1
VIOLATIONS OF PROVISIONS Of LAW
A.C. No. 11113, August 09, 2016
CLEO B. DONGGA-AS, Complainant, v. ATTY. ROSE
BEATRIX CRUZ-ANGELES, ATTY. WYLIE M. PALER,
AND ATTY. ANGELES GRANDEA, OF THE ANGELES,
GRANDEA & PALER LAW OFFICE, Respondent.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
For the Court's resolution is a Complaint-Affidavit1
filed on February 11, 2005 by complainant Cleo B.
Dongga-as (complainant), before the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP) – Commission on Bar Discipline
(CBD), against respondents Atty. Rose Beatrix Cruz-
Angeles (Atty. Cruz-Angeles), Atty. Wylie M. Paler
(Atty. Paler), and Atty. Angeles Grandea (Atty.
Grandea; collectively, respondents) of the Angeles,
Grandea & Paler Law Office (law firm), charging them
of various violations of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR) for, inter alia, refusing to return
the money given by complainant in exchange for legal
services which respondents failed to perform.
The Facts
Complainant alleged that sometime in May 2004, he
engaged the law firm of respondents to handle the
annulment of his marriage with his wife, Mutya
Filipinas Puno-Dongga-as (Mutya). In his meeting with
Attys. Cruz-Angeles and Paler, complainant was told
that: (a) the case would cost him P300,000.00, with the
first P100,000.00 payable immediately and the
remaining P200,000.00 payable after the final hearing
of the case; (b) respondents will start working on the
case upon receipt of PI00,000.00, which will cover the
acceptance fee, psychologist fee, and filing fees; and
(c) the time-frame for the resolution of the case will be
around three (3) to four (4) months from filing.
Accordingly, complainant paid respondents
P100,000.00 which was duly received by Atty. Cruz- complainant's independent verification through his
Angeles.2chanrobleslaw friend, he discovered that the records of his marriage
in the Civil Registrar were intact, and that the alleged
From then on, complainant constantly followed-up his absence of the records of his marriage was a mere
case with Attys. Cruz-Angeles and Paler. However, ruse to cover up the delay in the filing of the
despite his constant prodding, Attys. Cruz-Angeles and petition.7chanrobleslaw
Paler could not present any petition and instead,
offered excuses for the delay, saying that: (a) they still Utterly frustrated with the delay in the filing of his
had to look for a psychologist to examine Mutya; (b) petition for annulment, complainant went to
they were still looking for a "friendly" court and public respondents' law office to terminate their engagement
prosecutor; and (c) they were still deliberating where and to demand for a refund of the aggregate amount of
to file the case.3 They promised that the petition would P350,000.00 he earlier paid them. However, Attys.
be filed on or before the end of June 2004, but such Cruz-Angeles and Paler refused to return the said
date passed without any petition being filed. As an amount, and to complainant's surprise, sent him two
excuse, they reasoned out that the petition could not (2) billing statements dated October 5, 20048 and
be filed since they have yet to talk to the judge who October 10, 20049 in the amounts of P258,000.00 and
they insinuated will favorably resolve complainant's P324,000.00, respectively. Notably, the October 5,
petition.4chanrobleslaw 2004 billing statement included a fee for "consultants
(prosecutors)" amounting to P45,000.00.10 In view of
Sometime in the third week of July 2004, Attys. Cruz- the foregoing, complainant filed the instant Complaint-
Angeles and Paler asked for an additional payment of Affidavit before the IBP-CBD, docketed as CBD Case
P250,000.00 in order for them to continue working on No. 05-1426.
the case. Hoping that his petition would soon be filed,
complainant dutifully paid the said amount on July 23, In her defense,11 Atty. Cruz-Angeles admitted to have
2004, which was again received by Atty. Cruz- received a total of P350,000.00 from complainant,12
Angeles.5 However, to complainant's dismay, no but denied that she was remiss in her duties,
appreciable progress took place. When complainant explaining that the delay in the filing of the petition for
inquired about the delay in the filing of the case, Atty. annulment of marriage was due to complainant's
Cruz-Angeles attempted to ease his worries by saying failure to give the current address of Mutya and
that the draft petition was already submitted to the provide sufficient evidence to support the petition.13
judge for editing and that the petition will soon be Further, Atty. Cruz-Angeles alleged that it was Atty.
finalized.6chanrobleslaw Paler who was tasked to draft and finalize the
petition.14 For his part,15 Atty. Paler moved for the
In the last week of September 2004, complainant dismissal of the case for failure to state a cause of
received a text message from Atty. Cruz-Angeles action, arguing too that complainant filed the present
informing him that the National Statistics Office bore administrative complaint only to avoid payment of
no record of his marriage. The latter explained then attorney's fees.16chanrobleslaw
that this development was favorable to complainant's
case because, instead of the proposed petition for The IBP's Report and Recommendation
annulment of marriage, they would just need to file a
petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. She also In a Report and Recommendation17 dated July 10,
informed complainant that they would send someone 2012, the IBP Investigating Commissioner found Attys.
to verify the records of his marriage at the Local Civil Cruz-Angeles and Paler administratively liable and,
Registrar of La Trinidad, Benguet (Civil Registrar) accordingly, recommended that they be meted the
where his marriage was celebrated. However, upon penalty of suspension from the practice of law for four
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(4) months. However, Atty. Grandea was exonerated of A judicious perusal of the records reveals that
any liability as his participation in the charges has not sometime in May 2004, complainant secured the
been discussed, much less proven.18chanrobleslaw services of Attys. Cruz-Angeles and Paler for the Rule 16.03– A lawyer shall deliver the funds and
purpose of annulling his marriage with Mutya, and in property of his client when due or upon demand, x x x.
