων λεκτέον, εν ψ b
τά πλειστά εσ τι τών πάλαι ρηθέντων, έσθής* τε σύμπασα και
τώ ν ο π λ ώ ν τό πολύ καί τ ε ί χ η π ά ν τ α θ ’ οσ α γ ή ιν α

d 9 έστιν ώς (or έστιν) c: ώς έστιν m | a 2 πώς γάρ c: πώς γάρ ού

m
 in

cio E.S.: Wc must do the same thing now too, but to a still greater degree
<n than wc did then. For wc must put down all those kinds of expertise
that produce any tool in the city, whether small or large, as being
contributory causes. For without these there would never come to be
a city, nor statesmanship, but on the other hand wc shan’t, I think, put
as down any of them as the product of the expertise of the king.
Y.S.: No, wc shan’t.
E.S.: And yet we’re trying to do a difficult thing in separating this
kind of thing from the rest; in fact it is possible for someone to treat
anything you like as a tool of something and seem to have said
ct something credible. Ncvcnhclcss let us treat the following in its turn
as a different kind of thing among the objects people possess in a city.
Y.S.: What do you mean?
E.S.: Because it docs not have this capacity that tools have. For it is
c5 not put together with the purpose of causing the coming-inio-bcing of
something, as a tool is, but for the sake of preserving what craftsmen
have produced.
Y.S.: What do you mean?
E.S.: This varied kind of thing which is worked for things liquid and
solid, and for things that arc prepared on the fire and things that arc
cio not, and which wc refer to with the single name of ‘vessel’ - a
288 common kind of thing, and one that, I think, simply docs not belong
at all to the sort of expert knowledge wc arc looking for.
Y.S.: Certainly not.
E.S.: Wc must then observe a third very extensive kind of thing that
people possess, different from these others, which is found on land
a5 and on water, moves about a lot and is fixed, and is accorded high
value and none, but has a single name, because it is all for the sake of
some supporting or other, being always a scat for something.
Y.S.: What do you mean?
E.S.: I suppose wc call it by the name of ‘vehicle’ - not at all a
product of the art of statesmanship, but much more of those of
»10 carpentry, pottery, and bronze-working.
Y.S.: I see.
bt E.S.: And what is fourth? Should wc say that it is something different
from these, a kind of thing that includes the larger part of the things
wc mentioned before, all clothing, most armour, and walls, all those
112
π€ριβλήματα και λίθινα, κα\ μυρία ?Τ€ρα; προβολήν 64 δν€κα (2Μ)
σ υ μ π ά ν τ ω ν α υ τ ώ ν €ΐργα σ μ€?νω ν δ ι κ α ι ό τ α τ ’ ά ν ό'λον 5
τιροσαγορ€υοιτο πρόβλημα, καί πολλψ μάλλον τόχνης*
οίκοδομικής* cpyov και υφαντικής* τό πλ€ιστόν νομ ίζοιτ' άν
όρθότ€ρον ή πολιτικής*.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Πανυ μ4ν ουν.
ΞΕ. Π€μπτον 6k αρ' αν 4θ4λοιμ€ν τό π€ρι τον κόσμον κα\ c
γραφικήν θ€ΐναι και όσα ταυ'τη προσχρώμ€να καί μουσική
μ ιμ η 'μ α τα τ € λ € ΐτ α ι, προς* Ί α ς ήδονάς* μ όνον η μ ώ ν
άπ€ΐργασμόνα, δικαίως* δ' αν όνόματι π€ριληφθ4ντα 4νί;
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Ποίψ; 5
HE. Παίγνιόν που τι λ4γ€ται.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Τί μην;
ΞΕ. Τούτο το ίν υ ν του'τοις* 4ν όνομα α π α σ ι πρ€ψ €ΐ
προσαγορ€υθ€ν ού γάρ σπουδής* ούδέν αυτών χάριν, άλλα
παιδιάς* €ν€κα πάντα δραται. 10
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Και τούτο σχ€δόν τι μανθάνω. d
HE. Τό δ4 πασιν τουτοις* σώματα παρ4χον, 4ξ ών και 4ν
οις* δη μ ιουρ γουσ ιν ό π ό σ α ι τώ ν Τ€χνών νυν € Ϊρ η ντα ι,
παντοδαπόν €ΐδος* πολλών 4τ4ρων τ€χνών δκγονον δν, αρ' ούχ
€ΚΤον θησομ€ν; 5
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Τό ποιον δη λ€γ€ΐς*;
ΞΕ. Χρυσόν τ€ και άργυρον και πάνθ' όπόσα μ€ταλλ€υ€ται
και δσα δρυοτομική και κουρά σιίμπασα τόμνουσα παρόχ€ΐ
τ€κτονική και πλβκτική, και 4τι φλοιστική φυτών Τ€ και
έμψ υχω ν δέρμα τα σω μάτω ν π€ριαιρουσα σκυτοτομική, και e
όσαι π€ρι τά τοιαυτά €ΐσιν τόχναι, και φ€λλών και βυβλων
και δασμών 4ργαστικαι παρέσχον δημιουργ€Ϊν σύνθ€τα 4κ μη
συντιθ€μ4νων €ΐδη γ€νών. 4ν 64 αυτό προσαγορ€ΐίωμ€ν παν,
τό πρωτογ€ν4ς* άνθρώποις* κτήμα και άσιίνθ€τον και βασιλικής* 5
4πιστήμης* ούδαμώς* δργον δν.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Καλώς*.
ΞΕ. Την δη τής* τροφής* κτήσιν, και δσα €ΐς τό σώμα
συγκαταμ€ΐγνιίμ€να 4αυτών μόρ€σι μόρη σώματος* €ΐς* τό

e 4 προσαγοραίωμίν η: προσαγοροίομίν η, Ο
 113
(2*8) encirclements made out of earth, or out of stone, and tens of
b5 thousands of other things? Since all of them together arc worked
for the purpose of defending, it would be most apposite to call the
whole class that of ‘defence’, and it would be thought to be a
product much more of the expertise of the builder and the weaver,
most of it, more correctly than it would be thought to belong to
that of the statesman.
Y.S.: Absolutely.
ei E.S.: Would we want to put down as a fifth class the sort of thing
relating to decoration, painting, and those representations that arc
completed by the use of this, and of music, which have been
executed solely to give us pleasures, and which would
appropriately be embraced by a single name?
c5 Y.S.: What name?
E.S.: I think we talk about something we call a ‘plaything*.
Y.S.: Of course.
E.S.: Well, this one name will be fittingly given to all of them; for
it is not the ease that any of them is for the sake of a serious
cio purpose, but all arc done for the sake of amusement,
di Y.S.: This too I pretty well understand.
E.S.; And what provides materials for all these things, from which
and in which all of the kinds of expertise that have now been
mentioned work - a varied kind of thing that is the offspring of
as many different kinds of expertise - shall we not put it down as a
sixth?
Y.S.; What exactly arc you referring to?
E.S.: Gold and silver, and everything that is mined, and what the
art of tree-felling and all lopping provides by cutting for the art of
the carpenter and the basket-weaver, and again the art of stripping
ei off the outer covering of plants, and the one that removes skins
from bodies of living things, the art of the skinner, and all the
kinds of expertise that there arc in relation to such things, and
which by producing cork, and papyrus, and m aterials for
bindings, make possible the crafting of composite kinds of things
from kinds that arc not being put together. Let us call it all one
es thing, the first-born and incomposite possession of mankind,
which is in no way a product of the knowledge of kingship.
Y.S.: Right.
E.S.: Then that sort of possession that consists in nutrition, and all
those things which when they arc blended into the body, their
114
θ€ρατΐ€υσαί τ ιν α βυ'ναμιν €?ληχ€, Xc k t c ' ov έβ δ ο μ ο ν 2S9
όνομάσαντας* αύτδ συμπαν ήμών €ΐναι τροφόν, €ΐ μη τ ι
κάλλιοι/ έχομ€ν άλλο θέσθαι* γ€ωργική δέ και θηρ€υτική κα\
γυμναστική και Ιατρική και μαγ€ΐρική παν ύποτιθέντ€ς*
όρθοτ€ρον άποδώσομ€ν ή τή τιολιτική. 5
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Πώς* γάρ οΰ;
HE. Σχ€δόν τοίνυν δοα έχ€ται κτήσ€ως*, τιλήν των ήμερων
ζψων, έν τούτοις* έτττά οιμαι γέν€σιν €ΐρήσθαι. σκσπ€ΐ δέ* ήν
γάρ δικαιότατα μέν αν Τ€θέν κατ' άρχάς* το πρωτογ€νές*
€ΐδος*, μ€τά δέ τούτο δργανον, άγγ€ΐον, όχημα, πρόβλημα, b
παίγνιον, θρέμμα. παραλ€ΐπομ€ν δέ, €ΐ τι μη μέγα λέληθ€ν,
€is* τι τοιίτων δυνατόν άρμόττ€ΐν, οιον ή τοΟ νομίσματος·
ιδέα και σφραγίδων και παντός· χαρακτήρος*. γένος* Τ€ γάρ έν
αύτοΐς* ταυτα ούδέν έχ€ΐ μέγα συννομον, αλλά τά μέν €ΐς* 5
κόσμον, τά δέ €ΐς* όργανα βίςι μέν, όμως* δέ π ά ν τω ς
έλκόμ€να συμφωνήσ€ΐ. τά δέ π€ρι ζφων κτήσιν των ημέρων,
πλήν δουλών, ή πρότ€ρον άγ€λαιοτροφική διαμ€ρισθ€ΐσα πάντ' c
€ΐληφυια άναφαν€ΐται.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Πάνυ μέν ούν.
ΞΕ. Τό δέ δη δουλών και πάντων ύπηρ€τών λοιπόν, έν όϊς*
που καί μαντ€υ'ομαι τούς* π€ρΙ α υ τό τό π λ€'γμ α 5
άμφισβητουντας* τψ βασιλ€ΐ καταφαν€ΐς* γ€νήσ€θθαι, καθάπ€ρ
τοις* ύφάνταις* τότ€ τούς* π€ρι τό νήθ€ΐν Τ€ και ξαίν€ΐν και
όσα άλλα €ΐπομ€ν. οί δέ άλλοι πάντ€ς·, ώς* σ υ ν α ίτιο ι
λ€χθέντ€ς\ άμα τοις* έργοις* τοις* νυνδή ρηθ€ΐσιν άνήλωνται
και άπ€χωρίσθησαν από βασιλικής* τ€ και πολιτικής* πράξ€ως*. d
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Έοίκασι γουν.
ΞΕ. *Ίθι δη σκ€ψώμ€θα τούς* λοιπούς* προσ€λθόντ€ς* έγγύθ€ν,
ΐνα αυτούς* €ΐδώμ€ν β€βαιότ€ρον.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Ούκούν χρή. 5
ΞΕ. Τούς* μέν δη μ€γίοτους* ύπηρέτας*, ώς* ένθένδ€ 1δ€ΐν,
τουναντίον έχοντας* €υρίσκομ€ν όις* ύπωπτ€ΐίσαμ€ν έπιτήδ€υμα
και πάθος*.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Τίνας*;

b 2 <α> napaXcinopcv C, Ο
 115
(2*9) own parts with parts of ihc body, have a capacity for promoting its
care, we must say is a seventh, calling it all together ‘nurture*, unless
we have some more attractive term to propose; and if we place it
under the arts of the farmer, the hunter, the trainer in the gymnasium,
•s the doctor and the cook we shall be assigning it more correctly than if
we give it to the art of the statesman.
Y.S.: Of course.
E.S.: Well then, we have, I think, pretty well dealt with all those
things that have to do with possessions, in these seven classes, with
the exception of tame living creatures. Look at our list: it would be
most appropriate if we put down the ‘first-bom* class of thing at the
bi beginning, and after this ‘tool’, ‘vessel’, ‘vehicle’, ‘defence’,
‘plaything’, ‘nourishment’. If anything of no great importance has
escaped us, we leave it to one side, because it is capable of fitting into
one of these, for example the class consisting of coin, seals, and any
bs sort of engraving. For these do not have any great shared class
among them, but if some of them arc dragged off into decoration,
others into tools, it will be forcibly done, but nevertheless they’ll
wholly agree to it. As for those things relating to possession of tame
cl living creatures, apart from slaves, the art of herd-tearing which we
divided into its parts before will clearly be seen to have caught them
all.
Y.S.: Absolutely.
E.S.: Then what remains is the class of slaves and all those people
c5 who arc subordinate to others, among whom I strongly suspect that
those who dispute with the king about the woven fabric itself will
come into view, just as in the ease of weaving we found those
concerned with spinning and carding and all the other things we
mentioned disputing with the weavers over their product. All the
others, who have been described as ‘contributory causes’, have been
di disposed of along with the products we have just listed, and were each
separated off from the practical activity which is the sphere of the art
of kingship and statesmanship.
Y.S.: So it seems, at any rate.
E.S.: Come along, then: let’s get up close to those people that arc left
and take a look at them, so that we may get a firmer knowledge of
them.
d5 Y.S.: That’s what we should do.
E.S.: Well, those who arc subordinate to the greatest degree, looked at
from our present perspective, we find in a kind of function and
condition which arc the opposite of what we suspected.
Y.S.: Who arc they?
116
HE. Toils* ώνητους T€ κα\ τψ τρόπψ του'τψ κτητου'ς* οΟς 10
ά να μφ ισ βη τή τω ς δουλους εχομεν είπ εΐν, ήκισ τα βασιλικής* e
μεταποιούμενους τέχνη ς.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Πώς 6' ου;
ΞΕ. Τί δε'; τών Ελεύθερων δσοι τοις νυνδή ρηθεΐσιν €ΐς
υπηρετικήν' εκόντες αυτούς τάττουσι, τα τε γεωργίας και τα 5
των άλλων τεχνών/ έργα διακομίζοντες έπ* άλλήλους καί
άνισουντες, οι μεν κατ’ αγοράς, οί δε πόλιν εκ πδλεως
άλλαττοντες κατά θάλατταν και πεζή, νόμισμά τε προς τά
άλλα και αυτό προς αυτό διαμείβοντες, ους αργυραμοιβούς
τε και εμπόρους και ναύκληρους και καπήλους επωνομάκαμεν, 290
μών τή ς πολιτικής άμφισβητήσουσί τι;
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Τ ά χ ’ άν ίσ ω ς τή ς γε τών έμπορευτικών.
ΞΕ. Άλλ' ου μην ους γε όρώμεν μισθωτούς και θήτας
π ά σ ιν ε τ ο ιμ ό τ α τ α υ π η ρ έτο υ ν τα ς, μη' π ο τέ β α σ ιλ ικ ή ς 5
μεταποιούμενους ευρωμεν.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Πώς γάρ;
ΞΕ. Τί δε άρα τούς τά τοιάδε διακόνου ντας ήμίν εκάστοτε;
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Τά ποια ε ΐπ ες και τίνας;
ΞΕ. *Ών τό κηρυκικόν έθνος, όσοι τε περί γράμματα σοφοί b
γίγνονται πολλάκις ύπηρετήσαντες, και πόλλ’ ά ττα ετερα
περί τά ς άρχάς διαπονεΐσθαί τιν ες ετεροι πάνδεινοι, τ ί
τουτους αύ λέξομεν;
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. "Οπερ είπες νυν, ύπηρετας, άλλ' ούκ αυτούς εν 5
τα ΐς πόλεσιν άρχοντας.
ΞΕ. ’Αλλά ου μην όιμαί γε ένυπνιον Ιδων ειπον ταυτη πη
φανήσεσθαι τούς διαφερόντως άμφισβητουντας τ ή ς πολιτικής,
καίτοι σφόδρα γε άτοπον αν είναι δόξειε τό ζη τεΐν τουτους
εν ύπηρετική μοίρφ τινί. c
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Κομιδή μεν ούν.
ΞΕ. "Ετι δη προσμείζωμεν εγγύτερον επ ί το ύ ς μήπω
βεβασανισμενους. ε’ισι δε οΐ τε περί μαντικήν εχοντες τίνος
επιστήμης διακόνου μόριον έρμηνευται γάρ που νομίζονται 5
παρά θεών άνθρώποις.

a 3 τής m: τινες c
 117
dio E.S.: Those who arc bought, and acquired as possessions by this
ei means; people whom we can indisputably call slaves, and who least
pretend to kingly expertise.
Y.S.: Quite.
E.S.: What then of all those among free men who voluntarily place
e5 themselves in the service of those we mentioned just now, conveying
the products of farming and the other kinds of expertise between them
and establishing equality between them, some in market-places,
others moving from one city to another whether by sea or by land,
exchanging currency both for everything else and for itself - people
290 to whom we give the names of money-changers, merchants, ship­
owners, and retailers: surely they won’t lay claim at all to the art of
statesmanship?
Y.S.: It may be, perhaps, that they will - to that which operates in the
sphere of commerce.
E.S.: But those we see placing themselves with complete readiness at
>5 the service of all, for hire, as day-labourers - these we shall never find
pretending to kingly expertise.
Y.S.: Quite so.
E.S.: What in that ease arc we to say about those who perform
services of the following sorts for us whenever we need them?
Y.S.: What services do you mean, and who is it you’re talking about?
m E.S.: Those to whom belong the tribe of heralds, and all those who
become accomplished at writing by having repeatedly given their
services in this respect, and certain others who arc very clever at
working through many di flerent tasks relating to public offices: what
shall we call these in their turn?
ω Y.S.: What you called them just now - subordinates, and not
themselves rulers in cities.
E.S.: But I certainly wasn’t dreaming, I think, when I said that it was
somewhere here that there would appear those who particularly lay
claim to the art of statesmanship. And yet it would seem very odd
ei indeed to look for these in some portion of the subordinate arts.
Y.S.: Yes, quite.
E.S.: Then le t’s get still closer to those we haven’t yet cross-
questioned. There arc those who have a part of a subordinate kind of
cs expert knowledge in relation to divination; for they arc, I believe,
118
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Ναι.
HE. Κα\ μην και τδ τών \€ρόων αυ γένος, ώς τ δ νόμιμον
φησι, παρά μόν ήμών δωρ€άς θ€θΐς διά θυσιών έπιστήμόν
έσ τι κατά νουν έκ€ΐνοις δωρ€ΐσθαι, παρά δό έκ€ΐνων ήμίν d
€υχαίς κτήσιν αγαθών αίτήσασθαι* ταΟτα δό διακόνου τό χ ν η ς
έσ τί *που μόρια άμφότ€ρα.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Φαίν€ται γουν.
HE. “Ήδη τοίνυν μοι δοκουμ€ν οΐόν γό τίνος ίχνους· έφ' ο 5
τιορ€υόμ€θα προσάπτ€σθαι. τδ γάρ δή τών ΐ€ρόων σχήμα και
τδ τών μάντ€ων €υ μάλα φρονήματος πληρουται και δόξαν
σ€μνήν λαμβάν€ΐ διά τδ μόγ€θος τών έγχ€ΐρημάτων, ώστ€
π€ρί μόν Αίγυπτον ούδ' όξ€στι βασιλόα χωρίς ΐ€ρατικής
αρχ€ΐν, άλλ’ έάν άρα και τύχη nporcpov έξ άλλου γόνους c
βιασάμ€νος, ΰστ€ρον άναγκαίον €'ις τούτο €ΐστ€λ€Ϊσθαι αύτδν
τδ γόνος· ότι δό και τών Ελλήνων πολλαχου τά ίς μ€γίσταις
άρχάις τά μόγιστα τών ncpi τά τοιαυτα θύματα €υροι τ ις
αν προσταττόμ€να θυ€ΐν. και δή και παρ' ύμΐν ούχ ήκιστα 5
δήλον δ λόγω* τφ γάρ λαχόντι βασιλ€ΐ φασιν τήδ€ τά
σ € μ νό τα τα καί μ ά λ ισ τα π ά τ ρ ια τώ ν α ρ χ α ίω ν θυσιώ ν
άποδ€δόσθαι.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Και πάνυ γ€.
ΞΕ. Τουτους τ€ τοίνυν τούς κληρωτούς βασιλόας άμα και 291
ΐ€ρόας, και ύπηρότας αυτών, καί τινα ότ€ρον πάμπολυν όχλον
σκ€πτόσν, δς άρτι κατάδηλος ήμΐν γόγον€ν άποχωριοθόντων
τών όμπροσθ€ν.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Τίνας δ’ αυτούς και λόγ€ΐς; 5
ΞΕ. Και μάλα τινάς άτοπους.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Τ ί δή;
ΞΕ. Πάμφυλόν τ ι γόνος αυτών, ώς γ€ άρτι σκοπουμόνψ
φαίν€ται. πολλοί μέν γάρ λόουσι τώ ν άνδρών €ΐξασι και
Κ€νταυροις και τοιούτοισιν έτόροις, πάμπολλοι δέ Σατιίροις b
κ α ί τ ο ΐ ς ά σ θ € ν ό σ ι κα ί π ο λ υ τρ ο 'π ο ις θ η ρ ίο ις· ταχύ δέ
μβταλλάττουσι τ ά ς τ€ ιδέας και την δυναμιν *ίς άλλήλους.
και μόντοι μοι νυν, ώ Σώκρατ€ς, άρτι δοκώ καταν€νοηκόναι

a 3 κατάδηλος η: κατάδηλος νυν η, Ο

 119
considered to be interpreters from gods to men.
Y.S.: Yes.
E.S.: And then too the class of priests, in its turn, has - as custom tells
us - expert knowledge about the giving through sacrifices of gifts
<n from us to the gods which arc pleasing to them, and about asking
from them through prayers for the acquisition of good things for us;
and I imagine that both of these things arc parts of a subordinate art.
Y.S.; It appears so, at any rate.
<15 E.S.: Well now, it seems to me that at this point we arc, as it were,
getting close to some sort of trail leading to our destination. For the
type of priests and seers is filled full of self-importance and gets a
lofty reputation because of the magnitude of what they undertake, so
that in Egypt it is not even permitted for a king to hold oiTicc without
ci also exercising that of priest, and if in fact he happens to have
acceded to power at the beginning by force from another class, it is
later necessary for him to be initiated into the class of priests; and
again among the Greeks loo, in many places, it is to the greatest
offices that one would find being assigned the performance of the
e5 greatest of the sacrifices in relation to such things. And in fact what
I’m saying receives the clearest illustration in your ease; for they say
that the most solemn and ancestral of the ancient sacrifices arc
assigned here to the person who becomes king by lot.
Y.S.: Most certainly.
291 E.S.: Well then, we must look both at these king-priests by lot, and
their subordinates, and also a certain other very large crowd of
people, which has just become visible to us now that the previous
ones have been separated off.
»5 Y.S.: But who arc the people you mean?
E.S.: Some very odd people indeed.
Y.S.: How, exactly?
E.S.: It’s a class mixed out of all sorts, or so it seems to me as I look
bi at it just now. For many of the men resemble lions and centaurs and
other such things, and very many resemble satyrs and those animals
that arc weak but versatile; and they quickly exchange their shapes
and capacity for action for each other’s. And yet now, Socrates, I
120
τούς* άνδρας*. (Wl)
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Λόγοις* αν* Ιοικας* γάρ άτοπόν τ ι καθοραν. 6
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γάρ 6ή και νυν αυτός* το υ τ' Ιπ α θ ο ν έξαίφνης* ήμφ€γνόησα
κατιδών τον ncpi τά τών πόλ€ων πράγματα χορόν. c
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Ποιον;
HE. Τον πάντων τών σοφιστών μόγιστον γόητα και ταιίτης*
της* τέχνης* € μ π € ΐρ ο τ α τ ο ν δν α π ό τώ ν όντως* δ ν τ ω ν
πολιτικών και βασιλικών καίπ€ρ παγχάλ€πσν όντα άφαιρ€ΐν 5
άφαιρ€Τ€ον, cl μ€λλομ€ν 1δ€ΐν έναργώς* τό ζητούμ€νον.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. ’Αλλά μην τούτο γ€ ούκ avcTCOv.
HE. Ουκουν δή κατά γ€ την έμήν. καί μοι φράζ€ τόδ€.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Τό ποιον;
ΞΕ. *Αρ%ου μοναρχία τών πολιτικών ήμίν αρχών έσ τι μία; d
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Ναι.
HE. Και μ€τά μοναρχίαν cinoi τις* αν όιμαι τη ν υπό τώ ν
ολίγων δυναστ€ΐαν.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Πώς* δ' ου; 5
ΞΕ. Τρίτον δ€ σχήμα πολιτ€ΐας· ούχ ή του πλήθους* αρχή,
δημοκρατία τουνομα κληθ€ΐσα;
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Και πάνυ γ€.
ΞΕ. Τρ€ΐς* δ 1 ουσαι μών ου hcvt c τρόπον τιν ά γίγνοντα ι,
δύ’ k£ έαυτών αλλα προς* αύταΐς* ονόματα τίκτουσαί; 10
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Ποια δή;
ΞΕ. Προς* τό βίαιόν που και έκούσιον άποσκοπουντ€ς* νυν e
και ncviav και πλούτον και νόμον και ανομίαν cv αύταΐς*
γιγνόμ€να διπλήν έκατόραν τόΐν δυοΐν διαιρουντ€ς* μοναρχίαν
μ έν πρ ο σ α γο ρ € υ ο υ σ ιν ώς* δυ'ο π α ρ € χ ο μ € ν η ν €Ϊδη δυ ο ΐν
όνόμασι, τυραννίδι, τό 6έ βασιλική. 5
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Τ ί μήν;
ΞΕ. Την δέ ύ π ’ ολίγων γ€ €κάστοτ€ κρατηθ€Ϊσαν πόλιν
αριστοκρατία και ολιγαρχία.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Και πάνυ γ€.
ΞΕ. Δημοκρατία? γ€ μήν, έά ν τ' ούν βιαίως* έάντ€ έκουσίως* 10
 121

(29i) think I have identified the men in question.

b6 Y.S.: Please explain; you seem to have something odd in view.
E.S.: Yes; for everyone finds things odd if they arc unknown. And
this is exactly what happened to me just now: in the moment when I
ci first saw the chorus of those concerned with the affairs of cities I
failed to recognize them.
Y.S.: What chorus?
E.S.; That of the greatest magician of all the sophists, and the most
versed in this expertise; although removing him from those who really
c5 are in possession of the art of statesmanship and kingship is a very
difficult thing to do, remove him we must, if we arc going to see
plainly what we arc looking for.
Y.S.: But we must certainly not let this slip.
E.S.: Certainly not, as far as my view goes. So tell me this.
Y.S.: What?
<n E.S.: Is monarchy one of the kinds of rule over cities we recognize?
Y.S.: Yes.
E.S.: And after monarchy one would, I think, mention the holding of
power by the few.
as Y.S.: Of course.
E.S.: And isn’t a third type of constitution (he rule of the multitude,
called by the name of ‘democracy’?
Y.S.: Most certainly.
<iio E.S.: And being three, don’t they in a certain way become five, giving
birth to two other names in addition to themselves?
Y.S.: What arc these?
ei E.S.: I think that as things arc people refer to the aspects of force and
consent, poverty and wealth, law and lawlessness as they occur in
them, and divide each of the first two into two, calling monarchy, on
e5 the grounds that it exhibits two forms, by two names, the one
‘tyrannical’, the other ‘kingly’ monarchy.
Y.S.: Of course.
E.S.: And the city which has come to be controlled by a few people
they call by the names of ‘aristocracy’ and ‘oligarchy’.
Y.S.: Most certainly.
«io E.S.: With democracy, on the other hand, whether in fact the
122

των τ ά ς ούοί α ς έχόντων το πλήθος αρχή, και έάντ€ τους* 292

νόμους* άκριβώς φυλάττον έάντ€ μη, πα'ντως τούνομα ο ύ δ ύ ς
αυτής* €Ϊωθ€ μ€ταλλάττ€ΐν.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. *Αληθή.
ΞΕ. Τ ί ούν; ο\όμ€θά τινα τούτων τών πολιΤ€ΐών ορθήν €*ναι 5
τούτοις* τοΐς* όροις* όριοθ^Ίσαν, ένι και όλίγοις* και πολλοΐς,
και πλούτφ και π€νί<?, και τφ βιαίφ και έκουσίφ, κα\ μ€τά
γραμμάτων και αν€υ νόμων συμβαίνουσαν γίγν€σθαΐ;
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Τ ί γάρ δη και κωλυ€ΐ;
ΞΕ. Σκόπ€ΐ δη σαφ€ατ€ρον τήδ€ 4πόμ€νος. b
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Πή;
ΞΕ. Τ φ ρηθόντι κατά π ρ ώ τα ς πότ€ρον 4μμ€νούμ€ν ή
διαφωνήοομ€ν;
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Τφ δη τιοίφ λ«ίγ€ΐς; 5
ΞΕ. Την βασιλικήν αρχήν τών 4πιστημών €ΐναί τινα €φαμ€ν,
όΐμαι.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Ναί.
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και έτιιστατικήν 4κ τών άλλων προ€ΐλόμ€θα. 10
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Ναί.
ΞΕ. Κάκ τής* έτιιστατικής* τήν μέν 4 π ’ άψύχοις* Ιργοις, τήν c
δ ’ 4π\ ζωοις* και κατά τούτον δή τον τρότιον μ€ρίζοντ€ς
δ€υρ' α€ΐ προ€ληλύθαμ€ν, 4πιστήμης ούκ €ΐτιλανθανόμ€νοι, τό
δ* ήτις* ούχ ίκανώς ττω δυνάμ€νοι διακριβώσαοθαι.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Λόγξίς* όρθώς*. 5
ΞΕ. Τουτ' αυτό τοίνυν αρ' 4ννοούμ€ν, ότι τον όρον ούκ
ολίγους* ούδέ πολλούς*, ούδ4 τό έκούσιον ούδέ τό άκούσιον,
ούδέ π€νίαν ούδέ πλούτον γίγν€θθαι π€ρι αύτών χρ€ων, άλλα
τιν α έπιστήμην, €ΐπ€ρ άκολουθήσομ€ν το ΐς πρόοθ€ν;
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. 'Αλλά μήν τούτο γ€ αδύνατον μή ποιΛν. d
ΞΕ. Έ ξ άνάγκης* δή νυν τούτο οΰτω σκ€πτέον, 4ν τίν ι ποτ€
τούτων έπισ τήμη συμβαίν€ΐ γίγν€σθαι π€ρι άνθρώπων αρχής*,
σχ€δόν τής: χαλβπω τάτης και μ€γίστης* κτη'σασθαι. δ€Ϊ γάρ
ίδ€Ϊν αύτη'ν, ϊνα θ€ασώμ€θα τίνας* ά φ αιρ€τόον α πό του 5

C4 πω C: πως m
 123
292 multitude rules over those who possess the wealth by force or with
their consent, and whether by accurately preserving the laws or not, in
any ease no one is in the habit of changing its name.
Y.S.: True.
•5 E.S.: What then? Do we suppose that any of these constitutions is
correct, when it is defined by these criteria - one, few and many,
wealth and poverty, force and consent, and whether it turns out to be
accompanied by written laws or without laws?
Y.S.: Why, what actually prevents it?
bi E.S.: Look at it more clearly, following me this way.
Y.S.: Which?
E.S.: Shall we abide by what we said when we first began, or shall we
set ourselves in discord with it?
b5 Y.S.: What was that?
E.S.: We said that kingly rule was one of the kinds of expert
knowledge, I think.
Y.S.: Yes.
E.S.: And of these, not of all of them, but we chose out from the rest
bio particularly one that was concerned in a sense with making
judgements and controlling.
Y.S.: Yes.
ei E.S.: And then from the controlling sort, we took one that was set
over inanimate products, and one set over living creatures; and it is by
splitting things up in just this way that we have been progressing all
the time to the point where we arc now, not forgetting knowledge, but
as for what kind of knowledge it is, not yet being able to give a
sufficiently accurate answer.
c5 Y.S.: Your account is correct.
E.S.: Then do we see just this very point, that the criterion in these
things must not be few, nor many, nor consent nor the lack of it, nor
poverty nor wealth, but some kind of knowledge, if indeed we arc
going to be consistent with what we said before?
<n Y.S.: But that it's impossible that we should not do.
E.S.: Necessarily, then, we must now consider in which, if any, of
these expert knowledge about ruling human beings turns out to occur
- practically the most difficult and the most important thing of which
to acquire knowledge. For we must catch sight of it, in order to
124
φρονίμου βασιλέως, οΐ προσποιοΰνται μέν έΐναι πολιτικοί κα\
π€ΐθουσι πολλούς*, cloi δ€ ούδαμώς*.
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προ€ΐρηκ€ν.
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έπιστήμην δυνατόν έίναι κτήσασθαι;
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και πβντήκοντα αυτήν ικανώς κτήσασθαι; 5
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. 'Ρ<?στη μ€νταν ού'τω γ ' €Ϊη πασών τών Τ€χνών*
ΐσμ€ν γάρ ότι χιλίων άνδρών άκροι π€ττ€υται τοσουτοι προς*
τούς* έν τόις* άλλοις* 'Έλλησιν ούκ άν γένοιντό ποτ€, μή τι
δή βασιλής* γ€. δ€ΐ γάρ δή τόν γ€ τήν βασιλικήν έχοντα
έπιστήμην, άν τ ' άρχη και έάν μή, κατά τόν Ιμπροσθ€ λόγον 10
όμως* βασιλικόν προσαγορ€υ€σθαι. 293
ΞΕ. Καλώς άπ€μνημόν€υσας. έπόμ€νον δέ οίμαι τούτψ, τήν
μέν ορθήν αρχήν π€ρι ένα τινά και δύο και παντάπασιν
ολίγους δ€ΐ ζητέίν, όταν ορθή γίγνηται.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Τί μήν; 5
ΞΕ. Τούτους δέ γ€, έάντ€ έκόντων άντ' άκόντων άρχωσιν,
έάντ€ κατά γράμματα έάντ€ άν€υ γραμμάτων, καί έάν
πλουτουντ€ς ή π€νόμ€νοι, νομιστέον, ώσπ€ρ νυν ήγούμ€θα,
κατά τέχνην ήντινουν αρχήν άρχοντας, τούς ιατρούς δέ ούχ b
ήκιστα ν€νομίκαμ€ν, έάντ€ έκόντας έάντ€ άκοντας ήμας
ίώ ντα ι, τέ μ ν ο ν τ€ ς ή κά οντ€ς ή τιν α άλλην άλγηδόνα
προσάπτοντ€ς, και έάν κατά γράμματα ή χωρίς γραμμάτων,
και έάν πένητ€ς όντ€ς ή πλούσιοι, πάντω ς ούδέν ήττον 5
ιατρούς φαμ€ν, έωσπ€ρ άν έπιστατουντ€ς τέχνη, καθαίροντ€ς
€ΐτ€ άλλως ίσχναίνοντ€ς €ΐτ€ και αύξάνοντ€ς, άν μόνον έ π ’
άγαθψ τφ τών σωμάτων, β€λτίω ποιουντ€ς έκ χ€ΐρόνων,
σφ<ωσιν οι θ€ραπ€ύοντ€ς έκαστοι τά θ€ραπ€υόμ€να* ταύτη c
θήσομ€ν, ώς όιμαι, και ούκ άλλη, τούτον όρον όρθόν έιναι
μόνον ιατρικής και άλλης ήστινοσουν αρχής.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Κομιδή μέν ούν.

a4 6d m: 6rtv C | b 1 κατά τέχνην <τούς>0

 125
consider which people we must remove from the wise king, who
pretend to be possessors of the art of statesmanship, and persuade
many people that they are, but in fact arc not at all.
Y.S.: Yes, we must indeed do this, as our argument has told us.
ei E.S.: Well, docs it seem that a mass of people in the city arc capable
of acquiring this expertise?
Y.S.: How?
E.S.: But in a city of a thousand men, is it possible for a hundred or
e5 so, or again fifty, to acquire it adequately?
Y.S.: In that ease, it would be quite the easiest of all the kinds of
expertise there are; for we know that among a thousand men there
would never be so many top p e tte ia -players in relation to those
among the rest of the Greeks, let alone kings. For it is that man who
eto actually possesses the expert knowledge of kingship, whether he rules
293 or not, who must in any ease be called an expert in kingship,
according to what we said before.
E.S.: You’ve remembered well. As a consequence of this, I think, we
must look for correct rule in relation to some one person, or two, or
altogether few, when it is correct.
«5 Y.S.: We certainly must.
E.S.: Yes, but these, whether they rule over willing or unwilling
subjects, whether according to written laws or without them, and if
they rule as rich men or poor, we must consider - as we now suppose
μ - as carrying out whatever sort of rule they do on the basis of
expertise. More than anything we believe in the doctors, whether
they cure us with our consent or without it, by cutting or burning or
applying some other painful treatment, and if they do so according to
bs written rules or apart from written rules, and if as poor men or rich, in
any ease we arc no less inclined at all to say they arc doctors, so long
as they arc in charge of us on the basis of expertise, purging or
otherwise reducing us, or else building us up - it is no matter, if only
ct for the good of our bodies, making them better than they were, each
and every one of those who care for them preserves what is in their
care; in this way, as I think, and in no other shall we lay down that
this is the only correct definition of medicine and of any other sort of
rule whatsoever.
Y.S.: Yes, just so.
126
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αλλας Επι τά αισχίονα μ€μιμήσθαι. 5
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δέ και άν€υ νόμων 6civ άρχ€ΐν χαλ€πώτ€ρον άκου€ΐν Ερρήθη.
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 127
c5 E.S.: It must then be the ease, it seems, that of constitutions too the
one that is correct in comparison with the rest, and alone a
constitution, is the one in which the rulers would be found truly
possessing expert knowledge, and not merely seeming to do so,
whether they rule according to laws or without laws, and over willing
di or unwilling subjects, and whether the rulers arc poor or wealthy -
there is no criterion of correctness according to which any of these
must be taken into any account at all.
Y.S.: Right
E.S.: And whether they purge the city for its benefit by putting some
as people to death or else by exiling them, or whether again they make it
smaller by sending out colonics somewhere like swarms of bees, or
build it up by introducing people from somewhere outside and
making them citizens, so long as they act to preserve it on the basis of
expert knowledge and what is just, making it better than it was, so far
et as they can, this is the constitution which alone we must say is
correct, under these conditions and in accordance with criteria of this
sort; and all the others we arc talking about we must say not to be
genuine, and not really to be constitutions at all, but to have imitated
this one - those we say arc ‘law-abiding* for the belter, whereas the
c5 others have imitated it for the worse.
Y.S.; The rest of it, Stranger, seems to have been said in due measure;
but that ideal rule may exist even without laws was a statement harder
for a hearer to accept.
E.S.: You got in just a little before mewith your question,Socrates.
294 For I was about to ask you whether you accept all of this, or whether
in fact you find any of the things we have said hard to take; but as it is
it’s already apparent that we’ll want a discussion of this matter of the
correctness of those who rule without laws.
a5 Y.S.: Quite.
E.S.: Now in a certain sense it is clear that the art of the legislator
belongs to that of the king; but the best thing is not that the laws
should prevail, but rather the kingly man who possesses wisdom. Do
you know why?
Y.S.: What then is the reason?
tio E.S.: That law could never accurately embrace what is best and most
bt just for all at the same time, and so prescribe what is best; for the
dissimilarities between human beings and their actions, and the fact
that practically nothing in human affairs ever remains stable, prevent
128
άγ€ΐν των Ανθρωπίνων ούδέν έώσιν άπλοΟν έν ούδ€ν\ π€ρΙ (294)
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προς* άλλο τι, φιλονικίας* έν€κα; 5
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γυμναζόντων έπιτάξ€ΐς* έν ταΐς* τοιαύταις* άρχαΐς*.
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καί πάντων των κατά τά σώματα πόνων.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Έ σ τ ι ταυτα.
ΞΕ. Και τον νομοθέτην τοίνυν ήγώμ€θα, τον τα ΐσ ιν άγέλαις*
 129
(294) any kind of expertise whatsoever from making any simple decision in
t>s any sphere that covers all eases and will last for all time. I suppose
this is something we agree about?
Y.S.: Certainly.
E.S.: But we see law bending itself more or less towards this very
ct thing, like some self-willed and ignorant person, who allows no one
to do anything contrary to what he orders, nor to ask any questions,
not even if after all something new turns out for someone which is
better, contrary to the prescription which he himself has laid down.
c5 Y.S.: True; the law docs simply as you have just said with regard to
each and every one of us.
E.S.: Then it is impossible for what is perpetually simple to be useful
in relation to what is never simple?
Y.S.: Very likely.
cio E.S.: Why then is it ever necessary to make laws, given that law is not
di something completely correct? We must find out the cause of this.
Y.S.: Certainly.
E.S.: Now it is the ease with you, too, that people train in groups in
as the way they do in other cities, whether for running or for something
else, for competitive purposes?
Y.S.: Yes, very frequently.
E.S.: Well, now let’s recall to mind the instructions that expert trainers
give when they’re controlling people in such circumstances.
Y.S.: What arc you thinking of?
dio E.S.: That they think that there is no room for them to make their
prescriptions piece by piece to suit each individual, giving the
ei instruction appropriate to the physical condition of each, but they
think it necessary to prescribe what will bring physical benefit more
roughly, as suits the majority of eases and a large number of people.
Y.S.: Right.
E.S.: And it’s just for this reason that as it is they give equally heavy
e5 exercises to all the group, starting them off together and stopping
them together in their running and wrestling and the rest of their
physical exercises.
Y.S.: That’s so.
E.S.: Then let’s suppose the same about the legislator too, the person
130
έπιστατήσοντα του δικαίου πόρι καί των πρός* άλλήλους*
συμβολαίων, μη ποθ' Ικανόν γ€νησ€θθαι τιάσιν άθρόοις* 295
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 131
who will direct our herds in relation to justice and their contracts with
295 one another - that he will never be capable, in his prescriptions for
everyone together, to assign accurately to each individual what is
appropriate for him.
Y.S.: What you say certainly sounds reasonable.
E.S.: But he will, I think, set down the law for each and every one
»5 according to the principle of ‘for the majority of people, for the
majority of eases, and roughly, somehow, like this’, whether
expressing it in writing or in unwritten form, legislating by means of
ancestral customs.
Y.S.: Correct.
E.S.: Yes, it certainly is. For how would anyone ever be capable,
bt Socrates, of sitting beside each individual perpetually throughout his
life and accurately prescribing what is appropriate to him? Since in
my view, if he were capable of this, any one of those who had really
acquired the expert knowledge of kingship would hardly pul obstacles
t>5 in his own way by writing down these laws we talked about.
Y.S.: It certainly follows from what we have now said, Stranger.
E.S.: Yes, but more, my good friend, from the things that arc going to
be said.
Y.S.: And what arc they?
bio E.S.: Things like the following. Arc we to say, that is, between us,
ct that if a doctor, or else some gymnastic trainer, were going to be out
of the country and to be away from his charges for what he thought
would be a long time, and thought that the people being trained, or his
patients, would not remember the instructions he had given them, he
c5 would want to write down reminders for them - or what arc we to
say?
Y.S.: As you suggested.
E.S.: But what if he came back unexpectedly, having been away for
less time than he thought he would be? Do you think he would not
at propose other prescriptions, contrary to the ones he had written down,
when things turned out to be different, and better, for his patients
because of winds or else some other of the things that come from
Zeus which had turned out contrary to expectation, in some way
differently from the usual pattern, and he would obstinately think that
neither he nor the patient should step outside those ancient laws that
as had once been laid down, he himself by giving oilier instructions, the
patient by daring to do different things contrary to what was written
down, on the grounds that these were the rules of the art of medicine
132
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ΞΕ. Τ ί δέ ή μ ΐν δή τδ παρά τή ν π ο λ ιτικ ή ν τ έ χ ν η ν 5
 133
and of health, and that things that happened differently were
unhealthy and not part of his expertise; or would all things of this
kind, if they happened in the context of truly expert knowledge, in all
ei spheres cause altogether the greatest ridicule, for acts of legislation of
this sort?
Y.S.: Absolutely right.
E.S.: And the person who has written down what is just and unjust,
e5 fine and shameful, good and bad or has laid down unwritten laws on
these subjects for all those herds of human beings that graze, city by
city, according to the laws of those who wrote them down in each
ease - if the person who wrote them on the basis of expertise, or
someone else resembling him, arrives, is it really not to be permitted
296 him to give different instructions contrary to these? Or would not this
prohibition appear in truth no less ridiculous than the other one?
Y.S.: Of course.
E.S.; Well then, do you know what is said by the majority of people in
«5 such a case?
Y.S.: It doesn’t come to mind for the moment, just like that.
E.S.: Well, it sounds fine enough. What they say is that if someone
recognizes laws that arc better, contrary to those established by people
before him, then he must bring them in by persuading his city to
accept them in each ease, but not otherwise.
»io Y.S.: Well then? Is that not a correct view?
bi E.S.: Perhaps. But first things first: if someone forces through what is
better without the use of persuasion, tell me, what will be the name
we give to the use of force in this ease? No - not yet; answer me first
in relation to the previous eases.
Y.S.: What do you mean?
b5 E.S.: If then - to continue with our example - someone docs not
persuade his patient, but has a correct grasp of the relevant expertise,
and forces child, or man, or woman, to do what is better, contrary to
what has been written down, what will be the name we give to this
use of force? Surely anything rather than what we called an
unhealthy mistake contrary to the expertise in question? And the last
ei thing the person who was the object of the force in question can
correctly say about such a thing is that he had unhealthy things done
to him by the doctors who used force on him, things that did not
belong to their expertise?
Y.S.: What you say is very true.
es E.S.: And what do we suppose is the mistake we’re talking about, the
134
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 135
one that is in contravention of the expertise of the statesman? Isn’t it
what is shameful, what is bad, and unjust?
Y.S.: I agree, absolutely.
E.S.: Then those who have been forced, contrary to what has been
cio written down and ancestral custom, to do different things that arc
di more just, better and finer than the things they did before - tell me, if
people in this kind of situation for their part censure this kind of use
of force, isn’t it the ease that, if their censure isn’t to be the most
laughable of all, they must say anything on each occasion rather than
that those who have been forced have had shameful, unjust and bad
things done to them by those who did the forcing?
as Y.S.: What you say is very true.
E.S.: But arc the things forced on them just, if the person who did the
forcing is rich, and unjust if he happens to be poor? Or if, whether by
using persuasion or not, rich or poor, or according to written law or
ei contrary to it, he docs what is not to the benefit of the citizens or what
is, must this be the criterion, and in relation to these things - the truest
criterion of correct government of a city, the one according to which
the wise and good man will govern what belongs to the ruled? Just as
297 a steersman, always watching out for what is to the benefit of the ship
and the sailors, preserves his fellow-sailors not by putting things
down in writing but offering his expertise as law, so loo in this same
manner a constitution would be correct, would it not, if it issued from
a5 those who arc able to rule in this way, offering the strength of their
expertise as more powerful than the laws? And is it not the ease that
there is no mistake for wise rulers, whatever they do, provided that
bi they watch for one great thing, that by always distributing to those in
the city what is most just as judged by the intelligent application of
their expertise they arc able both to preserve them and so far as they
can to bring it about that they arc belter than they were?
Y.S.: It is certainly not possible to contradict what has just been said.
b5 E.S.: And neither should one contradict those other things we said.
Y.S.: What arc you referring to?
E.S.: That a mass of any people whatsoever would never be able to
acquire this kind of expert knowledge and so govern a city with
ei intelligence, but we must look for that one constitution, the correct
one, in relation to a small element in the population, few in number,
or even one, and that we must put down the other constitutions as
136
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ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Ποιον δη;
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Ιδ€ΐν όμως* μην τΐ€ΐρώμ€θα λαβ€ΐν αυτό. φέρ€ γάρ* όρθής*
ήμΐν μόνης- ουσης- ταύτης* τής- πολιΤ€ΐας* ήν €ΐρήκαμ€ν, όισθ’ 5
ότι τάς- αλλας* δ€ΐ τοΐς* ταύτης* συγγράμμασι χρωμένας* οίίτω
σφζ€σθαι, δρώσας- τό νυν έπαινούμ€νον, καίτΐ€ρ ούκ όρθότατον
V
ον;
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Τό ποιον;
ΞΕ. Τό παρά τούς- νόμους- μηδέν μηδένα τολμάν ττοΐ€ΐν των 10
έν τή *πόλ€ΐ, τον τολμώντα δέ θανάτφ ζημιουσθαι και ττασι e
τοΐς- έσχάτοις·. και τουτ' έστιν ορθότατα και κάλλιστ' Ιχον
ώς- δ€ΐίτ€ρον, έ*Π€ΐδάν τό πρώτον τις* μ€ταθή τό νυνδή ρηθέν
ψ δέ τρόπφ γ€γονός- έστι τούτο ο δη δ€υτ€ρον έφήσαμ€ν,
διαπ€ρανώμ€θα. ή γάρ; 5
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Πάνυ μέν ούν.
ΞΕ. Ε’ις- δη τάς- €ίκόνας* έπανίωμ€ν πάλιν, άις- άναγκαΐον
άπ€ΐκάζ€ΐν α€ΐ τούς- βασιλικούς- άρχοντας·.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Ποιας;
ΞΕ. Τον γ€νναΐον κυβ€ρνήτην καί τον έτόρων πολλών 10
αντάξιον ιατρόν. κατίδωμ€ν γάρ δη τ ι σχήμα έν τούτοις*
αύτοΐς* πλασάμ€νοι.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Ποιόν τι;
ΞΕ. Τοιόνδ€* οιον €ΐ πάντ€ς- π€ρι αυτών διανοηθ€ΐμ€ν ότι 29β
δ€ΐνότατα ύπ' αυτών πάσχομ€ν. ον μέν γάρ αν έθ€λήσωσιν
ημών τούτων έκάτ€ροι σψ<€ΐν, όμοίως- δή σψζουσιν, όν δ’ αν
λωβάσθαι βουληθώσιν, λωβώνται τ€μΐΌντ€ς* και κάοντ€ς· και
προστάττοντ€ς* άναλώματα φέρςιν παρ’ έαυτούς- οιον φόρους-, 5

ο6ί>η0έν c: δή0<ν m ,0
 137
imitations, just as was said a little earlier, some of them imitating this
c5 one for the better, the others for the worse.
Y.S.: What do you mean by this? What arc you saying? For I did not
understand the point about imitations when it was made just now
either.
E.S.: And it’s no small matter, if one stirs up this subject and then
discards it where it is, without going through it and showing the
at mistake that now occurs in relation to it.
Y.S.: What mistake is that?
E.S.: This sort of thing we must look for, since it is not altogether
what we arc used to or easy to see; but all the same let’s try to grasp
d5 it. Tell me: given that this constitution we have talked about is on our
view the only correct one, do you recognize that the others ought to
use the written documents that belong to this one, and save
themselves in this way, doing what is now praised, although it is not
the most correct thing to do?
Y.S.: What arc you referring to?
«no The principle that none of those in the city should dare to do anything
ei contrary to the laws, and that the person who dares to do so should be
punished by death and all the worst punishments. And this is very
correct and Fine as a second choice, when one changes the principle
we discussed just now, which is our First choice; but let us go through
eS the way in which what we have called ‘second-best’ has come about.
Do you agree?
Y.S.: Absolutely.
E.S.: Well then, let’s go back to the likenesses to which we must
always compare our kingly rulers.
Y.S.: Which likenesses?
*10 E.S.: The noble steersman and the doctor who is ‘worth many others’.
Let us look at the matter by fashioning a kind of Figure, using these as
material.
Y.S.: Of what kind?
E.S.: Of the following sort: let’s suppose that we all thought of them
as doing the most terrible things to us. For the one as much as the
other saves whichever of us he wishes to save, and whichever of us
they wish to mutilate, they do it by cutting and burning us and
138
ών σμικρά μέν els* τον κά μ νοντα καί ούδέν άναλίσκουσιν, (29β)
τ ο ί? 6 ' άλλοι? αυτοί τ€ και οί ο ΐκ έ τα ι χρώνται* και δή και b
τ€ λ€ υ τώ ντ€ ? ή παρά συγγ€νώ ν ή παρά τιν ω ν έχθρώ ν τοΟ
κάμ νοντο? χρ ή μ α τα μισθόν λα μ βά νοντ€? ά ποκ τ€ΐνυα σ ιν. ο ΐ τ ’
αύ κυβ€ρνη ται μ ύ ρ ια c'Tcpa τ ο ι α υ τ α έ ρ γ α 'ζ ο ν τ α ι ,
κ α τα λ € ΐπ ο ν τ€ ? Τ€ έκ τ ιν ο ? έπ ιβ ο υ λή ? έν τ α ΐ? ά ν α γ ω γ α ί? 5
έ ρ η μ ο υ ? , κ α ί σ φ ά λ μ α τ α π ο ιο ΰ ν τ € ? έ ν τ ο ΐ ? π € λ ά γ € σ ιν
έκβάλλουσιν c l? τ η ν θά λατταν, κα\ c'Tcpa κακουργουσιν. cl δή
τα υ τα διανοηθέντ€? βουλ€υσαίμ€θα π€ρι αυτώ ν βουλήν τιν α ,
τούτω ν τω ν Τ€χνών μ η κ έτι έ π ιτ ρ έ π € ΐν ά ρχ€ΐν α ύτοκράτορι e
μηδ€Τ€ρ<£ μ ή τ ’ ούν δούλω ν μ ή τ ’έλ€υθέρω ν, σ υ λ λ έ ξ α ι δ ’
έκ κ λ η σ ία ν η μ ώ ν α υ τώ ν , ή σ ύ μ π α ν τ α τ ο ν δ ή μ ο ν ή τ ο ύ ?
πλουσ ίου? μόνον, έξ€ Ϊν α ι δέ καί ιδ ιω τώ ν και τώ ν άλλων
δ η μ ιο υ ρ γ ώ ν π € ρ ί tc π λ ο υ κ α ί π € ρ ί ν ό σ ω ν γ ν ώ μ η ν 5
ξυμ βα λέοθαι καθ’ ό τι χρή τ ο ΐ? φ αρμ άκοι? ή μ α ? καί τ ο ί?
ια τρ ικ ο ί? ό ρ γάνο ι? προ? το ύ ? κ ά μ νο ντα ? χρήοθαι, καί δή καί
τ ο ί? π λο ίο ι? tc α υ το ί? καί τ ο ί? ν α υ τικ οί? ό ρ γά νοι? c l? τή ν d
τώ ν πλοίω ν xpeiav καί π€ρί τού? κινδύνου? το ύ ? tc προ?
αυτόν τον πλουν ανέμω ν καί θ α λ ά ττη ? π έρ ι καί προ? τ α ?
τ ο ί? λ η σ τα ί? cvtc0£ ci ?, καί έά ν να υ μ α χ€ ΐν άρα δέη που
μ α κ ρ ο ΐ? π λ ο ίο ι? π ρ ο ? cT cpa τοια υτα * τ ά δέ τι$ π λ ή θ € ΐ 5
δόξα ντα π€ρί τούτω ν, citc τινώ ν ιατρώ ν καί κυβ€ρνητών c it ’
άλλων ιδιω τώ ν συμβουλ€υόντων, γρ ά ψ α ν τα ? έν κύρβ€σί τ ισ ι
καί σ τή λα ι?, τ ά δέ καί ά γραφ α π ά τ ρ ια θ€μένου? έθη, κ α τά e
τα υ τα ήδη π ά ν τ α το ν έ π € ΐτα χρόνον ναυτίλλ€σθαι καί τ ά ?
τώ ν καμνόντω ν θ€ραπ€ΐα? ποΐ€ΐοθαι.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Κομιδή γ€ €ΐρηκα? άτοπα.
HE. Κατ’ ένιαυτόν δέ γ€ άρχοντα? καθίσταοθαι του πλήθου?, 5
citc έκ τών πλουσίων citc έκ του δήμου παντό?, ό? άν
κληρούμ€νο? λαγχάνη* τού? δέ καταστάντα? άρχοντα? άρχ€ΐν
κατά τά γ ρ ά μ μ α τα κυβ€ρνώ ντα? τ ά ? ναυ? καί το ύ ?
κάμνοντα? ίωμένου?.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Ταυτ’ έτι χaλcπώτcpa. 10
HE. 0c<2 δή καί τό μcτά ταυτα έπόμ€νον. έπ€ΐδάν γάρ δή

