709 Phil.

408 I, Rommel Cagoco Arnado, solemnly swear that I will he is a foreigner, attaching thereto a certification issued
support and defend the Constitution of the Republic of by the Bureau of Immigration dated 23 April 2010
EN BANC the Philippines and obey the laws and legal orders indicating the nationality of Arnado as ―USA-American.‖[10]
promulgated by the duly constituted authorities of the
[ G.R. No. 195649, April 16, 2013 ] Philippines and I hereby declare that I recognize and To further bolster his claim of Arnado‘s US citizenship, Balua
accept the supreme authority of the Philippines and will presented in his Memorandum a computer-generated
maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; and that I travel record[11] dated 03 December 2009 indicating that
CASAN MACODE MAQUILING, PETITIONER, VS.
impose this obligation upon myself voluntarily without Arnado has been using his US Passport No. 057782700 in
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ROMMEL ARNADO Y
mental reservation or purpose of evasion.[6] entering and departing the Philippines. The said record
CAGOCO, LINOG G. BALUA, RESPONDENTS.
shows that Arnado left the country on 14 April 2009 and
On 3 April 2009 Arnado again took his Oath of Allegiance returned on 25 June 2009, and again departed on 29 July
DECISION
to the Republic and executed an Affidavit of 2009, arriving back in the Philippines on 24 November
Renunciation of his foreign citizenship, which states: 2009.
SERENO, C.J.:
I, Rommel Cagoco Arnado, do solemnly swear that I
absolutely and perpetually renounce all allegiance and Balua likewise presented a certification from the Bureau of
THE CASE
fidelity to the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA of which I am a Immigration dated 23 April 2010, certifying that the name
citizen, and I divest myself of full employment of all civil ―Arnado, Rommel Cagoco‖ appears in the available
This is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 64 in conjunction
and political rights and privileges of the United States of Computer Database/Passenger manifest/IBM listing on file
with Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to review the Resolutions
America. as of 21 April 2010, with the following pertinent travel
of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC). The
records:
Resolution[1] in SPA No. 10-109(DC) of the COMELEC First
I solemnly swear that all the foregoing statement is true DATE OF Arrival : 01/12/2010
Division dated 5 October 2010 is being assailed for
and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.[7] NATIONALITY : USA-AMERICAN
applying Section 44 of the Local Government Code while
PASSPORT : 057782700
the Resolution[2] of the COMELEC En Banc dated 2
On 30 November 2009, Arnado filed his Certificate of DATE OF Arrival : 03/23/2010
February 2011 is being questioned for finding that
Candidacy for Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte, NATIONALITY : USA-AMERICAN
respondent Rommel Arnado y Cagoco (respondent
which contains, among others, the following statements: PASSPORT : 057782700[12]
Arnado/Arnado) is solely a Filipino citizen qualified to run
I am a natural born Filipino citizen / naturalized Filipino On 30 April 2010, the COMELEC (First Division) issued an
for public office despite his continued use of a U.S.
citizen. Order[13] requiring the respondent to personally file his
passport.
I am not a permanent resident of, or immigrant to, a answer and memorandum within three (3) days from
FACTS
foreign country. receipt thereof.
I am eligible for the office I seek to be elected to.
Respondent Arnado is a natural born Filipino
I will support and defend the Constitution of the Republic After Arnado failed to answer the petition, Balua moved
citizen.[3] However, as a consequence of his subsequent
of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and to declare him in default and to present evidence ex-
naturalization as a citizen of the United States of America,
allegiance thereto. I will obey the laws, legal orders and parte.
he lost his Filipino citizenship.
decrees promulgated by the duly constituted authorities.
I impose this obligation upon myself voluntarily without Neither motion was acted upon, having been overtaken
Arnado applied for repatriation under Republic Act (R.A.)
mental reservation or purpose of evasion.[8] by the 2010 elections where Arnado garnered the highest
No. 9225 before the Consulate General of the Philippines
On 28 April 2010, respondent Linog C. Balua (Balua), number of votes and was subsequently proclaimed as the
in San Franciso, USA and took the Oath of Allegiance to
another mayoralty candidate, filed a petition to disqualify winning candidate for Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del
the Republic of the Philippines on 10 July 2008.[4] On the
Arnado and/or to cancel his certificate of candidacy for Norte.
same day an Order of Approval of his Citizenship
municipal mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte in
Retention and Re-acquisition was issued in his favor.[5]
connection with the 10 May 2010 local and national It was only after his proclamation that Arnado filed his
elections.[9] Respondent Balua contended that Arnado is verified answer, submitting the following documents as
The aforementioned Oath of Allegiance states:
not a resident of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte and that evidence:[14]

1
 1. Affidavit of Renunciation and Oath of Allegiance
to the Republic of the Philippines dated 03 April
2009;
2. Joint-Affidavit dated 31 May 2010 of Engr. Virgil
Seno, Virginia Branzuela, Leoncio Daligdig, and
Jessy Corpin, all neighbors of Arnado, attesting
that Arnado is a long-time resident of Kauswagan
and that he has been conspicuously and
continuously residing in his family‘s ancestral house
in Kauswagan;
3. Certification from the Punong Barangay of
Poblacion, Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte dated 03
June 2010 stating that Arnado is a bona fide
resident of his barangay and that Arnado went to
the United States in 1985 to work and returned to
the Philippines in 2009;
4. Certification dated 31 May 2010 from the
Municipal Local Government Operations Office of
Kauswagan stating that Dr. Maximo P. Arnado, Sr.
served as Mayor of Kauswagan, from January 1964
to June 1974 and from 15 February 1979 to 15 April
1986; and
5. Voter Certification issued by the Election Officer of
Kauswagan certifying that Arnado has been a
registered voter of Kauswagan since 03 April 2009.
THE RULING OF THE COMELEC FIRST DIVISION
Instead of treating the Petition as an action for the
cancellation of a certificate of candidacy based on
misrepresentation,[15] the COMELEC First Division
considered it as one for disqualification. Balua‘s
contention that
Arnado is a resident of the United States was dismissed
upon the finding that ―Balua failed to present any
evidence to support his contention,‖[16] whereas the First
Division still could ―not conclude that Arnado failed to
meet the one-year residency requirement under the Local the COMELEC En Banc on the ground that ―the evidence
Government Code.‖[17]
In the matter of the issue of citizenship, however, the First contentions:[22]
Division disagreed with Arnado‘s claim that he is a Filipino
citizen.[18]
We find that although Arnado appears to have
substantially complied with the requirements of R.A. No.
9225, Arnado‘s act of consistently using his US passport
after renouncing his US citizenship on 03 April 2009
effectively negated his Affidavit of Renunciation.
xxxx
Arnado‘s continued use of his US passport is a strong
indication that Arnado had no real intention to renounce
his US citizenship and that he only executed an Affidavit of
Renunciation to enable him to run for office. We cannot
turn a blind eye to the glaring inconsistency between
Arnado‘s unexplained use of a US passport six times and
his claim that he re-acquired his Philippine citizenship and
renounced his US citizenship. As noted by the Supreme
Court in the Yu case, ―[a] passport is defined as an official
document of identity and nationality issued to a person
intending to travel or sojourn in foreign countries.‖ Surely,
one who truly divested himself of US citizenship would not
continue to avail of privileges reserved solely for US
nationals.[19]
The dispositive portion of the Resolution rendered by the
COMELEC First Division reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition for
disqualification and/or to cancel the certificate of
candidacy of Rommel C. Arnado is hereby GRANTED.
Rommel C. Arnado‘s proclamation as the winning
candidate for Municipal Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del
Nore is hereby ANNULLED. Let the order of succession
under Section 44 of the Local Government Code of 1991
take effect.[20]
The Motion for Reconsideration and
the Motion for Intervention
Arnado sought reconsideration of the resolution before
is insufficient to justify the Resolution and that the said
Resolution is contrary to law.‖[21] He raised the following
1. The finding that he is not a Filipino citizen is not
supported by the evidence consisting of his Oath
of Allegiance and the Affidavit of Renunciation,
which show that he has substantially complied with
the requirements of R.A. No. 9225;
2. The use of his US passport subsequent to his
renunciation of his American citizenship is not
tantamount to a repudiation of his Filipino
citizenship, as he did not perform any act to swear
allegiance to a country other than the Philippines;
3. He used his US passport only because he was not
informed of the issuance of his Philippine passport,
and that he used his Philippine passport after he
obtained it;
4. Balua‘s petition to cancel the certificate of
candidacy of Arnado was filed out of time, and
the First Division‘s treatment of the petition as one
for disqualification constitutes grave abuse of
discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction;[23]
5. He is undoubtedly the people‘s choice as
indicated by his winning the elections;
6. His proclamation as the winning candidate ousted
the COMELEC from jurisdiction over the case; and
7. The proper remedy to question his citizenship is
through a petition for quo warranto, which should
have been filed within ten days from his
proclamation.
Petitioner Casan Macode Maquiling (Maquiling), another
candidate for mayor of Kauswagan, and who garnered
the second highest number of votes in the 2010
elections, intervened in the case and filed before the
COMELEC En Banc a Motion for Reconsideration together
with an Opposition to Arnado‘s Amended Motion for
Reconsideration. Maquiling argued that while the First
Division correctly disqualified Arnado, the order of
succession under Section 44 of the Local Government
Code is not applicable in this case. Consequently, he
claimed that the cancellation of Arnado‘s candidacy
and the nullification of his proclamation, Maquiling, as the
legitimate candidate who obtained the highest number
of lawful votes, should be proclaimed as the winner.
Maquiling simultaneously filed his Memorandum with his
2
Motion for Intervention and his Motion for Reconsideration. xxxx
Arnado opposed all motions filed by Maquiling, claiming In his Separate Concurring Opinion, COMELEC Chairman
that intervention is prohibited after a decision has already The use of a US passport […] does not operate to revert Sixto Brillantes cited that the use of foreign passport is not
been rendered, and that as a second-placer, Maquiling back his status as a dual citizen prior to his renunciation as one of the grounds provided for under Section 1 of
undoubtedly lost the elections and thus does not stand to there is no law saying such. More succinctly, the use of a Commonwealth Act No. 63 through which Philippine
be prejudiced or benefitted by the final adjudication of US passport does not operate to ―un-renounce‖ what he citizenship may be lost.
the case. has earlier on renounced. The First Division‘s reliance in the ―[T]he application of the more assimilative principle of
RULING OF THE COMELEC EN BANC case of In Re: Petition for Habeas Corpus of Willy Yu v. continuity of citizenship is more appropriate in this case.
Defensor-Santiago, et al. is misplaced. The petitioner in the Under said principle, once a person becomes a citizen,
In its Resolution of 02 February 2011, the COMELEC En said case is a naturalized citizen who, after taking his oath either by birth or naturalization, it is assumed that he
Banc held that under Section 6 of Republic Act No. 6646, as a naturalized Filipino, applied for the renewal of his desires to continue to be a citizen, and this assumption
the Commission ―shall continue with the trial and hearing Portuguese passport. Strict policy is maintained in the stands until he voluntarily denationalizes or expatriates
of the action, inquiry or protest even after the conduct of citizens who are not natural born, who acquire himself. Thus, in the instant case respondent after
proclamation of the candidate whose qualifications for their citizenship by choice, thus discarding their original reacquiring his Philippine citizenship should be presumed
office is questioned.‖ citizenship. The Philippine State expects strict conduct of to have remained a Filipino despite his use of his American
allegiance to those who choose to be its citizens. In the passport in the absence of clear, unequivocal and
As to Maquiling‘s intervention, the COMELEC En Banc also present case, respondent is not a naturalized citizen but a competent proof of expatriation. Accordingly, all doubts
cited Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 which allows intervention natural born citizen who chose greener pastures by should be resolved in favor of retention of citizenship.‖[26]
in proceedings for disqualification even after elections if working abroad and then decided to repatriate to
no final judgment has been rendered, but went on further supposedly help in the progress of Kauswagan. He did not On the other hand, Commissioner Rene V. Sarmiento
to say that Maquiling, as the second placer, would not be apply for a US passport after his renunciation. Thus the dissented, thus:
prejudiced by the outcome of the case as it agrees with mentioned case is not on all fours with the case at bar. [R]espondent evidently failed to prove that he truly and
the dispositive portion of the Resolution of the First Division wholeheartedly abandoned his allegiance to the United
allowing the order of succession under Section 44 of the xxxx States. The latter‘s continued use of his US passport and
Local Government Code to take effect. enjoyment of all the privileges of a US citizen despite his
The respondent presented a plausible explanation as to previous renunciation of the afore-mention[ed] citizenship
The COMELEC En Banc agreed with the treatment by the the use of his US passport. Although he applied for a runs contrary to his declaration that he chose to retain
First Division of the petition as one for disqualification, and Philippine passport, the passport was only issued on June only his Philippine citizenship. Respondent‘s submission
ruled that the petition was filed well within the period 18, 2009. However, he was not notified of the issuance of with the twin requirements was obviously only for the
prescribed by law,[24] having been filed on 28 April 2010, his Philippine passport so that he was actually able to get purpose of complying with the requirements for running for
which is not later than 11 May 2010, the date of it about three (3) months later. Yet as soon as he was in the mayoralty post in connection with the May 10, 2010
proclamation. possession of his Philippine passport, the respondent Automated National and Local Elections.
already used the same in his subsequent travels abroad.
However, the COMELEC En Banc reversed and set aside This fact is proven by the respondent‘s submission of a Qualifications for elective office, such as citizenship, are
the ruling of the First Division and granted Arnado‘s Motion certified true copy of his passport showing that he used continuing requirements; once any of them is lost during
for Reconsideration, on the following premises: the same for his travels on the following dates: January 31, his incumbency, title to the office itself is deemed
First: 2010, April 16, 2010, May 20, 2010, January 12, 2010, March forfeited. If a candidate is not a citizen at the time he ran
31, 2010 and June 4, 2010. This then shows that the use of for office or if he lost his citizenship after his election to
By renouncing his US citizenship as imposed by R.A. No. the US passport was because to his knowledge, his office, he is disqualified to serve as such. Neither does the
9225, the respondent embraced his Philippine citizenship Philippine passport was not yet issued to him for his use. As fact that respondent obtained the plurality of votes for the
as though he never became a citizen of another country. probably pressing needs might be undertaken, the mayoralty post cure the latter‘s failure to comply with the
It was at that time, April 3, 2009, that the respondent respondent used whatever is within his control during that qualification requirements regarding his citizenship.
became a pure Philippine Citizen again. time.[25]
Since a disqualified candidate is no candidate at all in the

3
eyes of the law, his having received the highest number of number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission
votes does not validate his election. It has been held that The second question is whether or not the use of a foreign shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action,
where a petition for disqualification was filed before passport after renouncing foreign citizenship amounts to inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or
election against a candidate but was adversely resolved undoing a renunciation earlier made. any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order
against him after election, his having obtained the highest the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate
number of votes did not make his election valid. His ouster A better framing of the question though should be whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.
from office does not violate the principle of vox populi whether or not the use of a foreign passport after
suprema est lex because the application of the renouncing foreign citizenship affects one‘s qualifications Mercado v. Manzano[28] clarified the right of intervention
constitutional and statutory provisions on disqualification is to run for public office. in a disqualification case. In that case, the Court said:
not a matter of popularity. To apply it is to breath[e] life to That petitioner had a right to intervene at that stage of
the sovereign will of the people who expressed it when The third question is whether or not the rule on succession the proceedings for the disqualification against private
they ratified the Constitution and when they elected their in the Local Government Code is applicable to this case. respondent is clear from Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646,
representatives who enacted the law.[27] OUR RULING otherwise known as the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987,
which provides: Any candidate who has been declared
THE PETITION BEFORE THE COURT Intervention of a rival candidate in a by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for,
disqualification case is proper when and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any
Maquiling filed the instant petition questioning the there has not yet been any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment
propriety of declaring Arnado qualified to run for public proclamation of the winner. before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for
office despite his continued use of a US passport, and and receives the winning number of votes in such
praying that Maquiling be proclaimed as the winner in the Petitioner Casan Macode Maquiling intervened at the election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the
2010 mayoralty race in Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte. stage when respondent Arnado filed a Motion for trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and,
Reconsideration of the First Division Resolution before the upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may
Ascribing both grave abuse of discretion and reversible COMELEC En Banc. As the candidate who garnered the during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the
error on the part of the COMELEC En Banc for ruling that second highest number of votes, Maquiling contends that proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence
Arnado is a Filipino citizen despite his continued use of a he has an interest in the disqualification case filed against of guilt is strong. Under this provision, intervention may be
US passport, Maquiling now seeks to reverse the finding of Arnado, considering that in the event the latter is allowed in proceedings for disqualification even after
the COMELEC En Banc that Arnado is qualified to run for disqualified, the votes cast for him should be considered election if there has yet been no final judgment
public office. stray and the second-placer should be proclaimed as the rendered.[29]
winner in the elections.
Corollary to his plea to reverse the ruling of the COMELEC Clearly then, Maquiling has the right to intervene in the
En Banc or to affirm the First Division‘s disqualification of It must be emphasized that while the original petition case. The fact that the COMELEC En Banc has already
Arnado, Maquiling also seeks the review of the before the COMELEC is one for cancellation of the ruled that Maquiling has not shown that the requisites for
applicability of Section 44 of the Local Government Code, certificate of candidacy and / or disqualification, the the exemption to the second-placer rule set forth
claiming that the COMELEC committed reversible error in COMELEC First Division and the COMELEC En Banc in Sinsuat v. COMELEC[30] are present and therefore would
ruling that ―the succession of the vice mayor in case the correctly treated the petition as one for disqualification. not be prejudiced by the outcome of the case, does not
respondent is disqualified is in order.‖ deprive Maquiling of the right to elevate the matter
ISSUES The effect of a disqualification case is enunciated in before this Court.
Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646:
There are three questions posed by the parties before this Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. - Any candidate Arnado‘s claim that the main case has attained finality as
Court which will be addressed seriatim as the subsequent who has been declared by final judgment to be the original petitioner and respondents therein have not
questions hinge on the result of the first. disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for appealed the decision of the COMELEC En Banc, cannot
him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is be sustained. The elevation of the case by the intervenor
The first question is whether or not intervention is allowed in not declared by final judgment before an election to be prevents it from attaining finality. It is only after this Court
a disqualification case. disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning has ruled upon the issues raised in this instant petition that

4
the disqualification case originally filed by Balua against Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003, he became countries that he is an American citizen, with all attendant
Arnado will attain finality. eligible to run for public office. rights and privileges granted by the United States of
The use of foreign America.
passport after Indeed, Arnado took the Oath of Allegiance not just only
renouncing one’s once but twice: first, on 10 July 2008 when he applied for The renunciation of foreign citizenship is not a hollow oath
foreign citizenship is a repatriation before the Consulate General of the that can simply be professed at any time, only to be
positive and voluntary Philippines in San Francisco, USA, and again on 03 April violated the next day. It requires an absolute and
act of representation 2009 simultaneous with the execution of his Affidavit of perpetual renunciation of the foreign citizenship and a full
as to one’s nationality Renunciation. By taking the Oath of Allegiance to the divestment of all civil and political rights granted by the
and citizenship; it does Republic, Arnado re-acquired his Philippine citizenship. At foreign country which granted the citizenship.
not divest Filipino the time, however, he likewise possessed American
citizenship regained citizenship. Arnado had therefore become a dual citizen. Mercado v. Manzano[34] already hinted at this situation
by repatriation but it when the Court declared:
recants the Oath of After reacquiring his Philippine citizenship, Arnado His declarations will be taken upon the faith that he will
Renunciation required renounced his American citizenship by executing an fulfill his undertaking made under oath. Should he betray
to qualify one to run Affidavit of Renunciation, thus completing the that trust, there are enough sanctions for declaring the
for an elective requirements for eligibility to run for public office. loss of his Philippine citizenship through expatriation in
position. appropriate proceedings. In Yu v. Defensor-Santiago, we
By renouncing his foreign citizenship, he was deemed to sustained the denial of entry into the country of petitioner
be solely a Filipino citizen, regardless of the effect of such on the ground that, after taking his oath as a naturalized
Section 5(2) of The Citizenship Retention and Re- renunciation under the laws of the foreign country.[32] citizen, he applied for the renewal of his Portuguese
acquisition Act of 2003 provides: passport and declared in commercial documents
Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine citizenship under However, this legal presumption does not operate executed abroad that he was a Portuguese national. A
this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be permanently and is open to attack when, after similar sanction can be taken against anyone who, in
subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under renouncing the foreign citizenship, the citizen performs electing Philippine citizenship, renounces his foreign
existing laws of the Philippines and the following positive acts showing his continued possession of a foreign nationality, but subsequently does some act constituting
conditions: citizenship.[33] renunciation of his Philippine citizenship.

xxxx
(2) Those seeking elective public in the Philippines shall
meet the qualification for holding such public office as
required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the
time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a
personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign
citizenship before any public officer authorized to
administer an oath. x x x[31]
Rommel Arnado took all the necessary steps to qualify to
run for a public office. He took the Oath of Allegiance
and renounced his foreign citizenship. There is no question counter to the affidavit of renunciation he had earlier
that after performing these twin requirements required
under Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225 or the Citizenship
Arnado himself subjected the issue of his citizenship to
attack when, after renouncing his foreign citizenship, he
continued to use his US passport to travel in and out of the
country before filing his certificate of candidacy on 30
November 2009. The pivotal question to determine is
whether he was solely and exclusively a Filipino citizen at
the time he filed his certificate of candidacy, thereby
rendering him eligible to run for public office.
Between 03 April 2009, the date he renounced his foreign
citizenship, and 30 November 2009, the date he filed his
COC, he used his US passport four times, actions that run
executed. By using his foreign passport, Arnado positively
and voluntarily represented himself as an American, in
effect declaring before immigration authorities of both
While the act of using a foreign passport is not one of the
acts enumerated in Commonwealth Act No. 63
constituting renunciation and loss of Philippine
citizenship,[35] it is nevertheless an act which repudiates
the very oath of renunciation required for a former Filipino
citizen who is also a citizen of another country to be
qualified to run for a local elective position.
When Arnado used his US passport on 14 April 2009, or just
eleven days after he renounced his American citizenship,
he recanted his Oath of Renunciation[36] that he
―absolutely and perpetually renounce(s) all allegiance
and fidelity to the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA‖[37] and that
he ―divest(s) [him]self of full employment of all civil and
political rights and privileges of the United States of
America.‖[38]

5

We agree with the COMELEC En Banc that such act of
using a foreign passport does not divest Arnado of his
Filipino citizenship, which he acquired by repatriation.
However, by representing himself as an American citizen,
Arnado voluntarily and effectively reverted to his earlier
status as a dual citizen. Such reversion was not retroactive;
it took place the instant Arnado represented himself as an
American citizen by using his US passport.
This act of using a foreign passport after renouncing one‘s
foreign citizenship is fatal to Arnado‘s bid for public office,
as it effectively imposed on him a disqualification to run
for an elective local position.
Arnado‘s category of dual citizenship is that by which
foreign citizenship is acquired through a positive act of
applying for naturalization. This is distinct from those
considered dual citizens by virtue of birth, who are not
required by law to take the oath of renunciation as the
mere filing of the certificate of candidacy already carries
with it an implied renunciation of foreign
citizenship.[39] Dual citizens by naturalization, on the other
hand, are required to take not only the Oath of
Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines but also to
personally renounce foreign citizenship in order to qualify
as a candidate for public office.
By the time he filed his certificate of candidacy on 30
November 2009, Arnado was a dual citizen enjoying the
rights and privileges of Filipino and American citizenship.
He was qualified to vote, but by the express
disqualification under Section 40(d) of the Local
Government Code,[40] he was not qualified to run for a
local elective position.
In effect, Arnado was solely and exclusively a Filipino
citizen only for a period of eleven days, or from 3 April
2009 until 14 April 2009, on which date he first used his
American passport after renouncing his American
citizenship.
This Court has previously ruled that:
Qualifications for public office are continuing representation as a US citizen before the immigration
requirements and must be possessed not only at the time officials of this country.
of appointment or election or assumption of office but
during the officer's entire tenure. Once any of the required The COMELEC, in ruling favorably for Arnado, stated ―Yet,
qualifications is lost, his title may be seasonably as soon as he was in possession of his Philippine passport,
challenged. x x x.[41] the respondent already used the same in his subsequent
travels abroad.‖[44] We cannot agree with the COMELEC.
The citizenship requirement for elective public office is a Three months from June is September. If indeed, Arnado
continuing one. It must be possessed not just at the time of used his Philippine passport as soon as he was in
the renunciation of the foreign citizenship but possession of it, he would not have used his US passport on
continuously. Any act which violates the oath of 24 November 2009.
renunciation opens the citizenship issue to attack.
Besides, Arnado‘s subsequent use of his Philippine passport
We agree with the pronouncement of the COMELEC First does not correct the fact that after he renounced his
Division that ―Arnado‘s act of consistently using his US foreign citizenship and prior to filing his certificate of
passport effectively negated his ―Affidavit of candidacy, he used his US passport. In the same way that
Renunciation.‖[42] This does not mean, that he failed to the use of his foreign passport does not undo his Oath of
comply with the twin requirements under R.A. No. 9225, for Renunciation, his subsequent use of his Philippine passport
he in fact did. It was after complying with the does not undo his earlier use of his US passport.
requirements that he performed positive acts which
effectively disqualified him from running for an elective Citizenship is not a matter of convenience. It is a badge of
public office pursuant to Section 40(d) of the Local identity that comes with attendant civil and political
Government Code of 1991. rights accorded by the state to its citizens. It likewise
demands the concomitant duty to maintain allegiance to
The purpose of the Local Government Code in one‘s flag and country. While those who acquire dual
disqualifying dual citizens from running for any elective citizenship by choice are afforded the right of suffrage,
public office would be thwarted if we were to allow a those who seek election or appointment to public office
person who has earlier renounced his foreign citizenship, are required to renounce their foreign citizenship to be
but who subsequently represents himself as a foreign deserving of the public trust. Holding public office
citizen, to hold any public office. demands full and undivided allegiance to the Republic
and to no other.
Arnado justifies the continued use of his US passport with
the explanation that he was not notified of the issuance of We therefore hold that Arnado, by using his US passport
his Philippine passport on 18 June 2009, as a result of which after renouncing his American citizenship, has recanted
he was only able to obtain his Philippine passport three (3) the same Oath of Renunciation he took. Section 40(d) of
months later.[43] the Local Government Code applies to his situation. He is
disqualified not only from holding the public office
The COMELEC En Banc differentiated Arnado from Willy but even from becoming a candidate in the May 2010
Yu, the Portuguese national who sought naturalization as elections.
a Filipino citizen and later applied for the renewal of his
Portuguese passport. That Arnado did not apply for a US We now resolve the next issue.
passport after his renunciation does not make his use of a
US passport less of an act that violated the Oath of Resolving the third issue necessitates revisiting Topacio v.
Renunciation he took. It was still a positive act of Paredes[45] which is the jurisprudential spring of the
6
principle that a second-placer cannot be proclaimed as may find that some other person than the candidate eligibility of the person who obtained the highest number
the winner in an election contest. This doctrine must be declared to have received a plura[l]ity by the board of of votes in the election, its jurisdiction being confined ―to
re-examined and its soundness once again put to the test canvassers actually received the greater number of votes, determine which of the contestants has been duly
to address the ever-recurring issue that a second-placer in which case the court issues its mandamus to the board elected‖ the judge exceeded his jurisdiction when he
who loses to an ineligible candidate cannot be of canvassers to correct the returns accordingly; or it may ―declared that no one had been legally elected
proclaimed as the winner in the elections. find that the manner of holding the election and the president of the municipality of Imus at the general
returns are so tainted with fraud or illegality that it cannot election held in that town on 4 June 1912‖ where ―the
The facts of the case are as follows: be determined who received a [plurality] of the legally only question raised was whether or not Topacio was
On June 4, 1912, a general election was held in the town cast ballots. In the latter case, no question as to the eligible to be elected and to hold the office of municipal
of Imus, Province of Cavite, to fill the office of municipal correctness of the returns or the manner of casting and president.‖
president. The petitioner, Felipe Topacio, and the counting the ballots is before the deciding power, and
respondent, Maximo Abad, were opposing candidates for generally the only result can be that the election fails The Court did not rule that Topacio was disqualified and
that office. Topacio received 430 votes, and Abad 281. entirely. In the former, we have a contest in the strict sense that Abad as the second placer cannot be proclaimed in
Abad contested the election upon the sole ground that of the word, because of the opposing parties are striving his stead. The Court therein ruled:
Topacio was ineligible in that he was reelected the for supremacy. If it be found that the successful candidate For the foregoing reasons, we are of the opinion and so
second time to the office of the municipal president on (according to the board of canvassers) obtained a hold that the respondent judge exceeded his jurisdiction
June 4, 1912, without the four years required by Act No. plurality in an illegal manner, and that another candidate in declaring in those proceedings that no one was
2045 having intervened.[46] was the real victor, the former must retire in favor of the elect[ed] municipal president of the municipality of Imus
latter. In the other case, there is not, strictly speaking, a at the last general election; and that said order and all
Abad thus questioned the eligibility of Topacio on the contest, as the wreath of victory cannot be transferred subsequent proceedings based thereon are null and void
basis of a statutory prohibition for seeking a second re- from an ineligible candidate to any other candidate when and of no effect; and, although this decision is rendered
election absent the four year interruption. the sole question is the eligibility of the one receiving a on respondents' answer to the order to show cause, unless
plurality of the legally cast ballots. In the one case the respondents raised some new and additional issues, let
The often-quoted phrase in Topacio v. Paredes is that ―the question is as to who received a plurality of the legally judgment be entered accordingly in 5 days, without costs.
wreath of victory cannot be transferred from an ineligible cast ballots; in the other, the question is confined to the So ordered.[49]
candidate to any other candidate when the sole question personal character and circumstances of a single
is the eligibility of the one receiving a plurality of the individual.[48] (Emphasis supplied) On closer scrutiny, the phrase relied upon by a host of
legally cast ballots.‖ [47] decisions does not even have a legal basis to stand on. It
Note that the sentence where the phrase is found starts was a mere pronouncement of the Court comparing one
This phrase is not even the ratio decidendi; it is a with ―In the other case, there is not, strictly speaking, a process with another and explaining the effects thereof.
mere obiter dictum. The Court was comparing ―the effect contest‖ in contrast to the earlier statement, ―In the As an independent statement, it is even illogical.
of a decision that a candidate is not entitled to the office former, we have a contest in the strict sense of the word,
because of fraud or irregularities in the elections x x x because of the opposing parties are striving for Let us examine the statement:
[with] that produced by declaring a person ineligible to supremacy.‖
hold such an office.‖ ―x x x the wreath of victory cannot be transferred from an
The Court in Topacio v. Paredes cannot be said to have ineligible candidate to any other candidate when the sole
The complete sentence where the phrase is found is part held that “the wreath of victory cannot be transferred from question is the eligibility of the one receiving a plurality of
of a comparison and contrast between the two situations, an ineligible candidate to any other candidate when the the legally cast ballots.‖
thus: sole question is the eligibility of the one receiving a
Again, the effect of a decision that a candidate is not plurality of the legally cast ballots.” What prevents the transfer of the wreath of victory from
entitled to the office because of fraud or irregularities in the ineligible candidate to another candidate?
the elections is quite different from that produced by A proper reading of the case reveals that the ruling
declaring a person ineligible to hold such an office. In the therein is that since the Court of First Instance is without When the issue being decided upon by the Court is the
former case the court, after an examination of the ballots jurisdiction to try a disqualification case based on the eligibility of the one receiving a plurality of the legally cast

7
ballots and ineligibility is thereafter established, what stops This has been, in fact, already laid down by the Court
the Court from adjudging another eligible candidate who in Frivaldo v. COMELEC[50] when we pronounced: The first requirement that may fall when an unqualified
received the next highest number of votes as the winner x x x. The fact that he was elected by the people of reading is made is Section 39 of the LGC which specifies
and bestowing upon him that ―wreath?‖ Sorsogon does not excuse this patent violation of the the basic qualifications of local government officials.
salutary rule limiting public office and employment only to Equally susceptive of being rendered toothless is Section
An ineligible candidate who receives the highest number the citizens of this country. The qualifications prescribed 74 of the OEC that sets out what should be stated in a
of votes is a wrongful winner. By express legal mandate, for elective office cannot be erased by the electorate COC. Section 78 may likewise be emasculated as mere
he could not even have been a candidate in the first alone. The will of the people as expressed through the delay in the resolution of the petition to cancel or deny
place, but by virtue of the lack of material time or any ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility, especially if due course to a COC can render a Section 78 petition
other intervening circumstances, his ineligibility might not they mistakenly believed, as in this case, that the useless if a candidate with false COC data wins. To state
have been passed upon prior to election candidate was qualified. Obviously, this rule requires strict the obvious, candidates may risk falsifying their COC
date. Consequently, he may have had the opportunity to application when the deficiency is lack of citizenship. If a qualifications if they know that an election victory will cure
hold himself out to the electorate as a legitimate and duly person seeks to serve in the Republic of the Philippines, he any defect that their COCs may have. Election victory
qualified candidate. However, notwithstanding the must owe his total loyalty to this country only, abjuring and then becomes a magic formula to bypass election
outcome of the elections, his ineligibility as a candidate renouncing all fealty and fidelity to any other eligibility requirements. (Citations omitted)
remains unchanged. Ineligibility does not only pertain to state.[51] (Emphasis supplied)
his qualifications as a candidate but necessarily affects his What will stop an otherwise disqualified individual from
right to hold public office. The number of ballots cast in his This issue has also been jurisprudentially clarified in Velasco filing a seemingly valid COC, concealing any
favor cannot cure the defect of failure to qualify with the v. COMELEC[52] where the Court ruled that the ruling disqualification, and employing every strategy to delay
substantive legal requirements of eligibility to run for public in Quizon and Saya-angcannot be interpreted without any disqualification case filed against him so he can
office. qualifications lest ―Election victory x x x becomes a magic submit himself to the electorate and win, if winning the
formula to bypass election eligibility requirements.‖[53] election will guarantee a disregard of constitutional and
The popular vote does not cure the [W]e have ruled in the past that a candidate‘s victory in statutory provisions on qualifications and disqualifications
ineligibility of a candidate. the election may be considered a sufficient basis to rule in of candidates?
favor of the candidate sought to be disqualified if the
The ballot cannot override the constitutional and statutory main issue involves defects in the candidate‘s certificate It is imperative to safeguard the expression of the
requirements for qualifications and disqualifications of of candidacy. We said that while provisions relating to sovereign voice through the ballot by ensuring that its
candidates. When the law requires certain qualifications certificates of candidacy are mandatory in terms, it is an exercise respects the rule of law. To allow the sovereign
to be possessed or that certain disqualifications be not established rule of interpretation as regards election laws, voice spoken through the ballot to trump constitutional
possessed by persons desiring to serve as elective public that mandatory provisions requiring certain steps before and statutory provisions on qualifications and
officials, those qualifications must be met before one even elections will be construed as directory after the elections, disqualifications of candidates is not democracy or
becomes a candidate. When a person who is not to give effect to the will of the people. We so ruled in republicanism. It is electoral anarchy. When set rules are
qualified is voted for and eventually garners the highest Quizon v. COMELEC and Saya-ang v. COMELEC: disregarded and only the electorate‘s voice spoken
number of votes, even the will of the electorate expressed through the ballot is made to matter in the end, it
through the ballot cannot cure the defect in the The present case perhaps presents the proper time and precisely serves as an open invitation for electoral
qualifications of the candidate. To rule otherwise is to opportunity to fine-tune our above ruling. We say this with anarchy to set in.
trample upon and rent asunder the very law that sets forth the realization that a blanket and unqualified reading and Maquiling is not a
the qualifications and disqualifications of candidates. We application of this ruling can be fraught with dangerous second-placer as he
might as well write off our election laws if the voice of the significance for the rule of law and the integrity of our obtained the highest
electorate is the sole determinant of who should be elections. For one, such blanket/unqualified reading may number of votes from
proclaimed worthy to occupy elective positions in our provide a way around the law that effectively negates among the qualified
republic. election requirements aimed at providing the electorate candidates.
with the basic information to make an informed choice
about a candidate‘s eligibility and fitness for office.