The Investigating Commissioner found that connection therewith, paid Attys. Cruz-Angeles and It bears stressing that "the relationship between a
complainant indeed engaged the services of Attys. Paler the aggregate sum of P350,000.00 representing lawyer and his client is highly fiduciary and prescribes
Cruz-Angeles and Paler in order to annul his marriage legal fees. However, despite the passage of more than on a lawyer a great fidelity and good faith. The highly
with his wife, Mutya. Despite receiving the aggregate five (5) months from the engagement, Attys. Cruz- fiduciary nature of this relationship imposes upon the
amount of P350,000.00 from complainant, Attys. Cruz- Angeles and Paler failed to file the appropriate lawyer the duty to account for the money or property
Angeles and Paler neglected the legal matter entrusted pleading to initiate the case before the proper court; collected or received for or from his client. Thus, a
to them, as evidenced by their failure to just even draft and worse, could not even show a finished draft of lawyer's failure to return upon demand the funds held
complainant's petition for annulment despite being such pleading. Such neglect of the legal matter by him on behalf of his client, as in this case, gives rise
engaged for already five (5) long months.19 Moreover, entrusted to them by their client constitutes a flagrant to the presumption that he has appropriated the same
as pointed out by the Investigating Commissioner, violation of Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the CPR, to for his own use in violation of the trust reposed in him
despite their preliminary assessment that wit:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary by his client. Such act is a gross violation of general
complainant's petition would not likely prosper, Attys. CANON 18 – A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT morality, as well as of professional
Cruz-Angeles and Paler still proceeded to collect an WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE. ethics."26chanrobleslaw
additional P250,000.00 from complainant. Worse, they
even billed him an exorbitant sum of P324,000.00.20 Rule 18.03 – A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter Furthermore, Attys. Cruz-Angeles and Paler
Thus, the Investigating Commissioner opined that the entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection misrepresented to complainant that the delay in the
amounts respondents had already collected and would therewith shall render him liable. filing of his petition for annulment was due to the fact
still want to further collect from complainant can Case law exhorts that, "once a lawyer takes up the that they were still looking for a "friendly" court,
hardly be spent for research in connection with the cause of his client, he is duty-bound to serve the latter judge, and public prosecutor who will not be too much
annulment case that was not filed at all. Neither can with competence, and to attend to such client's cause of a hindrance in achieving success in the annulment
they cover just fees for Attys. Cruz-Angeles and Paler with diligence, care, and devotion whether he accepts case. In fact, in the two (2) billing statements dated
who did nothing to serve complainant's it for a fee or for free. He owes fidelity to such cause October 5, 200427 and October 10, 2004,28 Attys.
cause.21chanrobleslaw and must always be mindful of the trust and Cruz-Angeles and Paler made it appear that they went
confidence reposed upon him. Therefore, a lawyer's to various locations to look for a suitable venue in
In a Resolution22 dated September 28, 2013, the IBP neglect of a legal matter entrusted to him by his client filing the said petition, and even paid various amounts
Board of Governors adopted and approved the constitutes inexcusable negligence for which he must to prosecutors and members of the National Bureau of
aforesaid Report and Recommendation, with be held administratively liable,"25cralawred as in this Investigation to act as their "consultants." Such
modification increasing the recommended penalty to case. misrepresentations and deceits on the part of Attys.
two (2) years suspension from the practice of law. Atty. Cruz-Angeles and Paler are violations of Rule 1.01,
Cruz-Angeles moved for reconsideration,23 which was, In this relation, Attys. Cruz-Angeles and Paler also Canon 1 of the CPR, viz.:
however, denied in a Resolution24 dated June 7, 2015. violated Rules 16.01 and 16.03, Canon 16 of the CPR CANON 1 – A lawyer shall uphold the constitution,
when they failed to return to complainant the amount obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law
The Issue Before the Court of P350,000.00 representing their legal fees, viz. : and legal processes.
CANON 16 – A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL
The essential issue in this case is whether or not Attys. MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENT THAT Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
Cruz-Angeles and Paler should be held MAY COME INTO HIS POSSESSION. dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
administratively liable for violating the CPR. Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the CPR instructs that "[a]s
Rule 16.01 – A lawyer shall account for all money or officers of the court, lawyers are bound to maintain not
The Court's Ruling property collected or received for or from the client. only a high standard of legal proficiency, but also of
morality, honesty, integrity, and fair dealing."29
Clearly, Attys. Cruz-Angeles and Paler fell short of

such standard when they committed the afore-
described acts of misrepresentation and deception
against complainant. Their acts are not only
unacceptable, disgraceful, and dishonorable to the
legal profession; they also reveal basic moral flaws
that make Attys. Cruz-Angeles and Paler unfit to
practice law.30chanrobleslaw
As members of the Bar, Attys. Cruz-Angeles and Paler
should not perform acts that would tend to undermine
and/or denigrate the integrity of the courts, such as
insinuating that they can find a "friendly" court and
judge that will ensure a favorable ruling in
complainant's annulment case. It is their sworn duty as
lawyers and officers of the court to uphold the dignity
and authority of the courts. Respect for the courts
guarantees the stability of the judicial institution.