b 5 καταλαποντί? e: καταλιπόντο? in
 139
(29β) directing us to pay them expenses as if they were taxes, of which they
bi spend little or none on the patient, while they themselves and their
household use the rest; and the Final step is for them to take money
from relatives or some enemies of the patient as pay for killing him.
And steersmen, in their turn, work at a thousand other things of a
b5 similar kind, leaving people stranded on voyages as a result of some
conspiracy or other, causing shipwrecks on the seas and throwing
people overboard, and doing other malicious things. Let’s then
suppose that we thought this about them, and came to a conclusion in
ci a kind of council, no longer to allow either of these kinds of expertise
to have autonomous control either of slaves or of free men, but to call
together an assembly consisting of ourselves, either the people all
together or only the rich, and that it be permitted both to laymen and
c5 to the other craftsmen to contribute an opinion both about sailing and
about diseases, about the basis according to which we should employ
at drugs and the tools of the doctor’s art on patients, and also both ships
themselves and the tools of the sailor’s art for using the ships, in
relation both to the dangers affecting the voyage itself from winds and
sea and to encounters with pirates, and if it should turn out to be
<t5 necessary, perhaps, to fight a sea battle with long ships against others
of the same type; and that having written down on kurbeis or blocks
of stone of some sort what the majority has decided, whether with the
ei advice of some doctors and steersmen or of others who are laymen,
and having also established other things as unwritten ancestral
customs, we should then do all our sailing and caring for patients for
all future lime according to these.
Y.S.: What you’ve said is distinctly odd.
c5 E.S.: Yes - and that we should set up officers annually who belong to
the mass of people, whether from the rich or from the whole people,
whoever has office assigned to him by lot; and that those who take
office should execute their office according to the written rules, in
steering the ships and healing patients,
do · Y.S.: This is even harder to take.
E.S.: Then consider too what follows after this. When the year ends
140
των αρχόντων έκαστοι? ό ένιαυτό? έζέλθη, δ€ήσ€ΐ δικαστήρια
καθίσαντα? άνδρών, ή τώ ν πλουσίων έκ προκρίσ€ω? ή
συ'μπαντο? αυ τού δήμου τού? λαχο'ντα?, c l? το υτο υ? 299
cloayciv τού? άρζαντα? και €υθύν€ΐν, κατηγορ€ΐν δέ τόν
βουλο'μ^νον ώ ? ου κα τά τά γ ρ ά μ μ α τ α τ ο ν έ ν ια υ τ ό ν
έκυβέρνησ€ τά? ναυ? ούδέ κατά τά παλαιά των προγόνων
έθη* ταύτά δέ ταυτα και π€ρι τών τού? κάμνοντα? Ιωμένων 5
ών δ* αν καταψηφισθή τιμάν δτι χρή παθ€ΐν αύτών τινα? ή
άποτίν€ΐν.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Ούκουν δ γ ’ έθέλων και έκών έν τοΐ? τοιουτοι?
ap x civ δικαιότατ' αν ότιουν πάσχοι και άποτίνοι. b
ΞΕ. Και τοίνυν έτι δ€ησ€ΐ θέσθαι νόμον έπι πασι τούτοι?,
άν τ ι? κυβ€ρνητικήν καί τό ναυτικόν ή το ύ γΐ€ ΐνό ν καί
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νόμου?, άλλ’ αύτοκράτορα? a p x c iv τών πλοίων καί τών
νοσοιίντων, γραψάμ€νον c lo a y c iv τον βουλόμ€νον όι? c £ cotiv
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κολάζ€ΐν τοι? έσχατοι?, ούδέν γάρ δ€ΐν τών νόμων c iv a i 5
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σκ€υουργία? ή και γαυργία? κα\ τή? π€ρ\ τά φυτά συνόλη?
τέχνη ?, ή καί τινα ίπποφορβίαν αύ κατά συγγράμματα
θ€ασαίμ€θα γ ιγ ν ο μ έν η ν ή σιίμπασαν άγ€λαιοκομική ν ή
 141
for each and every one of the officers, there will be a requirement to
set up courts, either of rich men on the basis of preselection or again
299 those chosen by lot from the whole people together, and to bring those
who have held office before these judges in order to examine their
conduct, and for anyone who wishes to charge an officer that he failed
to steer the ships during the year according to the written rules or
as according to the ancient customs of their ancestors, and there will be
these same requirements also in the ease of those healing the sick; and
for any of them who arc condemned by the vote, the judges will have
to assess what penalty they should suffer or what financial restitution
they should make.
Y.S.: Well, anyone who would be willing and voluntarily undertakes
bi to hold office under such conditions would fully deserve to suffer any
penalty whatever and to pay back any amount.
E.S.: And further still it will be necessary to establish a law against all
the following things: if anyone is found looking into steersmanship
and seafaring, or health and truth in the doctor’s art, in relation to
bs winds and heat and cold, above and beyond the written rules, and
making clever speculations of any kind in relation to such things, in
the first place one must not call him an expert doctor or an expert
steersman but a star-gazer, some babbling sophist; and then that
anyone who wishes of those permitted to do so should indict him and
ci bring him before some court or other as corrupting other people
younger than himself and inducing them to engage in the arts of the
steersman and the doctor not in accordance with the laws, but rather
to take autonomous control of ships and patients; and if he is found
c5 guilty of persuading anyone, whether young or old, contrary to the
laws and the written rules, that the most extreme penalties must be
imposed on him. For it will be laid down that there must be nothing
wiser than the laws; for no one is ignorant about what belongs to the
art of the doctor, or about health, or what belongs to the art of the
4i steersman, or seafaring, since it is possible for anyone who wishes to
understand things that arc written down and things established as
ancestral customs. If then these things came about, Socrates, in the
way we say, both in relation to these kinds of expert knowledge, and
generalship, and all the art of hunting, of whatever kind, painting, or
45 any part whatever of all the art of imitation, carpentry, the whole of
tool-making, of whatever kind, or again farming and the whole kind
of expertise that deals with plants - or if again we imagined a kind of
142
μαντικήν ή πάν δτι μέρος διακονική π€ρΐ€ΐληφ€ν, ή π€ΤΤ€ίαν, e
ή συμπασαν αριθμητικήν ψιλήν €ΪΤ€ έπίπ€δον c it ' έν βάθ€σιν
c it ' έν τα χ€ σ ιν ούσάν τιου — τΐ€ρι ά π α ν τα τα υ τα ουτω
ττραττόμ€να τ ι π ο τ' αν φαν€ΐη, κατά συγγράμματα γιγνόμ€να
και μή κατά τέχνην; 5
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Δήλον δ τ ι πά σ αί τ€ αΐ τ έ χ ν α ι πα ντ€λώ ς αν
άπόλοιντο ήμΐν, και ούδ' Α ς αύθις γέν ο ιντ' άν ττοτ€ διά τον
άποκωλυοντα τούτον ζητ€ΐν νόμον ώοτ€ δ βίος, ών και νΟν
χαλ€πός, Α ς τον χρόνον έκ€ΐνον αβίωτος* γ ίγ ν ο ιτ ' άν το 300
παράπαν.
ΞΕ. Τί δέ τόδ€; cl κατά συγγράμματα μέν άναγκάζοιμ€ν
έκαστον γίγν€σθαι τών €ΐρημένων και τοΐς* συγγράμμασιν
ημών έπιστατ€ΐν τον χ€ΐροτονηθέντα ή λαχόντα έκ τύχης*, 5
ούτος* δέ μηδέν φροντίζων τών γραμμάτων ή κέρδους* cvckc' v
τίνος* ή χάριτος* Ιδίας* παρά τα υ τ' έπιχ€ΐροΐ δραν CTCpa,
μηδέν γιγνώσκων, αρα ου του κακού του πρόσθ€ν μέϊζον άν
έτι τούτο γίγνοιτο κακόν;
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Άληθέστατά γ€. 10
ΞΕ. Παρά γάρ όιμαι τούς* νόμους* τούς* έκ π€ΐρας πολλής* b
κ€ΐμ€'νους κ α ί τιν ω ν συμβουλώ ν έ κ α σ τ α χ α ρ ιέ ν τ ω ς
συμβουλ€υσάντων και π€ΐσάντων θέοθαι τό πλήθος*, ό παρά
ταυτα τολμών δραν, αμαρτήματος αμάρτημα πολλαπλάσιον
άπ€ργαζόμ€νος, άνατρέποι πάσαν άν πράξιν έ τ ι μ€ΐζόνως 5
τών συγγραμμάτων.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Πώς δ* ου μέλλ€ΐ;
ΞΕ. Δ ιά τ α υ τ α δή τ ο ις π€ρ'ι ό τουουν νο'μους καί
συγγράμματα τιθ€μένοις δαίτ€ρος πλους το παρά ταυτα μήτ€ c
ένα μήτ€ πλήθος μηδέν μηδέποτ€ έάν δραν μηδ' ότιουν.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Όρθώς.
ΞΕ. Ούκοΰν μιμήματα μέν άν έκάστων ταυτα €ΐη τή ς
ά λ η θ € ΐα ς, τα παρά τώ ν € ΐδ ό τω ν € ΐς δ υ ν α μ ιν c iv a i 5
γ€γραμμένα;
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Πώς δ' οΰ;
ΞΕ. Και μήν τόν γ€ €ΐδότα έφαμ€ν, τον όντως πολιτικόν,

a 10 άληθέστατά γο η: άληθέστατά η, Ο
 143
horsc-rcaring that took place according to written rules, or all of herd-
ei care, or the art of divination, or every part that is encompassed by the
business of carrying out the instructions of others, or petteia, or all the
science of numbers, whether -1 imagine - dealing with them on their
own, or plane, or in solids, or in speeds - in relation to all of these
things, practised in this way, what on earth would be the result that
es would appear, if they were done on the basis of written rules and not
on the basis of expertise?
Y.S.: It’s clear both that we should sec all the kinds of expertise
completely destroyed, and that they would never be restored, cither,
300 because of this law prohibiting research; so that life, which even now
is difficult, in that time would be altogether unlivcable.
E.S.: But what about the following consideration? If we were to
compel each of the things we have mentioned to be done according to
a5 written rules, and the person who has been elected or has been
appointed to office by lot, on the basis of chance, to oversee these
written rules of ours, but this person were to take no notice of what is
written down, for the sake either of profiting in some way or of doing
some personal favour, and were to undertake to do different things,
contrary to these, when he possesses no knowledge, would this not be
an evil still greater than the previous one?
•io Y.S.: Yes, very true.
bi E.S.: Yes, for if, I imagine, contrary to the laws that have been
established on the basis of much experiment, with some advisers or
other having given advice on each subject in an attractive way, and
having persuaded the majority to pass them - if someone dared to act
contrary to these, he would be committing a mistake many times
greater than the other, and would overturn all expert activity to a still
b5 greater degree than the written rules.
Y.S.: Yes - how would he not?
E.S.: For these reasons, then, the second-best method of proceeding,
ct for those who establish laws and written rules about anything
whatever, is to allow neither individual nor mass ever to do anything
contrary to these, anything whatsoever.
Y.S.: Correct.
E.S.: Well, imitations of the truth of each and every thing would be
c5 these, wouldn’t they - the things issuing from those who know which
have been written down so far as they can be?
Y.S.: Of course.
E.S.: Now we said - if we remember - that the knowledgeable
144
cl μ€μνήμ€θα, ποιήσ€ΐν τή τέχνη πολλά cl? τήν αύτοΟ πρδξιν
τών γραμμάτων ούδέν φροντίζοντα, όπόταν αλλ' αύτψ β€λτίω 10
δό£η παρά τά γ€γραμμ€να ύφ' αυτοί) καί έπ€σταλμένα d
άπουσίν τισιν.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Έφαμ€ν γάρ.
ΞΕ. Ουκουν άνήρ όστισουν cis* ή πλήθος* ότιουν, όί? άν
νόμοι Kcipcvoi τυγχάνωσι, τταρά ταυτα ότι άν έπιχ€ΐρήσωσι 5
Tioiciv (is* βέλτιον CTcpov όν, ταύτόν δρώοι κατά διίναμιν
OTicp ό αληθινός* έκέίνο?;
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Πάνυ μέν ούν.
ΞΕ. *Αρ* ούν cl μέν άν€πιστήμον€? ovtc? το τοιουτον
δρφ€ν, μιμέίσθαι μέν αν cmxcipoicv το άληθέ?, μιμοιντ’ αν 10
μέντοι παγκάκω?* cl 6 ’ cvtcxvoi, τούτο ούκ έσ τιν έ τ ι e
μίμημα άλλ' αυτό το άληθέστατον έκέίνο;
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Πάντως* ττου.
HE. Και μην έμπροσθέ γ€ ώμολογημένον ήμίν κέίται μηδέν
πλήθος μηδ' ήντινουν δυνατόν έίναι λαβ€ΐν τέχνην. 5
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Κέίται γάρ ούν.
ΞΕ. Ουκουν cl μέν coti βασιλική τις* τέχνη , τό των
πλουσίων πλήθος* και ό συμπας· δήμος* ούκ αν ποτ€ λάβοι την
πολιτικήν ταιίτην έπιστήμην.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Πώς* γάρ άν; 10
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γ€ γ ρ α μ μ έν α και π ά τρ ια έθη.
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ΞΕ. 'Ό ταν άρα οι πλούσιοι ταιίτην μιμώνται, totc 5
αριστοκρατίαν καλούμε τήν τοιαύτην πoλιτcίav· όπόταν
δέ τών νόμων μή φροντίζωσιν, ολιγαρχίαν.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Κινδυν^€ΐ.
ΞΕ. Καί μήν ό π ό τα ν αύθι? c l? άρχη κατά νόμου?,
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ιη: αύ τις c
 145
person, the one who really possesses the art of statesmanship, will do
cio many things with his expertise in relation to his own activity without
di taking any notice of the written laws, when other things appear to him
belter, contrary to the things that have been written down by him and
given as orders to some people who arc not currently with him.
Y.S.: Yes, that’s what we said.
E.S.: Well, any individual whatever or any large collection of people
ds whatever, for whom there are actually written laws established,
whatever they undertake to do that is different, contrary to these, on
the grounds that it is belter, do, don’t they, the same thing, so far as
they can, as that true expert?
Y.S.: Absolutely.
E.S.: Well then, if they were to do such a thing without having expert
dio knowledge, they would be undertaking to imitate what is true, but
ei would imitate it altogether badly; but if they did it on the basis of
expertise, this is no longer imitation but that very thing that is most
truly what it sets out to be?
Y.S.: I agree completely - 1 think.
E.S.: But it is established as agreed between us - we agreed it before,
eS at any rate - that no large collection of people is capable of acquiring
any kind of expertise whatever.
Y.S.: Yes, it remains agreed.
E.S.: Then if some kind of kingly expertise exists, the collection of
people consisting of the rich, and all the people together, could never
acquire the expert knowledge of statesmanship,
cio Y.S.: How could they?
E.S.: The requirement, then, as it seems, for all constitutions of this
3oi sort, if they arc going to imitate well that true constitution of one man
ruling with expertise, so far as they can, is that they must never -
given that they have their laws - do anything contrary to what is
written and ancestral customs.
Y.S.: Very well said.
•5 E.S.: In that ease, when the rich imitate it, then we shall call such a
constitution an ‘aristocracy’; when they take no notice of the laws, we
shall call it an ‘oligarchy’.
Y.S.: Possibly.
μ E.S.: And, in turn, when one person rules according to laws, so
imitating the person with expert knowledge, we shall call him a king,
146
διορίζοντέ? όνόματι τον μ έτ' έπ ισ τή μ η ^ ή δόξη? κατά (301)
νόμου? μοναρχοΟντα.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Κινδυνέύομέν.
HE. Ούκουν καν τι? αρα έπιστήμων δντω? ών €*? αρχή, 5
πάντω? τό yc όνομα ταύτόν βασιλέύ? και ούδέν έτέρον
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λέγομένων πολιτέΐών €ν μόνον γέγονέν.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Έ οικ€ γουν.
ΞΕ. Τ ί δ' όταν μητ€ κατά νόμου? μήτέ κατά έθη πράττη 10
τ ι? €i? αρχών* προσποιήται δέ ώσπέρ ό έπιστήμω ν ώ? άρα c
παρά τά γέγραμμένα τό γ€ βέλτιστον ποιητέον, ή δέ τ ι?
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τότ€ τον τοιουτον έκαστον τύραννον κλητέον;
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ΞΕ. Ουτω δή τύραννό? τ€ γέγονέ, φαμέν, και βασιλέύ? και
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και οίκ€ΐν διακυβέρνώντα έύδαιμόνω? ορθήν άκριβώ? μόνον 5
πολιτέίαν.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Πώ? 6' ου;
ΞΕ. Νυν δέ γ€ όπότ€ ούκ έστι γιγνόμένο?, ώ? δή φαμ€ν,
έν ται? πόλ€σι βασιλέίι? όιο? έν σμήν€σιν έμφυέται, τό Τ € e
σώμα έύθίι? και τήν ψυχήν διαφόρων €ΐ?, δ€ΐ δή συν€λθόντα?
συγγρα'μματα γράφ€ΐν, ώ? έοικέν, μ έτα θέοντα ? τά τη ?
αληθέστατη? πολιτέία? ίχνη.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Κινδυνέυέΐ. 5
ΞΕ. θαυμάζομέν δήτα, ώ Σώκρατέ?, έν τα ΐ? τοιαυται?
π ο λ ιτ έ ία ι? οσα σ υ μ β α ίν ε ι γ ίγ ν ε σ θ α ι κακά καί οσα
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b 7 δι1 ά δή c: διά δή m: διά δή <τοΟτο> c | τά πέντε m: τά

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(transposed from b 6-7) | ό4λέγομεν η: λέγωμεν n
 147
(301) not distinguishing by name the one ruling on his own with expert
knowledge or the one doing so on the basis of opinion, according to
laws.
Y.S.: Possibly we shall.
t>5 E.S.: Well then, if in fact some one person rules who really possesses
expert knowledge, in any ease he will be called by the same name and
not by any other one; and as a result of this the five names of what arc
now called constitutions have become only one.
Y.S.: It seems so, at any rate.
bio E.S.: And what of when some one ruler acts neither according to laws
ci nor according to customs, but pretends to act like the person with
expert knowledge, saying that after all one must do what is contrary
to what has been written down if it is best, and there is some desire or
other combined with ignorance controlling this imitation? Surely in
those circumstances we must call every such person a tyrant?
c5 Y.S.: Of course.
E.S.: Then it is in this way that the tyrant has come about, we say, and
king, and oligarchy, and aristocracy, and democracy, because people
found themselves unable to put up with the idea of that single person
of ours as monarch, and refused to believe that there would ever come
di to be anyone who deserved to rule in such a way, so as to be willing
and able to rule with virtue and expert knowledge, distributing what is
just and right correctly to all, but they think that on every occasion
such a person mutilates, kills and generally maltreats whichever of us
he wishes; although if there were to come to be someone of the kind
we are describing, he would be prized and would govern a
constitution that would alone be correct in the strict sense, steering it
through in happiness.
Y.S.: Quite.
E.S.: But as things arc, when it is not the ease - as we say - that a
ci king comes to be in cities as a king-bee is bom in a hive, one
individual immediately superior in body and mind, it becomes
necessary - as it seems - for people to come together and write things
down, chasing after the traces of the truest constitution.
c5 Y.S.; Possibly.
E.S.: Do we wonder, then, Socrates, at all the evils that turn out to
occur in such constitutions, and all those that will turn out for them.
148
κατά γράμματα και Ιθη μή μ€τά έπιστήμης· πραττούσης* τάς·
τιράξ€ΐς*, <ή> έτόρα προσχρωμόνη παντ\ κατάδηλος ώς* πά ντ' 302
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οι τΐ€ρι τά πολιτικά κατ’ ούδέν γιγνώσκοντ€ς* ήγουνται κατά b
πάντα σαφόστατα πασών έπιστημών ταυτην ς’ιληφόναι.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Αληθέστατα.
HE. Τίς* ουν δή τών ούκ ορθών πολιτ€ΐών τούτων ή'κιστα
χαλεπή συζήν, πασών χαλ€πών ούσών, και τίς* βαρύτατη; δ€ΐ 5
τι κατιδ€Ϊν ήμας*, καίπ€ρ προς* γ€ τό νυν προτ€θέν ήμΐν
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€ν€κα του τοιούτου πάντ€ς* δρώμ€ν χάριν.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Δ€ΐ* πώ ς δ' ου;
ΞΕ. Τ η ν α υ τ ή ν το ίν υ ν φ ά θι τρ ιώ ν ούσών χα λ € π ή ν c
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πολλών, € ΐνα ι τ ρ € ΐς τα υ'τα ς ή μ ΐν λ € γ ο μ έν α ς του νυν 5
€πικ€χυμόνου λόγου κατ' άρχάς.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. *Ησαν γάρ ουν.
ΞΕ. Τ αύτας τοίνυν δίχα τέμ ΐΌ ντ€ ς μίαν έκάστην έξ
ποιώμ€ν, τήν ορθήν χωρίς άποκρίναντ€ς τούτων έβδόμην.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Πώς*; 10
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αύ τώ ν μή πολλώ ν τ η ν Τ€ ςύ ώ νυ μ ο ν έφ α μ € ν € ΐν α ι
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 149
when a foundation of this kind underlies them, one of carrying out
their functions according to written rules and customs without
302 knowledge, which if used by another expertise would manifestly
destroy everything that comes about through it? Or should we rather
wonder at something else, namely at how strong a thing a city is by its
nature? For in fact cities have suffered such things now for an
«5 unlimited time, but nevertheless some panicular ones among them arc
enduring and arc not overturned; yet many from time to time sink like
ships, and perish, and have perished, and will perish in the future
through the depravity of their steersmen and sailors, who have
bi acquired the greatest ignorance about the greatest things, and who
although they in no respect have knowledge about what belongs to the
art of statesmanship, think that they have acquired this art in every
respect, most clearly of all kinds of expert knowledge.
Y.S.: Very true.
bs E.S.: So which of these ‘incorrect’ constitutions is least difficult to
live with, given that they arc all difficult, and which the heaviest to
bear? Should we lake a brief look at this, although a discussion of it
will be a side-issue in relation to the subject now set before us? And
yet, at any rate in general, perhaps everything that all of us do is for
the sake of this sort of thing.
Y.S.: We should, certainly.
ei E.S.: Well then, what you should say is that, if there arc three sorts of
constitution, the same one is at the same time exceptionally difficult
and easiest.
Y.S.: What arc you saying?
c5 E.S.: Just that monarchy, rule by a few and rule by many - that there
were these three sorts of constitution we were talking about at the
beginning of the discussion with which we have now been deluged.
Y.S.: Yes, there were.
E.S.: Well then, let’s divide these, each single one into two, and make
six, separating off the correct one from these on its own, as a seventh,
cio Y.S.: How so?
di E.S.: Out of monarchy let’s make kingly and tyrannical rule, and in
turn, out of the sort that doesn’t involve many, we said there was the
auspiciously named aristocracy, and oligarchy; and in turn, out of the
sort that docs involve many, then we called democracy single and put
as it down as such, but now in turn we must put this too down as double.
Y.S.: How, then? And dividing it by what criterion?
150
ΕΕ. Ούδέν διαφέροντι τώ ν άλλων, ούδ' cl τουνομα ήδη
διπλουν έσ τι ταύτης** άλλα το γ€ κατά νόμους* άρχ€ΐν κα\ e
παρανόμως* έσ τι και ταυτη κα\ ταΐς* άλλαις*.
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τούτων.
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ΕΕ. Την δέ γ€ τών μη πολλών, ώσπ€ρ ένδς* και πλήθους- τδ
ολίγον μέσον, ούτως* ήγησώμ€θα μέσην έ π ’ άμφότ€ρα* την δ ’
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 151
E.S.: By one that is no different from the other eases, even if now its
ei name is double; but at any rate ruling according to laws and contrary
to laws belongs both to this and to the others.
Y.S.: Yes, it does.
E.S.: Well, at the time when we were looking for the correct
e5 constitution, this cut was not useful, as we demonstrated in what we
said before; but since we have now set that one aside, and have put
down the rest as necessary, in the case of these the criterion of
contrary to laws and abiding by laws cuts each of them in two.
Y.S.: It seems so, given what has now been said,
eio E.S.: Well then, when monarchy is yoked in good written roles, which
we call laws, it is best of all six; but if it is without laws, it is difficult
and heaviest to live with.
303 Y.S.: Possibly.
E.S.: And the rule of those who arc not many, just as few is in the
middle between one and a large number, let's suppose to be middling
in both ways; while that of the mass, in its lum, we may suppose to be
as weak in all respects and capable of nothing of any importance either
for good or for bad as judged in relation to the others, because of the
fact that under it offices arc distributed in small portions among many
people. For this reason, if all the types of constitution are law-
bi abiding, it turns out to be the worst of them, but if all arc contrary to
law, the best; and if all arc uncontrolled, living in a democracy takes
the prize, but if they arc ordered, life in it is least liveable, and in First
place and best by far will be life in the first, except for the seventh;
for of all, that one we must separate out, like a god from men, from
t>s the other constitutions.
Y.S.: This seems both to follow, and to be, as you say, and we must do
as you suggest.
E.S.: So then we must also remove those who participate in all these
ei constitutions, except for the knowledgeable one, as not being
statesmen but experts in faction, and we must say that as presiding
over insubstantial images, on the largest scale, they arc themselves
too of the same sort, and that as the greatest imitators and magicians
c5 they turn out the be the greatest sophists among sophists.
152
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Κινδυν€0€ΐ τοΟτο cl? τούς* πολιτικούς· λ€γομόνους
π€ρΐ€στράφθαι τό ήήμα ορθότατα.
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μουσικής* αυτόν έγχ€ΐρητόον δηλώσαι. καί μοι λόγ€.
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ΞΕ. Μουσικής* 2στι πού τι? ήμιν μάθησις*, κα\ όλως* των b
π€ρι χ€ΐροτ€χνίας έπιστημών;

c 9-d 1 Σατυρικόν τινα θίασον ιπ: Σατυρικός τις θίασος c | (11-2

νυν 6* ουτω η: νυν ουτω η | d 5 όμοΟ τ ’ η: όμοΟ η
 153
Y.S.: This term looks as if it has been only too correctly turned round
against the so-called experts in statesmanship.
E.S.: So: this is our play, as it were - as we said just now that there
di was some band of centaurs and satyrs in view, one that we had to set
apart from the expertise of the statesman; and now it has been set
apart, as we have seen, with great difficulty.
Y.S.: It appears so.
E.S.: Yes, but there is something else remaining that is still more
as difficult than this, by reason of its being both more akin to the kingly
class, and closer to it, and harder to understand; and we seem to me to
be in a situation similar to that of those who refine gold.
Y.S.: How so?
E.S.: I imagine that these craftsmen also begin by separating out
dio earth, and stones, and many different things; and after these, there
ei remain commingled with the gold those things that arc akin to it,
precious things and only removable with the use of fire: copper,
silver, and sometimes adam as , the removal of which through repeated
smelling and testing leaves the ‘unalloyed’ gold that people talk about
e5 there for us to see, itself alone by itself.
Y.S.: Yes, they certainly do say these things happen in this way.
E.S.: Well, it seems that in the same way we have now separated off
those things that arc different from the expert knowledge of
statesmanship, and those that arc alien and hostile to it, and that there
eio remain those that arc precious and related to it. Among these, I think,
304 arc generalship, the art of the judge, and that part of rhetoric which in
partnership with kingship persuades people of what is just and so
helps in steering through the business of cities; as for these, in what
way will one most easily portion them off and show, stripped and
alone by himself, that person we arc looking for?
»5 Y.S.: It’s clear that we must try to do this somehow.
E.S.: Well, if it depends on our trying, we’ll find him; music will help
us reveal him. Answer me this.
Y.S.: What?
bt E.S.: I imagine we recognize such a thing as the learning of music,
and in general of the kinds of expert knowledge involving work with
the hands?
154
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Έ στιν. (304)
ΞΕ. Τί δέ; το 6' αύ τούτων ήντινοΟν €ΐτ€ δ€Ϊ μανθάν€ΐν
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συμπασών τών άλλων;
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διδασκούσης άρα σύ γ€ άποφαίνη δ€ΐν ήμΐν άρχ€ΐν; 5
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ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Πώς· 6' οΰ;
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πράττ€ΐν προς* τινας* ότιουν ή και τδ παράπαν <ήσυχίαν>
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ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Τή τής* πβιστικής* άρχούση και λ€κτικής.
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πολίτικου δύναμις*.
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βητορικδν, ώς: ercpov €ΐδος δν, ύπηρ€το0ν μήν ταύτη. c
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 155
(304) Y.S.: Wc do.
E.S.: And what of this? The matter of whether wc should leam any
b5 one of these or not - shall wc say that this too, in its turn, is a kind of
knowledge, concerned with these very things, or what shall we say?
Y.S.: Yes, we’ll say that it is.
E.S.: Then shall wc agree that this kind of knowledge is distinct from
them?
Y.S.: Yes.
bio E.S.: And shall wc agree that no one of them should control any other,
ci or that the others should control this one, or that this one should
manage and control all the others together?
Y.S.: This one should control them.
E.S.: In that ease you, at any rate, declare it to be your opinion that
the one that decides whether one should leam or not should be in
c5 control, so far as wc are concerned, over the one that is the object of
learning and teaches?
Y.S.: Very much so.
E.S.: And also, in that ease, that the one which decides whether one
should persuade or not should control the one which is capable of
persuading?
Y.S.: Of course.
cio E.S.: Well then: to which kind of expert knowledge shall we assign
di what is capable of persuading mass and crowd, through the telling of
stories, and not through teaching?
Y.S.: This too is clear, 1think: it must be given to rhetoric.
E.S.: And the matter of whether to do whatever it may be in relation
to some people or other through persuasion, or else by the use of force
45 of some kind, or indeed to do nothing at all: to what sort of expert
knowledge shall wc attach this?
Y.S.: To the one that controls the art of persuasion and speaking.
E.S.: It would be none other, I think, than the capacity of the
statesman.
Y.S.: Very well said.
<»o E.S.: This matter of rhetoric loo seems to have been separated quickly
ci from statesmanship, as a distinct kind of thing, but subordinate to it.
Y.S.: Yes.
E.S.: What should wc think about the following sort of capacity, in its
turn?
Y.S.: Which one?
c5 E.S.: The one that decides how to make war against each group of
people against whom wc choose to make war - whether wc shall say
156
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Και πώς* άν άτ€χνον διανοηθ€ΐμ€ν, ή'ν γ€ ή
στρατηγική και πασα ή πολ€μική πραξις* πράττ€ΐ;
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ΞΕ. Ούκ άρα πολιτικήν θήσομ€ν, ύπηρ€τικήν γ€ ούσαν, τήν
των στρατηγών Επιστήμην.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Ούκ €ίκό$τ. 10
ΞΕ. “Ίθι δή, και τήν των δικαστών τών όρθώς: δικαζόντων b
θ€ασώμ€θα δύναμιν.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Πάνυ μόν ούν.
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δυνάμςως* Εργον. 5
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 157
that it is not a matter of expertise, or docs involve expertise?
Y.S.: And how could we suppose it not to involve expertise: a
capacity which is exercized by generalship and all activity concerned
with war?
E.S.: And arc we to understand as different from this the one that is
eio able and knows how to reach a considered decision about whether we
should make war or should withdraw in friendly fashion; or as the
same as this?
Y.S.: Anyone who was following what was said before must suppose
that it is distinct.
305 E.S.: Shall we then declare our view that it controls it, if in fact we are
going to take things in line with what we said before?
Y.S.: I say yes.
E.S.: Then what mistress will we even try to propose for so terrifying
«5 and important an expertise, the whole of that concerned with war,
except the true art of kingship?
Y.S.: No other.
E.S.: In that ease we shall not set down the expert knowledge of
generals as statesmanship, since it is subordinate,
aio Y.S.: It seems unlikely that we shall.
bi E.S.: Come on then; let’s look at the capacity that belongs to those
judges who judge correctly.
Y.S.: Absolutely.
E.S.: Well then, docs its capacity extend to anything more than taking
bs over from the legislator-king all those things that arc established as
lawful in relation to contracts, and judging by reference to these the
things that have been prescribed as just and unjust, providing its own
individual excellence by virtue of the fact that it would not be willing
ci to decide the complaints of one citizen against another contrary to the
prescription of the legislator through being overcome by presents of
some sort, or fears, or feelings of compassion, or again by any enmity
or friendship?
Y.S.: No, the function of this capacity is roughly speaking as
c5 extensive as you have said.
E.S.: In that ease we discover the power of judges too not to be that
belonging to the king, but to be a guardian of the laws and
subordinate of that other capacity.
Y.S.: It seems so, at any rate.
eio E.S.: If then one looks at all the kinds of expert knowledge that have
been discussed, it must be observed that none of them has been
158
γάρ όντως* ούσαν βασιλικήν ούκ αυτήν 6ci πράττ€ΐν άλλ’ d
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και άκαιρίας*, τάς* 6' άλλας* τα προσταχθέντα δράν.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Όρθώς*. 5
ΞΕ. Διά ταυτα άρα &ς μέν άρτι δΐ€ληλυθαμ€ν, ουτ' άλλήλων
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πράξιν, κατά τήν Ιδιότητα των πράξ€ων τοΰνομα δικαίως*
€ΐληφ€ν ίδιον.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Εϊξασι γουν. e
ΞΕ. Τήν δέ πασών τ€ τούτων άρχουσαν και τών νόμων καί
σ υμ πάντω ν τώ ν κατά π όλιν έπ ιμ € λ ο υ μ ένη ν καί π ά ν τα
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τήν δυναμιν αυτής*, προσαγορ€ΐίοιμ€ν δικαιότατ’ αν, ώς* έοικ€, 5
πολιτικήν.
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ΞΕ. Ούκουν δή και κατά το τής* υφαντικής* παράδ€ΐγμα
βουλοίμ€θ' αν έπ€ξ€λθ€ΐν αυτήν νυν, ότ€ και πάντα τά γένη
τά κατά πόλιν δήλα ήμιν γέγον€; 10
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Και σφόδρα γ€.
ΞΕ. Τήν δή βασιλικήν συμπλοκήν, ώς* €01Κ€, λ€ΚΤ€ον ποια 306
Τ€ έστι και τίν ι τρόπφ συμπλέκουσα ποιον ήμιν ύφασμα
άποδίδωσιν.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Δήλον.
ΞΕ. *Η χαλ€πόν ένδ€ΐξα σ θα ι π ρ ά γμ α ά να γκ α ΐο ν άρα 5
γόγον€ν, ώς* φαίν€ται.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Πάντως* γ€ μήν ρητέον.
ΞΕ. Τό γάρ άρ€τής* μέρος* άρ€τής* €Ϊδ€ΐ διάφορον έινα ί τινα
τ ρ ό π ο ν τοίς* π€ρΙ λόγους* ά μ φ ισ β η τη τικ ο ις* κ α ί μ ά λ '
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2ν άρ€τής* ήμιν €ΐναι. b
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Πάνυ γ€.
 159
di declared lo be statesmanship. For what is really kingship must not
itself perform practical tasks, but control those with the capacity to
perform them, because it knows when it is the right time to begin and
set in motion the most important things in cities and when it is the
wrong time; and the others must do what has been prescribed for
them.
as Y.S.: Correct.
E .S.: For this reason, then, the kinds of expertise we have just
examined control neither each other nor themselves, but each is
concerned with some individual kind of practical activity of its own,
and in accordance with the individual nature of the activities in
question has appropriately acquired a name that is individual to it.
ei Y.S.: That seems so, at any rate.
E.S.: Whereas the one that controls all of these, and the laws, and
cares for every aspect of things in the city, and weaves everything
together in the most correct way - this, embracing its capacity with
eS the appellation belonging to the whole, we would, it seems, most
appropriately call statesmanship.
Y.S.: Yes, absolutely.
E.S.: We will want, won’t we, to pursue it further now by reference to
eio the model of the art of weaving, now that all the classes of things in
the city have become clear to us?
Y.S.: Yes, very much so.
306 E.S.: Then it seems that we should discuss the intertwining that
belongs to kingship - of what kind it is, and in what way it
intertwines to render us what sort of fabric.
Y.S.: Qcarly.
«5 E.S.: What it seems in that ease that we have to deal with is certainly
a difficult thing to show.
Y.S.: But in any ease we have to discuss it.
E.S.: To say that part of virtue is in a certain sense different in kind
from virtue provides an all too easy target for those expert in
•io disputing statements, if we view things in relation to what the
majority of people think.
Y.S.: I don’t understand.
E.S.: I’ll put it again, like this. I imagine you think that courage, for
bi us, constitutes one part of virtue.
Y.S.: Certainly.
160
ΞΕ. Και μήν σωφροσύνην γ€ άνδρ€ΐας* μέν Ιτ€ρον, ?ν 6’ ούν (306)
κα\ τοΟτο μόριον ής* κάκ€ΐνο.
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άλλήλοις- τά γ€ τη? άρ€τής- μόρια λέγετα ι που φιλία. c
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<Ινια> διαφοράν τοΐς- συγγ€νέσιν ές τι; 5
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€ΐς- δύο δέ αυτά τίθ€μ€ν έναντία άλλήλων €ΐδη.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Α έγ' Ι τ ι σαφέστ€ρον.
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€ΐτ€ κατά φωνής* φοράν, €ΐτ€ αυτών τούτων €ΐτ€ έν €ΐδώλοις* d
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γίγονας- εχτε άλλου παρών έπαινουντος* ήσθησαί;
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Τί μην; 5
ΞΕ. *Η και μνήμην Ιχ€ΐς* όντινα τρόπον αυτό δρώσιν έν
έκάστοις* τούτων;
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ΞΕ. *Αρ' ούν δυνατός* αυτό αν γ€νοίμην, ώσπ€ρ κα'ι
διανοούμαι, διά λόγων ένδ€ΐξασθαί σοι; 10
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αυτό έν τοις* ύπ€ναντίοις* γΙν€σι. τών γάρ δή πράξ€ων έν
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γ€νέσ€0ΐ c
 161
(306) E.S.: And also that moderation is something distinct from courage,
but at the same time that this too is one part of what the other is part
of.
b5 Y.S.: Yes.
E.S.: Well, we must dare to declare something astonishing in relation
to these two.
Y.S.: What?
E.S.: That, in some sort of way, they arc extremely hostile to each
bio other and occupy opposed positions in many things.
Y.S.: What do you mean?
E.S.: Not in any way the kind of thing we’re used to saying; for
ct certainly, I imagine, all the parts of virtue arc said to be amicably
disposed towards each other, if anything is.
Y.S.: Yes.
E.S.: Then should we look with extremely close attention to see
whether this is unqualifiedly the ease, or whether emphatically some
c5 aspects of them admit of dissent in some respect from what is related
to them?
Y.S.: Yes; please say how we should do so.
E.S.: We should look at it in relation to all those things we call fine,
but then go on to place them into two classes which arc opposed to
each other.
Y.S.: Put it still more clearly.
c io E.S.: Quickness and speed, whether in bodies, or in minds, or in the
<n movement of the voice, whether of these themselves or of them as
represented in images, all those imitations that music, and painting
too, provide - have you ever either praised any of these yourself or
been present to hear someone else praising them?
<15 Y.S.: Of course.
E.S.: And do you remember how they do it in every one of these
eases?
Y.S.: I don’t at all.
<*to E.S.: Then would I be able, I wonder, to show it to you in words just
as I have it before my mind?
ei Y.S.: Why not?
E.S.: You seem to think this kind of thing easy; but in any ease let’s
consider it in the opposite kinds of ease. Often and in many activities,
c5 whenever we admire speed and vigour and quickness, of mind and
162
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ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Ναι.
ΞΕ. Τί δέ; το τής- ήρ€μαίας- αύ γ€νέσ€ως· έιδος- αρ’ ού 307
πολλάκις- έπηνέκαμ€ν έν πολλαΐς- των πράσων;
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Και σφοδρά γ€.
ΞΕ. Μών ούν ού τάναντία λέγοντ€ς· ή π€ρι έκ€ΐνων τούτο
φθ€γγόμ€θα; 5
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Πώ^;
ΞΕ. Ώ ς ήσυχαιά πού φαμ€ν έκάστοτ€ και σωφρονικά, π€ρί
τ€ διάνοιαν πραττόμ€να άγασθέντ€ς· και κατά τάς- πράξβις-
αύ βραδέα και μαλακά, και Ι τ ι π€ρι φωνάς- γιγνόμ€να λέια
και βαρέα, και πάσαν ρυθμικήν κίνησιν και δλην μούσαν έν 10
καιρώ βραδυτήτι προσχρωμένην, ού το τής* άνδρ€ΐας· άλλα το b
τής· κοσμιότητος- όνομα έπιφέρομ€ν αύτοΐς* σύμπασιν.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Α ληθέστατα.
ΞΕ. Και μην όπόταν αύ γ€ αμφάτ€ρα γίγνηται ταυθ' ήμϊν
άκαιρα, μ€ταβάλλοντ€ς* έκάτ€ρα αύτών ψέγομ€ν έπι τάναντία 5
πάλιν άπονέμοντ€£ τοις* όνόμασιν.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Πώς-;
ΞΕ. Όξύτ€ρα μέν αύτά γιγνόμ€να του καιρού και θάττω και
σκληροτ€ρα φαινόμενα [και) υβριστικά και μάνικά λέγοντ€ς·,
τά δέ βαρύτ€ρα και βραδύτ€ρα και μαλακώτ€ρα δ€ΐλά κα\ c
βλακικά και σχεδόν ώς τό πολύ ταυτά τ€ και την σώφρονα
φύσιν και την άνδρξίαν την των έναντίων, οΐον πολ^μίαν
διαλαχου'σας- σ τά σ ιν ιδέας·, ο ύ τ’ άλλη'λαις- μ€ΐγνυμένας-
έφευρίσκομ€ν έν ιάχς π€ρι τά τοιαύτα πρά{€σιν, έτι Τ€ τούς* 5
έν ταΐς· ψυχαΐς- αύτάς- ΐσχοντας· διαφ€ρομένους· άλλήλοις*
 163
body, and again of voice, we speak in praise of it by using a single
appellation, that of ‘courage’.
Y.S.: How so?
E.S.: I think we say ‘quick and courageous’ - that’s a first example;
eio and ‘fast and courageous’, and similarly with ‘vigorous’; and in every
ease it’s by applying the name I’m talking about in common to all
these kinds of thing that we praise them.
Y.S.: Yes.
307 E.S.: But again - in many activities, don’t we often praise the kind of
things that happen gently?
Y.S.; Yes, very much so.
E.S.: Well then, don’t we express this by saying the opposite of what
a5 we say of the other things?
Y.S.: How?
E.S.: In that, I think, we say on each occasion that they arc 'quiet and
moderate’, admiring things done in the sphere of the mind and again
in that of actions themselves that arc slow and soft, and then too
ato things in the sphere of the voice that turn out smooth and deep, and all
bt rhythmic movement and the whole of music which employs slowness
at the right lime - we apply to them all the name, not of courage, but
of orderliness.
Y.S.: Very true.
t>5 E.S.: And when, conversely, both of these sets of qualities occur at the
wrong time, we change round and censure each of them, assigning
them to opposite effect by the names we use.
Y.S.: How?
E.S.: By calling them ‘excessive and manic’ when they turn out
ct quicker than is timely, and appear too fast and hard, and calling things
that arc too deep and slow and soft ‘cowardly and lethargic’; and it's
pretty much a general rule that we find that these qualities, and the
moderate type as a whole, and the ‘courage’ of the opposite qualities
do not mix with each other in the activities concerned with things of
c5 this sort, as if they were types of thing that had a warring stance
allotted to them, and moreover we shall see that those who possess
164
άψόμςθα έάν μ€ταδιώκωμ€ν.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Που δή λέγ€ΐς·;
ΞΕ. Έν πασί τ€ δή τούτοις* όίς* νΟι/ €ΐπομ€ν, ώς* €ίκός* Τ€ d
kv έτέροις* πολλοις*. κατά γάρ όιμαι την/ αυτών/ έκατέροις*
συγγέν€ΐαν τά μέν €παινούντ€ς* ώς· οίκ€ΐα σφέτ€ρα, τα δέ
των διαφόρων ψέγοντ€ς* ώς· άλλότρια, πολλήν ς \ς έχθραν
άλλήλοις* και -πολλών πέρι καθίστανται. 5
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Κινδυν€υουσιν.
ΞΕ. Παιδιά τοίνυν αυτή γέ τις* ή διαφορά τούτων 4στ\ των
€ΐδών* τΐ€ρι δέ τά μέγιστα νόσος* συμβαίν€ΐ ττασών έχθίστη
γίγν€σθαι ταίς* πόλ€σιν.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Π€ρι δή ποια φής*; 10
ΞΕ. Π€ρι όλην, ως γ€ €ΐκός*, τήν του ζην τιαρασκ€υήν. οί μέν e
γάρ δή διαφ€ρόντως* όντ€ς* κόσμιοι τον ήσυχον α€ΐ βίον
έτοιμοι ζην, αυτοί καθ' αυτούς* μόνοι τά σφέτ€ρα αυτών
πράττοντ€ς*, οίκοι τ€ αύ προς* άπαντας* ούτως* όμιλουντ€ς*, και
•προς* τάς* έζωθ€ν πόλ€ΐς* ώσαυ'τως* έτοιμ οι πά ντα όντ€ς* 5
τρόπον τινά άγ€ΐν €ΐρήνην και διά τον έρωτα δή τούτον
άκαιρότ€ρον όντα ή χρή, όταν α βούλονται πράττωσιν, έλαθον
αυτοί τ€ άπολέμως* ΐσχοντ€ς* καί τούς* νέους* ώσαυ'τως*
διατιθέντ€ς·, όντ€ς* τ€ α€\ τών έπιτιθ€μένων, έζ ών ούκ έν
πολλοις* Ιτ€σιν αύτόι και παΐδ€ς* και σιίμπασα ή πόλις* ά ντ’ 308
έλβυθέρων πολλάκις* έλαθον αυτούς* γ€νόμ€νοι δούλοι.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Χαλ€πόν €ΐπ€ς* και δ€ΐνόν πάθος*.
ΞΕ. Τί δ’ οί προς* τήν άνδρ€ΐαν μάλλον ρέποντ^ς*; αρ' ούκ
έπι πόλ€μον aci τινα τάς* αυτών συντ€ΐνοντ€ς* πόλ€ΐς* διά 5
τήν τού τοιούτου βίου σφοδροτέραν τού δέοντος* έπιθυμίαν
€ΐς* έχθραν πολλοις* και δυνατοΐς* καταστάντ€ς* ή πάμπαν
διώλ€σαν ή δούλας* αύ και ύποχ€ΐρίους* τόίς: έχθροιςτ ύπέθ€σαν
τάς* αυτών πατρίδας*;
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Έ σ τι και ταυτα. b
ΞΕ. Πώς* ούν μή φώμ€ν έν τούτοις* άμφότ€ρα ταυτα τά
γένη πολλήν προς: άλληλα α€ΐ καί τήν μ€γίστην ΐσ χ€ΐν
έχθραν και στάσιν;

d 3 οικεία <κα\> C | d 6 αυτή γ* έτι C

 165
them in their souls arc at odds with each other, if we go looking for
them.
Y.S.: Where do you mean us to look?
di E.S.: Both in all the spheres we mentioned just now, and no doubt in
many others. For I think because of their affinity to either set of
qualities, they praise some things as belonging to their own kin, and
censure those of their opponents as alien, and engage in a great deal
ds of hostility towards each other, and about a great many things.
Y.S.: Very likely.
E.S.: Well, this disagreement, of these sorts of people, is a kind of
play; but in relation to the most important things, it turns out to be a
disease which is the most hateful of all for cities.
Y.S.: In relation to what, do you mean?
ei E.S.: In relation to the organization of life as a whole. For those who
arc especially orderly arc always ready to live the quiet life, carrying
on their private business on their own by themselves, both associating
c5 with everyone in their own city on this basis, and similarly with cities
outside their own, being ready in any way to preserve peace of some
kind; and because of this passion of theirs, which is less timely than it
should be, when they do what they want nobody notices that they are
being unwarlike and making the young men the same, and that they
ate perpetually at the mercy of those who attack them, with the result
308 that within a few years they themselves, their children, and the whole
city together often become slaves instead of free men before they
have noticed it.
Y.S.: What you describe is a painful and terrifying thing to go
through.
E.S.: But what about those who incline more towards courage? Isn’t
«5 it the case that they arc always drawing their cities into some war or
other because of their desire for a life of this sort, which is more
vigorous than it should be, and that they make enemies of people who
are both numerous and powerful, and so either completely destroy
their own fatherlands or else make them slaves and subjects of their
enemies?
bi Y.S.: This too is true.
E.S.: How then can we deny that in these things both of these kinds of
people always admit of much hostility and dissent between them,
even to the greatest degree?
166
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Ούδαμώς* ώς* ού φήσομευ. 5
HE. Ούκουυ δπερ έπεσκοποϋμευ κατ’ άρχάς* άυηυρήκαμευ,
δτι μόρια αρετής* ού σμικρά άλλήλοις* διαφ^ρεσθου φιία€ΐ καί
δή και τούς· ΐσχουτας· δρατου το αύτδ τούτο;
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Κιυδυυευ'ετου.
ΞΕ. Τόδ€ τοίυυυ αύ λάβωμευ. 10
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Το ποιου;
HE. Εϊ τις* τιου των συυθετικώυ έπιστημώυ ττραγμα δτιοΟυ c
τώυ αυτής* εργωυ, καυ εί τδ φαυλότατου, έκουσα εκ μοχθηρώυ
και χρηστώυ τιυωυ συυίστησιυ, ή πασα επιστήμη παυταχου
τα μευ μοχθηρά είς* δυυαμιυ άτιοβάλλ€ΐ, τα δε επιτήδεια και
τα χρηστά ελαβευ, εκ τούτωυ δε και όμοίωυ και άυομοίωυ 5
δυτωυ, πάυτα εις* ευ αυτά συυάγουσα, μίαυ τιυά δυυαμιυ και
Ιδεαυ δημιουργεί.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Τ ί μήυ;
ΞΕ. Ούδ’ άρα ή κατά φύσιυ αληθώς* ούσα ήμΐυ πολιτική μη d
ποτ€ € κ χρηστώ υ καί κακώυ άυθρώπωυ εκουσα ε ιυ α ι
συστήσηται πόλιυ τιυά, άλλ’ ευδηλου δ τι παιδι$ πρώτου
βασαυΐ€Ϊ, μετά δε τήυ βάσαυου αύ τοις* δυυαμευοις* παιδευειυ
και ύπηρετεΐυ προς* τουτ' αύτδ παραδώσ€ΐ, προστάττουσα και 5
επιστατούσα αυτή, καθάπερ ύφαυτική τοις* τε ξαίυουσι και
τοις* τάλλα προπαρασκευάζουσιυ δσα πρδς* τήυ πλεξιυ αυτής*
συμπαρακολουθουσα π ρ ο σ τα 'ττει και ε π ισ τ α τ ε ί, το ια υ τα
έκάστοις* έυδεικυυσα τά έργα άποτελεΐυ οια άυ έπιτήδ€ΐα e
ήγήται πρδς* τήυ αυτής* ειυαι συμπλοκήυ.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Πάυυ μευ ούυ.
ΞΕ. Ταύτδυ δή μοι τουθ’ ή βασιλική φαίυ€ται πασι τοΐς*
κατά υόμου παιδευτάΐς* και τροφευσιυ, τήυ τής* έπιστατικής* 5
αυτή διίυαμιυ εχουσα, ούκ έπιτρεψειυ άσκεϊυ δτι μή τις* πρδς·
τή υ αυτής* συ'γκρασιυ άπεργαζο'μ^νΌς* ήθο'? τ ι πρε'που
αποτελεί, ταυτα δε μόυα παρακελευεσθαι παιδευειυ* και τούς*
μευ μή δυυαμευους* κοιυωυεΐυ ήθους* άυδρείου και σώφρουος*
δσα τε άλλα έστι τείυουτα πρδς* άρετήυ, άλλ' είς* άθεότητα 10
και ΰβριυ και άδικίαυ ύπδ κακής* βίςι φιίσεως* άπωθουμένους*, 309

θ4-5καΙ τά χρηστά η: καί χρηστά η, Ο | a 1 άπωΟουμόυους c:

άπωθου μera m
 167
b$ Y.S.: There’s no way we shall deny it.
E.S.: Then we have found, haven’t we, what we were originally
looking into, that parts of virtue of no small importance arc by nature
at odds with each other, and moreover cause those who possess them
to be in this same condition?
Y.S.: Very likely they do.
bio E.S.: Then let’s take the following point in its turn.
Y.S.: What’s that?
ei E.S.: Whether any, I suppose, of the kinds of expert knowledge that
involve putting things together voluntarily puts together any whatever
of the things it produces, even of the lowliest kind, out of bad and
good things, or whether every kind of expert knowledge everywhere
c5 throws away the bad so far as it can, and takes what is suitable and
good, and from these, both like and unlike, bringing them all together
into one, crafts some single kind of thing with a single capacity.
Y.S.: Of course.
ai E.S.: In that ease, neither will what we have decided is by nature truly
the art of statesmanship ever voluntarily put together a city out of
good and bad human beings, but very clearly it will first pul them to
the test in play, and after the test it will in turn hand them over to
as those with the capacity to educate them and serve it towards this
particular end, itself laying down prescriptions for the educators and
directing them, just as weaving follows along with the carders and
those who prepare the other things needed for its twining, and
ei prescribes for and directs them, giving indications to each group to
finish their products in whatever way it thinks suitable for its own
intertwining.
Y.S.: Yes, absolutely.
e5 E.S.: In just this very way, it seems to me that the art of kingship,
since it is this that itself possesses the capacity belonging to the
directing art, will not permit the educators and tutors, who function
according to law, to do anything in the exercise of their role the
working out of which will not result in some disposition which is
fitting in relation to the mixing that belongs to the directing art, and
calls on them to teach these things alone; and those that arc unable to
share in a disposition that is courageous and moderate, and the other
cio things that belong to the sphere of virtue, but are thrust forcibly away
309 by an evil nature into godlcssncss, excess and injustice, it throws out
168

θανα'τοις* Τ€ έκβα'λλ€ΐ καί φυγαΐς* και ταΐς* μ€γίσταις* (309)

κολάζουσα άτιμίαις*.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Λέγ€ται γουν πως* ούτως.
ΞΕ. Τούς* δέ έν άμαθίφ Τ€ αύ και ταπ€ΐνότητι πολλή 5
κυλινδου μένους* ς\ς το δουλικοί ύποζ€υγνυσι γένος.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. 'Ορθότατα.
ΞΕ. Τούς* λοιπούς* τοίνυν, όσων αΐ φυσ€ΐς* έπι τό γ€νναΐον
Ικαναι παιδ€ΐας* τυγχάνουσαι καθίσταοθαι και δέξασθαι μ€τά b
τόχνης* συμμ€ΐξιν προς* άλλήλας*, τούτων τάς* μέν έπι την
ανδρ€ΐαν μάλλον συντ€ΐνουσας\ όιον στημονοφυές* νομίσασ’
αυτών έϊναι τό στ€ρ€ον ήθος·, τάς* δέ έπι τό κόσμιον πίονί
Τ€ και μαλακφ και κατά την €ΐκόνα κροκώδ€ΐ διανήμάτι 5
προσχρωμένας*. ένα ντία δέ Τ€ΐνου'σας* άλλη'λαις*, π€ΐραται
τοιόνδ€ τινά τρόπον συνδ€ΐν και συμπλέκ€ΐν.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Ποιον δη;
ΞΕ. Πρώτον μέν κατά τό συγγ€νές* τό α€ΐγ€νές* δν τής* c
ψυχής* αυτών μέρος* θ€ΐψ συναρμοσαμένη δ€σμφ, μ€τά δέ τό
θ€ΐον τό ζψογ€νές* αυτών αύθις* άνθρωπίνοις*.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Πώς* τουτ' €ΐπ€ς* αύ;
ΞΕ. Την τών καλών και δικαίων πέρι και άγαθών και τών 5
τοιίτοις έναντίων όντως* ούσαν άληθή δόξαν μ€τά β€βαιώσ€ως*>
όπόταν έν ταΐς ψυχαΐς* έγγίγνηται, θ€ΐαν φημι έν δαιμονίφ
γίγν€σθαι γέν€ΐ.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Πρέπ€ΐ γουν ουτω.
ΞΕ. Τον δη πολιτικόν και τον αγαθόν νομοθέτην αρ’ ΐσμ€ν d
ότι προσήκ€ΐ μόνον δυνατόν €Ϊναι τη τής* βασιλικής* μουση
τούτο αυτό έμποΐ€ΐν τοΐς* όρθώς* μ€ταλαβουσι παιδ€ΐας, οί)ς*
έλέγομ€ν νυνδή;
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Τό γουν €*ικός. 5
ΞΕ. "Ος δ ’ αν δράν γ€, ώ Σώκρατ€ς, αδύνατή τό τοιουτον,
μ η δέποτ€ τοϊς* νυ ν ζ η τ ο υ μ έ ν ο ις ό ν ο 'μ α σ ιν α υτόν
προσαγορ€ΐίωμ€ν.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. 'Ορθότατα.
ΞΕ. Τ ί ούν; ανδρεία ψυχή λαμβανομένη τής* τοιανίτης* 10

b 6 [δέ] c I c 7 έν τ α ΐς ψ υχαΐς n: έν ψ υχαΐς η, Ο

 169
(309) by killing them, sending them into exile, and punishing them with the
most extreme forms of dishonour.
Y.S.: At least it is put something like this.
«5 E.S.: And again those who wallow in great ignorance and baseness it
brings under the yoke of the class of slaves.
Y.S.: Quite correct.
E.S.: Then as for the others, whose natures arc capable of becoming
bi composed in the direction of what is noble, if they acquire education,
and, with the help of expertise, of admitting commingling with each
other - of these, it tries to bind together and intertwine the ones who
strain more towards courage, its view being that their firm disposition
is as it were like the warp, and the ones who incline towards the
bs moderate, who employ an ample, soft, and - to continue the image -
wooflikc thread, two classes with opposite tendencies; and it docs so
in something like the following way.
Y.S.: What way is that?
ei E.S.: First, by fitting together that part of their soul that is eternal with
a divine bond, in accordance with its kinship with the divine, and after
the divine, in turn fitting together their mortal aspect with human
bonds.
Y.S.: Again, what do you mean by this?
c5 E.S.: That opinion which is really true about what is fine, just and
good, and the opposites of these, and is guaranteed, when it comes to
be in souls, I call divine, belonging to the class of what is more than
human.
Y.S.: It’s certainly a filling view to lake,
di E.S.: Then do we recognize that it belongs to the statesman and the
good legislator alone to be capable of bringing this very thing about,
by means of the music that belongs to the art of kingship, in those
who have had their correct share of education - the people we were
speaking of just now?
as Y.S.: That’s certainly reasonable.
E.S.: Yes, and anyone who is incapable of doing this sort of thing -
let’s never call him by the names we arc now investigating.
Y.S.: Quite correct.
dio E.S.: Well then - is a ‘courageous’ soul that grasps this sort of truth
170
άληθ€ΐα? άρ' ούχ ήμ€ρούται κα\ τών δικαίων μάλιστα ού'τω c
κοινων€ΐ ν άν έθ€λήσ€ΐ€ν, μή μ€ταλαβουσα δέ άποκλίν€ΐ
μάλλον προ? θηριώδη τινά φύσιν;
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Πώ? 6' οΰ;
ΞΕ. Τί δέ τό τη? κόσμια? φύσ€ω?; αρ’ ού τούτων/ μέν 5
μ€ταλαβδι/ των δόξων δντω? σώφροι/ και φρόνιμον, ώ? γ€ kv
π ο λ ιτ € ΐη , γ ίγ ν € τ α ι, μή κ ο ινω νή σ α ν δέ ώι/ λ€/γο μ € ν
έπον€ΐδιστόν τιι/α €ύηθ€ΐα? δικαιότατα λαμβάν€ΐ φήμην;
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Πάνυ μέν ούν.
ΞΕ. Ούκουν συμπλοκήν και δ€σμδν τούτον τοι? μέν κακοί? 10
προ? σφά? αυτού? και το ι? αγαθοί? προ? τού? κακού?
μηδέποτ€ μόνιμον φώμ€ν γίγν€σθαι, μηδέ τινα έπιστήμην
αύτφ σπουδή προ? τού? τοιουτου? αν χρήοθαί ποτ€;
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Πώ? γάρ;
ΞΕ. Τ οι? δ 1 €υγ€νόσι γ€νομένοι? τ€ Ι ξ α ρχή ? ήθ€σι 310
θρ€φθ€ΐσί τ€ κατά φιίσιν μόνοι? διά νόμων έμφυ€σθαι, και έπι
τούτοι? δη τουτ’ €ΐναι τέχνη φάρμακον, και καθάπ€ρ €ΐπομ€ν
τούτον θ€ΐότ€ρον €ΐναι τον σύνδ€σμον άρ€τή? μ€ρών φύσ€ΐ
ανόμοιων και έπι τά έναντία φ€ρομένων. 5
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. 'Αληθέστατα.
ΞΕ. Τού? μην λοιπού'?, δ ν τα ? ανθρω πίνου? δ€σμου'?,
ύπάρχοντο? τούτου του θ€ΐου σχ€δδν ούδέν χαλ€πδν οΰτ€
έννο€ΐν οΰτ€ έννοήσαντα άποτ€λ€Ϊν.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Πώ? δη, και τίνα?; b
ΞΕ. Τού? των έπιγαμιών και παίδων κοινωνήσ€ων και των
π€ρι τά? ιδία? έκδόσ€ΐ? και γάμου?, οι γάρ πολλοί τά π€ρΙ
ταύτα ούκ όρθώ? συνδουνται προ? την τών παίδων γέννησιν.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Τί δή; 5
ΞΕ. Τά μέν πλούτου καί δυνάμαον έν το ι? τοιούτοι?
δ ιώ γ μ α τ α τ ί κ α ί τ ι ? ά ν ώ ? ά ξ ια λο'γου σ πουδα'ζοι
μ€μφόμ€νο?;
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Ούδέν.
ΞΕ. Μάλλον δέ γ€ δίκαιον τών π€ρι τά γένη ποιουμένων 10
έ π ιμ έ λ € ΐα ν τούτω ν π έρ ι λέγ€ΐν, €Ϊ τ ι μή κα τά τρ όπον c

c 2 άποκλίνα m: αποκλίνει c, Ο | a 1 tc c: yc m | a 5 φύσα c:

φύσίω? m, O | b 10 γένη m: ήθη c
 171
el not tamed, and wouldn’t it be especially willing as a result to share in
what is just, whereas if it fails to get a share of it, doesn’t it rather
slide away towards becoming like some kind of beast?
Y.S.: Quite.
c5 E.S.: And what of the ease of the ‘moderate’ kind of soul? If it gets a
share of these opinions, doesn’t it become genuinely moderate and
wise, so far as wisdom goes in the context of life in a city, while if it
fails to get a portion of the things we’re talking about, doesn’t it very
appropriately acquire a disgraceful reputation, for simplcmindcdncss?
Y.S.: Absolutely.
eio E.S.: And let’s not say, shall we, that this intertwining and bonding, in
the ease of vicious men in relation to each other and good men in
relation to the vicious, ever turns out to be lasting, nor that any kind
of expert knowledge would ever seriously use it in relation to people
like this?
Y.S.: No; how would it?
3J0 E.S.: What I propose we should say is that it is only in those
dispositions that were both bom noble in the first place and have been
nurtured in accordance with their nature that it takes root through
laws, and that it is for them that this remedy exists by means of
expertise; and that, as we said, this bonding together is more divine,
«5 uniting parts of virtue that arc by nature unlike each other, and go in
opposite directions.
Y.S.: Very true.
E.S.: Yes, and the remaining bonds, which arc human, once this
divine one exists, arc perhaps not difficult at all either to understand,
or to effect once one has understood them.
t>t Y.S.: How then, and what arc they?
E.S.: Those that consist in intermarriages and sharing of children, and
in those matters relating to private giving-away in marriage. For most
people, in what relates to these things, do not bind themselves
together correctly with respect to the procreation of children,
w Y.S.: Why so?
E.S.: Why would anyone seriously concern themselves with censuring
the pursuit of wealth and forms of influence in such contexts, as if it
were worth discussing?
Y.S.: There would be no reason.
E.S.: No; it would be more appropriate to discuss those people who
cl pay attention to family-types, whether they arc acting erroneously in
172
πράττουσιν.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Είκδς γάρ ούν.
ΞΕ. Πράττουσι μέν δή ούδ' έξ ένδς* όρθοΟ λόγου, τή ν έν
τ<$ τταραχρήμα διώ κοντ€ς {><?στώνην και τφ τούς· μέν 5
προσομοίους* αύτοΐς* ά σ π α ζ€ θ θ α ι, τούς* δ ’ ά ν ο μ ο ίο υ ς μή
στόργ€ΐν, πλ€ΐστον τη δυσχ€ρ€ΐ<? μέρος* άπονόμοντ€ς.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Πώς·;
ΞΕ. Οι μέν που κόσμιοι τδ σφότ€ρον αυτών ήθος* ζητουσι,
καί κ α τά δυ'να μ ιν γ α μ ο υ σ ί τ€ π α ρ ά του'τω ν κα ί τ ά ς 10
έκδιδομόνας* παρ' αυτών € ΐς τοιουτους έκπόμπουσι π ά λ ιν ώς* d
δ' α υ τω ς τδ ncpi τη ν άνδρ€ΐαν γόνος* δρα, τ η ν αύτου
μ^ταδιώκον φυσιν, δέον ποΐ€Ϊν άμφότ€ρα τα γένη τούτων
τουναντίον άπαν.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Πώς·, και διά τί; 5
ΞΕ. Δ ιότι πόφυκ€ν άνδρ€ΐα Τ € έν πολλαΐς* γ€νόσ€σιν
αμ€ΐκτος· γ€ννωμόνη σώφρονι φυσ€ΐ κατά μέν άρχάς* άκμάζ€ΐν
ρώμη, τ€λ€υτώσα δέ έξανθ€ΐν παντάπασι μανίαις*.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Εΐκός*.
ΞΕ. Ή δέ αίδους* γ€ αύ λίαν πλήρης ψυχή και άκόραστος* 10
τόλμης* άνδρ€ΐας, kin 6k γ€ν€άς πολλάς* οΰτω γ€ννηθ€ΐσα, e
νω θ€στ€'ρα φ υ€ σ θα ι του καιρού κ α ί ά π ο τ € λ € υ τ ώ σ α δή
παντάτιασιν άναπηρουσθαι.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Και τουτ' €ΐκδς* ουτω συμβαίν€ΐν.
ΞΕ. Τουτους δή τούς* δ€σμούς* έλ€γον ότι χαλ€πδν ουδόν 5
συνδ€ΐν ύπάρξαντος του τΐ€ρι τά καλά κάγαθά μίαν έχ€ΐν
άμφότ€ρα τά γένη δόξαν, τούτο γάρ 4V καί όλον έσ τι
βασιλικής* συνυφάνσ€ως* έργον, μηδόποτ€ έάν άφίστασθαι
σώφρονα άπδ τών άνδρ€ΐων ήθη, συγκ€ρκίζοντα δέ όμοδοξίαις*
και τιμ α ΐς και άτιμίαις* και δόξαις και όμηρ€ΐών έκδόσ€σιν 10
€ ΐς άλλήλους, λ€ΐον και τδ λ€γόμ€νον €υήτριον ύ'φασμα
συνάγοντα έξ αυτών, τάς* έν ταΐς* πόλ€σιν άρχάς* ά€ΐ κοινή 311
τουτοις έπιτρότκιν.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Πώς*;
ΞΕ. Ου μέν αν ένδς* άρχοντος* χρ€ΐα συμβαίνη, τδν ταυτα

d 1 τοιου'τους η: τουτους η, Ο
 173
some way.
Y.S.: Yes, lhat’s reasonable.
E.S.: Well, they act out of no correct sort of consideration whatever,
c5 going for what is immediately easiest, and by welcoming those who
arc much like them, and not liking those who arc unlike them,
assigning the largest part of their decisions to their feelings of
antipathy.
Y.S.: How?
E.S.: The moderate, I think, look out for people with the disposition
cio they themselves possess, and so far as they can they both marry from
<n among these and marry off the daughters they arc giving away back to
people of this son; and the type related to courage docs just the same
thing, seeking after the nature that belongs to itself, when both types
ought to do completely the opposite of this.
(15 Y.S.: How, and why?
E.S.: Because it is in the nature of courage that when it is reproduced
over many generations without being mixed with a moderate nature, it
comes to a peak of power at first, but in the end it bursts out
completely in fits of madness.
Y.S.: That’s likely.
«no E.S.: And in its turn the soul that is too full of reserve and has no
ci admixture of courageous daring, and is reproduced over many
generations in this way, by nature grows more sluggish than is timely
and then in the end is completely crippled.
Y.S.: It’s likely that this too turns out as you say.
c5 E.S.: It was these bonds that I meant when I said that there was no
difficulty at all in tying them together once the situation existed in
which both types had a single opinion about what was fine and good.
For this is the single and complete task of kingly weaving-together,
never to allow moderate dispositions to stand away from the
courageous, but by working them closely into each other as if with a
cio shuttle, through sharing of opinions, through honours, dishonour,
esteem, and the giving of pledges to one another, drawing together a
Jit smooth and ‘fine-woven’ fabric out of them, as the expression is,
>i always to entrust offices in cities to these in common.
Y.S.: How?
E.S.: By choosing the person who has both qualities to put in chaigc
174
αμφότ€ρα έχοντα αιροιίμ€νον έπιστάτην* ού δ ’ αν πλ€ΐόνων, (311)
τούτων μέρος έκατόρων συμμ€ΐγνυντα. τά μέν γάρ σωφρόνων 6
αρχόντων ήθη σφοδρά μέν €υλαβή κα\ δίκαια και σωτήρια,
δριμιίτητος* δέ καί τίνος* Ιταμότητος* ό{€ΐας* κα\ πρακτικής:
ένδ€Ϊται.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Δοκ€ΐ γουν δή κα\ ταδ€. 10
ΞΕ. Τά δ' άνδρ€ΐά γ€ αύ προς* μέν τδ δίκαιον και €υλαβές* b
€Κ€ΐνων €πιδ€€σ τ€ρα, τό δ€ έ ν ταΐς* πρα'{€σι ιτ α μ ό ν
διαφ€ρόντως* Τσχ^ι. πάντα δέ καλώς* γίγν€σθαι τά π€ρι τάς*
πόλ€ΐς* ίδίςι και δημοσία τουτοιν μή παραγ€νομόνοιν άμφοιν
αδύνατον. 5
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Πώς* γάρ οΰ;
HE. Τούτο δή τέλος* ύφάσματος* €υθυπλοκί<£ συμπλακέν
γίγν€σθαι φώμςν πολιτικής* πράξ€ως* τό των άνδρ€ΐων και
σωφρόνων ανθρώπων ήθος*, όπόταν όμονοίςι και φιλί<£ κοινόν
συναγαγουσα αυτών τον βίον ή βασιλική τέχνη , πάντων c
μ€γαλοπρ€πέστατον υφασμάτων καί άριστον άποτ€λέσασα
[ώστ* €ΐναι κοινόν] τους* τ ' άλλους* έν ταΐς* πόλ€σι πάντας*
δου'λους* καί έλ€υθέρους* άμπίσχουσα, συνέχη του'τφ τό}
πλέγματι, και καθ’ όσον €υδαίμονι προσήκ€ΐ γίγν€σθαι πόλ€ΐ 5
τουτου μηδαμή μηδέν έλλ€ΐπουσα αρχή τ€ και έπιστατή.
ΣΩ. Κάλλιστα αύ τον βασιλικόν άπ€τέλ€σας* άνδρα ήμίν, ώ
ξέν€, και τον πολιτικόν.