8

With Arnado‘s disqualification, Maquiling then becomes
the winner in the election as he obtained the highest
number of votes from among the qualified candidates.
We have ruled in the recent cases of Aratea v.
COMELEC[54] and Jalosjos v. COMELEC[55] that a void COC
cannot produce any legal effect. Thus, the votes cast in
favor of the ineligible candidate are not considered at all
in determining the winner of an election.
Even when the votes for the ineligible candidate are
disregarded, the will of the electorate is still respected,
and even more so. The votes cast in favor of an ineligible
candidate do not constitute the sole and total expression
of the sovereign voice. The votes cast in favor of eligible
and legitimate candidates form part of that voice and
must also be respected.
As in any contest, elections are governed by rules that
determine the qualifications and disqualifications of those shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action,
who are allowed to participate as players. When there are inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or
participants who turn out to be ineligible, their victory is
voided and the laurel is awarded to the next in rank who
does not possess any of the disqualifications nor lacks any whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.
of the qualifications set in the rules to be eligible as
candidates.
There is no need to apply the rule cited in Labo v.
COMELEC[56] that when the voters are well aware within
the realm of notoriety of a candidate‘s disqualification
and still cast their votes in favor said candidate, then the
eligible candidate obtaining the next higher number of
votes may be deemed elected. That rule is also a
mere obiter that further complicated the rules affecting
qualified candidates who placed second to ineligible
ones.
The electorate‘s awareness of the candidate‘s
disqualification is not a prerequisite for the disqualification elected, from holding the office.
to attach to the candidate. The very existence of a
disqualifying circumstance makes the candidate
ineligible. Knowledge by the electorate of a candidate‘s
disqualification is not necessary before a qualified
candidate who placed second to a disqualified one can
be proclaimed as the winner. The second-placer in the
vote count is actually the first-placer among the qualified
candidates.
That the disqualified candidate has already been
proclaimed and has assumed office is of no moment. The
subsequent disqualification based on a substantive
ground that existed prior to the filing of the certificate of
candidacy voids not only the COC but also the
proclamation.
Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 provides:
Section 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. - Any candidate
who has been declared by final judgment to be
disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for
him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is
not declared by final judgment before an election to be
disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning
number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission
any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order
the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate
There was no chance for Arnado‘s proclamation to be
suspended under this rule because Arnado failed to file his
answer to the petition seeking his disqualification. Arnado
only filed his Answer on 15 June 2010, long after the
elections and after he was already proclaimed as the
winner.
The disqualifying circumstance surrounding Arnado‘s
candidacy involves his citizenship. It does not involve the
commission of election offenses as provided for in the first
sentence of Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, the
effect of which is to disqualify the individual from
continuing as a candidate, or if he has already been
The disqualifying circumstance affecting Arnado is his
citizenship. As earlier discussed, Arnado was both a Filipino
and an American citizen when he filed his certificate of
candidacy. He was a dual citizen disqualified to run for
public office based on Section 40(d) of the Local
Government Code.
Section 40 starts with the statement ―The following persons
are disqualified from running for any elective local
position.‖ The prohibition serves as a bar against the
individuals who fall under any of the enumeration from
participating as candidates in the election.
With Arnado being barred from even becoming a
candidate, his certificate of candidacy is thus rendered
void from the beginning. It could not have produced any
other legal effect except that Arnado rendered it
impossible to effect his disqualification prior to the
elections because he filed his answer to the petition when
the elections were conducted already and he was
already proclaimed the winner.
To hold that such proclamation is valid is to negate the
prohibitory character of the disqualification which Arnado
possessed even prior to the filing of the certificate of
candidacy. The affirmation of Arnado‘s disqualification,
although made long after the elections, reaches back to
the filing of the certificate of candidacy. Arnado is
declared to be not a candidate at all in the May 2010
elections.
Arnado being a non-candidate, the votes cast in his favor
should not have been counted. This leaves Maquiling as
the qualified candidate who obtained the highest
number of votes. Therefore, the rule on succession under
the Local Government Code will not apply.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition
is GRANTED. The Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc
dated 2 February 2011 is hereby ANNULLED and SET
ASIDE. Respondent ROMMEL ARNADO y CAGOCO is
disqualified from running for any local elective
position. CASAN MACODE MAQUILING is
hereby DECLARED the duly elected Mayor of Kauswagan,
Lanao del Norte in the 10 May 2010 elections.
9
This Decision is immediately executory.
Let a copy of this Decision be served personally upon the
parties and the Commission on Elections.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Velasco, Jr., Peralta Bersamin, Villarama, Jr., Perez,
Reyes, and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur.
Carpio, J., see concurring opinion.
Leonardo-De Castro, Del Castillo, Mendoza, and Leonen,
JJ., joins the dissent of J. Brion.
Brion, J., see: dissent.
Abad, J., see separate and concurring opinion.
[1] Rollo, pp. 38-49.
[2] Id. at 50-67.
[3] Id. at 229, Exhibit ―1-MR,‖ Certificate of Live Birth.
[4] Id. at 241, Exhibit ―12-MR,‖ Oath of Allegiance.
[5] Id. at 239, Exhibit ―10-MR,‖ Order of Approval.
Ibid, Note 2 and Annex ―1‖ of Duly Verified Answer,
[6]
Rollo, p. 160 and Annex ―2‖ of Memorandum for
Respondent, Rollo, p. 178.
[7] Ibid, p. 160 and 178.
[8] Id. at 139, Annex ―B‖ of Petition for Disqualification; Id. at
177, Annex ―1‖ Memorandum for Respondent.
[9] Id. at 134, Petition to Disqualify Rommel Cagoco
Arnado and/or to Cancel his Certificate of Candidacy for grounds for disqualification may be filed on any day after dual allegiance by reason of retention of foreign
Municipal Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte in
Connection with May 10, 2010 Local and National
Elections.
[10] Id. at 140, Certification.
February 2011.
[11]Id. at 191, Exhibit ―A‖ of Memorandum for Petitioner
filed before the Commission on Elections. [26] Id. at 69, Separate Concurring Opinion.
[12]Id. at 192, Exhibit ―C‖ of Memorandum for Petitioner Id. at 72-73, Dissenting Opinion of Commissioner Rene
[27]
filed before the Commission on Elections. V. Sarmiento, citing the cases of Torayno, Sr. v. COMELEC,
337 SCRA 574 [2000]; Santos v. COMELEC, 103 SCRA
[13] Records, pp. 76-77. 628 [1981]; Sanchez v. Del Rosario, 1 SCRA 1102 [1961];
and Reyes v. COMELEC, 97 SCRA 500 [1980].
Rollo, p. 42, Resolution dated 5 October 2010, penned
[14]
by Commissioner Rene V. Sarmiento, and concurred in by [28] 367 Phil. 132 (1999).
Commissioner Armando C. Velasco and Gregorio Y.
Larrazabal. [29] Id. at 142-143.
[15] Id. [30] G.R. No. 105919, 6 August 1992, 212 SCRA 309.
[16] Id. at 43. [31] Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225.
[17] Id. at 44. [32]See excerpts of deliberations of Congress reproduced
in AASJS v. Datumanong, G.R. No. 160869, 11 May 2007,
[18] Id. 523 SCRA 108.
[19] Id. at 46-47, Resolution dated 5 October 2010. In resolving the aforecited issues in this case, resort to the
deliberations of Congress is necessary to determine the
[20] Id at 48. intent of the legislative branch in drafting the assailed law.
During the deliberations, the issue of whether Rep. Act No.
[21] Id. at 214, Amended Motion for Reconsideration. 9225 would allow dual allegiance had in fact been the
subject of debate. The record of the legislative
Id. at 193-211, Verified Motion for Reconsideration; id.
[22] deliberations reveals the following:
at 212-246, Amended Motion for Reconsideration; id. at xxxx
247-254, Rejoinder to Petitioner‘s Comment/Opposition to
Respondent‘s Amended Motion for Reconsideration. Pursuing his point, Rep. Dilangalen noted that under the
measure, two situations exist — the retention of foreign
[23] Id. at 224, Amended Motion for Reconsideration. citizenship, and the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.
In this case, he observed that there are two citizenships
[24] A verified petition to disqualify a candidate pursuant to and therefore, two allegiances. He pointed out that under
Sec. 68 of the OEC and the verified petition to disqualify a the Constitution, dual allegiance is inimical to public
candidate for lack of qualifications or possessing some interest. He thereafter asked whether with the creation of
the last day for filing of certificates of candidacy but not citizenship and the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship,
later than the date of proclamation. (Sec. 4.B.1. COMELEC there will now be a violation of the Constitution. IEAacT
Resolution No. 8696).
Rep. Locsin underscored that the measure does not seek
[25] Rollo, pp. 64-66, COMELEC En Banc Resolution dated 2 to address the constitutional injunction on dual allegiance
10
as inimical to public interest. He said that the proposed
law aims to facilitate the reacquisition of Philippine
citizenship by speedy means. However, he said that in
one sense, it addresses the problem of dual citizenship by
requiring the taking of an oath. He explained that the
problem of dual citizenship is transferred from the
Philippines to the foreign country because the latest oath
that will be taken by the former Filipino is one of
allegiance to the Philippines and not to the United States,
as the case may be. He added that this is a matter which
the Philippine government will have no concern and
competence over.
Rep. Dilangalen asked why this will no longer be the
country's concern, when dual allegiance is involved.
Rep. Locsin clarified that this was precisely his objection to
the original version of the bill, which did not require an
oath of allegiance. Since the measure now requires this
oath, the problem of dual allegiance is transferred from
the Philippines to the foreign country concerned, he
explained.
xxxx
Rep. Dilangalen asked whether in the particular case, the
person did not denounce his foreign citizenship and
therefore still owes allegiance to the foreign government,
and at the same time, owes his allegiance to the
Philippine government, such that there is now a case of
dual citizenship and dual allegiance.
Rep. Locsin clarified that by swearing to the supreme
authority of the Republic, the person implicitly renounces
his foreign citizenship. However, he said that this is not a
matter that he wishes to address in Congress because he
is not a member of a foreign parliament but a Member of
the House.
xxxx
Rep. Locsin replied that it is imperative that those who
have dual allegiance contrary to national interest should
be dealt with by law. However, he said that the dual
allegiance problem is not addressed in the bill. He then
cited the Declaration of Policy in the bill which states that
"It is hereby declared the policy of the State that all
citizens who become citizens of another country shall be
deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under
the conditions of this Act." He stressed that what the bill
does is recognize Philippine citizenship but says nothing
about the other citizenship.
Rep. Locsin further pointed out that the problem of dual
allegiance is created wherein a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines takes an oath of allegiance to another country
and in that oath says that he abjures and absolutely
renounces all allegiance to his country of origin and
swears allegiance to that foreign country. The original Bill
had left it at this stage, he explained. In the present
measure, he clarified, a person is required to take an oath
and the last he utters is one of allegiance to the country.
He then said that the problem of dual allegiance is no
longer the problem of the Philippines but of the other
foreign country. (Emphasis supplied)
[33] See Discussion of Senators Enrile and Pimentel on Sec.
40(d) of the Local Government Code, reproduced
in Cordora v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 176947, 19 February
2009, 580 SCRA 12.
By electing Philippine citizenship, such candidates at the
same time forswear allegiance to the other country of
which they are also citizens and thereby terminate their
status as dual citizens. It may be that, from the point of
view of the foreign state and of its laws, such an individual
has not effectively renounced his foreign citizenship. That
is of no moment as the following discussion on §40(d)
between Senators Enrile and Pimentel clearly shows:
SENATOR ENRILE:
Mr. President, I would like to ask clarification of line 41,
page 17: "Any person with dual citizenship " is disqualified
to run for any elective local position. Under the present
Constitution, Mr. President, someone whose mother is a
citizen of the Philippines but his father is a foreigner is a
natural-born citizen of the Republic. There is no
requirement that such a natural-born citizen, upon
reaching the age of majority, must elect or give up
Philippine citizenship.
On the assumption that this person would carry two
passports, one belonging to the country of his or her father
and one belonging to the Republic of the Philippines, may
such a situation disqualify the person to run for a local
government position?
SENATOR PIMENTEL:
To my mind, Mr. President, it only means that at the
moment when he would want to run for public office, he
has to repudiate one of his citizenships.
SENATOR ENRILE:
Suppose he carries only a Philippine passport but the
country of origin or the country of the father claims that
person, nevertheless, as a citizen? No one can renounce.
There are such countries in the world.
SENATOR PIMENTEL:
Well, the very fact that he is running for public office
would, in effect, be an election for him of his desire to be
considered a Filipino citizen.
SENATOR ENRILE:
But, precisely, Mr. President, the Constitution does not
require an election. Under the Constitution, a person
whose mother is a citizen of the Philippines is, at birth, a
citizen without any overt act to claim the citizenship.
SENATOR PIMENTEL:
Yes. What we are saying, Mr. President, is: Under the
Gentleman's example, if he does not renounce his other
citizenship, then he is opening himself to question. So, if he
is really interested to run, the first thing he should do is to
say in the Certificate of Candidacy that: "I am a Filipino
citizen, and I have only one citizenship."
SENATOR ENRILE:
11
 February 2009, 580 SCRA 12.
But we are talking from the viewpoint of Philippine law, Mr.
President. He will always have one citizenship, and that is [40] Sec. 40. Disqualifications. - The following persons are

the citizenship invested upon him or her in the Constitution disqualified from running for any elective local position:
of the Republic. x x xx

SENATOR PIMENTEL: (d) Those with dual citizenship; x x x.

That is true, Mr. President. But if he exercises acts that will [41] Fivaldo v. COMELEC, 255 Phil. 934, 944 (1989).
prove that he also acknowledges other citizenships, then
he will probably fall under this disqualification. [42] Rollo, p. 46, Resolution dated 5 October 2010.
[34] Supra note 28 at 153.
[43] Id. at 219, Amended Motion for Reconsideration.
[35]Under Commonwealth Act No. 63, a Filipino citizen
may lose his citizenship: [44] Id. at 66, Resolution dated 02 February 2011.
(1) By naturalization in a foreign country;
[45] 23 Phil. 238 (1912).
(2) By express renunciation of citizenship;
[46]Id. at 240.
(3) By subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the
constitution or laws of a foreign country upon attaining [47] Id. at 255.
twenty-one years of age or more;
[48] Id at 254-255.
(4) By accepting commission in the military, naval or air
service of a foreign country; [49] Id. at 258

(5) By cancellation of the certificate of naturalization; [50] Supra note 41.

(6) By having been declared by competent authority, a [51] Id. at 944-945.

deserter of the Philippine armed forces in time of war,
unless subsequently, a plenary pardon or amnesty has G.R. No. 180051, 24 December 2008, 575 SCRA 590,
[52]

been granted: and 614-615.

(7) In case of a woman, upon her marriage, to a foreigner [53] Id. at 615, citing Quizon v. COMELEC, G.R. NO. 177927,
if, by virtue of the laws in force in her husband‘s country, 15 February 2008, 545 SCRA 635, Saya-ang v.
she acquires his nationality. COMELEC, 462 Phil. 373 (2003).

[36] See Note 7. [54] G. R. No. 195229, 9 October 2012.

[37] Id. [55] G.R. Nos. 193237/193536, 9 October 2012.

[38] Id. [56] G.R. No. 105111, 3 July 3 1992, 211 SCRA 297, 312.

[39] See Cordora v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 176947, 19

12
409 Phil. 633
EN BANC
[ G.R. No. 142840, May 07, 2001 ]
ANTONIO BENGSON III, PETITIONER, VS. HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL AND TEODORO C.
CRUZ, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
KAPUNAN, J.:
The citizenship of respondent Teodoro C. Cruz is at issue in
this case, in view of the constitutional requirement that "no
person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives
unless he is a natural-born citizen."[1]
Respondent Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines. He was born in San Clemente, Tarlac, on April
27, 1960, of Filipino parents. The fundamental law then
applicable was the 1935 Constitution.[2]
On November 5, 1985, however, respondent Cruz enlisted automatically entitled to the full enjoyment of his civil and
in the United States Marine Corps and, without the
consent of the Republic of the Philippines, took an oath of
allegiance to the United States. As a consequence, he lost
his Filipino citizenship for under Commonwealth Act No.
63, Section 1(4), a Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship
by, among others, "rendering service to or accepting
commission in the armed forces of a foreign country." Said
provision of law reads:
Section 1. How citizenship may be lost. — A Filipino citizen
may lose his citizenship in any of the following ways and/or
events:
xxx xxx xxx
(4) By rendering services to, or accepting commission in,
the armed forces of a foreign country: Provided, That the
rendering of service to, or the acceptance of such
commission in, the armed forces of a foreign country, and
the taking of an oath of allegiance incident thereto, with
the consent of the Republic of the Philippines, shall not
divest a Filipino of his Philippine citizenship if either of the
following circumstances is present:
(a) The Republic of the Philippines has a defensive and/or
offensive pact of alliance with said foreign country; or
(b) The said foreign country maintains armed forces on
Philippine territory with the consent of the Republic of the
Philippines: Provided, That the Filipino citizen concerned,
at the time of rendering said service, or acceptance of
said commission, and taking the oath of allegiance
incident thereto, states that he does so only in connection
with his service to said foreign country; And provided,
finally, That any Filipino citizen who is rendering service to,
or is commissioned in, the armed forces of a foreign
country under any of the circumstances mentioned in
paragraph (a) or (b), shall not be permitted to participate
nor vote in any election of the Republic of the Philippines
during the period of his service to, or commission in, the
armed forces of said country. Upon his discharge from the
service of the said foreign country, he shall be
political rights as a Filipino citizen x x x.
Whatever doubt that remained regarding his loss of
Philippine citizenship was erased by his naturalization as a
U.S. citizen on June 5, 1990, in connection with his service
in the U.S. Marine Corps.
On March 17, 1994, respondent Cruz reacquired his
Philippine citizenship through repatriation under Republic
Act No. 2630.[3] He ran for and was elected as the
Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan in the
May 11, 1998 elections. He won by a convincing margin of
26,671 votes over petitioner Antonio Bengson III, who was
then running for reelection.
Subsequently, petitioner filed a case for Quo Warranto Ad
Cautelam with respondent House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal (HRET) claiming that respondent Cruz
was not qualified to become a member of the House of
Representatives since he is not a natural-born citizen as
required under Article VI, Section 6 of the Constitution.[4]
On March 2, 2000, the HRET rendered its
decision[5] dismissing the petition for quo warranto and
declaring respondent Cruz the duly elected
Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan in the
May 1998 elections. The HRET likewise denied petitioner's
motion for reconsideration of the decision in its resolution
dated April 27, 2000.[6]
Petitioner thus filed the present petition
for certiorari assailing the HRET's decision on the following
grounds:
1. The HRET committed serious errors and grave abuse of
discretion, amounting to excess of jurisdiction, when it
ruled that private respondent is a natural-born citizen of
the Philippines despite the fact that he had ceased being
such in view of the loss and renunciation of such
citizenship on his part.
2. The HRET committed serious errors and grave abuse of
discretion, amounting to excess of jurisdiction, when it
considered private respondent as a citizen of the
Philippines despite the fact that he did not validly acquire
his Philippine citizenship.
3. Assuming that private respondent's acquisition of
Philippine citizenship was invalid, the HRET committed
serious errors and grave abuse of discretion, amounting to
excess of jurisdiction, when it dismissed the petition despite
the fact that such reacquisition could not legally and
constitutionally restore his natural-born status.[7]
The issue now before us is whether respondent Cruz, a
natural-born Filipino who became an American citizen,
can still be considered a natural-born Filipino upon his
reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.
13
Petitioner asserts that respondent Cruz may no longer be
considered a natural-born Filipino since he lost his
Philippine citizenship when he swore allegiance to the
United States in 1995, and had to reacquire the same by
repatriation. He insists that Article IV, Section 2 of the
Constitution expressly states that natural-born citizens are
those who are citizens from birth without having to
perform any act to acquire or perfect such citizenship.
Respondent on the other hand contends that he
reacquired his status as a natural-born citizen when he
was repatriated since the phrase "from birth" in Article IV,
Section 2 refers to the innate, inherent and inborn
characteristic of being a natural-born citizen.
The petition is without merit.
The 1987 Constitution enumerates who are Filipino citizens
as follows:
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of
the adoption of this Constitution;
(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the
Philippines;
(3) Those born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mothers,
who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of
majority, and
(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.[8]
There are two ways of acquiring citizenship: (1) by birth,
and (2) by naturalization. These ways of acquiring
citizenship correspond to the two kinds of citizens: the
natural-born citizen, and the naturalized citizen. A person
who at the time of his birth is a citizen of a particular
country, is a natural-born citizen thereof.[9]
As defined in the same Constitution, natural-born citizens
"are those citizens of the Philippines from birth without
having to perform any act to acquire or perfect his
Philippine citizenship."[10]
On the other hand, naturalized citizens are those who
have become Filipino citizens through naturalization,
generally under Commonwealth Act No. 473, otherwise
known as the Revised Naturalization Law, which repealed
the former Naturalization Law (Act No. 2927), and by
Republic Act No. 530.[11] To be naturalized, an applicant
has to prove that he possesses all the qualifications[12] and
none of the disqualifications[13] provided by law to
become a Filipino citizen. The decision granting Philippine
citizenship becomes executory only after two (2) years
from its promulgation when the court is satisfied that
during the intervening period, the applicant has (1) not
left the Philippines; (2) has dedicated himself to a lawful
calling or profession; (3) has not been convicted of any
offense or violation of Government promulgated rules; or
(4) committed any act prejudicial to the interest of the
nation or contrary to any Government announced
policies.[14]
Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may
however reacquire the same in the manner provided by
law. Commonwealth Act. No. 63 (C.A. No. 63),
enumerates the three modes by which Philippine
citizenship may be reacquired by a former citizen: (1) by
naturalization, (2) by repatriation, and (3) by direct act of
Congress.[15]
Naturalization is a mode for both acquisition and
reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. As a mode of initially
acquiring Philippine citizenship, naturalization is governed
by Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended. On the
other hand, naturalization as a mode for reacquiring
Philippine citizenship is governed by Commonwealth Act
No. 63.[16]Under this law, a former Filipino citizen who
wishes to reacquire Philippine citizenship must possess
certain qualifications[17] and none of the disqualifications
mentioned in Section 4 of C.A. 473.[18]
Repatriation, on the other hand, may be had under
various statutes by those who lost their citizenship due to:
(1) desertion of the armed forces;[19] (2) service in the
armed forces of the allied forces in World War II;[20] (3)
service in the Armed Forces of the United States at any
other time;[21] (4) marriage of a Filipino woman to an
alien;[22] and (5) political and economic necessity.[23]
As distinguished from the lengthy process of naturalization,
repatriation simply consists of the taking of an oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and
registering said oath in the Local Civil Registry of the place
where the person concerned resides or last resided.
In Angat v. Republic,[24] we held:
xxx. Parenthetically, under these statutes [referring to RA
Nos. 965 and 2630], the person desiring to reacquire
Philippine citizenship would not even be required to file a
petition in court, and all that he had to do was to take an
oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and
to register that fact with the civil registry in the place of his
residence or where he had last resided in the Philippines.
[Italics in the original.][25]
Moreover, repatriation results in the recovery of the
original nationality.[26] This means that a naturalized Filipino
who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as
a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was
originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine
citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a
natural-born Filipino.
In respondent Cruz's case, he lost his Filipino citizenship
when he rendered service in the Armed Forces of the
United States. However, he subsequently reacquired
Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 2630, which provides:
Section 1. Any person who had lost his Philippine
citizenship by rendering service to, or accepting
commission in, the Armed Forces of the United States, or
after separation from the Armed Forces of the United
States, acquired United States citizenship, may reacquire
Philippine citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to
the Republic of the Philippines and registering the same
14
with Local Civil Registry in the place where he resides or
last resided in the Philippines. The said oath of allegiance
shall contain a renunciation of any other citizenship.
Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the
Republic and having registered the same in the Civil
Registry of Magantarem, Pangasinan in accordance with accordance with paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof shall be
the aforecited provision, respondent Cruz is deemed to
have recovered his original status as a natural-born
citizen, a status which he acquired at birth as the son of a citizens. It is apparent from the enumeration of who are
Filipino father.[27] It bears stressing that the act of
repatriation allows him to recover, or return to, his original two classes of citizens: (1) those who are natural-born and
status before he lost his Philippine citizenship.
Petitioner's contention that respondent Cruz is no longer a undergo the process of naturalization to obtain Philippine
natural-born citizen since he had to perform an act to
regain his citizenship is untenable. As correctly explained
by the HRET in its decision, the term "natural-born citizen"
was first defined in Article III, Section 4 of the 1973
Constitution as follows:
Sec. 4. A natural-born citizen is one who is a citizen of the
Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to
acquire or perfect his Philippine citizenship.
Two requisites must concur for a person to be considered
as such: (1) a person must be a Filipino citizen from birth
and (2) he does not have to perform any act to obtain or
perfect his Philippine citizenship.
Under the 1973 Constitution definition, there were two
categories of Filipino citizens which were not considered
natural-born: (1) those who were naturalized and (2) those
born before January 17, 1973,[28] of Filipino mothers who,
upon reaching the age of majority, elected Philippine
citizenship. Those "naturalized citizens" were not
considered natural-born obviously because they were not
Filipinos at birth and had to perform an act to acquire
Philippine citizenship. Those born of Filipino mothers before
the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution were likewise not
considered natural-born because they also had to
perform an act to perfect their Philippine citizenship.
The present Constitution, however, now considers those WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.
born of Filipino mothers before the effectivity of the 1973
Constitution and who elected Philippine citizenship upon SO ORDERED.
reaching the majority age as natural-born. After defining
who are natural-born citizens, Section 2 of Article IV adds Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, and Puno, JJ., concur.
a sentence: "Those who elect Philippine citizenship in
Ynares-Santiago, J., C.J., Davide certified that she joins
deemed natural-born citizens." Consequently, only
with the majority opinion of J. Kapunan.
naturalized Filipinos are considered not natural-born
Panganiban, J., has separate concurring opinion.
citizens under the present Constitution that there are only
(2) those who are naturalized in accordance with law. A Pardo and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., join the concurring
citizen who is not a naturalized Filipino, i.e., did not have to opinion of J., Panganiban.
citizenship, necessarily is a natural-born Filipino. Sandoval-Gutierrez, J., dissents, please see dissenting
Noteworthy is the absence in said enumeration of a opinion.
separate category for persons who, after losing Philippine
citizenship, subsequently reacquire it. The reason therefor Melo and Vitug, JJ., no part. Chairman and member,
is clear: as to such persons, they would either be natural- respectively, of HRET which rendered the appealed
born or naturalized depending on the reasons for the loss judgement.
of their citizenship and the mode prescribed by the
applicable law for the reacquisition thereof. As Mendoza, J., no part, being ponente of decision under
respondent Cruz was not required by law to go through review.
naturalization proceedings in order to reacquire his
citizenship, he is perforce a natural-born Filipino. As such, Quisumbing, Buena, and de Leon Jr., JJ., on leave.
he possessed all the necessary qualifications to be
elected as member of the House of Representatives.
A final point. The HRET has been empowered by the [1] 1987 Constitution, Article IV, Section 6.
Constitution to be the "sole judge" of all contests relating
to the election, returns, and qualifications of the members [2] Article IV, Section 1 of the 1935 Constitution states:
of the House.[29] The Court's jurisdiction over the HRET is
merely to check "whether or not there has been a grave The following are citizens of the Philippines:
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction" on the part of the latter.[30] In the absence
1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the
thereof, there is no occasion for the Court to exercise its
time of the adoption of the Constitution;
corrective power and annul the decision of the HRET nor
to substitute the Court's judgment for that of the latter for
2) Those born in the Philippine Islands of foreign parents
the simple reason that it is not the office of a petition
who, before the adoption of this Constitution had been
for certiorari to inquire into the correctness of the assailed
elected to public office in the Philippine Islands;
decision.[31] There is no such showing of grave abuse of
discretion in this case.
3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines;
15
4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and, [12] Section 2, Act 473 provides the following qualifications: (b) He must not be defending or teaching the necessity or
upon reaching the age of majority, elected Philippine propriety of violence, personal assault, or assassination for
citizenship; and (a) He must be not less than 21 years of age on the day of the success and predominance of their ideas;
the hearing of the petition;
5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law. (c) He must not be a polygamist or believer in the
(b) He must have resided in the Philippines for a practice of polygamy;
[3] An Act Providing for Reacquisition of Philippine continuous period of not less than ten years;
Citizenship by Persons Who Lost Such Citizenship by (d) He must not have been convicted of any crime
Rendering Service To, or Accepting Commission In, the (c) He must be of good moral character and believes in involving moral turpitude;
Armed Forces of the United States (1960). the principles underlying the Philippine Constitution, and
must have conducted himself in a proper and (e) He must not be suffering from mental alienation or
[4] Said provision reads: irreproachable manner during the entire period of his incurable contagious diseases;
residence in the Philippines in his relation with the
No person shall be a member of the House of constituted government and as well as with the (f) He must have, during the period of his residence in the
Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen of the community in which he is living; Philippines (of not less than six months before filing his
Philippines and, on the day of the election, is at least application), mingled socially with the Filipinos, or who
twenty-five years of age, able to read and write, and (d) He must own real estate in the Philippines worth not have not evinced a sincere desire to learn and embrace
except the party-list representatives, a registered voter in less than five thousand pesos, Philippine currency, or must the customs, traditions and ideals of the Filipinos;
the district in which he shall be elected, and a resident have some known lucrative trade, profession, or lawful
thereof for a period of not less than one year immediately occupation; (g) He must not be a citizen or subject of a nation with
preceding the day of the election. whom the Philippines is at war, during the period of such
(e) He must be able to speak and write English or Spanish war;
[5] Rollo, p. 36. and any of the principal languages; and
(h) He must not be a citizen or subject of a foreign country
[6] Id., at 69. (f) He must have enrolled his minor children of school age, whose laws do not grant Filipinos the right to become
in any of the public schools or private schools recognized naturalized citizens or subjects thereof.
[7] Id., at 13. by the Bureau of Private Schools of the Philippines where
Philippine history, government and civic are taught or [14] Section 1, R.A. 530.

