SECOND DIVISION
 
 
HEIRS OF SARAH MARIE G.R. No. 169711
PALMA BURGOS,
Petitioners, Present:
Carpio, J., Chairperson,
- versus - Brion,
Del Castillo,
Abad, and
Perez, JJ.
COURT OF APPEALS and
JOHNNY CO y YU, Promulgated:
Respondents.
February 8, 2010
x --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
 
DECISION
 
ABAD, J.:
 
This case is about the legal standing of the offended parties in a criminal case to
seek, in their personal capacities and without the Solicitor Generals intervention,
reversal of the trial courts order granting bail to the accused on the ground of
absence of strong evidence of guilt.
 
The Facts and the Case
On January 7, 1992 a number of assailants attacked the household of Sarah
Marie Palma Burgos while all were asleep, killing Sarah and her uncle Erasmo
Palma (Erasmo). Another uncle, Victor Palma (Victor), and a friend, Benigno
Oquendo (Oquendo), survived the attack. The theory of the police was that a land
transaction gone sour between Sarahs live-in partner, David So (David), and
respondent Johnny Co (Co) motivated the assault.
 
Four months after the incident, the police arrested Cresencio Aman (Aman)
and Romeo Martin (Martin) who executed confessions, allegedly admitting their
part in the attack. They pointed to two others who helped them, namely, Artemio
Pong Bergonia and Danilo Say, and to respondent Co who allegedly masterminded
the whole thing. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 51, tried the
case against Aman and Martin in Criminal Cases 92-104918-21. The three others
remained at large. After trial, the RTC acquitted them both.
 
After 10 years or on September 5, 2002 respondent Co surrendered to the
National Bureau of Investigation. The prosecution charged him with two counts of
murder for the deaths of Sarah[1] and Erasmo[2] and two counts of frustrated murder
committed against Oquendo[3] and Victor.[4] Upon arraignment, Co pleaded not
guilty to the charges.
 
On September 25, 2002 respondent Co filed a petition for admission to bail.
[5]
 After hearing or on April 14, 2004, the RTC[6] granted bail on the ground that the
evidence of guilt of respondent Co was not strong. The RTC summarized the
prosecutions evidence as follows:
 
1. Aman and Martins extrajudicial confessions that pointed to
Co as the one who hired them to kill David and his family.
 
2. Davids testimony as alleged witness to the killing of
Sarah. Aman supposedly told David later when they met that it was
Co who ordered the massacre.
 
3. Police officer Leopoldo Vasquez, assistant leader of the
police team that investigated the case, said that his team conducted
two operations to take Co into custody. The first was in a restaurant
where they waited for him. But Co got suspicious and when he saw
the police, he immediately left the restaurant, got into his car, and
sped away. The police also tried to arrest Co at his residence but the
police did not find him there. Co also offered to settle the case.
 
The RTC had a low estimate, however, of the above evidence. First, the
extrajudicial confessions of Aman and Martin, apart from having been irregularly
executed, merely proved their participation in the killing. Neither, however,
claimed conspiracy with respondent Co. Further, the prosecution did not present
Aman or Martin during the bail hearing, reportedly because Aman was already
dead and Martin could not be located. To admit their sworn statements in evidence
would deprive Co of his constitutional right to cross-examine them.
 
Second, Davids narrations were, to the RTC, contradictory, uncorroborated,
and self-serving, thus lacking in evidentiary weight.
 
Third, police officer Vasquezs story was likewise uncorroborated. Besides,
while flight is often indicative of guilt, it requires a clear showing of the identity of
the offender and his evasion of arrest. Here, said the RTC, the prosecution failed to
establish Cos identity as the assailant and his reason for fleeing from the police.
 
Fourth, the prosecution failed to prove that the offer of settlement came
from Co.
 
Petitioner heirs of Sarah moved for reconsideration[7] but the RTC, now
presided over by another judge,[8] denied the same in its Order of May 18, 2005.
[9]
 This prompted the victims heirs to file a special civil action of certiorari with
prayer for a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction[10] before the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP 90028.
 