5 2 ιταμόν c: τό μέν m | 59< ω σ τ' clvai> κοινόν C

 175
a5 wherever there turns out to be a need for a single officer, and by
mixing together a part of each of these groups where there is a need
for more than one. For the dispositions of moderate people when in
office arc markedly cautious, just, and conservative, but they lack
bite, and a certain sharp and practical keenness,
aio Y.S.: This too certainly seems to be the ease,
bt E.S.: And the dispositions of the courageous, in their turn, arc inferior
to the others in relation to justice and caution, but have an exceptional
degree of keenness when it comes to action. Everything in cities
cannot go well, either on the private or on the public level, unless
b5 both of these groups arc there to give their help.
Y.S.: Quite.
E.S.: Then let us say that this marks the completion of the fabric
which is the product of the art of statesmanship, the weaving together,
with regular intertwining, of the disposition of brave and moderate
people, when the expertise belonging to the king, bringing their life
ct together in agreement and friendship and making it common between
them, completing the most magnificent and best of all fabrics and
covering all the oilier inhabitants of cities, both slave and free, holds
c5 them together with this twining and, so far as it belongs to a city to be
happy, not falling short of this in any respect, rules and directs.
Old Socrates: Another most excellent portrait, Stranger, this one that
you have completed for us, of the the man who possesses the art of
kingship: the statesman.
 177
Commentary
257 a 2 'our visitor': i.c. the *Eleatic Stranger’, to use his traditional tide: see Introduction.
a 3-5 'And perhaps, Socrates, your debt will be three times as great ’three times’, because a third
figure, that of the sophist, has already been described - in the Sophist , of which the Staiesnuin is
presented as a continuation. See Sophist 216 b ff. ‘Statesman’ (a 4) is the traditional translation of
the Greek πολιτικός the reference is in the first instance to an expert in the 'art of politics’,
πολιτική τέχνη, who will eventually be separated off from all individuals who currently occupy
themselves with the public affairs of the city, just on the basis that they lack the requisite expertise.
For further discussion of the term, see Introduction. In so far as 'statesman', in ordinary English
usage, implies someone who stands apart from, or above, ordinary 'politics’, it is therefore an
appropriate rendering. Plato evidently never wrote a separate dialogue called Philosopher, perhaps
he tired of the project, or thought that the nature of the philosopher emerged with sufficient clarity
from the treatments of the sophist and the statesman, wno are defined partly by contrast with him;
or the reference is to some other, differently named, dialogue (cf. Campbell Ivi-lix). When they
complete...': cf. n. on 311 c 7-8.
b 3-4 'by more than can be expressed ...': lit. *by more than according to the proportion which belongs
to your expertise (τέχνη)’. (On the important term τέχνη, see n. on 2o8 d 5; on Theodorus the
mathematician, see Introduction.) The fact is that - in a Platonic context - the sophist has no
positive value at all, and even has negative value. The question 'what are the relative values of the
three?' thus has no meaning - except perhaps in the case of the philosopher and the statesman. By
the end of the dialogue, there will be some considerable grounds for supposing that they will be the
same person; but their roles, and subject-matter, are different (philosophers may turn their hand to
politics, but are not ipso facto statesmen: statesmanship will require special skills).
b 5-6 'by our god Ammon': a Greek from the mainland might have said *by Zeus'; Theodorus, a Greek
from Cyrene in North Africa, uses his local equivalent (Thomas Johansen has pointed out to me
the possibility of a covert reference here to Phaedrus 274-5, where Ammon/Thamus appears as the
champion of memory.)
b8 'guest' translates the same Greek word (ξένος-) as 'stranger' and Visitor': the unnamed person is
from abroad, only temporarily visiting, and as such enjoying hospitality from hosts in Athens.
c4 'what we have In hand': for αυτών in this sense, Campbell compares 'the frequent use of αύτα
without a distinct antecedent in Thucydides'; it is equally frequent in Plato (in Pit. itself, see
284 c 8,292 c , and cf. 262 d 5,297 d 1 [αυτοί).
c 8-9 'who trains with him': the primary reference is to physical training, but the reference to 'giving
Theaetetus a rest' suggests that they are also training together in a different sense, Lc. in the ait of
philosophical conversation or 'dialectic' (cf. Campbell). Ferrari, referring to Theaetetus 147 c-d,
makes them rather fellow-students of Theodorus the mathematician (ftS 391 n. 6.) See also Miller
(1987), 5-8.
d3 'you say Is like me': see Theaetetus 143 c - 144 a. The 'you say' has an extra point, in that to be
told that one looked like the notoriously ugly Socrates (cf. esp. Xenophon, Symposium V.l ff.)
might not necessarily have been thought of as a compliment; Theodorus in the Theaetetus has to
apologize for telling Socrates that the young Theaetetus is not attractive (καλό*) because he has
Socrates' snub nose and prominent eyes.
257 d 3 · 258 a I '... designated by the same n a m e t h e question whether things which share the same
name arc in fact necessarily related will be raised utter on (see esp. 262 c 10 ff.). For the noun
πρόσρησις- ('designation'), cf. 306 e 7. (The shift from the singular έμοι to the pedite ήμΐν in
257 d 3 seems purely a matter of stylistic variation.)
a 2-3 '„. to recognize those akin to us': i.e. - as the next sentence shows - to discover whether they are
akin to us; the reference is presumably to 'recognition scenes' in tragedy, which usually involve
members of a family belatedly recognising each other in dialogue. In this case, the dialogue will
be of a rather different sort (i.e. philosophical).
a 3-4 Theaetetus ... answering questions': 'yesterday' was when the fictional conversation of the
Theaetetus took place; 'just now* refen to the So p h ist. The verb translated by 'encounter'
(συμμ€ίγνυμι) can refer to sexual encounters; its combination with διά λόγων (verbal1) may
perhaps hint at the playful eroticism which is typical of the Platonic Socrates (see esp. Symposium
and Phaedrus). Socrates' style in the Theaetetus - as the leader of a conversation which at least
formally ends in no firm conclusions - is also characteristic; it contrasts strongly with the approach
of the Stranger in both Sophist and Pit., whose questions predominantly expea yes-or-no answers,
and lead to some fairly firm results. (See also n. on 286 a 5.)
b 1-2 Throughout Pit ., stress is continually nut on the need for the willing cooperation of both partners in
the conversation. Plato's dialogues frequently emphasise this difference between philosophical
178 COMMENTARY 258 b-c
dialogue or dialcciic and other, more competitive, forms of discourse. (For the general issues
raised here and in the preceding note, see Introduction),
b 2-3 after the sophist, It seems to me quite why E.S. thinks it 'necessary' (αναγκαίοι') to take
the statesman first (cf. 257 c 1-2) is not immediately clear, but it is surely not irrelevant a) that one
of the central aspects of the process of the definition of the statesman will be his separation from
existing politicians (cf. n. on 257 a 3-5); and b) that these will be described as 'greatest of the
sophists' (291 c, 303 c), in virtue of their skill as illusionists,
b 3-5 Wow tell me For the second part of the question, the Greek has simply 'or how [sc. should we
posit]?'. The definition of the sophist also began from a division of branches of knowledge -
though it turned out that the true sophist possessed no real knowledge worthy of the name; in the
case of the true statesman, the hypothesis will be confirmed, or at any rale allowed to
stand. Knowledge is 'cut' in different ways in the two eases, which has interesting implications
for the process of division as a whole; cf. Cavini, RS 131.
b7 ’the kinds of knowledge': what is to be divided includes all kinds of specialized knowledge,
ranging from mathematics to shocmaking (sec n. on d 5). Λ more literal translation might be
■knowledges’; but the plural of abstract nouns is regularly used to refer to occurrences or instances
of the thing in question - in this case 'instances’ in the sense of 'species'.)
b 10-11 'I think I see a cut': lit. '(a cut) appears to me', which is ambiguous between 1 think I see' and Ί
see'; the first seems to be what is meant, in view of the Stranger's ensuing insistence on getting
Y.S.'s agreement about what 'appears' to him.
c 3-7 'For we must discover... as being two forms.' 'Character' translates Ιδέα, 'form' Δ δο ς (but see n.
on 262 b 7); the metaphor is that of selling a seal/mark on something - to show us what each thing
is. The terms είδος· and ιδέα arc standardly used in the dialogues for Platonic 'forms'; but more
relevant here are the meanings 'visible character', 'type/sort (of thing)'. It is important to see that
E.S. is not saying they must separate ofT statesmanship on the one hand, and all other kinds of
knowledge on the other (assigning one είδος- to each), which would in any case produce the
absurdity of a single class of έπιστήμαι, knowledges', which had nothing in common except that
they were not statesmanship (cf. esp. 262 c - 263 a). What has to be separated off at this first stage
is the 'path' that leads to statesmanship, i.e. that set of kinds of knowledge which includes
statesmanship, which forms a genuine group, and which is separated off in some relevant way -
i.e. by reference to some feature of them which is central to statesmanship - from all the rest. E.S
will continue to treat YJS. as a beginner, carefully explaining each step to him.
c8 'Stranger': the Greek has Y.S. addressing RS. as ω ξένε, which is a quite standard, polite form
of address for slrangers/visilors for which there is no obvious equivalent in English; I adopt Difes’
solution, turning 'stranger' into a proper name.
d1 'Mmust also be a matter for you: i.e. when the result of this preliminary task is clear, Y.S. must
'own' it jointly with E.S.; in this as in every part of the discussion they must move forward together
or not at all.
d5 'kinds of expertise': i.e. τέχναι, traditionally translated as ’craft’, 'art*, 'science', 'skill', and used
here as a synonym for έπιστήμαι (knowledges’); the two terms will be used interchangeably
throughout. Cf. Gill, R S 294 n.15. 'Επιστήμη is the noun corresponding to έπίστασθαι, which
covers both knowing how to do something and knowing something tout court; in the latter role it
is synonymous with γιγνώσκειν, which is what arithmetic and its kindred sciences arc said to
provide. In the present translation, τέχνη will generally be rendered as '(kind of) expertise',
επιστήμη as knowledge* or 'expert knowledge'; βασιλική', Ιατρική, etc. (sc. τέχνη/έπιστημη;
similarly πολίτικη', discussed in n. on 257 a 3-5) will be the 'art of kingship', the 'ari of medicine',
for the sake of brevity and convenience, (The difficulty with 'art', and the other standard
translations of τέχνη/επιστήμη, is that - unlike the Greek terms - they tend to refer to certain sub-
types of specialisms, and the central point in Pit. is usually about what is in common between all
τεχναι - i-c. that they involve expertise or specialized knowledge.)
e1 'wad ute It to complete': συ να πουλούσαν (Robinson, following Richards) would give us 'and
[sc. their knowledge] helping to complete'. fMaterial items': lit. 'bodies'.)
e 5 'purely theoretical': more literally, '(a kind of knowledge) which is only concerned with
knowing'.
e ll 'let me take this way': what follows is an argument to the effect that the four types - statesman,
king, slave-master and household manager - will share the same kind of knowledge. See 259
c 1-2: 'so ... it's clear that there is one kind of expert knowledge about all these things' (although
the slave-master now disappears from the ensuing list of 'these things' as a separate item, having
been identified in b 7 with the household manager). However E.S.'s ultimate aim in the present
context is evidently to justify locating the slatesmanAing on the theoretical side of the division of
knowledge (e 4-5). See 259 c 6 - d 4, with n. on (259) d 3-4. But the passage also introduces king'
and kingship' as terms synonymous with ’statesman’ and 'statesmanship' (259 c 2-4: that they are
synonymous terms seems - as the text stands - to require no separate argument, but see n. on 259 d
 COMMENTARY 258 c - 259 d 179
3-4). Cf. Euthydemus 290 c - 291 c. Little further use is made of the supposed identity of the
slave-master and household manager, in respect of expertise, with the king and statesman (but see
260 c 4 with note), which is introduced chiefly as a step in the argument. The argument goes like
this: since someone who possesses a skill as a private individual merits the title of expert in that
skill just like the person who exercises it in a public capacity (illustrated by reference to medicine,
259 a 1*4), we can say that anyone who possesses the (true, b 1) knowledge of kingship, whether
he is actually a king or a private individual, merits the name corresponding to that knowledge (259
a 6 - b 5); there are private individuals who run houscholds/manage slaves, and 'in relation to rule',
there is no difference between a large household [see below] and a small city; there is therefore a
single type of knowledge which is required, whether for ruling a city (king/staiesman) or a
household. But clearly, managing slaves won't involve doing anything with one's hands - that's
what slaves arc for. So, kings Call kings', Le. all four types named, and so kings in the ordinary
sense) operate on the theoretical level ... Aristotle (Politics 1.1) criticises Plato for obscuring
important differences between the different types of 'rule', and indeed Pit. itself will show some
interest c.g. in distinguishing rule with the consent of the ruled from rule without it (see 276 e);
moreover it is unclear how the final definition of the statesman (305 e), which refers explicitly to
the polis, can strictly be applied to the household manager (cf. n. on 289 d 10; and see Dixsaut, RS
257-8). It may be best to conclude that the argument is more persuasive than strict On the other
hand, Plato might well want to hold that the various types of rule are species of a single genus, or
in other words that any rule over human beings is fundamentally similar in type, in so far as it
deals with similar material (human beings) and has similar goals; we may note in particular that the
consent of the governed will be explicitly ruled out as a defining feature of true statesmanship.
There may be a certain (provocative?) adumbration of this position in the listing of the slave-
master (δίοπότης*) in 258 e 8 along with the statesman and the king; the term δεσπότη; can also
refer to the tyrant.
259*1*2 'h. in private practice H. in public employment Campbell takes the contrast between the two
verbs (ίδιωτευειν, δημοσιεύεις) to be between someone who is not practising (publicly or
privately) and someone who is. But if it is given that δημοσιευειν can in principle mean either
practise publicly' or 'practise* simpliciter , it is the first - contrasted either with private practice, or
not practising but still possessing the relevant expertise (either of which is probably compatible
with ιδιωτεύει^) - which is relevant to the argument: see preceding note. For useful information
about public doctors, sec Skcmp ad loc.
*3 '... Uic same professional title*: lit. 'the same name belonging to the expertise (τέχνη)’.
*8 'ought to have possessed': implying that he docs not - if he did, he would not need an adviser.
Skcmp (40-1) secs a possible reference, in the idea of advisers to kings, to the involvement in
practical politics of members of the Academy (including Plato himself), often in an advisory
capacity. We might also - or instead - detect a reference to the (idealized) figure of Socrates, who
is represented in the Gorgias (521 d) as the only true statesman, despite his position as private
citizen, and one completely without interest in political power in the ordinary sense. But there is
nothing in the text that is not explicable in terms of the immediate context. (Ought to have*
renders the past tense εδει; κεκτ ησθαι = *ΐο have acquired', and so to 'possess'.)
b 4-5 'w ill... be addressed as an expert in kingship': lit '(as) kingly'; but βασιλικό;, in the present
context, is dearly equivalent to 'possessing the expcrtiseAnowIcdge/ait of kingship'.
b7 'Next, a household manager ...': evidently, then, qua 'ruler', the household manager is just
someone who rules over slaves. See following note.
b 9-10 'Well then, surely ...': this seems to be a way of saying that the form and size of a large
household and of a small city are sufficiently close to make them comparable for the purpose of
argument. 'Household' is an inadequate translation of οΐκησι;/οΙκο; here, which will cover the
property and productive enterprises (including workers/slaves) of wealthy individuals as well as a
'household' in anything like our narrow sense; and this explains the alacrity with which Y.S.
accepts the equation between household manager* (οΐκόνομο;: 'manager' on its own might be
closer) and slave-master.
c 6-8 'But this much is clear...': i.c. the general point about the identity between the categories aside,
we can certainly agree... 'Any king', i.c. anyone in any of the categories named (and therefore the
stalcsman/king proper). For the argument that makes the point in question 'dear', sec note on 258
ell.
c 10 - d 1 'mure closely related to the theoretical kinds of knowledge': kingship/staicsmanship will turn
out in the next division to belong to a category of theoretical knowledge which nevertheless has
connections with 'practical' activity. (For the construction [βουλει... φώμενΐ, cf. n. on 260 e 5.)
d 3-4 'In that case we shall ...' The issue is not so much about the identity of kingship and
statesmanship, since this counts as established (sec c 1-4); rather E.S. is confirming the identity of
kingship and statesmanship with the knowledge which the true king/stalcsman (cf. b 1) will
possess. Kingship/staicsmanship is a matter of knowledge only, just in the sense that it does not
180 COMMENTARY 259 d - 261 a
itself involve any 'practical actions' (258 d 4*6). This conclusion (δρα, 'in that case*) is drawn from
what has just been agreed in (259) c 6 - d 2, that being a king involves rather little use of the hands,
with which the 'practical' kinds of expertise were associated. But at the same lime, d 3-4 serves to
indicate that, consistently with c 1-4, what has been said about kings in c 6 - d 2 will apply
equally to statesmen, and perhaps to announce the general point about the interchangeability of the
two sets of terms.
Two editors have thought d 3-4 out of place. If the two lines were to be transferred to a position
after b 5 (with d 2, as proposed in Sandbach 11977]). or after b 6 (with d 5, as proposed
independently by Robinson), we should still have a conclusion to the argument of 259 a Iff., in the
shape of c 10 - d 1; however it is not clear that d 3-4 would itself fit better in its new location.
There will appear to have been no argument by that point (pace Robinson, RS 41) to show the
identity of kingship and statesmanship, if that is what the conclusion ('in that case...*) is about; nor,
if it is about kingsnip/statesmanship and the practicalAheorclical distinction, docs anything in fact
follow for that from a 1 - b 5 - if someone can be a king even if he docs not put his knowledge into
practice (b 3-5), this would only show that kingship was theoretical rather than practical if we
supposed that a carpenter, c.g., is only a carpenter wnen actually making something. In any case,
that 'kingship/stalcsmanship is a theoretical "art"' would come in too early, and make the
introduction of household - and slave-management unnecessary (sec n. on 258 e l l ) . I conclude
that things arc better left as they are.
d 9-10 The δρα in av (= id v ) apa 'indicates the improbability of the supposition' (LSJ; cf. e.g. 264 b 11,
281 c 8) - yet ES. does in fact come up with a viable suggestion immediately. Ihcre might be an
element of play here (are we really supposed to believe that he and Y.S. are engaged in a search,
when ES. is so prompt to answer his own questions?); but we should not too easily assume it,
since it will not be clear that the suggestion is viable until it has been tested. The search (or
'search*) will later take some wrong turnings, which will be recognised as such,
e1 'We agreed, I think .«': pace Campbell, the imperfect ήν is 'philosophical' (Ί think' renders που).
The 'art of calculation', (τε'χνη) λογιστική - i.e., in the present context, 'arithmetic' (Αριθμητική) -
has at least been referred to earlier (257 a 7, b 6-7), as having practitioners (and if it has
practitioners, it presumably must exist).
e6 'judging what it has recognized': i.e. seeing how big the difference is.
e9 'manage': liL 'rule over' (δρχειν).
260 a 1 'share in': the verb is μετε'χειν, which - as it happens - is also the verb frequently used for the
relationship between Platonic 'forms' and particulars (sec Introduction),
a6 'to each group of workers': or *to each and every worker (έκαστοι? τον εργατών),
a 10 - b 1 'ha so far as one makes judgements, the other directs': as the case of the master-builder shows,
the distinction would be more accurately stated as one between those kinds of knowledge which
merely make judgements and those which make judgements and direct. Cf. 292 b 9-10 with note,
b1 'these two groups': group' here translates γε'νο?. The term becomes established firmly in the
sense of 'genus' in Aristotle, who employs είδο? for 'species’; in the present dialogue, and perhaps
in Plato generally, γε'νο? means \ind of thing', or 'class', a role in which it is often interchangeable
with ειδο?.
b2 They appear to do so.' In principle, φαινεσθον could also mean 'they clearly do ' (cf. n. on 258 b
10-11); tat Y.S.'s next response, to what is essentially the same question, seems to imply a
modicum of doubt.
b7 'it is enough': liL 'one must be content', in the sense that there is no point in looking for more,
c4 'is master of others': the verb is the one corresponding to δεσπότ η?, the 'master of slaves', who
represents the extreme case of 'direction* (slaves - in principle, at least - contribute nothing on
their own initiative), and it has been agreed that there is no difference between the knowledge of
the king and that of the slave-master (cf. n. on 258 c 11).
d1 'das* (of kings)': the word is γένο? again (cf. n. on b 1).
d5 'setts them on' translates πωλοΟσι πάλιν, where παλιν, following δεύτερον, is of course strictly
redundant.
d7 'dais*: or 'tribe'; cf. n. on 264 c 3-4 (and 'the class Ιγε'νο?] oHicralds' in d 2).
e5 '"self-directors'": 'the noun (αυτεπιτα'κτη?) is formed by analogy with αύτοπώλη? (d 1, the
'producer who sells his own products').
'should we divide': the (deliberative) subjunctive parallels c 4 παρεικα’σωμεν, introduced
pleonastically (as often) by βούλει, 'do you wish ...?' Cf. 259 d 1.
261 a 1 'not his opposite': i.e. the person who takes orders, like the interpreter, etc., rather than giving
them.
a 3-6 'Wdl then, since this ...': this sentence is as awkward as the (fairly literal) translation suggests,
though its meaning is mostly clear - 'this' is the 'self-directing class, while 'them' refers to the
interpreter, the herald, and so on; since we have successfully made this division, we must now try
to oividc the relevant part in its turn, if some plausible way of dividing it suggests
 COMMENTARY 261 a - 262 b 181
toclf lo us. The difficult part is the participial clause 'distinguished by difference in relation to
kinship' (άλλοτρίοτητι βιορισθίν προ? οίκαότητα). Diis and Skemp (and apparently LSJ)
take it as referring to the difference between the derivative nature of the coipmands issued by one
group and the non-derivative nature of those issued by the other. But this seems a strained reading
of the text (even if αλλστριότη? could mean 'derivativeness', the Greek would suggest that it was
the commands of the 'self-directing ' group which were characterised by derivativeness: Ήιβ ... is
... distinguished by άλλοτριότ η?'). The reference is perhaps rather methodological, i.e. to division
as the 'estrangement' (άλλοτριότη? as at e.g. Aristotle, Pol. 1311 b 15) between the two related
(olKcta) groups of 'arts': they arc different, but remain related. The metaphor, in this case, will be
close to the idea of definition per genus el differentiam.
a 10 'All those In control of others': lit. 'rulers' (αρχοντ£?), but in an extended sense, including
experts in any area which a) involves control over others, and b) does not involve merely passing
on someone elsc's directions.
• 10 · b I 'as employing directions': or, if the προσ- in προσχρωμένα? is operative (which it may not be),
'employing in addition (sc. to their critical function?)'.
b1 'for the sake of something's coming-lnto-belng': lit. Tor the sake of some coming-inio-being'.
As far as the Greek is concerned, 'coming-inlo-bcing' (ycvcoi?) could include change as well as
the production of some distinct item (e.g. a house, c 9); but - at least for the moment - ES. takes h
in the latter sense.
b 7-8 'inanimate animate': or 'without soul' (δψυχα), 'ensouled (έμψυχα),
b 13 'the production': i.e. 'the comings-into-bcing' (ycvcocoiv).
c 1-2 'and In this way the elementary lesson being taught to Y.S. continues (cf. 258 a): the
essential point here is that the whole of the 'directiverpart of theoretical knowledge is divided; if it
is not, they might have missed the relevant segment, which includes the king/statesman (cf. 258 c).
(The word for part, μέρο?, which appeared in b 10, is not in the Greek of this sentence, or in ES.'s
next contribution, but can be supplied innocuously, especially since the latter employs the verb
μ€ρίζαν, 'divide into parts'.)
c8 'the expert knowledge that belongs to a king': the expression to ... τ η? βασιλική? emo i ημη?
hardly differs in meaning from ή βασιλική έπιστ ημη uhe mailer of
d 3-5 'Now, as one can observe 'Rearing' (τροφή) will have feeding as a primary constituent. All
the obvious cases where someone controls the production/coming-inio-being of living creatures
(i.e. animal husbandry in its various forms) also involve rcaring/Tccding them, and so the sudden
addition of 'and rearing' looks harmless enough. But at the same time something is obviously
wrong, since slalesmcn/kings are surely not involved in the rearing in this sense - or indeed the
production - of citizens in the way that shepherds are in the rearing of their sheep. E.S. will shortly
point out this mistake, via the great myth: maybe there could be kings on this model, but not in the
conditions which actually (or presently) obtain in the world.
Is done singly': in the Greek, being μονοτροφία’, where μονοτροφία is a new coinage,
e3 '"herd-rearing" or "collective rearing"': άγ£λαιοτροφία and κοινοτροφικη are evidently two
more invented terms; the question is designed to introduce the important methodological point of e
5-7. (That there is no practical difference between άγ^αιοτροφία, and κοινοτροφι&ά [sc. τέχνη]
is shown by the immediate substitution for the former of άγελαιοτροφι&ιί; as before, the activity
implies the relevant expertise, and vice versa.)
e 5-6 'not paying serious attention to names': most importantly, as it turns out, by not assuming that
the structure of reality (which will at least include the ordinary world as it is) necessarily
corresponds to the language we use to refer to it; see e.g. 262 c lOff.
e7 'as you Instruct': i.e. take whichever option suits the argument best; in fact, the term ES. now
chooses, άγολαιοτροφικη, neatly combines both options on offer (sec n o n e 3).
261 e 8 · 262 a 2 'how by showing i.e.., as before, how to divide into two, and identify the relevant part.
The simplicity of the point contrasts with the (self-parodying?) tortuousness of the Greek, which is
unenlivened by any clear or consistent metaphor (even 'in double the field ... in half is, in the
Greek, merely 'in double... in the half [plural])'.
262 a 3-4 'It seems to me ...': an elaborate way of saying just that we can distinguish the rearing of human
beings from that of animals. But it isn't clear what the basis of this proposed division will be; as
ES. says (b 2-5), Y.S. has simply noticed what kind of living creatures statesmanship is in fact
concerned with; and this is generally not a 'safe' way of proceeding (b 5 - c Iff.),
a5 'Yes, a bs o l ut e l y , i . e . , 'you've certainly done well, yes (but...).' This is perhaps not a wholly
empty compliment (cf. n. on 261 d 3-5), although it is in the event swamped by the ensuing
criticism.
a 8 · b 1 'and without reference to classes ...; let the part or, perhaps more literally,'... apart from
form (cl6o?); let the part have (a?) form at the same time'. 7nc question, once more (see n. to 258
c 3-7) is about the meaning of 'form'; and the sequel seems to show that for a part to have (a) form*
is at the least for its constituent items to have enough in common to be treated as belonging to a
182 COMMENTARY 262 b-c
single class (they all have the same ’form’ or 'character', which makes them belong to the same
classAypc). It appears that we need not import here, any more than before, any of the special
features traditiondly associated with the Platonic 'theoiy of forms' (see Introduction). But this
does not by itself indicate that Plato has abandoned such ideas; it might simply be that they are not
(immediately) relevant in the present context See further 285 d 8ff., with notes; and Introduction.
(Marcos dc Pinotti, in R S , provides a useful discussion of the relationship between eidos and
m eros , 'part', in this and other contexts in Plato.)
b4 'the right division': 'right' is supplied here (the Greek has merely'... that you had the division1).
b7 'classes': Ιδόαι. On this term, cf. n. on 258 c 3-7: if there was any significant difference between
l6ca and ά δ ο ς in that passage, there is certainly none here (any ambiguity as between 'defining
character' and 'class' will apply eaually to both terms).
c 1 'philosophical investigations': lit. 'searches' (ζητήσος), but what is clearly meant is 'searches'
like the present one.
c 3-4 '... your natural endowments': lit. 'your nature'. This at first sight might look like a rebuke (if
Y.S. could only apply himself a little more, it should be clear enough already); but in the light of
the seauel, it is perhaps rather a compliment - Y.S. has the natural intelligence to understand a
difficult point, it he is given more help. It is actually, at bottom, the same point that they started
with, at 258 c, namely that the division must be between two classes; but the difficulty is to know
what constitutes a genuine class (γό’ο?, eidos-) and what does not (cf. esp. 263 a 2-4). However,
one can at least point to (cf. c 5 δηλώσαι) examples of what doesn't constitute such a class ...
d 1-2 'In the way that most people here carve things up': i.e. here in Greece (or in Athens); E.S.,
though a Greek, comes from S.Ilaly. If it is said dial most people', hoi polloi, do something, that is
generally, in Plato, a sign that it is something to be avoided, and the present passage is no
exception. (The contrast, of course, is with the Few philosophers.) The verb translated 'carve up'
(διαΐ’€μ€ΐν) is literally to 'distribute', 'allocate'; the metaphor of 'cutting' plainly still has some life
in iL
d5 'this collection' translates αυτό Git* 'it', clearly referring to 'all races other than the Greeks'). The
syntax of the sentence is clearly disturbed: after πρδς· άλληλα, we expect a participle
(?διανόμοντ£? ...), but instead E.S starts afresh (βα'ρβαρου ... npoaeino^TC? ... προσδοκώοιν),
leaving the datives ου’μπασι... άσυμφώνοις hanging, and abandoning the KaOdnep clause. Such
dislocations are not uncommon in Plato's Greek, which in many respects imitates the patterns and
habits of ordinary conversational language; though at the same lime one should not exaggerate the
regularity of 'ordinary' written Greek.
d6 'family-class': may be the best one can do to translate the obvious pun in Greek (γένο ς as 'class'
and as 'race1), which is probably the main reason for the choice of this particular example: if it is a
rule that each part which results from a division has, or is, a (single) γέν ο ς , then it must be wrong
to class all non-Greeks together, since there arc obviously many γένη of non-Greeks. It makes no
more sense to divide off Greeks by themselves than it docs to divide off Lydians or Phrygians
(e 6-7) - if, that is, one is involved in the business of philosophical analysis. There may be all sorts
of other contexts in which dividing off Greeks from all non-Greeks is not only legitimate but
practically very useful (as in 'are we going to be able to talk to them without an interpreter?'); but
in the present context such divisions would be unhelpful, because with one side essentially
undefined (cf. d 3 ancipoi?), we couldn't be sure that what we were looking for was to be found
(exclusively) on the other. It'll be much safer , then (b 5-7) to move on step by step, separating
genuine classes, i.c. sets of items which have essential features in common (as members of γένη in
the sense of races will share the same language and intermarry). It would be a different matter, of
course, if all races were simultaneously identified; that would certainly be a division κατά
γένη/εΐδη (cf. 287 b ff.). But Y.S., as a tiro, is still being restricted to division into twos. Since the
context is fully explicable in terms of the logical lesson being taught (and that is plainly central), it
is unclear whether we should detect - with Skemp, 131 n.l - any 'ulterior political motive' behind
the passage, in the shape of criticism of the view expressed in the Republic (470 b), that Greeks are
naturally opposed to (i.e. enemies of) non-Greeks. There is undoubtedly something provocative
about the comparison of Greeks with Lydians and Phrygians (see c.g. the beginning of Euripides'
Bacchae , where Dionysus uses his Lydian connections to underline his un-Greek strangeness and -
alleged - effeteness); but from the point of view of the logical issue under discussion Greeks,
Lydians, Phrygians, and any other race arc exactly on a par. What we are being provoked into
doing is to separate logical From other considerations.
d 6-7 'another example would be If someone thought': the optative νομίζοι continues the
construction begun in c 10 (... οιομ d ικς ... διαιροΐ).
d7 'dames': eido? again; the present passage seems to demonstrate more dearly than any that <Χδος
and γένο ς, in this dialogue at least, are synonyms: cf. n. on 262 b 7.
e7 'class': ijc. γέν ο ς Chaives' is merely a filler, the Greek has ’each of the (things) split off). This
takes us back to 262 a-b: 'all animals other than man' represents a part of the class (γόυοςΑΐδο?)
 COMMENTARY 263 a - 264 c 183
of Animals, bul is not itself a genuine class. The point leads to Y.S.'s next question: how exactly
docs one tell classes from mere parts (i.e. parts which are not also classes)?
263 a 2-4 "Quite right; but this very thing a difficult sentence; τοΟτο αυτό seems to be the original
object of πώ?.;.γμο(π»but then to be ousted from that role by γε'νος· κα\ με'ρος·. the subjects of the
ώς·-clause, which arc placed early (as happens regularly in such cases). Cf. Dies,
a5 *An excellent response, Socrates, but lit.: ’Best of men, you order no light (thing), Socrates.'
On this way of using a form of address, cf. 265 a 8, and 277 d 8 with note (sec also |263| d 3 my
courageous friend', which seems to refer back to 262 a 5 you've made a ... courageous division*),
a 6-7 'from the discussion we proposed': i.e. our proposed ulk, λόγος·, about the statesman. Yet in
fact, especially given the role of Y.S. as tiro philosopher, the dialogue thus far seems to have been
as much about method as about statesmanship. Cf. 285 d.
b 2-5 'However, there is one thing the emphasis on this point is striking; it perhaps marks Plato's
awareness of the importance of the issue which he is allowing E.S. and Y.S. to postpone (if h
mailers that we get hold of classes and not mere pans, how exactly do we tell the two apart?),
b5 we should expect the plural έτερα; Campbell explains the singular έτερον as ‘by attraction', after
the two singular nouns.
b6 'What should 1 say 1 have heard from you?': For this interpretation of τί μην, cf. Dcnmston
333.
b7 'whenever there Is a class of something': i.e. a sub-class; so e.g. in the case of the male-female
cut in the human γένος-, the 'something' will be humankind,
c3 The p o i n t l i t . 'From which the (matter) of the digression brought us here*,
d 3 · e 1 'And yet, my courageous friend ,J : having made his general objection to Y.S.'s division of the
living into human and non-human, E.S. here gives it specific application: (just as Lydians or
Phrygians might call all non-Lydians or non-Phrygians barbarians, so) some other animal might
think itself importantly different from all the rest, in the way that Y.S. thinks humans are (my
courageous friend’: cf. 262 a 5, with n. on 263 a 5), and reflect that in its naming system. What
this is supposed to illustrate is perhaps primarily the danger of relying on names (see 262 c 10ff.),
though it also casts doubt on what is presumably the basis of Y.S.'s division, the rationality of
human beings as contrasted with the irrationality of the brutes. For το 6ε (γε), introducing a
contrasting point or objection, sec LSJ s.v. ό (η. id) VULJ.
e6 'we were going wrong': the mistake in question must be to have divided all living creatures; but
when did it occur? Initially, the reference seems to be (and in R S I look it to be) to the point in the
conversation just before Y.S. made the division which has just been criticised at length: see c 7fL,
where it is pointed out that they had already made a division of living creatures as a whole. (In this
case καί τότε will mean 'then too'.) However E.S. has not (so far) said that Y.S.'s division
involved this mistake, only that it was dangerous (most immediately, because of the problem of
perspective). A simpler interpretation is to take E.S. as advancing a new criticism of Y.S., namely
that he shouldn't have divided living creatures as a whole (into human and others) precisely
because that class had already been divided (264 a 1-2), and correctly (264 a 5-6), into lame' and
'wild'.
e9 The use of μη'ν here seems to be what Dcnniston calls 'progressive*, adding a new point; similarly
at 264 a 6.
264 a 1-2 'the categories of: is supplied; the Greek has just by the domesticated and wild',
a2 'a nature amenable to domestication': lit. 'a nature (such as) to be domesticated*.
a 5-6 'had to be and still is': lit. both was [philosophical imperfect: 'was, sc. as we (implicitly, at 261
c<l) agreed'], and is, among the tame (plural]'. This brings us neatly back to the poult from where
the divisions will begin again.
a8 'let's not divide in the way we did then': i.e. by taking the class of living creatures all together,
as we did, or Y.S. did, at 262 a ('then'). ES. plainly cannot mean to bar dividing 'wholes* in
general, since the process began with a division of knowledge as a whole, which stands, and will
continue to stand - as will the division of all animals into tame and wiki; his point is quite specific
- we mustn't divide the whole class in this case (cf. n. on 263 c 6).
b5 'a fine situation': presumably because of the methodological lessons that have been learned along
the way.
b7 'what you are so keen to find': i.e. the relevant part of 'collective rearing', which Y.S. was so
keen to get to that he ignored the 'safe', and better', method (will be better able to reveal to you':
cf. 262 e 3-4).
b 11 Ib is - I w o n d e r l i t . This, if by any chance (εΐ δρα πολλακις: cf. c.g. Phaedrus 238 d) you
have heard (it) from some people.' The question is just whether Y.S. knows at ail about the
phenomena to be mentioned.
c 1-2 *the instances of flsh-rcarlng lit. *the instances of rearing [another plural of an
abslracl/gcncral term: cf. n. on 258 b 71 of fish in the Nile, and of those in the King's ponds'.
Here, as often in literature of the period, *the king' seems to refer to the Great King of Persia.
184 COMMENTARY 264 c -2 6 6 b
c 3 μ ίν yAp: ihc μ<ν seems lo be emphatic (cf. Denniston 364 IT.; similarly in c 3); ya'p implies
'(Yes, you do know about them,) because
d 1-2 'of the rearing the Greek is dose to shoithand - 'of the rearing of herd (animals), there is
(some) living in water, some also living on diy land'.
e 3-4 'Everybody would divide i.c. everybody would immediately see that that was the relevant
pan. fSon' in this ease translates φθλον; cf. 260 d 7 with note. The word fits here well enough,
given that the basis of the division is by types of animals.)
e 8-9 'Or don't you think the repeated emphasis on the obviousness of the moves in the present
scries of divisions (see d 9 - e 1) marks a clear contrast with Y.S.'s disputable division at 262 a.
(Skemp's suggestion, ad loc., of an allusion here lo Aristophanes' Birds is not unattractive, but such
an allusion is surely not in any ease the primary point)
e ll 'like an even number': an earlier editor - Ast - proposed to read άρτι τόν αριθμόν f(just as we]
recently [divided] number) in place of άρτιον αριθμόν ('even number*), which is found in all the
MSS. The division of number into even and odd was used at 262 c as an example of correct
method, but it can hardly be said that 'we divided' it 'Like an even number' makes perfectly good
sense - there would be a reference to the same methodological principle (in so far as even numbers
fall into two equal halves: Campbell refen to Laws 895 c), and there might also be a lighter point:
what is now required is a way ol separating bipeds from quadrupeds.
265 a 1 'the part towards which our argument has hurried': cf. 262 b 3-4. The 'part' in question is
something like '(the knowledge concerned with) human herd-lending'.
a 1·2 The Greek of cn ' ckcivo ... φαίνεται is difficult; on the translation given, en’ It ccivo... τεταμένα
is an acc. + inf. clause, with είναι supplied, and καθορδν is an 'epcxcgctic' or explanatory
infinitive.
a 8-9 'An extraordinary suggestion lit 'Certainly (sc. it is impossible to follow) both at once, you
extraordinary person.' E.S. seems to be asking Y.S. to be more precise in his answers; the lesson in
method continues. Cf. n. on 263 a 5.
b 5-6 'while we are f r e s h e r a playful extension of the metaphor of travel (E.S. has already said that
the task is easy).
b8 ήμΤν is a so-called ethic dative (of the observer/interested party).
d3 'stunted': qua hornless. (The alternative reading in the MSS would give us 'a herd docked of
horns'.)
d 9-10 'so-called "single-hooved'": the word μώνυξ is a standing epithet of horses in Homer, and is
consciously borrowed here from him (or from poetry in general).
e 1 'horses and donkeys': stands for 'single-hooved' creatures in general; these, E.S. suggests,
coincide with the class of intcrbrccdcrs, i.e. interbreeding kinds. (There seems no practical
difference here between τό των ίππων και όνων and οί ίπποι και [ol] όνοι: cf. c.g. 261 c 8 with
note.)
e 4-5 'Whereas what is still left i.e., clearly, the other 'families' of hornless, tame animals don't
interbreed.
e7 'take care': the term translated as 'care' here, Επιμέλεια, will later play an important role in the
argument, as a substitute for the notion of 'rearing' (τροφή); for the moment, however, it appears as
just another word for what shepherds, herdsmen etc. do for their flocks/hcrds. (’Sort’ is here φυσις,
the standard term for 'nature'; it may, but perhaps need not necessarily, indicate natural kind: cf.
e.g. Rep. 429 d.)
e ll 'separate' is διαστε'λλειν: Plato continues to vary his vocabulary to an extraordinary degree, as
also, and equally strikingly, in the case of his terms for 'class', 'sort' (cf. previous note, together
with 260 b 1, d 7, 262 b 7, etc., and sec Introduction); despite the fact that he is dealing with a
technical procedure (division), he goes to some lengths to avoid setting up a fixed technical
vocabulary. This is consistent, at least in spirit, with E.S.’s remarks about the need to avoid placing
reliance on our linguistic habits (261 c).
266 a 2-3 'Fur it is nut worth our while ...': the point here is perhaps just to clear up a possible ambiguity
about the classification of dogs - they may be tame, and they may live in groups, but if they are
tame, they will not live in groups, and so can't usefully count as herd-animals. (All that turns out
to be left, apart from human beings, is pigs.)
a6 'your distributions': the verb is again διανε'μαν, used as a synonym for διαιρέΐν (a 5).
a9 'one could say': the βηπου introduces a note of hesitancy (cf. που), which in the context is ironic:
as it turns out, E.S. is indulging in a punning joke.
a ll 'What do you mean?': Ihc aorist of cine; is what is sometimes called the 'instantaneous' aorisl,
frequently found in conversational contexts.
b1 'family-class': ye vo; again (cf. 262 d 6, with note); translated simply as 'class' in the case of dogs
in a 3.
 COMMENTARY 266 b - 267 b 185
b 2-3 'the diagonal with a potency of two feet': i.c. ihc diagonal of a square with sides of one foot in
length, its own length being the square root of the sum (2) of the squares on two of those sides;
’with a potency(power1, 6υναμι?) of two (fed)' is the Greek way of saying V2 (in length),
b 6-7 'endowed with two times two feet': i.e. members of the other class have four feet (the diagonal
of the square formed on the diagonal of the first will be V4, i.e the square root/potency’ of the sum
of the squares of two sides of v2).
b 8-9 'Of course it is - and ...': one may detect here an clement of irony on Y.S.’s own part,
b 10 - c I 'And there's more lit. Well, in addition to these things, do we see that something else, in its
turn, of those things which would have been successful in relation to laughter (ιών ...
€υδοκιμησάντων ά v = έκςίνων a ... ηύδοκίμησςν dv), Socrates, has happened to us in our
divisions?' There arc plenty of candidates as earlier examples, apart from the laboured
mathematical joke: c.g. the connection of the 'political art' with fish-rearing and crane-herding.
Plato is both laughing at himself, and underlining the fact that the incidental absurdity or otherwise
of the results of philosophical method is irrelevant to the question of its success. Cf. 266 d 6-8.
c 4-6 That our human family-class ...': that is, we turn out to have classed human beings with the
lowest of creatures (the suggestion that pigs are 'noble* is of course ironic: they have a 'stalely*
slowness - cf. Campbell, and Apology 30 c, which describes Athens as a large, 'noble', lumbering
carthorse). There is a pun on ouvrpcyciv frun together*), which means both to 'run (in a race?)
with* and e.g. 'converge with' (as in the case of lines); the first meaning is taken up in what follows.
(Tamily-class' and 'class' again both render yc vo?.)
c7 'I see It turning out very oddly Indeed': 'it' is the human race. There is no implication that Y.S.
has seen where the joke is going; he just knows that E.S. is up to something,
c8 'Well, Isn't It reasonableanother - deliberately appalling? - pun (ύστατα, last’: cf. u?, 'pig*);
presumably the point is that there is no competition between men and pigs,
c 9 · d 1 'And don't we notice ·.·': rearing pigs is even more lowly an occupation, by comparison with
being a king, than pigs themselves arc as animals in comparison with human beings (pigs being
slow, those who look after them arc fit for nothing - and so hardly 'trained' for anything); yet, as
E.S. goes on to say, this is not a relevant consideration, if the argument shows that they belong
together - as in his view they seem to do (up to a point), since as late as 295 c he is still to be found
treating statesmanship as a form of caring for living creatures in herds. If there arc important
differences, as he will claim to show via the myth, there arc also similarities,
d4 'in our inquiry about the sophist': sec Sophist 227 a-b.
d7 έμέλησο': the aorist here, and the perfect of d 7 ήτίμακζ, arc 'gnomic', indicating general truths.
( outc in d 6 is answered, as often, by re [d 7].)
d8 'by itself: i.c. without reference to what lies outside its purview (irrelevant considerations),
e 4-6 Then I say ... sharing the field with the winged alone': cf. 265 a (the shorter way 'divides off a
small part against a large one'). The immediate division of two-footed from four-footed is
legitimate, but dangerous in so far as any attempt to separate ofT a small part of a large class may
involve problems. Ihc real difference between the longer and shorter routes described by E.S. is
that, the first avoids doing this, leaving the division two-footcd/Tour-footcd to a stage when the
class to be divided has already been slimmed down: for longer' we may read 'slower', less hasty*
(cf. 264 b). Strictly speaking, the winged has already been separated off, at 264 e. But we may
easily suppose that the question now being addressed is 'what is the shortest route from "what goes
on foot" to the human?'; and in any case this shorter route is not used - sec 267 b-c.)?
e 10-11 'and because this expert knowledge Is his': Robinson proposes to follow one of the MSS in
omitting the και here, which will give the sense 'on the basis that this knowledge [oikcia? now
becomes fern. gen. sing., agreeing with έ πίστη μη?] belongs to him', which comes to much the
same thing.
267 a 5 'our account of the name': it is not the case, surely, that the aim either is or has been to define
the name 'statesmanship'; what E.S. and Y.S. want to do is rather to grasp the essence of the thing,
statesmanship, itself. In other words, they arc not concerned - as becomes ever clearer as the
dialogue proceeds - with the question 'what do we mean by statesmanship?', which might just be a
question about usage, but rather with the question 'what arc the essential features of that type of
knowledge which people need in order to govern city-states in the way they should be governed?*
*Namc' here seems to do duly for 'definition', as elsewhere in the dialogue: sec e.g. b 6-7; and 275
d 4-6, where 'naming' the statesman seems to be the same as 'defining' him. In this case the
genitive ιοΟ όνόματο? qualifies ιόν λόγον: our account - or 'argument' - is one that will consist
in the (complex) 'name* of statesmanship (cf. e.g. ό δήμο? των 'Αθηναίων, 'the people of the
Athenians'). (For a different account of the phrase, see Xarcy, RS 228.)
b4 'as the relevant part': lit. 'above all'; of course, by the same token, another part was also cut ofT,
but discarded.
b 5-6 'not less than triple': we might have expected η τριπλούv, or τριπλοΟ; the latter is found in
some minor MSS, but Campbell points to Laws 956 [a), where the MSS offer no alternative,
b 7-8 'calling It expert knowledge more literally, 'calling (it) herding knowledge of non-
interbreeding production/coming-into-bcing', where the three elements in the 'name' arc perhaps
186 COMMENTARY 267 c - 268 c
i) knowledge, ii) hcrding/rcaring, and iii) non-intcrbrccding; that coming-into-bcing (of living
creatures) is involved follows from ii).
c8 'the matter we raised': i.e., obviously, the question of the nature of statesmanship and the
statesman.
d 3-4 'still more dearly': the implication is evidently that the shovtcoming(s) of the definition offered
should already be clear, Y.S. has missed the point, but E.S. suggests that he also needs on his own
account to make it explicit.
el-2 the difference between all herdsmen ... and kings': this at first sight makes it look as if kings
are already distinguished from herdsmen, which is actually what G.S. undertakes to show as his
next move; kings/staicsmen arc not herdsmen, although they have something in common with
them (cf. note to 266 c 9 - d 1). The present context may simply reflect ordinary usage - kings are
certainly not normally regarded as herdsmen, even though poets may describe them, as Homer
regularly docs, as 'shepherds of the people'. This interpretation seems confirmed by E.S.’s next
contributions: see esp. e 9 toT? ncp\ τανθρώπινα vopcOoiv. For a different use of the idea of
rulers as herdsmen, see Theaetetus 174 d-c.
e5 'claims or pretends': for καί linking alternatives, sec Dcnniston 292 (8). Merchants, etc. (e 7-8)
will of course be pretenders to the statesman’s title just in so far as he has been given the wrong
one. But for some more significant pretenders, see 291 a ff.
268 b 4-5 'the music that belongs to his flock': the term ποίμνη (cf. also 267 c 1) is primarily associated
with sheep; on the switch from cowhcrding, in a 7-8, and on b 1-6 as a whole, see n. on d 8.
b 5-6 'And It's the same way with all other herdsmen': cf. n. on 267 e 1-2.
b8 'complete': or 'undamaged' (ακέραιος-), i.e. by the point that has just been made,
c 1-3 'when we posit him see 267 b 8 - c 3. It is of course assumed that the segment that remains
from the divisions will be exclusively occupied by kings and statesmen (cf. 275 b 3-7, with note); if
it is not, then further division will be necessary - and that, it turns out, is just what we shall be
offered.
c5 'a little earlier': the initial reference is to 267 c-d, and especially to c 8 - d 1; but the description
of 'our fears' then extends ('until we remove ...', c 8-10) to include the results of the diagnosis of
them which has just been completed. (The normal way of expressing fears for the present and past
is with μη' + indicative; the optatives - τυγχανοιμίν, άπειργασμένοι £\μ€ν- push the perspective
from which the thing feared is viewed into the future [sec Goodwin, M T § 369.21. The choice of
subjunctive + άν in the έως--clause in c 8-10, i.e. in preference to the optative we might have
expected after a past main verb, is thus entirely natural.)
c 6-8 describing some kingly figure, but not yet accurately to have finished the statesman ofT:
Tting* and 'statesman' here are of course synonymous. 'Figure': or 'shape', or 'form', or 'character';
the word here, σχήμα, is close - in this context - to being yet another term for 'sort of thing' or
'class'.
c 10 'uncontaminated with anyone else': lit. 'pure', 'unmixcd' (καθαρό?).
d8 'By mixing In, as one might put it, an element of play': it is hard to identify the precise force of
σχεδόν here, but it seems designed to raise a doubt about the extent to which the 'myth' (μΟΟο?,
d 9, e 4) or story which is about to be introduced really is a piece of 'play' (τταιδια'): it is partly
playful, and in that respect suitable for children (nai6c?, c 5), but it also has a serious purpose. In
its role as play, it seems to be an analogue of the songs which cowherds were alleged in b 1-6 to
use in order to 'comfort' (napajuificioeai) their charges. Indeed b 1-6 might itself be seen as
primarily serving to prepare the way for the present turn in the conversation, since in itself it looks
slightly odd: ancient cowherds seem to have been no more known for their musical talents than
their modem counterparts (in England, at least). Shepherds arc a different matter, and hence
perhaps the sudden shift from cows to sheep in b 4; why then E.S. did not start with sheep is
unclear, though since the context involves comparing kings/siatcsmcn with herdsmen in general, it
is perhaps to the point that the argument should not be developed exclusively in terms of one
species of herdsman. (Pan of the point of the myth will be to show that we did not do enough to
distinguish the statesman from other kinds of herdsmen, who were supposed to have been
separated off earlier in the division, and that this was the cause of the problem which has just been
identified.)
d9 'a great story': or 'myth', μΟΟο?. The term docs not always, or necessarily, denote something
fictional, and it is a typical feature of Platonic myths that they arc introduced as reports, or things
said (cf. c 7). That may also be the basic meaning of μΟΟο?. Still, however they may be dressed
up (in the present case, as the truth behind a fantastic story about Atreus and 'I'hycstcs), Platonic
myths usually are fictional constructions - but with a senous purpose (or purposes). On ’story­
telling' in the context of Pit., sec also n. on 304 d 1; on the relationship between the myth of Pit.
and the 'Great Myth’ put into Protagoras' mouth in the Protagoras , sec Introduction,
e5 'childish games': or, instead of παιδιά? (acc. pi. of παιδιά, play: as usual, the plural of an
abstract or general term indicates instances of the thing referred to), wc may choose to read
 COMMENTARY 268 c - 269 c 187
παιβιας (gen. sing, of παιδί a, 'childhood*); but whichever we read, there will be a pun on the
other. The original Greek text, as Plato wrote it, would have had no accents marked in any case
(two MSS, which do generally employ the later convention of accentual notation, themselves give
παιδια;, i.c. without accent); however anyone reading the passage out loud would have had to
make a choice.
e 7-9 There have occurred in the past the translation of c 7-9 is immediately based on an
unpublished translation of the myth section of Pit. by Luc Brisson which is probably the most
careful version which has yet been done. (In some details of the translation of later pans of the
myth, however, I shall diverge from Brisson.) Another way of taking e 7-9 is illustrated by
Skemp's translation, which is similar to that of Dies: These old stories have been told before and
will be told again. Among them is the one about the portent...' (Compare Ostwald's revision of
Skemp: 'Many of these old stories have happened before ...'; and Campbell: There really
happened ...') The advantage seems to lie clearly with the Brisson/Ostwaid/Campbell version:
there is little point in E.S.'s emphasising that the stories were and will be told (whicn is in a sense
already implicit in 'the things that have been told ...'), and that the relevant portent (or
'phenomenon': a φάσμα is something which 'appears', φαίνίται) will recur is an essential feature
of the myth. Whether or not we arc seriously supposed to take it as true that such a thing happened
and will happen again is another matter, it is a normal feature of fiction that we are invited, for the
moment, to take it for reality. Cf. n. on d 9.
e ll 'the sign of the golden lamb': some such story, involving a dispute between Atreus and Thyestes
over the kingship of Mycenae, is alluded to in Euripides, Orestes 986 ff. The birth of the golden
lamb among Atreus' flocks seems to have been an integral part of the story, but the theme of the
reversal of the course of the sun - without the stars, which figure in both Euripidean and Platonic
context - is elsewhere associated with other aspects of the disastrous history of the house of Wops
(sec C.W.Willink’s commentary on the Orestes, Oxford 1986, ad 1001 -2). However it dearly suits
Plato's purposes to link it in with the Atrcus/Thycstcs quarrel, in so far as that, like the wider
context of the Platonic myth, was about the right to kingship (apparently symbolized, in the story,
by the golden lamb: if so, Y.S.'s mistaken identification of the φάσμα in question neatly recalls the
connection).
269 a 1 'rather to that of the changing i.e. the sign (σημαον) of - represented by - the changing...
a2 'actually': the άpa here (and in a 4) seems to register the surprising nature of the report (cf.
Dennision 38-9).
a5 'everything': lit. 'it', αυτό, i.e. to totc σχήμα Ota configuration of things then*).
a 7 the kingship exercized by Kronos': from Hesiod (Works and Days 109-20) in the eighth
century B.C. on, 'the age of Kronos' is synonymous in Greek literature generally with a 'golden'
age; cf. 271 c-d, where this identification is presupposed. Empedocles, the sixth-century
philosopher-poet, (somehow) links the idea of a golden age with that of a regular cyde of cosmic
change; and it is plainly this combination which provides the main basis for Plato's own story. See
especially DK 31 (Empedocles) B 127, where the peacefulness of the first age is stressed, even to
the extent that it is called the time of Kupris/Aphrodite rather than of Kronos; and (31) B 17, 26
(on the cosmic cycle). The connection between all this and the story of Atrcus and Thyestes is
Plato's own invention. It is a typical feature of his myths that they bring together different
ingredients - mythical, philosophical, sometimes also historical - into new wholes. Another
ingredient will be added in b 2-4. E.S.'s remark at b 7-8 fthrough the great lapse of time ...*) is
thoroughly disingenuous. For the reversal of the sun's course, repotted by Egyptian priests, see
Herodotus 11.142; for an Egypt ruled by gods, Π.144.
b 2-3 'And what of the r e p o r t t h e idea of 'earth-bom' men occurs frequently in Greek mythology,
particularly in connection with city-foundation myths (indicating autoauhony: cf. n. on 271 b 2).
b5 'state of affairs': the word in the Greek, πάθος*, indicates what happens, or has happened, to
something or someone. Ihe reference cannot be to the 'event' (Skemp) of cosmic reversal as such,
since the πάθος· in question is said at b 8 - c 1 not to have been 'related' by anyone (said*, 'reported',
'described': ούδα; cTpnKcv). and E.S. suited his account from cosmic reversal as related in the
Atrcus-Thyestes story. Rather it is to the whole set of conditions which E.S. will describe (c 4 ff.),
of which cosmic reversal is one element. Cf. 270 b. (The story, then, is to be a new one.) For an
outline of the myth as a whole, sec Introduction.
c2 'exposition': lit. 'showing forth' (άπόδ*ι£κς); the word is also standard for 'demonstration' in the
sense of 'proof, but that sense is dearly not relevant tare.
c5 'move in a circle': what it means for the universe'(r 6 πδι , the whole ) to move in a circle is at
least primarily for the heavenly bodies to do so; if the earth, at its centre, moves at all (see the
difficult passage at Timaeus 40 b-c), it must dearly do so in a different sense.
άνήκ<ν is a gnomic aorisi: the action takes place not just once, but at the corresponding point m
every recurrence of the repeated cycle (cf. note on 268 c 7-9). (The following orav + subjunctive
is ambiguous between 'whenever...' and 'at such lime as ...'.)
188 COMMENTARY 269 d - c
d 1-2 'being a living creature and having had intelligence assigned to It by the one who fitted it
together In the beginning': this is one of a number of contexts in the Pit. myth which seem to
presuppose the cosmological account of the Tim aeus - in which, however, there is little hint of the
idea ol cosmic reversal: the variation, or ηαραλλα^ι?» in the courses of the heavenly bodies which
is mentioned ai Timaeus 22 c-d seems to be different in kind from the 'variation' envisaged here in
Pit. (παράλλαζι? again, e 4; the term appears in Plato only here and in the Timaeus passage). One
possibility is to suppose that the Timaeus account is just another auarry for elements of the present
story (cf. note on a 7 above); however, the issue of the status of that account (itself described as a
'myth') is a complicated one, and modem scholars have not infrequently treated Pit. itself as a
serious contribution to Platonic cosmology. (But cf. c.g. note on c 3-4 below.) The Timacan
elements here are 1. the idea that the universe was created at some point in the past by a divine
craftsman; 2. that it is a living creature; 3. that it was endowed by its creator with intelligence; and
4. that that intelligence is expressed in its circular movement ( Tim. 28 b-c, 30 a-c, 34 a).
If the participial clause being a living creature and having intelligence ...' is explanatory, as it
seems to be, what it explains is the universe's capacity to 'revolve' (nepiriyeiai) 'of its own accord'
(αυτό ματ or)» not its tendency to go into reverse, which is explained next, as a separate step. It
turns out actually to be the /urn-rational aspect of the universe which accounts for this fact, i.e. its
aspect as possessing a body (cf. 270 a 1-2, where E.S. dismisses the suggestion that the cause
might be a second intelligent god: there is something inherently irrational in the turning back of the
universe). What its creator gave it, at the beginning (κατ 'άρχα'?), in giving it intelligence, was the
power to move itself in a circle, either forwards or backwards. Sec also nn. on 270 a 3-4, 271
d 3-4.
d2 This backward movement': what is actually 'explained' is why it cannot always revolve in a
forward direction (i.e., apparently, the direction in which it goes when the god has not let it go*).
d 6-7 'the category of body': or ’the nature (φυ'σι?) of body'; but the point is in any case about the kind
of thing that body is.
d7 δνδί ουρανόν: the relative is attracted into the gender of ουρανό? (like κόσμο?, a more elevated
term for το παν, 'the whole' or universe).
e 1-2 'it is impossible for it to be altogether exempt from change': the association of change with
body is another important element shared with the story of the Timaeus: see e.g. 37 c ff. ('Exempt'
is άμοιρο?, liL 'without a share in', which continues the idea contained in the two preceding verbs,
μ€ταλαμβαναν and κοινωνεΐν.)
e2 'in the same place': place' is supplied in the translation, but the reference is plainly to revolution
(*a single motion', μίαν φοράν) around a single point. What the universe is unable to do is always
to move 'in the same way', i.e. uniformly in the same direction.
e 3-4 'and this is why it has reverse rotation as Us lot, which is the smallest possible variation of its
movement': editors have long fella difficulty about αύτοΟ ('i/j movement'). Among other things,
if it has been 'allotted' movement in reverse, how can the movement which is reversed be thought
of as the one which belongs to it? And has not reverse movement been identified as 'inborn' in it (d
3)? On the basis of these difficulties, Robinson proposes to read προ toG, i.e. 'the movement
(which it had) before that\ in place of αύτοΟ (see RS 42-5). However, the problems seem to
disappear if we suppose that 'its movement' refers to movement in a circle (cf. note on d 1-2, with
d 7 - e 3). E.S. has suggested that there has to be variation in the movement of the cosmos, but that
this will be the smallest which can be managed; it therefore continues to rotate, only in the
opposite direction. The claim is that this is the closest it can come to staying in the same condition,
and - if we exclude the possibility of variations of speed, which seems not to be considered - there
is a kind of topic to the idea. (Whether we should be looking for strict logic in a mythical context
which 'mixes in' some 'play' must be open to doubt; and the flavour of the 'explanation' currently
being given bears out the point.) The crucial point to be grasped is that E.S. is so far only asking
why the cosmos has two movements rather than one (cf. d 2-3 with n. on d 2), and is not
identifying, or primarily concerned to identify, one as 'variant' and the other as original, or cither as
belonging to' it. However, it is implicit in the consistent placing in E.S.'s description of the
divinely-assisted rotation before the other, and the consequent treatment of the latter as 'going the
opposite way' (c 7, c 4ff.; on 270 b 7-8, see below), that the divinely-assisted rotation is the proper
(and therefore in a sense original' one); and rotation in this direction will in fact later be identified
as 'the accustomed course which belongs to it' (ιόν άωΟότα δρόμον τον έαυτου, 273 a 6). (On
the traditional interpretation, the cosmos under divine control and in the present era rotate in
opposite directions. But I shall argue that the traditional interpretation is mistaken: sec, initially,
n. on 270 b 7-8.)
e5 'I dare say': as often (cf. 268 d 8), σχιβόν serves to soften what is being said; in fact, elsewhere
Plato finds no difficulty in the conception of a permanently self-moving universe.
e6 'unlike him': is meant to render αυ ('signals an opposition between the sensible, which moves,
and unchangeable intellect', Brisson).
 COMMENTARY 269 c - 270 b 189
e 7 'I* not permitted*: what is θέμι; is what is in accordance with divinely-established law or
custom; the principle in question here seems to derive from the axiom that the divine is unchanging
(cf. d 5-6).
e9 *ln any way': or ’as a whole’ (Di&s), ’in Us entirety’ (Skcmp); but there seems less point to this than
to an emphatic denial of this second possibility (ού/μή '6\ov = riot at all).
270 a 1-2 'or again that two gods turn It S. here rejects another logical possibility» on the basis of his
premisses, or of an extension of one of them (the divine cannot be opposed to itself); but we may
also detect a reference to the twin cosmic principles of Love and Strife which govern the cosmic
cycle of Empedocles (cf. n. on 269 a 7).
270 a 3 'Is helped by the guidance of: the verb is the same (συμποδηγ^ιν) as at 269 c 5. See n. on 271 d
3-4.
a 3-4 'acquiring life once more and receiving a restored immortality': if U 'acquires life* again, then
it looks as if it ought previously to have been dead; but perhaps we should not take this quite
literally, since at 269 c-d the nature of the cosmos as a living creature was asserted in the context
of a description of both of the two alternating rotations. The important point is that the reverse
rotation is a consequence of its nature as a physical entity, a combination of a rational soul with a
body; and like other such combinations (human beings, for example), it has a tendency to decay,
unless prevented by a higher cause (see esp. 273 a 1-3, b 4ff.). For the idea of an acquired'
immortality, cf. T im aeus 41 a-b, where the sun and planets are said to be immune from
destruction despite being in principle destructible. Here in Pit., Immortality' seems to derive from
the guarantee that the god will always 'restore life* to the cosmos; but see also 273 e 3, where
'ageless* is added to 'immortal' - with divine guidance or help, the universe does not grow old or
decay, as it docs when such guidance is absent (273 b ff.).
a 5 'from its craftsman': Le. its creator (cf. 269 d 1), whom the Timaeus too represents as a
craftsman (the 'Demiurge' of traditional translations). This craftsman turns out to be the same as
'the god' who from time to time assists the universe on its way.
'under Its own power': lit 'through itself.
a 7-8 'because of the very fact that ·#·': lit '... because of the very (δη) fact that it goes, being very
large and very equally balanced, resting on the smallest base' (or 'foot', noO?, used by extension of
the bottom df other things). Underlying a 5-8 is evidently an analogy with some kind of apparatus:
rotation in one direction creates an increasing resistance, which finally results in movement in the
other. (For Schuhl's plausible reconstruction of the mechanism involved, see Skcmp 101 -2)
bI 'reasonable': or 'probable', or 'plausible' (cI kot^ / cI ko;) ; but what Y.S. seems to be immediately
accepting is E.S.'s conclusion, as following from his premisses.
b4 'we said was responsible': see 269 b-c.
b 7-8 '... now in the direction of Us present rotation, now in the opposite direction': it is not
immediately clear which is the direction of the 'present' rotation, but the odds must be on its being
the same as the one before things go into reverse, in so far as the 'opposite' rotation has so far been
exclusively identified with rotation 'in reverse' (cf. n. on 269 e 3-4). Now the Idling go' of the
universe by the god, which leads to its rotation in reverse, will turn out to be at the end of a golden
age, the age of Kronos (272 e), which will be sharply distinguished from the present age (271 c-d).
In that case, there must be two reversals in each cycle: one at the end o( the golden age, and
another before our age begins (see esp. 271 c 4-7, with note); and this in turn implies the existence
of three eras or ages, rather than two, as on the traditional interpretation of the myth. Further
support for this way of taking E.S.'s story - proposed, partly following Lovejoy and Boas (1935),
156-9, by Brisson in his (1974), 478-96, and defended by him in RS, but so far not widely accepted
- will gradually emerge in the following notes; but one dear advantage is a greater parallelism
with the story of Atrcus and Thyestes which introduced the myth, since now in both cases reversal
will be in a sense an interlude in cosmic history, before the sun and stars resume their normal
courses. There are in any case serious difficulties with the traditional interpretation. One of these
is the corollary of the argument just mounted in favour of the type of view advanced by Brisson:
that we must suppose that 'moving in the opposite direction' and 'reversal' mean one thing in 269 c
- 270 a, i.e. moving in its present direction (since it is on any account clear that the god is not now
in control), and mean the converse of that in 270 b ff., i.e. the movement the cosmos had in the
divine era (since the reversal in the development of living creatures which is there described as
caused fay cosmic reversal equally clearly docs not belong to the present). The awkwardness is the
greater in that E.S. repeatedly stresses - beginning at d 3-4 - the way in which macrocosmic and
microcosmic reversals go together, if it is true that this will be th£case on any account, it would be
odd if Plato should begin by disjoining them in the order of the story-telling. Large-scale
destruction (270 c-d) also seems an inauspicious way of inaugurating what is supposed to be a
golden age. (We may note, in passing, that there is on any account one thing that certainly goes in
the same direction in both the age of Kronos and the age of Zeus: the growth of plants 1272 a; the
only difference being that in the latter age they require the 'art' of the farmer].)
190 COMMENTARY 270 b - 271 b
b9 'How do you mean?': I.c. ttow do you mean that that was responsible...?’ (cf. Campbell).
b 10 · e I 'turnings': the main examples of Turnings' (τροπαί, cf. our 'tropics') in the ordinary sense arc
those of the sun at the solstices; but these are of course not reversals , or at least not in the same
sense as the ’turning' now under discussion.
c 4-5 the greatest changes, too, occur then for us M.': 'then’, on the traditional interpretation (see n.
oo b 7-8), will be at the beginning of the divine era; on the interpretation adopted here, the
reference is to the beginning of a period which divides the divine era (when the cosmos revolved in
the same direction as it docs now: b 7-8) from our own. 'For us': what follows seems to suggest
that W here includes all kinds of living creatures.
c6 That too seems likely': *thai too is cIko;'; 'this is ό .κός\ then, = £oikc (c 3). Cf. n. on b 1
cIkotu»?.
c 8-9 'living things by their nature have more literally, *thc nature of living things has ...' (φύσις*
might also be taken in the sense of type' or 'class': living things as a whole'.)
c l! '_ destruction ~ on a very large s c a l e t h e idea of periodic catastrophes - connected with the
traditional story of the great flood associated with Deucalion and Pyrrha - is also found in the
Timaeus (22 c, 23 a-b) and Critias (112 a), and in the Laws (676 c ff.), but that such catastrophes
are caused by a reversal of the rotation of the cosmos is a notion peculiar to P it . (After d 1 ic we
expect 'and of human beings'; what we actually gel is something else, but which implies it.)
d4 'b in accordance with the retrogradation of the universe': or merely 'accompanies'; however,
what is to be described is another reversal, this time in the life-cycle of living things.
d 4-5 'when Its turning becomes the opposite of the one which now obtains': see n. on b 7-8. The
sense of 'turning', τροπή, here (revolution') is plainly different from that in c 1-2.
d 7-9 'First, the visible age of each and every creature ... stopped it is not that they stopped
getting older, only that they kept looking younger, hence 'ceased moving towards the older to look
at ' fi6civ, epexegctic infinitive)'. Cf. c 1 '... became as it were younger and more tender' (except
that 'more tender', in contrast to 'younger', perhaps describes what they actually became).
Something of the same idea is found in Hesiod, Works and Days 178 ff., where the poet predicts a
lime when babies will be bom already grey-haired (and Zeus will destroy the present race of men):
cf. 273 e 9-10. (Campbell explains ηλικία as 'Condition, or appearance, in respect of youth or
age.') 'Stopped': at this point ES. switches into past tenses, describing what is apparently a
recurring set of phenomena by reference to a particular occurrence of it - no doubt the one nearest,
in the past, to the present.
e 9-10 'As fur those who died a violent death at that time presumably the many who perished as a
result of the reversal itself (c 11 - d 2). This must certainly be so on the traditional interpretation,
according to which what is now being described is the beginning of the golden age, and in that age
there are no violent acts between living creatures (271 c l -3) - though widespread deaths from any
cause (in this case, through earthquakes: 273 a 1-3) arc likely to fit badly with anyone's view of
paradise. Cf. n. on b 7-8. If, on the other hand, the golden age has just ended , then catastrophes
seem to be more in place. fAi that time' must refer to the same penod to which the features just
described belong, namely the one immediately following the cosmic reversal, or that and the
succeeding time; cf. 271 a 2.)
e 10 'the body of the dead person ...': a striking phrase in the Greek, given that the second noun
(γίκρός - first in the Greek) itself commonly denotes a corpse. (*Body', σώμα, is in fact omitted in
one MS; what remains would probably be equivalent simply to 6 νοκρος-, 'the corpse'.) The point is
presumably that what is being described is only the visible aspect of death; what happens to the
other constituent of a living person, on Plato's view, i.c. his or her soul (see 272 e), is another
matter. If we follow out the analogy of what happens to living people in this upside-down world,
as 270 e 10-271 a 1 invites us to do, it looks as if the process of aying ought not to be complete
(where completion would be marked by the departure of the immortal soul) until the body had
completely disappeared. (In this ease there would be a special point to the present participle
TcXcuTiivruv, as referring to the process of dying - however swift - rather than the event of