[8] Article IV, Section 1. prescribed as part of the school curriculum, during the
entire period of the residence in the Philippines required of [15] Section 2, C.A. No. 63.
him prior to the hearing of his petition for naturalization as
I TOLENTINO, COMMENTARIES AND JURISPRUDENCE ON
[9]
Philippine citizen.
THE CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES 188, 1990 Ed. [16] An Act Providing for the Ways in Which Philippine

Citizenship May Be Lost or Reacquired (1936).

[13] Section 4, Act 473, provides the following
[10] 1987 Constitution, Article IV, Section 2.
disqualifications: [17] 1. The applicant must have lost his original Philippine

During the period under Martial Law declared by

[11] citizenship by naturalization in a foreign country or by
(a) He must not be opposed to organized government or express renunciation of his citizenship (Sec. 1[1] and [2],
President Ferdinand E. Marcos, thousands of aliens were
affiliated with any association or group of persons who C.A. No. 63);
naturalized by Presidential Decree where the screening of
uphold and teach doctrines opposing all organized
the applicants was undertaken by special committee
governments;
under Letter of Instructions No. 270, dated April 11, 1975, 2. He must be at least twenty-one years of age and shall
as amended. have resided in the Philippines at least six months before
he applies for naturalization (Sec. 3[1], C.A. No. 63);

16
3. He must have conducted himself in a proper and
irreproachable manner during the entire period of his
residence (of at least six months prior to the filing of the
application) in the Philippines, in his relations with the
constituted government as well as with the community in
which he is living (Sec. 3[2], C.A. No. 63);
4. He subscribes to an oath declaring his intention to
renounce absolutely and perpetually all faith and
allegiance to the foreign authority, state or sovereignty of
which he was a citizen or subject (Sec. 3[3], C.A. No. 63).
Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members,
three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to
be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six
shall be Members of the Senate or the House of
Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen
on the basis of proportional representation from the
political parties and the parties or organizations registered
under the party-list system represented therein. The senior
Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman.
Garcia vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal,
[30]

312 SCRA 353, 364 (1999).

[18] See note 13.
[31] Id
[19] Sec. 4, C.A. No. 63.

[20] Sec. 1, Republic Act No. 965 (1953).

[21] Sec. 1, Republic Act No. 2630 (1960).

[22] Sec. 1, Republic Act No. 8171 (1995).

[23] Ibid.

[24] 314 SCRA 438 (1999).

[25] Id., at 450.

Jovito R. Salonga, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW, p. 165

[26]

(1995).

[27] See Art. IV, Sec. 1, 1935 Constitution.

[28] The date of effectivity of the 1973 Constitution.

Article VI, Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution provides

[29]

thus:

Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives

shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the
sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns,
and qualifications of their respective Members. Each

17
468 Phil. 421 concubinage against the father of respondent, Allan F.
Antecedent Case Settings Poe, after discovering his bigamous relationship with Bessie
Kelley, 3) an English translation of the affidavit aforesaid, 4)
EN BANC On 31 December 2003, respondent Ronald Allan Kelly a certified photocopy of the certificate of birth of Allan F.
[ G.R. No. 161434, March 03, 2004 ] Poe, also known as Fernando Poe, Jr. (hereinafter "FPJ"), Poe, 5) a certification issued by the Director of the
MARIA JEANETTE C. TECSON AND FELIX B. DESIDERIO, JR., filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of Records Management and Archives Office, attesting to
PETITIONERS, VS. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, RONALD President of the Republic of the Philippines under the the fact that there was no record in the National Archives
ALLAN KELLY POE (A.K.A. FERNANDO POE, JR.) AND Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang Pilipino (KNP) Party, in the that a Lorenzo Poe or Lorenzo Pou resided or entered the
VICTORINO X. FORNIER, RESPONDENTS. [*] forthcoming national elections. In his certificate of Philippines before 1907, and 6) a certification from the
candidacy, FPJ, representing himself to be a natural-born Officer-In-Charge of the Archives Division of the National
[G.R. No. 161634. March 3, 2004] citizen of the Philippines, stated his name to be "Fernando Archives to the effect that no available information could
Jr.," or "Ronald Allan" Poe, his date of birth to be 20 August be found in the files of the National Archives regarding the
ZOILO ANTONIO VELEZ, PETITIONER, VS. RONALD ALLAN 1939 and his place of birth to be Manila. birth of Allan F. Poe.
KELLEY POE, A.K.A. FERNANDO POE, JR., RESPONDENT. [*]
Victorino X. Fornier, petitioner in G.R. No. 161824, entitled On his part, respondent, presented twenty-two
[G. R. No. 161824. March 3, 2004] "Victorino X. Fornier, Petitioner, versus Hon. Commission on documentary pieces of evidence, the more significant
Elections and Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, also known as ones being - a) a certification issued by Estrella M.
VICTORINO X. FORNIER, PETITIONER, VS. HON. Fernando Poe, Jr., Respondents," initiated, on 09 January Domingo of the Archives Division of the National Archives
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND RONALD ALLAN KELLEY 2004, a petition docketed SPA No. 04-003 before the that there appeared to be no available information
POE, ALSO KNOWN AS FERNANDO POE JR., RESPONDENTS. Commission on Elections ("COMELEC") to disqualify FPJ regarding the birth of Allan F. Poe in the registry of births
and to deny due course or to cancel his certificate of for San Carlos, Pangasinan, b) a certification issued by the
DECISION candidacy upon the thesis that FPJ made a material Officer-In-Charge of the Archives Division of the National
VITUG, J.: misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by Archives that no available information about the marriage
Citizenship is a treasured right conferred on those whom claiming to be a natural-born Filipino citizen when in truth, of Allan F. Poe and Paulita Gomez could be found, c) a
the state believes are deserving of the privilege. It is a according to Fornier, his parents were foreigners; his certificate of birth of Ronald Allan Poe, d) Original
―precious heritage, as well as an inestimable mother, Bessie Kelley Poe, was an American, and his Certificate of Title No. P-2247 of the Registry of Deeds for
acquisition,‖[1] that cannot be taken lightly by anyone - father, Allan Poe, was a Spanish national, being the son of the Province of Pangasinan, in the name of Lorenzo Pou,
either by those who enjoy it or by those who dispute it. Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject. Granting, petitioner e) copies of Tax Declaration No. 20844, No. 20643, No.
asseverated, that Allan F. Poe was a Filipino citizen, he 23477 and No. 23478 in the name of Lorenzo Pou, f) a
Before the Court are three consolidated cases, all of could not have transmitted his Filipino citizenship to FPJ, copy of the certificate of death of Lorenzo Pou, g) a copy
which raise a single question of profound importance to the latter being an illegitimate child of an alien mother. of the purported marriage contract between Fernando
the nation. The issue of citizenship is brought up to Petitioner based the allegation of the illegitimate birth of Pou and Bessie Kelley, and h) a certification issued by the
challenge the qualifications of a presidential candidate to respondent on two assertions - first, Allan F. Poe City Civil Registrar of San Carlos City, Pangasinan, stating
hold the highest office of the land. Our people are waiting contracted a prior marriage to a certain Paulita Gomez that the records of birth in the said office during the period
for the judgment of the Court with bated breath. Is before his marriage to Bessie Kelley and, second, even if of from 1900 until May 1946 were totally destroyed during
Fernando Poe, Jr., the hero of silver screen, and now one no such prior marriage had existed, Allan F. Poe, married World War II.
of the main contenders for the presidency, a natural-born Bessie Kelly only a year after the birth of respondent.
Filipino or is he not? On 23 January 2004, the COMELEC dismissed SPA No. 04-
In the hearing before the Third Division of the COMELEC on 003 for lack of merit. Three days later, or on 26 January
The moment of introspection takes us face to face with 19 January 2004, petitioner, in support of his claim, 2004, Fornier filed his motion for reconsideration. The
Spanish and American colonial roots and reminds us of presented several documentary exhibits - 1) a copy of the motion was denied on 06 February 2004 by the
the rich heritage of civil law and common law traditions, certificate of birth of FPJ, 2) a certified photocopy of an COMELEC en banc. On 10 February 2004, petitioner
the fusion resulting in a hybrid of laws and jurisprudence affidavit executed in Spanish by Paulita Poe y Gomez assailed the decision of the COMELEC before this Court
that could be no less than distinctly Filipino. attesting to her having filed a case for bigamy and conformably with Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, of the

18
Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. The petition, docketed G. and in relation to Article 69 of the Omnibus Election Code Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution in
R. No. 161824, likewise prayed for a temporary restraining which would authorize "any interested party" to file a assailing the jurisdiction of the COMELEC when it took
order, a writ of preliminary injunction or any other verified petition to deny or cancel the certificate of cognizance of SPA No. 04-003 and in urging the Supreme
resolution that would stay the finality and/or execution of candidacy of any nuisance candidate. Court to instead take on the petitions they directly
the COMELEC resolutions. instituted before it. The Constitutional provision cited
Decisions of the COMELEC on disqualification cases may reads:
The other petitions, later consolidated with G. R. No. be reviewed by the Supreme Court per Rule 64[2] in an "The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole
161824, would include G. R. No. 161434, entitled "Maria action for certiorari under Rule 65[3] of the Revised Rules of judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
Jeanette C. Tecson, and Felix B. Desiderio, Jr., vs. The Civil Procedure. Section 7, Article IX, of the 1987 qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and may
Commission on Elections, Ronald Allan Kelley Poe (a.k.a. Constitution also reads – promulgate its rules for the purpose."
‗Fernando Poe, Jr.‘), and Victorino X. Fornier," and the "Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its The provision is an innovation of the 1987 Constitution. The
other, docketed G. R. No. 161634, entitled "Zoilo Antonio Members any case or matter brought before it within sixty omission in the 1935 and the 1973 Constitution to
G. Velez, vs. Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, a.k.a. Fernando Poe, days from the date of its submission for decision or designate any tribunal to be the sole judge of presidential
Jr.," both challenging the jurisdiction of the COMELEC and resolution. A case or matter is deemed submitted for and vice-presidential contests, has constrained this Court
asserting that, under Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, ofdecision or resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, to declare, in Lopez vs. Roxas,[4] as ―not (being)
the 1987 Constitution, only the Supreme Court had original brief, or memorandum, required by the rules of the justiciable‖ controversies or disputes involving contests on
and exclusive jurisdiction to resolve the basic issue on the Commission or by the Commission itself. Unless otherwise the elections, returns and qualifications of the President or
case. provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision, Vice-President. The constitutional lapse prompted
order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought to Congress, on 21 June 1957, to enact Republic Act No.
Jurisdiction of the Court the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party 1793, "An Act Constituting an Independent Presidential
within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof." Electoral Tribunal to Try, Hear and Decide Protests
In G. R. No. 161824 Additionally, Section 1, Article VIII, of the same Contesting the Election of the President-Elect and the
Constitution provides that judicial power is vested in one Vice-President-Elect of the Philippines and Providing for
In seeking the disqualification of the candidacy of FPJ and Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be the Manner of Hearing the Same." Republic Act 1793
to have the COMELEC deny due course to or cancel FPJ‘s established by law which power ―includes the duty of the designated the Chief Justice and the Associate Justices of
certificate of candidacy for alleged misrepresentation of courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving the Supreme Court to be the members of the tribunal.
a material fact (i.e., that FPJ was a natural-born citizen) rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, Although the subsequent adoption of the parliamentary
before the COMELEC, petitioner Fornier invoked Section and to determine whether or not there has been a grave form of government under the 1973 Constitution might
78 of the Omnibus Election Code – abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of have implicitly affected Republic Act No. 1793, the
―Section 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of statutory set-up, nonetheless, would now be deemed
certificate of candidacy. --- A verified petition seeking to the Government.‖ revived under the present Section 4, paragraph 7, of the
deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy 1987 Constitution.
may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that It is sufficiently clear that the petition brought up in G. R.
any material representation contained therein as required No. 161824 was aptly elevated to, and could well be Ordinary usage would characterize a "contest" in
under Section 74 hereof is false‖ – taken cognizance of by, this Court. A contrary view could reference to a post-election scenario. Election contests
in consonance with the general powers of COMELEC be a gross denial to our people of their fundamental right consist of either an election protest or a quo
expressed in Section 52 of the Omnibus Election Code - to be fully informed, and to make a proper choice, on warranto which, although two distinct remedies, would
―Section 52. Powers and functions of the Commission on who could or should be elected to occupy the highest have one objective in view, i.e., to dislodge the winning
Elections. In addition to the powers and functions government post in the land. candidate from office. A perusal of the phraseology in
conferred upon it by the Constitution, the Commission Rule 12, Rule 13, and Rule 14 of the "Rules of the
shall have exclusive charge of the enforcement and In G. R. No. 161434 and G. R. No. 161634 Presidential Electoral Tribunal," promulgated by the
administration of all laws relative to the conduct of Supreme Court en banc on 18 April 1992, would support
elections for the purpose of ensuring free, orderly and Petitioners Tecson, et al., in G. R. No. 161434, and Velez, in this premise -
honest elections‖ - G. R. No. 161634, invoke the provisions of Article VII,

19
―Rule 12. Jurisdiction. -The Tribunal shall be the sole judge
of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of the President or Vice-President of the
Philippines.
―Rule 13. How Initiated. - An election contest is initiated by
the filing of an election protest or a petition for quo
warranto against the President or Vice-President. An
election protest shall not include a petition for quo
warranto. A petition for quo warranto shall not include an
election protest.
―Rule 14. Election Protest. - Only the
registered candidate for President or for Vice-President of
the Philippines who received the second or third highest
number of votes may contest the election of the President
or the Vice-President, as the case may be, by filing a
verified petition with the Clerk of the Presidential Electoral
Tribunal within thirty (30) days after the proclamation of the
winner.‖
The rules categorically speak of the jurisdiction of the
tribunal over contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of the "President" or "Vice-President", of the
Philippines, and not of "candidates" for President or Vice-
President. A quo warranto proceeding is generally
defined as being an action against a person who usurps,
intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public
office.[5] In such context, the election contest can only
contemplate a post-election scenario. In Rule 14, only a
registered candidate who would have received either the
second or third highest number of votes could file an
election protest. This rule again presupposes a post-
election scenario.
It is fair to conclude that the jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court, defined by Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987
Constitution, would not include cases directly brought
before it, questioning the qualifications of a candidate for
the presidency or vice-presidency before the elections
are held.
Accordingly, G. R. No. 161434, entitled "Maria Jeanette C.
Tecson, et al., vs. Commission on Elections et al.," and G.
R. No. 161634, entitled "Zoilo Antonio Velez vs. Ronald Allan
Kelley Poe a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr." would have to be
dismissed for want of jurisdiction. There was no such term as "Philippine citizens" during the
Spanish regime but "subjects of Spain" or "Spanish
The Citizenship Issue subjects."[13] In church records, the natives were called
'indios', denoting a low regard for the inhabitants of the
Now, to the basic issue; it should be helpful to first give a archipelago. Spanish laws on citizenship became highly
brief historical background on the concept of citizenship. codified during the 19th century but their sheer number
made it difficult to point to one comprehensive law. Not
Perhaps, the earliest understanding of citizenship was that all of these citizenship laws of Spain however, were made
given by Aristotle, who, sometime in 384 to 322 B.C., to apply to the Philippine Islands except for those explicitly
described the "citizen" to refer to a man who shared in the extended by Royal Decrees.[14]
administration of justice and in the holding of an
office.[6] Aristotle saw its significance if only to determine Spanish laws on citizenship were traced back to
the constituency of the "State," which he described as the Novisima Recopilacion, promulgated in Spain on 16
being composed of such persons who would be July 1805 but as to whether the law was extended to the
adequate in number to achieve a self-sufficient Philippines remained to be the subject of differing views
existence.[7] The concept grew to include one who would among experts;[15] however, three royal decrees were
both govern and be governed, for which qualifications undisputably made applicable to Spaniards in the
like autonomy, judgment and loyalty could be expected. Philippines - the Order de la Regencia of 14 August
Citizenship was seen to deal with rights and entitlements, 1841,[16] the Royal Decree of 23 August 1868 specifically
on the one hand, and with concomitant obligations, on defining the political status of children born in the
the other.[8] In its ideal setting, a citizen was active in Philippine Islands,[17] and finally, the Ley Extranjera de
public life and fundamentally willing to submit his private Ultramar of 04 July 1870, which was expressly made
interests to the general interest of society. applicable to the Philippines by the Royal Decree of 13
July 1870.[18]
The concept of citizenship had undergone changes over
the centuries. In the 18th century, the concept was The Spanish Constitution of 1876 was never extended to
limited, by and large, to civil citizenship, which established the Philippine Islands because of the express mandate of
the rights necessary for individual freedom, such as rights its Article 89, according to which the provisions of
to property, personal liberty and justice.[9] Its meaning the Ultramar among which this country was included,
expanded during the 19th century to include political would be governed by special laws.[19]
citizenship, which encompassed the right to participate in
the exercise of political power.[10] The 20th century saw the It was only the Civil Code of Spain, made effective in this
next stage of the development of social citizenship, which jurisdiction on 18 December 1889, which came out with
laid emphasis on the right of the citizen to economic well- the first categorical enumeration of who were Spanish
being and social security.[11] The idea of citizenship has citizens. -
gained expression in the modern welfare state as it so ―(a) Persons born in Spanish territory,
developed in Western Europe. An ongoing and final stage
of development, in keeping with the rapidly shrinking ―(b) Children of a Spanish father or mother, even if they
global village, might well be the internationalization of were born outside of Spain,
citizenship.[12]
―(c) Foreigners who have obtained naturalization papers,
The Local Setting - from Spanish
Times to the Present
20
―(d) Those who, without such papers, may have become them to be citizens of the Philippines entitled to the and such other persons residing in the Philippine Islands
domiciled inhabitants of any town of the Monarchy.‖[20] protection of the United States. who would become citizens of the United States, under
The year 1898 was another turning point in Philippine the laws of the United States, if residing therein."[26]
history. Already in the state of decline as a superpower, The term "citizens of the Philippine Islands" appeared for With the adoption of the Philippine Bill of 1902, the
Spain was forced to so cede her sole colony in the East to the first time in the Philippine Bill of 1902, also commonly concept of "Philippine citizens" had for the first time
an upcoming world power, the United States. An referred to as the Philippine Organic Act of 1902, the first crystallized. The word "Filipino" was used by William H. Taft,
accepted principle of international law dictated that a comprehensive legislation of the Congress of the United the first Civil Governor General in the Philippines when he
change in sovereignty, while resulting in an abrogation of States on the Philippines - initially made mention of it in his slogan, "The Philippines for
all political laws then in force, would have no effect on ".... that all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands continuing the Filipinos." In 1916, the Philippine Autonomy Act, also
civil laws, which would remain virtually intact. to reside therein, who were Spanish subjects on the 11th known as the Jones Law restated virtually the provisions of
day of April, 1891, and then resided in said Islands, and the Philippine Bill of 1902, as so amended by the Act of
The Treaty of Paris was entered into on 10 December 1898 their children born subsequent thereto, shall be deemed Congress in 1912 -
between Spain and the United States.[21] Under Article IX and held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands and as ―That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands who were
of the treaty, the civil rights and political status of the such entitled to the protection of the United States, Spanish subjects on the eleventh day of April, eighteen
native inhabitants of the territories ceded to the United except such as shall have elected to preserve their hundred and ninety-nine, and then resided in said Islands,
States would be determined by its Congress - allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance with the and their children born subsequently thereto, shall be
"Spanish subjects, natives of the Peninsula, residing in the provisions of the treaty of peace between the United deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine
territory over which Spain by the present treaty relinquishes States and Spain, signed at Paris, December tenth Islands,except such as shall have elected to preserve their
or cedes her sovereignty may remain in such territory or eighteen hundred and ninety eight."[23] allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance with the
may remove therefrom, retaining in either event all their Under the organic act, a ―citizen of the Philippines‖ was provisions of the treaty of peace between the United
rights of property, including the right to sell or dispose of one who was an inhabitant of the Philippines, and a States and Spain, signed at Paris December tenth,
such property or of its proceeds; and they shall also have Spanish subject on the 11th day of April 1899. The term eighteen hundred and ninety-eight and except such
the right to carry on their industry, commerce, and ―inhabitant‖ was taken to include 1) a native-born others as have since become citizens of some other
professions, being subject in respect thereof to such laws inhabitant, 2) an inhabitant who was a native of country; Provided, That the Philippine Legislature, herein
as are applicable to foreigners. In case they remain in the Peninsular Spain, and 3) an inhabitant who obtained provided for, is hereby authorized to provide for the
territory they may preserve their allegiance to the Crown Spanish papers on or before 11 April 1899.[24] acquisition of Philippine citizenship by those natives of the
of Spain by making, before a court of record, within a Philippine Islands who do not come within the foregoing
year from the date of the exchange of ratifications of this Controversy arose on to the status of children born in the provisions, the natives of the insular possessions of the
treaty, a declaration of their decision to preserve such Philippines from 11 April 1899 to 01 July 1902, during which United States, and such other persons residing in the
allegiance; in default of which declaration they shall be period no citizenship law was extant in the Philippines. Philippine Islands who are citizens of the United States, or
held to have renounced it and to have adopted the Weight was given to the view, articulated in jurisprudential who could become citizens of the United States under the
nationality of the territory in which they reside. writing at the time, that the common law principle of jus laws of the United States, if residing therein."
soli, otherwise also known as the principle of territoriality, Under the Jones Law, a native-born inhabitant of the
Thus – operative in the United States and England, governed Philippines was deemed to be a citizen of the Philippines
those born in the Philippine Archipelago within that as of 11 April 1899 if he was 1) a subject of Spain on 11
"The civil rights and political status of the native inhabitants period.[25] More about this later. April 1899, 2) residing in the Philippines on said date, and,
of the territories hereby ceded to the United States shall 3) since that date, not a citizen of some other country.
be determined by the Congress."[22] In 23 March 1912, the Congress of the United States made
Upon the ratification of the treaty, and pending legislation the following amendment to the Philippine Bill of 1902 - While there was, at one brief time, divergent views on
by the United States Congress on the subject, the native "Provided, That the Philippine Legislature is hereby whether or not jus soli was a mode of acquiring citizenship,
inhabitants of the Philippines ceased to be Spanish authorized to provide by law for the acquisition of the 1935 Constitution brought to an end to any such link
subjects. Although they did not become American Philippine citizenship by those natives of the Philippine with common law, by adopting, once and for all, jus
citizens, they, however, also ceased to be "aliens" under Islands who do not come within the foregoing provisions, sanguinis or blood relationship as being the basis of Filipino
American laws and were thus issued passports describing the natives of other insular possession of the United States, citizenship -

21
―Section 1, Article III, 1935 Constitution. The following are
citizens of the Philippines -
―(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the
time of the adoption of this Constitution
―(2) Those born in the Philippines Islands of foreign parents
who, before the adoption of this Constitution, had been
elected to public office in the Philippine Islands.
―(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.
―(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines
and upon reaching the age of majority, elect Philippine
citizenship.
―(5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.‖
Subsection (4), Article III, of the 1935 Constitution, taken
together with existing civil law provisions at the time, which
provided that women would automatically lose their
Filipino citizenship and acquire that of their foreign
husbands, resulted in discriminatory situations that
effectively incapacitated the women from transmitting
their Filipino citizenship to their legitimate children and
required illegitimate children of Filipino mothers to still
elect Filipino citizenship upon reaching the age of
majority. Seeking to correct this anomaly, as well as fully
cognizant of the newly found status of Filipino women as
equals to men, the framers of the 1973 Constitution
crafted the provisions of the new Constitution on
citizenship to reflect such concerns -
―Section 1, Article III, 1973 Constitution - The following are a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, old, married to Bessie Kelly, an American citizen, twenty-
citizens of the Philippines:
―(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of least ten years immediately preceding such election."
the adoption of this Constitution.
―(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the
Philippines.
―(3) Those who elect Philippine citizenship pursuant to the The date, month and year of birth of FPJ appeared to be
provisions of the Constitution of nineteen hundred and
thirty-five.
―(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.‖
For good measure, Section 2 of the same article also
further provided that –
"A female citizen of the Philippines who marries an alien
retains her Philippine citizenship, unless by her act or
omission she is deemed, under the law to have
renounced her citizenship."
The 1987 Constitution generally adopted the provisions of
the 1973 Constitution, except for subsection (3) thereof
that aimed to correct the irregular situation generated by
the questionable proviso in the 1935 Constitution.
Section I, Article IV, 1987 Constitution now provides:
―The following are citizens of the Philippines:
―(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of Pangasinan, and 84 years old at the time of his death on
the adoption of this Constitution.
―(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the
Philippines.
―(3) Those born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino
mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching
the age of majority; and
―(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.‖
The Case Of FPJ
Section 2, Article VII, of the 1987 Constitution expresses:
"No person may be elected President unless he is
able to read and write, at least forty years of age on the
day of the election, and a resident of the Philippines for at
The term "natural-born citizens," is defined to include
"those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without respondent and the marriage certificate of his parents,
having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their
Philippine citizenship." [27]
20 August 1939 during the regime of the 1935 Constitution.
Through its history, four modes of acquiring citizenship -
naturalization, jus soli, res judicata and jus sanguinis[28] –
had been in vogue. Only two, i.e., jus soli and jus sanguinis,
could qualify a person to being a ―natural-born‖ citizen of
the Philippines. Jus soli, per Roa vs. Collector of
Customs[29] (1912), did not last long. With the adoption of
the 1935 Constitution and the reversal of Roa in Tan
Chong vs. Secretary of Labor[30] (1947), jus sanguinis or
blood relationship would now become the primary basis
of citizenship by birth.
Documentary evidence adduced by petitioner would
tend to indicate that the earliest established direct
ascendant of FPJ was his paternal grandfather Lorenzo
Pou, married to Marta Reyes, the father of Allan F. Poe.
While the record of birth of Lorenzo Pou had not been
presented in evidence, his death certificate, however,
identified him to be a Filipino, a resident of San Carlos,
11 September 1954. The certificate of birth of the father of
FPJ, Allan F. Poe, showed that he was born on 17 May
1915 to an Español father, Lorenzo Pou, and a mestiza
Español mother, Marta Reyes. Introduced by petitioner
was an ―uncertified‖ copy of a supposed certificate of the
alleged marriage of Allan F. Poe and Paulita Gomez on 05
July 1936. The marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe and
Bessie Kelley reflected the date of their marriage to be on
16 September 1940. In the same certificate, Allan F. Poe
was stated to be twenty-five years old, unmarried, and a
Filipino citizen, and Bessie Kelley to be twenty-two years
old, unmarried, and an American citizen. The birth
certificate of FPJ, would disclose that he was born on 20
August 1939 to Allan F. Poe, a Filipino, twenty-four years
one years old and married.
Considering the reservations made by the parties on the
veracity of some of the entries on the birth certificate of
the only conclusions that could be drawn with some
degree of certainty from the documents would be that -
1. The parents of FPJ were Allan F. Poe and Bessie
Kelley;
2. FPJ was born to them on 20 August 1939;
3. Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley were married to
each other on 16 September, 1940;
22
 4. The father of Allan F. Poe was Lorenzo Poe; and ―Entries in official records. Entries in official records made
Under the Civil Code of Spain, which was in force in the
5. At the time of his death on 11 September 1954, in the performance of his duty by a public officer of the Philippines from 08 December 1889 up until the day prior
Lorenzo Poe was 84 years old. Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty to 30 August 1950 when the Civil Code of the Philippines
Would the above facts be sufficient or insufficient to specially enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of the took effect, acknowledgment was required to establish
establish the fact that FPJ is a natural-born Filipino citizen? facts therein stated.‖ filiation or paternity. Acknowledgment was either judicial
The marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley, The trustworthiness of public documents and the value (compulsory) or voluntary. Judicial or compulsory
the birth certificate of FPJ, and the death certificate of given to the entries made therein could be grounded on acknowledgment was possible only if done during the
Lorenzo Pou are documents of public record in the 1) the sense of official duty in the preparation of the lifetime of the putative parent; voluntary
custody of a public officer. The documents have been statement made, 2) the penalty which is usually affixed to acknowledgment could only be had in a record of birth, a
submitted in evidence by both contending parties during a breach of that duty, 3) the routine and disinterested will, or a public document.[32] Complementary to the new
the proceedings before the COMELEC. origin of most such statements, and 4) the publicity of code was Act No. 3753 or the Civil Registry Law expressing
record which makes more likely the prior exposure of such in Section 5 thereof, that -
The birth certificate of FPJ was marked Exhibit "A" for errors as might have occurred.[31] ―In case of an illegitimate child, the birth certificate shall
petitioner and Exhibit "3" for respondent. The marriage be signed and sworn to jointly by the parents of the infant
certificate of Allan F. Poe to Bessie Kelley was submitted as The death certificate of Lorenzo Pou would indicate that or only by the mother if the father refuses. In the latter
Exhibit "21" for respondent. The death certificate of he died on 11 September 1954, at the age of 84 years, in case, it shall not be permissible to state or reveal in the
Lorenzo Pou was submitted by respondent as his Exhibit San Carlos, Pangasinan. It could thus be assumed that document the name of the father who refuses to
"5." While the last two documents were submitted in Lorenzo Pou was born sometime in the year 1870 when acknowledge the child, or to give therein any information
evidence for respondent, the admissibility thereof, the Philippines was still a colony of Spain. Petitioner would by which such father could be identified.‖
particularly in reference to the facts which they purported argue that Lorenzo Pou was not in the Philippines during In order that the birth certificate could then be utilized to
to show, i.e., the marriage certificate in relation to the the crucial period of from 1898 to 1902 considering that prove voluntary acknowledgment of filiation or paternity,
date of marriage of Allan F. Poe to Bessie Kelley and the there was no existing record about such fact in the the certificate was required to be signed or sworn to by
death certificate relative to the death of Lorenzo Pou on Records Management and Archives Office. Petitioner, the father. The failure of such requirement rendered the
11 September 1954 in San Carlos, Pangasinan, were all however, likewise failed to show that Lorenzo Pou was at same useless as being an authoritative document of
admitted by petitioner, who had utilized those material any other place during the same period. In his death recognition.[33] In Mendoza vs. Mella,[34] the Court ruled -
statements in his argument. All three documents were certificate, the residence of Lorenzo Pou was stated to be "Since Rodolfo was born in 1935, after the registry law was
certified true copies of the originals. San Carlos, Pangasinan. In the absence of any evidence enacted, the question here really is whether or not his birth
to the contrary, it should be sound to conclude, or at least certificate (Exhibit 1), which is merely a certified copy of
Section 3, Rule 130, Rules of Court states that - to presume, that the place of residence of a person at the the registry record, may be relied upon as sufficient proof
―Original document must be produced; exceptions. - time of his death was also his residence before death. It of his having been voluntarily recognized. No such
When the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, would be extremely doubtful if the Records Management reliance, in our judgment, may be placed upon it. While it
no evidence shall be admissible other than the original and Archives Office would have had complete records of contains the names of both parents, there is no showing
document itself, except in the following cases: all residents of the Philippines from 1898 to 1902. that they signed the original, let alone swore to its
―x x x x x x x x x contents as required in Section 5 of Act No. 3753. For all
Proof of Paternity and Filiation that might have happened, it was not even they or either
Under Civil Law. of them who furnished the data to be entered in the civil
―(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of register. Petitioners say that in any event the birth
a public office or is recorded in a public office.‖ Petitioner submits, in any case, that in establishing filiation certificate is in the nature of a public document wherein
Being public documents, the death certificate of Lorenzo (relationship or civil status of the child to the father [or voluntary recognition of a natural child may also be
Pou, the marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe and Bessie mother]) or paternity (relationship or civil status of the made, according to the same Article 131. True enough,
Kelly, and the birth certificate of FPJ, constitute prima father to the child) of an illegitimate child, FPJ evidently but in such a case, there must be a clear statement in the
facieproof of their contents. Section 44, Rule 130, of the being an illegitimate son according to petitioner, the document that the parent recognizes the child as his or
Rules of Court provides: mandatory rules under civil law must be used. her own."