Without this guarantee, the institution would be
resting on very shaky foundations.31 This is the very
thrust of Canon 11 of the CPR, which provides that "[a]
lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to
the courts and to judicial officers and should insist on
similar conduct by others." Hence, lawyers who are
remiss in performing such sworn duty violate the
aforesaid Canon 11, and as such, should be held
administratively liable and penalized accordingly, as in
this case.[32]chanrobleslaw
Moreover, Canon 7 of the CPR commands every lawyer
to "at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the
legal profession" for the strength of the legal
profession lies in the dignity and integrity of its
members. It is every lawyer's duty to maintain the high
regard to the profession by staying true to his oath and
keeping his actions beyond reproach. It must be
reiterated that as an officer of the court, it is a lawyer's
sworn and moral duty to help build and not destroy
unnecessarily that high esteem and regard towards the
courts so essential to the proper administration of
justice; as acts and/or omissions emanating from
lawyers which tend to undermine the judicial edifice is
disastrous to the continuity of the government and to
the attainment of the liberties of the people. Thus, all
lawyers should be bound not only to safeguard the
good name of the legal profession, but also to keep
inviolable the honor, prestige, and reputation of the
judiciary.33 In this case, Attys. Cruz-Angeles and Paler
compromised the integrity not only of the judiciary,
but also of the national prosecutorial service, by
insinuating that they can influence a court, judge, and
prosecutor to cooperate with them to ensure the
annulment of complainant's marriage. Indubitably,
Attys. Cruz-Angeles and Paler also violated Canon 7 of
the CPR, and hence, they should be held
administratively liable therefor.
Anent the proper penalty for Attys. Cruz-Angeles and
Paler, jurisprudence provides that in similar cases
where lawyers neglected their client's affairs, failed to
return the latter's money and/or property despite
demand, and at the same time committed acts of
misrepresentation and deceit against their clients, the
Court imposed upon them the penalty of suspension
from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years.
In Jinon v. Jiz 34 the Court suspended the lawyer for a
period of two (2) years for his failure to return the
amount his client gave him for his legal services which
he never performed. Also, in Agot v. Rivera, 35 the
Court suspended the lawyer for a period of two (2)
years for his (a) failure to handle the legal matter
entrusted to him and to return the legal fees in
connection therewith; and (b) misrepresentation that
he was an immigration lawyer, when in truth, he was
not. Finally, in Spouses Lopez v. Limos, 36 the Court
suspended the erring lawyer for three (3) years for her
failure to file a petition for adoption on behalf of
complainants, return the money she received as legal
fees, and for her commission of deceitful acts in
misrepresenting that she had already filed such
petition when nothing was actually filed, resulting in
undue prejudice to therein complainants. In this case,
not only did Attys. Cruz-Angeles and Paler fail to file
complainant's petition for annulment of marriage and
return what the latter paid them as legal fees, they
likewise misrepresented that they can find a court,
judge, and prosecutor who they can easily influence to
ensure a favorable resolution of such petition, to the
3
detriment of the judiciary and the national
prosecutorial service. Under these circumstances, the
Court individually imposes upon Attys. Cruz-Angeles
and Paler the penalty of suspension from the practice
of law for a period of three (3) years.
Finally, the Court sustains the IBP's recommendation
ordering Attys. Cruz-Angeles and Paler to return the
amount of P350,000.00 they received from
complainant as legal fees. It is well to note that "while
the Court has previously held that disciplinary
proceedings should only revolve around the
determination of the respondent-lawyer's
administrative and not his civil liability, it must be
clarified that this rule remains applicable only to
claimed liabilities which are purely civil in nature – for
instance, when the claim involves moneys received by
the lawyer from his client in a transaction separate
and distinct and not intrinsically linked to his
professional engagement."37 Hence, since Attys. Cruz-
Angeles and Paler received the aforesaid amount as
part of their legal fees, the Court finds the return
thereof to be in order.
WHEREFORE, respondents Atty. Rose Beatrix Cruz-
Angeles and Atty. Wylie M. Paler are found GUILTY of
violating Rule 1.01, Canon 1, Canon 7, Canon 11, Rule
18.03, Canon 18, and Rules 16.01 and 16.03, Canon 16
of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly,
each of them is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice
of law for a period of three (3) years, effective upon
the finality of this Decision, with a STERN WARNING
that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be
dealt with more severely.
Likewise, respondents Atty. Rose Beatrix Cruz-Angeles
and Atty. Wylie M. Paler are ORDERED to return to
complainant Cleo B. Dongga-as the legal fees they
received from the latter in the aggregate amount of
P350,000.00 within ninety (90) days from the finality of
this Decision. Failure to comply with the foregoing
directive will warrant the imposition of a more severe
penalty.