death.)
270 e 10 · 271 a 1 'underwent the same effects': i.c. of growing ('as it were') younger, and smaller. There
seems to be only one way of dying in the reversed universe; and a violent death is a quick one.
This confirms that time's arrow keeps pointing firmly forward - E.S. is not envisaging a scenario in
which history repeats itself backwards; see n. on d 7-9.
271 a 2 'how did living creatures come into being In that time?' I.c. you've talked about their death;
what about their birth? As ES. goes on to confirm, the kind of world he's just been describing
doesn't leave much room for ordinary reproduction.
a 8 · b 2 'who bordered on the ending of the previous period, «. and grew up at the beginning of this
one': 'period' is more literally 'revolution' (which is also the root meaning of the Greek word
p e r io d o s ); the periods in question are characterized by contrary revolutions. I lake the
 COMMENTARY 271 b-c 191
accusative τδν ... χρόνον as one of duration of time, with έγατόνουν standing elliptically Tor 'they
lived bordering on ..λ
b2 *our messengers': i.c. public messengers, heralds' (κηρυκ€?). On the 'accounts' (λόγοι), which
are supposed to be true, cf. n. on 269 b 2-3: one such appears in the Menexenus (237 b-c), which
refers to the alleged 'autochthon/ of the Athenians. Plato himself proposes the use of a myth of
autochlhony for political purposes at Rep. 414 e; here in Pit. it suits him to treat stories of this kind
as historical, and to propose their 'real' explanation.
b 3-4 'what Is implied by what we have said': this seems to be what is meant by τb ... I vtcOOcv, which
is 'the (part?) from there', 'what follows from that*. (What we have said': sc. about what happened
in the period before ours.)
b 6-7 'men should be put together again there and come back to life': 'men' (Le. human beings) is
supplied; the Greek has no explicitly expressed subject (a vague 'they' is implied, which gradually
becomes fleshed out as the earth-bom). There' = in the earth. The 'putting together' or re­
assembly of the bodies of the new men is apparently effected by mechanical causes; as for their
other crucial component, their souls, Phaedo 81 c-d would suggest (less than wholly seriously; but
how much of the detail of the present context is exactly serious7) that there is a plentiful supply of
used models in the vicinity - souls which in their previous existence in a body became too attached
to its concerns, and now lurk around cemeteries. The relevance to the context of detailed
eschatological ideas is established by the final clause of the present sentence fall those of them,
that is ...', c 2: see below). On the traditional, two-period, interpretation of the myth, according to
which E.S. is here describing the beginning of the golden age, divine causes would probably be
responsible for the whole process of regeneration (cf. 274 a 3-4 with note); but on the
interpretation I have adopted, such divine causes are precisely not available. The dead in question
- 'from the dead', b 5; the ones who are 'coming back to life* - apparently cannot be those who
have died in this period, since according to 270 e 8 - 271 a 1 there will be nothing of their bodies
left to be rc-bom (and it is the return of their bodies which is what is primarily being described),
but must rather be the dead from the previous era; they apparently grew up in the normal direction,
and died old (and looking old), and they will - it seems - be re-bom grey-haired (see 273 e 9-10,
with n. on 270 d 7-9). Ibis would help to explain the suggestion in c 2 that some of the dead are
singled out by god for special honours: in so far as the period of cosmic reversal is a mirror image
of the preceding golden age of Kronos (for which see c 3ff.), it is not the most promising context
for the earning of such honours.
b 7-8 'following the direction of the reversal, with comlng-lnto-being turning round *the
reversal', i.c. the turning back of the cosmos. The 'turning round* of coming-into-being is not from
death to life, which in a sense happens to all of us, in so far as our souls will enter other bodies
(except in the case of the consistently philosophical: see n. on c 2), but from 'old' =
dccrcpil/dccaycd to 'young' = unformed.
b 8 · c I 'according to this argument': or 'account' (λόγο?); but what is in question - as before in the
myth - is the application of a kind of logic, albeit a perverse one. The preoccupation with the truth
of the whole story (note also the point in a 7ff. about the existence of witnesses) is striking; cf. note
on 268 d 9. (Robinsonproposes to replace λόγον with τρόπον, which is found in a quotation of the
passage in Eusebius. Inis would give us m this way' instead of 'according to this argument'; and
with one λόγον already in the sentence, it is easy enough to see how a copyist might have brought
in another. However κατά...τον λόγον nicely picks up b 3-4 [we must see what follows ...’1, and
there is no real objection to having λόγον twice in different senses in the same sentence.)
c 1-2 'the report told about them': i.c. the report which tells of the existence, once, of the earth-bom.
(But in fact, on the interpretation proposed, there will be another type of 'earth-bom’ people - bom,
that is, from the earth as babies - who belong to the golden age, and of whom no such 'report'
could survive: see 272 a 1, d 8 - e 3.)
c 2 'all those of them, that is, whom god did not take off to another destiny*: according to
Hesiod's account (Works and Days 121-3), all men of the golden age have a special fate, becoming
guardian spirits (δαίμον€?) of later races of men. In Platonic eschatology, important post-mortem
privileges arc gained only through individual merit, or, more specifically, by our becoming
philosophers: cf. 272 b 8ff., with n. on (272) c 5-6. (That the 'other dcstinyrmight be something
worse than rebirth, e.g. permanent relegation to the underworld as envisaged in the Phaedo myth,
seems to be ruled out by the fact that the conditions for the sorts of crimes meriting such
punishment arc absent from the golden age: see especially 271 e 1-3.)
c 4-7 'Bui as for the life ... In each set of turnings.'. These iwo sentences arc problematical. 1. What is
the sense of 'turning' here? Is it ‘turning' in the sense of 'reversal' (as in 270 c 1-2, and just now in b
7), or in that of 'rotation' (sec 270 d 5)? If the first, then (as Brisson proposes in a note to his
unpublished translation of the myth) 'turnings' must refer (a) to successive occurrences of the two
reversals referred to in c 5-7 and (b) not so much to the reversals themselves as to the states of
affaire resulting from them. But the second alternative seems to provide an easier route to the
192 COMMENTARY 271 c-d
same result, namely that 'those turnings' and *thcsc' refer to two different (recurring) periods of
rotation. 2. Which arc these two periods? On the traditional interpretation of the myth (see n. on
270 b 7-8), only two periods are in question altogether - i.e. the age of Kronos, and that of Zeus, in
which we now live (see 272 b 2). But in that case, how docs c 5-7 sive point to Y.S.'s question, as
it is plainly supposed to do? How is it relevant to the aueslion about which of the two periods
Kronos' reign belongs to, that there is a cosmic reversal 'in1(presumably at the end of) each? (For a
possible answer to these questions, see Ferrari, RS 390-1.) The underlying idea appears to be that
the golden age of Kronos was different from the present one (as E.S. underlines in c 8 - d 2, having
congratulated Y.S. for following his argument), and that that difference - given the scenario
outlined by RS. - will be explained by cosmic reversal, c 5-7 will have point just in the case that
there are three periods or stages, two (that of the time of Kronos, and that of reverse rotation)
preceding the present one, with two reversals, one at the end of each, cither of which would be
sufficient to explain the contrast between the era of Kronos and the present era. But that leaves it
in principle open which*of the two stages preceding ours is to be identified with Kronos' reign.
This, then, is what Y.S.'s question is about, except that - as E.S.’s reply in c 8 ff. confirms - he
frames it in terms of the contrast between the time when god is in control fthosc turnings'), and the
time when he is not ('these'), which includes our era. See n. on d 1*2.
One final point on the second of the two sentences in cnicstion CFor it is clear it is of course
conceivable that this is merely an incidental remade by Y.S., to show how well he is keeping up
(cf. c 8) - and presumably this is what any supporter of the traditional interpretation will nave to
suppose. But the 'for', and the reference to the two sets of 'turnings' which also appeared in the
preceding question, do plainly suggest that the sentence is somehow logically connected to that
question.
c 8 · d I 'everything's springing up of its own accord for human beings': this is evidently the feature
most immediately associated with the time of Kronos; cf. n. on 269 a 7.
d 1-2 '.MU belongs least to the movement that now obtains; it too belonged to the one before.':
Y.S.'s question must then have been 'did the reign of Kronos belong to the present
"turnings"/movement, or the previous ones?', and since he knows perfectly well that now is not that
time (sec n. on c 4-7), 'these tumings'Ahc present movement' must include both the present period
and the period of reversal which preceded it. If so, then 'the present movement' will actually stand
for two contrary movements, which is certainly awkward; but then the tale of cosmic history
began, and will end, with the contrast between a universe under divine control, and a universe
without it, and the moral of the story as a whole has to do with that contrast. (In effect,
'movement', φορά, itself docs duty for 'period', like π€ριφορά in b 1.) It is this recurrent contrast
between two eras which gives purchase to the traditional interpretation; however that interpretation
finally fails to do justice to the text (in addition to the objections already raised, and to be raised in
the following paragraph, see e.g. 272 d 8 - c 3 with note; 273 a 6 - b 1 with note).
What else , then, 'belonged to the (period) before’ fit too belonged to the one before’, d 2)? On
the two-stage interpretation, it will of course be the inversion of human growth and birth which has
just been described. But it is difficult even in principle to accept this as a feature of the golden age,
because at least the inversion of human (and animal) development, if not that of generation and
birth (see n. on b 6-7), is described as a consequence of the cosmic reversal, and in the age of
Kronos everything is supposed to be under direct divine control (d 3ff.). (For another closely-
related objection, see n. on 270 b 7-8. In Hesiod, as it happens, the birth of grey-haired babies is
part of a nightmare of a future, iron, age of decadence.) όη the three-stage interpretation, if the
implied reference in d 2 fit too*) were to be to what is described in 270 b ff., then 'the (period)
before' would have to be either the period of reversal by itself or that together with the period
before it; since neither alternative allows us to make good sense of Y.S.'s question and E.S.'s
answer to it (sec above, and n. on c 4-7), and 'the period before' must in fact be the 'first' of the
three, I conclude that the reference must be to something else - and why not to the god's
involvement, in that first period, in the cosmic rotation? This is the point to which F.S. will
immediately recur, and it is also the only feature of the period in question of which we have so far
been informed. But see also Brisson, RS 354.
d 3-4 'For then the god began to rule and take care of the rotation as a whole': this translation,
adopted by Brisson after Chambers (1979), receives some support from two other passages in Plato
{Parmenides 127 c and Timaeus 53 b), and - if 'then' refers to 'the period before', as it surely must
- is apparently required on any interpretation. (The only exception would be if 'the period before'
could be taken as including the first two stages on the three-stage interpretation [see preceding
note], in which ease 'the god ruled the whole rotation at first' would be precisely appropriate,
contrasting with the following reversal.) 'Ruling and taking care of the rotation as a whole' seems
initially to be a rather stronger idea than the 'guiding [the universe] on its way and helping it move
in a circle' of 269 c 5 (cf. 270 a 2), but in fact seems to be describing the same thing; the
contrasting situation, when the god 'lets go' (269 c 5, 270 a 5), will now be described in terms of
 COMMENTARY 271 d - 272 c 193
Ihc universe's 'taking charge of and mastering... itselT (273 b 1-2), and of its *bcing instructed to be
master of its own motion' (274 a 4-5), which it turns out to achieve only with difficulty and not for
an indefiniteperiod (cf. 269 e 5-6). The cosmic reversal occurs in the period before it achieves this
masleiy: 272 e 5-6, 273 a 1 - b 2. (I here diverge from Brisson (19*741 and in RS. Brisson takes
273 a 6 - d 4 as describing the reversed cosmos, aid 273 d 4 - e 3, together with 273 e 6 - 274 e 1,
as describing the origins and nature of the present era. By contrast, on the interpretation I shall
adopt, 273 a 6 - d 4 is already about the present era, and 273 d 4 - e 3 marks die return to the
golden age; 273 e 6 - 274 e 1 takes us back to the beginning of the present age. The main
difference between us is perhaps that I stress the coincidence of language - and, 1 take it, of
thought - between 273 b 1-2 and 274 a 5, whereas Brisson prefers to stress the apparent contrast
between what is said at 273 b 3ff. to happen 'at the beginning (κατ ' άρχά?] and what in 274 c Iff.
we are told happened In those first times' [κατά τους· πρώτους' χρόνου?]. But see η. on 274 c 1-2.)
d4 'a n d as for the regions, It was Just the sam e': the text read, ώ? δ 'αύ κατά τόπου?, is that
proposed by Robinson (RS 45-6), though 1 take ου in what appears to be a different way (Robinson
translates 'and secondly as concerned the regional level...' (my italics], where he seems to lake αύ
as answering to d 3 πρώτον). The MSS have ώ? vCv κατά τόπου? ('as now*), which Dies, and
Brisson in RS, retain; but the text is on any account corrupt, since a connective is needed (Dies and
Brisson follow Madvig in supplying κα\ after vGv), and in fact it seems precisely not be the case,
now, that the god 'rules over the whole rotation': see especially 274 d 3-6. But it is Brisson's view
that the god reassumes control of the rotation itself - though not of anything else - at the beginning
of the present period; see preceding note. (Burnet's ώ? δ ’αύ would give much the same sense as
Robinson's proposal)
d 4-5 'th e p a rts of the w orld-order having everyw here been divided I have retained the MSS
reading παντη, taking τά τοΟ κόσμου μέρη SiciXnppcva as an accusative absolute; the
construction is usually reserved for impersonal verbs (see Goodwin, M T § 854), but its use here
could be explained by the need to avoid a string of genitive plurals. Editors generally read πα'ντ
’ ην (Robinson endorses παντί] ήν, proposed by Xicoll). However the sense is much the same in
any case.
d 6-7 'divine sp irits'; these 'spirits' (SaiVovc?) arc still gods, if lesser ones, as e 5-6 confirms fa god
[Oco?] tended them'; cf. also 272 e 7, where δαίμων is used of *the greatest god*). For δαίμονΐ?
and the golden age in IIesiod, see n. on c 2.
'by kind and by h e rd ': kind' is γόνο?; *by herd', in the case of human beings, will mean *by
group', where the group might have constituted a city, if there had been such things as cities (see e
8).
e5 'a life ... w ithout toil'; the Greek here (αυτομάτου ... βίου, 'spontaneous life/livclthood*) is clearly
shorthand for c 8 - d 1 'everything's springing up of its own accord for human beings'.
e7 'p a stu re ': the verb here, νομίύω, is no more than a variant of the one (νέμω) translated as ’UmcT in
e 6 and elsewhere; the relationship between each divine herdsman and his human herd is just the
same as that between any normal herdsman and his.
e8 'an d given his tendance, they had no political constitutions, as so often, a sentence begins in
a particular way, and is then broken off: '... it is both the case [ic] that there were no constitutions,
nor..., for...' (but there turns out to be nothing to answer to the tc ).
272 a 1-2 'fo r all of them cam e back to life from the earth, rem em bering nothing of the p ast': as in the
reversed cosmos people arc re-bom from the earth as adults, so in the age of Kronos they arc re­
born as babies - and it is a different kind of re-birth (see d 8 - e 3 with note). The absence of
memory may perhaps be connected with their lack of political organisation; a condition of political
institutions, or at least of their - relative - stability (cf. 301 e -302 a), will be a memory of how
things were done in the past. But, as Luc Brisson points out to me, it is also required to assure the
identity of the re-bom as new, human beings, and not just old souls with new bodies.
a6 'they would feed': the verb is the middle of νόμω (see n. on 271 e 7), which in a herding context
would naturally mean this, rather than other translators' vaguer lived'.
b2 'which they say Is In the time of Zeus': according to tradition (λόγο?, sc. co τί = λέγσυσι). Zeus
took over kingship of the gods from his father Kronos. But according to ES.'s story, the present
era is marked by die absence of divine rule.
b 8 · c 5 'W ell then, If, w ith so m uch leisure ...': the idea of the 'nurslings of Kronos* talking to the
animals is partly fantastic, partly serious (like so much of the myth). If they arc so like the animals
in so many respects, maybe they could talk to them, and maybe even learn from them; for after all,
why should we suppose - especially in such a context - that human beings have a monopoly on
wisdom? For the suggestion that other animals might (perhaps) be rational, cf. 263 d. The picture
given of philosophy is as a kind of. Socratic questioning.
c 5-6 'th e Judgem ent is easy ... those who Hve dow ': pace Brisson (RS 358-9), it seems from 271 c 2
(sec n. ad loc.) that at least some of those who lived in the golden age did engage in philosophy -
just as some do now. But E.S.'s point in b 8ff. is a general one: i f the people of the golden age
194 COMMENTARY 272 c-c
engaged in philosophy, then they were better off than (the majority of) those who live now, and if
not, not (cl. Dillon, RS 371; Brier, RS 376); ’happiness' (ευδαιμονία in Greek, denoting the
possession of what really makes life worth living) in general depends on whether or not we do
philosophy. This is of course a familiar Socralic/ Platonic idea. Thus true happiness' is a matter of
our own choice: most people now, as E.S. dearly suggests, don't make the right choice; about
whether most people then did, despite their greater opportunities (b 8 - c 5), he remains agnostic.
The god(s) may - sometimes - control the revolutions of the universe, but even under ideal
conditions he does not control the way we live our lives,
c 7 · d 1 'storks ^ of the sort that even now are told about them': i.e., presumably, if they accompanied
bouts of self-indulgence, ones peopled with non-philosophers. It is hard to see precisely which
current stories (μΰθοι) ES is referring to; Aesop's fables (et. Phaedo 60 c ff.), which might look the
obvious choice, typically involve talking animals', but not people, whether talking to each other or
to the animals. But no doubt what is meant is simply 'the more common view of life in the age of
Kronos' (Dillon, RS 371). Or might there also be a playful reference to the present μΟθο?, in so far
as this by itsdf suggests that the people of the golden age - faced with such abundance - might not
all have been devoted to the cause of philosophy? There is certainly at least one light touch -
perhaps unsurprisingly, in a general context containing an 'element of play' (268 d) - in the shape
of the verb διαλε'γεσθαι, translated as 'exchange' ('and exchanging stones with one another*): this
is precisely the verb which is characteristically used for philosophical, dialectical, conversation,
d 1-2 ' a I may reveal how It seems to me, at least': lit. To reveal (it) at any rate in accordance with my
opinion', ώς + infinitive is a limiting' expression (cf. our 'so to speak*),
d 3-5 'until such time as someone appears who Is qualified to Inform us as before, ES. behaves
like a historian, dependent on witnesses and evidence (cf. especially 271 a-b). There will be a
strong contrast between his unwillingness to commit himself on the altitude of people of the age of
Kronos towards knowledge and philosophy, and his view of the absolute necessity for both in the
present age, when the divine has, as it were, taken a back scat. 'Kinds of knowledge' in the
translation (Ίο inform us in which of these two ways the desires of men of that time were directed
in relation to kinds of knowledge*), as at 258 b 7, represents επιστημαι, lit. Icnowlcdges' or
mstances/examplcs of knowledge', which is ambiguous enough to cover both philosophy and the
kinds of expertise for which there is no need in Kronos' time (since all basic needs were then
provided for) but for which there is every need in the present,
d5 'rousing our story into action': the metaphor here (εγείρω = 'wake up') is borrowed from the
poets, who talk e.g. of 'rousing' a song or lament (sec Pindar, Pylhians 9.104, Sophocles, Oedipus
at Colonus 1778). See also 277 d 5-6,297 c 8 for a similar use of κινεΐν ('move', stir upO.
d 8 - e 3 'and In particular all the earthly race had been used up ... as many times as had been laid
down for each': the idea of a fixed number of re-births for each soul is consistent with that of
fixed cosmic cycles; in the Phaedrus myth, each soul - other than resolutely philosophical ones -
undergoes ten reincarnations in every cycle. (The earthly race’ (το γηινον ... y ev o ?]: or The
stock of births issuing from the earth' - 1c capital dc naissanccs issues dc la terre', Brisson.) On the
traditional interpretation of the myth in terms of two periods, this 'earthly race' will be identical
with the 'earth-bom' of 271 a-c. But the modes of their respective births seem to be quite
different; while the 'earthly race' here results from the 'sowing' of earth with souls, as part of an
ordered process, the 'earth-bom' are the product of the trauma of reversal (cf. n. on 271 d 1-2), and
their bodies as well as their souls are re-cycled (271 b 5 - c 2) - whereas in the present ease, the
language of 'seeds' suggests new creatures, albeit with used souls. In the 'age of Zeus', of course,
we have to organize these new births for ourselves, as best we can (274 a-b).
e4 'the bar of the steering-oars': a ship would typically have had two steering-oars, one either side
of the stem of the ship, which could be moved by the steersman using a bar connecting them
together (Brisson [A5 357 n.28J).
e 4-5 retired to his observation-post': cf. Timaeus 42 e. At this point, the god is at best looking out
for the world - as, given its proclivities, it certainly needs him to do. Where we suppose the
'observation-post' to be - whether on the ship, or off it (as e.g. at Odyssey X.146) - will perhaps
depend on the degree to which we understand the god to draw back from the world; thus e.g.
Brisson, who takes him never to abandon the world entirely, places the observation-post ('la vigic')
firmly on board (RS 357-8). But it seems equally possible to take the other view, and have the god
watching from a distance.
e 5-6 'its allotted and Innate desire': I follow Brisson, (1974) n.9,484-7, both in taking ειμαρμένη w
an adjective, like σύμφυτο?. Qualifying έτιιθυμία, and in attributing a fairly colourless meaning to
it But the net result is probably the same as if it were to be taken as a noun ('destiny'): what is
'allotted' to it is in any case inescapable. 'Desire' which is responsible for thwarting the purposes of
reason is associated with the body of the cosmos (see 269 d-c, 273 b-c) much as the desire for
physical pleasures in human beings, which interferes with our rational processes, can be treated as
a consequence of our nature as corporeal beings: see e.g. Phaedo 64 c If., Timaeus 69 a ff.
 COMMENTARY 272 c -2 7 3 d 195
e7 ’the greatest divinity': the word δαίμων is plainly used here as a variant of ©co?; cf. 271 d 6-7
with note.
273 a 1-2 'Impelled with opposing movements, both the one that was beginning and the one that was
now ending': liL 'impelled with an opposite impulse [evavriav όρμήν, cognate or internal
accusative] of both beginning and cnding\
a 3 'another destruction': 'another', because of course there had been many such episodes of
destruction before. This particular episode belongs to the type described at 270 b^i fat the time
when [the uinverse's] turning becomes the opposite of the one which obtains now', 270 d 4-5).
a 6 · b 1 'set itself In order, Into the accustomed course that belongs to it': this marks the end of the
period of cosmic reversal, the account of which has been telescoped into five lines. But it has of
course already been described; now E.S. is giving us an outline account of the cosmic cycle as a
whole. (On the traditional interpretation, the description of the period of reversal - or at any rate
of the movement of the universe in the opposite sense to the one that obtains now - will have
ended at 272 e 3; for Brisson it ends at 27j d-e.) The accustomed course which belongs to it* is
one which results from the universe's 'mastering ... itself (κράτος ζχων ... έαυτοΟ, b 1-2; cf. 274
a 5), and this can surely only mean the mastery of reason (269 d 1) over the bodily element (269 d
5 - e 1); it was the absence of such control over the bodily which caused the reversal itself (269 d -
270 a), and the loss of it which will cause the decay of the cosmos and bring the 'age of Zeus' to an
end (273 b 4ff.). This age, then, is one which - at least for a time - is characterized by order fee!
itself in order', κατακοσμουμοΌς: making itself once more into a kosmos?), by contrast with the
(much shorter) period of reversal, which is a lime of confusion', and begins and ends with
earthquakes and destruction. The direction of rotation during our era is the same as that during the
age of Kronos; this 'course' of the universe is then its 'accustomed' one, and the one that 'belongs to
it, just in the sense that that is the course that it normally follows in the cycle as a whole, i.e.
except in that period of disturbance inaugurated by the god's letting it go*. But that there should be
this coincidence between the age of Kronos and ours is precisely what we should expect, if the
universe is indeed an intelligent, rational creature. That when left to itself it should - in some
major respects - always do the opposite of what it did when under the control of the (supremely
rational) divinity would surely be intolerable; in that case it would apparently have remembered
rather little of what it had been taught (see b 2-3). With the verb translated as 'set itself in order',
κατακοσμΛσθαι (b 1), we may compare the use of the corresponding noun κατακόσμησις fsuch
an arrangement■) in 271 c 3. (Brisson, RS 355, lists the present passage among those referring to
the actions of the god/demiurge; but if the universe is obeying his instructions, it is equally
certainly doing the actual ordering by itself.)
b 1-3 'itself taking charge of and mastering both the things within it and itself, because it
remembered so far as it could the teaching of its craftsman and father': i.c. reasserting the
control of reason and intelligence over the bodily element which had caused the reversal, where
reason and intelligence, on the cosmic level, arc -1 suggest - expressed not merely by movement
in a circle (cf. n. on 269 d 1-2), but movement in a circle in one particular direction. See preceding
note. But at the level of 'the things within [the universe]', too, matters are put to rights: at the
beginning, at least, it had the same, or a similar, proportion of success in the production of living
creatures - by new methods (sec 274 a 2 ff.) - as when it 'reared them in itself in company with the
steersman' (273 c 2-3).
b7 'before entering into the present world-order': i.c. the cosmos in its complete reaiircni cycle.
As we already know from references e.g. to *the one who fitted it together in the beginning' (269 d
1), the Pit. story, just like that in the Timaeus , includes the idea that the universe was created at
some point in the past (but the combination of creation and cycle is, again, peculiar to Pit.), For
the 'bodily clement', and its association with change, see 269 d 5 - e 1; and for the idea of pie-
cosmic disorder, cf. Tim . 48 a ff.
b 7-8 'For from the one who put it together the world possesses all floe things': i.e. the god is the
source of all the good things it has. (The univcrse/cosmos resumes as subject: that τδ
σωματοοδός, 'the bodily element', is subject of the preceding clause is guaranteed by the neuter
gender of μςτόχον.)
c1 'the heavens': i.e. the univcrse/cosmos (cf. 269 d).
d 1-2 and the goods it mixes in are slight': the cosmos again briefly ceded its role as subject, and
again resumes it
d 6-7 'the boundless sea of unlikeness': the idea of a 'boundless' (or limitless’, α-παρος) 'unlikcncss'
seems to contrast with that of older (b 1); it is a stale in which everything is in permwent change,
always becoming something different or 'unlike'. (The substitution of πόνιον, 'sea', by editors,
from ancient citations of the passage, for the MSS reading τόπον, 'place' kooks right, given the
other nautical metaphors in the surrounding context, and the difficulty of identifying what ·Λβ
place of unlikcncss' might be. There is nowhere else for the universe, Ihc all', to go - or is this too
prosaic an objection to what would itself have to be taken as a metaphor? Cf. Campbell. Dillon,
196 COMMENTARY 273 c - 274 b
RS 365 n.5, also draws attention to the fact that at least one ancient author, Plotinus, refers to 'the
place of unlikcncss', and that 'sea* is found only in *lhc later Plalonisls, from Proclus on'.)
e 3 'renders It immortal and ageless': cf. 2*70 a 3-4 with note. The 'greatest god' has, then,
intervened to prevent the complete dissolution of things; and if, as it looks reasonable to suppose,
'taking his position again at its steering-oars'(d 7 - e 1) is equivalent to 'ruling the rotation as a
whole* (271 d 3-4), his intervention will mark the beginning of a new 'golden' age. The world and
\hc things in it' have failed on their own, and now the god will care for them again,
e 3-5 'What has been said, then, is the end-point of everything; as for what is relevant to our
showing the nature of the king, it is sufficient If we take up the account from what went
before.' Both halves of this sentence are difficult and obscure in the Greek; more literally, it runs
This then has been said (as) end of everything; the (part which contributes?) towards the showing
forth of the king fis) sufficient for (us) grasping the account from the preceding'. The normal view
is probably that 'everything' refers to the story' itself, but the objection to this is that E.S. docs not
formally end his m ulhos until 274 e 1 ('As for the matter of our story, let it now be ended*).
Brisson takes a similar line, and translates *VoiU Ic dernier mot de louie fhistoire ...', despite
supposing (like Lovejoy and Boas, (1935] 158) that what has just been described is the middle,
temporary period of reversal before the universe resumes its normal course; he therefore appears to
be even more vulnerable to the same objection (which he attempts to meet, with only partial
success, by supposing E.S. to mean something like *Wel], this is as far as I shall go in relating the
story i t s e l f RS 352). If, however, what is in question is the return to the golden age (as it will
also be on the traditional interpretation), then that is indeed the 'end of everything', in the sense that
we will have come full circle: 'everything', then, is 'the whole cycle' (and perhaps that is what is
actually meant by translations like ihc tale is now told'). If we take up the account from what
went before' means picking up the story from 273 a-b, where the world recovers itself from its
critical reversal, in movement and in 'growth' and generation: 'When the world-order (kosmos) had
been turned back again on the course that leads to the kind of coming-into-bcing which obtains
now [i.e. at the beginning of our era], the movement of the ages of living creatures once again
stopped ...' (273 e 6-7). lliis 'turning' (στρέφεοθαι) is then distinct from the one caused by the god
in e 2; but it is clearly identified Chad been turned back again on the course that leads ...*), and the
reference to 'taking up the account from what went before' further prepares us for the shift,
e 6-7 'the course that leads to the kind of coming-into-bcing ...': as before, the mode in which living
things come into being - and also the direction in which they develop (c 8ff.) - changes with the
rotation of the cosmos; see 271 b 7-8.
e 9-10 'those bodies that had just been born from the earth already grey-haired': the bodies as well
as the souls of the 'earth-bom' arc re-bom (cf. nn. on 271 b 6-7,272 d 8 - e 3); the unfortunates in
this ease arc described just as todies' perhaps because they scarcely had lime to change from their
previous state as corpses.
274 a 1 'the condition of the universe': i.e. its newly changed condition, in which forward movement is
restored, but it has to fend for itself.
a 1-3 'there was a change to the mode of conception l i t '... the imitation of conception, birth and
nurture kept pace with all things by necessity', where μίμημα συνείπετο toi? ndoiv repeats, while
it also vanes, 273 e l l - 274 a 1 απομιμούμενα κα\ συνακολουθοΟντα τφ του παντδ? παΟήματι.
a 3-4 'under the agency of others' putting it together': others' (ετε'ρων) could in principle as well be
neuter as masculine. But the primary reference is probably to the construction of new living
creatures in the age of Kronos (see 272 d-e), when divine agents were available to do the work, and
Brisson is probably right in suggesting an allusion here to the auxiliary gods of the Timaeus , to
whom the divine craftsman devolved the task of creating mortal creatures. Cf. also the creation of
human beings by the gods (within the earth') in the myth of the P rotagoras (320 d). For a
diffcrcrtl kind of 'putting together', see 271 b 6.
a5 'had been instructed to be master of its own motion': 'the instruction', presumably, was part of
the 'leaching* it got from its 'craftsman and father’ (273 b 2-3). Being 'master of its own motion'
means moving itself in the right direction, and not the one in which it moved previously under the
domination cf its bodily element; in this sense, in becoming 'master of its own motion', it also
becomes 'master of itself (αύτο-κρα'τωρ). But since what the cosmos docs - or what at least the
heavenly bodies do (cf. n. on 269 c 5) - is to move in a circle, mastering themselves and mastering
their movement will in any case come to much the same thing,
a 6-7 'so far as possible by themselves': another example of Plato’s wit and eye for detail - most types
of living things, of course, cannot reproduce *by themselves', but need to couple with each other,
b1 'under the agency of a similar impulse': i.e. its own.
b 4-5 'those which relate to human beings will be shorter to relate and more to the point': as
before, E.S. takes care not automatically to privilege human beings over animals; however in the
end it is human beings that we arc interested in, since statesmen rule over humans and not animals.
(The term Οηρίον has so far been reserved for animals as opposed to human beings; nor do we need
 COMMENTARY 274 b - 275 a 197
to take the expression τών άλλων θηρίων here - any more than at 263 c 6 - as implying the
inclusion of human beings among the *bcasts', given the possibility of expressions in Greek like
cTtc ... Ιατρών ... ciT ’ άλλων Ιδιωτών, 'whether doctors or else laymen', 298 d 6-7: cf. also
305 c 1.)
b 5-6 'Having been deprived of the god Le. the special 'spirit' or god (δαίμων) who looked after
each *hcrd' in the age of Kronos; see 271 d-e.
b7 'had gone wild': no longer having anyone to herd'them.
c 1-2 'in those first times were still without resources and without expertise of any kind': Brisson,
in R St makes much of the apparent contrast between what is said here to happen 'ia those first
times' (κατά το υ ς πρώτου; ... χρόνου;), and what was said in 273 b 3 to happen 'at the
beginning', drawing the conclusion that the reference must be to different periods - in the one case,
things went badly at Tint, in the other they went well. But the present passage may guile plausibly
be taken as describing how things came to go well in the early stages of the age of Zeus (though
they later started to go wrong). In other words, it is simply a matter of a difference of lime-scale:
in the earlier passage, H.S. is looking at the period on the large scale, whereas in the later one he is
looking more at the detailed conditions of our existence. It will in any case be true that our era
began with suffering and destruction, because of the (second) cosmic reversal: sec 273 a 4-6. (By
contrast, of course, there will be no such suffering when the cosmos returns to the golden age -
because there will be no reversal at this point.) Without any resources': the 'resources' in question
are Tcinds of expertise' - once more, τόχναι (they were ά-Tcxvoi): kinds of specialized
knowledge, 'aits'. These are what enable human beings to flourish. For this pan of E.S.s account,
we may contrast the account of human 'history' in the myth of the Protagoras (321 bff.): see
Introduction. The main source is again Hesiod, and his accounts in both Works and Days and
Theogony of the original gifts of Prometheus and other gods to man.
c6 'along with an Indispensable requirement for teaching and education': these gifts, then, are
different from the ones men enjoyed in the age of Kronos, in that to make use of them rcqoircs
considerable effort from us. It is surprising to find gods giving gifts to us human beings in a period
when we were supposed to be managing on our own; but we do not need to suppose that E.S. is in
this ease endorsing the 'ancient reports' in question. Laws 677 cfT. attributes the (re-)dtscovery of
the technai to the genius of certain legendary human figures.
c7 'crafts': that is, τόχναι, which I have previously translated as kinds of expertise'; here, however,
the reference is clearly to 'crafts' in a narrow sense, at least so far as IIcpnacstus* contribution is
concerned.
c7-d 1 his feHow-craftworker': Athena, who was particularly associated with Hephaestus at Athens;
cf. P ro ta g o ra s 321 d-e, where they share a house (Hephaestus there is specialized in the
blacksmith's art, while Athena possesses all the rest of 'wisdom relating to life: - except for the
'political art*).
d7 'in the way we did then': i.e. in the time of Kronos. Once again, E.S. at first sight appears to
operate in terms of two eras only, not three. However, the absence here of any mention of the
intervening period (when the world went into reverse) makes sense, in so far as the point of the
myth is essentially lied to the contrast between the present, when we need to rely on ourselves, and
our golden past, when we could rely on divine assistance. The period of reversal was a brief,
catastrophic, interlude: one that lasted 'many tens of thousands of revolutions' (270 a 7), but ten
thousand 'revolutions' is a mere thirty years or so, and the cosmic cycle - if we may judge e.g. by
the P toedrus - would itself be measured in thousands of years.
e1 'As fur the matter of our stoiy, let It now be ended': lit. let it now have an end'. E.S. rounds
off his account as he began it (see 268 d 9 with note) by adverting to its status as a story .
According to one plausible reading, the description of world history as a series of stages is a way
of describing different aspects of the world as it is: as Brisson puls it in RS (361), In die Politicus
myth, two antinomic conceptions - of a world dominated by the divinity, and of a universe
abandoned to itself - arc rejected in favour of a third: a universe in which divinity and chance co­
exist, exactly as in the Timaeus ...'
e 7-8 'In one way Skemp finds two separate 'mistakes' (One mistake was not so serious, but the
other ,..'), but this itself seems to be a mistake. See following note (and cf. Campbell). Than in
the other ease': Campbell and others understand e.g. £φην with rore Ohan I said/lhoughl it was]);
but a) this is an unconvincing reading of the Greek, and b) it is not clear to what previous point in
the conversation the reference would be. Cf. 275 a 6 κατ * ckcivo.
274 e 10 · 275 a 6 'In that when asked The section down to 276 c, designed as a series of comments on
the myth and its lessons for the inquiry, includes a total of five ways in which things went wrong,
or might be said to have gone wrong: 111 they got hold of the wrong sort o f king (274 e 10-275 a2);
(21 they said something true hut unclear (or incomplete) about the right kind of king (275 a 3-6);
(31 they 'missed in their aim at' - διημαρια'νομο’: the root is the same as the one translated as
'(make a) mistake in 274 e - 275 a - the 'scIf-directive kind of expertise that looks after living
198 COMMENTARY 274 c 275 b
creatures in groups', by choosing a term which actually doesn't apply in the ease of human-herding,
i.c. τροφή· 'nurture* or 'rearing' (275 d 4 - c 1); [4| they made another 'big mistake' (θιαμαρτάνω
again) in not dividing human rcarcrs/carctakcrs from divine ones (276 c 4 - d 5); and [5] they went
wrong (apaprdm) in not separating the king from the tyrant (276 d 7 - c 4). At least two things
arc tolerably clear, firstly that [1] and [2] reflect different ways of looking at what went wrong in
their previous divisions, and secondly that at least [3] and |4| (to leave |5| for the moment out of
account) are meant to be taken as having been the immediate causes of [ 11. To take the first point
first: *thc mistake' (274 e 4) can be described either [11 in terms of their having got hold of the
wrong thing entirely - which would be the stricter interpretation; or [2J in terms of their having got
hold of the right thing, only unclcarty, or only of part of the right thing. 111chimes with 275 b 3-7,
where E.S. suggests that one of the purposes of the myth was to show what precisely liuman-herd-
rearer' succeeded in picking out (see n. ad loc.), while both [1] and [2| together arc perhaps
anticipated in 268 c 5-10. We should recall that we arc still in the middle of a lesson in
methodology: if the effect of (11 is to remind Y.S. that we need complete accuracy and clarity, that
of [2| is to offer a way forward Thai (31 and [4] arc meant to be taken as immediate causes of (1)
follows just from the way E.S. lays out his diagnosis. (In fact, the situation with respect to [3| is
rather more complex than this suggests: see nn. on 275 d 4 and - especially - on 275 b 2-3.) We
reached the wrong result, so (c 9) let's go back by the following route. We should have chosen a
term other than "herd-rearing", and in any case we should have divided divine from human.' And
it is perfectly true that if they had done this, they would not have ended up identifying the
king/statesman with the divine herdsman of the age of Kronos. In any case, the next step - once
we have got rid of those false moves reported in [3] and |4] - will be to establish the manner’
(τρόπο?) of the (human) statesman's rule: so E.S. says at 275 a 8-10, picking up [2|. He rules over
the whole city; that much they got right. But how, exactly, docs he do that? (Clearly, not by
'rearing'/*nurturing' them, as the myth made clear: cf. b 1-3.) This brings us to [5], which itself
relates to 'manner (τρόπο? again: 276 e 4) of rule. Is the distinction between voluntarily-accepted
and enforced rule perhaps the one they want? Y.S. immediately takes the bail; E.S. again tries to
slow him down (2/7 a 3ff.), and initiates a new phase in the discussion which involves separating
the king's/statesman's knowledge from other kinds of expertise which operate in the city. This, it
seems, is the proper way to establish the 'manner' of the statesman's rule.
274 e 11-275 a 1 'from the opposite period': 'opposite', not in the sense that the 'rotation and mode of
generation* then were in the opposite direction, but that they happened in an 'opposite' way, i.c.
through divine agency - which is after all the point of comparison which is relevant to the
immediate argument. See (c.g.) n. on 274 d 7.
275 a 4 βό is the so-called 'apodotic' 6c (see Goodwin, M T §§ 512-13), and may safely be treated as
redundant; a 4 ταύτ η plainly begins the main clause of the sentence.
a 8-9 'we should define the manner of his rule see n. on 274 c 10 - 275 a 5. He rules over the
whole city, i.c. all citizens, and in all aspects (which is to be distinguished, as the myth is supposed
to have taught us, from his being, himself, everything to the citizens); but how? We might seem to
have at least part of the answer, in that we know that the 'art of kingship' is 'self-directive' (260 c
if.): it will rule over the whole city by issuing orders to others. Ilowcvcr the divine shepherd might
be said to do the same, in so far as he devolves power to the subsidiary daimones who look after
the various parts of the universe and the living things in it (271 d). What we need is a closer
definition of the role of the statesman within the city, a definition which will mark him off from
others who also claim to 'care for* its citizens.
b1 'introduced*: or 'deposited* (as with evidence in court: napaiiOcoOai).
b 2-3 'everyone now disputes this function with the person we are looking for': given where our
divisions took us, 'everyone' (i.c. all sorts of other experts) will claim the same function as the
king; all sorts of people fccd/rcar/carc for the citizens (a point which was perhaps 'demonstrated'
by the myth in so far as it contrasted the age of Zeus, and all the many kinds of expertise human
beings living in it need, with that of Kronos, when everything was provided for us). It should be
noticed that the problem, first identified at 267 c - 268 a, of others^'disputing the function of the
statesman' with him, arises even apart from the particular issue of the choice of the word τροφή
('rearing', 'nurture*), which will be raised next. In fact, once some more general term, like 'caring
for' (έπιμόλαα,Ckpancia), has been substituted for τροφή, ihc statesman will turn out to have
even more 'rivals', even though they may be of different kinds. The problem will be that
cmpcXcia is loo wide a term, and lets too much in; we must narrow it down (as E.S. puts it, by
specifying the τρόπο? or 'manner' of the statesman's rule). Skemp (n. on 274 c 7-8) secs the choice
of the term τροφή as itself the major mistake which the myth was designed to illustrate; however if
all we had had to go on was that kings cared fo r the human herd, the results would not have been
substantially different. Sec following note, (pic term τροφή was m f*ct brought in by E.S:
himself, at 261 d 3, and without any real justification: see n. ad loc. Its main function, in
 COMMENTARY 275 b-c 199
retrospect, seems to have been to facilitate the introduction of the myth, with its central figure of
the divine shepherd.)
b 3-7 ’but also In order that we might see ... that very person, whom alone_It Is appropriate to
think worthy of this name alone': 'this name', Le., presumably, the name of ’human-hcrd-rearer'.
This second part of the sentence in b 1-7 corresponds doscly with the first description, in 274 e 10
• 275 a 6, of the error identified in the myth, as the first part (b 1-3) corresponds with the second
(275 a 3-6): cf. n. on this passage above. Either we can lake our original definition of 267 a 8 - c 3
as merely a step on the way towards a complete definition, with much of the detail still to be filled
in (by separating off the statesman's 'competitors', which the broad terms of the definition still
allow in); or we regard it as a complete definition in itself - as E.S. began to do, in 267 c, with
Y.S.'s approval. But in the latter case, we have to interpret it strictly according to the rules, and ask
what that single thing is which is picked out exclusively by the 'name' in question f ...whom alone
... it is appropriate to think worthy of this name alone*). In defining, what we are looking for is the
sole 'name' of the definiendum, and one which fits it to the exclusion of everything else.
Interpreted in this way, the definitiοπ/name we arrived at was actually not of the statesman at all
(but of the divine shepherd) - or, to the extent that it was o f him (and after all it was the statesman
we were trying to define), we have to admit that it was not complete.
c 1-2 'the statesmen who belong to our present era': either statesmen as they would ideally be, or
statesman as they actually are - in so far as these meet the requirements which ES. and r S . are
formulating (which, as it happens, E.S. will turn out to think that none of them docs).
c5 'I suppose you must be right': or 'no doubt'; the που seems to qualify the degree of assent (in line
with its usual role) - though it is not clear why Y.S. should want to quarrel at all with E-S.’s last
sentiment. Perhaps he is just reserving judgement, and after all we have so far heard nothing
explicitly about existing politicians
c 6-7 '... neither less nor more worth looking for _': this looks like the same point as at 266 d (that
philosophical inquiry makes no distinction between subject-matters, dealing with the more
dignified and less dignified alike). But after 271 e, which compared divine rule over men in the
golden age with human rule over domestic animals, our association in 266 c-d with pigs and
swineherds may have a new resonance.
c9 Then let's go back by the following route': having shown that the result they had reached is
unsatisfactory, E.S. now proceeds to establish which were the wrong turnings they took (see n. on
274 e 10 - 275 a 6).
d4 'we missed in a way in our aim at this': i.e. we missed in our aim at that expertise which looks
after living creatures in herds (at 261 c-d), because (as ES. explains) we called it by a name (herd-
rearing) which actually excluded the statesman, who has nothing to do with rearing his herd (d 8 -
c 1). (Campbell translates '[o]ur error lay somewhere in this', taking the genitive ταυ'της· to be
governed by nq.) This claim of ES.’s is something of a surprise, since he will go on to assign to
the statesman a vital interest in his charges' education and choice of partners - and match-making,
at least, was one of the functions specifically assigned to herdsmen at 268 a, by implication as part
of the 'rearing' (τροφή) of their charges. Perhaps, however, E.S. is merely returning to the more
basic connection of τροφή with food and nourishment (cf. 267 c 4-7); certainly statesmen have no
direct concern with that. Divine man-herders, on the other hand, equally certainly do - and this
again raises the possibility, dismissed in the n. above on b 2-3, that it is the use of the term τροφή
which was the major error in the earlier divisions, just in so far as it is this which leads directly to
our 'getting hold of the divine shepherd rather than the human king. However it seems more
appropriate, in the context, that the really significant errors should be identified as being - at least
at bottom - methodological, as they will be on the interpretation proposed (nn. on b 2-3,3-7): the
argument was loo hasty, and plumped for a 'name'/deftnition which did not pick out the statesman
in the required way. d 4 itself suggests no great stress on the mistaken choice of term; it is not
itself labelled as a T>ig mistake', as the next one - their failure to separate human from divine - will
be (276 c 5).
d8 'the feature of rearing': sec preceding note.
eI 'when we should have applied i.e. what we needed was a common term, covering human as
well as other kinds of herding, which we could then divide as we did (see 276 a 3-7) to find that
part relating to statesmanship. (Again, to suggest that it is term s that arc being divided is
misleading: what is being divided is actually - as ES. understands it - what those terms pick out.
See n. on 567 a 5.)
*5 'herd-keeping': 'herd-keeping', in the translation, is a mere place-filler (as the suffix in the Greek,
-κομικη, probably is too); the real work is done by the following two alternative terms. The
dropping of the prefix ’herd-' in these cases is not significant; statesmanship is still, and will
continue to be, regarded as a species of herding, in so far, of course, as this is understood as
looking after herds (cf. n. on 267 c 1-2). ES. never goes back and questions the allocation of
200 COMMENTARY 276 b - 277 b
statesmen to the same general type as herdsmen, and 'herding' is therefore bound to form a part of
the complex 'name' which will finally be discovered.
276 b 1-5 'no one would ever have contended with us this is, in effect, the immediate upshot of the
myth, taken together with the passage at 267 c ff. - there is no human 'herd-rearer (if 'rearing'
includes feeding), but if there were, merchants, farmers etc. would have better claim to the title
than would kings four kings': the Greek says merely 'any of the kings' = 'any king', but the
contrast is between human kings and divine herdsman-kings).
c 1 'w hich is over all hum an beings': this given fad about kingship represents the justification for
the conclusion that kings alone have care for' the whole human community (no one else rules over
everybody).
c 9-10 'a s if th a t w ere (he end o f (he m aU er': lit. 'as if (the expertise of the king and the statesman)
were completely finished' (as if being crafted).
d 4-5 'w here we would have divided ...': sc. if we had not taken the wrong turning (as demonstrated
by the myth).
d7 '(be a rt of (he c a re r resulting from (his apportionm ent': i.c. the part of herd keeping that is left
after the cutting off of the divine species of it.
e 1-2 we m ade a m istake before In (his way too, by M. putting king and ty ra n t Into the same
category': they 'put king and tyrant into the same category' (in Greek, merely 'into the same',
where 'the same' is neuter) just in the sense that thev claimed to have defined the king/siaicsman
without having separated him off from the tyrant. But this implies that the species Tiuman-hcrd-
keepers' in principle may include tyrants, which looks surprising, if \ceping' is defined - as it has
been - in terms of 'caring for': in Plato, the word 'tyrant' (τύραννος) is generally used in a
pejorative sense, referring to those rulers who act for their own benefit rather than that of their
subjects, and whose rule has to be enforced for just this reason. However, c 10-13 suggests that we
must in the present context understand the difference between 'king' and 'tyrant' exclusively in
terms of that between voluntary and enforced rule. Later it will be agreed that kingly rule may
itself be enforced rather than voluntary, and that the distinction is actually irrelevant to the
definition of kingship (291 c ff.). To that extent, the present division is abandoned; however the
king will still be very sharply distinguished from the tyrant, by a different criterion (see csp. 301
b-c). On the function of the present context in the overall structure or argument of the dialogue,
see nn. on 274 c 10 - 275 a 6,302 e 4-8. E.S. will immediately signal (277 a) that they have again
taken a wrong turn; they may have said something, now (cf. 275 a), about the manner (τρόπος) of
the rule of the king (namely that it is different from that of the tyrant), but it is not sufficient (One
obvious way in which it is insufficient is in not indicating the true difference between king and
tyrant - which in turn indicates the need for a clearer notion of what 'caring for', and the special
expertise of the king/stalesman, consists in. One of its essential features will, of course, turn out to
be that it - unlike tyranny - is for the benefit of the ruled.)
277 a 6 · b 1 'ju st as sculptors ... beyond w hat is necessary': it is hard to identify the particular set of
circumstances being referred to in the sphere of actual sculptors (unless - a suggestion made to me
by John Belts - it has to do with sculptures being made to fit into a particular space, as c.g. in a
frieze); but ILS.'s general meaning is clear enough without the illustration.
b 1 'I suppose in o rd e r to ...': '1 suppose' is meant to render δη, which I lake to be ironic (cf.
Denniston 232-3); certainly there was little indication that the motives now suggested were the
ones which actually dictated the use of the myth. Later on (286 b-c) E.S. will in fact defend the
myth as philosophically useful, and talks - apparently with reference to the present passage - only
of their having been afraid that it was *bolh beside the point and too long' (286 c 1). The general
upshot of what he is saying here in 277 a-c is that despite the time they have devoted to their story,
they have still not finished off their account (and so, from that limited point of view, it might
appear excessive).
b 4 'illustrations': the term (παραδςίγματα) is the same as the one that will be translate! as 'models'
in the passage immediately following the present one (277 d ff.); it may have its original or
primary location in the sphere of the visual arts (cf. n. on d 1-2).
b 4-5 ’took upon ourselves ... in the shape of th e sto ry ': Campbell has '[look] up in the fable, as it
were, a monstrous lump’, explaining the genitive (roO μυΟοδ) as a 'genitive of apposition or
respect'.
b 5-6 'so forcing ourselves to use a greater p art of it than necessary': i.c. so grand a story (may have:
cf. n. on b 1 iVa δη) required a mass of material out of proportion to its immediate function?
b 7 'an d have in every way failed to apply a finish to o u r story': what the text seems to say here is
distinctly puzzling, since even if it were true that the siory/myih is incomplete (maybe more detail
might have been added, but there seem to be no obviously important omissions), that would hardly
be relevant, either in general terms (since it was on any account brought in for ulterior purposes),
or to the specific context, which is all about the incompleteness of the account so far given of
statesmanship. There seems no alternative but to suppose that our 'failure to apply a finish' refers
 COMMENTARY 277 c - 278 c 201
precisely lo this, and that 'story' is, surprisingly, used in a different sense (our 'story', i.e. our
argumcnt/discussion) from the one it had (’myth*) only two lines before. (The only alternative
apparently available is to take the dative τφ μύθι* as instrumental, with 'our account* supplied: i.e.
'we have failed to apply a finish to our account with the myth. But this seems an unacceptably
difficult way to take the Greek, in which a dative following τέλος* IniBdrai would naturally be
taken as that of the thing to which a fmish/end was being applied/puL) The switch in this case
could be supposed to be prepared for by the 'in every way (πάντο>ς): 'we have not completed our
"story" about the statesman, of which the story/myth was a part’. Cf. Narcy, RS 227 n.l; and for
the paradoxical treatment of dialectic as a kind of story-telling, see Rowe (1993) on Phaedo 61 e,
70 b.
c 1 'portrait': the word is ζ$ ο ν , which is also living creature' (c 4); the change of simile, from
sculpture to painting, is probably just for the sake of this pun (which 1 have found impossible to
reproduce in English translation). We are painting a £φον of a C$ov - though of course, as E.S.
goes on to add, a portrait in words of any living creature is superior to any actual portrait of ii/him.
The idea of a verbal picture or illustration (model*) will be central to the next section of the
discussion, and the apparently inconsequential, remark in c 3-6 fBut it is not painting ...Ο is no
doubt introduced at least partly as a bridge to the new topic in the conversation.
d 1-2 'It's a hard thing, my fine friend, to demonstrate any of the greater subjects without using
models': 'models' are paradeigmata fillustrations' in b 4), a term which may nave its primary use
in the creative sphere (the artist's original, or the architect's blueprint); it is also regularly used of
precedents, exemplars, or examples. Jowctt and Skemp (c.g.) prefer 'example' in tins context, but
this seems less than wholly appropriate: what E.S. is leading up to is the use of an analysis of
weaving to illustrate the structure of 'the kingly art', which - he will claim - is analogous to that of
weaving; and weaving is scarcely an 'example* of ruling. (Something will then be a 'paradigm' or
'model' of or for something else in this context if it offers an illuminating analogy, cf. the use of
εικόνες at 297 c 7.) 'My fine friend': see n. on d 8. On 'the greater subjects', sec especially n. on
285 c 4.
d 5-6 'what happens to us In relation to knowledge': 'what happens to us' is πάθος* as at 269 b 5; as
the sequel shows, the reference is to the process by which wc acquire, or can acquire, or teach,
knowledge of difficult subjects.
d8 'my dear fellow': English is as short on such forms of address as Greek is rich in them; cf. d 1,
where 'my fine friend* docs equally little justice to the Greek original. They are frequently used, as
here (and as they can be used in English), almost as exclamations, setting a lone and/or giving
emphasis to something, or marking it as new or important For ώ μακάριε itself, see c.g. Phaedo
69 a, Republic 432 d, and Dover (1980) on Symposium 198 b. Sec also 263 a 5,280 e 6, and 283
b 5, with notes.
e 3-4 'are... acquiring skill': lit 'are becoming experienced'.
e 5-7 That they distinguish ...': for other uses of the analogy of letters and syllables, see Theaetetus
201 c if., Philebus 17 a ff.; and Kato, RS 169 ff.
278 a 2 'once again': cf. the 'then again' of 277 d 3; as the teacher might say, they do know it all, in a
sense - or in the right context; but then again, they don't, because they make mistakes.
b 1-2 'the same kind of thing with similar features': lit. 'the same likeness and kind of thing' (or
'nature': φύσις). The expression 'the same likeness' would strictly imply that both occurrences of
the letter resembled some third thing; however one of the two is plainly meant to be the 'model* of
(the thing resembled by) the other.
b3 'have been shown set beside': '[t]hcrc is a slight allusion to the etymology of παρά-δειγμα',
Campbell (παοατιθε'ιιενα 6ciYQnT
b 5 · c 1 'they bring it about that each of all the individual letters Is called both different ~. and the
same': a long way round - recalling some of the philosophical lessons of the Sophist (254 d ff.) -
of saying that the children learn (through the use of the model') to identify each letter clearly and
reliably as something distinct by itself. 'Always the same as and identical to itself: more literally,
'the same always, in the same way, as itself. For a similar emphatic combination (κατά ταύτά καί
ωσαύτως* έχει ν) sec c.g. Phaedo 76 c.
c5 'we come to be using a m oder : liL 'there is coming-to-be of a model' (with emphatic yc \
c 6 'and distinct': lit. Tom apart', i.e. kept separate from the thing first thought of - which
distinguishes model from metaphor. For a similar use of the same verb, see Republic 503 b. (7a
something different E.S. perhaps has in mind analogical fea tu res of things in different
spheres.)
c8 'it seems so': or 'Plainly' (given the ambiguity of φαίνεσθαι between To appear' and To be clearly'
so-and-so: cf. n. on 260 b 2). The decision is difficult: is Y.S. commenting wryly on E.S.'s
somewhat tortuous formulation, or is he going all the way with him?
c9 'our minds': or 'our soul’ (ήμών ή ψνχη).
202 COMMENTARY 278 d - 279 a
d 1 'the Individual letters of everything': i.c. the (shared) 'elements' of anything you care to name in
the universe. Plato may have been the fmt to use the word στοιχεΐον for the 'elements' of the
natural world (by his time normally understood as fire, air, water and earth); in the present context,
we are reminded of the roots of this use in metaphor.
d 2 'now collecting themselves In some cases': the alternative reading £v τισιν ΐσταται, proposed
by Hermann and accepted by Robinson, would give something like 'taking their stand in some
cases', i.c., presumably, finding stability/securily, which comes to much the same thing.
d 2-3 'now, In others, all at sea in relation to all of them': the Greek verb here (φε'ρεσθαι) need mean
no more than 'is carricd/takcn', or 'moves'; however the contrast with 'collecting itself suggests
(involuntary) movement this way and that, and in the Greek as well as the English context the
nautical metaphor is close at hand. In relation to all of them': or 'in relation to everything'.
d 3-4 'and somehow or other getting the constituents of the combinations themselves right':
'somehow', because we clearly don't have a firm grasp on them. The constituents': the Greek here
has only the neuter plural of the definite article, but the meaning is clear enough. Themselves' is
slightly puzzling; docs E.S. mean that we get them right even though they're in combinations
(when in other such cases we don't)? Slallbaum may be right to suspect the text - though his
proposal to supply εκ before των συγκρασεων is not obviously an improvement.
Campbell translates 'and forms right opinion of some of them here and there amongst the
combinations', separating των συγκρασεων from αύτών and taking it closely with άμη γέ π ij; but
it would obscure E.S.'s point to suggest that there was 'correct opinion' about only some of the
'letters', and the contrast indicated by the με v ... δέ is between our minds' relationship to the letters'
under one set of circumstances (τα μεν κτλ.), and their relationship to them under another
(μετατιθε'μ€να 6 ' .... d 4-6).
d 4-6 'but once again not knowing what corresponds to whole words , in the image, is unimportant;
what matters is the distinction between syllablcs/groups of letters (features grouped together) and
individual letters (features separated out). For the pair long/not easy, cf. 2/7 e 6-7 fshortcsl and
easiest' syllables); the point of models will be to use the easier case to clarify the more difficult - as
weaving will be used to clarify the nature of statesmanship.
d 8·e2 'Right, my friend „.: the yap (in πώςγα'ρ;) implies assent by E.S. to Y.S.'s acceptance of his last
point. E.S. appears to be underlining the need for 'models': if they didn't use these - where ex
hypolhesi they know where they stand - they would have somehow to begin from what they're in
the dark about, i.e. the original things. There will in this case be no need for Slallbaum's
emendation of yap to a pa, accepted by Robinson.
c3 'I dare say ...': this looks like one of the cases where σχεδόν, which might be expected to soften
an assertion, is actually used, with light irony (somewhat like που), to reinforce it.
e 4-7 'Well, If that's the way it is ... with the intention then.»': With the emendations reported in the
apparatus (πράγματος- for παραδείγματος, Schlcicrmachcr, μεταβα'λλοντες for μέλλοντες·,
Comarius), the meaning would be something like '... in first attempting to sec the nature of a thing
as a whole in something else, a small model on the specific level, and after that changing (it?) ...'.
Robinson, in accepting the emendations, says that '[w]c arc no longer here concerned with
παράδειγμα παραδείγματος.' However it seems perfectly feasible to suppose, despite E.S.’s 'we
would not be in the wrong' (which might most naturally be taken as referring to the future), that he
is in fact just now finally closing off that topic, in preparation for the new one (cf. next note); it is
not unlike his manner to explain and justify his procedures with almost painful precision. Λ
difficulty for the emended version is that, if indeed E.S. is already in effect referring forward to the
use of weaving to illustrate statesmanship, the relationship between these two things is not that
between whole and part (’... as a whole’, δλου/οη the specific level', κατά μέρος).
e8 'something of the same sort': Skcmp/Ostwald translates ταύτδν είδος 'the quality identical with
(the kingly quality)', Fowler, in the Lceb translation, 'the same figurative method’. These versions,
like the one I have adopted, take είδος in the sense of kind of thing' (when it can stand cither for
type or for token); a further possibility would be to understand είδος as 'form', 'shape',
'confguration' (cf. 279 a 7-8).
e9 -1 0 'In an attempt once more ... to recognize ...': S. here neatly recalls where they had got to with the
definition of the king and the statesman. 'Once more', because of the position of the adverb ip the
Greek, probably qualifies 'auempt... to recognize' rather than 'through the use of a model'. 'In an
expert, systematic way’: lit. T>y means of expertise' (ιεχνα).
c 10-11 'so that It may be present to us In our waking state instead of In a dream': cf. 277 d. The
claim seems to be that - if a model of a suitable sort is available - they do in fact already know
what statesmanship is, in so far as they understand the same configuration in the other simpler
('smaller') case.
279 a 1 'what we were saying before': sec 267 c ff., and especially 268 c.
a 7-8 'occupied In the same activities as statesmanship': lit. having the same busincss/occupation as
statesmanship' (the MSS have '... the same political occupation ...'; Λsi’s emendation of πολιτικήν
 COMMENTARY 279 b-e 203
to πολιτική must be right). It is striking that E.S. should say 'the sa m e\ not 'similar': on the one
hand, this is in line with the analogy of letters and syllables (it is undoubtedly the same letter, y,
that appears in by* and lynx'); on the other, it raises the question to what extent we should see
Plato as treating statesmanship *by analogy with’ weaving, or the statesman’s weaving together of
the pans of the city (305 e 5) as a 'metaphor* - rather, periiaps, his account claims to reveal
statesmanship literally as a kind of weaving. But this looks less likely than a claim that both
belong to the same genus (of combining). In this case too the ’activities' of statesmanship could
still in a sense be described as 'the same* u those of weaving. 0 owe some aspects of this note to
conversation with Terry Penner.)
b 1-3 'By Zeus, Socrates, if we don't well, there is weaving - do you want The staccato
English here is an attempt to render the effect of the άλλ’ ούν ... yc (used 'apodotically',
Dcnniston 444: 'if we don't have anything else, well, at any rate there is this ../). E.S. perhaps
simultaneously suggests his marvellous good fortune at having found something (by Zeus', wuh
the lack of a connective at the beginning of the sentence conveying the suddenness of the
realization), and a modesty about whether it will necessarily be the best that could be found. The
idea that we know difficult things in a 'dreamlike' way (277 d, 278 e) prepares the way for this kind
of intuition - which of course in principle might turn out to be mistaken; they must now (if there is
nothing better available) see whether it will work out. (Intuition' seems an appopriale way to
deserite E.S.'s situation as it is represented. We might, alternatively, see in E.S.'s behaviour an
ironic acknowledgement by the author of the lack of spontaneity involved at another level - or
again, we could combine both types of interpretation.)
b9 'dividing each thing': 'thing' is supplied (the Greek merely has the neuter singular of 'each*); what
is cut is of course, as before, tt8n or γένη, kinds of thing', or (as I have chosen standardly to call
them) 'classes'.
c1 έβράσαμςν: the aorisl is sometimes used, as here, with τί ού to make a suggestion about what to
do immediately Cstrangely like a future', Goodwin ATT § 62).
c4 'I shall make my answer to you by just going through it': if for large stretches of the ensuing
treatment of weaving E.S. operates on his own, this is for the sake of speed; the conditions of the
exercise - and particularly its collaborative nature - seem to be much the same as before (as b 8~c2
leads us to expect).
c 6-7 'all the things we make and acquire': Le. all those things that are both (a) possessions and (b)
the product of a craft - as woollen objects plainly arc (make* is δημιουργόν, what the δημιουργός*
or craftsman docs; I have elsewhere translated it as 'to craft', although this is rarely much more
attractive - as an English verb - than it would be here). The starting-point for the short ensuing
division which gives us a preliminary definition of weaving is then that group of crafts or kinds of
expertise (τέχναι) which makes the things we acquire, for the purposes of daily life. To arrive at
this starting-point, E.S. has in effect recognized things which have some sort of kinship* with
weaving, and whose differences from it he will now identify. This is an (implicit) example of the
dialectical procedure of 'collection': see n. on 282 b 6-8; 285 a-b, with 261 a 4 and note; and
Introduction.
c7 τοΟ μή πάσχίΐν: the μη is of the redundant sort typically found after verbs of preventing (see
Goodwin, M T §5 807,811).
c 8 - d 1 'some are charms, whether divine or human, warding things off*: these 'charms-for-warding-
off (άλί£ιφαρμακα) seem to be magical ones; for the distinction between divine and human types,
we may perhaps compare the difference between inspired and human diviners (and poets) at
Phaedrus 244 a ff. (cf. Timaeus 72 b-c). But the most immediate connection is with the division
made between divine and human herd-carers (276 d). (The human' sort of 'charms' might in
principle have included medicines , bm sec 280 d 7 - c 1.)
d7 'a different sort are compound1: i.e. made of parts put together (συ'νθοα). fPcrforaicd*, in the
next line, refers to the processes of sewing, etc.: see 280 c 3-4.)
*2 'made of the "sinews'' of things growing from the earth': 'made of "sinews'" renders «υ'ρινος,
which at 280 c 1-2 is marked as a metaphorical use. The word φυτόν normally means 'plant', but
can also denote any type of living creature; hence the addition of ck γης ('from the earth').
(Stallbaum admonishes the reader not to suppose that the genitive φυτών depends on vevpiva; it
depends rather on a supplied π€ρικαλυμματα - 'some sinewy/fibrous n. are from plants'.)
*3 'by means uf water and earth': Skcmp must be right to explain this as a reference to felting (cf.
280 c 3 πιλητικη) - which perhaps employs 'earth' to the extent that the process producing a
finished felted article may involve fulling.
e4 'bound together with themselves': i.e. interwoven. The spare prosaic language of the division
reflects its technical function.
* 4-5 'manufactured from materials': materials' is supplied in the translation; the Greek has merely
"those (things) bound together...'.
e (4-)6 For this use of the dative with koXcu (δνομα), see e.g. Cratylus 385 d (Stallbaum).
204 COMMENTARY 280 a - 281 a
280 a 1 ’the state': i.c. ihc city (πάλι?). This temporary variation in the translation of πόλις· is necessary
to make E.S.’s point - once πολίτικη has been translated as 'statesmanship'. (However, if we
wanted to translate our 'sute' into ancient Greek, πόλις* is probably the only word available.)
a 3-6 'And shall we say that weaving too... did not differ from that of statesmanship?' In so far as
it represented the largest part in relation to the manufacture of clothes': this is essentially the way
Difcs lakes the clause, but with the difference that he explains it as a reference to the simplicity of
ancient clothes. However that point played no part in the preceding division Crepresented’ renders
the imperfect ήν, which is 'philosophical', referring back to what was established before). Jowcu's
translation (at least that largest portion of it which was concerned with the making of clothes';
similarly Skcmp, and cf. Campbell) suggests a reference back to 279 b 3-4 and the restriction to
weaving of wool; but it seems a forced way of taking the Greek, especially since the clause
contains no specific reference to wool. It is also more to the point that weaving is not the only 'ait'
concerned with the making of clothes: clothes are not only woven, but may be made e.g. out of
skins (279 d 7), and to make woollen clothes will in fact turn out to involve the co-operation of
other 'arts' (280 a 8ff.; csp. 281 b 7-10), a point already hinted at in 279 e 6 - 280 a 1 ('... the
expertise which especially has charge of clothes'). 'And shall we say ...?' (or 'arc we to say ...?',
deliberative subjunctive) will then imply 'for the purposes of the argument'; in fact weaving does
differ in more than name from dothes-making- so that the case is actually different from kingship
and statesmanship f... we said that the art of kingship did not differ from that of statesmanship', sc.
except in name: see 258 e - 259 c).
a 8 - b 3 'someone might perhaps suppose .J: what he might suppose, in relation to weaving, brings us
back to just the kind of point we had reached in the attempt to define the statesman; the 'model'
(παράδειγμα) of weaving now begins to be put to use.
b 6-8 'If you grasp the kinship in this case the translation here is considerably fuller than the
Greek, but the sense is hardly in dispute.
d5 'those assigned as parts of the art of joinery': or having had parts of the art of joinery assigned
to them' (sec Campbell), which amounts to the same thing.
e 2-4 '~. the very expertise we looked for as he goes back over old ground, E.S.'s precision of
language gradually seems to give way to elaborate invention verging on self-parody (*woollen
defence 7). (For a similar moment, sec Phaedrus 238 b-c.) But the underlying message, which is
still about method, is clearly serious enough. He has now finished his recapitulation of how they
divided weaving off from other 'arts' which are ’kindred’ to it (those with which the 'part' containing
weaving is combined in a single γένος, or 'class', at each stage, before the division of that class),
and starts the next task, which is to separate it from the 'co-opcralivc' class (b 2) - though first he
shows why it is necessary (280 c 6 - 281 d 3). 11J Parts of the process of clolhes-making arc
certainly not weaving (280 c 7 - 281 b 1), nor [2] arc certain other arts which 'care for' clothes or
fabric (281 b 3-5 - 'care for* or looking after' clothes being one of the elements in the account of