23
In the birth certificate of respondent FPJ, presented by
both parties, nowhere in the document was the signature
of Allan F. Poe found. There being no will apparently
executed, or at least shown to have been executed, by
decedent Allan F. Poe, the only other proof of voluntary
recognition remained to be "some other public
document." In Pareja vs. Pareja,[35] this Court defined what
could constitute such a document as proof of voluntary
acknowledgment:
"Under the Spanish Civil Code there are two classes of
public documents, those executed by private individuals
which must be authenticated by notaries, and those
issued by competent public officials by reason of their
office. The public document pointed out in Article 131 as
one of the means by which recognition may be made
belongs to the first class."
Let us leave it at that for the moment.
The 1950 Civil Code categorized the acknowledgment or
recognition of illegitimate children into voluntary, legal or
compulsory. Voluntary recognition was required to be
expressedly made in a record of birth, a will, a statement
before a court of record or in any authentic writing. Legal
acknowledgment took place in favor of full blood brothers
and sisters of an illegitimate child who was recognized or
judicially declared as natural. Compulsory
acknowledgment could be demanded generally in cases
when the child had in his favor any evidence to prove
filiation. Unlike an action to claim legitimacy which would
last during the lifetime of the child, and might pass
exceptionally to the heirs of the child, an action to claim
acknowledgment, however, could only be brought during
the lifetime of the presumed parent.
Amicus Curiae Ruben F. Balane defined, during the oral
argument, "authentic writing," so as to be an authentic
writing for purposes of voluntary recognition, simply as
being a genuine or indubitable writing of the father. The
term would include a public instrument (one duly
acknowledged before a notary public or other
competent official) or a private writing admitted by the
father to be his.
The Family Code has further liberalized the rules; Article
172, Article 173, and Article 175 provide:
―Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established
by any of the following:
―(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a
final judgment; or
―(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public
document or a private handwritten instrument and signed
by the parent concerned.
―In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate
filiation shall be proved by:
―(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a
legitimate child; or
―(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and
special laws.
―Art. 173. The action to claim legitimacy may be brought
by the child during his or her lifetime and shall be
transmitted to the heirs should the child die during minority
or in a state of insanity. In these cases, the heirs shall have
a period of five years within which to institute the action.
―The action already commenced by the child shall survive
notwithstanding the death of either or both of the parties.
―x x x x x x x x x.
―Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their
illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same,
evidence as legitimate children.
―The action must be brought within the same period
specified in Article 173, except when the action is based
on the second paragraph of Article 172, in which case the
action may be brought during the lifetime of the alleged
parent.‖
The provisions of the Family Code are retroactively
applied; Article 256 of the code reads:
"Art. 256. This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as
it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in
accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.‖
Thus, in Vda. de Sy-Quia vs. Court of Appeals,[36] the Court
has ruled:
"We hold that whether Jose was a voluntarily recognized
natural child should be decided under Article 278 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines. Article 2260 of that Code
provides that 'the voluntary recognition of a natural child
shall take place according to this Code, even if the child
was born before the effectivity of this body of laws' or
before August 30, 1950. Hence, Article 278 may be given
retroactive effect."
It should be apparent that the growing trend to liberalize
the acknowledgment or recognition of illegitimate
children is an attempt to break away from the traditional
idea of keeping well apart legitimate and non-legitimate
relationships within the family in favor of the greater
interest and welfare of the child. The provisions are
intended to merely govern the private and personal
affairs of the family. There is little, if any, to indicate that
the legitimate or illegitimate civil status of the individual
would also affect his political rights or, in general, his
relationship to the State. While, indeed, provisions on
"citizenship" could be found in the Civil Code, such
provisions must be taken in the context of private relations,
the domain of civil law; particularly -
"Civil Law is that branch of law which has for its double
purpose the organization of the family and the regulation
of property. It has thus [been] defined as the mass of
precepts which determine and regulate the relations of
assistance, authority and obedience among members of
a family, and those which exist among members of a
society for the protection of private interests."[37]
In Yañez de Barnuevo vs. Fuster,[38] the Court has held:
"In accordance with Article 9 of the Civil Code of Spain, x
x x the laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the
status, condition and legal capacity of persons, govern
Spaniards although they reside in a foreign country; that,
in consequence, 'all questions of a civil nature, such as
those dealing with the validity or nullity of the matrimonial
bond, the domicile of the husband and wife, their support,
as between them, the separation of their properties, the
rules governing property, marital authority, division of
24
conjugal property, the classification of their property, legal determining his citizenship status should thus be deemed―1. I am the sister of the late Bessie Kelley Poe.
causes for divorce, the extent of the latter, the authority to independent from and not inextricably tied up with that ―2. Bessie Kelley Poe was the wife of Fernando Poe, Sr.
decree it, and, in general, the civil effects of marriage prescribed for civil law purposes. The Civil Code or Family
―3. Fernando and Bessie Poe had a son by the name of
and divorce upon the persons and properties of the Code provisions on proof of filiation or paternity, although Ronald Allan Poe, more popularly known in the
spouses, are questions that are governed exclusively by good law, do not have preclusive effects on matters alien Philippines as `Fernando Poe, Jr.,‘ or `FPJ‘.
the national law of the husband and wife." to personal and family relations. The ordinary rules on ―4. Ronald Allan Poe `FPJ‘ was born on August 20, 1939 at
The relevance of "citizenship" or "nationality" to Civil Law is evidence could well and should govern. For instance, the St. Luke's Hospital, Magdalena Street, Manila.
best exemplified in Article 15 of the Civil Code, stating that matter about pedigree is not necessarily precluded from
―x x x x x x x x x
- being applicable by the Civil Code or Family Code
"Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, provisions. ―7. Fernando Poe Sr., and my sister Bessie, met and
condition and legal capacity of persons are binding became engaged while they were students at the
upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living Section 39, Rule 130, of the Rules of Court provides - University of the Philippines in 1936. I was also
abroad" - ―Act or Declaration about pedigree. The act or introduced to Fernando Poe, Sr., by my sister that
that explains the need to incorporate in the code a declaration of a person deceased, or unable to testify, in same year.
reiteration of the Constitutional provisions on citizenship. respect to the pedigree of another person related to him ―8. Fernando Poe, Sr., and my sister Bessie had their first
Similarly, citizenship is significant in civil relationships found
by birth or marriage, may be received in evidence where child in 1938.
in different parts of the Civil Code,[39] such as on it occurred before the controversy, and the relationship ―9. Fernando Poe, Sr., my sister Bessie and their first three
successional rights and family relations.[40] In adoption, forbetween the two persons is shown by evidence other than children, Elizabeth, Ronald, Allan and Fernando II, and
instance, an adopted child would be considered the such act or declaration. The word `pedigree‘ includes myself lived together with our mother at our family's
child of his adoptive parents and accorded the same relationship, family genealogy, birth, marriage, death, the house on Dakota St. (now Jorge Bocobo St.), Malate
rights as their legitimate child but such legal fiction dates when and the places where these facts occurred, until the liberation of Manila in 1945, except for some
extended only to define his rights under civil law [41] and and the names of the relatives. It embraces also facts of months between 1943-1944.
not his political status. family history intimately connected with pedigree.‖ ―10. Fernando Poe, Sr., and my sister, Bessie, were blessed
For the above rule to apply, it would be necessary that (a) with four (4) more children after Ronald Allan Poe.
Civil law provisions point to an obvious bias against the declarant is already dead or unable to testify, (b) the ―x x x x x x x x x
illegitimacy. This discriminatory attitude may be traced to pedigree of a person must be at issue, (c) the declarant ―18. I am executing this Declaration to attest to the fact
the Spanish family and property laws, which, while must be a relative of the person whose pedigree is in that my nephew, Ronald Allan Poe is a natural born
defining proprietary and successional rights of members of question, (d) declaration must be made before the Filipino, and that he is the legitimate child of Fernando
the family, provided distinctions in the rights of legitimate controversy has occurred, and (e) the relationship Poe, Sr.
and illegitimate children. In the monarchial set-up of old between the declarant and the person whose pedigree is "Done in City of Stockton, California, U.S.A., this 12th day of
Spain, the distribution and inheritance of titles and wealth in question must be shown by evidence other than such January 2004.
were strictly according to bloodlines and the concern to act or declaration.
keep these bloodlines uncontaminated by foreign blood Ruby Kelley
was paramount. Thus, the duly notarized declaration made by Ruby Kelley Mangahas
Mangahas, sister of Bessie Kelley Poe submitted as Exhibit Declarant
These distinctions between legitimacy and illegitimacy 20 before the COMELEC, might be accepted to prove the DNA Testing
were codified in the Spanish Civil Code, and the invidious acts of Allan F. Poe, recognizing his own paternal
discrimination survived when the Spanish Civil Code relationship with FPJ, i.e, living together with Bessie Kelley In case proof of filiation or paternity would be unlikely to
became the primary source of our own Civil Code. Such and his children (including respondent FPJ) in one house, satisfactorily establish or would be difficult to obtain, DNA
distinction, however, remains and should remain only in and as one family - testing, which examines genetic codes obtained from
the sphere of civil law and not unduly impede or impinge "I, Ruby Kelley Mangahas, of legal age and sound mind, body cells of the illegitimate child and any physical
on the domain of political law. presently residing in Stockton, California, U.S.A., after residue of the long dead parent could be resorted to. A
being sworn in accordance with law do hereby declare positive match would clear up filiation or paternity. In Tijing
The proof of filiation or paternity for purposes of that:

25
vs. Court of Appeals, [42] this Court has acknowledged the
strong weight of DNA testing -
"Parentage will still be resolved using conventional
methods unless we adopt the modern and scientific ways
available. Fortunately, we have now the facility and
expertise in using DNA test for identification and
parentage testing. The University of the Philippines Natural
Science Research Institute (UP-NSRI) DNA Analysis
Laboratory has now the capability to conduct DNA typing
using short tandem repeat (STR) analysis. The analysis is
based on the fact that the DNA of a child/person has two
(2) copies, one copy from the mother and the other from
the father. The DNA from the mother, the alleged father
and the child are analyzed to establish parentage. Of
course, being a novel scientific technique, the use of DNA
test as evidence is still open to challenge. Eventually, as
the appropriate case comes, courts should not hesitate to
rule on the admissibility of DNA evidence. For it was said,
that courts should apply the results of science when
competently obtained in aid of situations presented, since
to reject said result is to deny progress."
Petitioner’s Argument For
Jurisprudential Conclusiveness
Petitioner would have it that even if Allan F. Poe were a
Filipino citizen, he could not have transmitted his
citizenship to respondent FPJ, the latter being an
illegitimate child. According to petitioner, prior to his
marriage to Bessie Kelley, Allan F. Poe, on July 5, 1936,
contracted marriage with a certain Paulita Gomez,
making his subsequent marriage to Bessie Kelley bigamous
and respondent FPJ an illegitimate child. The veracity of
the supposed certificate of marriage between Allan F.
Poe and Paulita Gomez could be most doubtful at best.
But the documentary evidence introduced by no less
than respondent himself, consisting of a birth certificate of
respondent and a marriage certificate of his parents
showed that FPJ was born on 20 August 1939 to a Filipino
father and an American mother who were married to
each other a year later, or on 16 September 1940. Birth to
unmarried parents would make FPJ an illegitimate child.
Petitioner contended that as an illegitimate child, FPJ so
followed the citizenship of his mother, Bessie Kelley, an
American citizen, basing his stand on the ruling of this
Court in Morano vs. Vivo,[43] citing Chiongbian vs. de Supreme Court said that there was no valid proof that
Leon[44] and Serra vs. Republic.[45] Leoncio was in fact the son of a Filipina mother. The Court
therefore concluded that Leoncio was not Filipino. If
On the above score, the disquisition made by amicus Leoncio was not Filipino, neither was his son Quintin.
curiae Joaquin G. Bernas, SJ, is most convincing; he states Quintin therefore was not only not a natural-born Filipino
- but was not even a Filipino.
"We must analyze these cases and ask what the lis
mota was in each of them. If the pronouncement of the ―The Court should have stopped there. But instead it
Court on jus sanguinis was on the lis mota, the followed with an obiter dictum. The Court said obiter that
pronouncement would be a decision constituting doctrine even if Leoncio, Quintin's father, were Filipino, Quintin
under the rule of stare decisis. But if the pronouncement would not be Filipino because Quintin was illegitimate. This
was irrelevant to the lis mota, the pronouncement would statement about Quintin, based on a contrary to fact
not be a decision but a mere obiter dictum which did not assumption, was absolutely unnecessary for the case. x x x
establish doctrine. I therefore invite the Court to look It was obiter dictum, pure and simple, simply repeating
closely into these cases. the obiter dictum in Morano vs. Vivo.
―First, Morano vs. Vivo. The case was not about an ―x x x x x x x x x
illegitimate child of a Filipino father. It was about a stepson
of a Filipino, a stepson who was the child of a Chinese "Aside from the fact that such a pronouncement would
mother and a Chinese father. The issue was whether the have no textual foundation in the Constitution, it would
stepson followed the naturalization of the stepfather. also violate the equal protection clause of the
Nothing about jus sanguinis there. The stepson did not Constitution not once but twice. First, it would make an
have the blood of the naturalized stepfather. illegitimate distinction between a legitimate child and an
illegitimate child, and second, it would make an
―Second, Chiongbian vs. de Leon. This case was not illegitimate distinction between the illegitimate child of a
about the illegitimate son of a Filipino father. It was about Filipino father and the illegitimate child of a Filipino
a legitimate son of a father who had become Filipino by mother.
election to public office before the 1935 Constitution
pursuant to Article IV, Section 1(2) of the 1935 Constitution. ―The doctrine on constitutionally allowable distinctions
No one was illegitimate here. was established long ago by People vs. Cayat.[47] I would
grant that the distinction between legitimate children and
―Third, Serra vs. Republic. The case was not about the illegitimate children rests on real differences. x x x But real
illegitimate son of a Filipino father. Serra was an differences alone do not justify invidious distinction. Real
illegitimate child of a Chinese father and a Filipino mother. differences may justify distinction for one purpose but not
The issue was whether one who was already a Filipino for another purpose.
because of his mother who still needed to be naturalized.
There is nothing there about invidious jus sanguinis. ―x x x What is the relevance of legitimacy or illegitimacy to
elective public service? What possible state interest can
―Finally, Paa vs. Chan. This is a more complicated case. there be for disqualifying an illegitimate child from
[46]
The case was about the citizenship of Quintin Chan who becoming a public officer. It was not the fault of the child
was the son of Leoncio Chan. Quintin Chan claimed that that his parents had illicit liaison. Why deprive the child of
his father, Leoncio, was the illegitimate son of a Chinese the fullness of political rights for no fault of his own? To
father and a Filipino mother. Quintin therefore argued that disqualify an illegitimate child from holding an important
he got his citizenship from Leoncio, his father. But the public office is to punish him for the indiscretion of his
26
parents. There is neither justice nor rationality in that. And if
there is neither justice nor rationality in the distinction, then
the distinction transgresses the equal protection clause
and must be reprobated.‖
The other amici curiae, Mr. Justice Vicente Mendoza (a
former member of this Court), Professor Ruben Balane and
Dean Martin Magallona, at bottom, have expressed
similar views. The thesis of petitioner, unfortunately hinging
solely on pure obiter dicta, should indeed fail.
Where jurisprudence regarded an illegitimate child as
taking after the citizenship of its mother, it did so for the
benefit the child. It was to ensure a Filipino nationality for
the illegitimate child of an alien father in line with the
assumption that the mother had custody, would exercise
parental authority and had the duty to support her
illegitimate child. It was to help the child, not to prejudice
or discriminate against him.
The fact of the matter – perhaps the most significant
consideration – is that the 1935 Constitution, the
fundamental law prevailing on the day, month and year
of birth of respondent FPJ, can never be more explicit
than it is. Providing neither conditions nor distinctions, the
Constitution states that among the citizens of the
Philippines are ―those whose fathers are citizens of the
Philippines.‖ There utterly is no cogent justification to
prescribe conditions or distinctions where there clearly are
none provided.
In Sum –
(1) The Court, in the exercise of its power of judicial review,
possesses jurisdiction over the petition in G. R. No. 161824,
filed under Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, of the Revised
Rules of Civil Procedure. G.R. No. 161824 assails the
resolution of the COMELEC for alleged grave abuse of
discretion in dismissing, for lack of merit, the petition in SPA
No. 04-003 which has prayed for the disqualification of
respondent FPJ from running for the position of President in
the 10th May 2004 national elections on the contention
that FPJ has committed material representation in his
certificate of candidacy by representing himself to be a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines.
(2) The Court must dismiss, for lack of jurisdiction and
prematurity, the petitions in G. R. No. 161434 and No.
161634 both having been directly elevated to this Court in
the latter‘s capacity as the only tribunal to resolve a
presidential and vice-presidential election contest under
the Constitution. Evidently, the primary jurisdiction of the
Court can directly be invoked only after, not before, the
elections are held.
(3) In ascertaining, in G.R. No. 161824, whether grave
abuse of discretion has been committed by the
COMELEC, it is necessary to take on the matter of whether
or not respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen, which, in
turn, depended on whether or not the father of
respondent, Allan F. Poe, would have himself been a
Filipino citizen and, in the affirmative, whether or not the
alleged illegitimacy of respondent prevents him from
taking after the Filipino citizenship of his putative father.
Any conclusion on the Filipino citizenship of Lorenzo Pou
could only be drawn from the presumption that having
died in 1954 at 84 years old, Lorenzo would have been
born sometime in the year 1870, when the Philippines was
under Spanish rule, and that San Carlos, Pangasinan, his
place of residence upon his death in 1954, in the absence No Costs.
of any other evidence, could have well been his place of
residence before death, such that Lorenzo Pou would
have benefited from the ―en masse Filipinization‖ that the
Philippine Bill had effected in 1902. That citizenship (of
Lorenzo Pou), if acquired, would thereby extend to his son, Puno, J., on leave but was allowed to vote; see separate
Allan F. Poe, father of respondent FPJ. The 1935
Constitution, during which regime respondent FPJ has
seen first light, confers citizenship to all persons whose
fathers are Filipino citizens regardless of whether such
children are legitimate or illegitimate.
(4) But while the totality of the evidence may not establish separate opinion.
conclusively that respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen
of the Philippines, the evidence on hand still would
preponderate in his favor enough to hold that he cannot Carpio, J., see dissenting opinion.
be held guilty of having made a material
misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy in
violation of Section 78, in relation to Section 74, of the
Omnibus Election Code. Petitioner has utterly failed to
substantiate his case before the Court, notwithstanding
the ample opportunity given to the parties to present their
position and evidence, and to prove whether or not there
has been material misrepresentation, which, as so ruled
in Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC,[48] must not only be
material, but also deliberate and willful.
WHEREFORE, the Court RESOLVES to DISMISS –
1. G. R. No. 161434, entitled "Maria Jeanette C.
Tecson and Felix B. Desiderio, Jr.,
Petitioners, versus Commission on Elections, Ronald
Allan Kelley Poe (a.k.a. "Fernando Poe, Jr.,) and
Victorino X. Fornier, Respondents," and G. R. No.
161634, entitled "Zoilo Antonio Velez,
Petitioner, versus Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, a.k.a.
Fernando Poe, Jr., Respondent," for want of
jurisdiction.
2. G. R. No. 161824, entitled ―Victorino X. Fornier,
Petitioner, versus Hon. Commission on Elections
and Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, also known as
Fernando Poe, Jr.,‖ for failure to show grave abuse
of discretion on the part of respondent
Commission on Elections in dismissing the petition
in SPA No. 04-003.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., see separate opinion, concurring.
opinion.
Panganiban, J., on official leave; allowed to vote but did
not send his vote on the matter.
Quisumbing, J., joins the dissent of Justices Tinga and
Morales; case should have been remanded.
Ynares-Santiago, J., concurs and also with J. Puno‘s
Sandoval-Gutierrez, J., concurs, please see separate
opinion.
Austria-Martinez, J., concurs, please see separate opinion.
Corona, J., joins the dissenting opinion of Justice Morales.
Carpio-Morales, J., see dissenting opinion.
Callejo, Sr., J., please see concurring opinion.
27
Azcuna, J., concurs in a separate opinion. Thousand Oaks, New Delhi (1994). natural and other illegitimate children of a mother
Tinga, J., dissents per separate opinion. belonging to another State born outside of the Spanish
[9] Ibid. dominions, (2) The children specified in the preceding
paragraph, born in the Spanish dominions or on board
Tan Chong vs. The Secretary of Labor, 45 O.G. No. 31,
[1] [10] Ibid. Spanish vessels on the high seas if they do not, on
1269. attaining the age of majority fixed in the laws of the
[11] Ibid. Kingdom, elect Spanish nationality, (3) Those being
Sec. 2. Mode of review. – A judgment or final order or
[2] Spaniards, acquire another nationality, as well by
resolution of the Commission on Elections and the [12] Ibid. renouncing the first as by accepting employment, from
Commission on Audit may be brought by the aggrieved another government without the authority of the
party to the Supreme Court on certiorari under Rule 65, [13] Under the codified Novisima sovereign and (4) The woman who contracts marriage
except as hereinafter provided. (Rule 64) Recopilacion promulgated in Spain in 1805, the following with a subject of another State. (Garcia, supra., pp. 6-7)
were considered denizens (vecinos) " all foreigners who
[3] Sec. 1. Petition for certiorari. – When any tribunal, board obtained the privilege of naturalization, those who were [18]Under the law, the following were foreigners (a) All
or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has born in these kingdoms, those who residing therein may persons born of foreign parents outside of the Spanish
acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with be converted to the holy Catholic faith; those, being self- territory; (b) Those born outside of the Spanish territory of
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of supporting, established their domicile therein; and in the foreign fathers and Spanish mothers while they do not
jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, case of a foreign woman who married a native man, she claim Spanish nationality, (3) Those born in Spanish territory
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a thereby becomes subject to the same laws and acquires of foreign parents or foreign fathers and Spanish mothers
person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the same domicile as her husband; those who establish while they do not make that claim, (4) Spaniards who may
the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and themselves in the country by acquiring real property; have lost their nationality, (5) Those born outside of the
praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying those who have trade or profession and go there to Spanish territory of parents who may have lost their
the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and practice the same; also those who practice some Spanish nationality; and (6), the Spanish woman married
granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may mechanical trade therein or keep a retail store;....those to a foreigner. (Garcia, supra., p. 7)
require. who reside for a period of ten years in a home of his own;
and also those foreigners who, in accordance with the [19] Velayo, infra., p. 11.
The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true common law, royal orders and other laws of the
copy of the judgment, order or resolution subject thereof, kingdoms, may have become naturalized or acquired [20] Article 17, The Civil Code of Spain.
copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and residence therein. (Leon T. Garcia, ―The Problems of
pertinent thereto, and a sworn certification of non-forum Citizenship in the Philippines,‖ Rex Bookstore, 1949, at p. 4) [21] Garcia, supra, pp. 6-7.
shopping as provided in the third paragraph of section 3,
Rule 46. (Rule 65) [14] Garcia, supra., at p. 3. Ramon M. Velayo, ―Philippine Citizenship And
[22]

Naturalization,‖ Central Book Supply, Manila (1965), pp.

[4] 17 SCRA 761. [15]Justices Malcolm, Recto and Florentino Torres believed 22-23.
that the law was effective in the Philippines. Those who
[5] See Rule 66, Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. entertained the contrary view were Justices Imperial and [23] Ibid., p. 30.
Villareal. (Garcia, supra., at 4.).
The Politics of Aristotle, edited and translated by Ernest
[6] [24] Garcia, supra, at pp. 31-32.
Barker, Oxford University Press, London, 1946. at p. 93. [16] Garcia, supra., pp. 5-6.
[25] Garcia, supra, pp. 23-26.
[7] Id., at 95. [17]Under the Royal Decree of August 23, 1868, the
following were considered foreigners --- (1) The legitimate [26] Velayo, supra, p. 31
Introduction, ―The Conditions of Citizenship,‖ edited by
[8] and recognized natural children of a father who belongs
Bart Van Steenbergen, Sage Publications, London, to another independent state, and the unrecognized and [27] Section 2, Article IV, 1987 Constitution.

28

[28] Per amicus curiae Joaquin G. Bernas, SJ.
[29] 23 Phil 315 (1912).
[30] Supra., which held that jus soli was never applied in the ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by
Philippines.
[31] Antillon vs. Barcelon, 37 Phil 148.
[32] Article 131 Old Civil Code.
[33] Dayrit vs. Piccio, 92 Phil 729.
[34] 17 SCRA 788.
[35] 95 Phil 167.
[36] 125 SCRA 835.
Vicente J. Fransisco, Civil Code of the Philippines, Bk I,
[37]
1953 at p. 5
[38] 29 Phil 606.
Article 16. Real property as well as personal property is
[39]
subject to the law of the country where it is situated.
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both
with respect to the order of succession and to the amount
of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of
testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national
law of the person whose succession is under
consideration, whatever may be the nature of the
property and regardless of the country wherein said
property may be found.
Article 17. The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills,
and other public instruments shall be governed by the
laws of the country in which they are executed.
When the acts referred to are executed before the
diplomatic or consular officials of the Republic of the
Philippines in a foreign country, the solemnities established
by Philippine laws shall be observed in their execution.
Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, them before a marriage license can be obtained, to
and those which have for their object public order, public submit a certificate of legal capacity to contract
policy and good customs, shall not be rendered
determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign
country.
Article 815. When a Filipino is in a foreign country, he is submit an affidavit stating the circumstances showing
authorized to make a will in any of the forms established
by the law of the country in which he may be. Such will
may be probated in the Philippines.
Article 816. The will of an alien who is abroad produces
effect in the Philippines if made with the formalities
prescribed by the law of the place in which he resides, or
according to the formalities observed in his country, or in
conformity with those which this Code prescribes.
Article 817. A will made in the Philippines by a citizen or
subject of another country, which is executed in
accordance with the law of the country of which he is a
citizen or subject, and which might be proved and
allowed by the law of his own country, shall have the
same effect as if executed according to the laws of the
Philippines.
Article 819. Wills, prohibited by the preceding article,
executed by Filipinos in a foreign country shall not be valid
in the Philippines, even though authorized by the laws of
the country where they may have been executed.
Article 1039. Capacity to succeed is governed by the law
of the nation of the decedent.
Article 10. Marriages between Filipino citizens abroad
[40]
may be solemnized by a consul general, consul or vice-
consul of the Republic of the Philippines. The issuance of
the marriage license and the duties of the local civil
registrar and of the solemnizing officer with regard to the
celebration of marriage shall be performed by said
consular official.
Article 21. When either or both of the contracting parties
are citizens of a foreign country, it shall be necessary for
marriage, issued by their respective diplomatic or consular
officials.
Stateless persons or refugees from other countries shall, in
lieu of the certificate of legal capacity herein required,
such capacity to contract marriage.
Article 26. x x x
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter
validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating
him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have
capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
Article 80. In the absence of a contrary stipulation in the
marriage settlements, the property relations of the spouses
shall be governed by Philippine laws, regardless of the
place of the celebration of the marriage and their
residence. This rule shall not apply:
(1) Where both spouses are aliens;
(2) With respect to the extrinsic validity of contracts
affecting property not situated in the Philippines and
executed in the country where the property is located;
and
(3) With respect to the extrinsic validity of contracts
entered into in the Philippines but affecting property
situated in a foreign country whose laws require different
formalities for their extrinsic validity.
See Ching Leng vs. Galang, L-11931, October 1958,
[41]
unreported.
[42] 354 SCRA 17.
29
756 PHIL. 309 1984 to 235 C 3rd Street, 10th Avenue, Caloocan Ninth: I am able to speak and write English and Filipino;
1994 City
1994 to 64-A Parklane Street, Barangay Tenth: I believe in the principle underlying the Philippine
SECOND DIVISION presentSangandaan, Project 8, Quezon City; Constitution. I am of good moral character and have
[ G.R. No. 200983, March 18, 2015 ] conducted myself in a proper and irreproachable manner
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. HUANG TE FU, Third: My trade or profession is a Businessman engaged in during the entire period of my residence in the Philippines,
A.K.A. ROBERT UY, RESPONDENT. the manufacture of zipper, in which I have been in my relations with the constituted Government as well as
connected since 1992; and from which I derive an with the community in which I am living. I have mingled
DECISION average monthly income of P15,000.00; socially with the Filipinos, and have evinced a sincere
DEL CASTILLO, J.: desire to learn and embrace the customs, traditions, and
This case reiterates the rule in naturalization cases that Fourth: I was born on the 15th day of August 1976 in ideals of the Filipinos. I have all the qualifications required
when full and complete compliance with the Taiwan. I am at present a Citizen or subject of the under Section 2, a special qualification under Section 3,
requirements of the Revised Naturalization Law, or Republic of China, under whose laws Filipinos may by being married to a Filipino woman, and none of the
Commonwealth Act No. 473 (CA 473), is not shown, a become naturalized citizens or subjects thereof [sic]; disqualifications under Section 4 of Commonwealth Act
petition for naturalization must be perfunctorily denied. No. 473;
Fifth: I am married to a Filipino, IRENE D. CHAN, 28 years of
This Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] seeks to set aside 1) age, having been born on 11 April 1977 at Manila, and I am not opposed to organized government or affiliated
the November 29, 2011 Decision[2] of the Court of Appeals with whom I have two (2) children, namely: ROCHELLE IVY with any association or group of persons who uphold and
(CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 91213 affirming the September 24, C. HUANG, 3 years of age, who was born on 26 March teach doctrines opposing all organized governments. I
2007 Order[3] of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, 2002 at [sic] Quezon City; and REYNARD IVAN C. HUANG, am not defending or teaching the necessity or propriety
Branch 96 in Nat. Case/Spec. Proc. No. Q-05-55251, as 1 year of age, who was born on 25 February 2004 at [sic] of violence, personal assault, or assassination for the
well as 2) the CA‘s March 7, 2012 Resolution [4] denying Quezon City. My wife and two children are presently success and predominance of men‘s ideas. I am not a
petitioner‘s Motion for Reconsideration. [5] residing with me at 64-A Parklane Street, Barangay polygamist nor a believer in the practice of polygamy. I
Sangandaan, Project 8, Quezon City; have not been convicted of any crime involving moral
Factual Antecedents turpitude. I am not suffering from any mental alienation or
Sixth: I arrived in the Philippines via China Airlines on the incurable diseases. The nation of which I am a citizen or
On March 19, 2004, respondent Huang Te Fu, a.k.a. Robert 13th of August 1982; subject of is not at war with the Philippines. The country of
Uy – a citizen of the Republic of China (Taiwan) – filed a which I am a citizen or subject of grants Filipinos the right
sworn Declaration of Intent to Become [a] Citizen of the Seventh: I have filed my Declaration of Intent to Become to become naturalized citizens or subjects thereof;
Philippines[6] with the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG). a Citizen of the Philippines with the Office of the Solicitor
General on 4 March 2004, pursuant to and in compliance Eleventh: It is my intention in good faith to become a
On April 27, 2005, respondent filed with the Regional Trial with Section 5 of Commonwealth Act No. 473, as citizen or subject of the Philippines and to renounce
Court of Quezon City (trial court) a Petition for amended;[8] absolutely and forever all allegiance and fidelity to my
Naturalization,[7] which was docketed as Spec. Proc. No. foreign prince, potentate, state, or sovereignty, and
Q-05-55251 and assigned to Branch 96. The Petition states: Eighth: I have resided continuously, for the last twenty particularly to the Republic of China of which at this time I
three (23) years, in the Philippines since my arrival. I have am a citizen or subject. I will reside continuously in the
I apply for naturalization as citizen of the Philippines and to received my primary education at Philippine Cultural High Philippines from the date of the filing of my petition up to
the Court, respectfully shows [sic]: School; secondary education at Philippine Cultural High the time of my admission to the Philippine Citizenship;
First: My full name is HUANG TE FU, also known as ROBERT School; and finished my college education at Ateneo de
UY; Manila University with the degree of Bachelor of Science Twelfth: I have not heretofore made any petition for
Second:My places of residence were: in Computer Science, respectively, which are schools citizenship to any Court;
1982 1 Santiago Street, Malinta, Valenzuela City recognized by the Government and not limited to any
1982 to Biak na Bato, San Francisco Del Monte, race or nationality; Thirteenth: Mr. BENJAMIN A. MORALEDA, JR., of legal age,
1984 Quezon City married, residing at 82-A Maginoo Street, Barangay

30
Central, Quezon City, and Ms. BELLA RAMONA A.
ANTONANO, of legal age, single, residing at 1 Ligaya
Street, Mandaluyong City, who are both Filipinos, will
appear and testify as my witnesses at the hearing of my
herein petition.
on October 01, 2000; that he has two children namely,
Rochelle Ivy C. Huang, 3 years old, and Reynard Ivan C.
Huang, 1 year old and that he and his family are presently
residing at 64-A Parklane Street, Barangay Sangandaan,
Project 8, Quezon City.
petitioner was able to establish by sufficient evidence,
both testimonial and documentary, that he has all the
qualifications and none of the disqualifications provided
for under the law which will warrant the granting of the
relief being prayed for.