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Meanwhile, the complaint as against Atty. Angeles Chancellor Posadas and Vice Chancellor for students constitutes violation of Code of Professional
Grandea is DISMISSED for lack of merit. Rosario Torres-Yu, who also repaired to the office of Responsibility.
the colonel, joined Atty. Lambino in opposing the turn-
Let copies of this Decision be served on the Office of over of the suspects to Atty. Dizon, despite the latter’s 2. Whether the act of Atty. Dizon in trying to arrest the
the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the claim that under its Charter the NBI was authorized to student-suspects constitutes violation of the Code of
Philippines, and all courts in the country for their make warrantless arrests. Professional Responsibility.
information and guidance and be attached to
respondents' personal records as attorney. The suspects’ lawyer, one Atty. Villamor, later also By Report and Recommendation submitted to the
showed up at the office of Col. Bentain and after what Board of Governors of the IBP on June 20, 2005, CBD
SO ORDERED.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary appeared to be a heated discussion between Atty. Investigating Commissioner Siegfrid B. Mison
Dizon and the UP officials, the students were allowed recommended the dismissal of the complaint against
A.C. No. 6968             August 9, 2006 to go back to their dormitories, with Atty. Villamor Atty. Lambino in light of a finding that she "acted
ATTY. ORLANDO V. DIZON, Complainant, undertaking to accompany them to the NBI the within her official duties as she safeguarded the rights
vs. following morning. of the students in accordance with the school’s
ATTY. MARICHU C. LAMBINO, Respondent. substitute parental authority" and "within the bounds
x-----------------------------------------x The two student-suspects were eventually indicted in of the law as the NBI agents had no warrants of
ATTY. MARICHU C. LAMBINO, Complainant, court. arrest."
vs.
ATTY. ORLANDO V. DIZON, Respondent. Hence, spawned the filing of a complaint by Atty. With respect to the complaint against Atty. Dizon, the
DECISION Dizon against Atty. Lambino before the Integrated Bar Commissioner recommended to reprimand him for
CARPIO MORALES, J.: of the Philippines (IBP), for violation of Canon 1, Rules violating the Code of Professional Responsibility in
1.1 to 1.3 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, "recklessly tr[ying] to arrest" the suspects without
The killing during a rumble on December 8, 1994 of docketed as CBD Case No. 346. warrant.
University of the Philippines (UP) graduating student
Dennis Venturina, the chairperson of the UP College of Atty. Dizon had earlier filed a criminal complaint also The IBP Board of Governors, by Resolution of October
Public Administration Student Council, drew the then against Atty. Lambino, together with Chancellor 22, 2005, adopted and approved the Commissioner’s
Chancellor of UP Diliman Roger Posadas to seek the Posadas and Vice Chancellor Torres-Yu and Col. Report. The IBP thereupon transferred to this Court its
assistance of the National Bureau of Investigation Bentain, before the Ombudsman, for violation of P.D. Notice of Resolution, together with the records of the
(NBI). 1829 which makes it unlawful for anyone to obstruct cases which this Court noted by Resolution of
the apprehension and prosecution of criminal offenses. February 1, 2006.
Acting on the request of Chancellor Posadas, Atty.
Orlando Dizon, then Chief of the Special Operations Atty. Lambino in turn charged Atty. Dizon before the As earlier stated, the issue against Atty. Lambino is
Group (SOG) of the NBI, together with his men, IBP with violation of the Code of Professional whether she violated the Canons of Professional Ethics
repaired to the Office of Col. Eduardo Bentain, head of Responsibility, specifically Canon 1, Rule 1.01, 1.02, in "refusing to turn over the suspected students to the
the UP Security Force on December 12, 1994. and 1.03; Canon 6, Rules 6.01 and 6.02; and Canon 8, group of Atty. Dizon."
Rule 8.01, docketed as CBD Case No. 373.
As two student-suspects in the killing, Francis Carlo When the complaint of Atty. Dizon before the
Taparan and Raymundo Narag, were at the time in the The administrative cases were, on motion of Atty. Ombudsman against Chancellor Posadas, Vice
office of Col. Bentain, Atty. Dizon requested to take Lambino, consolidated. Before the IBP Commission on Chancellor Torres-Yu and Atty. Lambino was elevated
them into his custody. Atty. Marichu Lambino, Legal Bar Discipline (CBD), the issues were defined as on Certiorari and Prohibition, this Court addressing in
Counsel of UP Diliman, who repaired to the Office of follows: the negative the two issues raised therein, to wit:
Col. Bentain, advised against Atty. Dizon’s move,
however, he not being armed with a warrant for their 1. Whether the act of Atty. Lambino in refusing to turn (1) Whether the attempted arrest of the student
arrest. over the suspected students to the group of Atty. Dizon suspects by the NBI could be validly made without a
warrant; and (2) Whether there was probable cause for
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prosecuting petitioner for violation of P.D. No. 1829. x 1.02 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional PERALTA, J.:
x x,1 Responsibility which provides:
Before us is a Complaint1 for Disciplinary Action dated
held that the objection of the said UP officials to the CANON 1 – A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE September 1, 2016 filed by the spouses Pepito Frias
arrest of the students "cannot be construed as a CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND and Prescila Chavez Frias (Spouses Frias) against
violation of P.D. No. 1829, Sec. 1 (c) without rendering AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL respondent Atty. Nelly E. Abao (Atty. Abao) for
it unconstitutional,"2 they having "a right to prevent PROCESSES. violation of Rule 1.01 and Rule 10.01 of the Code of
the arrest [of the students] at the time because their Professional Responsibility and of the Notarial Law.