weaving so far, along with its role in elothes-making); nor again (3| is weaving to be identified
with those arts which make the tools needed for weaving (281 c 2-5). Just saying that weaving is
the 'finest and greatest' of the forms of caring for clothes will not, In these circumstances, be
enough (281 c 7 - d 3; cf. Gorgias 451 d ff.). Then finally E.S. docs separate off these other 'arts',
in reverse order [31 by means of the distinction between 'causes' and 'contributory causes' (281 d
11-12), [2] by distinguishing 'preparation' from actual making (282 a 1-4, 6-8), and [1] by a
complex application of the difference between combination and separation (282 b 1ff.).
e6 'my boy': cf. 277 d 1, 8 with notes. The lesson being taught here is a particularly crucial one,
which will - for the first time since the myth - allow some real headway to be made towards the
definition of the statesman. Is the fact that Y.S. is addressed as a *boy' perhaps something to do
with his recent, and rare, lapse (b 3-5)? Contrast e.g. 263 a 5.
e7 'the production of clothes': i.c. making them, which seems to be treated as a kind of 'care for'
them (and the most important kind: 2/9 c 6 - 280 a 3, 281 c 7 - d 2), alongside - but to be
distinguished from - fulling (281 b 3, 282 a 1-4); the latter's role in what we might call the
production-process is recognized by treating it as a cause (281 d - 282 a), i.c. as something which
works directly on the product, but it is dearly distinguished from those arts involved in the 'making
itself (282 a 6-7).
281 a 3 'a kind of Intertwining': or 'combination'; συμπλοκή is literally a 'plailing/wcaving together', but
- unlike υφ rj and its cognates ('weaving') - can be used of any sort of close interweaving' of things.
(Sec 282 b ff.)
a 5-6 'what I'm talking about...': i.c. the first stage in elothes-making, which is easily (more easily,
perhaps, in the Greek than in English) supplied as subject. Ά matter of breaking apart' translates
διαλυιικη, sc. τέχνη: as before, there is no great emphasis in such cases between the activity itself
and the relevant expertise - as indeed there is not in English. (But the whole division - like the
main one - is in any case ultimately one of kinds of cxpcrtisc/aits.) Things that arc combined, even
 COMMENTARY 281 b - 282 b 205
malted, together': for this kind of use of καί ('and even') cf. Dcnnision 291 (6), and the related tc
... καί (not only... but also: Dcnnision 515)below in a 11.
b 3-5 'Are we to posit ...?' The logic is: if weaving were just a matter of 'caring for* clothes - or
statesmanship just a matter of caring for things in the city (279 e 6 - 280 a 3. with 280 e 2*4) - then
either we should have to deny, of other forms of activity which also plainly 'care for' the same
things, that they do so, or call them sorts of weaving/sutesmanship. (But neither alternative is
palatable, so our account thus far must be incomplete.) In 282 a, clothes-mending is treated as a
part of fulling; it is tempting to translate 'including clothes-mending': cf. Denniston, 291 (5).
b6 'Certainly not': i.e. we certainly shan't refer to them as arts of weaving; but in that case, as E.S.
immediately points out, we have to face the fact that they are still forms of 'care for* clothes,
c4 'will also lay da bn to being at least a contributory cause*: or jointly responsible for', but the
contrast between συναίτιο? and αίτιο?, introduced at d 11 -12, makes the rendering ’(co-)cauic'
nearly irresistible, even though it substitutes a main for an adjective (*will ... lay daim': with
Robinson, I have accepted Richards's emendation of the MSS reading προσποιησασθαι to the
future npoonoiTjocoOar, to retain the aorist would be an extreme application of the principle of
lectio difficilior, since no plausible justification of the aorist appears to be available),
c8 'if we turn out (to set it down _)': for this use of cl/εάν 5pa, see Denniston 37-8.
c 8 · d 1 'finest and greatest of all those kinds of care J : for the idea of weaving as a kind of care' for
clothes, cf. n. on 280 e 7.
d 1-2 'or would we be saying something true, but not dear, or complete ..?' This virtually repeals
the wording at 275 a 4-5, at the similar stage in the definition of statesmanship,
d 11-12 'h. a contributory cause N. a cause': for the distinction, cf. Timaeus 46 c-d and Phaedo 99 a-b,
with Philebus 27 a (’production’: or 'coming-into-bcing' [yc vcoi?], or generally, something's
happening).
e4 'these are what I mean by': something like this (λέγω) needs to be supplied, from whatever verb
we understand with Y.S.'s m3? in d 13.
e6 That seems to make sense': 'Plato often uses yoOv in answers conveying a qualified assent'
(Dcnnision 452). There seems no particular reason why Y.S. should qualify his assent here; the
point is perhaps that he is basing it just on bow ES. has presented his proposal - and YS. will wah
to see how it works out.
e7 Then as a next step #.·': for E.S.'s general strategy in the present context, see n. on 280 e 2-4.
282 a 2 'the art of preparation': lit. the cosmetic (art)' (κοσμητική), the one which'sets in order', or
makes things dean and tidy; cf. Sophist 227 a, and (Pit.) 288 c 1-4. (Some washing, and fulling in
the stria sense, form part of the manufaauring process - though for ILS., not of the 'making itself
[cf. n. on 280 e 7J - of woollen textiles; 'mending' plainly does not, being included simply because
it is an obvious example of 'caring for* clothes which is not identical with weaving.)
a4 For the dative after όνομα'ζαμ, cf. the similar usage with καλέίν at 279 e 4-6.
a7 'the making of clothes itself, whose parts we're talking about': this is the point at which the
'fuller's art* is left behind; it's dear that weaving has to do with the actual making of the woollen
product, so it's the various aspects of this that we're concerned with,
a 7-8 'Is some single expertise among those spoken of by everybody': Campbell takes 'spoken of by
everybody' as '[ujscd in common parlance'; in this case E.S. is acknowledging that for once he
doesn't have to invent a name. We might compare those earlier occasions when the identification
of kinds of thing/γ ό ’η is confirmed by reference to Y.S.'s knowledge of things in the world (like
fish- or crane-rearing, 264 b-c).
b2 'each ... Is a part of two kinds of expertise at once': i.e. wool-working and separation (b 8) in
the one case, wool-working and combination in the other, cf. c 5-6, d 1-2. Weaving itself will turn
out to be a part of that part of combination which is a part of wool-working: see 283 a 3-7.
(τουτοιν έκατίρον, κτλ. = τούτω έκα'^ρον ...)
b4 'half of the art of the shuttle': at Cratylus 388 a-b, separating things is aaually treated as the
function of the shuttle. What is perhaps meant is the separating of the warp-threads, pulled
together by the woof, to give passage to the shuttle-borne thread, f Aaivities', in what immediately
follows, is supplied; the Greek has only 'all those [neuter) which ...'.)
b 5-6 'all of this we can ... declare as one and as belonging to wool-working itself: i.e., there is an
ait of 'putting apart' in general, of which part belongs to the art of wool-working,
b 6-8 'And there were, we agreed, two great kinds of expertise...': the next step is to identify this 'art
of putting apart' as the 'art of separation', which is brought in along with its pair, the 'art of
combination1, by reference to previous agreement (ήστην is another philosophical imperfect) -
'everywhere fin every sphere', κατά naVra), we said, the arts of combination and separation are
(or tend to be?) found in association with each other'. This of course is most immediately the case
with the method of dialectic currently being employed, i.e. 'collection and division' (cf. e.g. Sophist
253 b-c, and, for 'collection', n. on 2/9 c 6-7 above); and the agreement in question is perhaps the -
implicit - agreement between them to rely on this method, as one having universal application. In
206 COMMENTARY 282 c - 283 b
a context which is above all a demonstration of collection and division, the two kinds of expertise*
(or 'arts': tc' x i o i once again) will plausibly be described as 'great', or powerful. (The supplement
of αμα in b 6, proposed by Robinson to ease 'a very large transition', is probably unnecessary,
though the Greek as it stands certainly seems less than completely smooth.)
c 1-3 'separation In the case of wool and the warp the shuttle separates the warp-threads (see n.
on b 4 above), whereas the raw wool is 'separated' by hand fcarding': cf. following note). Y.S., at
least, may well be confused by the brevity with which E.S. expresses himself here: see n. on d 7-8.
c3 'as many names as we referred to a moment ago': i.c., presumably, at b 4, in which case the
only names in question are 'carding' and '(half) the art of the shuttle' - plus 'wool-working', in so
far as both of these arc parts of wool-working (in c 5-6 and d 1-2, similarly, E.S. insists on the fact
that the relevant part of combination is also a part of wool-working). 'Carding' is the modem name
for the process referred to in c 1-3 as separation of the wool, and as done by hand; the 'cards' from
which the name 'carding' derives are evidently a later invention.
c6 'and takes place In it': i.c. in woolwoiking. The point might be to re-emphasize that this kind'
has not been discarded or divided off (as others are about to be).
d 1-2 'the part which Is simultaneously combination and wool-working': i.c. that part of
combination which falls under wool-working.
d 7-8 '... the manufacture of the warp': why Y.S. singles out the warp is not immediately clear.
Campbell suggests that it is (a) because so far only the warp, and not the woof, has been mentioned
(c 1), and (b) because '[t]he woof was more loosely spun' (see e 11-13). (a) looks the more
convincing reason, especially if we suppose that Y.S. need not necessarily be well-informed about
the details of the weaving process. He might also have been misled by E.S.'s imprecision at c 1-3;
as indeed might we. Any such misunderstanding is now cleared up.
c2 'timely': because, in the process, the definition of weaving - as the combination of warp and woof
- will become clear? But it looks obvious enough in any ease (see 283 a 9 - b 2). It is later on that
the definitions will turn out to have their real use: see 306 a ff., on statesmanship as weaving
together the 'warp' and the ’woof in society.
e 9 'guides its production': the basic meaning of the verb (dncuOuvcii/) is either 'guide' ('its
production' is supplied in the translation for the 'it' of the Greek) or 'set straight’, The latter might
be appropriate enough in the context; however 'guiding' or 'directing' is probably at least the
dominant sense, in view of the use of cnuaticu' (*set in command over) in the corresponding
case in e 14.
e 12-13 '(softness...) in relation to the drawing out in the dressing process': i.c. they'll be soft, but also
resistant enough to withstand the dressing of the cloth.
e 13 'vou'U call': 1 propose to understand φάθι from c 8, for which φώμςν is substituted in 283 a 1 for
the invented κροκοΐ'ητική (though e 9 στημονητική must equally be invented for the occasion). (I
follow Robinson in omitting a second τήν, before κροκοίητικnv, in line with one of the primary
MSS.)
283 a 3 'And as for the part of weaving which we put forward for Investigation': the last two words
are a harmless supplement The part of weaving in question is of course that of weaving wool.
a 4-5 'the part of combination, that combination which Is contained in wool-working': the
somewhat lumbering translation is necessary to make it clear that, in the Greek, 'which is in wool­
working' qualifies '(the art of) combination', not 'the part', in which ease 'the part of combination'
and 'that combination which is in wool-working' have the same reference (syntactically, the second
phrase is in apposition to the first: cf. Campbell). The 'part' in question oif course itself contains
several parts, two of which have just been described; but the relevant part of (the part oQ
combination (which is in wool-working) is sufficiently well-defined by the context (’when it
produces something intertwined ...*). (Either E.S. has quietly abandoned what has so far been his
regular practice of dividing into two [see n. on 262 d 6], even in advance of the formal sanctioning
of that move in 287 b-c, or else we should treat the production of thread , whether of warp- or of
woof-type, as a single kind of combination, which is itself then divided into two, although this
division is not strictly required. |Cf. n. on 282 e 2.])
b 5 'my dear fellow': see n. on 277 d 8. Here too - perhaps - the discussion is about to take an
important new turn (with the introduction of the criterion of 'due measure'); alternatively, it marks
a change of tone from the striking 'my boy' of 280 c 6.
b 7 'that wouldn't be at all surprising': it is difficult not to sympathize with Robinson's view that
something is wrong with the text here; the repetition of the same phrase (Οαυμαο i bv ou6cV, 'not at
all surprising'), referring to contrasting things, within two lines is jarring. However Robinson's
solution, to omit it on its first occurrence in b 5 (so that E.S. begins simply 'But perhaps, my dear
fellow,...'), is not particularly attractive (the second ϋαυμαοιόν ou6cV, if anything, looks more
dispensable), and there is a general question about how far one should go in ameliorating apparent
unevennesses in Plato's text, however rare they may be.
 COMMENTARY 283 c - 284 b 207
c 6 'discussions': lit. 'ways of passing lime' (άατριβά?); the reference is of course to
discussionsArcatmenU like the one that has just been given to weaving (cf. 285 c 5-6).
c8 'these very things': i.e., apparently, in the first instance, length and brevity, though this takes us
back to 'excess and deficiency in general* (c 11 - d 1). The point is that it would be possible to talk
about excess and deficiency in other ways than by discussing them in themselves, e.g. by listing
examples of them, or perhaps by looking at what others have said about the subject Considering
things 'in themselves* is of course what E.S. is doing throughout Pit.: close analysis of particular
things.
d4 δύο μέρη: this is a kind of *intemal' accusative, which helps to complete the sense of the verb; it is
regularly found with verbs of division, distribution, etc.
d6 'bow we should divide it': liu 'the division, how (we should divide)'.
6 8-9 'what producing things necessarily is': lit. 'the necessary being [or 'existence': ουσία] of
coming-into-bcing/production (ycvcoi?)', an obscure phrase, of which Y.S. understandably asks
for an explanation fWhat do you mean?'). Campbell translates 'according to the otherwise
impossible existence of production'; the reference must in any case be to the claim in 284 a-b that a
large number of other 'arts' or kinds of expertise are inseparable from this second port of the 'art of
measurement'.
e3 'the class of what k in due measure': this looks like a shorthand way of expressing what in 284 e
6-8 is expressed by means of a list (for φυ'σι? in the sense of lund', 'class', see c.g. 265 e 8). What
is meant is 'what is in due measure, what is fitting, the right moment, what is as it ought to be -
everything that removes itself from the extremes to the middle*. One of the keys to the
understanding of the present context is that 'exceeding* (or falling short of) this can be expressed in
Greek by the comparative of an adjective or adverb: e.g. as well as meaning 'greater/Iarger (than)',
μεΐζον* can also mean 'too great'.
«7 'll seems so': as before (sec 260 b 2, 278 c 8), the reply φαίν*€ΐαι is in principle ambiguous,
between 'it is clearly so', and It seems so’; and on this occasion either would fit. Ilowever I have
chosen to take it that Y.S. is slightly grudging in his acceptance of what EtS. has just said, because
he can sec that it cuts across what he just just agreed to.
e 8-9 'we must posit that the great and the small exist and are objects of judgement In these twin
ways': lit ’(we) must posit these twin beings [?] and judgings [= 'ways of being and judging?] cf
the great and the small*. That E.S. can substitute 'great' and 'small' so readily for 'greater* and
Icss/smallcr' dearly suggests that he sees the first pair as exclusively relative terms: what is 'great*,
or large', is so only in relation to something else which is by comparison 'small' (except when & is
too large, which is in relation to what is just right/in due measure). Hence the talk in d 7-8 of
greatness and smallness ui relation to each other', for which wc may compare e.g. Phaedo 102 b ff.
e9 'and not as we said Just before': i.e. in d 11 - e 2. (With S iiv , we should supply θχσβαι, from
8ct £oi\ )
e 10-11 'we must speak of their existing In one way J : with τήν* μ ίν , and then τ ήν δ *, wc dearly need
to supply either ουσίαν* or ουσίαν* καί κρίσιν*.
284 a 7 'and the one we said was weaving': clearly, in defining weaving, we have identified the expertise
which has that name. Jowett translates 'aforesaid* (cf. 282 d 3 προρρηβόσαν*), Skemp 'which we
have just defined* (similarly Dies); the first translation seems inappropriate, the second appropriate
but in my view less natural than the one proposed.
a9 'not as something which k not but as something which is and k troublesome': the Greek has
but as something being [i.e. which is] troublesome*, but 'as being (...)' is plainly meant to
contrast with the preceding 'as not being* (as something which is not). Wc would probably be
inclined to understand the apparently incomplete 'is' here as 'exists'. It is sometimes questioned,
especially in the context of the Sophist (sec e.g. White [1993] xxii ff ), whether incomplete or
'uncomplemented' uses of 'is' (con) and 'is not* in Plato refer straightforwardly to existence and
nonexistence; the present passage could perhaps tell cither way, but plainly the underlying question
is whether there is such a thing as this kind of 'more and less', however this may be pul - not just
whether wc in fact measure like this, but whether it is appropriate to do so. Sec n. on d 6-7.
a 9-10 Ίη relation to what they do': or *producc', if we take into account the treatment of the 'practical'
in terms of the productive arts in 2o8 d-e.
bl 'all good and fine things': i.e. all the good and fine things they may happen to produce.
b 3-4 'our search ·.. for the knowledge of Idngshlp': there could be no clearer evidence, if evidence
were still needed, of the identity m Pit. of the 'ait of statesmanship* and the 'art of kingship'; a 6-7
said that what wc were looking/scarching for was (the art of) statesmanship.
b6 'Is it the case then that Just as with the sophist the Greek looks as if it says 'in the Sophist’
(iv τφ σοφιστή), and certainly a reference to another text could be made like this (sec Thucydides
1.9.4). But of course, characters within a Platonic woii ought only to be able refer to the
conversations which other dialogues purport to record, not to those (written) dialogues themselves;
208 COMMENTARY 284 b-d
and there are at least two examples in Plato where 'in x' refers to 'in the case of/in the context of/in
our discussion of*: see Theaetetus 147 c, P hile bus 33 b. ('Is it the case there is no expected fj
to balance the noTcpov, which presumably has to be quietly idled out with an implied 'or isn't ii?*)
b 6-7 'we compelled what is not Into being as well as what is': 'as well as what is' is partly supplied
The verb for 'compel' in the Greek is a compound form with προσ- = 'in addition', which in many
cases seems to add little or nothing to the sense of the basic verb; however in b 9 it clearly is
operative (’not only ... but also...'), and the paradox of the Sophist which is referred to here plainly
depends on the assumption that only what is can be. The sixth-century philosopher Parmenides of
Elea (E.S.’s home town) used this assumption to rid what is of change and difference, so that all
that there could be was an entirely homogeneous and static One; after all, what is different from
something is not that thing, and something which changes is not what it was before. The Sophist
came by a similar route to another paradox: unless what is not can somehow be, then false
statement and belief - in which the sophist is allegedly a specialist, and which seems to involve
saying and thinking something which 'is not' - will be impossible. The paradox is overcome partly
by analyzing 'is not' in this case in terms of difference, and by showing that there are no
unacceptable consequences which flow from saying that one thing, x, is not another, y (so that, in
this sense, 'what is not, isT fWhcn our argument escaped us down this route': cf. Phaedo 76 e -
77 a.) On the topic of 'not-being' in the Sophist and Pit. as a whole, see Palumbo in RS.
c 1-3 'it Is certainly not possible ... in an undisputed way': cf. a 5-8 - without the existence of this
second kind of measure, we shall have made the statesman and others disappear.
c7 'about the subject in question': lit. 'about them' (ncpl αυτών'); but what E.S. goes on to say
seems to relate exclusively to the ’being' of the second kind of measure. Clearly, however, this is
the subject with which he is presently concerned; the reference is perhaps to the sorts of things
we've been saying about it. For this use of αύτα (vel. sim.) without clear reference, see 257 c 4
with note. (To propose the following hypothesis': liL 'to lay down/posil as a basis the following'.)
d1 'what has now been said': there arc in principle two things to wnich this could refer, either [1]
the argument given in a-b for the existence of the second kind of measure, or [2] the task of
'compelling' this kind of measure to come into being (b-c). Since [1] is put to immediate use
(d 4-8), and not deferred to some indeterminate time in the future fat some lime we shall need
the reference must in fact be to [2J.
d2 'the precise truth itself: liL 'the precise (or 'exact', 'accurate*) itself. It is at first sight tempting to
see here a reference to a Platonic 'form', since the phrase 'the x itself is regularly - though not
exclusively (see c.g. Phaedo 103 e) - used in the dialogues to refer to such things. On the face of
it, 'the precise itself (whatever that may be) seems as such hardly relevant to the context; some
scholars, however, find lurking here none other than 'the One', which ancient reports appear to tell
us was identified at some point in the Academy as the principle of order, proportion, harmony and
beauty - a set of things not so very far removed from the notion of 'duc measure' which underlies
the present passage as a whole. (Cf. Ferber [19911» and in RS.) However (a) phrases of this type
do not necessarily refer to forms (see above); (b) there is no parallel for such a way of describing
the form of (the) one, or unity; and (c) what we 'shall need' in the future looks on this account
remarkably like what we are supposed to need it for (compelling this kind of measure to come into
being' / ' the demonstration in relation to the One', if that means, as I suppose it would, the
demonstration of the existence of the One). It seems easier, or at any rate more relevant and more
economical, to treat the sentence in question as a way of saying just that well have to postpone the
precise account of things until later (we have been told in c 5 that it's an even harder task than the
one that occupied so much of the Sophist) - but meanwhile (d 2-8), wc'U make do with the
argument we've already given. (If d 1-2 seems an elaborate way of saying so elementary a thing,
which might simply have been said with ακριβή for τακριβέ; |as proposed bv Asl], that is not a
conclusive objection: there arc many contexts in Pit. where the complexity of expression appears
out of proportion to that of the thought conveyed. That 'the accurate itself might in principle mean
'the really accurate account [sc. of the matter]' now seems to me not seriously in douttt, as e.g.
Slallbaum agrees.) At the same time, we should not miss the unmistakcablc signals E.S. has given
us about the importance, in a wider context, of the notion of m easure ; if this is cither identical
with, or closely related to, the principle of the good (as it seems reasonable to suppose), then the
Pit. here will be comparable to those passages in other dialogues, notably the Phaedo (99 a-c) and
the Republic (504 c If.), which make goodness the key to the understanding of the universe and of
man's life within it.
d 2-3 'as for what Is being shown well and adequately In proportion to our present concerns':
'concerns' is supplied; the Greek has merely 'in proportion lo/lowards the present'. The clause turns
out to be loosely in apposition to 'this argument' (or 'proposition', 'statement', 'thing said': ούτο; 6
λόγο;); that is, 'what is being shown' is 'that we should suppose...'. The sentence is altogether
difficult, and there might be something wrong with the text, but to improve it would
 COMMENTARY 284 d - 285 a 209
require too many changes to what is transmitted by the MSS (see Stallbaum). (In RSt I proposed to
translate the ότι-clause as 'that it (sc. that there is such a thing as 'what is in due measure') is being
shown well and a d eq u a tely I now think this is a mistake.)
d 4*5 'namely that we should surely suppose that it Is similarly the case that ail the various kinds of
expertise exist the kinds of expertise* or 'arts' (τέχναι) which would be rendered impossible
by the non-availability of the second kind of measure are a specific sub-type (284 a-b( e); however
it would still be true that, if it were not available, 'all the kinds of expertise* could not exist, since
some of them would have disappeared from the scene. ‘Surdy' in the translation is an attempt to
render Spat which seems to fall into the last of the categories described by Denniston, 38 (2)r. ’...
sometimes the context implies acceptance of the idea, and Spa merely denotes that its truth has not
before been realized.' Contrast Spa at 285 a 1.
d 6-7 'For both, If the latter Is the c a s e a n d if h b the case that the kinds of expertise exist, the
other b the case too': 'is the case* translates the same verb (civai) in the Greek as 'exists*. The
basic proposition can be stated, and actually is, without this verb at all - 'that the greater and less
arc measured not only in relation to each other, but also in relation to the coming-into-being of
what is in due measure', d 4-6; but the implication is that they are measured in this latter way, as
much as in the former, in virtue of something that holds, is true (cf. n. on a 9). With Stallbaum, I
have supposed that cKeiva refers to (όμοίω;) τα; τόχνα; πάσα; civai, 'that all the various kinds
of expertise exist'; if the plural looks too harsh (and Sullbaum's parallels are not wholly
convincing), the only alternative is to emend to έκοΐναι cioi (Madvig, accepted by Robinson).
e5 'speeds': or, as one part of the MS tradition has it, 'thicknesses* (παχυτ ητα;); but h is hard to see
how these would differ from breadths' and 'depths', and it would be unsurprising if room were
made in the list (through the addition of 'speeds ; for the special concerns of astronomy , which is
treated in the R e p u b lic as one of the branches of the relevant part of measurement', Le.
mathematics. See Republic 527 d ff.
e 6-8 'in relation to what b In due measure, what b fitting ~ - everything that removes itself from
the extremes to the middle': the middle', that is, in the sense of being neither too large nor too
small, neither loo long nor loo short, etc. The other 'ait of measurement’, of course, will simply
record, or 'judge' (cf. 259 e), numbers, lengths, and so on; the first sort will impose a measure - of
the appropriate kind - on its subject-matter. (The aorist άπψκίσθη is 'gnomic', referring to what
happens on each relevant occasion.)
There arc considerable similarities between Plato's idea of a middle between two extremes and
Aristotle's idea of virtue as a mean between two extremes represented by contrasting vices; it may
even be that Plato's 'middle' - as it will be identified e.g. by the 'art of statesmanship' - will turn out
to have the same sort of flexibility as Aristotle's 'mean'. At any rale, Plato and Aristotle appear to
be agreed both that there will be a right solution for every political/cthical problem in every set of
circumstances, and that the circumstances will rarely be the same in any two cases, so that what the
middlc/mcan (the word in both cases is actually the same in the Greek) is, or what is right and in
accordance with due measure, will be difficult to capture in terms of general rules. See P it.
294 a-b; Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics Π.5.
285 a 1-2 'that there b in fact an art of measurement relating to everything that comes into being': the
Spa here ( in fact') plainly does convey the tone of scepticism whidi was missing from 284 d 4.
The 'sophisticated people* (κομψοί) in question are in RS.'s view something less than sophisticated
(elsewhere in Plato too, κομψό; has an ironic flavour see e.g. Phaedo 105 b, with 101 c); if they
do succeed in saying something 'wise', they do so without recognizing where its wisdom resides.
Who these 'sophisticated* (or 'refined*) people are is unclear. Skemp accepts Campbell's suggestion
(also made by Hermann) that Pythagoreans are meant, and Pythagoreanism is certainly widely
associated with a kind of mathemalizaiion of reality (Campbell refers us to Gorgias 493 e with
Cratylus 405 d); other alternative candidates are (Pythagoreanizing?) members of the Academy
itself, or perhaps the σοφοί or 'wise' people of P haedo 96 a ff., the natural philosophers who
suppose that coming-inio-bcing is just a matter of adding or subtracting different basic material
elements. But the phrase 'many o f the sophisticated’ docs not itself obviously suggest a precise
reference to a particular school, and in the event E.S.’s main interest in whoever might be meant is
as a means of returning to the old point about the need for proper, scientific, divisions (a 4fT.).
a 3-4 'all those things that are the products of the various kinds of expertise': this class of things is
not obviously or necessarily co-cxlcnsive with that of 'everything that comes into being' (a 2).
despite the previous association of 'coming-into-being' with production, since now the reference is
to something other people say. Cf. preceding note. E.S. is pointing out^ that what the
'sophisticated' say (perhaps that everything that comes into being, in nature and in 'art', partakes in
measurement), is true, but only because of something that they fail to acknowledge, that the
products of art - whatever may be true of those of nature - involve a special kind of measure and
measurement.
210 COMMENTARY 285 a-d
a 7-8 'dividing oilier things not according to parts': 'pans' here seems to be used merely by way of
variation for 'classes7 (d6n). just as the active form of διαιρ£Ϊν substitutes without observable
change of meaning for the middle form in a 5. That all classes arc pans, but not all pans classes is
a lesson that has already been learned (262 a ff.), and there should be no danger of
misunderstanding - as there clearly is not in Y.S.'s case. (Other things' [a 7|: or 'things that are
different [cicpa].)
a 8 · b 1 'when one perceives first the community of the many things': i.c. when one perceives ihc
similarity between whatever things arc in question; in the ease in point, kinds of measurement,
which the 'sophisticated' simply saw as having something in common, without also recognizing the
differences between them, (when one perceives f i r s t .... I take it that this describes one possible
type of case, contrasting with a second, described in b 2*6, when one sees the differences first. See
Introduction.) But it would be a mistake to suppose that 'the many things' arc exclusively kinds of
things - or 'forms', in the semi-technical Platonic sense (for which cf. n. on 284 d 2; for the general
type of interpretation in question, see Skemp). This is not only because 'the many things'
(beautiful, just, or whatever: see e.g. P haedo 78 d-e) is normally used in Plato for particular
things, for after all he above all is able to change his usage. It is rather because Pit. as a whole
typically starts, in its analysis of things, with what is or might be familiar to us and Y.S., and what
we observe: so, on the largest scale, with the 'model' of weaving, which is (or so I shall suggest)
used precisely as a 'perceptible likeness' of statesmanship. See especially n. on d 8-9. Generally,
when we 'perceive* a resemblance between kinds of things, we are likely to be perceiving a
resemblance between particulars of those kinds; and the absence of the sharp ontological
distinctions (most of all between 'forms' and particulars) which we find in dialogues like Phaedo or
Republic is a noticeable feature of Pit. - as it is of the other two dialogues in the scries, Theaetetus
and Sophist. See nn. on 262 a 8 - b 1 and 285 c 4 - 286 a 2, and Introduction,
b 1-2 'all those differences which are located in classes': and so serve to distribute 'the many' into
classes?
b 2-3 τάς β'αν παντοδαττάς άνομοιότητας: the accusative here seems to be left loosely hanging
(though it might approximate to a kind of accusative 'of respect'); while in principle it could be
taken as governed by δυσωπουμ€νον, its distance from the participle makes this unlikely,
b3 'when they are seen in multitudes': 'multitudes' (πλήθη) corresponds to 'the many things' in a 8;
i.e. apparently distinct things or groups of things, as opposed to (in the other case) apparently
homogeneous things or groups.
b 3-4 'one should be incapable ...': in RS , I look the phrase in question (μη δυνατόν civai) as written
loosely for 'to be incapable of not (pulling a face) ...'; but such imprecision is rare in Plato (as
opposed to the conversational looseness noticed in b 2-3), and there now seems to me no
compelling reason not to allow E.S. to mean what he says,
b5 'in some real class': the Greek phrase is a difficult one. 1 have assumed that it is the equivalent of
e.g. ytvci τινι δ όντως coti . Cf. Skemp's 'in their real general group' (Campbell: '[w]ilh the
reality [dascin] of a genus'; Dibs: 'dans 1'csscnce d’un genre*),
c 1 'two kinds of art of measurement': i.c. two classes (γένος = ά δ ο ς ) of different kinds of
expertise, involving respectively the two sorts of measure and measurement
c4 'account': 'thing said'; λόγος, as at 283 b 7 - c 1, which introduced the present topic,
c 5-6 'the whole business': the term is διατριβή, as at 283 c 6 (see note),
c8 'the session': cf. 277 c ff.
d3 'Clearly fur the sake of hb being able to answer all': H.S.'s question might in principle be taken
as 'is it for the sake of a rather than for the sake of £>?', but the form of Y.S.'s response makes it
clear that it is rather 'is it more for the sake of a t or (more) for the sake of b T In any case,
however, no one would deny that finding the statesman is at least part of the purpose of the
conversation in Pit. (and if the purpose were to make E.S. and Y.S. belter able to discuss every
subject dialectically, it would also make them better able to discuss the statesman),
d 8-9 'I certainly don't suppose that anyone with any sense would want to hunt down the definition
of w eaving for the sake of weaving itself.' This sentence is of crucial importance for the
understanding of what follows. The basic question is still the same as the one with which we
started at 283 a-b, namely why we have spent quite so much time on the definition of weaving.
The section which now begins forms the final part of H.S.'s complex answer to this aueslion. His
first move was to get Y.S. to accept that there is such a thing as being too long anu too short as
well as being longer and shorter (283 c - 285 c); his second, to offer a criterion for excessive and
defective length, in terms of the purposes of discussions like the present one (285 c-d); the final
move - though in H.S.'s terms it is part of the same 'account' or λόγος that was announced in 285 c
- is to show how in principle the account of weaving contributes to those purposes (285 d - 286 c,
followed by a further passage on criteria: 286 c - 287 a). On the interpretation I propose, the nub
of this explanation is tnat weaving is itself a 'perceptible likeness' (aloOn rη τις όμοιότ ης, e 1) of
statesmanship. Ihc interpretation runs as follows, with the steps numbered in square brackets.
 COMMENTARY 285 d-c 211
[1] In some cases such 'perceptible likenesses* (whatever these may turn out to include: see
below) have only to be pointed to to throw light on the things with which they are being compared
(d 10 - e 4), but (2) in other cases - and the most important - no such clear likenesses' exist (e 4 -
286 a 4), and so [3] perception has to be replaced, or supplemented, by verbal accounts.
[4] Statesmanship is one such case: weaving resembles h, but simply pointing to weaving and
saying 'statesmanship is like that' will not help - the resemblances have to be worked through
verbally. But [5| the account of weaving was longer than would have been required just for the
immediate purpose of helping to find statesmanship and the statesman, and (6) the reason for that
was that it gave an opportunity for practising the kind of verbal account that is needed in the case
of the most important subjects, which 'are clearly shown only by verbal means and by nothing else'
(286 a 5-7). Steps [3], [4], and [5J are not given separately and explicitly in the text, but can, I
believe, legitimately be inferred from it (as Ferrari, e.g., by implication, seems to agree: RS 392-3,
with n.13). As a 'model' for statesmanship, weaving is also a 'likeness' of it (cf. 278 a-b); it is
certainly also something that exists in the perceptible world - and this is what allows the transition
from d 8-9 ('we certainly haven't been going through all this for the sake of weaving’) to the point
about the difference between the two kinds of subjects. When it is said that with the second kind
there is no 'likeness' or 'image' (ίΐδωλον, apparently used synonymously with όμοιοτη?)
'clearly/plainly worked* (286 a 1-2), this might in principle mean that they have no likenesses' at
all; but (a) the emphasis seems to fall on the clearly' (έναργώ;), and on the fact that the perception
of an image in their case will not fully satisfy the needs of an enquirer (though admittedly this
would still hold if they had no images), and (b) the necessary link with the surrounding context
would be broken, since again weaving was introduced precisely because of its resemblances to
statesmanship, (b) matters particularly, because 286 a 4 - b 1 is certainly part of the explanation
why we spent so much time on weaving (286 a 8 In smaller things' links directly with 285 d 8-9).
In fact, it is nowhere said or implied that there is anything which lacks likenesses* altogether; at
most, there arc some things which are ’clearly shown by words alone and by nothing else' (286 a 6-
7). It then seems reasonable to locale the emphasis on the second of the two phrases in 285 e 3:
'(an account ...) which involves no trouble and without recourse to verbal m eans’. The real
difference between the two types of cases is that in the first perception is enough, while in the
second it is not, though it may still have a role, as it probably does in the case of weaving: Y S .
presumably answered E.S.'s questions on the subject on the basis of what he had heard about and
seen of it (cf. n. on 285 a 8 - b 1). As for step [5J, a combination of 283 a 9 - b 2 and 286 c 4 - 287
a 6 confirms that the treatment of weaving was itself designed as an exercise in dialectic, and not
just to help with the search for the statesman.
For significantly different interpretations of the passage, see Skemp, and Owen (1986 I1973J).
The chief weakness of Owen's overall interpretation - though it is certainty right in many details -
is that it leaves the passage without sufficient connection with its immediate context, and fails to
explain why the subject it treats should arise just here. However his purpose is partly a polemical
one, against Skemp; on this polemic, and on Skcmp's interpretation, see following note,
e 1 'to some of the things that are there are certain perceptible likenesses wbkh are there to be
easily understood': cf. 277 b-c (csp. c 3-6), and Owen (1986) 139 n.3, contra Skemp; Skemp
replies in his (1987), 241-2. Skemp translates likenesses which the senses can grasp arc available
in nature to those real cxistcnts which are in themselves easy to understand', accepting an old
emendation of ρςιδίω? to ρόδιοι?, and glossing ’"Nature" in my translation is meant to refer to the
real objective order of Forms with their perceptible likenesses', i.e. particulars Q A 1). (The Ostwaki
revision of Skcmp's translation keeps its main features: 'Some of the things that have true
existence and arc easy to understand have likenesses in nature which are accessible to the senses.*)
On Skcmp's account, the Platonic form of weaving is an example of the type o f thing referred to
here at d 10 - c 1, and the form of statemanship an example of the other type, i.e. the one without
clear images, etc. But the distinction Skemp insists on, between the form of weaving and its
'likeness', actual weaving, is hardly prominent in the context as a whole: cf. n. on 285 a 8 - b 1.
(We may add that *thc things that are* [act δντα) docs not by itself m ean 'forms'; if it has that
reference, it acquires it from the context. Contrast Phaedo 79 a, 'Do you want us to posit two kinds
(cT6n) of the things that are, the one visible, the other invisible?', with [Ptiaedo] 66 a, where the
reference is certainly to forms; sec also 65 c, where the phrase appears in yet another role. At Pit.
287 d 8, on ... τών διττών simply means 'anything you like'; similarly at 306 b 10.) To this extent
it is easy to sympathise with the general intent of Owen's attack on the Skemp interpretation (but
see n. on 285 e 4 - 286 a 2). In that case, we should certainly abandon Skcmp's way of rendering
τκφυκασιΐ’ (itself criticized by Owen): the verb can simply substitute for clrau, and probably docs
so here. The 'perceptible likenesses' which are immediately intelligible will be the picturcsAnodels
which non-philosophers were said in 277 c to prefer to verbal explanations of things (cf. Owen). ^
For the construction καταμαθ€Ϊν ... ιΐίφυκασιν we may compare Phaedrus 229 a πόα
(iori) καΟίζίσθαι, 'there is grass to sit on* (sec Goodwin, M T § 772); the early position of the
212 COMMENTARY 285 c - 286 c
phrase is significant, mailing as it does - on the interpretation suggested - the contrast between
this type of perceptible likeness' and the type represented by weaving in relation to statesmanship.
See preceding note. (Λ change to fc6ioi? k. seems then not only unnecessary but actually out of
place: the main point is about the ease with which the likenesses, not the things themselves, can be
understood.)
e 3 'which Involves no trouble': seems to be explained by 'without recourse to verbal means' (lit.
'without λόγο?, i.e. anything said); the phrases together seem to describe both the 'account' that is
demanded and the one that is offered. There is some awkwardness about someone's being said to
ask for an 'account* (λόγο?) 'without λόγο?'; we must suppose that the expression 'to ask (aUctr)
for a λόγο?' of something is capable of covering even the most basic demand for an explanation, as
in e.g. 'What's so-and-so? I haven't heard of it'. (Campbell justly says of the whole sentence that it
is laboured and pleonastic'.)
e 4 'those things that are greatest and most valuable': according to the Phaedrus , the most
important subjects for the philosopher arc 'the just, the Tine and the good' (Phaedrus 276 a ff., 277
e - 278 a), and to judge from later passages in Pit . (sec csp. 302 a 8,305 d 3, with 309 c 5 and 307
d 8), the same is dso the case in this dialogue - on the single assumption that the king-statesman is
also a philosopher. See also (e.g.) R epublic 504 d. If statesmanship may not itself, on this
account, be one of the 'greatest and most valuable' things, in so far as it depends on knowledge of
these others, it is certainly included among Ihe greater' (see 277 d), and what is said to be true of
'the greatest' (that there is no easily comprehensible image of them, etc.), is also true of it (The
case of the king' is actually said, at 278 e 7, to be 'of the greatest importance', but the context there
is perhaps rather different) It, and the statesman (if he is distinguishable from it: see 259 d), will
be 'without body', like them, in so far as it is, to use Owen's term, 'undcpictable' in the literal sense.
285 e 4 · 286 a 2 'th ere Is no Image a t all which has been w orked in plain view for the use of mankind':
Skemp translates 'there arc no corresponding visible resemblances, no work of nature clear for all
to look upon' (retained in the Oslwald version). This is over-translation, if it is not actually a
mistranslation (cf. n. on 285 d 8-9): all that is said is that there is no visible rcscmblancc/image in
this ease which has the features obtaining in the other. Owen takes Skemp to task for taking
'worked image' as referring to objects in nature instead of artefacts, but this criticism is misplaced:
especially in a work which introduces the figure of a Divine Craftsman (in the myth), there is no
difficulty about the description of natural objects as themselves 'worked' (Skemp compares Sophist
266 b). But Skemp is equally wrong in taking 'image' here to refer to the particular as opposol to
the form (cf. n. on 285 d 10 - e 1). Ihcrc is nothing in the context that indicates the presence of the
sorts of metaphysical ideas which Skemp discovers there; the language of 'image' and
'resemblance', which is central to those ideas - in whatever form Plato may or may not have
espoused them - is used for a quite different purpose.
286 a 2-4 'th e showing of which will enable the person who w ants ...': i.e. because the 'images' arc not
perspicuous, or 'easy to understand', in this ease, as they are in the other (285 d 10 - e 1). In the
Sophist , the fisherman - who serves as 'model' for the discovery of the sophist - is described as
something 'of little worth' (φαυλον), 'small' (σμικρο'Ο* and 'well-known' (cuγνωστόν), but
nevertheless as involving (or having', cxciv) an account or λόγο? 'no less [sc. in extent?] than any
of the greater things' (Sophist 218 d-e). The difference between lesser and greater things - apart
from their relative importance or worth - is evidently, then, not in the complexity of the accounts
to be given of them, but just in that giving an account of the lesser is easier, presumably because
they are more easily accessible; and that is also what makes them portrayablc or dcpictablc.
a5 'able to give and receive an account': the reference is apparently to the two-sided nature of the
dialectical process. Ihcrc arc two ways in which this may be represented: either in terms of a
master-pupil relationship (see c 1-2), or in terms of a joint advance in understanding (as at 287
a 2-4, and as for the most part in Pit.). But in any ease any statement must not only be given by
one party, but accepted and agreed to by the other (cf. nn. on 258 a 3-4 and b 1-2, and
Introduction).
a 5-6 'th e things which a re w ithout body: sec n. on 285 c 4.
b 6 · c 1 'N ot least because ... would tu rn out to be superfluous as well as long.' This is a difficult and
unwieldy sentence. Sullbaum's view, that there may be something wrong with the beginning of it,
is not hard to share: the tc in b 6 is odd, and the expression ... ifj? 6uoxcpcia? fiv ···
dnc6c(dpc8a δυσχορώ? (b 6-8) may initially look even odder (Stallbaum says that it is the work
of 'a babbler, not of Plato% But both are defensible: H.S. begins, perhaps, as if he were going to
say '... both the δυσχόραα we felt about the μακρολογία of the discussion of weaving, and that we
felt about..., and that we felt about...', but ends, illogically, by saying Ίχχΐι the δ. we fell about the
μ. of the discussion of weaving, and the μ. about..., and the μ. about...' For its part, δυσχοραα?
ήν ... άτκδ€(ο'μςθα δυσχίρώ? may be taken as a variation for ... r|v ... { δυοxcραίνομε, which
would be more regular Greek for the tidy 'we felt' in the translation ^though the actual text still has
an inelegant feel about it). See Campbell. Further problems arise in b 9, with thet long series of
genitives: should we accent ncpl, taking it with what follows, or nipt, taking it with
 COMMENTARY 286 c - 287 c 213
τοΟ σοφιστοΟ? Robinson takes the fmt alternative, which seems marginally easier, against
Burnet in the old Oxford text (Campbell prints πε'ρι, and takes it as looking both ways: *|i|t often
happens in these dialogues that a word is contrived to "pay a double debt1"). With the participle in
b 9, we probably have to understand e.g. άπαντα ταυτα ειπομεν from b 3-4. b 10 πλέον must be
'rather great* rather than 'too great*; that it wasAhey were too long is not something they 'reflected*
or 'considered' if they also feared that it would turn out to be 'superfluous as well as long* (c 1).
The references are to 283 a-b (weaving: though 'fear' hardly repescnls what was actually expressed
on that occasion), 277 b-c (the myth of the reversal of the universe), and - perhaps - to Sophist
217 e.
c2*3 'In order that we may not cf. 283 b 6-8 πρδ? δη το νόσημα το τοιοΟτον.~
d4 L but we mustn't refer everything to this': there will of course in principle be different criteria
of what is 'filling', depending on what one's goal is; ES. now reiterates what the appropriate goal is
in this case - not pleasure, nor ease and speed of progress, but an increase in ones dialectical
capacities.
e5 'going round In circles': as E.S. described their own account of weaving at 283 b - the passage
which began the whole of the present section, now drawing to a close. (Skemp is right in
suggesting that περίοδο? would not normally be capable of meaning 'roundabout ulk'; but after
283 b 2 περιηλΟομεν i v κύκλφ - and in a dialogue much occupied with things going round in
circles - it surely can.)
286 e 6 287 al 'we must not let such a person go Just like that without a backward glance': lit. '(our
argument tells us [see d 7-8]) that (ότι) the requirement is not to let such a person go with all speed
or immediately
287 a 5 'sorts of censure and praise': for this use of the simple plurals of the nouns for 'censure' and
'praise', cf. e.g. 258 b 7 with note. The point seems to oc the one spelled out in 'relating to some
other criteria' (προ? άλλ’ άτια; the καί will then have an explanatory flavour, 'other.... i.e. ...*).
b 4-5 'Well then, the king has been separated off from the many kinds of expertise that share his
field - or rather from all of them concerned with herds': 'from all of them concerned with
herds', i..e. from all o th e r kinds of expertise (with πολλών and πασών, understand τεχνών)
concerned with herds; in the last provisional definition of statesmanship at 276 c 10-13
kingship/stalcsmanship was still described as a kind of caring for herds (of two-footed creatures),
and nothing has been said since then to justify the elimination of this element of the definition (cf.
Clark, RS 240). The way in which these other 'expertises' or 'arts' were 'separated ofT was by the
substitution of the term 'caring for' (έπιμε'λεια, vet sim ) for nurture' (τροφή) in 275 c ff., together
with the specification that the king cares for the whole community, which allowed the king to be
distinguished both from herdsmen as such and from all those who would otherwise have disputed
his title (in this case, *herd-nurtured) with him, i.e. merchants, farmers, millers, etc. (267 e): see
276 a 9 - c 2. The same context, of course, also separated the king from the divine herdsman or
νομεύ? (276 d) - and from the lime when there were no cities or political organization. It is the
city which is the king's proper 'field', and the ensuing divisions will relate exclusively to it: note
(287) b 6 'those in the city ...'. But there are still other kinds of expertise to be separated off, as
E.S. goes on to say (b 6-7). Only those specifically concerned with herd-care have been dealt with,
and this docs not exhaust the list of those that are σύννομοι with kingship - except in one sense of
σύννομο?, which is both *kindrcd*, 'associate', and also 'feeding together', suggesting ’fellow -
herding '. This is why E.S. can begin by implying that he has dealt with all the σύννομοι kinds of
expertise; but the dominant sense of the term, in die context, is the fust fkindrcd'), and this is what
necessitates the correction, 'or rather, from all of them concerned with herds' (i.e. not all the
kindred ones). SkcmpADslwald has '... set apart from most o f those occupying the same region':
this would make for a simpler reading, but the form of the relative (όσαι, 'as many as") is probably
against it. (Cf. Dies.)
b 6*7 'there remain, we are saying, those in the city Itself that are contributory causes and those
that are causes': the Greek has ’... those in the city itself of/bclonging to both those that are
contributory causes and those that arc causes'. From now on, E.S. concentrates single-mindcdly on
the search for the statesman, without long methodological asides. The divisions themselves have
the same prosaic exhaustiveness, so that to this extent his characterization of the purpose of the
whole exercise in the preceding section (to make us better dialecticians') still holds. Yet from a
certain point - probably 291 a - the political themes begin to acquire an impetus of their own, and
it ceases to be possible convincingly to describe the dialogue as methodological rather than
political-theoretical. *Wc arc saying': that is, of course, in consequence of our agreement to apply
the model of weaving to the case of statesmanship: see especially 281 d-e.
c3 like a sacrificial animal': i.e. carefully, methodically, and where the joints arc: cf. Phaedrus
265 e.
c 10 Ίο a still greater degree than we did then': since we also included all tool-making relevant to
weaving, \o a greater degree' (μάλλον) cannot mean 'more exhaustively'; it rather reflects the fad
214 COMMENTARY 287 d - 288 d
that in the present case we shall find ourselves including the making of tools for all expert
activities whatever (d 1-3 '... we must put down all those kinds of expertise that produce any tool in
the city... as contributory causes').
d 3-4 'fur without these there would never come to be a city, nor statesmanship': the 'statesman', the
pol'uikos , is someone who runs a polis\ clearly, therefore, if there were no cities (as there were not
in the age of Kronos: 271 e 8), there would be no such thing as statesmanship. The view implied
of the city itself is as the product of ordered forms of activity, i.e. kinds of cxncrtisc/arts (icyvai);
take away these - as you would if you removed their tools - and the city would cease to cxisL We
should return to a state of nature, but with no one to provide for us (sec csp. 274 b-d).
d 8 · e 1 'In fact HIs possible.« something credible': δστις by itself can function, as apparently here, like
όστισούν: anything you like of the things that are (τών οντων)'. For γαρ ouv, with ouv
reinforcing γαρ, see Dcnniston 445-7. Hither Campbell's cotiv ώς, or plain £στιν (Hermann), is
necessary for the sense (cotiv = c^caTiv).
e 8-9 'fur things that are prepared on the fire and things that are not': and so itself both goes on the
fire and docs not
288 a 8-10 '1 suppose we call it by the name of "vehicle" ...': this category clearly includes both seats
and vehicles in our sense; according to Difcs, it also includes anything (as well as seats) which
supports anything else. This, on his view, is what explains the reference to the potter. For Skcmp,
the juxtaposition of poller and bronze-worker picks up the pair 'of high value and none', referring
respectively to the enamber-pol of comedy and the bronze chariot of epic (or 'the bronze "thrones*
of temple priests'). The best solution may be to combine Di&s's general point with Skcmp's
discovery of what he calls 'professorial humour' (which probably docs not extend to the invention
of the category itself, though this is as odd in Greek as it is in English - as the poetic references
offered by Dies and Skcmp tend to show).
hi 'a kind uf thing that': 1 supply ά δ ο ς (cf. 287 c 9,288 a 3), here and elsewhere in b 1-8.
b2 'the things we mentioned before': see 279 c - 280 a.
b 6-7 'a product much more ..., most of it': this last qualification perhaps reflects the fact that at least
one kind of expertise concerned with defence, namely that of the general, will turn out to be at
least close to statesmanship (303 d ff.); or, less interestingly, the point is just that some of the
products named, e.g. defensive armour, belong to 'arts' other than building and weaving
(Campbell).
c 1-3 '... the sort of thing relating to decoration, painting, and those representations ...': for
'decoration', cf. 282 a 2 with note (κόσμος presumably falls within the sphere of κοσμητική).
'Representations' translates μιμη'ματα, the products of μίμησις, traditionally translated as
'imitation'. Something rather more like what we mean in English by 'imitation' will play an
important role in the argument later on (see 291 a ff., and csp. 300 a ff.); in the context of Platonic
discussions of art and literature, the sense is closer to that of 'rc-crcalion' (>c-presentation'), i.e. of
the subjects portrayed, although the idea that artistic productions arc mere 'imitations' is rarely far
away. (But sec n. on c 9-10.) 'Music': i.e. Greek m o u s ik it the 'art of the Muses’, to which
literature, especially poetry, and music in our sense (and also dance; sec 306 c 10 - d 3 with 307
a 7 - b 2, and Alcibiades /108 c-d) are regarded as central: see especially Republic Η-ΙΠ.
c4 δικαίως ... iv i: equivalent to a δικαίως ό v όνομα τι τκριληφΟίί η iv i.
c 9-10 'Η Is not the case that any of them Is for the sake of a serious purpose it looks at first sight
as if E.S. is dismissing all art as by definition unscrious, and incapable of rising above the status of
diversion or play (παιδια: cf. 268 d 8); and if that were the case, it would be the harshest
judgement on art and literature anywhere in the dialogues - Plato is often, indeed always, highly
critical of existing art, but nowhere else docs he suggest that it is actually incapable of serving any
serious purpose, in any form (though he comes close to it, e.g. in Republic X). Rather the reverse:
literature o f the right sort usually has a crucial role to play in Platonic theories of education. In
fact, however, the present context will be consistent with this general position, if we suppose that
the clause in c 3-4, 'which arc executed solely to give us pleasures', is meant to separate off and
assign to the category of the 'fifth' one kind of artistic product, as distinct from others which have a
different, and especially educational, purpose. That this is what E.S. means - however tcasingly he
may express it - is suggested e.g. by 304 c-d, where the orator is said to have a role in persuading
the mass of the people by telling them stories (the traditional sphere of the poets: sec Republic
376 e - 377 d), and surely confirmed by the emphasis placed on the need for the true statesman to
oversee the moral education of the citizens (308 d ff.; sec 309 d 2 with note). Poetry, music and
dance arc central to such education both as described in the Republic , and in this respect Platonic
educational theory is merely a revised and idealized version of normal Greek practice; if E.S. has
some new means of providing it which bypasses 'music' altogether, there is no nint of it. (It will of
course then be trivially true that 'it is not die case that any of them is for a serious purpose ...', but
E.S.’s point at this juncture is merely to justify the unusual application of the term 'plaything'.)
d2 'materials': lit.'bodies'.
 COMMENTARY 288 d - 289 c 215
d7*«4 'Gold and silver ... not being put together1: an unusually difficult sentence. I have taken it that
'the art of stripping off, ’the an of the skinned, and 'all the kinds of expertise that there a r e a r e
all added on as further subjects for δσα ... παρέχει in d 8, but that then - perfectly logically - the
idea of 'providing raw materials' then reappears within the new relative clause fall the kinds of
expertise that there are This clause brings the whole list together, cork, papyrus, and
(materials for) bindings are just further examples of the sort of thing, Le. raw material, which ES.
has in mind fand which by producing cork', etc., ijc. 'and which by producing cork, papyrus,
bindings, and everything else of that sort With φλοιστικη (d 9) we probably have to
understand δέρματα περιαιροΟσα (φυτών); παρε'σχον is another gnomic aorist, and παρεχυ itself
seems in this case to combine, or to be ambiguous between, the senses of 'provide' and 'allow* (the
'arts' in aucstion provide materials which permit the production of certain kinds of things). With
the artful juxtaposition of είδη and γενών at the end of the sentence, we are brought bade sharply
to our starting-point - kinds of thing, which are immediately reduced to a single kind (e 4-6).
e5 'first-born': or 'first in the order of production/coming-into-being (γε'νεσι;)', which has the
advantage of sounding less poetic (but cf. n. on 280 e 2-4). The term, possibly invented by Plato,
suggests the contrast between our age and the age of Kronos in the myth - in that age, in a sense,
everything (and everyone) was ’first born', in so far as it sprang directly from the earth, whereas in
our age what springs from the earth is only raw material needing to be worked - (and even the
material itself requires work, and special expertise, to extract it* cl. 274 b-d).
e8 'that sort of possession': since 287 e 1 (cf. 288 a 3) we seem to have been listing types of
possessions, or κτ ηματα: the verbal noun used here, κτήσι;, may refer to the act of acquisition, or
the state of possessing, but can also stand in for κτήματα.
288 c 8 • 289 a I 'all those things which when they are blended into the body ... have a capacity for
promoting Its care': this covers both food and medicines (since the category as a whale linns out
to be assigned to the doctor - and the trainer, perhaps as prescribing diets? - as well as to the
farmer, etc.); but the connection of τροφή Cnurture', 'nourishment') with θεραπενειν (care*)
perhaps recalls the earlier classification at 275 d-e of τροφή as a species of 'caring for' (θεραπεία).
See further on 289 b 2. I lake i αυτών ... μέρη to be in a kind of apposition to οσα ...
συγκαταμειγνυμενα (foods, medicines); they are appropriately intertwined with μέρεσι ...
σώματος*.
289 a 8 'Look at our list': at our list'is supplied, but harmlessly.
b2 '"nourishment"': what must be referred to here is the class just now labelled as 'nurture' (ι ροφός·,
a 2), but the choice of word for it here, θρε'μμα, is surprising, since θρέμμα is normally 'creature'
('thing reared'), and the class in question must certainly include vegetable as well as animal
products. However there are plenty of novel uses of terms in the whole section; sec c.g. n. on 288
a 7-8 (τροφό; itself is a case in point, since it normally means 'rearer', 'nurse'). At the same time,
there may also be a hint here that we are to accommodate in this class, or rather the set of 'arts’
involved in it, at least part of herd-rearing', which will soon be re-introduced to cover domestic
animals (b 6 - c 2: sec note). Cf. 261 d 3-4 a caring for creatures (θρέμματα) together in herds'.
b3 'Is capable': δυνατόν, sc. ov.
b4 'the class': here Ιδέα (cf. nn. on 258 c 3-7,262 b 7).
b 4-5 'For these do not have any great shared class among them': i.e. they do form a class, but it is
not a 'great' one; and in any case (αλλά ...) they can be distributed among others? Given that 'great*
ought not to mean 'important', since we have been told that the present type of inquiry doesn't
operate on such criteria (see esp. 266 d 6-8), the sense is probably just that the class isn't extensive
enough to list separately, if its members can be filled in elsewhere. There is a certain anacolouthon
in the sentence: we expect a καί answering to tc, but instead we have άλλα', perhaps because the
two reasons for not treating the things in question separately are not after all totally distinct.
b5-7 'but If some of them are dragged ufT It will be forcibly done, but nevertheless they U wholly
agree to It': this looks at first sight like a frank admission by E.S. that he is prepared to
compromise and divide in a sloppy way. I suspect, however, that the division is actually meant to
be a correct one. The things to be divided on this occasion, especially money , are simply being
thought of as recalcitrant: money ought to be a tool, but often isnl used like one. See the
treatment of commerce in c 4ff., and especially the reference to money-changers in c 8-9.
b 7 - c 2 'As for those things relating to possession of tame living c r e a t u r e s t h i s docs not necessarily
mean that we shall require an eighth class of 'possessions' (and the 'arts' that go with them); the
products of herd-rearing', like the set of things just considered (coins etc.), may rather be divided
up among the other seven (goatskins among 'defences', cows in 'nourishment', and so on). At the
same time, it docs look as if they 'share a great class' between them; if they arc not to be regarded
as constituting an eighth, it will perhaps be just because, in this context, they have already been
subsumed under the others.
216 COMMENTARY 289 c-d
c4 'all Uiose people who are subordinate to others': the term υπηρέτης if used in literature for all
soits of subordinate functions (sec LSJ s.v.) - as it surely is in the present context (Skcmp has
'personal servants' - though in his note to d 10 - c 2, he too refers to 'slaves and other
subordinates').
c 4-5 'among whom I strongly s u s p e c t S . ' s 'suspicion', of course, turns out to be correct, or at least
partly correct - those who dispute the finished product with the king arc indeed 'underlings', or
people who should be subordinate to the king and his knowledge (but in fact arc not), though he
also has other competitors, the whole class of existing 'statesmen', who will have no place in a
well-run city at all. See further on c 8 - d 1. The talk of people's 'disputing' titles or roles has up
till now been little more than a picturesque way of saying tnal related kinds have not been properly
separated off in the analysis (there arc no actual disputes between weavers and carders over
responsibility for the woven cloth). But we now begin to encounter categories where the language
of disputing*has a more direct application.
c 5 'the woven fabric Itself: in so far as statesmanship is analogous to weaving, it will have a
product analogous to the weaver's cloth, and for the most part, perhaps, E.S. means here just to
refer to that product (whatever it might be). But in the end statesmanship will turn out to be a kind
of 'weaving', or at least an 'ait of combination' (cf. n. on 282 b 2).
c 6-8 'just as In the case of weaving after καθατκρ, the sentence loosely continues with the
accusative, as if it were still governed by μαντευ'ομαι; the translation fills in what we seem to need
to supply.
c 8 · d 1 'ΛΙΙ the others were each separated off from the practical activity which is the sphere of
the art of kingship and statesmanship': we arc firmly back with the very first set of divisions in
258 ff., which began by separating kinds of knowlcdge/cxpcrtise into 'practical', i.e. those that
produce or do things themselves, and theoretical, and went on to discover kingship/statesmanship
among that branch of the theoretical which issues instructions to other ('practical') aits. The
'practical activity which is the sphere of the statesman' is of course the 'care of the human herd'
(substituted for the original 'rearing'), the practical details of which arc dealt with by others, under
his oversight. These arc presumably the people who correspond to spinners, carders, etc., i.e. the
'causes', as opposed to the 'contributory causes', and we should immediately expect a division of
these. But instead, having introduced the notion of 'subordinates', E.S. prefers to divide this class,
some parts of which (slaves, merchants) arc apparently not 'causes' at all. What may help to
explain this strategy is a crucial difference between weaving and statesmanship: that there is a gulf
between actual and ideal cities, as there in not between actual and ideal weaving - which is by its
nature ordered, and where any 'dispute' between the different arts will be purely theoretical (sec n.
on c 4-5); whereas all sorts of people actually lay claim to the role which, according to E.S.,
belongs to the (true) statesman alone. The division of 'subordinates' allows room for the discussion
of these various types, which a division of 'causes' (which would by definition be based on the
ideal state) would not so easily be able to include. In what now follows there is a noticeably
increasing emphasis on the idea of pretensions to importance (c 2 μεταττοιασθαι). However, the
division of sutordinalcs docs certainly include the 'causaiory' (αιτίαι) ιεχναι or 'expertises' which,
in E.S.'s ideal state, would take their orders directly from the king or statesman; and the other
categories can easily be filled in - slaves as subordinate to any 'practical' τέχνη, merchants to
those operating the 'contributory' τέχναι in general (sec e 4-7).
d6 'those who are subordinate to the greatest degree': Skcmp prefers to interpret τού? μεγίστου?
ύπηρςτα? as 'the most extensive class of servants', but this seems to leave the qualification looked
at from our present perspective' unexplained (ώ? cv0cv6c i d c X v , lit, 'to look [at it] from here').
What is meant is that if we arc looking just at the notion of 'subordination', then there is no one
more subordinated, less autonomous, than slaves (who arc of course the type intended: d 10-c 1);
but there arc other types which arc, from points of view other than that of legal status, equally or
more lacking in autonomy, and so slave-like: one such is the merchant class, which is introduced
next, and which will be persuasively described as choosing to make themselves 'unfree'
(Voluntarily placing themselves in the service’ of others, c 4-5), and compared with those who put
themselves out to hire as day-labourers (290 a 5-6) - so coming to resemble those who are
'indisputably' slaves (c 1 άναμφισβητη'τω?). (The extreme case will be that of the tyrant of
R epublic IX, who despite apparently possessing supreme power is actually less free than his
subjects, even a slave - to his own master-lust: Republic 574 d - 575 a.)
d7 'the opposite of what we suspected': i.e. that we would find in the class of 'subordinates' (c 4-6),
namely 'functions and conditions' which resembled those of the king. 'We suspected': E.S. had
grounds for his suspicions, in the analogy with weaving ('just as in the case of weaving ...', c 6-8),
which Y.S. in effect opted to share by his response at d 2.
d 10 'and acquired as possessions is this reference to slaves as 'possessions' perhaps a hint that
slaves by themselves in fact constitute an eighth (or ninth) class ol 'contributory causes' (cf. a 7-8,
with n. on b 7 - c 2)? (Their separation from the other seven classes could then, perhaps, be
 COMMENTARY 289 d - 290 c 217
explained simply as a transitional device - and one that has the additional advantage of providing
the slatting'point for the treatment of the commercial class.) If so, however, the teal 'contributory
cause(s)' in this case would be the artis)’ of dealing with slaves (cf. c 8 - d 1), and according to 259
b-c the chief or only such ’art’, that of slave-master or *household manager', is identical to
statesmanship. In fact, if slaves represent a species of ’subordinates’, the relevant art-by analogy
with the other cases - ought to be that of being a slave. The present clause, in that case, merely
points out a resemblance between this *kind’ and the ones previously analyzed; in the present
context at least, his or her subordination to others is more of a defining feature of the slave than the
fact that he or she is someone else’s possession.
1 5-7 ’conveying the products of farming and the other kinds of expertise between one another and
establishing equality between them*: *between one another*, Le. (presumably) between the
farmer and the other types of producers. (For the notion of ’establishing equality1between different
products, of differing value, cf. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics \J$.)
290 a 3 that which operates in the sphere of commerce’: with some hesitation, I have retained the
τβ; of the MSS, partly on the strength of Skcmp’s explanation, which points to the possibility of
indirect political influence wielded by private banking houses (the reference is to Isocrates'
Trapeziticus: see e.g. (§ 52, 57). But the notion of a ’statesmanship of those involved in
commerce', introduced so casually, without explanation, is not entirely convincing. (Campbell
translates 'the science of directing commercial intercourse, glossing '(tfhe merchant may profess
political economy, but not statesmanship or political science.' But it is doubtful whether this
'science* could be called a kind of 'statesmaiship', since it would appear to have no connection with
the 'state' or polis.) The alternative is to read τιν*;, Le. ίσος- tux; yc (adopted by Robinson, with
some support from a minor MS), giving the sense 'Maybe some of those involved in commerce
might do so'; in this case we shall still need something like Skcmp's explanation.
a 4-6 'But those we see placing themselves introduces a new class of 'subordinates', parallel with
those of slaves and merchants; but it is hard to resist the impression that its main function is to
reply to Y.S.'s suggestion that maybe merchants might make the relevant claim (both merchants
and day-labourers voluntarily subordinate themselves to others; what's the difference between
them?). For άλλ ού μην, sec Damiston 347 (though it is not quite an a fortiori argument which is
in question, any more than it is in b 7); for ού μη' + aorist subjunctive, expressing strong denial,
Goodwin, ATT5 295.
b 1*3 Those to whom belong the class of heralds.« tasks relating to public offices': for heralds, see
260 d-e. The other categories relate to our 'civil servants' (cf. Dies and Skcmp ad loc.): the
reference to 'accomplishment at writing' (γραμματα) suggests those officials called at Athens
γράμματά; and ύπογραμματςΐ; {sc c n S A n tif under-secretaries'). 'Accomplished* renders σοφό;,
which normally means 'wise' (or 'skilful*), but in Plato it is frequently used ironically, as it is here:
the 'wisdom' or 'skill' of the functionaries in question is acquired not by talent or initiative but
merely by repetition (having repeatedly ...*). Cf. n. on 300 b 1-6. There is probably the same
slighting tone in 'tribe* (c0vo;, though this could merely be a variant for 260 d 7 φϋλον - in which
case, unless that term too has an uncomplimentary tinge, we have acquired yet another term for
'class' or \ind*); it is certainly present in 'very clever’ (πα'νδονοι), and 'working through*
(6ianovcio0ai) may suggest an eye for the detail rather than the whole picture. E-S. is not being
gratuitously insulting; it seems from b 7 - c 1 that some of these officuds - whose role may be
further devalued by being compared to that of heralds - either played, or claimed to play, more
than a subordinate role. Cf. Lysias A gainst Nicom achus z7, where the speaker charges
Nicomachus with having exceeded his powers - as transcriber of the laws - and in effect turned
himself from a ύπογραμμαται; into a lawgiver'.
b 9 - c 1 'And yet It would seem very odd indeed i.c. this is certainly not the place where one would
expect to find them. Λ μοίρα (the word translated as 'portion*) is something that results from
division and distribution; so most frequently one’s fate or lot.
c 3-4 'those we haven't yet cross-questioned': as Skcmp points out, the verb βασανίζαν is the one
used for examining slaves (as witnesses, under torture). Skcmp comments: *[ilbc implication
would seem to be that the groups considered so far arc slaves or ncar-slavcs; we now proceed to
the free citizens in an ascending order of dignity.' But it is not at all clear that E.S. (or Plato)
himself regards the groups which follow as any different from the preceding ones; however much
or little he thinks of seers and priests (and his description of them is hardly unqualifiedly
complimentary), what he has to say about the politicians (291 a ff.) could not be more scathing. In
any case, \hosc not yet cross-questioned* surely implies that these too will be. Qua 'subordinates',
E.S. suggests (half-seriously), all of them resemble slaves - though only because they belong to the
same general class. .
c 4-6 There are those who have a part J : I suggest (pace Brickhouse and Smith, in their [1994ρ,
that with his *thcy are, I believe, considered to be (interpreters)', E.S. steps back from endorsing the
claim that seers really perform the role in question; their role too will be a subordinate (διάκονο;)
218 COMMENTARY 290 c - 291 b
one T- in this ease» lo the gods. For interpreters as subordinate, although themselves - like heralds
and seers - issuing instructions to others, see 260 d-e (διάκονος functions as a synonym of
ύπηροικη; as a noun, it can also, appropriately, mean 'messenger').
c 8-d 1 'has - as custom tells us - expert knowledge': the qualification 'as custom says' is important;
elsewhere, especially in the Euihyphro (14 b ff.) and the Republic (364 b - 365 a; cf. Laws 906 b
ff.), Plato is strongly critical of the traditional wav of treating the relationship between men and
gods as a commercial transaction. Presumably, if there is no such expertise as that attributed to the
priests and seers, they then fall out of the analysis altogether, it is, after all, meant lo be an analysis
precisely of kinds of expertise. (The phrase ίπιστημόν έστι is equivalent to έηίσταται, knows
now to', which is regularly followed by the infinitive.)
d 2-3 'and I Imagine that both of these things are parts of a subordinate art': i.e. because, like seers,
they arc essentially interpreters - of what pleases the gods.
d6 'the type of priests ~Λ* \y v c \ or 'figure' - σχήμα, as at 268 c 6 and 275 c 1.
d 8 - e 3 'so that In Egypt... to be Initiated into the class of priests': the translation here largely follows