Attached hereto and made an integral part of this
petition are: (a) the Original Certification of Arrival from
the Bureau of Immigration (Annex ―A‖); (b) Declaration of
Intent to Become a Citizen of the Philippines (Annex ―B‖);
(c) Affidavit of the two witnesses (Annexes ―C‖ and ―D‖);
and (d) my two recent photographs (Annexes ―E‖ and ―E-
1‖).
WHEREFORE, petitioner prays that he be admitted a
citizen of the Philippines.[9]
After trial, the trial court issued a September 24, 2007
Order[10] granting respondent‘s petition for naturalization,
decreeing thus:
Petitioner[11] thereafter testified that he was born on
August 15, 1976 in Taiwan; that his father, Huang Ping-
Hsung, and mother, Huang Wen, Chiu-Yueh are both
Chinese nationals; that he is the holder of Alien Certificate
of Registration No. E062035 and Immigrant Certificate of
Residence No. 259804; that he resided at Lin 4, Chienkuo
Li, Panchiao City, Taipei County, Taiwan Province since his
birth until he came to Manila, Philippines on August 13,
1982; that he first stayed at Santiago Street, Valenzuela
City; that they transferred to Biak-na-Bato Street, San
Francisco Del Monte and they later transferred to 23-C,
3rd Street, 10th Avenue, Caloocan City; that petitioner
presently resides at No. 64-A Parklane Street, Barangay
Sangandaan, Project 8, Quezon City; that he attended
Philippine Cultural High School for his elementary and
secondary education; that he attended Ateneo de
Manila University where he took up Bachelor of Science in
Computer Science.
When petitioner graduated from College in the year 2000, reside continuously in the Philippines from the date of filing 2003 and 2004 reveal that his actual monthly income
he worked as General Manager of MIT Zipper, a company of this petition up to the time of [his] admission to the
owned by the family of the petitioner; that as a
businessman he conscientiously files Income Tax Returns;
that he is presently married to Irene Chan, a Filipino citizen Based on the foregoing, the Court believes that the
Petitioner further alleged that he believes in the principles ACCORDINGLY, therefore, the petition for admission as
underlying the Philippine Constitution. He had conducted citizen of the Philippines is hereby GRANTED.
himself in a proper, irreproachable manner during his
entire period of residence in the Philippines in his relations This decision shall become executory after two (2) years
with the constituted government as well as with the from its promulgation and after the Court, after hearing,
community in which he is living. These allegations are with the attendance of the Solicitor General or his
evinced by the clearances petitioner was able to secure representative, is satisfied, and so finds that during the
from the Philippine National Police, National Bureau of intervening time the applicant has (1) not left the
Investigation, Office of the Clerk of Court – Regional Trial Philippines, (2) dedicated himself continuously to a lawful
Court, Quezon City, and the Office of the City calling or profession, (3) not been convicted of any
Prosecutor. He has mingled socially with the Filipinos, and offense or violation of government[-]promulgated rules, or
have [sic] evinced a sincere desire to learn and embrace (4) committed any act of [sic] prejudicial to the interest of
the customs, traditions, and ideals of the Filipinos. the nation or contrary to any government renounced [sic]
policies.
Petitioner further alleged that he is not a polygamist nor a
believer in the practice of polygamy. He has not been SO ORDERED.[12]
convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude. He is
not suffering from any mental alienation or any incurable Ruling of the Court of Appeals
or contagious disease. The nation of which he is presently
a citizen or subject of, is not at war with the Philippines. He
Petitioner filed an appeal with the CA, which was
is not opposed to organized government or affiliated with docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 91213. Petitioner contended
any association or group of persons who uphold and in its Appellant‘s Brief[13] that respondent may not become
teach doctrines opposing all organized governments. He a naturalized Filipino citizen because: 1) he does not own
has all the qualifications required and none of the real estate in the Philippines; 2) he does not have some
disqualifications under Commonwealth Act No. 473, as known lucrative trade, profession or lawful occupation; 3)
amended. he is not gainfully employed, as he merely worked in the
business owned by his family and was merely given
Moreover, petitioner‘s intention to become a citizen of the allowances by his parents for the daily expenses of his
Philippines is being done in good faith, and to renounce family; 4) in an August 2001 Deed of Sale [14] covering a
absolutely and forever all allegiance and fidelity to any parcel of land in Antipolo City he and his wife supposedly
foreign state, prince, potentate or sovereignty and purchased, respondent falsely misrepresented himself as a
particularly to the Chinese Government of which at this Filipino citizen, thus exemplifying his lack of good moral
time he is a citizen and subject, and that petitioner shall character; 5) his income tax returns for the years 2002,
differs from his monthly income as declared in his petition
Philippine Citizenship. for naturalization, leading to the conclusion that either he
is evading taxes or concealing the truth regarding his
income; and 6) on cross-examination by petitioner, he

31
could not cite any of the principles underlying the extent of the operations of the petitioner-appellee‘s family the petitioner‘s estimate of his income in his application
Philippine Constitution which he is supposed to believe in. business and his involvement in the management thereof and that declared by him during his direct testimony
are corroborated by the testimonies of Atty. Benjamin should not be taken against him as an indication of intent
In a short Comment/Opposition[15] to petitioner‘s brief, Moraleda and Atty. Bella Ramona Antonano, both friends to evade payment of taxes. x x x
respondent admitted that while ―he was merely made to of the Huang family and the petitioner-appellee since
sign the Deed of Sale‖ which falsely represented him as a 1987 and 1994, respectively. Both witnesses also testified xxxx
Filipino citizen, he ―had nothing to do with the that the petitioner-appellee possessed all the
preparation‖ thereof and was ―unaware‖ that his qualifications and none of the disqualifications to become Lastly, the Solicitor General argued that petitioner-
citizenship was even indicated therein – ―he just signed a naturalized citizen of the Philippines. appellee is disqualified from becoming a citizen of the
the document as requested by the broker so that the Philippines because he could not even cite any of the
property will be registered in the name of his wife;‖ that Secondly, the Solicitor General also averred that the principles underlying the Constitution during cross-
the discrepancy between his income declarations in his petitioner-appellee failed to conduct himself in a proper examination x x x.
tax returns and the declared income in his petition for and irreproachable manner during his entire stay or
naturalization came to light and resulted from the fact residence in the Philippines. It noted that the petitioner- xxxx
that ―he does not personally file his income tax returns and appellee stated in his petition that he earns an average of
that he merely received salaries in the range of P15,000.00 P15,000.00 per month but his declared gross income for We agree with the observation of the petitioner-appellee
per month considering that he is employed in a family 2002 and 2003 indicated that he earned P120,000.00 that the oppositor‘s representative during the cross-
corporation;‖ that ―most of his expenses are taken care of annually while in 2004, his annual gross income was examination was actually asking the petitioner-appellee
by his parents who own the corporation,‖ P210,000.00. The Solicitor General contended that to recite what these underlying principles of the
and this has been explained during his cross- because of the petitioner-appellee‘s failure to divulge his Constitution are in a manner which a law professor would
examination; that while petitioner claimed that he could true income, his moral character has been tainted. normally ask his Political Law students. Not being able to
not cite any underlying principles of the Constitution, he enumerate the principles in verbatim does not necessarily
was not confronted by the former about these principles We hold otherwise. mean that one does not believe in the Constitution. What
during the proceedings; and that petitioner‘s opposition is is important is that the petitioner-appellee declared under
based merely on conjecture and particular portions of the Absent a clear and unmistakable showing that the oath that he believes in the principles underlying the
evidence which do not represent the whole context of petitioner-appellee knowingly and deliberately filed a Constitution, and that he had no derogatory or criminal
the proceedings. fraudulent return with intent to evade tax or that he has record which would be a clear violation of the law of the
concealed the truth in his income tax returns, the land. Apparently, during cross-examination the oppositor-
On November 29, 2011, the CA issued the assailed presumption that the latter has regularly filed his return appellant did not confront the petitioner-appellee of the
Decision, pronouncing thus: prevails. The petitioner-appellee has, in fact, explained principles which it thought the latter does not believe in.
First off, an examination of the evidence presented during before the trial court that his salary is not exactly fixed;
the proceedings below shows that the petitioner- sometimes he earns more or sometimes less than his WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED and the Decision dated
appellee[16] has been engaged in some lucrative trade or estimated or average monthly earnings which could well September 24, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
lawful occupation. He works as general manager in their be between P15,000.00 to P18,000.00. He even testified City, Branch 96 in Naturalization Case No. Q-05-55251 is
family-owned business, Crown Shipper Manufacturer and that he is not included in the payroll since his parents own AFFIRMED.
Trading Corporation, a zipper manufacturing company the company and his salaries are handed to him by his
employing workers mostly coming from the province. parents. SO ORDERED.[17]

Prior to his appointment as general manager, petitioner-
appellee has also been working in the family‘s business
before his parents turned over the management of its
affairs. This is evidenced by the increase in the declared
gross income of the petitioner-appellee in his Income Tax
Returns filed for the years 2002, 2003, 2004 and 2005. The
In the case of Republic of the Philippines v. Court of
Appeals and Loh Khuan Fatt, the Supreme Court did not
agree with the argument of the Solicitor General that
there had been a willful failure on the part of the
applicant to disclose the petitioner‘s true income, thereby
tainting his moral character. The discrepancy between
Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but in its March 7,
2012 Resolution, the appellate court stood its ground.
Issue
Thus, the instant Petition was filed, raising the following
issue:

32
WHETHER X X X RESPONDENT X X X HAS DULY COMPLIED
WITH THE RIGID REQUISITES PRESCRIBED BY
COMMONWEALTH ACT NO. 473, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS
THE REVISED NATURALIZATION LAW, AS TO ENTITLE HIM TO
BE ADMITTED AS A CITIZEN OF THE PHILIPPINES.[18]
Petitioner’s Arguments
In its Petition and Reply[19] seeking the reversal of the
assailed CA dispositions as well as the denial of
respondent‘s petition for naturalization, petitioner argues
that respondent failed to prove that he is engaged in a
lucrative trade, profession or lawful occupation; that
respondent‘s admission during trial that he is not even in
the payroll of his employer belies his claim that he is the
general manager thereof, as well as his claim that he is
engaged in a lucrative trade; that respondent‘s declared
monthly income is not even sufficient for his family, much
less could it be considered ―lucrative;‖ that respondent‘s
admission that he received allowances from his parents
to answer for the daily expenses of his family further proves
the point that he does not have a lucrative trade; that the
monthly income declared in respondent‘s petition for
naturalization could not be reconciled with the incomes
stated in his annual tax returns; that the inconsistencies in
respondent‘s testimonial and documentary evidence
point to the fact the he could either be evading taxes or
concealing the truth regarding his income, and indicates
that he does not possess the requisite good moral
character; that respondent‘s act of falsely declaring
himself a Filipino citizen in the August 2001 deed of sale
proves lack of good moral character and defiance of the
constitutional prohibition regarding foreign ownership of
land; and that respondent has exhibited lack of
knowledge of the underlying principles of the Philippine
Constitution.
Respondent’s Arguments
In his Comment,[20] respondent reiterates that the
inconsistencies in his income tax returns and declarations
during the naturalization proceedings are explained by
the fact that he does not personally file his income tax
returns; that his monthly salary is not fixed; that most of his
expenses are taken cared of by his parents who own the
zipper manufacturing business which employs him; that
the Antipolo property was not titled in his name, but in the
name of his wife, and the title thereto merely describes
and indicates that the owner – his wife – is married to him;
that he was merely made to sign the deed of sale, and he
had no hand in its preparation – nor was he aware that his
citizenship was indicated therein; and that as he was not
a law student, he could not at the trial be expected to
recite verbatim and specifically the underlying legal
principles of the Constitution, which is what petitioner
expected him to do at the time.
Our Ruling
The Court finds for petitioner.
In Republic v. Hong, [21] it was held in essence that an
applicant for naturalization must show full and complete
compliance with the requirements of the naturalization
law; otherwise, his petition for naturalization will be
denied. This ponente has likewise held that ―[t]he courts
must always be mindful that naturalization proceedings
are imbued with the highest public interest. Naturalization
laws should be rigidly enforced and strictly construed in
favor of the government and against the applicant. The
burden of proof rests upon the applicant to show full and
complete compliance with the requirements of law.‖[22]
Section 2 of the Revised Naturalization Law or CA 473
requires, among others, that an applicant for
naturalization must be of good moral character and must
have some known lucrative trade, profession, or lawful
occupation. In regard to the requirement that the
applicant must have a known lucrative trade,
this ponente declared:
Based on jurisprudence, the qualification of ―some known
lucrative trade, profession, or lawful occupation‖
means “not only that the person having the employment
gets enough for his ordinary necessities in life. It must be
shown that the employment gives one an income such
that there is an appreciable margin of his income over his
expenses as to be able to provide for an adequate
support in the event of unemployment, sickness, or
disability to work and thus avoid one’s becoming the
object of charity or a public charge.” His income should
permit “him and the members of his family to live with
reasonable comfort, in accordance with the prevailing
standard of living, and consistently with the demands of
human dignity, at this stage of our civilization.‖
Moreover, it has been held that in determining the
existence of a lucrative income, the courts should
consider only the applicant‘s income; his or her spouse‘s
income should not be included in the assessment. The
spouse‘s additional income is immaterial ―for under the
law the petitioner should be the one to possess ‗some
known lucrative trade, profession or lawful occupation‘ to
qualify him to become a Filipino citizen.‖ Lastly, the Court
has consistently held that the applicant‘s qualifications
must be determined as of the time of the filing of his
petition.[23] (Emphasis supplied)
From the above, it may be concluded that there is no
basis for the CA finding that respondent is engaged in a
lucrative trade. Indeed, his supposed income of
P15,000.00 to P18,000.00 per month as found by the CA is
not enough for the support of his family. By his own
admission, most of his family‘s daily expenses are still
shouldered by his parents who own the zipper
manufacturing business which employs him. This simply
means that respondent continues to be a burden to, and
a charge upon, his parents; he lives on the charity of his
parents. He cannot support his own family on his own.
Indeed, it is even doubtful that respondent is carrying on a
trade at all. He admitted during trial that he was not even
listed or included in the payroll of his family‘s zipper
business. If this is the case, then he may not be
considered an employee thereof. One of the most
effective pieces of evidence to prove employment –
aside from the employment contract itself and other
documents such as daily time records[24] – is a worker‘s
inclusion in the payroll. With this admitted fact, one may
not be faulted for believing that respondent‘s alleged
employment in his family‘s zipper business was contrived
for the sole purpose of complying with the legal
requirements prior to obtaining Philippine citizenship.
33
On the other hand, even assuming that respondent was
indeed employed by his parents, his non-inclusion in the
payroll for all the years he has worked in his parents’
business[25] suggests – as correctly argued by petitioner –
an intent to evade taxes or to conceal the true nature of
a Filipino citizen – which he did to secure the seamless
registration of the property in the name of his wife – is
further proof of respondent‘s lack of good moral
character. It is also a violation of the constitutional
prohibition on ownership of lands by foreign
Diamante and concurred in by Presiding Justice Andres B.
Reyes, Jr. and Associate Justice Mariflor P. Punzalan
Castillo.
[3] Id. at 71-75; penned by Judge Afable E. Cajigal.

his employment and the amount of his salary or income. It
is concealment of the truth; an attempt to circumvent
with impunity the tax laws, labor laws relative to the
employment of aliens, and other laws that would
otherwise regulate respondent‘s actions during his stay in
this country. Indeed, without payroll records, it can never
be said that respondent works for his parents‘ zipper
business. If such is the case, then respondent is not
individuals.[27] His defense that he unknowingly signed the
deed is unacceptable. First of all, as a foreigner living in a [4] Id. at 51-52.
foreign land, he should conduct himself accordingly in this
country – with care, circumspect, and respect for the laws [5] Id. at 53-55.
of the host. Finally, as an educated and experienced
businessman, it must be presumed that he acted with due [6] Id. at 63.
care and signed the deed of sale with full knowledge of its
import.[28] [7] Id. at 67-70.

required to state in his income tax return – as is the case –

his employer and what he actually receives as salary Having decided in the foregoing manner, We must Or Commonwealth Act No. 473, The Revised
[8]

therefrom; he is free to conveniently declare any amount conclude the instant case and disregard the other issues Naturalization Law, approved June 17, 1939.
of income in his tax returns. and arguments of the parties; they are deemed irrelevant
and will not alter the conclusion arrived at. As far as this [9] Rollo, pp. 67-69.
Either way, respondent‘s deliberate non-inclusion in the Court is concerned, respondent has failed to satisfy the
payroll of his parents‘ business can have only the most law which renders him completely undeserving of Filipino [10] Id. at 71-75.
unpleasant connotations. And his consent to be part of citizenship.
such scheme reflects negatively on his moral character. It [11] Herein respondent.
shows a proclivity for untruthfulness and dishonesty, and WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The November 29,
an unreserved willingness and readiness to violate 2011 Decision and March 7, 2012 Resolution of the Court [12] Rollo, pp. 73-75.
Philippine laws. of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 91213 are REVERSED AND
SET ASIDE. The September 24, 2007 Order of the Regional [13] CA rollo, pp. 45-62.
The appellate court‘s reliance upon the case of Republic Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 96 in Nat. Case/Spec.
v. Court of Appeals[26] is misplaced. In that case, there Proc. No. Q-05-55251 is likewiseANNULLED and SET [14] Rollo, p. 118.
was only a discrepancy between the applicant‘s estimate ASIDE, and the respondent‘s Petition for Naturalization in
of his income in his application and that declared by him said case is DISMISSED. [15] CA rollo, pp. 104-107.
during his direct testimony. In the present case,
respondent is not at all listed on the payroll of his parent‘s SO ORDERED. [16] Herein respondent.
business, where he is supposed to be its general
manager. As a result, there is absolutely no basis for the Carpio, (Acting Chief Justice), * Velasco, [17] Rollo, pp. 44-48.
correct determination of his income; instead, he invites Us Jr.,** Mendoza, and Leonen, JJ., concur.
to conveniently rely on his income tax returns and his [18] Id. at 22.
unilateral declarations. As We have earlier said, if We are
to believe them, then still, they are insufficient to generate * Per Special Order No. 1945 dated March 12, 2015. [19] Id. at 132-137.
a conclusion that respondent is carrying on a lucrative
trade; he cannot support his family from his declared ** Per Special Order No. 1951 dated March 18, 2015. [20] Id. at 123-128.
income.
[1] Rollo, pp. 14-38. [21] 520 Phil. 276, 285 (2006).
Moreover, respondent‘s admitted false declaration under
oath contained in the August 2001 deed of sale that he is [2] Id. at 40-49; penned by Associate Justice Franchito N. [22] Republic v. Ong, G.R. No. 175430, June 18, 2012, 673

34
SCRA 485, 498.

[23] Id. at 499-500.

See Ang v. San Joaquin, Jr., G.R. No. 185549, August 7,

[24]

2013, 703 SCRA 269, 287.

[25] Or since 2000.

[26] 354 Phil. 733 (1998).

CONSTITUTION, Article XII, Section 7. – Save in cases of

[27]

hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred

or conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or
associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the
public domain.

See Development Bank of the Philippines v. National

[28]

Merchandising Corporation, 148-B Phil. 310 (1971).

