Genria Nicole G.

Guzman
CODEGOV K31
11621249
In Re: Cunanan (94 PHIL 534)

FACTS:
Congress passed Republic Act No. 972, also known as the “Bar Flunkers” Act of 1953. Under the
rules of court, only those with an average of 75% in all subjects, without getting less than 50%
in any subject. Later, candidates who obtained an average of 72% was raised to 75% and the
Supreme Court passed and admitted them to the bar. Republic Act No. 972 allowed bar
candidates who obtained a general average of 70% in any bar examination after July 4 1946 up
to August 1951 bar examinations. After Republic Act No. 972 was approved many candidates
who have failed their bar examinations, invoked provisions from Republic Act No. 972 when
they filed petitions for admissions to the bar. Some only sought for their grades to be
reconsidered but the Supreme Court found no reason to revise their grades. The author of the
proposed bill, Honorable Senator Pablo Angeles David said that the reason for lowering the
passing rate to 70% was to give consideration to students who didn’t have sufficient materials
and adequate preparation, during the years immediately after the Japanese Occupation.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Republic Act No. 972 is constitutional.

HELD:
Republic Act No. 972 was declared unconstitutional. First, its objective is contrary to public
interest, for qualifying 1094 bar candidates who failed due to inadequate preparation due to
there being insufficient materials and the fact that it the years immediately after the Japanese
Occupation. Second, the power to determine who should be admitted to practice law belongs
to the judicial department not the legislative department of our government. There is no
express provision in the Constitution which indicates an intent that this traditional power of the
judicial department should in any manner be subject to legislative control. The legislature and
the judicial department are separate and independent of one another. The legislature has no
power to admit candidates, that the courts deem unfit, to the bar. Art. VIII, sec. 13 of the
Constitution states that, “The Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate rules
concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of
law. Said rules shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade and shall not diminish increase
or modify substantive rights. The existing laws on pleading, practice, and procedure are hereby
repealed as statutes, and are declared Rules of Courts, subject to the power of the Supreme
Court to alter and modify the same. The Congress shall have the power to repeal, alter, or
supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure, and the admission to the
practice of law in the Philippines."

Cayetano v Monsod (201 SCRA 210)

FACTS:
Respondent, Christian Monsod was nominated by former President Corazon C. Aquino to the
position of Chairman of COMELEC. Petitioner, Reynato Cayetano opposed the nomination,
claiming that Monsod does not possess the required qualification of having been engaged in
the practice of law for at least ten years. On June 5, 1991, the Commission on Appointments
confirmed the nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the COMELEC and on June 18, 1991,
Monsod assumed office as chairman of the COMELEC. The petitioner then filed the instant
petition for certiorari and Prohibition praying that the confirmation and appointment of
Monsod as Chairman of COMELEC be declared null and void. Monsod is a member of the
Philippine Bar and has been paying his professional license fees as a lawyer for more than ten
years. After graduating from U.P. College of Law and passing the bar, Atty. Monsod worked at
his father’s law office, worked as an operations officer for World Bank Group in Costa Rica and
Panama, which involved getting acquainted with the laws of member-countries negotiating
loans and coordinating legal, economic, and project work of the Bank. After he returned to
Philippines, he worked with Meralco, served as CEO of an investment bank, rendered services
to various companies as legal and economic consultant or CEO. He was also a former Secretary-
General and National Chairman of NAMFREL, work which involved being knowledgeable in
election law. He also worked with farmers and urban poor groups, in initiating, lobbying for and
engaging in affirmative action for the agrarian reform law and lately the urban land reform bill.
He also conducted numerous hearings as a member of the Constitutional Commission and
Chairman of its Committee.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent, Christian Monsod possessed the required qualification as
Chairman of COMELEC and has engaged in the practice of law for ten years.