the interpretation in Samb (in RS)%which seems to show successfully that Plato's report of things
Egyptian can be seen as being true to the facts. The point is not so much about the Pharaoh's
becoming a member of the priestly caste (since all religious authority by definition flows from him
as Pharaoh), but of his acquisition, in the case that he comes to power as it were from outside, of
the detailed knowledge that would allow him to function in his religious role - because, of course,
in the present context, it is precisely the possession of knowledge that matters (one is a priest in
virtue of possessing priestly knowledge - if it exists - just as one is a weaver in virtue of
possessing knowledge about weaving). Samb prefers a vaguer translation of e 2 cl? τούτο ...: 'il
est nlccssaire que ... il sc fasse initier en rapport avec la caste ...' (RS 335); but the translation I
have given also preserves Plato's reputation as a reporter of things Egyptian, given that the context
makes clear what is meant (cf. Samb's '... 1'initialion, sous unc forme ou unc autre, cst
indispensable pour acqulrir la competence ndccssairc h la direction effective du cultc ct dc
I'Empirc', RS 335 n.9). 1-SJ's rendering of cioicXcioOai, *lo be received into (a class)', derives
from an interpretation of the present passage; the verb appears to be a coinage of Plato's own,
though the simple τςλοΐσθαι, in the sense of *bc initiated', is found frequently - with the dative -
both in Plato and elsewhere (it is the active tcXciv which is used with cl? in the sense simply of
'belonging lo a class').
e3 'among the Greeks too, In many places': των 'Ελλήνων is a kind of partitive genitive after
ττολλαχοΟ.
e 4 'in relation to such things': i.e., presumably, such things as the highest offices (or more
generally, the most important things); high religious function and high office arc connected, as in
Egypt We begin to see more clearly why E.S. thinks they arc now hot on the trail of their quarry,
the statesman. The most important priests arc also sometimes the most important officers of stale,
and these naturally have sutus both in their own eyes and those of others (d 7-8); their claim to the
title of 'sutesman' will be especially loud. The next step will be to bring in the generality of
existing politicians (291 a ff.).
e 5-8 'And in fact what I'm saying ... the person who becomes king by lot': the 'person who becomes
king by lot' at Athens ('in your case', here') is the King Archon. For a vivid picture of some of the
religious duties of this personage, and an illustration of what might be meant by 'most solemn and
ancestral', see the speech Against Neaera , once attributed lo Demosthenes, 72 ff.
291 a 1-4 'Well then, we must look both at these king-priests by lot, and their subordinates, and also a
certain other very large crowd of people ...': this 'very large crowd' is to be considered along
with the class of king-priest because the one consists of people who play - or, as it turns out, usurp
- the role of the (true) statesman, while the other actually has the title of king. King-priests in the
event get no separate treatment, but by the end of the ensuing discussion there is no doubt what
E.S.'s view is about a kingship csublishcd on the basis of the lot (or about democracy in general).
The relevance of 'and their subordinates' Cihcsc king-priests ... and their subordinates') is that il
will have to be considered whether this kind of king has the appropriate kind of relationship with
those he directs, i.e. the one which the true king will have, based on knowledge. But the addition
also neatly marks the fact that we have now reached the end of the previous division of the class of
subordinates, and are passing on to those that have them, whether they arc qualified to do so or not
(Skemp translates '... we must study these kings chosen by lot and these priests with their
ministerial assistants'; but τούς-κληρωτούς- βασιλέας αμα καί Ιορέας·, lit. (?| 'these kings by lot
and at the same time priests' looks like a single unit; and it is certainly difficult to take 'and their
assistants/subordinalcs' with 'priests' alone.)
a8 'It's a class mixed out of all sorts': more literally, perhaps, 'I mean (supplied from a 5) a class of
them which is of all sorts (παν-φΟλον)'.
b2 'those animals that are weak and versatile': I believe Skemp is right to see in 'weak but
versatile' animals a reference lo chameleons (which might be confirmed by the following 'and they
 COMMENTARY 291 b-c 219
exchange ...'; but sec also below). But why chameleons, why this roundabout way of referring to
them - and why in general the apparently rather ragbag list of creatures: lions, centaurs,
chameleons ...? I suggest, hesitantly, that ES. is describing the different varieties of existing
politicians (who are o f course the Very odd' people in question), much as they are described in
R ep u b lic VIIMX: those who resemble lions are the 'timocrats', who are dominated by the
’spirited', or lion-like, part of the soul; the centaurs or horse-men are - perhaps - oligarchs, who
according to the Republic are driven by the desire for profit, which belongs to the lowest, beast­
like, part of the soul, but who manage (if the oligarchy is successful) to keep it under some kind of
rational control - reason being what is most characteristically human, according to the famous
image of the soul as man, lion and many-headed beast in Republic (DC) 588 b ff.; while the satyrs
and chameleons arc the democrats, who are controlled by their lowest part (the satyrs of myth are
notoriously lecherous), but keep changing their minds from day to day about which desire they
prefer to indulge. (There will of course be considerably more democrats than oligarchs, or
timocrats, which is why there are 'very many’ of the last two types, and only ’many’ of the others.)
’Weak and versatile' simultaneously describes the chameleon and the democrat, picking out those
features of the first which are relevant to the comparison. The idea of the creatures - and not just
the last - changing into each other itself recalls the succession of constitutions described in the
Republic passage. All that is missing is the tyrant, who is controlled by a single master-lust: satyrs
might fit the bUl from this point of view, but arc not particularly powerful or aggressive. Or does
the tyrant lurk under the 'other such things’ (monsters like the centaur?) in b 1? In general, the
connections with the Republic in the passage seem dear and extensive enough to justify our talking
of a hidden reference to that work. If this explanation is rejected, the only alternative seems to be
to treat the list as an odd collection - which in one sense it is supposed to be. For a different
interpretation of the idea of the creatures' changing into each other, see Accauino (RS 211), who
takes it as referring to the way in which - under existing conditions - orators, generals and judges
assume roles other than those proper to them (cf. 303 eff.).
b 7 'everyone finds things odd if they are unknown': lit. 'oddness (τό δίοποι) results from
ignorance for everyone’.
c1 'the chorus as in the theatre, because they are acting a part (cf. 303 c 8)? But no more need
be meant than *band', 'troop' - or ’class'; this would help explain E.S.'s next reply (see following
note). Cf. Protagoras 315b.
c 3-4 That of the greatest magician of all the sophists, and the most versed in this expertise': the
Greek in fact equates the individual with the group (What chorus?' The greatest magician ...*),
which is intelligible if what is in question is primarily a type - see preceding note. (What type?*
The greatest magician ...*) This expertise* is presumably in the first instance that of magic*
(γόητρα, implying sleight of hand, cheating), but since by implication sophists are being equaled
with magicians, sophistry loo will be included. The whole of the next section, down to 303 c-d, is
devoted mainly to demonstrating this claim that existing politicians are impostors, or, as ES. puts
it, that 'since they arc the greatest imitators (μιμ ητά?) and magicians, they are also the greatest
sophists of all' (303 c 3-5). For the connection between sophistry and mutation', which consists in
creating an illusion of knowledge (and so 'imitating' or 'mimicking' those who know), see
especially Sophist 267 a IT.; in the last stage in the division there, at 268 b, one kind of politician,
the demagogue, who is specifically denied the title of πολιτικό? or 'statesman', is separated off
from the sophist proper, who is said to spend his time plying his trade with individuals rather than
by addressing large groups of people. But it is clearly suggested that he is very dose in type to the
sophist, and the scale of the confidence trick that he plays is sufficient to explain the claim made
here in Pit. that he - along with other types of cxisibig politicians - is greatest of the sophists'.
The demonstration that these 'odd', 'strange' (άτοπο?) types are magidans' and counterfeiters
begins with an enumeration of the various kinds of constitution, and the criteria which distinguish
than (291 c - 292 a): rule by one person, few people, or many, rule by the poor or by the rich, rule
without the consent of the dlizens, or with it, and rule which observes or fails to observe
established laws (292 a 5-8). ES. then refers back to his original classification of statesmanship as
a kind of knowledge or expertise, and suggests that this feature is different from any of those that
serve to define actual constitutions (292 b - c). The next step is to sec whether any of those who
presently claim to be experts in running dues possess this knowledge: since it is very difficult to
acquire, it cannot belong to large numbers of people - which will exclude democracy and
democratic politicians; it will also - so E.S. claims - be concerned exdusively with the good of the
citizens, irrespective of any other consideration whatsoever - which will exdudc the other types of
constitution as well as democracy, in so far as they are all actually run on the basis of such other,
supposedly irrelevant, considerations, about whether the government serves the interest of a
particular group, whether it rules with the consent of the citizens, or whether it is or is not in
accordance with established laws (292 d - 293 e). It follows then that no existing constitution can
be ’correct’ (sec 292 a 5-8), and a fortiori no existing 'statesman', who works within the framework
220 COMMENTARY 291 c - 292 b
of such constitutions, can properly lay claim to the knowledge of statesmanship. But Y.S. then
raises an objection: can true statesmanship really operate without reference to laws (293 e 6-7)?
The objection is a crucial one, for if it could be shown that observance of the laws is a sine qua non
of good government, then any politician who operates within a law-abiding constitution - and E.S.
admits (300 c - 301 b, 302 d-e) that there may be law-abiding versions of all main types - may
after all have a claim to be exercising good government, and the constitution within which he
works may also turn out to be 'correct. Only after he has refuted this objection, which takes him
until 303 b, can E.S. draw his final conclusion.
c8 κατά ye τήν 4μήν: sc.8o£av. ΡοΓοΟκουν 6ή ... ye, see Denniston 422-3.
d 1 'kinds of rule over cities': or binds of political rule' (the point being that one can also talk of
'ruling' in other eases: see 293 c 2-3). The dative ήμΐν is 'ethic'.
d 3-4 'after monarchy one would ... mention ...': Ic. after rule by one person (monarchy), one next
naturally passes on to rule by a few. The term δυναστοία (here folding of poweO can be used by
itself to signify an oligarchy.
d6 'constitution' is πολιτοία, i.c. mode of organization of 'political rule’; in this ease defined by the
rule of many people - or, as the name 'democracy' implies, by 'thepeople', the δήμος. Officially,
'the Athenian people' represents all (adult, male) citizens, but in Plato and other fundamentally
anti-democratic writers of the period it usually designates the mass of the people, characterized
either by their ignorance and lack of education and/or their poverty. In the present context,
'democracy' is essentially the rule of the poor over the rich (see 291 e 10 - Z92 a 1), just as
oligarchy - and also, in fact, 'aristocracy' - is rule by the rich over the poor, but oligarchs will turn
out to be as lacking in understanding as 'the many'. (Type' is σχήμα again: cf. 290 d 6.)
d 9 'don't they ...?': the expression μών (originally μή ούν) οό is apparently more or less
indistinguishable from ίρ ’ου.
el 'as things are': the implication is that, in some unspecified way, what people currently (νυν) do is
mistaken; and in fact all the named criteria will be rejected as irrelevant to the concerns of
statesmanship proper, f People refer to the aspects of force and consent': the Greek has simply'...
refer to violence and voluntariness ...'.)
e3 'divide each of the first two Into two': exactly how the named criteria arc used to make this
division (of 'monarchy' into tyranny and kingship, and of the rule of few into aristocracy and
oligarchy) is not made explicit, but a) the tyrant, unlike the monarch, would certainly be
recognized as ruling by force (see 276 d-e); b) in so far as 'tyrant' is a pejorative term, it lends in
itself to imply unconstitutional rule; and c) the traditional understanding of the difference between
aristocracy and oligarchy would be that the first is rule by the few best' (families), the second rule
by the rich. But perhaps E.S. is simply listing the criteria people in fact use, and the divisions they
make, without being concerned about how precisely they use the criteria to arrive at them. He will
later have his own single criterion for distinguishing good from bad, or less bad from worse,
versions of the three main types (rule by one, few, and many), namely whether or not they abide by
established law (300 c - 301 b, 302 d-e). For the 'popular' treatment of rule by the many,
corresponding to the present one of rule by one man and by the few, see 291 c 10 - 292 a 3.
e5 'the one "tyrannical"': a τδ μόν, corresponding to the following to 6c, is easily supplied (cf.
Denniston 166).
e 10 'With democracy': the genitive goes with 292 a 2-3 τουνομα (ούδα.ς έΐωθ€ μοταλλα'τταν);
having been placed first in the sentence for emphasis, it then becomes so far separated from the
rest of the main clause that it needs to be recalled by 292 a 3 αύ τής.
291 e 10 - 292 a 2 'whether in fact... by force or with ... consent, and whether by accurately preserving
the laws or not': the second of the three pairs of criteria listed in 291 e 1-2, wealth and poverty, is
of course missing; democracy is always rule by the poor over the rich (according to Plato: sec n.
on 291 d 6). (On συν here [co'vt ’ούν], see Denniston 418-19 fan auxiliary strengthening particle'
- but one which seems to add as little as the 'in fact’ in the translation].) In this ease, as in the
others, by force or consent' and 'according to law or contrary to law' arc of course distinct criteria;
any type of constitution might slick rigidly to a code of laws which was against the interests of
some group in the city - and in the present case the wealthy would presumably object to being
stripped of their wealth by legal as well as illegal means.
292 a 7-8 accompanied by written laws or without laws': lit. 'with writings (γραμματα) and without laws
(νόμοι)'; the choice of nouns reflects no more than a desire for variation, though in fact laws need
not be written (see 295 a, etc.). For the strategic significance of the question here in a 5-8, see n.
on 291 c 3-4.
a9 'Why, actually prevents it?': The combination of particles here is difficult. For the καί,
see Denniston 315; for the γαρ 6ή, perhaps compare Denniston 244 (4), 'elliptical ydp in an
answer-question', reinforced by δη - the whole amounting to something like 'Well, I hear what you
say, but what...?'
b3 'when we first began': 258 b ff. (so ιό πρώτος: sc. αρχας.)
 COMMENTARY 292 b - 293 b 221
b 9-10 'A nd o f these, not o f all of them , but we chose out from the rest J : i.e. we did not merely say
that it was a kind of knowledge, but we specified what kind, by picking out the type which was
both 'critical' and 'controlling'. Statesmanship, as a control!ing/directive an (there Επιτακτική
rather than, as here, Επιστατικη: another case, presumably, of variation?), was strictly spcdcing
separated off from the 'critical' branch of theoretical types of expertise ('making judgements'); but
it was recognized that it also included a 'critical' element (see n. on 260 a 10 - b 1) - and how could
statesmanship not be involved in making judgements?
c6 T h e n do we see ju s t this very point': the location of τοίνυν in third rather than its usual second
place has the effect of giving special emphasis to tout' αύιό (cf. Dennision 579-80).
d2 ’In w hich, If any': for this rendering of l v τίνι ποτέ, cf. LSJ s.v. tiotc ΙΠ.3. The reference of
'these' must be, in the first instance, to the types of constitution listed, but then by implication to
the people who run them - as e 1-2 confirms.
d4 'practically the most difficult and the most Important thing of which to acquire knowledge*:
the Greek seems literally to say that it is ruling over human beings that is most difficult and
important to acquire, but this would be a surprising thing for ES. to say, and hardly relevant.
Clearly what is meant is that knowledge of ruling is so; the language of the sentence is loose but
intelligible.
d 4-5 'F o r we m ust catch sight o f it': Le. of the knowledge/expcrtisc in question. ES. talks here as if
he expects that he might find it somewhere among existing politicians - reasonably enough, since
his question, 'where among them it occurs', is in principle an open one, and he has a long way to go
before he can legitimately fed happy about 'removing' all of them,
e 4-5 'is It possible ,J : more Literally, ... is a hundred or so’s ... acquiring it... possible?
e 7-5 'th e re w ould never be so m any top peseta·players J : 1 take the point to be that thereare
relatively few such players in the whole of Greece, so that to find fifty among a thousand men must
be impossible. (Felicia was a board-game resembling draughts.) Contrast Skemp's 'judged by
proper inicr-Hcllcnic standards' (similarly Campbell), and Dies's 'dans tout ce qull a de Grecs, on
ne trouverait pas, sur dix mille, une telle proportion ...' Against the Campbell/Skemp
interpretation, the main objection is that Y.S.'s response would be relativdy weak - you couldnt
find fifty top pelleia-pU ycn would still allow that you could find quite a number; any reference to
relative levels of expertise would also be unhdpful (though Campbell makes a subtle attempt to
turn this to advantage: '[ejven those few v e still judged, therefore, by a relative standard*).
293 a 2 'You've remembered well': indeed he has; he has made a fair shot at quoting what ES.said at
259 b 3-5. In effect, Y.S. was explaining the basis of his counting: he has included everyone
qualified - and even then the number of lings' is vanishingly small,
a 2-4 'As a consequence of this, I t h i n k , i t seems that - with Campbell - we must take έπόμ€νον...
τούτο as loosely in apposition with the rest of the sentence (and οίμαι, as often, used
parenthetically); as Stallbaum says, if Stephanus were right to read the much the much easier 6civ
(which would make την μέν ορθήν κτλ. dependent on έπόμ€νον ...), it would be a good question
why all the MSS happen to read 6ci.
a4 'when it is correct': this is not mere repetition; its purpose is to emphasize that a small number of
rulers won't by itself guarantee 'correct rule', which might be suggested by the previous oart of the
sentence. What does constitute correct rule is then explained in a 6fT.: expert rule (rule κατά
τέχνην), which has the good of the citizens as its sole concern,
a 6 - b 1 'M. these .Nwe must consider -. as carrying out whatever sort of rule they do on the basis of
expertise': i.e. if the one, two or few in question are to count as ruling 'correctly', what mailers is
that they should do so from knowledge, and all the other considerations are irrelevant. (For νομίζω
+ participle, see LSJ s.v. Π.5.; 'as we now suppose* = as we have agreed in 292 b.) Whatever form
of rule they do' (ήντινουν αρχήν), because, so far as the argument has gone up to this point, they
may be kings Cmthe traditional sense), tyrants, aristocrats or oligarchs - but not democrats, who
have been excluded in 292 e. But the ήντινουν might possibly also be taken, simultaneously, with
τέχνην: as E.S. pointed out in 292 c 3-4, we have not yet sufficiently identified the kind of
expertise which is needed. An essential feature of this - which amounts to a closer specification of
the kind of 'care' which the ideal ruler will take of the citizens - is next introduced via the analogy
of medicine (a familiar one in Plato: cf. 297 e 7-8). Robinson, following Apelt, proposes a
different interpretation of a 6 - b 1: '... we must accredit (the rulers (or, better, ’these as rulers?]) in
the way we now accredit according to their skill those who have any particular function they have
charge o f (RS 38, taking νομίζω and ηγούμαι in the sense of helieve in', a sense νομίζω must
have in a 8, removing the commas after νομιοτέον and ήγούμ(θα in a 8, and - perhaps - inserting
τους before ήντινοΟν). This interpretation is an attractive one, particularly in so far as it makes the
sentence lead directly into what follows (the example of the doctors); that *11)096' (τούτους) possess
expert knowledge is already reasonably clearly implied by the preceding argument. Whichever
version wc adopt, the general sense of the context remains the same; after much hesitation, I
marginally prefer, as I did in /?$, the one which Robinson proposes to replace, mainly on the
222 COMMENTARY 293 b-c
grounds that it makes the connection with a 2-4 easier and smoother, even if it might make that
with b Iff. less so (and that it involves no change to the text, although Robinson claims the change
he suggests - the insertion of τού? in b 1 - to be 'possibly ... unnecessary’). With the alternative
interpretation, a 6 δό ye would probably mean 'Yes, and' rather than 'Yes, but': cf. Denniston 154.
b 1*2 'M ore than anything we believe In the d o c to rs ...': i.e. the doctors provide the clearest example
of the principle in question (vc νομικάμςν is a gnomic perfect: see Goodwin, M T $$ 154-5).
b 3 'b u rn in g ': i.e. cauterizing (but when the idea is picked up next in 298 a 4, ’burning’ is what is
meant).
b 4 'w ritten rules': γράμματα, 'writings', as in a 7 (and 292 a 8): the term neatly covers both laws
and what corresponds to these in the doctors' ease.
b 6 1 add 'it is no matter' (partly following Difcs), to soften the awkwardness - though the Greek is
scarcely less awkward - of 'if only' (άν μόνον = Ιά ν μόνον), which repeats, presumably for
emphasis, the idea of the preceding όωσπερ (&v).
b8 'b e tte r than they w ere': lit *bcucr from (being) worse'.
c 1*3 'in this way, as 1 think, and In no o th er ...': i.e., mutatis mutandis , any 'art' which 'rules over'
something else must use its special knowledge to 'care for' it (Ocpancuciv, one of the terms
introduced into the revised definition of statesmanship at 275 c), and do everything for its good (c
1 'each and every one ...' is perhaps already beginning to show signs of including 'arts' other than
medicine). 'Definition' translates όρο?, the same word translated as 'criterion' at 292 a 6 and c 6:
'defining feature' might come close to covering both. (There is a certain degree of repetition here
loo, in 'in this way ..., that this is the only correct definition ...': clearly E.S. wants to make his
point in the strongest possible way.)
c 5-6 'c o rre c t In c o m p a riso n w ith th e r e s t': the Greek on the face of it says 'pre-
eminently/cxcecdingly (διαφ£ρόντω?) correct', but E.S. cannot mean to suggest that others are
correct, only less so, if this one is 'alone a constitution' (i.e. the only one worthy of the name - no
other way of organizing a city even deserves consideration).
d 1-2 'th ere Is no criterion of c o r r e c t n e s s more literally, 'none of these must be taken into account
in any way in accordance with any (rule of?) correctness'; the piling up of negatives (lit. 'none... in
no way ... in accordance with no ...') makes this E.S.'s most emphatic statement yet lie adds
τούτων ύπολογιστόον κτλ. as if covtc κατά νο’μου? ... formed its protasis, whereas it dearly
forms part of the relative clause beginning in c 6 (Stallbaum); the passion of his declaration
perhaps disturbs his syntax, though things could be made more orderly by reading a colon instead
of a comma in d 1, with Campbell.
d 4-5 'w hether they purge the city ...by putting some people to death o r else by exiling them ': cf.
Protagoras 322 d, 325 a-b (death or exile, suggests Protagoras, is the fate in Athens of those
unable to share in the - minimal - virtues of a citizen). See further 309 a, with notes. Campbell
compares Gorgias 468 d, where killing people and exiling them arc examples of political injustice
- that is, when done by a tyrant or orator/demagogue on the basis of ignorance.
d9 'making It better than it was': on the concept of 'making the dty better', see n. on 294 a 10 - b 2.
Importing new citizens, like getting rid of some existing ones, seems to contribute towards this end
in so far as it increases the total number of good citizens in the city. This is hardly likely to do
much for those removed, but no doubt it is the benefit of the largest number which the ruler will
look to first.*
e 4-5 'fo r the b e tte r ... for the w orse': lit. 'towards the bcttcr/worsc'. That nothing more precise need
be meant is suggested by the fact that when E.S. comes finally to explain this claim, he substitutes
for these expressions the simple 'well' (καλώ?, 300 e 12) and 'utterly badly' (παγκα’κω?, 300 c 1).
Cf.P hile bus 40 c. There is no justification - at least on the interpretation of the later context
which I shall propose - for Skemp/Ostwald's '...fairly closely ,... shocking caricatures ...’; still less
for Difes's '... copicnl les mcillcurs trails de ccttc droitc constitution, sinon, scs traits les plus
mauvais ', since there is no suggestion anywhere that the 'correct constitution' has any 'worse'
features (though in the event, it will be a matter of the copying of features of the ideal
constitution). Those we say arc law-abiding' (c 4): either E.S. is taking about common opinion, or
he is referring to those constitutions which are run according to the principle which he and Y.S.
have discussed (among others), of slicking to the laws; if the term ςΰνομο?, lit. having good laws',
has not actually been used, ανομία, 'lawlessness', the opposite of ςύνομια, did appear as a
description of the opposite state: 291 e 2. On the importance of the choice of this particular word,
see the following note.
The sense and syntax of the sentence would be complete without the last word μ€μιμησΟαι; but
it is harmless, and merely suggests (surprisingly) that a new main clause has begun with τα? 6k
άλλα? (we may supply a second Xcktcov from c 4).
e 6-7 T h e re st ... seem s to have been said in due m easure; b u t th a t ideal ru le m ay exist even
w ithout laws ...': For the general importance of this turn in the discussion, see n. on 291 c 3-4.
Y.S. politely expresses incredulity: to be well-governed would normally be considered the same
 COMMENTARY 293 c - 295 a 223
thing as having good la w s - and indeed both ideas are expressed in the same Greek ternis»
εύνομεΐσθαι and ευνομία. The importance of the description of law-abtdmg' cities as εΰνομοι (e
4) thus becomes clear: these are precisely the types of constitution which would normally be
thought to be best But ES. will suck to his guns» and attempt to establish hii radical case.
The second half of what Y.S. says here, literally, is *but that it is necessary to rule also without
laws (t6 + infinitive sUnding as subject] was said harder to hear* (*to hear* is an epexegctic, or
limiting', infinitive: see Goodwin, M r $ 768). But it was nowhere said that rule had to be without
laws, only that whether or not a constitution was based on laws had no relevance to its correctness
or otherwise - and it turns out that there will certainly be circumstances under which the ideal ruler
will need to use written laws (though he will feel no obligation to stick to them: see immediately
294 a 6-8). Since E.S. makes no move to correct Y.S. at this point, we must assume that the
offending clause is shorthand for somethine like 'that for rule to be as it should, it may even be
without laws' (similarly ES.'s *this matter ofthe correctness of those who rule without laws' at 294
a 2-4).
294 a 6 'Now the με'ντοι is 'progressive', marking 'the transition to a new point* (Dcnniston 406).
a 10 · b 2 T h a l law could never accurately em brace ...’: *bcsi’ in its two occurrences in the Greek is
represented by two different words, but ones which are normally synonymous (both function as
superlatives of 'good', αγαθός). The difference between them here is given wholly by the context:
the second hest includes both what is *best’ (in people's best interests) and what is 'most just'. But
in fact it is normal for Plato to treat what is in one's best interests and what is just as co-extensive,
and there is liulc doubt that the 'care' that the ideal statesman here hi Pit. is to exercize over the
citizens, and his aim to 'make the city belter' (293 d 9) has to at least primarily to do with what we
should call their 'moral health', and what Plato’s Socrates usually treats as the health of the soul*.
'Prescribe' is επιταττειν, which belongs to the family of words used for 'directing', 'directive', etc.
in 260a ff.
b4 'sim ple': i.e. unqualified.
b 8-c 1 'bending Itself p retty m ore o r less tow ards this very thing': συντείνω could in principle mean
no more than 'tending (towards), but the combination of σχεδόν - as so often softening an
assertion - and the foliowring image of the obstinate individual suggests the stronger sense of
actually straining towards something. The 'more or less* probably acknowledges ihe slight
overstatement; of course law can itself recognize the possibility of exceptions (though these loo
must be on a general level, so that E.S.'s broad characterization will still hold). But Y.S. shows no
such reservations (c 5-6).
c 3*4 'n o t even if after all som ething new tu rn s out this is explained by 295 c-d, where we find a
very similar formulation (ουμβαινόντων άλλων βελτιόνων τοις κάμνουσι... παρά την ελπίδα ~.)
- the law is just like a doctor who refuses to alter his prescription, despite the fad that the pattern
has already improved for other reasons. The idea of the law as preventing the asking of any
aucstions is developed further at 299 b-d.
c9 'Very likely': the reply κινδυνεύει can suggest doubt, but does not always do so; here, since Y.S.
has already in b 7 straightforwardly accepted what is essentially the same point, it can scarcely do
so - unless he is simply withholding judgement on the generalized version in which ES. has now
put it
c 10 · d 1 'Why then Is It ever necessary .J: once again (cf. n. on 293 e 6-7, with 294 a 7-8), it is clear that
E.S. does not wish to dispense with laws altogether, if they arc going to look for an explanation of
why it is necessary, presumably it sometimes is. (Later on, in fad, we find him discussing the role
of judges , as guardians of the king's laws: 305 b-c.)
d3 'w ith you': i.e. here at Athens.
d 8 'in such c ircu m stan ces': more literally, 'in such cases of rule' (αρχή), flnstnidions': or
'prescriptions' [έπιτάζεις].)
d 10 'to m ake th eir prescriptions piece by piece': the verb is the same as the one used at 262 b 5 -
λεπτουργεΐν, 'to make fine cuts', 'do fine work*.
e2 'to prescribe w hat will bring physical benefit': as Stallbaum explains, τήν ιού λυσιτελούντος
τοίς σώμασι ποιεισθαι τα(ιν = έπιτάττειν το λυσιιελούν τοίς σομασι.
e4 'as It Is': I take it that vOv contrasts what they adually do (D&s: 'en fait*) with what they might
have done, i.e. make up their prescriptions piece by piece. (Of the panicles, δη. and in effect κα\,
emphasize διδ, while ye 'marks a new stage in the thought': Denniston 247.)
e 8 'o u r h e rd s ': the sudden reappearance (J the term άγε’λαι (which docs not seem to be a normal
word for groups of people) is striking; it reminds us that the ultimate concern is with discovering
that kind of expen knowledge which directs the 'care of the human herd*.
295 a 1 'will never be capable': we should exped ου rather than μη in an accusative and infinitive clause
after a verb of thinking; but sometimes the normal rule is broken. Cf. Goodwin, M T § 685.
a 4-5 'acco rd in g to the principle o f "fo r the m ajority o f people, for the m ajority o f cases, and
roughly, somehow, Uke th is" ': the effect of the first to in a 4 (τό τόις πολλοί ς ...) is to turn the
224 COMMENTARY 295 a-c
whole of ιοί? πολλοί? ... παχυτέρω? (with parenthetical οίμαι) into a noun, which represents a
quotation, more or less, of 294 e 1-2; the case (accusative) can be categorized as an accusative ’of
respect*.
a 5-7 'whether expressing it in writing or In unwritten form, legislating by means of ancestral
customs': this legislator', then, seems to be a notional figure; he cannot invent 'unwritten law', in
the shape of 'ancestral customs', overnight (though Ostwald, commenting on this passage in his
revision of Skemp, p.67, n.24, compares Aristotle, P olitics 1319 b 37ff., which envisages a
lawgiver selling up unwritten as well as written laws). In unwritten form' is literally 'in (things)
unwritten' (the neuter plural of the adjective), which is then explained by 'ancestral customs'. The
word άγραμματο? is evidently not used in this sense elsewhere; but Plato is not afraid of
innovation in language, and Iv αγράμματοι? nicely balances i v γρα'μμασιν, with no danger of its
being misunderstood. On 'unwritten laws' in general, see Skemp's long and useful note ad loc.
a9 Yes, It certainly is': the μέντοι is 'affirmative': Denniston 399.
b 1-2 'capable ... of sitting': J otc adds nothing to the sense (see Goodwin, M T § 588), and there is no
difference between Ικανά? γίγνεσθαι J ote + infinitive here and the same sequence without ώστε
in a 1-2.
b 2-5 these laws we talked about': i.e. laws which have the (necessary) features we talked about (cf.
Skemp's translation, try framing written codes of the kind we have been criticizing'). 'Any one of
those... would hardly' is an emphatic way of saying 'no one would ...'; hence the ποτέ fever*) after
hardly' (σχολή), which is impossible to render in English without disturbing the sense. The &v in
the middle of the participial clause τοΟτο δυνατά? ών in b 2-3 does not belong in it (and cannot,
since the clause represents the protasis of a remote future condition), but merely anticipates the &v
in the following line with the optative of the apodosis.
b7 'Yes, but' renders 6c ye: RS. acknowledges that it does indeed follow from what has been said
before (which is obscured by Skcmp/Ostwald's Ί would rather say ... that it follows from what is
about to be said'), but now promises a further argument to the same end. The underlying notion is
still as at 294 a 7-8, that the final word should not belong to the law as such, but to the person who
possesses the relevant knowledge.
b 10 · c 5 'Are we to say, that Is, between us, that...': 'that is, between us' (lit- 'to ourselves', with emphatic
ye) shows E.S. re-establishing that this is, after all, a two-way conversation, not a matter of ex
cathedra statements by him (as might be suggested by b 7-8 'the things that are going to be said}.
The sentence as a whole represents a remote future condition with a complex participial protasis
(μέλλοντα, οιηθέντα: cf. b 2-5), all set in the accusative and infinitive after εΐπωμεν (ana with a
second acc. + inf. after οιηθέντα: for the μη here, see n. on 295 a 1); the context of the remote
condition accounts for the optative ώ? οΐοιτο in c 2, which is by attraction or assimilation (as if
E.S. had said ci μέλλοι...: cf. Goodwin, M T § 558). Between the present infinitive αποδήμων
and the future άπέσεσθαι (c 1-2) there seems to be no difference of meaning (since the lime
referred to must be the same in either case).
c7 'Do you think he would n o t...': the Greek has simply 'would (he) not ...?' (dp *ou ...), which
normally amounts to 'Surely ...?', expecting the answer 'Yes'; but in this ease the sense is plainly
rather Is it the case that... not ...7' (see d 2ff.).
d2 'or else some other of the things that come from Zeus': in another prose context, this might be
merely a quaint, poetic way of referring to climatic conditions (with Zeus in one of his familiar
roles as weather-god: cf. c.g. Homer Iliad V.91; Hesiod Works and Days 564-5; and Protagoras, in
the myth, at Protagoras 321 a); here in PU.t however, Zeus - or rather the age of Zeus - has
already played a role, and we should probably look for a connection with that. Is the point perhaps
just about the unpredictability of the weather in this age, in contrast to that of Kronos? For the
idea of climate as a major factor in human health, see the Hippocratic treatise Airst Waters, Places.
d4 'should step outside those ancient laws that had once been laid down': here roles arc suddenly
reversed, and instead of laws being compared to what a doctor's written prescriptions, a doctor is
envisaged as having the same attitude to nis prescriptions as if they were laws of ancient origin.
d7 'not part of his expertise': or not belonging to expertisc^art' in general (ούκ έντεχνα). The
accusative absolute construction is normally used with impersonal verbs, but it can also be used
with other (personal') verbs - as here in d 4-6 ώ? ταΟτα δντα κτλ. - when the clause is
introduced by J?/Joncp (Goodwin, M T S 853).
d8 'in the context of truly expert knowledge': here, for emphasis, the synonyms (as they are in Pit)
έπιστημη and τέχνη appear together fin the context of is supplied; the Greek has simply 'in
(expertI knowledge... and true expertise*).
e 1-2 'for acts of legislation of this sort': the construction of the sentence here suddenly changes, as
docs the role of γέλω? - which at first referred to the source of the laughter, but now refers to the
laughter itself ('would these not be the cause of laughter?'/ 'would there not be laughter at such
things?'). The genitive will be what is sometimes called an 'objective' genitive, as in e.g. one's
love^atrcd o f something.
 COMMENTARY 295 e - 296 c 225
e5 'o r Has laid down unw ritten law s': the Greek has καί, but this may link alternatives (cf. c.g. 293
a 3, and Dcnniston 292). The question is whether the imaginary legislator will always use both
written and unwritten laws, and 295 a 5-6 suggests that he will not necessarily do so: he will... set
down the law ... whether expressing it in writing or in unwritten form, legislating by means of
ancestral customs'. The reference to the use of 'ancestral customs' may be part of what lies behind
e 8 'if the person who wrote them, or someone else resembling him, arrives’; the original legislator
m$y not be available (see also n. on e 7-8). The question is just whether the person with expert
knowledge is to be bound by existing prescriptions or not, and it makes no difference whether
those prescriptions are written or unwritten.
e 6-7 'those h erds of hum an beings th a t graze».': cf. n. on 294 e 8 (but micvcoBai, graze*, of course
itself suggests νόμος, law*). As the translation indicates fin each case*), I lake iv εκα'σται? (sc.
Tats* πόλε σι) with (νομευονται) κατά του? των γραψάντu v νόμους, rather than as a simple
repetition of κατά πάλιν.
e 7-8 'η th e person w ho w rote them .»': *ihe person who wrote them on the basis of expertise’ adds
precision to the description in e 4-5 fthe person who has written down what is just and unjust „.*).
It is not just any lawgiver who is to be allowed to change his laws (far from it, as we shall see), but
only the 'truly expert lawgiver. We are dealing with the parallel case to the one described in 295 b
10 - e 2, that of the doctor or gymnastic trainer (who is assumed to be in possession of the relevant
expert knowledge): if he goes away, and circumstances change, then it will be entirely appropriate
for him to change his previous prescriptions. Similarly if the expert legislator should come back -
or rather arrive, as E.S. puts it (295 e 8), because he now includes the case where someone else
who has the relevant knowledge comes to the city; since he too has the relevml qualifications, then
he too will be allowed to change things (possessing the 'art of statesmanship*. or that of legislation,
will be the only qualification required). See also n. on e 5.
The verb εζέστω here in e 8 is what governs the dative in e 4-5 (τονομοθετησαντι). For the
'peculiar' construction μή Ιξ ό ο το , see Goodwin, M T {§ 253, 291: ’... μη έξε'στω; is the
interrogative of μη Ιξέο τω , let him not be allowed,** μτ\ έλθομε v;... is that of μή ελθομεν. Ut
us not go.*
296 a 7 'Well, It sounds fine enough': there is often a sense attaching to ευπρεπή*? of what merely seems
fine, attractive, plausible; that the 'thing said’ (λόγο?) issues from 'the many’ is probably sign
enough, given that it is Plato who is writing, that it does so here. Plato himself puis an idea into
Socrates' mouth at C rito 5 1 c which sounds similar, but is actually quite different Socrates'
principle is that the individual citizen must abide by the laws unless he can persuade his city to
change them; the principle in question here is that if anyone thinks of a way of improving the laws,
he must persuade his city to accept the improvement, and it would be perfectly coherent to disagree
with this principle - on E.S.’s grounds, that knowledge overrides any requirements for consent -
while accepting the other (since in that case it is a matter simply of Uwbreaking by an individual
citizen acting in a private capacity, which one could object to - as Socrates does - on independent
grounds). The first principle will in any case be untouched by ES.’s ensuing argument, to the
effect that an expert legislator may force through prescriptions for behaviour even against his
subjects' wilL (The reason why E.S. has to consider this ming said by the majority* is of course
that if legislators did have to rely on persuading the citizens to accept his new laws, then one of the
criteria of good government which ne is excluding - i.e. the presence or absence of the consent of
the citizens - would come back into the frame.) For a somewhat different, but probably
compatible, treatment of the issues, see Weiss, RS 213-14.
b 1 'B ut first things first': with some hesitation, I take 6 'ovv here in what Dcnniston (463) calls its
'resumptive' use, lcad[ing] back to the main topic, which has temporarily been lost sight of. Y S .
has been too quick to ask for E.S.’s endorsement of what seems to be his own view, that the
principle is a correct one; that is something that cannot be decided without further argument.
b 2-3 ’No - not yet; answ er m e first In relation to the previous cases': ES. goes on to put the same
question in relation to the example of the doctor (b 5-8); the other example, of the trainer in the
gymnasium, seems to be forgotten. (The με'ντοι here is strongly adversative: see Dcnniston 405.)
b5 ΤΓ then - to continue w ith o u r exam ple - someone does not persuade his patient t o - to
continue with our example* renders άρα, which is in effect purely connective, rather like ouv or 6η*
(Dcnniston 41).
b 6-7 'an d forces child, o r m an, o r w om an i.e. anyone, whether child or adult; a child might be
expected to have to be forced or otherwise induced to accept treatment. (We may compare the
analogy in G orgias 521 d - 522 b between the ideal statesman - in this case [the elder] Socrates
himself - and the doctor, faced by a court of children, and charged by a cook/confcctioner with
maltreating them.) For the same sequence (childAnan/woman) see Protagoras 325 a.
b 8-9 'w h at w e called': see 295 d 6-7.
b 9-c 3 'A nd the last thing the person who w as the object of the force In question can correctly say
...': more literally: 'And the person who was ... can (£οτι, i.e. f^con: sc. αύτώ) say everything
226 COMMENTARY 296 c - 297 c
correctly... except that...' After πρότερον, we should expect fj rather than πλη'ν; there is simply t
change m construction.
c 9 · d 4 Then those who have been forced ...': the syntax of this sentence is again difficult, but
intelligible: the genitive τών βιασθεντων (c 9) is picked up by d 1 τών τοιούτων ('people in this
kind of situation', i.e. those who have been forced ...); the accusative in d 1, τόν ψόγον, is written
as if δεί λε'γειν were going to follow, instead of which li.S. chooses to use λεκτόον + dative
(αύτψ, referring back to ib v ψόγον). (In d 3, πλην substitutes for fi, after a comparative, as in c
c9 'and ancestral custom': o r ' o r a s at 295 e 5 (καί again)?
d 7 · e 4 'Or If, whether by using persuasion or not, ». what belongs to the ruled': editors generally
have deleted the words μή συμφορά η in e 1 (i.e. 'whal is not beneficial ('of the citizens' is supplied
by the translation] or', leaving simply '(he does) what is beneficial'). The only explicit discussion
of the passage that I have found, that in Skemn, ad loc., suggests that δρ$ μη συμφορά η συμφορά
Hmplics an alternative indirect question (whether ... or) as the form of the sentence ...; but έάν (in
k&v πείσα? κ£ν μη πείσα?) can be nothing but conditional...'. Now we arc certainly dealing with
a conditional sentence; the question is only whether 6pq μή συμφορά ή συμφορά can express
alternative conditions, and it looks as if the sentence itself shows that it can, since (εάν...)
πλούσιο? if πε νη? ... 6p4 could properly be reformulated as κάν πλούσιο? κάν πε'νη? 6ρ4
(similarly with η κατά γράμματα η παρά γρα'μματα). The difficulty is that there are two levels of
'whether... or' (both conditional), with three alternatives on the first level, and with the two levels
distinguished in the Greek only by the difference between participlcs/adjectivcs - πείσα?,
πλούσιο?, etc. - and the main verb of the protasis, 6p$; in the translation, I have introduced an
extra 'if: 'if, whether...'. Since the 'truest criterion' can be stated either as 'whether the ruler docs
things that arc beneficial', or as 'whether he docs things that are beneficial or not beneficial', I
propose that the text transmitted by the main MSS should stand. 'What belongs to the ruled' (c 3-
4): i.e. those aspects of their lives which should be under the control of the 'wise and good ruler*,
e4 'a steersman': the steersman is plainly understood as the person who knows how to navigate and
take the ship safely to its destination; his role then partly overlaps (even includes?) that of the
'ship's captain' (Skcmp/Osiwald), but 'steersman' preserves the mam sense of the Greek word, and
the conncction/contrast with the image of the god at the steering-oars of the world.
297 a 5 'Is it not the case that': is supplied, as is 'would it not' in the previous sentence; the traditional
reading of both sentences as (gently) interrogative is probably correct
a6 'wise': here εμφρων; compare ό σοφό?καΙ αγαθό? ανηρ at 296 e 2-3 and άνδρα τον μετά
φρονησεω? βασιλικόν at 294 a 8. In each case, it is the expert knowledge of
slatcsmanship/kingship which is in question.
b 1-3 'that by always distributing to those in the dty what is most Just...': the 'that' is supplied; in
the Greek the following words (τό μετά voO κτλ.) 'arc governed by με'χριπερ άν; but since they
serve to explain the preceding words (sc. εν μεγα φυλα'ττειν), for that reason they arc addai
without connection by apposition of the whole clause' (Slallbaum). 'By...distributing ...': lit.
'distributing to those in the city the most just together with intelligence and expertise', where 'with
intelligence and expertise' qualifies 'the most just' rather than 'distributing'. As the translation
indicates, I take it that 'intelligence and expertise' is a hendiadys, expressing in shorthand form
everything that has been said about the necessary flexibility of the statesman's response in a
complex world. 'So far as they can': the same rider appeared at 293 d 9-c 1; see n. on 311 c 5.
b 5 'And neither should one contradict those other things we said': in fact the ownership of 'those
other things' (listed in b 7 - c 5) is not stated; but since Y.S. either immediately accepted them, or
in one case did not (then) object, they will be joint property according to the rules of the present
conversation (so loo, b 4 makes him joint owner of the contents of 296 d 6 - 297 b 3).
b 7 · c 5 That a mass of any people whatsoever ...': it looks as if the purpose of this passage is to take
the discussion back to whal H.S. said in 293 c 3-5, before the objection from Y.S. which has
brought us to the present point; it now turns out that he was not happy about this either (c 6-7).
293 e 3-5 is cited more or less precisely f just as was said a little earlier'); the rest of b 7 - c 5 gives
the salient points of the argument which led up to it, recalling especially 292 c 1-2 and 293 a 2-4.
It is noticeable in the last ease that the original order, 'some one person, or two, or altogether few',
is reversed - 'a small element in the population, few in number, or even one': liL 'some small
(element) and (? καί) little (ολίγον, which in the plural is ’few*) or (καί) the one (neuter, referring
to the unit of counting?); the reversal perhaps reflects the difference between the earlier context,
where the other types of constitution (including oligarchy) were still in play, and the present one,
where they are not, or rather arc going to be finally ruled out. Still, we might ask the reason for the
sudden preference for the number one, for which no argument has been mounted; for all that has
been said, there might well be more than one Tting' in the required sense, and however many there
were, they would still not constitute an oligarchy, or an aristocracy (which, being devoid of Tcingly*
knowledge, arc entirely different beasts).
 COMMENTARY 297 c-c 227
c6 'Wbat do you mean by this? What —?*: There is only one question in the Greek, with two
interrogative words placed side by side; precisely the same formulation is found at e.g. Theaetetus
146 d (cf. Laws 968 c).
'when it was made': if the MSS reading is correct, this is evidently the only place where
Plato ever uses the word, and it seems hard to attach any meaning to it which accords with uses of
it outside Plato (see Definition 266: Campbell's 'I suppose' - see also LSJ - does not help).
Badham's emendation to ρηθέν ('when it was made/said j, which Robinson adopts, looks both neat
and necessary.
c 8 · d i 'And it's no small matter, if one stirs up here 'one' (i i?) must refer to E.S. himself; if YS . is
puzzled about the original statement, E.S. himself has reasons to expand on it (which is
presumably why he came back to it in the first place). This subject* substitutes for 'this
stalement/thing said' ( io Gtov τον λόγον), in order to give purchase to u (αυτό, which presumably
refers to the content of the thing said). On the identity of the 'mistake* in question, see n. on e 4-5.
d5*8 'do you recognize that the others ought to use the written documents which belong to Ibis one
Written documents' (σύγγραμματα): Le. written laws; the term seems to be used as a simple
valiant of γρα'μματα (but cf. συγγραφαί used in the same legal sense in an actual forensic context
e.g. in Lysias, Against Nicomachus 17). The difficulty is, however, that these other constitutions,
in the absence of the good king (if he were present, they would themselves be 'correct'), have no
way of getting access to the laws which the correct constitution would have - and since the aim of
this constitution is quite different from theirs, its laws would also apparently be different. In view
of this difficulty, and of what later seems to be said about the relationship between the best
constitution and the rest, I proposed in RS that d 6 meantemploying writings in the way that it
(the best constitution) does\ If this looks too difficult a way to take an apparently simple clause,
the alternative is probably to emphasize the 'ought': 'they ought to use sc. if they are to save
themselves (as many of them fail to do, and those that do, against expectation: 301 e - 302 b). But
in any case what is immediately taken up is the general principle of keeping to the established laws
fwhat is now praised').
E.S.'s overall strategy in what follows will be, first, to argue - on the basis of the usual analogy
with other 'ails' or kinds of expertise - that there is something intrinsically absurd about such a
principle (298 b - 300 a), though one can imagine the sort of state of mind that might lead to Us
introduction (298 a-b); then to suggest that not keeping to established laws has even worse
consequences (300 a-b). This provides the raw material he needs for the eventual justification of
his claim that all non-ideal constitutions arc Imitations', but some (the law-abiding' ones) better
than others (those that neglect the laws).
d 10-el 'that none of those in the city should dare the reference, given the context, is primarily to
those in office; cf. 300 a.
e3 'when one changes the principle we discussed just now': here and in d 10-e 1, principle' is
supplied in the translation (the Greek has just 'no one's daring to do anything and Ihc first
thing, the one we discussed just now'). This (second) principle is the one discussed in 294 a if., that
the true king is above the laws; 'changing' it, as we discover in 300 a-e, means transforming U into
a licence for anyone (any public official) to act against the law - to which the second choice will
certainly be preferable: see n. on d 5-8 and cf. n. on 300 e 2. CChoice* is also supplied - but we
are clearly talking about pulling things in order of preference.) It does not seem possible for
μςτατίθημι to mean 'set aside' (Skcmp; cf. also Stallbaum, Campbell, and Dies).
e 4-5 'but let us go through the way In which what we have called "secoud-bcst” has come about1:
i.e. - as I suppose - how the principle in question, that law is always sovereign, has come to be
established, and as most correct (when it is not: 297 d 7-8); or, what comes to the same thing, how
people have come to choose types of constitution which exhibit this principle as if U were best.
This is the mistake which now occurs' referred to in c 9 - d 1; and this is what is in fart explained,
if we combine 301 c 6ff., which explains why people have turned their backs on the first-choice
solution, with the contrast between those constitutions based on law and those not.
e 7-8 '·.· to which we must always compare our kingly rulers': Le. because they so dearly help to
illustrate the structure of kingship - the role in it of expert knowledge, and its purpose of caring for
those ruled? The 'likenesses' in question, statesmanship and medicine (e 10-11), regularly feature
in eihical/polilical contexts in the Platonic dialogues; but the doctor has of course already played a
major role here in Pit., and from 296 e the steersman seems to have taken over the place of the
gymnastic trainer - the initial example in the present context, perhaps because of the likely setting
of the dialogue in the gymnasium (sec Theaetetus 144 b-c; cf. Pit. 257 c). (The 'modcT of weaving
was useful lor the business of division, and will be again 1303 d ff.J; but for the moment it is set to
one side.) Λ likeness' (cTkuv ) is something which resembles something else; OstwakJ replaces
'parallel cases' in Skcmp’s translation with Images'.
228 COMMENTARY 297 c - 299 a
• 11-12 'by fashioning a kind of figure, using these as materiar: ihc idea iccim to be that of moulding
a shape out o f some plastic material. (Hite doctor who is "worth many others"': E.S. quotes, or
paraphrases, Horner, Iliad XI.514.) For the structure of the following argument, see n. on d 5-8.
298 a 2 · h 3 'F o r the one as m uch as the o th e r Having begun by treating steersmen and doctors
together, E.S. then immediately starts talking about doctors by themselves, and so has to begin
again with steersmen (b 3fT.). The description of the imaginary case of Ihe doctors is clearly
largely determined by the comparison with the political case; the most obvious example is the
reference to taxes, and the last idea ('to take ... pay for killing him') clearly hints at the practice at
Athens under the democracy of paving citizens for jury service. 'And the final step is': και δή καί
already announces the climax of the description, but is reinforced by tcXcouSvtc?, 'finishing (by
doing something)'.
h6 'causing shipwrecks the translation here smoothes out the Greek, which shifts suddenly from
a participial construction to further main verbs (after b 5 καταλαπον™? tc we should expect
έκβάλλον™? ... κακουργούντος, although this would have been difficult after σφοίλματα
noioOvrc?).
h 7ff. 'L e t's then suppose this new sentence - which continues, in effect, down to c 9 - has the
form the protasis of a remote future condition with no apodosis. It probably continues the
construction in 298 a 1, '(Of the following sort:) as if we were to think ...', with διανοηθ*ΐμ€ν
picked up by διανοηθέντ€?. But it is perhaps only the length of the sentence which is likely to
make us stop looking for an apodosis. The clumsy, list-like language of the whole recalls that of
legal documents.
h 8 'cam e to a conclusion In a kind o f council': I have taken it that βουλήν τι να is internal
accusative after βουλευσαίμίθα, 'we met in some kind of council'; 'came to a conclusion' is
supplied to take account of the fact that what follows is the description of a decision (*nol to allow
...'). But βουλή could by itself refer to the decision; and the sense will be the same in either case.
At Athens, 'the council' would normally refer to the Council of Five Hundred, which prepared
business for the popular assembly.
c 1-2 'to have autonom ous control either o r slaves or of free m en': 'to have autonomous control' is to
'rule αύτοκρατωρ' - the same word that was used of the cosmos as it entered the age of Zeus (274 a
5), the age when we ourselves, through the 'arts', are in control of our own lives. For a form of
expcrlisefari' (τέχνη) to Tiave autonomous control' over people seems to be for them to act solely
as their expertise as possessors of the 'art' dictates. 'Either of slaves ...': the ουν (μητ ’ούν),
according to Dcnniston (418-19), denotes 'indifference'; slaves, qua slaves, would be expected to
be told how to act, but in this imagined situation, free men would share the same lack of
freedom of action. The slaves in question arc probably slave-doctors: cf. Laws 120 a ff.
c 3-4 'or only the rich': E.S. thus makes clear that the reference to an 'assembly' docs not mean that his
remarks arc aimed only at democracies.
c 4-5 'th e other craftsm en': i.e. other than doctors and steersmen (cf. Apology 22 d-c, where Socrates
describes the craftsmen in the manual trades - like the poets - as being in the habit of thinking that
because they know a lot about their subject, they also know about 'the most important things'). We
need to supply a dative with έξεΐναι: 'that it be permitted (to people belonging to the class o f...)'.
c7 'and also': the καί δη καί marks the even more patent absurdity of what is to follow.
d5 'long ships': i.e. triremes.
d 7-8 'on kurbeis o r blocks of stone': the kurbeis , at Athens, were revolving columns, perhaps made of
wood, on which early laws were inscribed (Plutarch, Life o f Solon 25, says that he saw fragments
of them himself); they seem to have been replaced by stelait 'blocks of stone' (cf. Lysias Against
Nicomachus, and csp. 17, where the same combination, kurbeis!stelai, is accepted by editors as a
probable restoration of the transmitted text). ITie addition of τισι fof some sort’, which I take to
go with both nouns) makes the reference less specific to Athens - and of course the whole
discussion is in principle wholly general.
e 6-7 'w hether from the r k h or from the whole people, w hoever has office assigned to him by lot':
for the specification 'from the rich or from the whole people', cf. n. on c 3-4. It is not clear whether
'whoever has office assigned to him by lot’ goes with both cases or only with the second; but 300 a
4-5 talks about the person 'overseeing' the laws - who is probably a magistrate rather than a
member of the courts about to be introduced in e 11 ff. - as either obtaining office by lot or
elcctol (sec following note). From E.S.’s point of view it hardly matters, since if the officers come
from 'the mass’ of the people (πλήθος· agam; 'majority' in d 5), whether the 'mass’ consisting of the
rich or the whole people, thev will in any case be unqualified. ’Officers’, i.e. 'rulers', ίρχοντα?,
recalls but docs not exclusively refer to the office of Archon at Athens.
298 · 13 - 299 a 1 'either of rich men on the basis of preselection or again those chosen by lot from the
whole people together': or, alternatively, 'those chosen by lot (λαγχάνω = 'obtain office by lot', as
in 298 c 7) cither from the rich on the basis of preselection or from the whole people ...'; though in
this latter case άνδρών - lit. 'courts o f m en , cither ...' - would look otiose, since it is hardly
 COMMENTARY 299 a-e 229
necessary in a Greek context to specify that the courts must be made up out of aduk males (the
syntax is ' (courts) of men, either the rich .... or... those chosen by lot [τον? λαχόντα?, accusative,
now in apposition with δικαστήρια rather than όνδρών] from the whole people'.) It is quite
possible, however, that both versions would come to the same thing, since to go by to Aristotle's
evidence (such as it is), 'preselection' would appear to involve a combination of election (at the
first stage: in the present case, presumabiv with at least the candidates restricted to the wealthy)
and the lot (at the second). In general, Aristotle treats the lot as an essentially democratic
institution (Politics 1317 b 20-21); but at Politics 1298 b 9-11 'preselection' on the model described
seems to be associated with an 'aristocratic* mode of constitution - which for Aristotle tends to
mean oligarchic (see 1293 b 33 ff.) - and at Constitution o f Athens 8.1 (whether or not this was
written by Aristotle himself) it is a feature of the Solonian constitution, whose arrangements for the
appointment of officers of state the Politics also tends to treat as 'aristocratic'. 'Aristocracy' in Pit.
too is a form of oligarchy in Aristotelian terms, if this is the rule of the (few) wealthy: see 301 a.
299 a 2 ’In order to examine their conduct': public scrutiny of officials (ctouvai) at the end of their term
of office was a regular feature of Athenian political life.
a -7 'for any of them who are condemned by the vote J : for the distinction between 'suffering a
penally7(the Greek has only παθειν, which is to Tiave something done to one} and 'paying back'
(dnoT ivciv), Campbell compares e.g. Laws 843 b, 875 d. καταψηφισθή is impersonal; liL
'whomever it is voted against*, ών 5 * &v ... αυτών = τούτων 6 * ών dv; τι να? repeals the
indefiniteness of the relative clause.
b4 'beat and cold': liL hot (things) and cold (things)'; perhaps the reference is to hot and cold bodies,
1. e. fevers and chills (cf. Skemp). For 'winds', see 295 c-d.
b5 'making clever speculations': Le. 'elever' according to this law; but actually 'wise', since it is the
truth that this person is looking for (σοφί^σθαι, 'faire le savant' (Dies] - play the wise, σοφό?,
man).
c3 'anyone who wishes of those permitted to do so': *11)036 permitted', in a democracy, will be any
adult male citizen; in an oligarchy, the rich (oi? c( cotiv = τούτων oi? c{ cotC.) But the expression
'anyone who wishes ...' itself belongs to an Athenian context: see Hansen (1981), 359-65, and
Accattino, RS 208 n.12.
c 4 'some court or other': i.e. like the popular court which tried old Socrates, on a charge of
'corrupting the young* by teaching them radical ideas; cf. Apology 24 b-c (for δη τι, see Dcmustan
212-13, and cf. Phaedo 115 d). For Socrates as 'star-gazer', see Apology 23 d; for the philosopher
as 'babbling' (άδολόσχη?), e.g. Phaedo 70 c; for both ideas combined. Republic 4S8 e (in the
image of the ship of stale), Theaetetus 173 b ff. It is Socrates, the great seeker after truth, who
according to the Gorgias is likely to be the only true statesman of his lime (because be tells the
citizens the truth about their souls): cf. n. on 259 a 8. That this same Socrates is actually present
and listening to the discussion is of course likely to give it an additional dimension: cf. Hindi, RS
188, and my Introduction to the present volume. To take autonomous control' (c 2): cf. 298 c 1.
c6 'it will be laid down': this, or something like it, needs to be understood to explain the continuing
infinitive construction; though now it is an ordinary accusative and infinitive, rather than the
(νόμο? cotQ μη' + infinitive - *ihe law is, not to do x\ or 'to do x* - in b 6 ff. (and in 298 c, etc.).
The justification of the principle in question in what follows is also in the accusative and infinitive,
since it is in effect, if not actually, pan of what the law would say.
d3-4 'all the art of hunting, of whatever kind': perhaps a reference to the kind of hunting' in whkh
E.S. and Y.S. arc engaged (for the statesman), and so to the an of dialectic itself (see e.g. 263 b 1-
2, 264 a 5, 285 d 9, 290 d 5, 291 c 6; and, especially, Euthydem us 290 b-c, where branches of
mathematics arc explicitly treated ms species of hunting, on the grounds that they discover things).
The switch from accusative (nepi ταύτα? τά? cπίστη'μα?, d 2) to genitive - since στρατηγική?,
etc. must themselves be governed by the same nepi - is once again merely a question of variation
(as is the temporary return to the accusative in d 4 συμπα'ση? μόρο? ότιουν μιμητική?, which
avoids a collection of four successive genitives).
d 4-5 'painting, or any part whatever of all the art of imitation': for the Imitative' or ’representative’
arts, see n. on 288 c 1-3.
d8 'or all of herd-care': slipped in innocently enough; it is a branch of Ticrd-care’ that we are
concerned with. Still, the question here is about the whole of the genus. Cf. Campbell's comment
on the whole list (p.154): ’... [m]any threads of previous discussion are here taken up.’
e 1 'the business of carrying out the Instructions of others': i.e the category which we were
dividing when we got on to the subject of existing politicians, which included divination (those in
this sphere have a sharc/part in some subordinate art’, 290 c 4-5). Petteia , which is mentioned
next, came in at 292 c, the types of mathematics, last in the list, at 284 e.
«3 'whether - I Imagine - dealing with them the point of που (1 imagine', or 'perhaps') is
unclear; is ILS. marking his relative ignorance of mathematics, in comparison with Theodorus?
Skcmp/Oslwald finds here (and at 284 e) a reference to 'the four slages of the mathematical
230 COMMENTARY 299 c - 300 c
curriculum of ihc Academy, which arc represented in the R ep u b lic as the course of higher
education for the philosopher-king prescribed in Book VII*. The inference from the Republic to
practice in the Academy is possible but unsafe; a reference to contemporary mathematics via
Theodores looks marginally safer, for the omission of the Tint in a series of εΐτε'β (more or less in
the sense of 'either... or... or...'), see Dcnnision 507-8.
299 e 8-300 a 2 'so th a t life, which even now Is difficult, In th at tim e w ould be altogether unllvcabte':
Y.S. seems here to imagine E.S.'s description as if it were of some future era; that life 'even now is
difficult' recalls the account of this age of Zeus in the myth. Cf. Hesiod's prediction of the horrors
which await the men of the age of iron (Works and D ays 180 ff.). But Uirsch, RS 188, is surely
also right to detect here a reminiscence of Socrates, at Apology 38 a: a situation like the one
described by E.S. would actually have outlawed the very kind of inquiry or examination which
Socrates (or at any rate Plato's Socrates) thought alone made life liveable' (βιωτό?). For cl? of
time in or at which something happens or is the case, see l-SJ s.v. II.2.
300 a 5 'th e person who has been elected o r has been appointed to ofTIce by lot1: see nn. on 298 c 6-7
and 298 c 13 - 299 a 1. (The officer in question would presumably be one of the magistrates rather
than a member of the courts set up to examine the magistrates' conduct, since the sphere of
influence of the latter would be too restricted.)
b 1-6 'Yes, fo r If, I Im ag in e,... th an the w ritten rules.': Skcmp/Ostwald - in common with all other
translators and commentators whose views I have consulted - interprets this passage as implying
an endorsement of the rule of law: The laws which have been laid down represent the fruit of long
experience - one must admit that Each of them incorporates the clever advice of some counselor
who has persuaded the public assembly to enact it. Any man who dares ...' But in fact it pays
written laws an extremely back-handed compliment. 'On the basis of much experiment' (πείρα, liL
'trial') sounds reasonably positive - though one should remember contexts like Gorgias 463 b,
where 'experience and practice' (εμπειρία και τριβή) are strongly contrasted with expertise
(τέχνη); cf. Laws 720 b, which describes a slave's brand of expertise derived from watching his
master at work, and from (mere) experience. But that laws have been accepted on the basis that
'some adviscrs/counsclors' (or other) have advised it, in an 'attractive' ('pleasing', 'elegant':
χαριε'ντω?) way, and especially that their acceptance depended on persuading the majority, or the
mass (πλήΟο?), is - in the light of the whole of the preceding context - absolutely no
recommendation of them at all. Ihc only positive point in favour of written laws (with b 1 τού?
νόμου?, we finally move away from the analogy of the other arts) is that having them and sticking
to them is preferable to not doing so. 'All expert activity': as before, it seems safest to interpret
πράζι? in the light of the first division of the dialogue (the more so because it is not long since RS.
has referred us back to it: see 292 b-c; 258 c).
b7 bow would it not?': lit. how is it not going to (overturn it)?
c 1 'second-best m ethod of proceeding': lit. 'second voyage', but the metaphor appears to be dead
(unless it is partially revived by all die preceding talk about ships); cf. e.g. Phaedo 99 c, with the
note in Rowe (1993) ad loc.
c 4-6 'W ell, Im itations of the tru th ... w ould be these, w ouldn't they This crucial sentence is
translated by Dies as referring to the laws and written rules' of b 8-c 1 ('Ccs codes seraicnl done,
en chaquc domainc ..*); Skcmp/Ostwald, to similar effect, has Then laws would seem to be written
copies of scientific truth ...' See also e.g. Gill, RS 296. But laws, i.e. existing laws, have precisely
been shown not to be what the things referred to arc said most importantly to be: 'things issuing
from those who know'. They arc based on 'experiment', the advice of 'some advisers', and the
consent of the (ignorant) majority/mass. Dies and Skemp mitigate this difficulty by rendering what
1 have translated as 'the things issuing from those who know which have been written down so far
as they can be’ (ιά παρά τώ v ειδόιων εί ? δυ'ναμιν εί ναι γεγραμμε'να) as 'traedes 1c plus
parfaitement possible sous ('inspiration dc ccux qui savcnl'/ '... based so far as possible on the
instructions received from those who really possess the scientific truth on these mauers'. But -
again - when, and how, did the cities in question ever get access to such instructions? It is much
more in line with the preceding argument as a whole to suppose that 'issuing from those who know'
is meant to contrast with the origins of existing laws; and if so, Ihcsc' (ιαΟια, c 4) cannot refer
backwards to c 1. (298 d 6-7 would allow the possibility that the 'advisers’ who managed to get the
laws adopted included some knowledgeable proplc; but there is no suggestion in that context that
their advice was decisive - rather the reverse, in so far as the imaginary assemblies made no
distinction between experts and non-experts. Nor docs any later passage in Pit. contradict the
account - or caricature - of existing legislative methods which is summed up in 300 a; contrast
Protagoras 326 d, where - as Kathryn Morgan pointed out to me - Protagoras simply asserts the
excellence of the ancient lawgivers of the democratic city, on the basis of no evidence whatever.
According to Ilirsch, RS 186, '[h]ow (the laws of the law-abiding forms of constitutions] come into
being and acquire validity is left... deliberately unclear' [my italics). If they do 'acquire validity'
IGellung erlangen], then Plato can surely not have failed to notice that he has not shown how they
 COMMENTARY 300 c-c 231
do; but in that case, why should he also have framed his account of actual legislative processes in
such a way as to suggest that any 'validation' - which would require knowledge - would be in
principle impossible?) The only alternative is to suppose that ‘these’ refen forward, in the way
suggested by the translation I have adopted, and to take the whole sentence as a general statement
about 'imitations of the truth'. If these cannot be, or include, existing laws (because of the problem
of access), they must be those written instructions which 'issue from' (real) expens, including the
real statesman, who has been continuously compared with expens in other spheres. These are only
'imitations', because, as we have been told, written rules can never reflect or encapsulate any expert
knowledge fully - hence 'so far as they can be', c 8 - d 2 in fact then goes on to refer precisely to
'those things that have been written down by the knowledgeable statesman. E.S. says *issuing
from', rather than *by', here in c 5, perhaps just in order to bring out the contrast with the source
('from', *k, b 1) of existing laws; in any case, even if a difference is intended between things
written which 'issue from those who know', on the one hand, and things written by someone who
knows, it is evidently irrelevant to the argument, since the whole issue is simply whether laws were
or were not framed on the basis of expert knowledge. If the laws of b 1 were not framed on that
basis (as the description of the processes which led to their adoption suggests that they cannot have
been), then they cannot be 'imitations of the truth' in the sphere of the 'art of statesmanship'. E.S. is
now beginning the central part of his promised explanation of 'better' and 'worse* imitations; and
his first move is to identify what the best kind of imitation is - which is something different from
either of the other two categories of imitation. For a related kind of Imitation of the truth', by the
philosopher, see Republic 500 b if. (For the civat, which is of a piece whh but adds little to cl?
δύναμιν, see Goodwin, M T $ 780.)
c7 'Of course': what Y.S. accepts so emphatically is no doubt especially the connection between
truth and knowledge, which will be central to c 4-6 both on the traditional interpretation (see
preceding note) and on the interpretation I am proposing. But it is likely to count in favour of the
latter that it also offers Y.S. something he has reason - in the shape of the preceding argument - to
assent to.
c 9*10 'in relation to his own activity'...: i.e. statesmanship, 'caring for the human herd*. Without
taking any notice of the written laws' echoes a 6, where the same phrase (except for one inckveii
difference: μη for ού) is used of the official' who goes conLrary to written rules, but without
knowledge - and who therefore bears a superficial resemblance to the knowledgeable statesman.
This is the point which EJS. takes up in d 3fif.).
d2 'to some people who are not currently with him1: I suggest that this curious phrase Qit· 'some
people who are absent') is designed to cover the two cases which were earlier identified as
requiring an expert to write things down, namely when he is away, out of the city (295 b 10 - c 5),
and when - which will be most of the lime - he is unable to be 'sitting beside [an] individual and
accurately prescribing what is appropriate to him’ (295 b 1>2).
d4 'any large collection of people*: any πλ ήΟο?, which previously meant ‘the majority' or Vie mass',
but now seems to refer even to groups with fe w members: thus e 7 - 8 talks of 'the ντληθο? of the
rich', in clear reference to oligarchy, the rule of the few*. But these Tew' are evidently still in some
sense many - too many, evidently, to acquire the art of statesmanship: e 7-9. Cf. 293 a 2-4
Caltogether few), 297 b 7 - c 2 fa small number, even oncT
d7 'that true expert': lit. ’that "true" person'; the reference is presumably to c 8 *thc knowledgeable
person, the one who really possesses the art of statesmanship:
e2 'that very thing which is most truly what it claims to be': this is probably an oveitranslation of
the Greek (lit. 'that truest (thing) itself)· hi any case, it turns out that cities and statesmen imitate
the best constitution Tor the worse’ (here, 'altogether badly*) by failing to stick to established laws;
it is a 'bad imitation' because they mimic one feature of the best - that it will not regard sticking to
the laws as a central principle - without possessing a second which is a necessary condition of the
first, namely the expert knowledge which justifies it (something which plainly 'changes' the
principle fundamentally: see 297 e 3). See 301 b 10 - c 3, where precisely this understanding of
oad imitation* is spelled out in relation to the lyram. Neither here nor anywhere else is there any
suggestion that they are imitating the laws belonging to the best state, of which (to emphasize the
point once again) they have no inkling. (By the same token, \hcy would be undertaking...' cannot
imply that these Imitators' 'undertake' - or try': έπιχαραυ - consciously to hnitatc the ideal; they
arc simply doing something which is, as it happens, or can be described as, an imitation of iL)
e3 'I agree completely - I think': as Skcmp's translation (*Yes - or so I should say’, emended to a
plain *Ccrtainly' by Ostwald) suggests, the που introduces a qualification of what at first sight looks
like unqualified agreement (παντω?). Cf. n. on 275 c 5.
* 4-5 'no large collection of people': cf. note on d 4. This seems to be the wrong point to refer to; on