35

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 120295 June 28, 1996
JUAN G. FRIVALDO, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and RAUL R.
LEE, respondents.
G.R. No. 123755 June 28, 1996
RAUL R. LEE, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JUAN G.
FRIVALDO, respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:p
The ultimate question posed before this Court in these twin
cases is: Who should be declared the rightful governor of
Sorsogon -
(i) Juan G. Frivaldo, who unquestionably obtained the
highest number of votes in three successive elections but
who was twice declared by this Court to be disqualified to
hold such office due to his alien citizenship, and who now
claims to have re-assumed his lost Philippine citizenship
thru repatriation;
(ii) Raul R. Lee, who was the second placer in the canvass,
but who claims that the votes cast in favor of Frivaldo
should be considered void; that the electorate should be
deemed to have intentionally thrown away their ballots;
and that legally, he secured the most number
of valid votes; or
(iii) The incumbent Vice-Governor, Oscar G. Deri, who
obviously was not voted directly to the position of
governor, but who according to prevailing jurisprudence
should take over the said post inasmuch as, by the
ineligibility of Frivaldo, a "permanent vacancy in the
contested office has occurred"?
In ruling for Frivaldo, the Court lays down new doctrines on
repatriation, clarifies/reiterates/amplifies existing
jurisprudence on citizenship and elections, and upholds
the superiority of substantial justice over pure legalisms.
G.R. No. 123755
This is a special civil action under Rules 65 and 58 of the
Rules of Court for certiorari and preliminary injunction to
review and annul a Resolution of the respondent
Commission on Elections (Comelec), First
Division,1 promulgated on December 19, 19952 and
another Resolution of the Comelec en banc promulgated
February 23, 19963 denying petitioner's motion for
reconsideration.
The Facts
On March 20, 1995, private respondent Juan G. Frivaldo
filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the office of
Governor of Sorsogon in the May 8, 1995 elections. On
March 23, 1995, petitioner Raul R. Lee, another candidate,
filed a petition4 with the Comelec docketed as SPA No.
95-028 praying that Frivaldo "be disqualified from seeking
or holding any public office or position by reason of not
yet being a citizen of the Philippines", and that his
Certificate of Candidacy be canceled. On May 1, 1995,
the Second Division of the Comelec promulgated a
Resolution5 granting the petition with the following
disposition6:
WHEREFORE, this Division resolves to GRANT the petition
and declares that respondent is DISQUALIFIED to run for
the Office of Governor of Sorsogon on the ground that he
is NOT a citizen of the Philippines. Accordingly,
respondent's certificate of candidacy is canceled.
The Motion for Reconsideration filed by Frivaldo remained
unacted upon until after the May 8, 1995 elections. So, his
candidacy continued and he was voted for during the
elections held on said date. On May 11, 1995, the
Comelec en banc7 affirmed the aforementioned
Resolution of the Second Division.
The Provincial Board of Canvassers completed the
canvass of the election returns and a Certificate of
Votes8 dated May 27, 1995 was issued showing the
following votes obtained by the candidates for the
position of Governor of Sorsogon:
Antonio H. Escudero, Jr. 51,060
Juan G. Frivaldo 73,440
Raul R. Lee 53,304
Isagani P. Ocampo 1,925
On June 9, 1995, Lee filed in said SPA No. 95-028, a
(supplemental) petition9 praying for his proclamation as
the duly-elected Governor of Sorsogon.
In an order10 dated June 21, 1995, but promulgated
according to the petition "only on June 29, 1995," the
Comelec en banc directed "the Provincial Board of
Canvassers of Sorsogon to reconvene for the purpose of
proclaiming candidate Raul Lee as the winning
gubernatorial candidate in the province of Sorsogon on
June 29, 1995 . . ." Accordingly, at 8:30 in the evening of
June 30, 1995, Lee was proclaimed governor of Sorsogon.
On July 6, 1995, Frivaldo filed with the Comelec a new
petition,11 docketed as SPC No. 95-317, praying for the
annulment of the June 30, 1995 proclamation of Lee and
for his own proclamation. He alleged that on June 30,
1995, at 2:00 in the afternoon, he took his oath of
allegiance as a citizen of the Philippines after "his petition
for repatriation under P.D. 725 which he filed with the
Special Committee on Naturalization in September 1994
had been granted". As such, when "the said order (dated
June 21, 1995) (of the Comelec) . . . was released and
received by Frivaldo on June 30, 1995 at 5:30 o'clock in
the evening, there was no more legal impediment to the
proclamation (of Frivaldo) as governor . . ." In the
alternative, he averred that pursuant to the two cases
of Labo vs. Comelec,12 the Vice-Governor - not Lee -
should occupy said position of governor.
On December 19, 1995, the Comelec First Division
promulgated the herein assailed Resolution13 holding that
Lee, "not having garnered the highest number of votes,"
was not legally entitled to be proclaimed as duly-elected
governor; and that Frivaldo, "having garnered the highest
number of votes,
and . . . having reacquired his Filipino citizenship by
repatriation on June 30, 1995 under the provisions of
Presidential Decree No. 725 . . . (is) qualified to hold the
office of governor of Sorsogon"; thus:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Commission (First Division),
therefore RESOLVES to GRANT the Petition.
Consistent with the decisions of the Supreme Court, the
proclamation of Raul R. Lee as Governor of Sorsogon is
hereby ordered annulled, being contrary to law, he not
having garnered the highest number of votes to warrant
his proclamation.
Upon the finality of the annulment of the proclamation of
Raul R. Lee, the Provincial Board of Canvassers is directed
to immediately reconvene and, on the basis of the
36
completed canvass, proclaim petitioner Juan G. Frivaldo
as the duly elected Governor of Sorsogon having
garnered the highest number of votes, and he having
reacquired his Filipino citizenship by repatriation on June
30, 1995 under the provisions of Presidential Decree No.
725 and, thus, qualified to hold the office of Governor of
Sorsogon.
Conformably with Section 260 of the Omnibus Election
Code (B.P. Blg. 881), the Clerk of the Commission is
directed to notify His Excellency the President of the
Philippines, and the Secretary of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of the Province of Sorsogon of this resolution
immediately upon the due implementation thereof.
On December 26, 1995, Lee filed a motion for
reconsideration which was denied by the Comelec en
banc in its Resolution 14 promulgated on February 23, 1996.
On February 26, 1996, the present petition was filed.
Acting on the prayer for a temporary restraining order, this
Court issued on February 27, 1996 a Resolution which inter
alia directed the parties "to maintain the status
quo prevailing prior to the filing of this petition."
The Issues in G.R. No. 123755
Petitioner Lee's "position on the matter at hand may briefly
be capsulized in the following propositions"15:
First -- The initiatory petition below was so far insufficient in
form and substance to warrant the exercise by the
COMELEC of its jurisdiction with the result that, in effect,
the COMELEC acted without jurisdiction in taking
cognizance of and deciding said petition;
Second -- The judicially declared disqualification of
respondent was a continuing condition and rendered him
ineligible to run for, to be elected to and to hold the
Office of Governor;
Third -- The alleged repatriation of respondent was neither
valid nor is the effect thereof retroactive as to cure his
ineligibility and qualify him to hold the Office of Governor;
and
Fourth -- Correctly read and applied, the Labo Doctrine
fully supports the validity of petitioner's proclamation as
duly elected Governor of Sorsogon.
G.R. No. 120295
This is a petition to annul three Resolutions of the
respondent Comelec, the first two of which are also at
issue in G.R. No. 123755, as follows:
1. Resolution16 of the Second Division, promulgated on
May 1, 1995, disqualifying Frivaldo from running for
governor of Sorsogon in the May 8, 1995 elections "on the
ground that he is not a citizen of the Philippines";
2. Resolution17 of the Comelec en banc, promulgated on
May 11, 1995; and
3. Resolution18 of the Comelec en banc, promulgated also
on May 11, 1995 suspending the proclamation of, among
others, Frivaldo.
The Facts and the Issue
The facts of this case are essentially the same as those in
G.R. No. 123755. However, Frivaldo assails the above-
mentioned resolutions on a different ground: that under
Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, which is
reproduced hereinunder:
Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course or to cancel a
certificate of candidacy. -- A verified petition seeking to
deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy
may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that
any material representation contained therein as required
under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed
at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time
of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be
decided, after notice and hearing, not later than fifteen
days before the election. (Emphasis supplied.)
the Comelec had no jurisdiction to issue said Resolutions
because they were not rendered "within the period
allowed by law" i.e., "not later than fifteen days before the
election."
Otherwise stated, Frivaldo contends that the failure of the
Comelec to act on the petition for disqualification within
the period of fifteen days prior to the election as provided
by law is a jurisdictional defect which renders the said
Resolutions null and void.
By Resolution on March 12, 1996, the Court consolidated
G.R. Nos. 120295 and 123755 since they are intimately
related in their factual environment and are identical in
the ultimate question raised, viz., who should occupy the
position of governor of the province of Sorsogon.
On March 19, 1995, the Court heard oral argument from
the parties and required them thereafter to file
simultaneously their respective memoranda.
The Consolidated Issues
From the foregoing submissions, the consolidated issues
may be restated as follows:
1. Was the repatriation of Frivaldo valid and legal? If so,
did it seasonably cure his lack of citizenship as to qualify
him to be proclaimed and to hold the Office of
Governor? If not, may it be given retroactive effect? If so,
from when?
2. Is Frivaldo's "judicially declared" disqualification for lack
of Filipino citizenship a continuing bar to his eligibility to run
for, be elected to or hold the governorship of Sorsogon?
3. Did the respondent Comelec have jurisdiction over the
initiatory petition in SPC No. 95-317 considering that said
petition is not "a pre-proclamation case, an election
protest or a quo warranto case"?
4. Was the proclamation of Lee, a runner-up in the
election, valid and legal in light of existing jurisprudence?
5. Did the respondent Commission on Elections exceed its
jurisdiction in promulgating the assailed Resolutions, all of
which prevented Frivaldo from assuming the governorship
of Sorsogon, considering that they were not rendered
within the period referred to in Section 78 of the Omnibus
Election Code, viz., "not later than fifteen days before the
elections"?
The First Issue: Frivaldo's Repatriation
The validity and effectivity of Frivaldo's repatriation is the lis
mota, the threshold legal issue in this case. All the other
matters raised are secondary to this.
The Local Government Code of 199119 expressly requires
Philippine citizenship as a qualification for elective local
officials, including that of provincial governor, thus:
Sec. 39. Qualifications. -- (a) An elective local official must
be a citizen of the Philippines; a registered voter in the
barangay, municipality, city, or province or, in the case of
a member of the sangguniang panlalawigan,
sangguniang panlungsod, or sangguniang bayan, the
district where he intends to be elected; a resident therein
for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of
the election; and able to read and write Filipino or any
other local language or dialect.
(b) Candidates for the position of governor, vice governor
or member of the sangguniang panlalawigan, or mayor,
vice mayor or member of the sangguniang panlungsod of
highly urbanized cities must be at least twenty-three (23)
years of age on election day.
37
xxx xxx xxx
Inasmuch as Frivaldo had been declared by this
Court20 as a non-citizen, it is therefore incumbent upon
him to show that he has reacquired citizenship; in fine,
that he possesses the qualifications prescribed under the
said statute (R.A. 7160).
Under Philippine law,21 citizenship may be reacquired by
direct act of Congress, by naturalization or by repatriation.
Frivaldo told this Court in G.R. No. 10465422 and during the
oral argument in this case that he tried to resume his
citizenship by direct act of Congress, but that the bill
allowing him to do so "failed to materialize,
notwithstanding the endorsement of several members of
the House of Representatives" due, according to him, to
the "maneuvers of his political rivals." In the same case, his
attempt at naturalization was rejected by this Court
because of jurisdictional, substantial and procedural
defects.
Despite his lack of Philippine citizenship, Frivaldo was
overwhelmingly elected governor by the electorate of
Sorsogon, with a margin of 27,000 votes in the 1988
elections, 57,000 in 1992, and 20,000 in 1995 over the same
opponent Raul Lee. Twice, he was judicially declared a
non-Filipino and thus twice disqualified from holding and
discharging his popular mandate. Now, he comes to us a
third time, with a fresh vote from the people of Sorsogon
and a favorable decision from the Commission on
Elections to boot. Moreover, he now boasts of having
successfully passed through the third and last mode of
reacquiring citizenship: by repatriation under P.D. No. 725,
with no less than the Solicitor General himself, who was the
prime opposing counsel in the previous cases he lost, this
time, as counsel for co-respondent Comelec, arguing the
validity of his cause (in addition to his able private counsel
Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr.). That he took his oath of allegiance
under the provisions of said Decree at 2:00 p.m. on June
30, 1995 is not disputed. Hence, he insists that he -- not Lee
-- should have been proclaimed as the duly-elected
governor of Sorsogon when the Provincial Board of
Canvassers met at 8:30 p.m. on the said date since,
clearly and unquestionably, he garnered the highest
number of votes in the elections and since at that time, he
already reacquired his citizenship.
En contrario, Lee argues that Frivaldo's repatriation is
tainted with serious defects, which we shall now discuss in
seriatim.
First, Lee tells us that P.D. No. 725 had "been effectively
repealed", asserting that "then President Corazon Aquino
exercising legislative powers under the Transitory Provisions
of the 1987 Constitution, forbade the grant of citizenship
by Presidential Decree or Executive Issuances as the same
poses a serious and contentious issue of policy which the
present government, in the exercise of prudence and
sound discretion, should best leave to the judgment of the
first Congress under the 1987 Constitution", adding that in
her memorandum dated March 27, 1987 to the members
of the Special Committee on Naturalization constituted for
purposes of Presidential Decree No. 725, President Aquino
directed them "to cease and desist from undertaking any
and all proceedings within your functional area of
responsibility as defined under Letter of Instructions (LOI)
No. 270 dated April 11, 1975, as amended."23
This memorandum dated March 27, 198724 cannot by any
stretch of legal hermeneutics be construed as a law
sanctioning or authorizing a repeal of P.D. No. 725. Laws
are repealed only by subsequent ones 25 and a repeal
may be express or implied. It is obvious that no express
repeal was made because then President Aquino in her
memorandum -- based on the copy furnished us by Lee --
did not categorically and/or impliedly state that P.D. 725
was being repealed or was being rendered without any
legal effect. In fact, she did not even mention it
specifically by its number or text. On the other hand, it is a
basic rule of statutory construction that repeals by
implication are not favored. An implied repeal will not be
allowed "unless it is convincingly and unambiguously
demonstrated that the two laws are clearly repugnant
and patently inconsistent that they cannot co-exist".26
The memorandum of then President Aquino cannot even
be regarded as a legislative enactment, for not every
pronouncement of the Chief Executive even under the
Transitory Provisions of the 1987 Constitution can nor
should be regarded as an exercise of her law-making
powers. At best, it could be treated as an executive policy
addressed to the Special Committee to halt the
acceptance and processing of applications for
repatriation pending whatever "judgment the first
Congress under the 1987 Constitution" might make. In
other words, the former President did not repeal P.D. 725
but left it to the first Congress -- once created -- to deal
with the matter. If she had intended to repeal such law,
she should have unequivocally said so instead of referring
the matter to Congress. The fact is she carefully couched
her presidential issuance in terms that clearly indicated
the intention of "the present government, in the exercise
of prudence and sound discretion" to leave the matter of
repeal to the new Congress. Any other interpretation of
the said Presidential Memorandum, such as is now being
proffered to the Court by Lee, would visit unmitigated
violence not only upon statutory construction but on
common sense as well.
Second, Lee also argues that "serious congenital
irregularities flawed the repatriation proceedings,"
asserting that Frivaldo's application therefor was "filed on
June 29, 1995 . . . (and) was approved in just one day or
on June 30, 1995 . . .", which "prevented a judicious review
and evaluation of the merits thereof." Frivaldo counters
that he filed his application for repatriation with the Office
of the President in Malacañang Palace on August 17,
1994. This is confirmed by the Solicitor General. However,
the Special Committee was reactivated only on June 8,
1995, when presumably the said Committee started
processing his application. On June 29, 1995, he filled up
and re-submitted the FORM that the Committee required.
Under these circumstances, it could not be said that there
was "indecent haste" in the processing of his application.
Anent Lee's charge that the "sudden reconstitution of the
Special Committee on Naturalization was intended solely
for the personal interest of respondent,"27 the Solicitor
General explained during the oral argument on March 19,
1996 that such allegation is simply baseless as there were
many others who applied and were considered for
repatriation, a list of whom was submitted by him to this
Court, through a Manifestation28 filed on April 3, 1996.
On the basis of the parties' submissions, we are convinced
that the presumption of regularity in the performance of
official duty and the presumption of legality in the
repatriation of Frivaldo have not been successfully
rebutted by Lee. The mere fact that the proceedings
were speeded up is by itself not a ground to conclude
that such proceedings were necessarily tainted. After all,
38
the requirements of repatriation under P.D. No. 725 are not
difficult to comply with, nor are they tedious and
cumbersome. In fact, P.D.
72529 itself requires very little of an applicant, and even the
rules and regulations to implement the said decree were
left to the Special Committee to promulgate. This is not
unusual since, unlike in naturalization where an alien
covets a first-time entry into Philippine political life, in
repatriation the applicant is a former natural-born Filipino
who is merely seeking to reacquire his previous citizenship.
In the case of Frivaldo, he was undoubtedly a natural-
born citizen who openly and faithfully served his country
and his province prior to his naturalization in the United
States -- a naturalization he insists was made necessary
only to escape the iron clutches of a dictatorship he
abhorred and could not in conscience embrace -- and
who, after the fall of the dictator and the re-establishment
of democratic space, wasted no time in returning to his
country of birth to offer once more his talent and services
to his people.
So too, the fact that ten other persons, as certified to by
the Solicitor General, were granted repatriation argues
convincingly and conclusively against the existence of
favoritism vehemently posited by Raul Lee. At any rate,
any contest on the legality of Frivaldo's repatriation should
have been pursued before the Committee itself, and,
failing there, in the Office of the President, pursuant to the
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies.
Third, Lee further contends that assuming the assailed
repatriation to be valid, nevertheless it could only be
effective as at 2:00 p.m. of June 30, 1995 whereas the
citizenship qualification prescribed by the Local
Government Code "must exist on the date of his election,
if not when the certificate of candidacy is filed," citing our
decision in G.R. 10465430 which held that "both the Local
Government Code and the Constitution require that only
Philippine citizens can run and be elected to public
office." Obviously, however, this was a mere obiter as the
only issue in said case was whether Frivaldo's
naturalization was valid or not -- and NOT the effective
date thereof. Since the Court held his naturalization to be
invalid, then the issue of when an aspirant for public office
should be a citizen was NOT resolved at all by the Court.
Which question we shall now directly rule on.
Under Sec. 39 of the Local Government Code, "(a)n
elective local official must be:
* a citizen of the Philippines;
* a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or
province . . . where he intends to be elected;
* a resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately
preceding the day of the election;
* able to read and write Filipino or any other local
language or dialect.
* In addition, "candidates for the position of governor . . .
must be at least twenty-three (23) years of age on
election day.
From the above, it will be noted that the law does not
specify any particular date or time when the candidate
must possess citizenship, unlike that for residence (which
must consist of at least one year's residency immediately
preceding the day of election) and age (at least twenty
three years of age on election day).
Philippine citizenship is an indispensable requirement for
holding an elective public office,31 and the purpose of the
citizenship qualification is none other than to ensure that
no alien, i.e., no person owing allegiance to another
nation, shall govern our people and our country or a unit
of territory thereof. Now, an official begins to govern or to
discharge his functions only upon his proclamation and on
the day the law mandates his term of office to begin.
Since Frivaldo re-assumed his citizenship on June 30, 1995 -
- the very day32 the term of office of governor (and other
elective officials) began -- he was therefore already
qualified to be proclaimed, to hold such office and to
discharge the functions and responsibilities thereof as of
said date. In short, at that time, he was already qualified
to govern his native Sorsogon. This is the liberal
interpretation that should give spirit, life and meaning to
our law on qualifications consistent with the purpose for
which such law was enacted. So too, even from
a literal (as distinguished from liberal) construction, it
should be noted that Section 39 of the Local Government
Code speaks of "Qualifications" of "ELECTIVE
OFFICIALS", not of candidates. Why then should such
qualification be required at the time of election or at the
time of the filing of the certificates of candidacies, as Lee
insists? Literally, such qualifications -- unless otherwise
expressly conditioned, as in the case of age and
residence -- should thus be possessed when the "elective
[or elected] official" begins to govern, i.e., at the time he is
proclaimed and at the start of his term -- in this case, on
June 30, 1995. Paraphrasing this Court's ruling in Vasquez
vs. Giap and Li Seng Giap & Sons, 33 if the purpose of the
citizenship requirement is to ensure that our people and
country do not end up being governed by aliens, i.e.,
persons owing allegiance to another nation, that aim or
purpose would not be thwarted but instead achieved by
construing the citizenship qualification as applying to the
time of proclamation of the elected official and at the
start of his term.
But perhaps the more difficult objection was the one
raised during the oral argument34 to the effect that the
citizenship qualification should be possessed at the time
the candidate (or for that matter the elected official)
registered as a voter. After all, Section 39, apart from
requiring the official to be a citizen, also specifies as
another item of qualification, that he be a "registered
voter". And, under the law35 a "voter" must be a citizen of
the Philippines. So therefore, Frivaldo could not have been
a voter -- much less a validly registered one -- if he was not
a citizen at the time of such registration.
The answer to this problem again lies in discerning the
purpose of the requirement. If the law intended
the citizenship qualification to be possessed prior to
election consistent with the requirement of being a
registered voter, then it would not have made citizenship
a SEPARATE qualification. The law abhors a redundancy. It
therefore stands to reason that the law intended
CITIZENSHIP to be a qualification distinct from being a
VOTER, even if being a voter presumes being a citizen first.
It also stands to reason that the voter requirement was
included as another qualification (aside from "citizenship"),
not to reiterate the need for nationality but to require that
the official be registered as a voter IN THE AREA OR
TERRITORY he seeks to govern, i.e., the law states: "a
registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or
province . . . where he intends to be elected." It should be
emphasized that the Local Government Code requires an
elective official to be a registered voter. It does not
require him to vote actually. Hence, registration -- not the
actual voting -- is the core of this "qualification". In other
words, the law's purpose in this second requirement is to
39
ensure that the prospective official is actually registered in
the area he seeks to govern -- and not anywhere else.
Before this Court, Frivaldo has repeatedly emphasized --
and Lee has not disputed -- that he "was and is a
registered voter of Sorsogon, and his registration as a voter
has been sustained as valid by judicial declaration . . . In
fact, he cast his vote in his precinct on May 8, 1995."36
So too, during the oral argument, his counsel steadfastly
maintained that "Mr. Frivaldo has always been a
registered voter of Sorsogon. He has voted in 1987, 1988,
1992, then he voted again in 1995. In fact, his eligibility as
a voter was questioned, but the court dismissed (sic) his
eligibility as a voter and he was allowed to vote as in fact,
he voted in all the previous elections including on May 8,
1995."3 7
It is thus clear that Frivaldo is a registered voter in the
province where he intended to be elected.
There is yet another reason why the prime issue
of citizenship should be reckoned from the date of
proclamation, not necessarily the date of election or date
of filing of the certificate of candidacy. Section 253 of the
Omnibus Election Code 38 gives any voter, presumably
including the defeated candidate, the opportunity to
question the ELIGIBILITY (or the disloyalty) of a candidate.
This is the only provision of the Code that authorizes a
remedy on how to contest before the Comelec an
incumbent's ineligibility arising from failure to meet the
qualifications enumerated under Sec. 39 of the Local
Government Code. Such remedy of Quo Warranto can
be availed of "within ten days after proclamation" of the
winning candidate. Hence, it is only at such time that the
issue of ineligibility may be taken cognizance of by the
Commission. And since, at the very moment of Lee's
proclamation (8:30 p.m., June 30, 1995), Juan G. Frivaldo
was already and indubitably a citizen, having taken his
oath of allegiance earlier in the afternoon of the same
day, then he should have been the candidate
proclaimed as he unquestionably garnered the highest
number of votes in the immediately preceding elections
and such oath had already cured his previous "judicially-
declared" alienage. Hence, at such time, he was no
longer ineligible.
But to remove all doubts on this important issue, we also
hold that the repatriation of Frivaldo RETROACTED to the
date of the filing of his application on August 17, 1994.
It is true that under the Civil Code of the
Philippines, 39 "(l)aws shall have no retroactive effect,
unless the contrary is provided." But there are settled
exceptions40 to this general rule, such as when the statute
is CURATIVE or REMEDIAL in nature or when it CREATES
NEW RIGHTS.
According to Tolentino,41 curative statutes are those which
undertake to cure errors and irregularities, thereby
validating judicial or administrative proceedings, acts of
public officers, or private deeds and contracts which
otherwise would not produce their intended
consequences by reason of some statutory disability or
failure to comply with some technical requirement. They
operate on conditions already existing, and are
necessarily retroactive in operation. Agpalo,42 on the
other hand, says that curative statutes are
"healing acts . . . curing defects and adding to the means
of enforcing existing obligations . . . (and) are intended to
supply defects, abridge superfluities in existing laws, and
curb certain evils. . . . By their very nature, curative statutes
are retroactive . . . (and) reach back to past events to
correct errors or irregularities and to render valid and
effective attempted acts which would be otherwise
ineffective for the purpose the parties intended."
On the other hand, remedial or procedural laws, i.e.,
those statutes relating to remedies or modes of
procedure, which do not create new or take away vested
rights, but only operate in furtherance of the remedy or
confirmation of such rights, ordinarily do not come within
the legal meaning of a retrospective law, nor within the
general rule against the retrospective operation of
statutes.43
A reading of P.D. 725 immediately shows that it creates a
new right, and also provides for a new remedy, thereby
filling certain voids in our laws. Thus, in its preamble, P.D.
725 expressly recognizes the plight of "many Filipino
women (who) had lost their Philippine citizenship by
marriage to aliens" and who could not, under the existing
law (C.A. No. 63, as amended) avail of repatriation until
"after the death of their husbands or the termination of
their marital status" and who could neither be benefitted
by the 1973 Constitution's new provision allowing "a Filipino
woman who marries an alien to retain her Philippine
citizenship . . ." because "such provision of the new
Constitution does not apply to Filipino women who had
married aliens before said constitution took effect." Thus,
P.D. 725 granted a new right to these women -- the right
to re-acquire Filipino citizenship even during their marital
coverture, which right did not exist prior to P.D. 725. On the
other hand, said statute also provided a new remedy and
a new right in favor of other "natural born Filipinos who
(had) lost their Philippine citizenship but now desire to re-
acquire Philippine citizenship", because prior to the
promulgation of P.D. 725 such former Filipinos would have
had to undergo the tedious and cumbersome process of
naturalization, but with the advent of P.D. 725 they could
now re-acquire their Philippine citizenship under the
simplified procedure of repatriation.
The Solicitor General44 argues:
By their very nature, curative statutes are retroactive, (DBP
vs. CA, 96 SCRA 342), since they are intended to supply
defects, abridge superfluities in existing laws (Del Castillo
vs. Securities and Exchange Commission, 96 Phil. 119) and
curb certain evils (Santos vs. Duata, 14 SCRA 1041).
In this case, P.D. No. 725 was enacted to cure the defect
in the existing naturalization law, specifically C.A. No. 63
wherein married Filipino women are allowed to repatriate
only upon the death of their husbands, and natural-born
Filipinos who lost their citizenship by naturalization and
other causes faced the difficulty of undergoing the rigid
procedures of C.A. 63 for reacquisition of Filipino
citizenship by naturalization.
Presidential Decree No. 725 provided a remedy for the
aforementioned legal aberrations and thus its provisions
are considered essentially remedial and curative.
In light of the foregoing, and prescinding from the wording
of the preamble, it is unarguable that the legislative intent
was precisely to give the statute retroactive operation.
"(A) retrospective operation is given to a statute or
amendment where the intent that it should so operate
clearly appears from a consideration of the act as a
whole, or from the terms thereof."45 It is obvious to the
Court that the statute was meant to "reach back" to those
persons, events and transactions not otherwise covered
by prevailing law and jurisprudence. And inasmuch as it
40
has been held that citizenship is a political and civil right
equally as important as the freedom of speech, liberty of
abode, the right against unreasonable searches and
seizures and other guarantees enshrined in the Bill of
Rights, therefore the legislative intent to give retrospective
operation to P.D. 725 must be given the fullest effect
possible. "(I)t has been said that a remedial statute must
be so construed as to make it effect the evident purpose
for which it was enacted, so that if the reason of the
statute extends to past transactions, as well as to those in
the future, then it will be so applied although the statute
does not in terms so direct, unless to do so would impair
some vested right or violate some constitutional
guaranty."46 This is all the more true of P.D. 725, which did
not specify any restrictions on or delimit or qualify the right
of repatriation granted therein.
At this point, a valid question may be raised: How can the
retroactivity of P.D. 725 benefit Frivaldo considering that
said law was enacted on June 5, 1975, while Frivaldo lost
his Filipino citizenship much later, on January 20, 1983, and
applied for repatriation even later, on August 17, 1994?
While it is true that the law was already in effect at the
time that Frivaldo became an American citizen,
nevertheless, it is not only the law itself (P.D. 725) which is
to be given retroactive effect, but even the repatriation
granted under said law to Frivaldo on June 30, 1995 is to
be deemed to have retroacted to the date of his
application therefor, August 17, 1994. The reason for this is
simply that if, as in this case, it was the intent of the
legislative authority that the law should apply
to past events -- i.e., situations and transactions existing
even before the law came into being -- in order to benefit
the greatest number of former Filipinos possible thereby
enabling them to enjoy and exercise the constitutionally
guaranteed right of citizenship, and such legislative
intention is to be given the fullest effect and expression,
then there is all the more reason to have the law apply in
a retroactive or retrospective manner to situations, events
and transactions subsequent to the passage of such law.
That is, the repatriation granted to Frivaldo on June 30,
1995 can and should be made to take effect as of date of
his application. As earlier mentioned, there is nothing in
the law that would bar this or would show a contrary
intention on the part of the legislative authority; and there
is no showing that damage or prejudice to anyone, or
anything unjust or injurious would result from giving
retroactivity to his repatriation. Neither has Lee shown that
there will result the impairment of any contractual
obligation, disturbance of any vested right or breach of
some constitutional guaranty.
Being a former Filipino who has served the people
repeatedly, Frivaldo deserves a liberal interpretation of
Philippine laws and whatever defects there were in his
nationality should now be deemed mooted by his
repatriation.
Another argument for retroactivity to the date of filing is
that it would prevent prejudice to applicants. If P.D. 725
were not to be given retroactive effect, and the Special
Committee decides not to act, i.e., to delay the
processing of applications for any substantial length of
time, then the former Filipinos who may be stateless, as
Frivaldo -- having already renounced his American
citizenship -- was, may be prejudiced for causes outside
their control. This should not be. In case of doubt in the
interpretation or application of laws, it is to be presumed
that the law-making body intended right and justice to
prevail.4 7
And as experience will show, the Special Committee was
able to process, act upon and grant applications for
repatriation within relatively short spans of time after the
same were filed.48 The fact that such interregna were
relatively insignificant minimizes the likelihood of prejudice
to the government as a result of giving retroactivity to
repatriation. Besides, to the mind of the Court, direct
prejudice to the government is possible only where a
person's repatriation has the effect of wiping out a liability
of his to the government arising in connection with or as a
result of his being an alien, and accruing only during the
interregnum between application and approval, a
situation that is not present in the instant case.
And it is but right and just that the mandate of the people,
already twice frustrated, should now prevail. Under the
circumstances, there is nothing unjust or iniquitous in
treating Frivaldo's repatriation as having become
effective as of the date of his application, i.e., on August
17, 1994. This being so, all questions about his possession of
the nationality qualification -- whether at the date of
proclamation (June 30, 1995) or the date of election (May
8, 1995) or date of filing his certificate of candidacy
(March 20, 1995) would become moot.
Based on the foregoing, any question regarding Frivaldo's
status as a registered voter would also be deemed settled.
Inasmuch as he is considered as having been repatriated
-- i.e., his Filipino citizenship restored -- as of August 17,
1994, his previous registration as a voter is likewise deemed
validated as of said date.
It is not disputed that on January 20, 1983 Frivaldo
became an American. Would the retroactivity of his
repatriation not effectively give him dual citizenship,
which under Sec. 40 of the Local Government Code
would disqualify him "from running for any elective local
position?"49 We answer this question in the negative, as
there is cogent reason to hold that Frivaldo was really
STATELESS at the time he took said oath of allegiance and
even before that, when he ran for governor in 1988. In his
Comment, Frivaldo wrote that he "had long renounced
and had long abandoned his American citizenship -- long
before May 8, 1995. At best, Frivaldo was stateless in the
interim -- when he abandoned and renounced his US
citizenship but before he was repatriated to his Filipino
citizenship."50
On this point, we quote from the assailed Resolution dated
December 19, 1995:51
By the laws of the United States, petitioner Frivaldo lost his
American citizenship when he took his oath of allegiance
to the Philippine Government when he ran for Governor in
1988, in 1992, and in 1995. Every certificate of candidacy
contains an oath of allegiance to the Philippine
Government."
These factual findings that Frivaldo has lost his foreign
nationality long before the elections of 1995 have not
been effectively rebutted by Lee. Furthermore, it is basic
that such findings of the Commission are conclusive upon
this Court, absent any showing of capriciousness or
arbitrariness or
abuse.52
The Second Issue: Is Lack of Citizenship
a Continuing Disqualification?
Lee contends that the May 1, 1995 Resolution 53 of the
Comelec Second Division in SPA No. 95-028 as affirmed in
toto by Comelec En Banc in its Resolution of May 11, 1995
"became final and executory after five (5) days or on May
41
17, 1995, no restraining order having been issued by this
Honorable Court.54 Hence, before Lee "was proclaimed as
the elected governor on June 30, 1995, there was already
a final and executory judgment disqualifying" Frivaldo. Lee
adds that this Court's two rulings (which Frivaldo now
concedes were legally "correct") declaring Frivaldo an
alien have also become final and executory way before
the 1995 elections, and these "judicial pronouncements of
his political status as an American citizen absolutely and
for all time disqualified (him) from running for, and holding
any public office in the Philippines."
We do not agree.
It should be noted that our first ruling in G.R. No. 87193
disqualifying Frivaldo was rendered in connection with the
1988 elections while that in G.R. No. 104654 was in
connection with the 1992 elections. That he was
disqualified for such elections is final and can no longer be
changed. In the words of the respondent Commission
(Second Division) in its assailed Resolution:55
The records show that the Honorable Supreme Court had
decided that Frivaldo was not a Filipino citizen and thus
disqualified for the purpose of the 1988 and 1992
elections. However, there is no record of any "final
judgment" of the disqualification of Frivaldo as a
candidate for the May 8, 1995 elections. What the
Commission said in its Order of June 21, 1995
(implemented on June 30, 1995), directing the
proclamation of Raul R. Lee, was that Frivaldo was not a
Filipino citizen "having been declared by the Supreme
Court in its Order dated March 25, 1995, not a citizen of
the Philippines." This declaration of the Supreme Court,
however, was in connection with the 1992 elections.
Indeed, decisions declaring the acquisition or denial of
citizenship cannot govern a person's future status with
finality. This is because a person may subsequently
reacquire, or for that matter lose, his citizenship under any
of the modes recognized by law for the purpose. Hence,
in Lee vs. Commissioner of Immigration,56 we held:
Everytime the citizenship of a person is material or
indispensable in a judicial or administrative case,
whatever the corresponding court or administrative
authority decides therein as to such citizenship is generally
not considered res judicata, hence it has to be threshed
out again and again, as the occasion demands.
The Third Issue: Comelec's Jurisdiction
Over The Petition in SPC No. 95-317
Lee also avers that respondent Comelec had no
jurisdiction to entertain the petition in SPC No. 95-317
because the only "possible types of proceedings that may
be entertained by the Comelec are a pre-proclamation
case, an election protest or a quo warranto case". Again,
Lee reminds us that he was proclaimed on June 30, 1995
but that Frivaldo filed SPC No. 95-317 questioning his
(Lee's) proclamation only on July 6, 1995 -- "beyond the 5-
day reglementary period." Hence, according to him,
Frivaldo's "recourse was to file either an election protest or
a quo warranto action."
This argument is not meritorious. The Constitution57 has
given the Comelec ample power to "exercise exclusive
original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the
elections, returns and qualifications of all elective . . .
provincial . . . officials." Instead of dwelling at length on
the various petitions that Comelec, in the exercise of its
constitutional prerogatives, may entertain, suffice it to say
that this Court has invariably recognized the Commission's
authority to hear and decide petitions for annulment of
proclamations -- of which SPC No. 95-317 obviously is
one.58 Thus, in Mentang vs. COMELEC,59 we ruled:
The petitioner argues that after proclamation and
assumption of office, a pre-proclamation controversy is no
longer viable. Indeed, we are aware of cases holding that
pre-proclamation controversies may no longer be
entertained by the COMELEC after the winning candidate
has been proclaimed. (citing Gallardo vs. Rimando, 187
SCRA 463; Salvacion vs. COMELEC, 170 SCRA 513;
Casimiro vs. COMELEC, 171 SCRA 468.) This rule, however,
is premised on an assumption that the proclamation is no
proclamation at all and the proclaimed candidate's
assumption of office cannot deprive the COMELEC of the
power to make such declaration of nullity. (citing Aguam
vs. COMELEC, 23 SCRA 883; Agbayani vs. COMELEC, 186
SCRA 484.)
The Court however cautioned that such power to annul a
proclamation must "be done within ten (10) days following
the proclamation." Inasmuch as Frivaldo's petition was
filed only six (6) days after Lee's proclamation, there is no
question that the Comelec correctly acquired jurisdiction
over the same.
The Fourth Issue: Was Lee's Proclamation Valid?
Frivaldo assails the validity of the Lee proclamation. We
uphold him for the following reasons:
First. To paraphrase this Court in Labo vs. COMELEC,60 "the
fact remains that he (Lee) was not the choice of the
sovereign will," and in Aquino vs. COMELEC,61 Lee is "a
second placer, . . . just that, a second placer."
In spite of this, Lee anchors his claim to the governorship
on the pronouncement of this Court in the aforesaid
Labo62 case, as follows:
The rule would have been different if the electorate fully
aware in fact and in law of a candidate's disqualification
so as to bring such awareness within the realm of
notoriety, would nonetheless cast their votes in favor of
the ineligible candidate. In such case, the electorate may
be said to have waived the validity and efficacy of their
votes by notoriously misapplying their franchise or
throwing away their votes, in which case, the eligible
candidate obtaining the next higher number of votes may
be deemed elected.
But such holding is qualified by the next paragraph, thus:
But this is not the situation obtaining in the instant dispute.
It has not been shown, and none was alleged, that
petitioner Labo was notoriously known as an ineligible
candidate, much less the electorate as having known of
such fact. On the contrary, petitioner Labo was even
allowed by no less than the Comelec itself in its resolution
dated May 10, 1992 to be voted for the office of the city
Payor as its resolution dated May 9, 1992 denying due
course to petitioner Labo's certificate of candidacy had
not yet become final and subject to the final outcome of
this case.
The last-quoted paragraph in Labo, unfortunately for Lee,
is the ruling appropriate in this case because Frivaldo was
in 1995 in an identical situation as Labo was in 1992 when
the Comelec's cancellation of his certificate of candidacy
was not yet final on election day as there was in both
cases a pending motion for reconsideration, for which
reason Comelec issued an (omnibus) resolution declaring
that Frivaldo (like Labo in 1992) and several others can still
be voted for in the May 8, 1995 election, as in fact, he
was.
Furthermore, there has been no sufficient evidence
presented to show that the electorate of Sorsogon was
42
"fully aware in fact and in law" of Frivaldo's alleged
disqualification as to "bring such awareness within the
realm of notoriety;" in other words, that the voters
intentionally wasted their ballots knowing that, in spite of
their voting for him, he was ineligible. If Labo has any
relevance at all, it is that the vice-governor -- and not Lee
-- should be pro- claimed, since in losing the election, Lee
was, to paraphrase Labo again, "obviously not the choice
of the people" of Sorsogon. This is the emphatic teaching
of Labo:
The rule, therefore, is: the ineligibility of a candidate
receiving majority votes does not entitle the eligible
candidate receiving the next highest number of votes to
be declared elected. A minority or defeated candidate
cannot be deemed elected to the office.
Second. As we have earlier declared Frivaldo to have
seasonably reacquired his citizenship and inasmuch as he
obtained the highest number of votes in the 1995
elections, he -- not Lee -- should be proclaimed. Hence,
Lee's proclamation was patently erroneous and should
now be corrected.
The Fifth Issue: Is Section 78 of the
Election Code Mandatory?
In G.R. No. 120295, Frivaldo claims that the assailed
Resolution of the Comelec (Second Division) dated May 1,
1995 and the confirmatory en banc Resolution of May 11,
1995 disqualifying him for want of citizenship should be
annulled because they were rendered beyond the fifteen
(15) day period prescribed by Section 78, of the Omnibus
Election Code which reads as follows:
Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course or to cancel a
certificate of candidacy. -- A verified petition seeking to
deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy
may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that
any material representation contained therein as required
under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed
at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time
of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be
decided after notice and hearing, not later than fifteen
days before the election. (Emphasis supplied.)
This claim is now moot and academic inasmuch as these
resolutions are deemed superseded by the subsequent
ones issued by the Commission (First Division) on
December 19, 1995, affirmed en banc63 on February 23,
1996; which both upheld his election. At any rate, it is
obvious that Section 78 is merely directory as Section 6 of
R.A. No. 6646 authorizes the Commission to try and decide
petitions for disqualifications even after the elections, thus:
Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. -- Any candidate
who has been declared by final judgment to be
disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for
him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is
not declared by final judgment before an election to be
disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning
number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission
shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action,
inquiry or protest and upon motion of the complainant or
any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order
the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate
whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong. (emphasis
supplied)
Refutation of
Mr. Justice Davide's Dissent
In his dissenting opinion, the esteemed Mr. Justice Hilario
G. Davide, Jr. argues that President Aquino's
memorandum dated March 27, 1987 should be viewed as
a suspension (not a repeal, as urged by Lee) of P.D. 725.
But whether it decrees a suspension or a repeal is a purely
academic distinction because the said issuance is not a
statute that can amend or abrogate an existing law.
The existence and subsistence of P.D. 725 were
recognized in the first Frivaldo case;64 viz., "(u)nder CA No.
63 as amended by CA No. 473 and P.D. No. 725, Philippine
citizenship maybe reacquired by . . . repatriation". He also
contends that by allowing Frivaldo to register and to
remain as a registered voter, the Comelec and in effect
this Court abetted a "mockery" of our two previous
judgments declaring him a non-citizen. We do not see
such abetting or mockery. The retroactivity of his
repatriation, as discussed earlier, legally cured whatever
defects there may have been in his registration as a voter
for the purpose of the 1995 elections. Such retroactivity
did not change his disqualifications in 1988 and 1992,
which were the subjects of such previous rulings.
Mr. Justice Davide also believes that Quo Warranto is not
the sole remedy to question the ineligibility of a
candidate, citing the Comelec's authority under Section
78 of the Omnibus Election Code allowing the denial of a
certificate of candidacy on the ground of a false material
representation therein as required by Section 74. Citing
Loong, he then states his disagreement with our holding
that Section 78 is merely directory. We really have no
quarrel. Our point is that Frivaldo was in error in his claim in
G.R. No. 120295 that the Comelec Resolutions
promulgated on May 1, 1995 and May 11, 1995 were
invalid because they were issued "not later than fifteen
days before the election" as prescribed by Section 78. In
dismissing the petition in G.R. No. 120295, we hold that the
Comelec did not commit grave abuse of discretion
because "Section 6 of R.A. 6646 authorizes the Comelec
to try and decide disqualifications even after the
elections." In spite of his disagreement with us on this
point, i.e., that Section 78 "is merely directory", we note
that just like us, Mr. Justice Davide nonetheless votes to
"DISMISS G.R. No. 120295". One other point. Loong, as
quoted in the dissent, teaches that a petition to deny due
course under Section 78 must be filed within the 25-
day period prescribed therein. The present case however
deals with the period during which the Comelec
may decide such petition. And we hold that it may be
decided even after the fifteen day period mentioned in
Section 78. Here, we rule that a decision promulgated by
the Comelec even after the elections is valid
but Loong held that a petition filed beyond the 25-day
period is out of time. There is no inconsistency nor conflict.
Mr. Justice Davide also disagrees with the Court's holding
that, given the unique factual circumstances of Frivaldo,
repatriation may be given retroactive effect. He argues
that such retroactivity "dilutes" our holding in the first
Frivaldo case. But the first (and even the second Frivaldo)
decision did not directly involve repatriation as a mode of
acquiring citizenship. If we may repeat, there is no
question that Frivaldo was not a Filipino for purposes of
determining his qualifications in the 1988 and 1992
elections. That is settled. But his supervening repatriation
has changed his political status -- not in 1988 or 1992, but
only in the 1995 elections.
Our learned colleague also disputes our holding that
Frivaldo was stateless prior to his repatriation, saying that
"informal renunciation or abandonment is not a ground to
lose American citizenship". Since our courts are charged
only with the duty of determining who are Philippine
43
nationals, we cannot rule on the legal question of who are
or who are not Americans. It is basic in international law
that a State determines ONLY those who are its own
citizens -- not who are the citizens of other countries.65 The
issue here is: the Comelec made a finding of fact that
Frivaldo was stateless and such finding has not been
shown by Lee to be arbitrary or whimsical. Thus, following
settled case law, such finding is binding and final.
The dissenting opinion also submits that Lee who lost by
chasmic margins to Frivaldo in all three previous elections,
should be declared winner because "Frivaldo's ineligibility
for being an American was publicly known". First, there is
absolutely no empirical evidence for such "public"
knowledge. Second, even if there is, such knowledge can
be truepost facto only of the last two previous elections.
Third, even the Comelec and now this Court were/are still
deliberating on his nationality before, during and after the
1995 elections. How then can there be such "public"
knowledge?
Mr. Justice Davide submits that Section 39 of the Local
Government Code refers to the qualifications
of electivelocal officials, i.e., candidates, and
not elected officials, and that the citizenship qualification
[under par. (a) of that section] must be possessed by
candidates, not merely at the commencement of the
term, but by election day at the latest. We see it
differently. Section 39, par. (a) thereof speaks of "elective
local official" while par. (b) to (f) refer to "candidates". If
the qualifications under par. (a) were intended to apply to
"candidates" and not elected officials, the legislature
would have said so, instead of differentiating par. (a) from
the rest of the paragraphs. Secondly, if Congress had
meant that the citizenship qualification should be
possessed at election day or prior thereto, it would have
specifically stated such detail, the same way it did in pars.
(b) to (f) far other qualifications of candidates for
governor, mayor, etc.
Mr. Justice Davide also questions the giving of retroactive
effect to Frivaldo's repatriation on the ground, among
others, that the law specifically provides that it is only after
taking the oath of allegiance that applicants shall be
deemed to have reacquired Philippine citizenship. We do
not question what the provision states. We hold however
that the provision should be understood thus: that after
taking the oath of allegiance the applicant is deemed to
have reacquired Philippine citizenship, which reacquisition
(or repatriation) is deemed for all purposes and intents to
have retroacted to the date of his application therefor.
In any event, our "so too" argument regarding the literal
meaning of the word "elective" in reference to Section 39
of the Local Authority Code, as well as regarding Mr.
Justice Davide's thesis that the very wordings of P.D. 725
suggest non-retroactivity, were already taken up rather
extensively earlier in this Decision.
Mr. Justice Davide caps his paper with a clarion call: "This
Court must be the first to uphold the Rule of Law." We
agree -- we must all follow the rule of law. But that is NOT
the issue here. The issue is how should the law be
interpreted and applied in this case so it can be followed,
so it can rule!
At balance, the question really boils down to a choice of
philosophy and perception of how to interpret and apply
laws relating to elections: literal or liberal; the letter or the
spirit, the naked provision or its ultimate purpose; legal
syllogism or substantial justice; in isolation or in the context
of social conditions; harshly against or gently in favor of
the voters' obvious choice. In applying election laws, it
would be far better to err in favor of popular sovereignty
than to be right in complex but little understood legalisms.
Indeed, to inflict a thrice rejected candidate upon the
electorate of Sorsogon would constitute unmitigated
judicial tyranny and an unacceptable assault upon this
Court's conscience.
EPILOGUE
In sum, we rule that the citizenship requirement in the
Local Government Code is to be possessed by an elective
official at the latest as of the time he is proclaimed and at
the start of the term of office to which he has been
elected. We further hold P.D. No. 725 to be in full force
and effect up to the present, not having been suspended
or repealed expressly nor impliedly at any time, and
Frivaldo's repatriation by virtue thereof to have been
properly granted and thus valid and effective. Moreover,
by reason of the remedial or curative nature of the law
granting him a new right to resume his political status and
the legislative intent behind it, as well as his unique
situation of having been forced to give up his citizenship
and political aspiration as his means of escaping a regime
he abhorred, his repatriation is to be given retroactive
effect as of the date of his application therefor, during the
pendency of which he was stateless, he having given up
his U.S. nationality. Thus, in contemplation of law, he
possessed the vital requirement of Filipino citizenship as of
the start of the term of office of governor, and should
have been proclaimed instead of Lee. Furthermore, since
his reacquisition of citizenship retroacted to August 17,
1994, his registration as a voter of Sorsogon is deemed to
have been validated as of said date as well. The
foregoing, of course, are precisely consistent with our
holding that lack of the citizenship requirement is not a
continuing disability or disqualification to run for and hold
public office. And once again, we emphasize herein our
previous rulings recognizing the Comelec's authority and
jurisdiction to hear and decide petitions for annulment of
proclamations.
This Court has time and again liberally and equitably
construed the electoral laws of our country to give fullest
effect to the manifest will of our people,66 for in case of
doubt, political laws must be interpreted to give life and
spirit to the popular mandate freely expressed through the
ballot. Otherwise stated, legal niceties and technicalities
cannot stand in the way of the sovereign will. Consistently,
we have held:
. . . (L)aws governing election contests must be liberally
construed to the end that the will of the people in the
choice of public officials may not be defeated by mere
technical objections (citations omitted).67
The law and the courts must accord Frivaldo every
possible protection, defense and refuge, in deference to
the popular will. Indeed, this Court has repeatedly stressed
the importance of giving effect to the sovereign will in
order to ensure the survival of our democracy. In any
action involving the possibility of a reversal of the popular
electoral choice, this Court must exert utmost effort to
resolve the issues in a manner that would give effect to
the will of the majority, for it is merely sound public policy
to cause elective offices to be filled by those who are the
choice of the majority. To successfully challenge a winning
candidate's qualifications, the petitioner must clearly
demonstrate that the ineligibility is so patently
antagonistic68 to constitutional and legal principles that
overriding such ineligibility and thereby giving effect to the
44
apparent will of the people, would ultimately create single-mindedly insisted on returning to and serving once
greater prejudice to the very democratic institutions and more his struggling but beloved land of birth. He therefore
juristic traditions that our Constitution and laws so zealously deserves every liberal interpretation of the law which can
protect and promote. In this undertaking, Lee has be applied in his favor. And in the final analysis, over and
miserably failed. above Frivaldo himself, the indomitable people of
In Frivaldo's case. it would have been technically easy to Sorsogon most certainly deserve to be governed by a
find fault with his cause. The Court could have refused to leader of their overwhelming choice.
grant retroactivity to the effects of his repatriation and WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing:
hold him still ineligible due to his failure to show his (1) The petition in G.R. No. 123755 is hereby DISMISSED. The
citizenship at the time he registered as a voter before the assailed Resolutions of the respondent Commission are
1995 elections. Or, it could have disputed the factual AFFIRMED.
findings of the Comelec that he was stateless at the time (2) The petition in G.R. No. 120295 is also DISMISSED for
of repatriation and thus hold his consequent dual being moot and academic. In any event, it has no merit.
citizenship as a disqualification "from running for any No costs.
elective local position." But the real essence of justice SO ORDERED.
does not emanate from quibblings over patchwork legal Padilla, Regalado, Romero, Bellosillo, Francisco,
technicality. It proceeds from the spirit's gut consciousness Hermosisima, Jr. and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.
of the dynamic role of law as a brick in the ultimate Melo, Vitug and Kapunan, JJ., concurs in the result.
development of the social edifice. Thus, the Court Narvasa, C.J. and Mendoza, J., took no part.
struggled against and eschewed the easy, legalistic,
technical and sometimes harsh anachronisms of the law in
order to evoke substantial justice in the larger social
context consistent with Frivaldo's unique situation
approximating venerability in Philippine political life.
Concededly, he sought American citizenship only to
escape the clutches of the dictatorship. At this stage, we
cannot seriously entertain any doubt about his loyalty and
dedication to this country. At the first opportunity, he
returned to this land, and sought to serve his people once
more. The people of Sorsogon overwhelmingly voted for
him three times. He took an oath of allegiance to this
Republic every time he filed his certificate of candidacy
and during his failed naturalization bid. And let it not be
overlooked, his demonstrated tenacity and sheer
determination to re-assume his nationality of birth despite
several legal set-backs speak more loudly, in spirit, in fact
and in truth than any legal technicality, of his consuming
intention and burning desire to re-embrace his native
Philippines even now at the ripe old age of 81 years. Such
loyalty to and love of country as well as nobility of purpose
cannot be lost on this Court of justice and equity. Mortals
of lesser mettle would have given up. After all, Frivaldo
was assured of a life of ease and plenty as a citizen of the
most powerful country in the world. But he opted, nay,