attempted arrest was illegal."3 xxxx
The facts are as follows:
Indeed, Atty. Lambino was legally justified in advising Rule 1.02 – A lawyer shall not counsel or abet
against the turn over of the suspects to Atty. Dizon, activities aimed at defiance of the law or at Complainant Pepito Frias, married to Prescila Chavez,
there being no basis for him to effect a warrantless lessening confidence in the legal system. (Emphasis is the registered owner of a parcel of land known as
arrest. Atty. Dizon’s administrative complaint against supplied). Lot No. 3270-A, Psd-06-000781, situated at Barangay
her must then be dismissed. Malonoy, Dao, Capiz, covered by Transfer Certificate
WHEREFORE, CBD Case No. 346 against Atty. of Title (TCT) No. T-14354 (subject property).
Respecting the complaint against Atty. Dizon, this Marichu C. Lambino is DISMISSED.
Court, also in Posadas v. Ombudsman, held that "[f]or The Spouses Frias narrated that in early 1900s,
the failure of the NBI agents to comply with the Atty. Orlando V. Dizon is, in CBD Case No. 373, found Susana Frias, their daughter, was enduring a heart
constitutional and procedural requirements, . . . their guilty of violation of Canon 1 of Rule 1.02 of the Code disease. Because of financial difficulties, they accepted
attempt to arrest [the two student-suspects] without a of Professional Responsibility and is REPRIMANDED the offer of one of their daughters who was then
warrant was illegal."4 and WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar residing in Mindanao, to bring Susana to Davao for
infraction shall be dealt with more severely. treatment. Before they left, the Spouses Frias asked
In the main, Atty. Dizon invoked Section 1 (a) of Rodrigo Arbiz, and his wife, Maria, the parents of
Republic Act 157 (The NBI Charter) which empowers Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of Jermehilda Escutin, if they could lend them money to
the NBI "to undertake investigations of crimes and the Bar Confidant, the National Bureau of cover for their transportation to Mindanao and the
other offenses against the laws of the Philippines, upon Investigation, and the Department of Justice. medical expenses of Susana. Although the Spouses
its own initiative and as public interest may Arbiz agreed to lend them some money, they
require"5 and to make arrests. The invocation does not SO ORDERED. demanded that the Spouses Frias secure the loan with
impress. Said section does not grant the NBI the the subject property, for twenty years.
power to make warrantless arrests. The NBI Charter
clearly qualifies the power to make arrests to be "in Because the Spouses Frias were unsure of their
accordance with existing laws and rules." capacity to pay back the loan in time, and were afraid
A.C. No. 12467 [Formerly CBD Case No. 16-5072], they might lose the subject property if they failed to
Members of the investigation staff of the Bureau of April 10, 2019 settle the loan, they allegedly offered instead to lease
Investigation shall be peace officers, and as such have the property to the Spouses Arbiz, instead of
the following powers: TOPIC: RLE 1.01 mortgaging it to them.

(a) To make arrests, searches and seizures in SPOUSES PEPITO AND PRESCILA FRIAS, Rodrigo Arbis allegedly accepted the offer to lease the
accordance with existing laws and rules.6 COMPLAINANTS, v. ATTY. NELLY E. ABAO, subject property, and gave them the amount of
RESPONDENT. P340,000,00. Both parties agreed that: (1) the Spouses
x x x x (Emphasis supplied) Frias would not have any obligation to give back the
DECISION amount of P340,000.00 to Rodrigo Arbiz; (2) Rodrigo
By persisting in his attempt to arrest the suspected Arbiz and his wife would possess the subject property
students without a warrant, Atty. Dizon violated Rule for twenty years, that is from January 16, 1995 to
 6

January 16, 2015, and enjoy the use and produce of the no. 106, found on page 23, Book No. LVIX.3 However, In her Answer9 dated November 14, 2016, Atty. Abao
land; (3) Rodrigo Arbiz and his wife would be the Spouses Frias insisted that they did not execute admitted that she notarized the subject Deed of
responsible to pay for the real estate taxes due on the any document of conveyance of the said parcel of land Absolute Sale without the necessary notarial
property because it would be difficult for the Spouses to anybody. They claimed that it was impossible for commission to do so. She offered no valid excuse for
Frias to pay them while they were in Mindanao; (4) the them to execute the said Deed of Absolute Sale on July her unauthorized notarial act. She denied having
Spouses Frias would not disturb Rodrigo Arbiz and his 11, 1995 because at that time they already left for notarized a fictitious deed of absolute sale, and
wife's possession of the property until after the Mindanao and never came back to Dao, Capiz, until maintained that complainants personally appeared and
expiration of twenty years; and (5) the Spouses Frias April 4, 2015. signed the subject Deed of Absolute Sale before her.