the face of it, large-ish numbers of people can acquire some kinds of expertise (farming, weaving,
and so on). The crucial point whicn was agreed was that statesmanship was a peculiarly difficult
232 COMMENTARY 300 c - 301 b
form of expertise lo acquire (292 d-c) - though there arc evidently other lesser forms which arc
also difficult (like peiteia).
t 7 'If some kind of kingly expertise exists': as of course the whole of Pit. assumes, rightly or
wrongly; the 'if-clause serves primarily to state a premiss of the argument. Yet the μ< v (cl μίν)
docs momentarily suggest a contrasting alternative: 'if there is no such thing'. What would follow
in that case would, of course, be that the 'second-best' would become best - and not an 'imitation'
of it (But since that is impossible...)
300 e II · 301 a 3 The requirement, then what then is it, exactly, that constitutes 'imitating the true
constitution wcll7 Again, it cannot be a mailer of imitating its laws, since it is clearly implied that
the constitutions in question (all constitutions of this sort' = those based on the rule of tnc rich or
of the whole people) already have their own laws, if they have any - as they must in any case,
given that there is no expert statesman around, or even anyone approximating to him, lo guide
them. What is plainly suggested is that if they do stick to their laws, ipso fa c to they will be
imitating the true constitution well. Now there is one situation, or rather pair of situations, in
which the ideal city will slick to its laws: namely those situations which make it necessary for the
ideal ruler to write down laws in the first place - when he is not there to prescribe for individual
citizens, and when he is actually away from the city (see n. on 300 d 2). (Certainly they will not be
allowed to diverge from his prescrifHions on their own account, unless they arc all lings' in the
proper sense of possessing the relevant expertise; but that, according to what has been agreed, is
impossible, since they constitute a large number.) But in the ease of these other constitutions, he
will be absent permanently; there will then be a clear sense in which, by slicking to the laws, they
will be doing something that resembles what happens under the ideal constitution, and so
'imitating' it 'so far as they can'. A particular advantage of this interpretation is that 'good imitation'
will precisely coincide with what was described in 300 b 8-c 2 as the 'second-best', i.e. simply
keeping to the existing laws (apparently, whatever they may be: there is no justification for
smuggling in lo 300 b 8-c 2 itself the proviso that the laws in question must be at least passably
close to the ideal). On the traditional interpretation, not only will the two things be different, but
the 'good imitation' - if it is exceptionally good, i.e. if it gets close to the real thing - would
frequently turn out to be better than the 'second-best', while still being inferior to the besL (In 301
a 2, with αυτοί?, masculine, E.S. suddenly prefers lo talk about the citizens or rulers under the
constitutions in question, rather than the constitutions themselves, which are the main logical
subject of the sentence.)
301 a 4 'What you say is absolutely right': S. gives enthusiastic assent, being still at heart a
'constitutionalist': cf. Gill in RS. There is , then, after all, a clear ease for 'rule according lo the
laws', however much scorn E.S. may have poured on it in the course of his argument - and
especially in view of the fact, even on E.S.'s account, that the ideal king will be an extremely rare
phenomenon.
a 5-7 'in that case, when the rich imitate it, then we shall call such a constitution an "aristocracy"
that is, we shall call rule by the (relatively) few wealthy 'rule by the best (aristoi)\ because it
is at least better than the alternative (rule according to the whim of those in office). The verb
(καλούpev) could in principle be either future or present; but it must be right to take it as future,
since we arc dealing with what follows from the argument ('in that ease', <?pa), and what we
actually do - if indeed aristocracies and oligarchies were generally classified on the basis in
question, which seems doubtful - is irrelevant to that.
b1 'so imitating given that it has been implied that 'imitating the true constitution well' is simply
a matter of ruling according to laws (sec n. on 300 e l l - 301 a 3), it seems justifiable to interpret
the participle μιμου'μοΌ? in this way, i.e. as describing 'ruling according to laws', rather than as
introducing imitation as a separate point. It will not then strictly be true to say that this law-
abiding monarch imitates the knowledgeable statesman; the latter precisely does not 'rule
according to laws'. Rather it is the relevant constitution which imitates the ideal constitution (in so
far as both involve keeping to the laws, under similar circumstances); and this was how the point
was actually put in the first place, for all three constitution-types (300 e l l - 301 a 3). The
emendation of αύθι? to αύ τι? in a 9 (Badham), also adopted by Robinson, is probably
unnecessary: for αύθι? = αύ, 'in tum', see 309 c 3.
b2 'on the basfar of opinion': in the straightforward sense that what he docs, or rather the laws on
which he bases his rule, will be determined by what he, or whoever framed the laws, happened to
think. Opinion', δόξα, is regularly opposed lo knowledge in Plato's dialogues; for a central case,
see Republic 476 d ff. (Written out in full, b 2-3 τοv μίτ’ έηιστημη? κτλ. would be τον per’
έπιστημπ? μοναρχούντα fj τον μςτά δόξη?καιά νόμου? μοναρχοΟντα.)
b4 'Possibly we shall': Y.S.'s answer here, which need not express doubt (cf. 294 c 9), in this ease
probably docs; see b 8 'll seems so, at any rale', which clearly falls short of whole-hearted assent.
As to a possible reason for his being sceptical, cf. n. on a 4: if he is still hankering after
 COMMENTARY 301 b-c 233
’constitutionalism', then he might wdl have lingering objections to a classification of constitutions
which is based ultimately on the idea that law is in one sense dispensable.
b 7-8 'and as a result of this Use five names of what are now called constitutions have become only
one': Difcs thinks that this idea fits badly in the context, and proposes to read a βη τά πάντα
όνόμαια τ ώ ν νϋν Xcyopivwv π ο λ ι τ α ώ ν t k v t c μ ό ν ο ν ycyovcv. This would give something like
because of this all the names for the constitutions presently being distinguished have become only
five'. Robinson accepts this text (with a variation suggested by Mazon, which does not change the
sense), and suggests transposing the whole of δ ι ά ... ycyovcv to a position after δ η μ ο κ ρ α τ ί α m c 7,
where - with the changes proposed - it fils at least as well as it does in its present location. In fact,
however, there seems no need for any change at all, if we take into account ILS.’s radical dakn at
293 c 5-7 that the ideal constitution was ’alone a constitution* - a claim which is surely recalled in
any case by the expression 'what are now called constitutions': if it is a kingship, and it is the only
constitution, then (E.S. concludes, perhaps gently teasing Y^. in the light of bis expressed
scepticism) only one of the five names of constitutions currently recognized will remain. Cf.
Campbell.
c 1-2 'but pretends to act like the person with expert knowledge, saying t h a t t h e Greek has
something more like'... but pretends, like the person with expert knowledge, that after all one must
do what is best (emphatic ye) contrary to what has been wntlen down' (but of course for the ideal
ruler this is a true, not a pretended, explanation).
c 2-3 'some desire or other': the immediate reference will be to 300 a 6-7, but it is difficult not to thmk
of the description of the tyrant in the Republic , prey to a single, consuming master-lust {Republic
572eff.). Inis imitation': cf. n. on 300 e 2.
c 6 - d 4 Then k is In this way that the tyrant has come about, we say, *We say* (c 6): that is, our
discussion has shown why people are content with existing sorts of constitution, instead of opting
for the best - because they think that any single ruler will behave like the tyrant, and like the
experts imagined in 298 a 2 - b 7 (directly recalled in '... mutilates, kills and generally maltreats
whichever of us he wishes'). 'But they think that' is necessarily supplied in d 2: its. clearly
switches there from describing what people do not believe to what they do believe (the Greek gives
no subject for the infinitives in the clause represented by 'that... mutilates but the reference to
298 a-b dearly justifies 'such a person*).
d 4-6 'although if there were to come to be someone J : this clause, which is in the accusative and
infinitive construction, seems at first sight as if it ought to form part of what people generally (c 7-
8) say or believe; but while they might concede that 'someone such as you describe [i.c. someone
knowledgeable and actually incorruptible] would be prized', they surely would not concede that
only a city run by him would have a proper constitution (and be truly happy). It is perhaps more
plausible to suppose that the clause informally continues what 'we say ' (c 6). The statement may
perhaps look surprisingly optimistic, especially given the references to Socrates' demise fihe only
true statesman' of the G orgias) at the hands of a popular court. But if the ideal king not only
existed, but actually held power, then people would be different, having been brought up under a
different kind of regime.
d 8-e 2 'But as things are ... one individual Immediately superior in body and mind': there are
perhaps three points of contrast with the king-bee, at least the second and third of which are dearly
implied in the preceding conversation (cf. c 6 as we say*); namely, first, that if kings' do exist in
cities, they are not immediately recognizable, as king-bees arc; second, that in any case they do not
come about, one in every city, regularly, as a matter of course; and third, that they are not born as
kings (though evidently they would have to have the right natural capacity, they arc not kings
'immediately' - they have a difficult expertise to acquire: cf. the characterization of ttchnai at 2/4
c 6 as accompanied by 'an indispensable requirement for leaching and education'; and also the long
course of training of the philosopher-kings in the Republic). But all of this is consistent with the
possibility that such people are actually available, even if not in power. The Laws appears more
pessimistic: see 713 c - /14 a, 875 a-d (and Aristotle, Politics 1332 b 16 Cf.). The idea of a human
leader arising naturally like a king-bee' is imagined as realized in the person of Cyrus at
Xenophon, Education c f Cyrus V.1J24. (The preponderant Greek view seems to have been that the
leader* of the hive was male: sec Skemp ad loc.)
e 3-4 'chasing after the traces of the truest constitution': i.e. by 'writing laws’, which seems to be
shorthand for having them and sticking to them (since it is evidently law-abiding' constitutions
which arc being referred to, and that is what they do). They could scarcely be said to 'chase after
the traces of the truest constitution' deliberately (cf. n. on 300 e 2), if they are unable even to put up
with the idea of it (c 7-8); they simply do something which is, as a matter of fact, descnbable in
that way, or as an 'imitation for the beller' of the best (cf. 300 e 11 - 301 a 3). E.S. has now
completed his promised explanation of why people thmk the ’second-best’constitutional alternative
in fact to be the best: see 297 c 4-5 with note. For criticisms of c 6 - e 4 as a whole, see Vlastos
(1981) 214 n.23. Vlastos says of the passage that it is 'carelessly written ..., one of Plato’s worst’.
234 COMMENTARY 301 c - 302 d
because he talks (a) 'as though he meant the absurdity that mistrust of his (Plato's) ideal ruler
accounted for the origins of existing states, all of them, including tyra n n y\\ and (b) 'as though
legislation by assemblies were the only present-day alternative to ideal monarchy, which is
surprising, to say the least'. But one might reply to (a) by saying that Plato has merely described
the origins of a situation in which tyranny, among other things, can arise; and to (b) by pointing out
that for Plato/E.S. there is only one alternative to ideal (knowledgeable) legislation, which is
legislation by the ignorant, and this might as well be illustrated by the example of legislative
assemblies. (The general context of Vlastos's criticisms is a rebuttal of the suggestion - originally
made by Gould - that the passage displays Platonic 'pessimism'. But see n. on 301 d 4-6 above.)
e6 'D o we w onder, then, S o c r a t e s the reason whv they should not be surprised is already clear
(βήτα), but is restated in 301 c 8 - 302 a 2 (*whcn a foundation of this kind underlies them ...'); E.S.
passes over Y.S.'s 'possibly'.
301 e 8 - 302 a 2 'when a foundation of this kind underlies them , one of carrying o u t ...': the Greek here
is difficult; more literally, 'when a foundation ..., the one which carries out the functions [sc.
attaching to them], using which ...' (for κατάδηλο?, sc. έστί, ώ? ..., cf. δήλο? ί\μί + participle, 'it
is clear that I am*). The text printed differs in only one respect from that in the MSS, namely the
insertion of η in 302 a 1; this, or something like it, is taken by all editors to be necessary to the
sense. Robinson, along with other editors, favours other changes too: following others, he inserts
τέχνη after προσχρωμένη (1 have assumed, with Campbell, that this can be supplied from 'the
preceding argument^, and proposes to follow Campbell's suggestion of ύπ 'αυτή for ταυτη (he
also places a question mane after πρα'ζα? in 302 a 1). It looks as if current constitutions are
admitted to be using some expertise f... which if used by another expertise ...*)\ί hut if they operate
'without knowledge, it must be a fairly debased kind - compare the slave's expertise at Laws 720 b
(n. on 300 b 1-6 above).
302 a 5 · b 2 'yet m any from tim e to tim e sink like ships ...': as before, it is the lawless' sorts of
constitution, to which E.S. gradually turns in the course of this sentence fthrough the depravity of
their steersmen and sailors': compare the behaviour of the sailors on the ship in the more belter-
known nautical image at Republic 488 a - 489 a), that arc the object of his most extreme criticisms;
yet the 'law-abiding' ones, dealt with in 301 e 6ff., arc themselves treated with considerable
harshness. Even they receive no clean bill of health, since they too arc said - as they have
consistently been said before - to be founded on ignorance; even their laws arc and were framed by
people without knowledge. The most that will be conceded (302 b 4ff.) is that some of the
constitutions that currently exist are 'easier to live with' than others. On the important implications
of this whole position for the understanding of the 'development' of Plato's political thought, see
Introduction. What it is for a city to be 'overturned', or to 'sink', is presumably for it to meet with
some large-scale disaster: Arends, (1994) 191, identifies this with loss of independence to an
external power, but there seems no good reason for excluding the trauma of internal political
revolution (cf. Steiner [1994] 135). For 'the greatest things', cf. 285 d 8 - 286 b 1, with notes,
especially on 285 c 3-4.
b 3 'V ery tru e ': Y.S. can agree unreservedly with at least the last part of what E.S. has just said,
about the lawless' constitutions.
b8 'fo r the sake of this sort o f thing': i.e. living a tolerable life? In this sense, subjects like the one
now proposed arc always relevant χα'ριν + genitive is identical in meaning to cvcKa + genitive;
here, as occasionally elsewhere, c vckq and χα'ριν appear, plconastically, together.
c 5-6 '...at the beginning of the discussion with which we have now been deluged': i.e. at 291 d ff.;
E.S. seems to admit that the discussion of existing constitutions and politicians has taken on an
impetus of its own. 'Sorts of ('sorts of constitution') is not in the Greek, here or in c 1; but
expressions like 'rule by one person’ ('monarchy') or *by few’ do not by themselves strictly
designate constitutions, only broader categories of constitutions - see e.g. 291 d 6 (σχήμα
ττολιταας·, of rule by the many). The syntax is disturbed, but the translation should indicate its
general structure.
c 10 'How so?' How are we to divide them and make six? The sequel confirms that his question relates
primarily to the division of rule by many; the divisions of monarchy and rule by few arc by now
clear enough.
d 1-5 |O ut of monarchy ...' There are at least two awkward items in this sentence, though as a whole it
is unlikely to have sounded quite as awkward as it docs in the utilitarian translation offered: (i) the
shorthand expressions 'out ol the not many' ( ck ... τών μή πολλών) and 'out of the many' ( ck ... των
πολλώ ν) for 'out of (the rule of) the few' and 'out of (the rule of) the many'; and (ii) the syntax of
the last part, where the formula 'out o f ...' now scarcely seems to fit at all (but the meaning is clean
'whereas in the ease of the rule of the many, we previously made no division, calling it by a single
name, but now we must treat this as double too*). But such repetition or 'anaphora' in itself is very
much at home in Greek; and a similar consideration helps to account for the three times repeated
'and/bul in tum' (6' αυ).
 COMMENTARY 302 d - 303 b 235
d 7 · c I 'even if now Us name Is double': for fan 8tnXoGv, Apch read μή βιπλοΰν, while Robinson
proposes fan (or 6ή)άιιλο0ν, both presumably on the grounds that 'even if ...' introduces a
difference between this case and that of the others, and that this difference is exactly that it has a
single name. However, paradoxically this point seems capable of being expressed as much by
'double' as by 'single': one name covering two things is both single, and, in another sense, double
(importantly, 'single', άπλοΟ;, is not applied to the name in d 3-5, but to democracy itself: 'we
called democracy single', though in fact this was a matter of giving it a single name),
e 4-8 'Well, at the time when _': to put it in another way, when our attention was directed towards the
ideal constitution, we had no need to apply the distinction in question (nor did they, in fact, apply it
on their own account at all: see 291 e Iff., with note on 291 e 3), because the criterion 'with or
without laws' was - as we showed - actually irrelevant to the ideal; but now that we are
considering other types of constitution in themselves, as a necessary part of the world as it actually
is (we have to live with them, for the reasons explained), we must apply it, because, when
combined with the categories of one, few and many, it is what gives us a proper and complete
classification. So now we do have six, as promised in c 8-9 (or seven, with the ideal constitution):
kingship of the law-abiding type, tyranny, aristocracy, oligarchy, and the two types of democracy.
The other two distinctions which appeared in the original classification at 291 d ff., attributed to
people generally, Le. rich/poor and with/without consent - the second of which E.S. himself used
at 2/6 d-e to distinguish kingship from tyranny - seem now by implication to be dispensed with, at
least as separate criteria. But given the account of the origin of the lawless* constitutions, from
desire and/or favouritism or factionalism (see 300 a 3-9, with 301 c 2-3), there may still be a
subsidiary role for them. 276 d-e itself may perhaps serve chiefly as a signpost pointing generally
to later developments, i.e. the separation of the true king from existing politicians as a «hole: cf.
n. on 276 e l l
c9 'It seems so, given what has now been said': i.e. I agree that we need to divide democracy too in
this way, having heard your explanation?
303 a 1 'Possibly': this looks the right answer here, since so far at least E.S. has given no grounds for his
assertion. E.S. seems to respond immediately, substituting a lets suppose .J (a 3) for direct
assertion. 'Good written rules [lit. 'writings', γρα'μμαια], which we call laws' (302 e 10-11) can hi
principle be taken in either of two ways: as saying (i) that good written rules are what we call
laws; or (ii) that written rules arc what we call laws (but these must be good, if monarchy is to be
best of the six). But (i) seems to be ruled out, because it has nowhere been said that laws have to
be good to count as laws (and although such a position might in general look thoroughly Platonic,
it would mean that the 'second-best' option would cease to be viable, in that it must involve at least
some less than ideal laws). E.S. is rattier recognizing that a monarchy, or indeed either of the ocher
two general types of rule, might be law-abiding', but have appalling laws, which indeed the earlier
parody of non-idcal law-making (298 a ff.) suggests is a real possibility; and in this case it might
well be worse than another form which happened to have better laws, despite what is about to be
suggested about the general advantage ol having a single person in control. (Compare the
Skcmp/Oslwald translation, which seems to imply the same point: The rule of one man, if it has
been kept within bounds by the written rules we call laws...'.)
a 3-6 'while that of the mass M.we may suppose to be weak In all respects the reason, then, why
monarchy is both best (of the six) and worst (302 c 1-2, with 302 e 10-12) is that in it power is
most concentrated; the king's oversight of good laws will render them particularly effective, while
the tyrant will have absolute licence to do what is bad and harmful, for a different view of the
criterion operating here, based on the interpretation of ’good imitation' in terms of the possession of
good laws, see GUI, RS 301.
a 7 · b 4 'if all the types .Mare law-abiding, It turns out to be the worst but if all are contrary to
law, the best if so, we seem to have two general types of constitution which are both hardest
and easiest to live with, instead of one, ms suggested at 302 c 1-2 - the rule of one person (302 e
10-12), and now the rule of many, since in so far as it has the least capacity for evil, it wUl from
this point of view be easiest to live with, and in so far as it has the least capacity for good, it will be
hardest (life in it is least liveable', lit. 'one must live in it least', and apparently by the same
criterion according to which good monarchy is easiest to live in/wiih). Since the point is slated
separately, and in terms which most clearly recall 302 c 1-2, for monarchy, it is probably monarchy
that ES. had in mind there; but the least we can say is that the original idea becomes somewhat
lost. 'If all arc uncontroUed': the term here, ακόλαστό;, is generally used of the uncontrolled
pursuit of pleasure, which recalls the connection of the lawless’constitutions with 'desire* (301 c 2-
3.300*5-6).
b7 This seems both to follow, and to be, as you say': 'follow', i.e. from what has been said f as you
say', ουτω, goes with both infinitives), for the translation, cf. Dies, though Skcmp, for one, seems
to discover no great difference between the two verbs (συμβαίιχιν and γίγιχσθαι) in this context;
if right, it implies agreement from Y.S. that goes one step further than in 302 e 8.
236 COMMENTARY 303 b-c
b 9 · c 5 'w e m ust also rem ove those who p artic ip a te In all these constitutions ’remove', in the
original sense of dividing off (contrast the 'separating out' of the seventh, όκκρίναν, in b 5). E.S.
now feels that his original claim, that existing politicians arc magicians and sophists (sec 291 c 3-4,
with note), is sufficiently established, and returns to the business of division. Experts in
faction* (στασιαστικούς·): the monarchic, or oligarchic, or democratic, guardians of 'good laws'
(302 c 10-11) seem immediately to have been forgotten, and we go back to the earlier and harsher
treatment of existing politicians as a group - they arc all, E.§. suggests, partisan, leaders of
factions, a description which actually seems to fit oligarchs and democrats better than the rest.
Insubstantial images' translates the single word ιΚδωλα Cphantoms', e.g. in Homer, as a synonym
of phantasmata in Republic 598 b), which clearly refers to the different types of constitutions that
have been declared to be such only in name. fAnd we must say that as presiding ...' [c 2-3]: the
Greek slips from αφαιρετέο v to simple accusative and infinitive, as if λεκτέον had intervened.)
c 6-7 'only too correctly tu rn ed round against the eo-called experts in statesm anship': for hostility
from politicians towards sophists, see especially Protagoras 316 c ff., with M eno 91 c - 92 c; cf.
also Apology 19 e - 20 c, Gorgias 519 e - 520 b.
c 8 · d 2 'So: this is our play yet another difficult sentence, and there is some doubt about the text.
Only part of the MS tradition has 6c (6 ’) in d 1, and Robinson proposes to delete it, with a comma
after τέχνης- (as well as changing Σα τυρικόν τι να θίασον into the nominative). However the same
son of sense seems more easily got with the 6c (although that is not in itself a clinching argument),
and the accusative looks defensible - see translation. The μέν in c 8 is answered by the 6c in d 4
rather than the disputed one in d 1; E.S. is closing off one section of the discussion in order to
open another. άτεχνώ? ... ώσπερ: 'just like'. 'Our play .... satyrs': i.e. like a satyr play, in which
our satyr-politicians (cf. 291 b 2, with n. on [291]) have played the leading role; the satyr-play
traditionally followed the products οΐ the serious Muse of tragedy.
d 4-6 'th e re is som ething ?ise rem aining which is still m ore difficult than this ...': it is perhaps the
relationship of this new class (class' is again γένο?), or group of classes, to kingship/slalcsmanship
which is hardest to understand' about them; at any rate this is what it takes E.S. longest to explain.
The new items turn out to be further types of 'subordinate' art (υπηρετική*: cf. 304 c 1, 305 a 8, c
7), the nature of which one might think had already been sufficiently explained. However two at
least of the types in question - rhetoric or oratory, generalship, and the art of the judge^juror -
would normally be regarded as anything but 'subordinate': 'orators' (cf. n. on 304 a 1-2) would
owe obedience to no one, and generals in practice could be extremely powerful figures (cf. n. on
305 a 8-9). See especially Accattino, RS 207-8, who points out, following Hansen, that in other
literature of the time the standard expression for 'politicians' is not politikoi - 'statesmen', or Plato's
experts in the art of statesmanship' - but actually 'orators and generals' (ρη'τορε? καί στρατηγοί).
See Introduction. What E.S. has to do is to demonstrate that this is a case of the usurpation of
functions by those not aualified to exercize them, by specialists of a different sort (or people who
in an ideal world would be specialists), who ought properly to subserve, and to be controlled by,
the statesmanship; if so they can safely be divided off from him, as were experts in other
subordinate arts. (Without the tc after όμοΟ, which is omitted in one of the main MSS, the sense
would be simply both more akin ... and harder to understand', with όμοΟ acting to reinforce the
both ... and'. But there seems more point to the text as translated, in which the emphasis falls on
the kinship/closcncss of the new class to kingship. On ... tc ... tc ... in Plato, see Denniston 503-4:
used 'very rarely to join single words'.)
e 2 'adam at*: 'adamant' is proverbial for its hardness and durability; in Theophrastus, it is diamond,
but at Tim aeus 59 b it is dark-coloured. One suggestion is haematite (sec Skcmp ad loc.). It
certainly ought not to be steel, which fils its description in Hesiod Cgrcy/whilc', theogony 161;
*pale', Shield o f Heracles 231), since it should be a natural substance - hence 'copper', not bronze',
lor χαλκό?; if, that is, Plato is referring to the realities of the refining process rather than merely
constructing an account to fit the comparison with statesmanship, with which the description
begins to merge in the following relative clause. However, for what it is worth, Y.S. vouches for
its accuracy (c 6). (The following relative a is not in our MSS, but is in any case indispensable to
the sense.)
e 3-5 'leaves the "unalloyed" gold that people talk about there for us to see for the same idea,
applied to the statesman, see 268 c 8-10. The adjective άκη'ρατο? frequently appears in the poets
in the sense of 'unalloyed', 'pure' (like καθαρό? in 268 c, and also ακέραιο? at 268 b 8), and
sometimes describing gold, as at PM G 1.54 (Aleman); cf. 592 (Simonides). 'Pure gold' is a
standard or model of purity - as it is in the present context. (There may also be more than a verbal
coincidence with Herodotus VII.lO.a.1 ιόν χρυσόν τον άκηρατον αυτόν ... έπ 'έωυτοΟ οιί
6ιαγινώσκομεν, 'we do not recognize unalloyed gold itself by itself, but only when we rub with
other gold (on the touchstone 1beside it'.) For a more explicit Platonic use of the same image, sec
Republic 434 c - 435 a, with Kalo, RS 172.)
 COMMENTARY 303 c - 304 d 237
e 7 'in th e sam e wav': κατά ... λόγον perhaps amounts to much the same as κατά ... τρόπον, with
λόγος substituted for τρόπο; in the light of Y S .'s Xcyoai: the 'way* in question is the one he says
people report.
e 7-9 'those things th a t a re different from the expert knowledge of statesm anship, and those th a t
a re alien and hostile to It': the second category fthose... hostile to it*) is presumably represented
by the so-called 'statesmen* who have just been disposed of; the other by everything else that has
been distinguished from (true) statesmanship. Things in this other category could in fact
themselves be described as 'related' to statesmanship, as well as 'different', in so far as all will be
co-members with it of some genus or other (which is why they had to be divided off from it); cf.
285 a-b. The presence of 'alien* and hostile' elements, in the case of statesmanship, is one feature
which makes it markedly different from that of weaving, which could be described as 'related' to
all the things from which the division separated it (280 a 7 - b 3). Existing politicians are hostile'
to statesmanship in the straightforward sense that they represent its diametrical opposite
(ignorance).
e 10 'th e a rt o f the ju d g e ': 'judges' in Athenian courts performed the roles of both judges and jurors in
modem courts, as no doubt they would under the 'conea' constitution. The difference is that in the
ideal case they would be qualified in *the art of judging', not laymen like the judges in the
democratic courts (and any other existing type of court).
304 a 1-2 'th a t p a r t o f rh e to ric w hich ia p a rtn e rsh ip w ith kingship persuades people ,J: if ideal
kingship is not aaually instantiated anywhere, nor any ideal 'art of judging', certainly no (ideal)
rhetoric of the kind described is so either. 'Orators', ^rjTopc;, is a term frequently used of speakers
in the assembly (see LSJ s.v.), who would come under the heading of those who have just been
dismissed as 'experts in faaion', and impostors; professional orators, on the other hand, and
teachers of oratory, would be a different though sometimes partly overlapping category. The latter
are regularly treated critically, sometimes with contempt, in Plato's dialogues: for an extended
example, see the attack on Gorgias and pupils of his in Gorgias. They are special targets for Plato
just because they combine an ability to persuade with an ignorance (according to Plato) of what
they ought to be persuading people about. The case for a knowledgeable rhetoric, which is entirely
consistent with criticism ol existing praailioners, is argued at length towards the end of the
Phaedrus (269 c ff.). The business (npa'£ci;) of cities’: the reference is to those 'actions' which
are to be overseen by the true statesman, according to the earliest divisions of PU.t and some of
which will be specified in the final section of the dialogue.
a 6-7 'm usic will help us reveal him ': more literally, 'we must try to reveal him through music' (i.e. by
using music as an example).
b 4 T ( βό; τά β *αύ: for the second δό (δ ’αύ) in b 4, see Denniston 173-5. The αυ appears to
anticipate its pair after c πίστη μην in the following line - and it is after all the contents of this
clause introduced by t o which arc being identified as (another) έπιστη'μην ... τινα (ιαύτην,
referring to τό ... τούτων κτλ., is attracted to the gender of έπιστημην).
b 7 'Y es, w e'll say that it is': this *kind of knowledge', in ordinary life, would presumably not be
separately identified or named; it is just that knowing whether or not something should be learned
is different from what is learned, and knowing how to leach iL (For a discussion, with Socrates, of
just such a subject, sec the Laches.) But in the ideal city, it will be the statesman himself who
oversees education (308 d-e).
b 10 'co n tro l': i.e. 'rule* (άρχαν); similarly in the following lines.
c 4 'th e one th a t decides': the τ ήν (sc. ... £πιστη'μην) is restored by editors, onthe model of c 7;
among the MSS, 'whether one must learn or not’ ( c l... μή) forms part of Y.S.'s last reply, but it
scarcely fits there.
d 1 'th ro u g h the telling o f stories, and not through teaching^: *not through teaching* separates
rhetoric from the kinds of expertise previously considered, which do involve teaching; for teaching
as a kind of persuasion, sec G orgias 453 d ff. What rhetoric conveys is not knowledge (as
teaching docs) but rather opinions and attitudes (cf. Gorgias 454 e - 455 a, Theaetetus 201 a-b),
which in the case of the new model rhetoric (cf. n. on 304 a 1-2) will be in accordance with the
truth. The citizens of the ideal city of Pit. will evidently come to acquire some rational beliefs
through education (309 c-d), though self-evidently they will not be capable of full understanding
(which would make them all kings'). It is perhaps because of this that there will be a need for
rhetoric: sometimes there will be a need tor non-rational means of persuasion. Through the
telling of stories': we may think here of the 'noble Baton' which is to be fed to the citizens of the
Republic - even, apparently, the philosopher-kings themselves - about their origins (414 b ff.).
(Cf. also Books 1Ι-ΙΠ, where stones form an essential part of the education of children, and P it .
268 d-e, which similarly associates listening to storks with children. Euihydemus 290 a describes
rhetoric —or'speech-making'- as όχλων κηλησί; t c και π α ρ α μ υ θ ί α , a means of'charming and
assuring crowds of people'Xjurors, people in the assembly, etc.1: cf. n. on \Plt.\ 268 d 8, and the
possible connection between the cowherd's 'comforting/assuring', παραμυθασθαι, his charges and
238 COMMENTARY 304 d - 305 e
the telling of μΟΟοι, stories.) In the Laws there appears a middle course between teaching and the
telling of stories, which involves offering people at large persuasive arguments which nevertheless
fall short of full rigour (this in the prologues to individual laws: sec esp. 719 c ff.). But the sharp
distinction between rulers and ruled which we find in P it . is lacking in the Laws, where in default
of the ideal monarch (711c ff., 874 e - 875 d), the citizens rule themselves, on the basis of law; and
in any case the role of the orator in Pit. needs to be kept distinct from that of the educator (sec
above). The underlying theory seems to be worked out in detail in the Phaedrus , whose 'true
rhetoric' - based on philosophical knowledge - involves the speaker's adapting the form of what he
says to the ’souls' of his hearers, 'offering a complex soul complex snccchcs containing all the
modes, and simple [i.c. rational] speeches to a simple soul' (Phaedrus 577 c ; see Rowe [1986] ad
loc.). The orators of Pit., perhaps, will get their philosophy by proxy, working as they do under
instructions from the king. But we should also remember, in this context as a whole, that stories
fmyths^ play a regular part in Plato's own writing, along with arguments of all kinds,
d 4-5 'or indeed to do nothing at all': editors generally accept Hermann's supplement (ήσυχιαν),
which seems the best available; as it stands, without supplement, the text appears meaningless,
e 1 'but subordinate to it': which would, again, distinguish the new kind of rhetoric from the
existing model, whose practitioners arc (dangerously, according e.g. to the Gorgias ) autonomous,
e 10 'is able and knows how to': i.e. is able because it has the relevant knowledge (Campbell),
e 12 'Anyone who was following ...': or, if we supply ήμΐν (rather than an indefinite 'anyone', or
'people': cf. 305 c 9-10) with έηομό’οισιν, 'if we are being consistent...'; but for έπομαι in the
sense of 'follow', 'understand', sec 280 b 5. (αναγκαΐον lic p a v , sc. ύπολαβαν civai.)
305 a 8-9 'In that case we shall not set down the expert knowledge of generals as statesmanship': we
should bear in mind in this context the considerable power that generals at Athens could wield,
despite being dependent on annual election and scrutiny; notoriously, for a period in the fifth
century, Pericles virtually ruled the city as general. The 'art of generalship' is also subordinated to
statesmanship at Euihydemus 290 a-d (as also arc other 'arts', including that of 'speech-making':
291 c-d with 289 c - 290 a), but on different grounds - and Socrates subsequently reaches an
impasse in the conversation there over the description of statesmanship itself,
b4 'docs Us capacity extend ...?' The 'capacity' or 'power' (δυναμις/δυναμαι) of some expertise, in
this context, is a mailer of what it can do in virtue of the expertise which it is (cf. 304 e 10 with
note).
b 6-7 'judging by reference to these the things that have been prescribed as just and unjust': or,
just possibly, 'judging by reference to those things that have been prescribed as just and unjust'.
On both versions, it seems as if the judges will have to do some interpretation , but (a) the necessity
for such a role follows from the earlier description of law flaw could never accurately embrace
what is best and most just for all at the same time', 294 a 10 - b 2), together with the fact that even
the ideal king cannot be everywhere at once; (b) this is presumably what the 'art of judging' is for.
Like other kinds of 'arts of interpretation', it is evidently thought of as remaining strictly
subordinate, and as calling for no initiative on the judges' part (b 7 - c 3). But it would surely be
difficult to maintain this line, since if the judges genuinely add nothing of their own, this will
imply that the law was after all self-sufficient; cf. n. on 311 a 4 - b 5.
b 7 · c 3 'providing Us own Individual excellence by virtue of the fact that It would not be willing ...':
that is, the feature in question is the only thing that the judges will contribute indcpoidcnlly; for
problems with this idea, see preceding note. 'By virtue of the fact that...': lit. '(providing its own
['private', 'personal': ίδίανί excellence Ιάροήν]) of not being willing ...'; cOcXciv άν (c 2),
represents a potential idea (ούκ αν tOtXoijcv]). 'Or again' (’or again by any enmity or friendship'):
the 'again' is meant to represent άλλης, not 'other' but Resides',
c 10 · d 1 'what is really kingship must nut Itself perform practical tasks': cf. 258 d ff.
d 2-4 'because it knows ...': lit. knowing the beginning and selling in motion of the most important
things in cities in relation to its being the right time and its being the wrong time'. The immediate
reference will be to the sorts of decisions referred to in 304 d 3-5 and e 9-11 (whether to try
persuasion or force; whether to make war or peace), but 'the greatest things' will include rather
more than this (see c 2-6).
d4 and the others must do what has been prescribed for them': thus the art of kingship, under
the ideal constitution, will itself be law (cf. 297 a).
d8 'and In accordance with the Individual nature of the activities In question ...': i.e., roughly, the
names they have correctly imply that they arc restricted to their own subjects, to the exclusion of
their controlling anything else (including themselves), which would be an additional function?
e1 That seems so': lit. 'they seem to have’, sc. acquired, each of them, the name appropriate to their
function.
e 2-6 'Whereas the one that controls all of these ...': this sentence seems to announce the formal end
of our divisions, and our final discovery of the statesman. It may seem a fairly thin result for so
long a discussion, but it must be remembered that the definition itself, if properly stated, would
 COMMENTARY 305 c - 306 a 239
include a reference to each of the (successful) divisions (cf. e 9-10 'now that all the classes of
things in the city have become clear to U S'). Or in other words, statesmanship has been defined
primarily by establishing what it is not. *Every aspect of things in the city': συμπαντω* τά ν ...
might in principle be masculine ('everyone in the city*), but this seems unlikely in view of the
neuter n a v i a which follows. *Wiih the appellation that belongs to the whole': Le. πολίτικη, which
is, literally, '(art of) rulina the city'. The whole', ib κοινόν fthe common', 'what is common1), can
itself mean something like 'the state' (cf. e.g. Herodotus 1.67), but a contrast is clearly intended
with the individual concerns of the other arts which are emphasized in d 7-8. *Most appropriately'
('most justly*) itself refers to the previous divisions: more appropriately than anything else - and
especially, we might add, the impostors who presently wield power.
306 a 1 ’the intertwining which belongs to kingship': for the term συμπλοκή (’intertwining*), which
gives the genus to which the species of weaving belongs - and statesmanship too, in so far as it
resembles weaving cf. 281 a 3. The justification for the introduction of the idea of 'weaving
together* into the definition of statesmanship (if indeed it was a definition) at 305 e 2-6 is perhaps
just (a) that statesmanship has been shown to care for 'everything in the city', and (b) that this
comprises a highly complex set of things and functions. What follows is a rather more specific
application of the same idea - but in the most important area of all (cf. 305 d 3, 'the greatest
things'), that of the citizens as moral and political agents. See further n. on 311 a 1-2.
a 8-10 T o say that a part of virtue is la a certain sense different in kind from virtue it is hard to
be certain what precisely this sentence means (though as I shall suggest, its point may partly be not
to say anything very precise). Those expert in disputing statements' (or 'things said’, λόγοι),
according to the interpretation I have adopted, are people like the brothers Euthydemus and
Dionysodorus who appear in the Euthy demus: logic-choppers with a popular reputation for a
cleverness that is in fact purely verbal. What offers people ’an easy target' in this case is, as I take
it, a statement - a pci ης* μόρο? άροης* ciftci διάφορον coii - which could mean cither (i) 'a part
of virtue is different in kind from a (i.e. a part of) virtue', which is actually at least the initial point
E.S. is going to make (a 10 - b 4), or (ii) 'a part of virtue is different in kind from virtue', which
could then be taken to imply that it was not then itself a (part of) virtue at all - and which therefore
gives the 'disputatious* their chance. (What they typically like to do is to show someone
contradicting themselves; in fact they would be showing their inability to divide things properly,
like the 'sophisticated* people of 284 e - 285 b.) Dies and Skcmp both lake an altogether different
view: on their account, the passage is about the difference between the well-known Socralic view,
which also appears in other dialogues (e.g. Laches , Protagoras) that 'all virtue is [in some sense]
one', and what would apparently have been the ordinary and natural view (in a way represented by
Protagoras in the Protagoras: see 329 d ff.) that virtue represents a collection of distinct parti.
Both give a translation of a 8-10 closer to version (i) than to version (ii) (so also Campbell, Fowler,
Petit; Ostwald, in his revision of Skemp, goes over to something like (ii], but still retains Skcmp's
overall interpretation); and they take the phrase I have translated as If we view things in relation to
what the majority of people ['the many*] think' (Le., as I suppose, ordinary unphdosophical people
will think it an easy object of attack, whereas in facl it is easily defensible) rather as '(lor the
disputatious) who appeal to commonly accepted ideas' (Skemp; similarly Dies). The gist of the
passage on this view, then, is that EJS. (or rather Plato) is noticing that he is about to say something
which is incomforlably close to what certain 'disputatious' peoplc^people generally think - though
Difes at least, in a note, suggests that the 'all virtue is one' doctrine will ultimately be salvaged.
However there are difficulties with this interpretation: 'that a part of virtue is in a certain sense
different from another* will not in any obvious sense be 'an easy urget' (cOcniOctov), i.e. easily
attacked by the people in question, if it is actually their view fbclle malicrc de dispute’, Dies); and
'the disputatious' is not an obvious way of referring to people like Protagoras. The phrase hi a
certain sense* will fit on either view: on the Skcmp/Difcs interpretation, it will itself, presumably,
contain a reference to 'virtue is one'; on my own interpolation it is what draws attention to die
ambiguity of the suicmcni in question, although it might also be taken simultaneously in the other
way.
A final point: the word translated as 'different (from)', διάφορος*, can also mean 'at odds (with)';
cf. Skcmp's 'one kind of goodness clashes with another kind of goodness' (where 'another kind of
goodness^ represents apcifc ίΐδ ο [= μόρο], this sense of διάφορος, unlike the other one,
normally being found with the dative). Since the main point that E.S. will ultimately inirothicc is
precisely that two virtues are ’hostile' to each other (b 9-10), it probably needs to be considered
whether it is this kind of idea specifically, rather than the mere difference between two virtues,
which is supposed to provide ammunition for the disputatious - which woukl amount to a third
type of interpretation. But it is undcar what kind of ammunition it would offer, and to whom. The
most that we can suppose is that the choice of word is influenced by what is to come, and also
perhaps that it adds nicely to the ambiguity of the context; meanwhile the point is just the
preliminary one, that there arc two virtues which arc distinct from one another, while still being
240 COMMENTARY 306 a-c
virtues, an idea which if expressed in the form 'virtue is different in kind from virtue' ([velsim .) can
easily be made to look self-contradictory. ('Virtue' is the traditional translation of άροη, which I
have preferred on this occasion - as against 'excellence' at 305 b 7 - mainly in order not to obscure
the connections, if any, with the a pci η is one’ doctrine, given that this is nearly always given as
'virtue is one'.)
bI 'for us': the force of this may be to contrast 'our' position with that of the others last mentioned
(Tor us, whatever they may suppose ...').
b3 'moderation': the word is σωφροσύνη, often translatable as 'self-control* (or 'temperance'), in
relation to physical pleasures, but in this context - as the sequel will show - referring more to a
general cvcn-tcmpcrcdncss and lack of excitability fkccping one’s head', 'good sense' arc close to
the root meaning of the word).
b5 'what the other Is part of: i.c 'virtue' (thus the silly and superficial point that the 'disputatious'
might seize on is immediately side-stepped; see n. on a 8-10).
b 9-10 That, in some sort of way, they are extremely hostile to each other thus the main point
that E.S. is making is not merely that the two virtues arc distinct from each other, but that, 'in some
sort of way', they are actually opposed to each other - which is certainly an 'astonishing' idea.
(Establishing that they arc different, but both virtues, is in fact just a preliminary to this revelation:
if they arc both virtues, however different, how could they be opposed? See b 12 - c 1.) But he
eventually explains himself: it is just that, in any city, and even one run in the 'correct' fashion,
there will be people with two different sorts of qualities which are dcscribablc, respectively, as
'courage' and 'moderation', and which arc therefore both admirable, but which nevertheless put
them at odds with one another. What is at issue is not the virtues in their full, knowledge-based
form, for after all we already know that the population at large cannot acquire the relevant
knowledge (cf. n. on 304 d 1, and 308 e 8 - 10 with note), but something closer to natural, i.e.
inborn, dispositions. That there is not more reference than there is - on the interpretation I have
proposed - to the 'virtue is one' idea in the context as a whole is perhaps surprising; but then it was
always a specialized, and in part deliberately paradoxical, idea, and here E.S. is more inclined to
depend on, or start from, what Y.S. will immediately accept (a 10 - b 4), and what people generally
say (b 12 - c 1, with note). For other discussion of the issues, see the essays by Mishima and
Bobonich in RS. 'Many things': lit. 'many of the things that are', i.c. that there are in the world;
E.S. is going to broaden out the ideas of 'courage' and 'moderation' in such a way that they can
refer to items other than people and actions. (With exOpav ... cxovtc - see apparatus - the sense
would be essentially the same, i.e.'... in a certain way they [?] admit of hostility and [?] an opposed
altitude [Campbell] ...': coiov cxovtc = cxctov.)
b 12 - c 1 'Nut ... the kind of thing we're used to saying; for ... all the parts of virtue are said ...:':
Skemp's view is that what is referred to here is not - as I have supposed - what people generally
think, but what was proposed in the R epublic , where the virtues and their possessors all work
peaceably together (the new position, he says, 'is equivalent to declaring eternal conflict between
the warrior and civilian classes'). But there arc several objections one might raise to this. First, it
might be said that it would assimilate E.S. too closely to Plato himself, when elsewhere his status
as a visitor to Athens (who can scarcely have heard the conversation of the Republic ) is carefully
maintained. True, E.S. docs sometimes introduce ideas which arc not prepared for in Pit. itself
(see n. on 309 c 1-2); and expressions like 'it is said' do not always refer to general opinion (cf. n.
on 309 a 4). Ilowcvcr the two groups to be described in Pit. hardly correspond to the 'warrior' and
'civilian' classes in the Republic , and in particular they have not been deliberately trained to acquire
the relevant virtues, as the soldiers and (probably) producers of the Republic have. In any case the
sentence is surely most naturally read as referring to general opinion, especially in the light of 'not
... the kind of thing we arc used to' (it would surely be a fairly obvious and normal thought that
good qualities, and good people, go together). Skemp himself is prevented from taking it in this
way, having taken a 10 as referring to popular belief that the virtues arc antagonistic towards each
other '[t]hcrc may also be a reference to popular views that certain characteristic virtues belong to
different nations or different cities, and that these distinctive qualities are necessarily antagonistic -
Attic wisdom and Spartan phlegm, for instance.' On the whole issue of the relationship between
this part of Pit. and the scheme of the Republic , see Bobonich, RS 325 ff.
c 3-5 '... whether this is unqualifiedly the case, or whether emphatically ...': that is, arc people right
- arc courage and moderation always 'in friendly agreement' (and they are, after all, 'related' as
parts of virtue); or are there eases where we find them ranged against each other in a significant
way? 'Some aspects' translates the neuter plural of 'some' (tVia). Either <cvia>, proposed by
Robinson, or <iiva> (Campbell), seems to be necessary for the sense. (Difcs pnnts £χοι\ a
correction in one of the MSS, for £ χα , and £στι τι instead of Campbell's ΐ ς τι for the MSS
έστι'[ιΊ, following Heindorf; but the Greek that results is probably less convincing than it is in the
other ease. There is no difference between the various editors about what is meant.)
 COMMENTARY 306 c - 307 d 241
c 7-8 'things wc call fine, but then po on to place then bito two danes Le. 'things which we
regard as excellent and yet classify as mutually opposed* (Skcmp). The unexpected introduction of
αυτά, referring to the same things as όσα, changes the construction by bringing in a new main
clause.
d1 'or in the movement of the voice': the reference to the voice seems connected with the fact that
όέύτη?, 'quickness', 'sharpness', can also refer to high pilch in sound (cf. e 4-5, and 307 a 9Ί0,
where the opposites are 'smooth' and 'deep'; see also e g. Protagoras 332 c>. from voices, we pass
to 'music* (μουσική', Le. as before, poetry, music, and dance - see n. on 288 c 1-3, and 307 a 10 - b
1). (Skemp refers to Timaeus 67 b, and to Pythagorcanism, for a theory which connects high pilch
specifically with speed.) 'Minds': 'souls', but see e 4, where we have 'quickness of thought*
(βιανόησι?).
'Images': as in the case of the politicians (303 c 2); and as insubstantial, in so far as they are not
what they pretend to be (cf. n. on 303 b 9 - c 5).
e3 'to the opposite kinds of case': the alternative text i v tetj νπενανιίαι; yevcocoiv, suggested by
Campbell, and adopted by Robinson, would give us something like h i the opposhe occurrences
("happenings', comings-to-be*)’; but this is if anything more obscure than the transmitted tcxL (307
a 1 gives us both alternatives together: kind [now «:ιδος· rather than γένος] of occurrence'.) What
E.S. actually does is to look together at two kinds of things (γένη) both of which we praise and yet
which are opposed to each other, and it looks possible to extract this from the text primed in the
light of what has preceded. T he opposite kinds of case', Le. the ones we identified before (cases
where we applaud opposite things), but as they appear in the general area which is now being
looked at, namely quickness, etc., and by implication their opposites. This seemed to begin as an
example, but ends by taking us back to courage and moderation. Or is ES. proposing that
everything 'fine' (c 7) is Somehow reducible to quickness and associated qualities, and its
opposites? If so, it sounds implausible. Cf.Dixsaul.fe5 263.
e 6-7 'by using a single appellation, that of "courage"': for an example in Pit., sec 262 a 5 with 263 d
3 (Dihs usefully lists examples in other dialogues of both this 'appellation* and the opposite ones in
his notes to306c 10-d 4 and 307 a 7-b 2).
e 9-10 '_ "quick and courageous" _ "fast and courageous" N. "vigorous”': once again, it is difficult
to convey the nuances of the Greek (particularly in relation to 'voice': cf. note on c 10 - d 1),
though Y-S.'s reactions may also suggest that ES. is to some extent going out on a limb. Bui there
is no doubt about where the argument as a whole is going, or how.
307 a 10 'music': the term μούσα here seems to be used as a variam of μουσική in 306 d 2 (similarly e.g.
the use of ανδρικόν for ανδρέΐον in 306 e 9-10; and see following note).
b2 'orderliness': variation again - κοσμιότ χ\ς for σωφροσύνη, 'moderateness' (but dearly the same
thing is meant). Not for the first time, a long sentence leads to disturbed syntax: the original In
that...', answering Y.S.'s How?', is forgotten, and a main clause is introduced (we apply ...*)·
(Stallbaum proposes to bracket ώς, and prints a stop after προσχρωμένην in b 1.)
c 2-7 'and it's pretty much a general rule that we find.- if we go looking for them': the grounds far
the 'general rule' stated (more literally: 'and pretty much for the roost part we find ...3 seem to be
simply that completely different sets of criteria operate in the two cases. There is one apparem
exception, in the case of 'cowardly', applied to things that arc too soft, etc.: since 'cowardly' is
presumably the opposite of 'courageous', this at first sight suggests that there might after all be
something in common between 'courageous' and 'moderate'. But in a way it helps to underline
E.S.’s point, because 'cowardly' in this case is applied, not because of a lack of 'courage', but by
reference to the criterion of timely' moderateness - what is required is not 'courage', but proper
'moderationHowever, the qualification (pretty much ...') perhaps warns us against pressing the
idea of perpetual 'dissent' between the two sets of qualities too hard, and there is a clear sense in
which we could still treat them as different parts of the same range. We should also remember 306
b 12 - c 5, the effect of which is to say that so far as people are concerned (presumably included
under the heading of 'souIs'/minds in the present contexiX war between 'courage' and 'moderation'
is by no means a general rule. 'As if they were types of thing (ιδέας) which had a waning stance
allotted to them* (c 3-4): cf. 306 b 9-10. (In the last part of the sentence, ooic ... tc —is a normal
sequence.)
d3 'as belonging to their own kin': the expression ως oUcia o<Hiepa is defended by SuHbaum by
reference e.g. to Demosthenes, Against C ollides 9 and 13 fthc land is ήμέκρον ίδιον'); the
parallel seems good enough to make Stephanus' οίκαα <kai> σφέτepa unnecessary.
d5 'Very likely': Y.S.'s κινδυνιύουσιν here - and κινδυν€υ€τον at 308 b 9 - look more like 294 c 9
than the 'possibly' of e.g. 301 a 8, b 4.
d 7-8 'of these sorts of people': the Greek has simply 'of these sorts' (if *ΐδη docs indeed mean sorts,
kinds of (thing)' - a role in which (Χδος has often enough appeared before); but it is clearly types
of people that we are talking about
242 COMMENTARY 308 a - 309 a
308 a 3 'What you describe is ... painful and terrifying the strength of Y.S.'s response is noticeable;
and for E.S., too, the achievement of political ends evidently has as one of its condition^the
absence of external domination - though that will be entirely consistent with his general position,
in so far as the domination of the city by a foreign power would be likely to prevent the
implementation of its own agenda for the good life.
b1 This too Is true.' The descriptions of both types give the appearance of being drawn from real
life; and in a Greek city, where war with neighbours or competitors, or invaders, was always a
possibility, it would be surprising not to find opposition between more warlike and aggressive and
quieter and more pacific factions. This is in fact a recurring theme of literature in the fifth and
fourth centuries (see csp. Dixsaut in RS, 260-1). The inclusion in Plato's tripartite psychology, in
the Republic and elsewhere, of a separate 'spirited' part which is responsible among other things for
our competitive impulses, itself indicates his recognition of the importance - and incradicability -
of this aspect of (?malc) humanity. Rut the present context is particularly significant for Plato's
political thought, in that it recognizes the fact, largely obscured in the utopian construction of the
R e p u b lic , that an important part of the business of governing stales is the settlement and
negotiation of the competing desires and interests of the population (see Skemp [1980], and Lane
in RS).
b 2-3 'these kinds of people': 'of people' is supplied, and it might be that 'these kinds' (ye νη) rather
refers to the general categories of the 'courageous' and the 'moderate' with which we began
(including high voices, restrained pictures, etc.).
b6 'what we were originally looking Into': see 306 b 9-10; E.S. proposed looking into it' at 306 c 3-
5. The second part of the claim, 'and moreover...', was only made explicit at 307 c 5-7, but would
be implicit in the first part in any ease.
c2 'even of the lowliest kind': lit. 'even if (it is) the lowliest (thing) - κδν cl = καί c l, with &v fcfiv
= και αν) included, as often, even though it is inappropriate in this form of conditional idea (even
if it is’).
c 6-7 'some single kind of thing with a single capacity': lit (?) 'some one capacity (δυναμις) and kind
of thing (i6ca)’. If it is a single (kind of) thing, then it will have its own capacity, what it can do, in
virtue of what it now is, as opposed to those of the materials separately.
d 3-4 'very dearly it will first put them to the test': the term for 'put to the test' is βασανίζαν, which
was last used of the 'testing' (μοά βασα'νων) of gold in 303 c 2-5 (sec also 290 c, where it
appeared to refer to the examination under torture o f slaves - which can hardly be relevant here).
Lor the idea of 'testing in play’, here put with deliberate paradox, cf. Republic 413 d-c, with Laws
794 a, which talks about games which children 'naturally' play (αύτοφυα;), and others they invent
for themselves. The question is, presumably, whether the child has the right natural inclinations.
Evidently, in the best stale of /V/., all the children will be expected to be 'golden', not just the best
few, as in the Republic (but the 'gold' standard is lower: to meet it is not now to be a future king).
fVery clearly it will...’: ςυδηλον on is perhaps used parenthetically, on the model of δηλονότι.)
d 5 'serve it': i.c. the art of statesmanship, the 'directing art'. The verb is the same as the one
previously rendered as 'play a subordinate role' (ύπηρίταν); thus education too is one of the
subordinate' arts, like rhetoric, generalship and judging - and apparently also the most imporant of
them, if indeed the chief purpose of statesmanship is to 'make the citizens belter* (see esp. 293 d-
e, 297 a-b). No doubt it is introduced last, and separately, for this very reason.
e4 Ίο just this very way': the phrase ταυ τον ... τοΟτο must here be used adverbially, as the neuter
accusative forms of ουτο? on their own often are.
e 6-8 'anything ... the working out of which will not result ...': lit.'... anything working out which
someone will not [generic μη] complete some disposition [or 'character': ήθος) filling towards its
own mixing [i.c. that performed by the art of kingship]'.
e 8-10 'and those that are unable to share in a disposition that is courageous and moderate, and the
other things...': it seems likely that every citizen must possess some measure of both courage and
moderation (cf. 307 e 1-2, 'those who are especially orderly’; 308 a 4, 'those who incline more
towards courage'; 309 b 2-3, 'the ones who strain more towards courage'); if not, then καί in e 9
must be taken as linking alternatives, as frequently in earlier contexts (see e.g. 267 e 5 with note,
293 a 3, 298 a 6). The other things that lend towards virtue': 'tend towards' represents ταναν
προς*, which means any one of 'touch on’, 'come close to’, 'resemble' (‘T heaetetus 169 a-b), 'refer to',
or belong to' in the sense of belonging to a category. The 'things’ in question appear to be what
would normally be called the (other) 'parts' of virtue, but whatever else E.S. means by the phrase, it
seems to slop just short of this, which would have implied the impossible condition - which is in
any ease contradicted by the sequel - that every citizen must possess full courage and/or
moderation, together with the other virtues in their full form.
309 a 2-3 'it throws out...': i.e. as thc wcavcr throws away (308 c 4) any materials that arc unsuitable for his
weaving; cf. also 293 d. Similar harsh proposals arc also found in the Republic (410 a) and the
Laws (/35 b ff., with e.g. 854 c ff.). ’With inc most extreme forms of dishonour': the central word
 COMMENTARY 309 a-c 243
here, ότι μία (lit. lack of/loss of honour*), in an Athenian judicial context, tends to refer
specifically to loss of citizenship or citizen rights - which explains how this sort of punishment can
be treated as a variety of 'throwing out'.
a4 'At least It is put something like this': this answer, in the Greek, presents some problems. Y.S.
says λίγεται, which usually means Is said', i.e. by people generally: cf. n. on 306 b 12 - e I, and
for another, unambiguous, example, 303 c 6. But 'people generally' would surely not say the sort
of thing ES. has just said; or at any rate they would not talk about killing and exiling people in the
context of ideal kingship, in which they have no interest at all, as ES. has told us. However, Plato
has Protagoras describe democratic practice in similar terms (see n. on 293 d 4-5), and Socrates'
own ease is of course evidence that the democracy could in fact kill people for Impiety*
fgodlessncss'). The difference, perhaps, is just that the ideal king would systematically purge the
population of immoral elements. The only alternative is to translate 9is being put like this*, te. by
us, in our conversation; the reference would be to 293 d (and after aH, *it has been said* and Τι was
said* are regularly used to refer back to earlier statements; why not *il is being said?). In either
case, Y.S.’s evident reservations ('At least ...*) may reflect his scruples about accepting a policy of
social cleansing, consistently with his concerns about the abandonment of the principle of the
sovereignty of law - concerns which he first expressed in his response to E.S. at 293 e. If so, then
he shows traces of the popular attitudes described in 301 c 6ff.
a5 'great Ignorance': 'great' is clearly an important qualification; cf. n. on 308 e 8 -10.
a 8 - b 7 Then as fur the others and it does so In somethbig like the following way.' It is impossible
to retain the structure of this difficult sentence in (English, if any sense is to come out of it. There is
a change of construction in b 2, where instead of saying e.g. These he tries to bind together*,
E.S. decides to describe the two classes separately; the other complications are the insertion of a
participial clause with *il' (the art of kingship) as subject into the description of the first class, and
the delay of the main verb to the end of the sentence, with a reference forward to what is to come
next (These... - of these, the ones ...., thinking .-, and the ones .... it tries to bind together... in .~
the following way*). ’Who employ ... a thread': the 'natures’ of this second class momentarily
become weavers themselves, as it were, who produce them as a wooflike thread. Robinson
proposes to delete 6c in b 6, but since - on the interpretation adopted - both classes have already
had a participial clause attached to their descriptions, the particle may as well stand, linking the
new participial clause to them. 'Becoming composed* (b l£ for this absolute use of καθίστασθαι,
see LSJ s.v. καθίστημι B.4 (*stand or become quiet or calm9). It is not, I think. Slid that the people
being described - those who tend more to 'courage', and those who tend towards ’moderation' -
actually achieve nobility (which would be καθίστασΟαιεΙς), even with education. Thai becoming
composed' fits the 'courageous* slightly better than the 'moderate' hardly marten, since k is the
courageous with which ES. begins. On limits to the 'commingling' involved, sec Lane, RS 278-9.
c 1-2 'that part of their soul that is eternal': for the idea that only part of the soul is eternal, see
Tim aeus 69 c ff. (cf. also Republic 611 b - 612 a). Here, perhaps, ES. does for a moment step
outside his fictional context, adopting a specifically Platonic notion for which the conversation in
P it. itself has not prepared us (cf. n. on 306 b 12 - c 1). The relevant part is, of course, reason
itself.
c 2-3 'their mortal aspect': or, alternatively, the mortal part of their souls (supplying τη* ψυχής- and
μέρος- from the first part of the sentence); but U is actually their bodies which are primarily Titled
together' (through marriage).
c6 'and Is guaranteed': that is, by the king, who knows. Literally, the Greek has 'with confirmation',
which might imply mere security - i.c. that the citizens will retain their beliefs 'unshakably'. But
the verbal noun in question, and the verb itself, are regularly used of confirming the truth of
something; and the connection with knowledge and rationality which this provides is precisely
what seems to justify the connection with the divine (gods, according to Plato, being rational above
all else). For a more aporotic treatment of the issues, see Bobonkh, RS 322.
d2 'by means of the music which belongs to the art of kingship': for μούσα in the role of 'music'
(in the Greek sense), sec 307 a 10 with note. The reference is probably both to the means by which
the citizens will be educated (see n. on 288 c 9-10), and to the statesman's knowledge as a whole;
we may think of the identification of philosophy in the Phaedo (60 e - 61 a) as the true 'music*,
d7 'the names we are now Investigating': king* and 'statesman', entailing possession of the 'art of
kingship/statesmanship'.
e 2-3 'doeso't it rather slide away towards becoming like some kind of beast?' For this idea, we may
compare especially the image of the human soul at Republic 588 b ff.: if the influence of reason
becomes too weak, then h may be dragged off by one of the soul's other parts, either the lion (as
perhaps in the present case), or the many-headed beast of the lowest' desires,
e 6-7 'so far as wisdom goes in the context of life in a city': clearly, the point is to distinguish a
citizen's wisdom from that of the king (cf. e.g. 294 a 7-8X but k is not so obvious how to get this
meaning from the Greek, which seems to say something like 'so far as (goes), at least, ui a
244 COMMENTARY 309 c - 311 b
constitution'. The form of the phrase in the Greek is familiar enough (cf. LSJ s.v. w? Ab.11.2), but
why 'in a constitution’? Surely the king's own knowledge would exist in this same context -
whether he were an actual king, or only a person who possessed the relevant knowledge, without
being in power? The solution seems to be to take πολιτα'α in a different sense from the one it has
had up to now; and *thc existence of a citizen (πολίτη?)’, or ’being a citizen’, a meaning found in
the orators (see LSJ s.v. 1.3) fits well enough. (Difcs seems to take the same line: '... et sage, autant
du moins que 1c requiert la vie cn cit£'.)
c 10-11 'vicious men In relation to each other and good men In relation to the vicious': 'vicious', that
is, in the sense of being characterized by 'vice' instead of 'virtue' (*bad', as applied to people, seems
more or less to have gone out of fashion in English, unlike 'goodT It hardly seems worth even
considering these two cases, since Vicious' people would presumably be thoroughly resistant to
accepting the sort of opinions E.S. has in mind; but the main function of the sentence seems to be
rhetorical, preparing the way for the opposite case (n.b. c 10 rot? μέν κακοί?, answered by τοί? 6 ’
cuycvcoi in 310 a 1).
310 a 2-3 'and that it is fur them that this remedy exists, by means of expertise': pace Skemp, φαρμακον
must mean 'remedy' here, since what E.S. is talking about is exactly a 'cure' for a defect in nature,
namely that without the intervention of expert knowledge or 'art' people of 'noble' origin, i.e. bom
with the potentiality for good, will turn out badly. Bobonich, RS 321, points out the contrast
between tne use of the medical metaphor here and the cuttings and burnings of e.g. 293 b ff.; but
by now, of course, the knife has already done its work (308 d - 309 a). Through laws’ (a 2): the
education curriculum will itself be fixed by law', or written instructions from the statesman (cf.
308 d-e).
a 7-9 '... the remaining bonds ... are perhaps not difficult ...': more literally, 'for (someone) to
understand the remaining bonds ... and having understood them to effect them is ... not difficult';
i.c. the syntactical subject is the infinitive clause itself.
b 2 'sharing of children': i.e. between the two groups, for the purposes of marriage, rather than the
'community of children' proposed in the Republic (e.g. 457 d); though the latter might possibly
have the same effect of 'bonding' different types, it would of course be inconsistent with the
mention of 'private giving in marriage', i.e. of daughters.
b 10 - c 1 'those people who pay attention to family-types': if γένη here is taken simply in the sense of
'families' fthose who pay attention to γένη*), then E.S. would probably have brought back in again
the criteria he has just excluded, since the main reasons for being concerned about the family of
one's prospective son- or daughter-in-law would have to do precisely with wealth and influence.
On this basis, Robinson accepts Slallbaum's emendation of γένη to ήθη, though Stallbaum
proposed it on less convincing grounds. However, like Campbell, I sec no difficulty in taking the
word in the sense of 'types' or 'classes', a meaning it has had often enough before in PU.t and as it
will soon do again (d 2, 3). But since it also can mean 'families', it will have a certain extra
resonance in a context concerned with marriage, and there will still be a sense in which anyone
concerned with types in such a context will also be concerned to know what family someone
comes from, in so far as children often lake after parents. Dies has '... lc souci de la race ’; my
'family-types' (cf. 262 d) is a clumsy attempt to convey the ambiguity more directly.
d 8 'but in the end».': cf. 307 b 8-9. (The ic in d 6 seems to look forward to the introduction of the
corresponding ease with καί, but in the event this second case is brought in in a separate sentence:
d 10 -e 3.)
c 10 'dishonour': cf. 309 a 2-3 with note.
c 9 'the giving of pledges': apparently daughters; the word for 'giving' is that used for 'giving in
marriage' at b 3.
e 11 'a ... "fine-woven'' fabric ..., as the expression Is': 'fine-woven' (or 'fine-woven fabric') is
apparently a quotation from somewhere; in extant literature before Plato, the adjective appears
only in a fragment of Aeschylus (fr. 47 Nauck).
311 a 1-2 'always to entrust offices In dties to these In common': this clearly makes it look as if the whole
point of the 'mixing' process is in order to gel things right in those levels of government below the
king; and yet that seems too limited a role for the weaving' role of the king (see 305 c 3-4 not»τα
συνυφαίνουσαν) - unless, that is, essentially the whole citizen body is somehow to be involved in
the processes of government, as under the democracy, and also as in the stale of the Laws , and the
holding of office is itself central to the lives of the citizens. Sec also n. on c 3-4.
a 4 · b 5 'By choosing... For the dispositions of moderate people... are markedly cautious... And the
dispositions of the courageous, in their turn ...': It is legitimate to ask why the characters of the
subordinate office-holders matter so much, if they arc to be entirely controlled from above. But in
fact the list of qualities which will be desirable for holders of these officers - caution, justice,
conservatism, dnvc, and keenness - tends to suggest that rather more will be left to their initiative
than the earlier argument suggested. The answer may be that in reality the king' will, and can
only, retain a general oversight, and his subordinates will have to deal with much of the detail,
 COMMENTARY 311 b-c 245
especially in interpreting and applying the law (cf. n. on 305 b 6*7). The life of the citizen, then, if
citizens and 'officers' are largely overlapping categories (see preceding note), will not after all be a
simple matter of living according to written rules - and, in retrospect, that was always an
impossibility, given what was said about the nature of law itself. The king cannot always be there
to advise and prescribe; and if it is the case that he does not 'come to be m cities as a king-bee is
bom in a hive' (301 d 8 - e 1), not too much reliance should perhaps be pin on him in any case.
b7 ’with regular Intertwining': cf. 283 a 5.
b 9*c 1 'bringing their life together In agreement and friendship and making It common between
them': Robinson accepts Praechter's insertion of <J otc ctvei> after φιλί?. The sense is
complete, and the same, whether the words are included or not; the insertion forms part of an
explanation of the presence of the bracketed words in c 3 (as misplaced from b 9).
c 3-4 'and covering all the other inhabitants of cities': 'covering', Le. as with a garment - even though
this significantly alters the metaphor. This clause confirms what we might have guessed, that the
citizen-body will not be composed wholly of 'courageous* and 'moderate' people - who after all
only constitute a problem for the statesman in so far as the incline too fa r in one direction or the
other. What has been described is perhaps best thought of as an example - but a crucially
important one - of the proper activity of the statesman. Both slave and free': slaves, as before m
Pit., are regarded as a standard feature of a city.
c5 'so far as it belongs to a city to be happy': i.e. because of the limits to what even the expert
statesman can do with the material at his disposal (cf. 293 d 10 - e 1,297 b 3), especially, perhaps,
given the perpetual potentiality for conflict between the different types described; but this is, after
all, the age of Zeus, for which the prognostications, according to ES.’s great story, are not good
(273 a-d).
c 7-8 'Another most excellent portrait, Stranger the translation of this last sentence is adapted
from D&s; more literally, the Greek has 'Mosi excellently, again, you have finished off the kingly
man for us, Stranger, and the statesman(like man)'. 'Again/another... portrait* (for the image, cf.
257 a 4,268 c 7-8,276 c 9-10,277 a 5-6, and esp. 277 b 7 - c 3): just as the dialogue began with
a reference to the So p h ist , so it ends with one. But the final word, literally, belongs to tbe
statesman: ... κα\ τον πολιτικόν.
I have - after much hesitation - accepted the view of Robinson and others that this last
contribution is too broad and authoritative to be attributed to Y.S.; since it was the great man
himself, Y.S.'s namesake, who helped to set up the discussion in the first place, be seems an
obvious candidate. (Some editors, including Robinson, propose to invent a final response from
Y.S. before O.S.'s presumed intervention, i.c. Well said*, vel sim . .) For an opposing view, see e.g.
Dixsaut, RS 256, who calls Fricdlandcr and Robin hi aid.
Plato
STATESMAN, edited by CJ. Rowe