45
Republic of the Philippines 1988, or twenty-one days after his proclamation. As the
SUPREME COURT petition by itself alone was ineffectual without the filing
Manila fee, it should be deemed filed only when the fee was
paid. This was done beyond the reglementary period
EN BANC provided for under Section 253 of the Omnibus Election
Code reading as follows:
G.R. No. 86564 August 1, 1989
SEC. 253. Petition for quo warranto. — Any voter
RAMON L. LABO, JR., petitioner, contesting the election of a Member of the Batasang
vs. Pambansa, regional, provincial, or city officer on the
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (COMELEC) EN BANC ground of ineligibility or of disloyalty to the Republic of the
AND LUIS L. LARDIZABAL, respondents Philippines shall file a sworn petition for quo warranto with
the Commission within ten days after the proclamation of
Estelito P. Mendoza for petitioner. the result of the election.
Rillera and Quintana for private respondent. The petitioner adds that the payment of the filing fee is
required under Rule 36, Section 5, of the Procedural Rules
of the COMELEC providing that —
CRUZ, J.:
Sec. 5. No petition for quo warranto shall be given due
The petitioner asks this Court to restrain the Commission on course without the payment of a filing fee in the amount
Elections from looking into the question of his citizenship as of Three Hundred Pesos (P300.00) and the legal research
a qualification for his office as Mayor of Baguio City. The fee as required by law.
allegation that he is a foreigner, he says, is not the issue.
The issue is whether or not the public respondent has and stresses that there is abundant jurisprudence holding
jurisdiction to conduct any inquiry into this matter, that the payment of the filing fee is essential to the
considering that the petition for quo warranto against him timeliness of the filling of the petition itself. He cites many
was not filed on time. rulings of the Court to this effect, specifically Manchester
v. Court of Appeals. 1
It is noteworthy that this argument is based on the alleged
tardiness not of the petition itself but of the payment of For his part, the private respondent denies that the filing
the filing fee, which the petitioner contends was an fee was paid out of time. In fact he says, it was flied
indispensable requirement. The fee is, curiously enough, all
ahead of time. His point is that when he filed his "Petition
of P300.00 only. This brings to mind the popular verse thatfor Quo Warranto with Prayer for Immediate Annulment of
for want of a horse the kingdom was lost. Still, if it is shown
Proclamation and Restraining Order or Injunction" on
that the petition was indeed filed beyond the January 26, 1988, the COMELEC treated it as a pre-
reglementary period, there is no question that this petition
proclamation controversy and docketed it as SPC Case
must be granted and the challenge abated. No. 88-288. No docket fee was collected although it was
offered. It was only on February 8, 1988, that the
The petitioner's position is simple. He was proclaimed COMELEC decided to treat his petition as solely for quo
mayor-elect of Baguio City, on January 20, 1988. The warranto and re-docketed it as EPC Case No. 88-19,
petition for quo warranto was filed by the private serving him notice on February 10, 1988. He immediately
respondent on January 26, 1988, but no filing fee was paid paid the filing fee on that date.
on that date. This fee was finally paid on February 10,
The private respondent argues further that during the
period when the COMELEC regarded his petition as a pre-
proclamation controversy, the time for filing an election
protest or quo warranto proceeding was deemed
suspended under Section 248 of the Omnibus Election
Code. 2 At any rate, he says, Rule 36, Section 5, of the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure cited by the petitioner,
became effective only on November 15, 1988, seven days
after publication of the said Rules in the Official Gazette
pursuant to Section 4, Rule 44 thereof. 3 These rules could
not retroact to January 26,1988, when he filed his petition
with the COMELEC.
In his Reply, the petitioner argues that even if the Omnibus
Election Code did not require it, the payment of filing fees
was still necessary under Res. No. 1996 and, before that,
Res. No. 1450 of the respondent COMELEC, promulgated
on January 12, 1988, and February 26, 1980, respectively.
To this, the private respondent counters that the latter
resolution was intended for the local elections held on
January 30, 1980, and did not apply to the 1988 local
elections, which were supposed to be governed by the
first-mentioned resolution. However, Res. No. 1996 took
effect only on March 3, 1988, following the lapse of seven
days after its publication as required by RA No. 6646,
otherwise known as the Electoral Reform Law of 1987,
which became effective on January 5, 1988. Its Section 30
provides in part:
Sec. 30. Effectivity of Regulations and Orders of the
Commission. — The rules and regulations promulgated by
the Commission shall take effect on the seventh day after
their publication in the Official Gazette or in at least (2)
daily newspapers of general circulation in the Philippines.
The Court has considered the arguments of the parties
and holds that the petition for quo warranto was filed on
time. We agree with the respondents that the fee was
paid during the ten-day period as extended by the
pendency of the petition when it was treated by the
COMELEC as a pre-proclamation proceeding which did
not require the payment of a filing fee. At that, we reach
this conclusion only on the assumption that the
requirement for the payment of the fees in quo warranto
46
proceedings was already effective. There is no record that the requirement of citizenship as a qualification for public which was the Court of Appeals for appropriate action.
Res. No. 1450 was even published; and as for Res. No. office can be so demeaned. What is worse is that it is Considering, however, the length of time that this case
1996, this took effect only on March 3, 1988, seven days regarded as an even less important consideration than has been pending, we apply the rule in the case of Del
after its publication in the February 25, 1988 issues of the the reglementary period the petitioner insists upon. Castillo v. Jaymalin, (112 SCRA 629) and follow the
Manila Chronicle and the Philippine Daily Inquirer, or after principle enunciated in Alger Electric, Inc. v. Court of
the petition was filed. This matter should normally end here as the sole issue Appeals, (135 SCRA 37) which states:
originally raised by the petitioner is the timeliness of the
The petitioner forgets Tañ;ada v. Tuvera 4 when he argues quo warranto proceedings against him. However, as his ... it is a cherished rule of procedure for this Court to
that the resolutions became effective "immediately upon citizenship is the subject of that proceeding, and always strive to settle the entire controversy in a single
approval" simply because it was so provided therein. We considering the necessity for an early resolution of that proceeding leaving no root or branch to bear the seeds
held in that case that publication was still necessary under more important question clearly and urgently affecting of future litigation. No useful purpose will be served if this
the due process clause despite such effectivity clause. the public interest, we shall directly address it now in this case is remanded to the trial court only to have its
same action. decision raised again to the Intermediate Appellate Court
In any event, what is important is that the filing fee was and from there to this Court. (p. 43)
paid, and whatever delay there may have been is not The Court has similarly acted in a notable number of
imputable to the private respondent's fault or neglect. It is cases, thus: Only recently in the case of Beautifont, Inc., et al. v. Court
true that in the Manchester Case, we required the timely of Appeals, et al. (G.R. No. 50141, January 29, 1988), we
payment of the filing fee as a precondition for the From the foregoing brief statement of the nature of the stated that:
timeliness of the filing of the case itself. In Sun Insurance instant case, it would appear that our sole function in this
Office, Ltd. v. Asuncion, 5 however this Court, taking into proceeding should be to resolve the single issue of ... But all those relevant facts are now before this Court.
account the special circumstances of that case, whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that And those facts dictate the rendition of a verdict in the
declared: the motion for new trial of the GSIS in question should petitioner's favor. There is therefore no point in referring the
indeed be deemed pro forma. But going over the case back to the Court of Appeals. The facts and the
This Court reiterates the rule that the trial court acquires extended pleadings of both parties, the Court is legal propositions involved will not change, nor should the
jurisdiction over a case only upon the payment of the immediately impressed that substantial justice may not be ultimate judgment. Considerable time has already
prescribed filing fee. However, the court may allow the timely achieved, if we should decide this case upon such elapsed and, to serve the ends of justice, it is time that the
payment of the said fee within a reasonable time. In the a technical ground alone. We have carefully read all the controversy is finally laid to rest. (See Sotto v. Samson, 5
event of non-compliance therewith, the case shall be allegations and arguments of the parties, very ably and SCRA 733; Republic v. Paredes, 108 Phil. 57; Lianga Lumber
dismissed. comprehensively expounded by evidently Co. v. Lianga Timber Co., Inc., 76 SCRA 197; Erico v. Heirs
knowledgeable and unusually competent counsel, and of Chigas, 98 SCRA 575; Francisco v. City of Davao, 12
The same idea is expressed in Rule 42, Section 18, of the we feel we can better serve the interests of justice by SCRA 628; Valencia v. Mabilangan, 105 Phil.
COMELEC Rules of Procedure adopted on June 20, 1988, broadening the scope of our inquiry, for as the record 162).lâwphî1.ñèt Sound practice seeks to accommodate
thus: before us stands, we see that there is enough basis for us the theory which avoids waste of time, effort and
to end the basic controversy between the parties here expense, both to the parties and the government, not to
Sec. 18. Non-payment of prescribed fees. — If the and now, dispensing, however, with procedural steps speak of delay in the disposal of the case (cf. Fernandez
fees above prescribed are not paid, the Commission may which would not anyway affect substantially the merits of v. Garcia, 92 Phil. 592, 597). A marked characteristic of our
refuse to take action thereon until they are paid and may their respective claims. 6 judicial set-up is that where the dictates of justice so
dismiss the action or the proceeding. (Emphasis supplied.) demand ... the Supreme Court should act, and act with
xxx finality.' (Li Siu Liat v. Republic, 21 SCRA 1039, 1046, citing
The Court notes that while arguing the technical point Samal v. CA, 99 Phil. 230 and U.S. v. Gimenez, 34 Phil. 74).
that the petition for quo warranto should be dismissed for While it is the fault of the petitioner for appealing to the In this case, the dictates of justice do demand that this
failure to pay the filing fee on time, the petitioner would at wrong court and thereby allowing the period for appeal Court act, and act with finality. 7
the same time minimize his alleged lack of citizenship as "a to lapse, the more correct procedure was for the
futile technicality," It is regrettable, to say the least, that respondent court to forward the case to the proper court xxx

47

Remand of the case to the lower court for further
reception of evidence is not necessary where the court is
in a position to resolve the dispute based on the records
before it. On many occasions, the Court, in the public
interest and the expeditious administration of justice, has
resolved actions on the merits instead of remanding them
to the trial court for further proceedings, such as where
the ends of justice would not be subserved by the remand
of the case or when public interest demands an early
disposition of the case or where the trial court had already
received all the evidence of the parties. 8
This course of action becomes all the more justified in the
present case where, to repeat for stress, it is claimed that
a foreigner is holding a public office.
We also note in his Reply, the petitioner says:
In adopting private respondent's comment, respondent
COMELEC implicitly adopted as "its own" private
respondent's repeated assertion that petitioner is no
longer a Filipino citizen. In so doing, has not respondent
COMELEC effectively disqualified itself, by reason of
prejudgment, from resolving the petition for quo warranto
filed by private respondent still pending before it? 9
This is still another reason why the Court has seen fit to rule
directly on the merits of this case.
Going over the record, we find that there are two
administrative decisions on the question of the petitioner's
citizenship. The first was rendered by the Commission on
Elections on May 12, 1982, and found the petitioner to be
a citizen of the Philippines. 10 The second was rendered
by the Commission on Immigration and Deportation on
September 13, 1988, and held that the petitioner was not
a citizen of the Philippines. 11
The first decision was penned by then COMELEC Chigas,
Vicente Santiago, Jr., with Commissioners Pabalate
Savellano and Opinion concurring in full and
Commissioner Bacungan concurring in the dismissal of the
petition "without prejudice to the issue of the respondent's
citizenship being raised anew in a proper case."
Commissioner Sagadraca reserved his vote, while
Commissioner Felipe was for deferring decision until
representations shall have been made with the Australian
Embassy for official verification of the petitioner's alleged
naturalization as an Australian.
The second decision was unanimously rendered by
Chairman Miriam Defensor-Santiago and Commissioners
Alano and Geraldez of the Commission on Immigration
and Deportation. It is important to observe that in the
proceeding before the COMELEC, there was no direct
proof that the herein petitioner had been formally
naturalized as a citizen of Australia. This conjecture, which
was eventually rejected, was merely inferred from the fact
that he had married an Australian citizen, obtained an
Australian passport, and registered as an alien with the
CID upon his return to this country in 1980.
On the other hand, the decision of the CID took into
account the official statement of the Australian
Government dated August 12, 1984, through its Consul in
the Philippines, that the petitioner was still an Australian
citizen as of that date by reason of his naturalization in
1976. That statement 12 is reproduced in full as follows:
I, GRAHAM COLIN WEST, Consul of Australia in the
Philippines, by virtue of a certificate of appointment
signed and sealed by the Australian Minister of State for
Foreign Affairs on 19 October 1983, and recognized as
such by Letter of Patent signed and sealed by the
Philippines Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs on 23
November 1983, do hereby provide the following
statement in response to the subpoena Testificandum
dated 9 April 1984 in regard to the Petition for
disqualification against RAMON LABO, JR. Y LOZANO (SPC
No. 84-73), and do hereby certify that the statement is
true and correct.
STATEMENT
A) RAMON LABO, JR. Y LOZANO, date of birth 23
December 1934, was married in the Philippines to an
Australian citizen. As the spouse of an Australian citizen, he (Signed) GRAHAM C. WEST Consul
was not required to meet normal requirements for the
grant of citizenship and was granted Australian citizenship
by Sydney on 28 July 1976.
B) Any person over the age of 16 years who is
granted Australian citizenship must take an oath of
allegiance or make an affirmation of allegiance. The
wording of the oath of affirmation is: "I ..., renouncing all
other allegiance ..." etc. This need not necessarily have
any effect on his former nationality as this would depend
on the citizenship laws of his former country.
C) The marriage was declared void in the Australian
Federal Court in Sydney on 27 June 1980 on the ground
that the marriage had been bigamous.
D) According to our records LABO is still an Australian
citizen.
E) Should he return to Australia, LABO may face court
action in respect of Section 50 of Australian Citizenship Act
1948 which relates to the giving of false or misleading
information of a material nature in respect of an
application for Australian citizenship. If such a prosecution
was successful, he could be deprived of Australian
citizenship under Section 21 of the Act.
F) There are two further ways in which LABO could
divest himself of Australian citizenship:
(i) He could make a declaration of Renunciation of
Australian citizenship under Section 18 of the Australian
Citizenship Act, or
(ii) If he acquired another nationality, (for example,
Filipino) by a formal and voluntary act other than
marriage, then he would automatically lose as Australian
citizenship under Section 17 of the Act.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I HAVE HEREUNTO SET MAY HAND
AND SEAL OF THE AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY, MANILA, THIS 12th
DAY OF APRIL 1984. DONE AT MANILA IN THE PHILIPPINES.
48

This was affirmed later by the letter of February 1, 1988,
addressed to the private respondent by the Department
of Foreign Affairs reading as follows: 13
Sir:
With reference to your letter dated 1 February 1988, I wish
to inform you that inquiry made with the Australian
Government through the Embassy of the Philippines in
Canberra has elicited the following information:
1) That Mr. Ramon L. Labo, Jr. acquired Australian
citizenship on 28 July 1976.
2) That prior to 17 July 1986, a candidate for
Australian citizenship had to either swear an oath of
allegiance or make an affirmation of allegiance which
carries a renunciation of "all other allegiance.
Very truly yours, For the Secretary of Foreign Affairs:
(SGD) RODOLFO SEVERINO, JR. Assistant Secretary
The decision also noted the oath of allegiance taken by
every naturalized Australian reading as follows:
OATH OF ALLEGIANCE
I, A.B., renouncing all other allegiance, swear by Almighty
God that I will be faithful and bear true allegiance to Her
Majesty Elizabeth the Second, Queen of Australia, Her
heirs and successors according to law, and that I will
faithfully observe the laws of Australia and fulfill my duties
as an Australian citizen. 14
and the Affirmation of Allegiance, which declares:
AFFIRMATION OF ALLEGIANCE
I, A.B., renouncing all other allegiance, solemnly and
sincerely promise and declare that I will be faithful and
bear true allegiance to Her Majesty Elizabeth the Second,
Queen of Australia, Her heirs and successors according to
law, and that I will faithfully observe the Laws of Australia The petitioner's contention that his marriage to an
and fulfill my duties as an Australian citizen. 15 Australian national in 1976 did not automatically divest
him of Philippine citizenship is irrelevant. There is no claim
The petitioner does not question the authenticity of the or finding that he automatically ceased to be a Filipino
above evidence. Neither does he deny that he obtained because of that marriage. He became a citizen of
Australian Passport No. 754705, which he used in coming Australia because he was naturalized as such through a
back to the Philippines in 1980, when he declared before formal and positive process, simplified in his case because
the immigration authorities that he was an alien and he was married to an Australian citizen. As a condition for
registered as such under Alien Certificate of Registration such naturalization, he formally took the Oath of
No. B-323985. 16 He later asked for the change of his Allegiance and/or made the Affirmation of Allegiance,
status from immigrant to a returning former Philippine both quoted above. Renouncing all other allegiance, he
citizen and was granted Immigrant Certificate of swore "to be faithful and bear true allegiance to Her
Residence No. 223809. 17 He also categorically declared Majesty Elizabeth the Second, Queen of Australia ..." and
that he was a citizen of Australia in a number of sworn to fulfill his duties "as an Australian citizen."
statements voluntarily made by him and. even sought to
avoid the jurisdiction of the barangay court on the ground The petitioner now claims that his naturalization in Australia
that he was a foreigner. 18 made him at worst only a dual national and did not divest
him of his Philippine citizenship. Such a specious argument
The decision of the COMELEC in 1982 quaintly dismisses all cannot stand against the clear provisions of CA No. 63,
these acts as "mistakes" that did not divest the petitioner which enumerates the modes by which Philippine
of his citizenship, although, as earlier noted, not all the citizenship may be lost. Among these are: (1)
members joined in this finding. We reject this ruling as naturalization in a foreign country; (2) express renunciation
totally baseless. The petitioner is not an unlettered person of citizenship; and (3) subscribing to an oath of allegiance
who was not aware of the consequences of his acts, let to support the Constitution or laws of a foreign country, all
alone the fact that he was assisted by counsel when he of which are applicable to the petitioner. It is also worth
performed these acts. mentioning in this connection that under Article IV,
Section 5, of the present Constitution, "Dual allegiance of
The private respondent questions the motives of the citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be
COMELEC at that time and stresses Labo's political dealt with by law."
affiliation with the party in power then, but we need not
go into that now. Even if it be assumed that, as the petitioner asserts, his
naturalization in Australia was annulled after it was found
There is also the claim that the decision can no longer be that his marriage to the Australian citizen was bigamous,
reversed because of the doctrine of res judicata, but this that circumstance alone did not automatically restore his
too must be dismissed. This doctrine does not apply to Philippine citizenship. His divestiture of Australian
questions of citizenship, as the Court has ruled in several citizenship does not concern us here. That is a matter
cases. 19 Moreover, it does not appear that it was between him and his adopted country. What we must
properly and seasonably pleaded, in a motion to dismiss consider is the fact that he voluntarily and freely rejected
or in the answer, having been invoked only when the Philippine citizenship and willingly and knowingly
petitioner filed his reply 20 to the private respondent's embraced the citizenship of a foreign country. The
comment. Besides, one of the requisites of res judicata, to possibility that he may have been subsequently rejected
wit, identity of parties, is not present in this case. by Australia, as he claims, does not mean that he has
been automatically reinstated as a citizen of the
Philippines.
49
 three dissenting 24 and another two reserving their vote.
Under CA No. 63 as amended by PD No. 725, Philippine The petitioner argues that his alleged lack of citizenship is 25 One was on official leave. 26
citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, a "futile technicality" that should not frustrate the will of the
by naturalization, or by repatriation. It does not appear in electorate of Baguio City, who elected him by a "resonant Re-examining that decision, the Court finds, and so holds,
the record, nor does the petitioner claim, that he has and thunderous majority." To be accurate, it was not as that it should be reversed in favor of the earlier case of
reacquired Philippine citizenship by any of these methods. loud as all that, for his lead over the second-placer was Geronimo v. Ramos, 27 Which represents the more logical
He does not point to any judicial decree of naturalization only about 2,100 votes. In any event, the people of that and democratic rule. That case, which reiterated the
as to any statute directly conferring Philippine citizenship locality could not have, even unanimously, changed the doctrine first announced in 1912 in Topacio vs. Paredes 28
upon him. Neither has he shown that he has complied requirements of the Local Government Code and the was supported by ten members of the Court 29 without
with PD No. 725, providing that: Constitution. The electorate had no power to permit a any dissent, although one reserved his vote, 30 another
foreigner owing his total allegiance to the Queen of took no part 31 and two others were on leave. 32 There
... (2) natural-born Filipinos who have lost their Philippine Australia, or at least a stateless individual owing no the Court held:
citizenship may reacquire Philippine citizenship through allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, to preside
repatriation by applying with the Special Committee on over them as mayor of their city. Only citizens of the ... it would be extremely repugnant to the basic concept
Naturalization created by Letter of Instruction No. 270, Philippines have that privilege over their countrymen. of the constitutionally guaranteed right to suffrage if a
and, if their applications are approved, taking the candidate who has not acquired the majority or plurality
necessary oath of allegiance to the Republic of the The probability that many of those who voted for the of votes is proclaimed a winner and imposed as the
Philippines, after which they shall be deemed to have petitioner may have done so in the belief that he was representative of a constituency, the majority of which
reacquired Philippine citizenship. The Commission on qualified only strengthens the conclusion that the results of have positively declared through their ballots that they do
Immigration and Deportation shall thereupon cancel their the election cannot nullify the qualifications for the office not choose him.
certificate of registration. (Emphasis supplied.) now held by him. These qualifications are continuing
requirements; once any of them is lost during Sound policy dictates that public elective offices are filled
That is why the Commission on Immigration and incumbency, title to the office itself is deemed forfeited. In by those who have received the highest number of votes
Deportation rejected his application for the cancellation the case at bar, the citizenship and voting requirements cast in the election for that office, and it is a fundamental
of his alien certificate of registration. And that is also the were not subsequently lost but were not possessed at all in Idea in all republican forms of government that no one
reason we must deny his present claim for recognition as a the first place on the day of the election. The petitioner can be declared elected and no measure can be
citizen of the Philippines. was disqualified from running as mayor and, although declared carried unless he or it receives a majority or
elected, is not now qualified to serve as such. plurality of the legal votes cast in the election. (20 Corpus
The petitioner is not now, nor was he on the day of the Juris 2nd, S 243, p. 676.)
local elections on January 18, 1988, a citizen of the Finally, there is the question of whether or not the private
Philippines. In fact, he was not even a qualified voter respondent, who filed the quo warranto petition, can The fact that the candidate who obtained the highest
under the Constitution itself because of his alienage. 21 He replace the petitioner as mayor. He cannot. The simple number of votes is later declared to be disqualified or not
was therefore ineligible as a candidate for mayor of reason is that as he obtained only the second highest eligible for the office to which he was elected does not
Baguio City, under Section 42 of the Local Government number of votes in the election, he was obviously not the necessarily entitle the candidate who obtained the
Code providing in material part as follows: choice of the people of Baguio city. second highest number of votes to be declared the
winner of the elective office. The votes cast for a dead,
Sec. 42. Qualifications. — An elective local official must be The latest ruling of the Court on this issue is Santos v. disqualified, or non-eligible person may not be valid to
a citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-three years of Commission on Elections 22 decided in 1985. In that case, vote the winner into office or maintain him there.
age on election day, a qualified voter registered as such the candidate who placed second was proclaimed However, in the absence of a statute which clearly asserts
in the barangay, municipality, city or province where he elected after the votes for his winning rival, who was a contrary political and legislative policy on the matter, if
proposes to be elected, a resident therein for at least one disqualified as a turncoat and considered a non- the votes were cast in the sincere belief that the
year at the time of the filing of his certificate of candidate, were all disregarded as stray. In effect, the candidate was alive, qualified, or eligible, they should not
candidacy, and able to read and write English, Filipino, or second placer won by default. That decision was be treated as stray, void or meaningless.
any other local language or dialect. supported by eight members of the Court then 23 with

50
It remains to stress that the citizen of the Philippines must
take pride in his status as such and cherish this priceless
gift that, out of more than a hundred other nationalities,
God has seen fit to grant him. Having been so endowed,
he must not lightly yield this precious advantage, rejecting
it for another land that may offer him material and other
attractions that he may not find in his own country. To be
sure, he has the right to renounce the Philippines if he sees
fit and transfer his allegiance to a state with more
allurements for him. 33 But having done so, he cannot
expect to be welcomed back with open arms once his
taste for his adopted country turns sour or he is himself
disowned by it as an undesirable alien.

Philippine citizenship is not a cheap commodity that can

be easily recovered after its renunciation. It may be
restored only after the returning renegade makes a formal
act of re-dedication to the country he has abjured and he
solemnly affirms once again his total and exclusive loyalty
to the Republic of the Philippines. This may not be
accomplished by election to public office.

WHEREFORE, petitioner Ramon J. Labo, Jr. is hereby

declared NOT a citizen of the Philippines and therefore
DISQUALIFIED from continuing to serve as Mayor of Baguio
City. He is ordered to VACATE his office and surrender the
same to the Vice-Mayor of Baguio City, once this decision
becomes final and executory. The temporary restraining
order dated January 31, 1989, is LIFTED.

Fernan, (C.J.), Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Paras,

Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes,
Griñ;o-Aquino Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.