The CA dismissed the petition,[11] however, for having been filed without involving
the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), in violation of jurisprudence[12] and the
law, specifically, Section 35, Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of the Administrative
Code which states that:
 
Sec. 35. Powers and Functions.The Office of the Solicitor General shall
represent the Government of the Philippines, its agencies and
instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation, proceedings,
investigation or matter requiring the services of lawyers. When authorized
by the President or head of the office concerned, it shall also represent
government-owned or controlled corporations. The Office of the Solicitor
General shall constitute the law office of the Government and, as such, shall
discharge duties requiring the services of lawyers. It shall have the following
specific powers and functions:
 
xxxx
 
 (1) Represent the Government in the Supreme Court and the Court of
Appeals in all criminal proceedings; represent the Government and
its officers in the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, and all other
courts or tribunals in all civil actions and special proceedings in which
the Government or any officer thereof in his official capacity is a
party.
 
Petitioner heirs of Sarah moved for reconsideration[13] but the CA denied it
for lack of merit in its Resolution of September 16, 2005,[14] hence, the heirs
recourse to this Court.
 
The Issue
 
The case raises one issue: whether or not the CA correctly dismissed the
special civil action of certiorari, which questioned the RTCs grant of bail to
respondent Co, for having been filed in the name of the offended parties and
without the OSGs intervention.
 
The Courts Ruling
Generally, a criminal case has two aspects, the civil and the criminal. The
civil aspect is borne of the principle that every person criminally liable is also
civilly liable.[15]
 
The civil action, in which the offended party is the plaintiff and the accused
is the defendant,[16] is deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the
offended party waives the civil action or reserves the right to institute it separately
or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.[17]
 
The law allows the merger of the criminal and the civil actions to avoid
multiplicity of suits.[18] Thus, when the state succeeds in prosecuting the offense,
the offended party benefits from such result and is able to collect the damages
awarded to him.
 
But, when the trial court acquits the accused[19] or dismisses the case[20] on
the ground of lack of evidence to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt, the civil action is not automatically extinguished since liability under such
an action can be determined based on mere preponderance of evidence. The
offended party may peel off from the terminated criminal action and appeal from
the implied dismissal of his claim for civil liability.[21]
 
The purpose of a criminal action, in its purest sense, is to determine the
penal liability of the accused for having outraged the state with his crime and, if he
be found guilty, to punish him for it. In this sense, the parties to the action are the
People of the Philippines and the accused.[22] The offended party is regarded
merely as a witness for the state.[23] Also in this wise, only the state, through its
appellate counsel, the OSG,[24] has the sole right and authority to institute
proceedings before the CA or the Supreme Court.[25]
 
As a general rule, the mandate or authority to represent the state lies only in
the OSG. Thus
 
It is patent that the intent of the lawmaker was to give the designated
official, the Solicitor General, in this case, the unequivocal mandate to
appear for the government in legal proceedings. Spread out in the laws
creating the office is the discernible intent which may be gathered from the
term shall x x x.
 
xxxx
 
The Court is firmly convinced that considering the spirit and the
letter of the law, there can be no other logical interpretation of Sec. 35 of the
Administrative Code than that it is, indeed, mandatory upon the OSG to
represent the Government of the Philippines, its agencies and
instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding,
investigation or matter requiring the services of a lawyer.[26]
 
For the above reason, actions essentially involving the interest of the state, if not
initiated by the Solicitor General, are, as a rule,[27] summarily dismissed.[28]
 
Here, the question of granting bail to the accused is but an aspect of the
criminal action, preventing him from eluding punishment in the event of
conviction. The grant of bail or its denial has no impact on the civil liability of the
accused that depends on conviction by final judgment. Here, respondent Co has
already been arraigned. Trial and judgment, with award for civil liability when
warranted, could proceed even in his absence.
 