would entrust the original owner's duplicate copy of
TCT No. T-14354 that covers the subject property to The Spouses Frias then searched for an original copy Meanwhile, on November 29, 2016, the complaint for
Rodrigo Arbiz and his wife. These agreements, of the deed of absolute sale with the Clerk of Court of unlawful detainer filed by the Spouses Frias against
however, were not put into writing as it was the usual Roxas City. The Clerk of Court of Roxas City, Atty. the Spouses Escutin, docketed as Civil Case No. V-376,
practice those days. Jelou F. Almalbis-Laguna, issued a Certification4 dated was dismissed.10
November 3, 2015 stating that the deed of absolute
On January 16, 1995, the Spouses Frias left for South sale executed by Pepito Frias and Prescila Frias in In its Report and Recommendation11 dated September
Cotabato, leaving whatever they owned in Capiz. favor of Rodrigo Arbiz and Maria L. Arbiz under Doc. 19, 2017, the IBP-CBD found Atty. Abao liable for
Despite all medical treatments they could afford with No. 106, Page 23, Book No. LVIX dated July 11, 1995 notarizing documents without a notarial commission
their savings, Susana died in 2000 in South Cotabato. and notarized by Atty. Abao does not exist. It further and for executing an untruthful judicial affidavit. For
certified that respondent Atty. Abao was never notarizing a document without commission, the IBP-
Sometime in 2000, the Spouses Frias learned that commissioned as Notary Public in the City of Roxas, CBD recommended that Atty. Abao be suspended from
Rodrigo Arbiz died. Later, in 2005, they also learned Province of Capiz for the year 1995 and had no the practice of law for six (6) months, and that if she is
that Rodrigo Arbiz's wife, Maria, also died. They notarial files on record for the same year.5 presently commissioned as notary public, she be
discovered that the heirs of the Spouses Arbiz, disqualified from being commissioned as notary public
Jermehilda Escutin and Danilo Escutin, took The Spouses Frias, likewise, lamented that while Atty. for a period of two (2) years. Further, for executing an
possession of the subject property. Abao admitted that she notarized the Deed of Absolute untruthful judicial affidavit and testifying thereon, the
Sale purportedly executed by them, she, however, IBP-CBD, likewise, recommended a penalty of
The Spouses Frias alleged that even after the death of made false statements in her Judicial Affidavit6 dated suspension from the practice of law for a period of one
the Spouses Arbiz, they could not return to Dao, Capiz July 28, 2016 wherein she alleged that: (1) Pepito Frias (1) year.
because they respected the alleged lease agreement. was present when she notarized the said document; (2)
After the expiration of the lease contract, they decided Prescila Frias was present when she notarized the In a Resolution12 dated June 29, 2018, the IBP-Board
to return to Capiz, and claim the subject property as Deed of Absolute Sale; and (3) Pepito Frias and of Governors adopted and approved the Report and
they believed to be entitled thereto. However, the Prescila Frias affixed their signatures in the said Deed Recommendation of the IBP-CBD on the recommended
Spouses Escutin refused to turnover the possession of of Absolute Sale.7 penalty.
the subject property. Thus, the Spouses Frias filed a
complaint for ejectment against the Spouses Escutin. Thus, the instant administrative complaint against
Atty. Abao for violation of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 and RULING
In their Answer, the Spouses Escutin argued that the Rule 10.01 of Canon 10 of the Code of Professional
subject property was sold to their parents by the Responsibility (CPR).
Spouses Frias. They attached a copy of the Deed of We agree with the findings of the IBP-CBD, except as
Absolute Sale dated July 11, 1995 purportedly On October 3, 2016, the Integrated Bar of the to use recommended penalty.
executed by complainants in favor of the parents of the Philippines-Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD)
Spouses Escutin.2 ordered Atty. Abao to submit her answer to the Time and again, this Court has stressed that
complaint against her.8 notarization is not an empty, meaningless and routine
The Deed of Absolute Sale was notarized by herein act. It is invested with substantive public interest that
respondent Atty. Abao on July 11, 1995, as document only those who are qualified or authorized may act as
 7

notaries public.13 It must be emphasized that the act of Japitana v. Atty. Parado,21 following the Court's
of notarization by a notary public converts a private pronouncements in Re: Violation of Rules on Notarial
document into a public document making that By performing notarial acts without the necessary Practice,22 the lawyer was suspended for two (2)
document admissible in evidence without further proof commission from the court, Atty. Abao violated not years from the practice of law and forever barred from
of authenticity. A notarial document is by law entitled only her oath to obey the laws, particularly the Rules becoming a notary public when he notarized
to full faith and credit upon its face, and for this on Notarial Practice, but also Canons 1 and 7 of the documents with no existing notarial commission.
reason, notaries public must observe with utmost care Code of Professional Responsibility which proscribes
the basic requirements in the performance of their all lawyers from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, Considering that Atty. Abao has been proven to nave
duties. immoral or deceitful conduct and directs them to performed notarial work in Dao, Capiz, without the
uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession, requisite commission, the Court finds the
In the present case, it is undisputable that Atty. Abao at all times.16 recommended penalty insufficient. Likewise, Atty.