HELD:
Yes, Atty. Christian Monsod possess the required qualification of having been engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten years. Practice of law is defined as any activity, in and out of
court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and
experience. Atty. Monsod has worked as a lawyer-economist, A lawyer-manager, a lawyer-
entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts and a lawyer legislator of both the
rich and the poor. This shows that Atty. Monsod has indeed engaged in the practice of law as he
utilized his knowledge, training and experience, if not all then in most jobs that he has done and
the positions he has held for the past several years.
Genria Nicole G. Guzman
CODEGOV K31
11621249

Stemmerik v Mas A.C. No. 8010

Facts:
Complainant Stemmerik, a citizen and resident of Denmark, expressed interest in acquiring real property in the
Philippines. He consulted respondent, Atty. Mas, who told him that he can legally acquire and own real property
in the Philippines. Respondent even suggested an 86,998 sq.m. property in Quarry, Agusuin,
Cawag, Subic, Zambales with the assurance that the property was alienable. The complainant
trusted the respondent and purchased the property through him. Respondent demanded and
received a PHP400,000 fee from the complainant for his service of preparing the necessary
documents. The complainant the returned to Denmark and entrusted the processing of the
necessary paper work to the respondent. When the respondent prepared a contract to sell the
property between the complainant and a certain Bonifacio de Mesa, respondent prepared and
notarized a deed of sale in which de Mesa sold and conveyed the property to a certain Ailyn
Gonzales for PHP3.8 million. After the complainant gave the respondent the PHP3.8 million and
various contracts and agreements were executed, the complainant could no longer reach the
respondent. When the complainant returned to the Philippines he learned that aliens could not
own land under Philippine laws. Moreover, verification at the Community Environment &
Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources in
Olongapo City revealed that the property was inalienable as it was situated within the former
US Military Reservation.5 The CENRO also stated that the property was not subject to
disposition or acquisition under Republic Act No. 141. Complainant then filed a complaint for
disbarment against the respondent for gravely misrepresenting that a foreigner could legally
acquire land in the Philippines and for maliciously absconding with complainant’s ₱3.8 million.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent, Atty. Mas should be disbarred.

Held:
The Commission on Bar Discipline found the respondent to be “nothing more than an
embezzler” who misused his professional status as an attorney to deceive the complainant and
abscond with the complainant’s money. Respondent was dishonest and deceitful. He abused
the trust and confidence reposed by complainant in him. The CBD recommended the
disbarment of respondent. The court agreed with the IBP that the findings and
recommendation of the CBD should be adopted in addition to requiring the respondent to
return PHP4.2 million. Respondent committed a serious breach of his oath as a lawyer and is
also guilty of culpable violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the code of ethics of
the legal profession. Thus the Court disbarred the respondent, Atty. Mas and ordered him to
return the complainant the total of PHP4.2 million. The Court also ordered the NBI to locate
Atty. Mas and to file the appropriate criminal charges against him.

Garcia v Sesbreno A.C. No. 7973

Facts:
Complainant, Garcia filed a complaint for disbarment against Sesbreno before the Office of the
Bar Confidant. The case was docketed as A.C. No. 7973. Garcia claimed that in 1965 he married
Virginia Alcantara in Cebu and that they had 2 children. In 1971, they separated and in 1992,
Garcia alleged that Virginia filed for annulment. The annulment was eventually granted. In
2005, Complainant alleged that while he was in Japan, his 2 children, represented by
respondent, Sesbreno, filed an action for support against him and his sister Milagros Garcia
Soliman. At the time of the hearing, his children, Maria Margarita and Angie Ruth were already
39 and 35 years old. The case was then dismissed. In 2007, when complainant returned from
Japan and Sasbreno and his children heard of hi return, Sesbreno filed a Second Amended
Complaint against him. Complainant alleged that Sesbrenowas convicted by the RTC of Cebu
City for homicide. He also alleged that the respondent is on parole and that he should not be
allowed to continue practicing law as homicide is a crime against moral turpitude. A day prior to
the filing of A.C. No. 7973, or on 29 July 2008, Garcia filed a complaint for disbarment against
Sesbreño before the IBP-CBD. He alleged that Sesbreño is practicing law despite his previous
conviction for homicide in Criminal Case No. CBU-31733, and despite the facts that he is only on
parole and that he has not fully served his sentence. Garcia alleged that Sesbreño violated
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court by continuing to engage in the practice of law despite
his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude. Upon the directive of the IBP-CBD, Garcia
submitted his verified complaint against Sesbreño alleging basically the same facts he alleged in
A.C. No. 7973. To answer the complaint, respondent alleged that his sentence was commuted
and the phrase "with the inherent accessory penalties provided by law" was deleted. He also
argued that the disqualification only applies during the term of the sentence. Respondent
further alleged that homicide does not involve moral turpitude and claimed that the
complainant’s complaint was motivated by extreme malice and bad faith and desire to retaliate
against him for representing the complainant’s children in court. The IBP-CBD ruled that
conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude is a ground for disbarment or suspension.
Citing International Rice Research Institute v. National Labor Relations Commission, 1 the IBPCBD
further ruled that homicide may or may not involve moral turpitude depending on the degree
of the crime. The IBP-CBD reviewed the decision of this Court convicting Sesbreño for the crime
of homicide, and found that the circumstances leading to the death of the victim involved
moral turpitude. The IBP-CBD recommended that Sesbreno be disbarred and hisname stricken
from the Roll of Attorneys