 In Narciso v. Sta. Romana-Cruz,[29] this Court allowed the offended party to
challenge before it the trial courts order granting bail. But in that case, the trial
court gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in granting
bail without conducting any hearing at all. Thus, to disallow the appeal on the basis
of lack of intervention of the OSG would leave the private complainant without
any recourse to rectify the public injustice.[30] It is not the case here. The trial court
took time to hear the parade of witnesses that the prosecution presented before
reaching the conclusion that the evidence of guilt of respondent Co was not strong.
 
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS the Court
of Appeals Decision in CA-G.R. SP 90028 dated June 29, 2005 and its Resolution
dated September 16, 2005.
 
SO ORDERED.
 
 
ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice
 

 
WE CONCUR:
 
 
 
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
 
 
 
 
ARTURO D. BRION MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
Associate Justice Associate Justice
 
 
 
 
 JOSE P. PEREZ
Associate Justice
 
 
 
ATTESTATION
 
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
 
 
 
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division
 
CERTIFICATION
 
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division
Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Courts Division.
 
 
 
 
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

[1]
 Criminal Case 92-107853.
[2]
 Criminal Case 92-107854.
[3]
 Criminal Case 92-107855.
[4]
 Criminal Case 92-107856.
[5]
 CA rollo, pp. 39-41.
[6]
 Presided over by Judge Romulo A. Lopez.
[7]
 CA rollo, pp. 42-52.
[8]
 Judge Myra V. Garcia-Fernandez.
[9]
 CA rollo, pp. 36-38.
[10]
 Id. at 2-19.
[11]
 Rollo, pp. 23-26; penned by Associate Justice Amelita G. Tolentino and concurred in by Associate Justices
Roberto A. Barrios and Vicente S.E. Veloso.
[12]
 Cited case: Cooperative Development Authority v. Dolefil Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries Cooperative, Inc., 432
Phil. 290 (2002).
[13]
 Rollo, pp. 31-33.
[14]
 Id. at 28-29.
[15]
 REVISED PENAL CODE, Article 100.
[16]
 Hun Hyung Park v. Eung Won Choi, G.R. No. 165496, February 12, 2007, 515 SCRA 502, 512-513.
[17]
 RULES OF COURT, Rule 111, Sec. 1(a).
[18]
 Salazar v. People, 458 Phil. 504, 514 (2003); Hun Hyung Park v. Eung Won Choi, supra note 16, at 511.
[19]
 People v. Santiago, G.R. No. 80778, June 20, 1989, 174 SCRA 143, 151; Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company
v. Veridiano II, 412 Phil. 795 (2001).
[20]
 Perez v. Hagonoy Rural Bank, Inc., 384 Phil. 322 (2000).
[21]
 Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company v. Veridiano II, supra note 19.
[22]
 Hun Hyung Park v. Eung Won Choi, supra note 16, at 514.
[23]
 Id. at 511.
[24]
 ADMINISTRATIVE CODE OF 1987, Book IV, Title III, Chapter 12, Section 35 (1); Macasaet v. People, 492
Phil. 355, 375 (2005); Cario v. De Castro, G.R. No. 176084, April 30, 2008, 553 SCRA 688, 696; People v. Puig,
G.R. Nos. 173654-765, August 28, 2008, 563 SCRA 564, 575.
[25]
 Cario v. De Castro, supra note 24.
[26]
 Gonzales v. Chavez, G.R. No. 97351, February 4, 1992, 205 SCRA 816, 832; Cooperative Development
Authority v. Dolefil Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries Cooperative, Inc., supra note 12, at 307.
[27]
 Perez v. Hagonoy Rural Bank, Inc., supra note 20, at 334.
[28]
 Cooperative Development Authority v. Dolefil Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries Cooperative, Inc., supra note 12, at
306.
[29]
 385 Phil. 208 (2000).
[30]
 Id. at 222, citing People v. Calo, G.R. No. 88531, June 18, 1990, 186 SCRA 620, 624.