performed notarial acts on the subject deed of absolute Abao's assertion of old age and sickness fails to
sale knowing fully well that; she was without a valid In the case of Nunga v. Atty. Viray,17 the Court convince, considering that at the time of the
notarial commission. Her lack of notarial commission appropriately held that where the notarization of a commission of the unauthorized act of notarizing, she
at the time of the unauthorized notarization was document is done by a member of the Philippine Bar at was only fifty-four (54) years old. Instead, Atty. Abao
likewise sufficiently established by the Certification a time when he has no authorization or commission to must be barred from being commissioned as notary
issued by Atty. Jelou F. Almalbis-Laguna, Clerk of do so, the offender may be subjected to disciplinary public permanently and suspended from the practice
Court VI of the Office of the Clerk of Court, Regional action. For one, performing a notarial [act] without of law for a period of two (2) years.23
Trial Court, 6th Judicial Region, Roxas City in the such commission is a violation of the lawyer's oath to
territory where Atty. Abao performed the unauthorized obey the laws, more specifically, the Notarial Law.
notarial act.14 Clearly, Atty. Abao could not perform Then, too, by making it appear that he is duly
notarial functions in Dao, Capiz, since she was not commissioned when he is not, he is, for all legal
commissioned in the places to perform such act in the intents and purposes, indulging in deliberate WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Nelly E. Abao is found
year 1995. falsehood, which the lawyer's oath similarly GUILTY of malpractice as a notary public, and
proscribes. These violations fall squarely within the violating the lawyer's oath as well as Rule 1.01, Canon
Under the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, a person prohibition of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
commissioned as a notary public may perform notarial Professional Responsibility, which provides: "A lawyer Accordingly, she is SUSPENDED from the practice of
acts in any place within the territorial jurisdiction of shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or law for two (2) years and BARRED PERMANENTLY
the commissioning court for a period of two (2) years deceitful conduct."18 from being commissioned as Notary Public, effective
commencing the first day of January of the year in upon her receipt of a copy of this Decision.
which the commissioning is made. Commission either In a number of cases, the Court has subjected lawyers
means the grant of authority to perform notarial or the to disciplinary action for notarizing documents outside Let copies of this Decision be furnished all the courts
written evidence of authority.15 Without a their territorial jurisdiction or with an expired of the land through the Office of the Court
commission, a lawyer is unauthorized to perform any commission. In Zoreta v. Atty. Simpliciano,19 the Administrator, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
of the notarial acts. respondent was, likewise, suspended from the practice the Office of the Bar Confidant, and be recorded in the
of law for a period of two (2) years and was personal files of Atty. Abao.
Clearly, for misrepresenting in the subject Deed of permanently barred from being commissioned as a
Absolute Sale that she was a notary public for and in notary public for notarizing several documents after SO ORDERED.
Dao, Capiz, when in fact she was not, Atty. Abao the expiration of his commission. In the case of Judge
further committed a form of falsehood which is Laquindanum v. Atty. Quintana,20 the Court A.C. No. 3232 September 27, 1994
undoubtedly anathema to the lawyer's oath. Atty. suspended a lawyer for six (6) months and was
Abao's misdeeds run afoul of her duties and disqualified from being commissioned as notary public ROSITA C. NADAYAG, complainant,
responsibilities, both as a lawyer and a notary public. for a period of two (2) years, because he notarized vs.
documents outside the area of his commission, and ATTY JOSE A. GRAGEDA, respondent.
with an expired commission. In the more recent case
 8

Fiscal through the Police Station Commander in June

MELO, J.: 1987 but that and until the time of this Report was not Nonetheless, said Commission, on the basis of the
tried in Court yet but that the Information did not complaint and the supporting affidavit, as well as the
In a letter-complaint dated April 15, 1988, Rosita C. include said Atty. Jose A. Grageda, hence this report. counter-affidavit of respondent, found that "there is
Nadayag charged respondent Atty. A. Grageda, a reason for disciplining the respondent" premised upon
practicing attorney and notary public in Iligan City, (p. 2, Vol. I, Record.) the following observations:
with conduct unbecoming of a lawyer in connection
with a "Pacto de Retro" transaction wherein Respondent filed his counter-affidavit dated March 29, Respondent first admits that he was consulted by the
complainant was the vendee. Complainant's affidavit, 1989, pertinently alleging: vendor-a-retro and the complainant (vendee-a-retro) on
which accompanied her letter-complaint, alleged that the matter of the title when he was asked to notarize
respondent: 6. That they showed me a copy of the title which I the Deed of Sale a Retro. He admits that he rendered
examined and found out the title was clear and there an opinion based on the title that was presented to
. . . prepared and notarized a PACTO DE RETRO sale was no annotation or entry so I told them that as far as him. It turns out that the title presented to him is the
with me as the Vendee-a-Retro last January 21, 1987 in the title was concern there was no encumbrances or Original Certificate of Title which only the Register of
this City using Original Certificate of Land Title stolen annotation and can be the subject of the Pacto de Deeds has custody of and he should have sensed foul-
from the Office of the Register of Deeds herein in Retro; play or irregularity. As a lawyer and officer of the
Iligan as a result of which I was swindled in One court, he should have been alerted and should have
hundred eight thousand pesos (P108,000.00) because 7. That they insisted that I notarized the document so I reported the irregularity of an Original Certificate of
the said land sold to me by Pacto de Retro was already proceeded to translate the document in Cebu, Visayan Title, which should be in the exclusive safekeeping of
sold ahead of time to another party, using the owner's dialect to make sure that the parties understood the the Register of Deeds, in the possession of
duplicate copy of the title. That during our pacto de deed and they replied that they understood this and I unauthorized persons. Even if it were the photostat
retro sale, as I was suspicious already of the asked then further if they have any more to add or copy of said Original Certificate of Title that was
appearance of the Original Certificate of Title, having delete; they answered that there was no more and they presented to him, the same did not bear any
many annotations and old patches thereof, when I will sign the same; certification by the Register of Deeds which could have
brought the matter to the attention of Atty. Jose A. alerted him of the irregularity. The testimony that the
Grageda, notarizing the same, he simply answered me 8. That I told them to sign the document above their Original was shown to him has not been controverted.