Issue:
Whether being convicted of the crime of homicide involves moral turpitude.

Held:
The court based their ruling on whether homicide involves moral turpitude, the ruling of
International Rice Research Institute v. NLRC. In International Rice Research Institute v. NLRC,
the court ruled that  Homicide may or may not involve moral turpitude depending on the
degree of the crime. Moral turpitude is not involved in every criminal act and is not shown by
every known and intentional violation of statute, but whether any particular conviction involves
moral turpitude may be a question of fact and frequently depends on all the surrounding
circumstances. 
While x x x generally but not always, crimes mala in seinvolve moral turpitude, while crimes
mala prohibitado not, it cannot always be ascertained whether moral turpitude does or does
not exist by classifying a crime as malum in se or as malum prohibitum, since there are crimes
which are mala in se and yet rarely involve moral turpitude and there are crimes which involve
moral turpitude and are mala prohibita only. It follows therefore, that moral turpitude is
somewhat a vague and indefinite term, the meaning of which must be left to the process of
judicial inclusion or exclusion as the cases are reached. In People v. Sesbreño,8 the Court found
Sesbreño guilty of homicide and ruled: WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Cebu City, Branch 18, in Criminal Case No. CBU-31733 is hereby MODIFIED. Appellant
Raul H. Sesbreño is hereby found GUILTY of HOMICIDE and hereby sentenced to suffer a prison
term of 9 years and 1 day of prision mayor, as a minimum, to 16 years and 4 months of
reclusion temporal, as a maximum, with accessory penalties provided by law, to indemnify the
heirs of the deceased Luciano Amparado in the amount of ₱50,000.00 and to pay the costs. The
court agrees with the decision of the RTC of Cebu City and with the IBP-CBD that the
circumstances show that moral turpitude is present. The decision of the RTC of Cebu City
showed that the respondent’s victim, Amprado and his companion, Yapchangco, were just
walking past by the respondent’s home when Sesbreno, without any provocation from
Amprado and his companion, went out of his house and started firing at them. According to
Amprado’s companion, they were a few metres away from the respondent’s gate when they
heard the screeching sound of the gate and when they turned around, they saw the respondent
aiming his rifle at them. Yapchangco and Amparado ran away but Amparado was hit. An eye
witness, Rabanes, recalled that he heard shots and opened the window of his house. He saw 
Yapchangco and Amparado running away while Sesbreño was firing his firearm rapidly, hitting
Rabanes' house in the process. Another witness,... Edwin Parune, saw Amparado fall down after
being shot, then saw Sesbreño in the middle of the street, carrying a long firearm, and walking
back towards the gate of his house. The IBP-CBD correctly stated that Amparado and
Yapchangco were just at the wrong place and time. They did not do anything that justified the
indiscriminate firing done by Sesbreño that eventually led to the death of Amparado. The
practice of law is not a right but a privilege.19 It is granted only to those possessing good moral
character.20 A violation of the high moral standards of the legal profession justifies the
imposition of the appropriate penalty against a lawyer, including the penalty of disbarment.
Thus, the court rule that respondent, Sesbreno be disbarred.