51
Republic of the Philippines ten days from his proclamation, in accordance with Government Code, and the Omnibus Election Code. He
SUPREME COURT Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code. The League, also joined in the private respondent's argument that
Manila moreover, was not a proper party because it was not a Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code was not
voter and so could not sue under the said section. applicable because what the League and Estuye were
EN BANC seeking was not only the annulment of the proclamation
Frivaldo moved for a preliminary hearing on his affirmative and election of Frivaldo. He agreed that they were also
G.R. No. 87193 June 23, 1989 defenses but the respondent Commission on Elections asking for the termination of Frivaldo's incumbency as
decided instead by its Order of January 20, 1988, to set governor of Sorsogon on the ground that he was not a
JUAN GALLANOSA FRIVALDO, petitioner, the case for hearing on the merits. His motion for Filipino.
vs. reconsideration was denied in another Order dated
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND THE LEAGUE OF February 21, 1988. He then came to this Court in a petition In his Reply, Frivaldo insisted that he was a citizen of the
MUNICIPALITIES, SORSOGON CHAPTER, HEREIN for certiorari and prohibition to ask that the said orders be Philippines because his naturalization as an American
REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT, SALVADOR NEE ESTUYE, set aside on the ground that they had been rendered with citizen was not "impressed with voluntariness." In support
respondents. grave abuse of discretion. Pending resolution of the he cited the Nottebohm Case, [(1955 I.C.J. 4; 49 A.J.I.L.
petition, we issued a temporary order against the hearing 396 (1955)] where a German national's naturalization in
J.L. Misa & Associates for petitioner. on the merits scheduled by the COMELEC and at the Liechtenstein was not recognized because it had been
same time required comments from the respondents. obtained for reasons of convenience only. He said he
Lladoc, Huab & Associates for private respondent. could not have repatriated himself before the 1988
In their Comment, the private respondents reiterated their elections because the Special Committee on
assertion that Frivaldo was a naturalized American citizen Naturalization created for the purpose by LOI No. 27C had
CRUZ, J.: and had not reacquired Philippine citizenship on the day not yet been organized then. His oath in his certificate of
of the election on January 18, 1988. He was therefore not candidacy that he was a natural-born citizen should be a
Petitioner Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed governor-elect qualified to run for and be elected governor. They also sufficient act of repatriation. Additionally, his active
of the province of Sorsogon on January 22, 1988, and argued that their petition in the Commission on Elections participation in the 1987 congressional elections had
assumed office in due time. On October 27, 1988, the was not really for quo warranto under Section 253 of the divested him of American citizenship under the laws of the
League of Municipalities, Sorsogon Chapter (hereafter, Omnibus Election Code. The ultimate purpose was to United States, thus restoring his Philippine citizenship. He
League), represented by its President, Salvador Estuye, prevent Frivaldo from continuing as governor, his ended by reiterating his prayer for the rejection of the
who was also suing in his personal capacity, filed with the candidacy and election being null and void ab initio move to disqualify him for being time-barred under
Commission on Elections a petition for the annulment of because of his alienage. Even if their petition were to be Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code.
Frivaldo; election and proclamation on the ground that considered as one for quo warranto, it could not have
he was not a Filipino citizen, having been naturalized in been filed within ten days from Frivaldo's proclamation Considering the importance and urgency of the question
the United States on January 20, 1983. In his answer dated because it was only in September 1988 that they received herein raised, the Court has decided to resolve it directly
May 22, 1988, Frivaldo admitted that he was naturalized in proof of his naturalization. And assuming that the League instead of allowing the normal circuitous route that will
the United States as alleged but pleaded the special and itself was not a proper party, Estuye himself, who was suing after all eventually end with this Court, albeit only after a,
affirmative defenses that he had sought American not only for the League but also in his personal capacity, long delay. We cannot permit this delay. Such delay will
citizenship only to protect himself against President could nevertheless institute the suit by himself alone. be inimical to the public interest and the vital principles of
Marcos. His naturalization, he said, was "merely forced public office to be here applied.
upon himself as a means of survival against the Speaking for the public respondent, the Solicitor General
unrelenting persecution by the Martial Law Dictator's supported the contention that Frivaldo was not a citizen It is true that the Commission on Elections has the primary
agents abroad." He added that he had returned to the of the Philippines and had not repatriated himself after his jurisdiction over this question as the sole judge of all
Philippines after the EDSA revolution to help in the naturalization as an American citizen. As an alien, he was contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications
restoration of democracy. He also argued that the disqualified from public office in the Philippines. His of the members of the Congress and elective provincial
challenge to his title should be dismissed, being in reality a election did not cure this defect because the electorate and city officials. However, the decision on Frivaldo's
quo warranto petition that should have been filed within of Sorsogon could not amend the Constitution, the Local citizenship has already been made by the COMELEC

52
through its counsel, the Solicitor General, who
categorically claims that Frivaldo is a foreigner. We
assume this stance was taken by him after consultation
with the public respondent and with its approval. It
therefore represents the decision of the COMELEC itself
that we may now review. Exercising our discretion to
interpret the Rules of Court and the Constitution, we shall
consider the present petition as having been filed in
accordance with Article IX-A Section 7, of the
Constitution, to challenge the aforementioned Orders of
the COMELEC.
The basic question we must resolve is whether or not Juan
G. Frivaldo was a citizen of the Philippines at the time of
his election on January 18, 1988, as provincial governor of
Sorsogon. All the other issues raised in this petition are
merely secondary to this basic question.
The reason for this inquiry is the provision in Article XI,
Section 9, of the Constitution that all public officials and
employees owe the State and the Constitution
"allegiance at all times" and the specific requirement in
Section 42 of the Local Government Code that a
candidate for local elective office must be inter alia a
citizen of the Philippines and a qualified voter of the
constituency where he is running. Section 117 of the
Omnibus Election Code provides that a qualified voter
must be, among other qualifications, a citizen of the
Philippines, this being an indispensable requirement for
suffrage under Article V, Section 1, of the Constitution.
In the certificate of candidacy he filed on November 19,
1987, Frivaldo described himself as a "natural-born" citizen
of the Philippines, omitting mention of any subsequent loss
of such status. The evidence shows, however, that he was
naturalized as a citizen of the United States in 1983 per the
following certification from the United States District Court,
Northern District of California, as duly authenticated by
Vice Consul Amado P. Cortez of the Philippine Consulate
General in San Francisco, California, U.S.A.
OFFICE OF THE CLERK
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
September 23, 1988 There were many other Filipinos in the United States
similarly situated as Frivaldo, and some of them subject to
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN: greater risk than he, who did not find it necessary — nor
do they claim to have been coerced — to abandon their
Our records show that JUAN GALLANOSA FRIVALDO, born cherished status as Filipinos. They did not take the oath of
on October 20, 1915, was naturalized in this Court on allegiance to the United States, unlike the petitioner who
January 20, 1983, and issued Certificate of Naturalization solemnly declared "on oath, that I absolutely and entirely
No. 11690178. renounce and abjure all allegiance and fidelity to any
foreign prince, potentate, state or sovereignty of whom or
Petition No. 280225. which I have heretofore been a subject or citizen,"
meaning in his case the Republic of the Philippines. The
Alien Registration No. A23 079 270. martyred Ninoy Aquino heads the impressive list of those
Filipinos in exile who, unlike the petitioner, held fast to their
Very truly yours, Philippine citizenship despite the perils of their resistance to
the Marcos regime.
The Nottebohm case cited by the petitioner invoked the
WILLIAM L. WHITTAKER international law principle of effective nationality which is
clearly not applicable to the case at bar. This principle is
Clerk expressed in Article 5 of the Hague Convention of 1930 on
the Conflict of Nationality Laws as follows:
by:
Art. 5. Within a third State a person having more than one
(Sgd.) nationality shall be treated as if he had only one. Without
prejudice to the application of its law in matters of
personal status and of any convention in force, a third
ARACELI V. BAREN State shall, of the nationalities which any such person
possesses, recognize exclusively in its territory either the
Deputy Clerk nationality of the country in which he is habitually and
principally resident or the nationality of the country with
This evidence is not denied by the petitioner. In fact, he which in the circumstances he appears to be in fact most
expressly admitted it in his answer. Nevertheless, as earlier closely connected.
noted, he claims it was "forced" on him as a measure of
protection from the persecution of the Marcos Nottebohm was a German by birth but a resident of
government through his agents in the United States. Guatemala for 34 years when he applied for and
acquired naturalization in Liechtenstein one month before
The Court sees no reason not to believe that the petitioner the outbreak of World War II. Many members of his family
was one of the enemies of the Marcos dictatorship. Even and his business interests were in Germany. In 1943,
so, it cannot agree that as a consequence thereof he was Guatemala, which had declared war on Germany,
coerced into embracing American citizenship. His feeble arrested Nottebohm and confiscated all his properties on
suggestion that his naturalization was not the result of his the ground that he was a German national. Liechtenstein
own free and voluntary choice is totally unacceptable thereupon filed suit on his behalf, as its citizen, against
and must be rejected outright. Guatemala. The International Court of Justice held
53
Nottebohm to be still a national of Germany, with which provided for therein had not yet been constituted seems patent violation of the salutary rule limiting public office
he was more closely connected than with Liechtenstein. to suggest that the lack of that body rendered his and employment only to the citizens of this country. The
repatriation unnecessary. That is far-fetched if not qualifications prescribed for elective office cannot be
That case is not relevant to the petition before us because specious Such a conclusion would open the floodgates, erased by the electorate alone. The will of the people as
it dealt with a conflict between the nationality laws of two as it were. It would allow all Filipinos who have renounced expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of
states as decided by a third state. No third state is this country to claim back their abandoned citizenship ineligibility, especially if they mistakenly believed, as in this
involved in the case at bar; in fact, even the United States without formally rejecting their adoptedstate and case, that the candidate was qualified. Obviously, this rule
is not actively claiming Frivaldo as its national. The sole reaffirming their allegiance to the Philippines. requires strict application when the deficiency is lack of
question presented to us is whether or not Frivaldo is a citizenship. If a person seeks to serve in the Republic of the
citizen of the Philippines under our own laws, regardless of It does not appear that Frivaldo has taken these Philippines, he must owe his total loyalty to this country
other nationality laws. We can decide this question alone categorical acts. He contends that by simply filing his only, abjuring and renouncing all fealty and fidelity to any
as sovereign of our own territory, conformably to Section 1 certificate of candidacy he had, without more, already other state.
of the said Convention providing that "it is for each State effectively recovered Philippine citizenship. But that is
to determine under its law who are its nationals." hardly the formal declaration the law envisions — surely, It is true as the petitioner points out that the status of the
Philippine citizenship previously disowned is not that natural-born citizen is favored by the Constitution and our
It is also worth noting that Nottebohm was invoking his cheaply recovered. If the Special Committee had not yet laws, which is all the more reason why it should be
naturalization in Liechtenstein whereas in the present case been convened, what that meant simply was that the treasured like a pearl of great price. But once it is
Frivaldo is rejecting his naturalization in the United States. petitioner had to wait until this was done, or seek surrendered and renounced, the gift is gone and cannot
naturalization by legislative or judicial proceedings. be lightly restored. This country of ours, for all its difficulties
If he really wanted to disavow his American citizenship and limitations, is like a jealous and possessive mother.
and reacquire Philippine citizenship, the petitioner should The argument that the petition filed with the Commission Once rejected, it is not quick to welcome back with eager
have done so in accordance with the laws of our country. on Elections should be dismissed for tardiness is not well- arms its prodigal if repentant children. The returning
Under CA No. 63 as amended by CA No. 473 and PD No. taken. The herein private respondents are seeking to renegade must show, by an express and unequivocal act,
725, Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by direct act prevent Frivaldo from continuing to discharge his office of the renewal of his loyalty and love.
of Congress, by naturalization, or by repatriation. governor because he is disqualified from doing so as a
foreigner. Qualifications for public office are continuing WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and petitioner JUAN
While Frivaldo does not invoke either of the first two requirements and must be possessed not only at the time G. FRIVALDO is hereby declared not a citizen of the
methods, he nevertheless claims he has reacquired of appointment or election or assumption of office but Philippines and therefore DISQUALIFIED from serving as
Philippine citizenship by virtue of a valid repatriation. He during the officer's entire tenure. Once any of the required Governor of the Province of Sorsogon. Accordingly, he is
claims that by actively participating in the elections in this qualifications is lost, his title may be seasonably ordered to vacate his office and surrender the same to
country, he automatically forfeited American citizenship challenged. If, say, a female legislator were to marry a the duly elected Vice-Governor of the said province once
under the laws of the United States. Such laws do not foreigner during her term and by her act or omission this decision becomes final and executory. The temporary
concern us here. The alleged forfeiture is between him acquires his nationality, would she have a right to remain restraining order dated March 9, 1989, is LIFTED.
and the United States as his adopted country. It should be in office simply because the challenge to her title may no
obvious that even if he did lose his naturalized American longer be made within ten days from her proclamation? It SO ORDERED.
citizenship, such forfeiture did not and could not have the has been established, and not even denied, that the
effect of automatically restoring his citizenship in the evidence of Frivaldo's naturalization was discovered only Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Feliciano,
Philippines that he had earlier renounced. At best, what eight months after his proclamation and his title was Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea and
might have happened as a result of the loss of his challenged shortly thereafter. Regalado, JJ., concur.
naturalized citizenship was that he became a stateless
individual. This Court will not permit the anomaly of a person sitting as Sarmiento, J., took no part.
provincial governor in this country while owing exclusive
Frivaldo's contention that he could not have repatriated allegiance to another country. The fact that he was Cortes J., concurs in the result.
himself under LOI 270 because the Special Committee elected by the people of Sorsogon does not excuse this

54
Republic of the Philippines these petitions docketed as G.R. No.104654 and G.R. No.
SUPREME COURT 105715 and G.R. No. 105735. The petitions were The motion was granted in an Order dated January 24,
Manila consolidated since they principally involve the same issues 1992, wherein the hearing of the petition was moved to
and parties. February 21, 1992. The said order was not published nor a
EN BANC copy thereof posted.
I
On February 21, the hearing proceeded with private
G.R. No. 104654 respondent as the sole witness. He submitted the following
G.R. No. 104654 June 6, 1994 documentary evidence: (1) Affidavit of Publication of the
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Order dated October 7, 1991 issued by the publisher of
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, Rules of Court in relation to R.A. No. 5440 and Section 25 of The Philippine Star (Exh. "A"); (2) Certificate of Publication
vs. the Interim Rules, filed by the Republic of the Philippines: of the order issued
HON. ROSALIO G. DE LA ROSA, PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE (1) to annul the Decision dated February 27, 1992 of the by the National Printing Office (Exh. "B"); (3) Notice of
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 28, MANILA and JUAN Regional Trial Court, Branch 28, Manila, in SP Proc. No. 91- Hearing of Petition (Exh. "B-1"); (4) Photocopy of a Citation
G. FRIVALDO, respondents. 58645, which re-admitted private respondent as a Filipino issued by the National Press Club with private
citizen under the Revised Naturalization Law (C.A. No. 63 respondent‘s picture (Exhs. "C" and "C-2"); (5) Certificate
G.R. No. 105715 June 6, 1994 as amended by C.A. No. 473); and (2) to nullify the oath of Appreciation issued by the Rotary Club of Davao (Exh.
of allegiance taken by private respondent on February 27, "D"); (6) Photocopy
RAUL R. LEE, petitioner, 1992. of a Plaque of Appreciation issued by the Republican
vs. College, Quezon City (Exh. "E"); (7) Photocopy of a Plaque
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JUAN G. FRIVALDO, On September 20, 1991, petitioner filed a petition for of Appreciation issued by the Davao-Bicol Association
respondents. naturalization captioned: "In the Matter of Petition of Juan (Exh. "F"); (8) Certification issued by the Records
G. Frivaldo to be Re-admitted as a Citizen of the Management and Archives Office that the record of birth
G.R. No. 105735 June 6, 1994 Philippines under Commonwealth Act No. 63" (Rollo, pp. of private respondent was not on file (Exh. "G"); and (8)
17-23). Certificate of Naturalization issued by the United States
RAUL R. LEE, petitioner, District Court (Exh. "H").
vs. In an Order dated October 7, 1991 respondent Judge set
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JUAN G. FRIVALDO, the petition for hearing on March 16, 1992, and directed Six days later, on February 27, respondent Judge rendered
respondents. the publication of the said order and petition in the the assailed Decision, disposing as follows:
Official Gazette and a newspaper of general circulation,
The Solicitor General for petitioner in G.R. No. 104654. for three consecutive weeks, the last publication of which WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Petitioner JUAN G.
should be at least six months before the said date of FRIVALDO, is re-admitted as a citizen of the Republic of
Yolando F. Lim counsel for private respondent. hearing. The order further required the posting of a copy the Philippines by naturalization, thereby vesting upon him,
thereof and the petition in a conspicuous place in the all the rights and privileges of a natural born Filipino citizen
Office of the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court, (Rollo, p. 33).
QUIASON, J.: Manila (Rollo, pp. 24-26).
On the same day, private respondent was allowed to
In Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections, 174 SCRA 245 On January 14, 1992, private respondent filed a "Motion to take his oath of allegiance before respondent Judge
(1989), this Court declared private respondent, Juan G. Set Hearing Ahead of Schedule," where he manifested his (Rollo, p. 34).
Frivaldo, an alien and therefore disqualified from serving intention to run for public office in the May 1992 elections.
as Governor of the Province of Sorsogon. He alleged that the deadline for filing the certificate of On March 16, a "Motion for Leave of Court to Intervene
candidacy was March 15, one day before the scheduled and to Admit Motion for Reconsideration" was filed by
Once more, the citizenship of private respondent is put in hearing. He asked that the hearing set on March 16 be Quiterio H. Hermo. He alleged that the proceedings were
issue in cancelled and be moved to January 24 (Rollo, pp. 27-28). tainted with jurisdictional defects, and prayed for a new

55
trial to conform with the requirements of the Naturalization On June 10, the COMELEC issued the questioned en banc In substance, petitioner prays for the COMELEC‘s
Law. resolution which dismissed the petition for having been immediate resolution of SPA Case No. 92-016, which is a
filed out of time, citing Section 19 of R.A. No. 7166. Said petition for the cancellation of private respondent‘s
After receiving a copy of the Decision on March 18, 1992, section provides that the period to appeal a ruling of the certificate of candidacy filed on March 23, 1992 by
the Solicitor General interposed a timely appeal directly board of canvassers on questions affecting its composition Quiterio H. Hermo, the intervenor in G.R. No. 104654 (Rollo,
with the Supreme Court. or proceedings was three days. p. 18).

G.R. No. 105715 In this petition, petitioner argues that the COMELEC acted The petition for cancellation alleged: (1) that private
with grave abuse of discretion when it ignored the respondent is an American citizen, and therefore ineligible
This is a petition for certiorari, mandamus with injunction fundamental issue of private respondent‘s disqualification to run as candidate for the position of governor of the
under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court in relation to in the guise of technicality. Province of Sorsogon; (2) that the trial court‘s decision
Section 5(2) of Article VIII of the Constitution with prayer re-admitting private respondent as a Filipino citizen was
for temporary restraining order filed by Raul R. Lee against Petitioner claims that the inclusion of private respondent‘s fraught with legal infirmities rendering it null and void; (3)
the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) and private name in the list of registered voters in Sta. Magdalena, that assuming the decision to be valid, private
respondent, to annul the en banc Resolution of the Sorsogon was invalid because at the time he registered as respondent‘s oath of allegiance, which was taken on the
COMELEC, which dismissed his petition docketed as SPC a voter in 1987, he was as American citizen. same day the questioned decision was promulgated,
Case No. 92-273. The said petition sought to annul the violated Republic Act No. 530, which provides for a two-
proclamation of private respondent as Governor-elect of Petitioner further claims that the grant of Filipino citizenship year waiting period before the oath of allegiance can be
the Province of Sorsogon. to private respondent is not yet conclusive because the taken by the applicant; and (4) that the hearing of the
case is still on appeal before us. petition on February 27, 1992, was held less than four
Petitioner was the official candidate of the Laban ng months from the date of the last publication of the order
Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) for the position of governor Petitioner prays for: (1) the annulment of private and petition. The petition prayed for the cancellation of
of the Province of Sorsogon in the May 1992 elections. respondent‘s proclamation as Governor of the Province of private respondent‘s certificate of candidacy and the
Private respondent was the official candidate of the Sorsogon; (2) the deletion of private respondent‘s name deletion of his name from the list of registered voters in Sta.
Lakas-National Union of Christian Democrats (Lakas- from the list of candidates for the position of governor; (3) Magdalena, Sorsogon.
NUCD) for the same position. the proclamation of the governor-elect based on the
remaining votes, after the exclusion of the votes for In his answer to the petition for cancellation, private
Private respondent was proclaimed winner on May 22, private respondent; (4) the issuance of a temporary respondent denied the allegations therein and averred:
1992. restraining order to enjoin private respondent from taking (1) that Quiterio H. Hermo, not being a candidate for the
his oath and assuming office; and (5) the issuance of a same office for which private respondent was aspiring,
On June 1, petitioner filed a petition with the COMELEC to writ of mandamus to compel the COMELEC to resolve the had no standing to file the petition; (2) that the decision
annul the proclamation of private respondent as pending disqualification case docketed as SPA Case No. re-admitting him to Philippine citizenship was presumed to
Governor-elect of the Province of Sorsogon on the 92-016, against private respondent. be valid; and (3) that no case had been filed to exclude
grounds: (1) that the proceedings and composition of the his name as a registered voter.
Provincial Board of Canvassers were not in accordance G.R. No. 105735
with law; (2) that private respondent is an alien, whose Raul R. Lee intervened in the petition for cancellation of
grant of Philippine citizenship is being questioned by the This is a petition for mandamus under Rule 65 of the private respondent‘s certificate of candidacy (Rollo, p.
State in G.R. No. 104654; and (3) that private respondent is Revised Rules of Court in relation to Section 5(2) of Article 37.).
not a duly registered voter. Petitioner further prayed that VIII of the Constitution, with prayer for temporary
the votes case in favor of private respondent be restraining order. The parties herein are identical with the On May 13, 1992, said intervenor urged the COMELEC to
considered as stray votes, and that he, on the basis of the parties in G.R. No. 105715. decide the petition for cancellation, citing Section 78 of
remaining valid votes cast, be proclaimed winner. the Omnibus Election Code, which provides that all
petitions on matters involving the cancellation of a
certificate of candidacy must be decided "not later than

56
fifteen days before election," and the case of Alonto v. citizenship. He tried to reacquire his Philippine citizenship prescribed by the said law. It is not for an applicant to
Commission on Election, 22 SCRA 878 (1968), which ruled through repatriation and direct act of Congress. However, decide for himself and to select the requirements which
that all pre-proclamation controversies should be he was later informed that repatriation proceedings were he believes, even sincerely, are applicable to his case
summarily decided (Rollo, limited to army deserters or Filipino women who had lost and discard those which be believes are inconvenient or
p. 50). their citizenship by reason of their marriage to foreigners merely of nuisance value. The law does not distinguish
(Rollo, pp. 49-50). His request to Congress for sponsorship between an applicant who was formerly a Filipino citizen
The COMELEC concedes that private respondent has not of a bill allowing him to reacquire his Philippine citizenship and one who was never such a citizen. It does not provide
yet reacquired his Filipino citizenship because the decision failed to materialize, notwithstanding the endorsement of a special procedure for the reacquisition of Philippine
granting him the same is not yet final and executory several members of the House of Representatives in his citizenship by former Filipino citizens akin to the
(Rollo, p. 63). However, it submits that the issue of favor (Rollo, p. 51). He attributed this to the maneuvers of repatriation of a woman who had lost her Philippine
disqualification of a candidate is not among the grounds his political rivals. citizenship by reason of her marriage to an alien.
allowed in a
pre-proclamation controversy, like SPC Case No. 92-273. He also claims that the re-scheduling of the hearing of the The trial court never acquired jurisdiction to hear the
Moreover, the said petition was filed out of time. petition to an earlier date, without publication, was made petition for naturalization of private respondent. The
without objection from the Office of the Solicitor General. proceedings conducted, the decision rendered and the
The COMELEC contends that the preparation for the He makes mention that on the date of the hearing, the oath of allegiance taken therein, are null and void for
elections occupied much of its time, thus its failure to court was jam-packed. failure to comply with the publication and posting
immediately resolve SPA Case No. 92-016. It argues that requirements under the Revised Naturalization Law.
under Section 5 of Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of It is private respondent‘s posture that there was substantial
Procedure, it is excused from deciding a disqualification compliance with the law and that the public was well- Under Section 9 of the said law, both the petition for
case within the period provided by law for reasons informed of his petition for naturalization due to the naturalization and the order setting it for hearing must be
beyond its control. It also assumed that the same action publicity given by the media. published once a week for three consecutive weeks in the
was subsequently abandoned by petitioner when he filed Official Gazette and a newspaper of general circulation
before it a petition for quo warranto docketed as EPC No. Anent the issue of the mandatory two-year waiting period respondent cites his achievements as a freedom fighter
92-35. The quo warranto proceedings sought private prior to the taking of the oath of allegiance, private and a former Governor of the Province of Sorsogon for six
respondent‘s disqualification because of his American respondent theorizes that the rationale of the law terms.
citizenship. imposing the waiting period is to grant the public an
opportunity to investigate the background of the The appeal of the Solicitor General in behalf of the
II applicant and to oppose the grant of Philippine Republic of
citizenship if there is basis to do so. In his case, private the Philippines is meritorious. The naturalization
G.R. No. 104654 respondent alleges that such requirement may be proceedings in SP Proc.
dispensed with, claiming that his life, both private and No. 91-58645 was full of procedural flaws, rendering the
We shall first resolve the issue concerning private public, was well-known. Private respondent cites his decision an anomaly.
respondent‘s citizenship. achievement as a freedom fighter and a former Governor
of the Province of Sorsogon for six terms. Private respondent, having opted to reacquire Philippine
In his comment to the State‘s appeal of the decision citizenship thru naturalization under the Revised
granting him Philippine citizenship in G.R. No. 104654, The appeal of the Solicitor General in behalf of the Naturalization Law, is duty bound to follow the procedure
private respondent alleges that the precarious political Republic of the Philippines is meritorious. The naturalization prescribed by the said law. It is not for an applicant to
atmosphere in the country during Martial Law compelled proceedings in SP Proc. No. 91-58645 was full of decide for himself and to select the requirements which
him to seek political asylum in the United States, and procedural flaws, rendering the decision an anomaly. he believes, even sincerely, are applicable to his case
eventually to renounce his Philippine citizenship. and discard those which he believes are inconvenient or
Private respondent, having opted to reacquire Philippine merely of nuisance value. The law does not distinguish
He claims that his petition for naturalization was his only citizenship thru naturalization under the Revised between an applicant who was formerly a Filipino citizen
available remedy for his reacquisition of Philippine Naturalization Law, is duty bound to follow the procedure and one who was never such a citizen. It does not provide

57
a special procedure for the reacquisition of Philippine
citizenship by former Filipino citizens akin to the
repatriation of a woman who had lost her Philippine
citizenship by reason of her marriage to an alien.
The trial court never acquired jurisdiction to hear the
petition for naturalization of private respondent. The
proceedings conducted, the decision rendered and the
oath of allegiance taken therein, are null and void for
failure to comply with the publication and posting
requirements under the Revised Naturalization Law.
Under Section 9 of the said law, both the petition for
naturalization and the order setting it for hearing must be
published once a week for three consecutive weeks in the
Official Gazette and a newspaper of general circulation.
Compliance therewith is jurisdictional (Po Yi Bo v.
Republic, 205 SCRA 400 [1992]). Moreover, the publication
and posting of the petition and the order must be in its full
test for the court to acquire jurisdiction (Sy v. Republic, 55
SCRA 724 [1974]).
The petition for naturalization lacks several allegations
required by Sections 2 and 6 of the Revised Naturalization
Law, particularly: (1) that the petitioner is of good moral
character; (2) that he resided continuously in the
Philippines for at least ten years; (3) that he is able to
speak and write English and any one of the principal
dialects; (4) that he will reside continuously in the
Philippines from the date of the filing of the petition until
his admission to Philippine citizenship; and (5) that he has
filed a declaration of intention or if he is excused from said Even discounting the provisions of R.A. No. 530, the courts
filing, the justification therefor.
The absence of such allegations is fatal to the petition (Po
Yi Bi v. Republic, 205 SCRA 400 [1992]).
Likewise, the petition is not supported by the affidavit of at
least two credible persons who vouched for the good
moral character of private respondent as required by
Section 7 of the Revised Naturalization Law. Private
respondent also failed to attach a copy of his certificate
of arrival to the petition as required by Section 7 of the
said law.
The proceedings of the trial court was marred by the
following irregularities: (1) the hearing of the petition was
set ahead of the scheduled date of hearing, without a
publication of the order advancing the date of hearing,
and the petition itself; (2) the petition was heard within six
months from the last publication of the petition; (3)
petitioner was allowed to take his oath of allegiance
before the finality of the judgment; and (4) petitioner took
his oath of allegiance without observing the two-year
waiting period.
A decision in a petition for naturalization becomes final
only after 30 days from its promulgation and, insofar as the
Solicitor General is concerned, that period is counted from
the date of his receipt of the copy of the decision
(Republic v. Court of First Instance of Albay, 60 SCRA 195
[1974]).
Section 1 of R.A. No. 530 provides that no decision
granting citizenship in naturalization proceedings shall be
executory until after two years from its promulgation in
order to be able to observe if: (1) the applicant has left
the country; (2) the applicant has dedicated himself
continuously to a lawful calling or profession; (3) the
applicant has not been convicted of any offense or
violation of government promulgated rules; and (4) the
applicant has committed any act prejudicial to the
interest of the country or contrary to government
announced policies.
cannot implement any decision granting the petition for
naturalization before its finality.
G.R. No. 105715
In view of the finding in G.R. No. 104654 that private
respondent is not yet a Filipino citizen, we have to grant
the petition in G.R. No. 105715 after treating it as a petition
for certiorari instead of a petition for mandamus. Said
petition assails the en banc resolution of the COMELEC,
dismissing SPC Case No. 92-273, which in turn is a petition
to annul private respondent‘s proclamation on three
grounds: 1) that the proceedings and composition of the
Provincial Board of Canvassers were not in accordance
with law; 2) that private respondent is an alien, whose
grant of Filipino citizenship is being questioned by the
State in G.R. No. 104654; and 3) that private respondent is
not a duly registered voter. The COMELEC dismissed the
petition on the grounds that it was filed outside the three-
day period for questioning the proceedings
and composition of the Provincial Board of Canvassers
under Section 19 of R.A. No. 7166.
The COMELEC failed to resolve the more serious issue —
the disqualification of private respondent to be
proclaimed Governor on grounds of lack of Filipino
citizenship. In this aspect, the petition is one for quo
warranto. In Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections, 174 SCRA
245 (1989), we held that a petition for quo warranto,
questioning the respondent‘s title and seeking to prevent
him from holding office as Governor for alienage, is not
covered by the ten-day period for appeal prescribed in
Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code. Furthermore,
we explained that "qualifications for public office are
continuing requirements and must be possessed not only
at the time of appointment or election or assumption of
office but during the officer‘s entire tenure; once any of
the required qualification is lost, his title may be
seasonably challenged."
Petitioner‘s argument, that to unseat him will frustrate the
will of the electorate, is untenable. Both the Local
Government Code and the Constitution require that only
Filipino citizens can run and be elected to public office.
We can only surmise that the electorate, at the time they
voted for private respondent, was of the mistaken belief
that he had legally reacquired Filipino citizenship.
Petitioner in G.R. No. 105715, prays that the votes cast in
favor of private respondent be considered stray and that
he, being the candidate obtaining the second highest
number of votes, be declared winner. In Labo, Jr. v.
COMELEC, 176 SCRA 1 (1989), we ruled that where the
candidate who obtained the highest number of votes is
later declared to be disqualified to hold the office to
which he was elected, the candidate who garnered the
58
second highest number of votes is not entitled to be
declared winner (See also Geronimo v. Ramos, 136 SCRA
435 [1985]; Topacio v. Paredes, 23 Phil. 238 [1912]).

G.R. No. 105735

In view of the discussions of G.R. No. 104654 and G.R. No.

105715, we find the petition in G.R. No. 105735 moot and
academic.

WHEREFORE, the petitions in G.R. No. 104654 and G.R. No.

105715 are both GRANTED while the petition in G.R. No.
105735 is DISMISSED. Private respondent is declared NOT a
citizen of the Philippines and therefore DISQUALIFIED from
continuing to serve as GOVERNOR of the Province of
Sorsogon. He is ordered to VACATE his office and to
SURRENDER the same to the Vice-Governor of the
Province of Sorsogon once this decision becomes final
and executory. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero,

Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug and Kapunan, JJ., concur.

Narvasa, C.J. and Cruz, J., took no part.

59