At the time of writing there exists no English translation of the Statesman (one of
Plato’s central works on politics, but also containing much else besides) which is both
accurate and usable; nor is there a modern commentary available to help the reader
through the argument, which is. in some parts, likely to be inaccessible without a guide.
This new edition fills both gaps, being aimed especially, like other volumes in the Aris
& Phillips series of texts, at students and other readers with little or no knowledge of
the original language. This dialogue is of interest to philosophers and students of
political theory as well as to classicists.

Christopher Rowe is Professor of Greek at the University of Bristol His publications

include a translation of and commentary on Plato's Phaedrus in this series and a
commentary on Halo's Phaedo (C.U.P.)

Other published and forthcoming texts of classical philosophy include:

ARISTOTLE On the Heavens (ed. Leggatt)

CICERO On Fate with Boethius Consolation o f Philosophy (ed. Sharpies)
On Friendship and The Dream of Scipio (ed. Powell)
On Stoic Good and Evil (ed. Wright)
PLATO Apology o f Socrates (ed. Stokes)
Me no (ed. Sharpies)
Phaedrus (ed. Rowe)
Republic V (ed. Halliwell)
Republic X (ed. Halliwell)
Symposium (ed. Rowe)

For further information on these books and others in the Classical Texts series, you are
cordially invited to write to the publishers:

Aris & Phillips Ltd, Teddington House, Warminster, Wiltshire BA12

8PQ, England