that the title was all right and that he told me further typewritten name which they did and witnessed by the The Vendee was in fact in possession of the Original
not to worry as he is an attorney and besides he knew other person with them who were present, so after because it was testified that when the Register of
very well the Vendor-a- Retro whose business their signature in good faith based upon their Deeds found that respondent was in possession, the
transactions especially notarial matter has been and in documents I notarized the same. original certificate was confiscated by the Register of
fact always handled by him (Attorney Jose A. Grageda). Deeds.
(p. 10, Vol. II, Record.)
That said stolen Original Certificate of Land Title was The Commission takes special note of a notary public
confiscated by Iligan City Register of Deeds, Attorney Pursuant to Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court and the acting more than a notary public and goes beyond
Reynaldo Baguio on the occasion when I applied for resolution of the Court En Banc of April 12, 1988, the mere certification of the presence of the signatories,
registration of my Pacto de Retro. Findings showed case was referred to the Commission on Bar Discipline their having signed, and having contracted. By
that many other cased of stolen original certificates of of the Integrated Bar of the Philippine (IBP) for transcending these bounds, such notary public has
land titles have taken place in the said office but the investigation, report, and recommendation. entered the realm of giving "legal advice" — thus
said Attorney as the Register of Deeds did not "acting also as counsel aside from notary public" to the
prosecute the thieves thereof. The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline scheduled parties to the contract.
hearings for reception of evidence but complainant
I filed Estafa case against the Vendor-a-Retro together manifested that she cannot proceed to Manila and Treated as counsels for the vendee, he had the legal
with her accomplices to include said Attorney Jose A. attend to her case due to financial constraints. Upon duty to advice him properly of the irregularities and
Grageda, coursing it through the local Barangay the other hand, respondent could no longer be located, the dangers of holding the Original Certificate which
Captain last May 1987 yet, then forwarded to the City having moved without leaving any forwarding address. should have been in the custody of the Register of
 9

Deeds. Respondent had acted recklessly at the least, in professional indiscretion. After all, notarization is not
his advise of the vendee. He rendered an opinion that an empty routine. Notarization of a private document
was irresponsible that his client converts such document into a public one and renders
it admissible in court without further proof of its
authenticity.
ACCORDINGLY, and as recommended by the IBP
Board of Governors, the Court Resolved to SUSPEND
relied upon — which recklessness is censurable. respondent Atty. Jose A. Grageda from the practice of
law for a period of three (3) months commencing from
(pp. 3-4, Commissioner's Report; ff. p. 22, Vol. Record.) receipt of this Resolution, with the warning that a
repetition of the same or any other misconduct will be
A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dealt with more severely. Let a copy of this Resolution
dignity of the legal profession. The trust and be spread on the records of said respondent, with
confidence necessarily reposed by clients require in copies thereof furnished to the Integrated Bar of the
the attorney a high standard and appreciation of his Philippines and duly circularized to all courts.
duty to his clients, his profession, the courts and the
public. The bar should maintain a high standard of SO ORDERED.
legal proficiency as well as of honesty and fair dealing.
Generally speaking, a lawyer can do honor to the legal RULE 1.01
profession by faithfully performing his duties to A.C. No. 7136 August 1, 2007
society, to the bar, to the courts, and to his clients. To
this end, nothing should be done by any member of the JOSELANO GUEVARRA, complainant,
legal fraternity which might tend to lessen in any vs.
degree the confidence of the public in the fidelity, ATTY. JOSE EMMANUEL EALA, respondent.
honesty, and integrity of the profession. (Marcelo vs.
Javier, Sr., 214 SCRA 1 [1992]). DECISION
After his marriage to Irene on October 7, 2000,
complainant noticed that from January to March 2001,
Irene had been receiving from respondent cellphone
calls, as well as messages some of which read "I love
you," "I miss you," or "Meet you at Megamall."
Complainant also noticed that Irene habitually went
home very late at night or early in the morning of the
following day, and sometimes did not go home from
work. When he asked about her whereabouts, she
replied that she slept at her parents' house in
Binangonan, Rizal or she was busy with her work.
In February or March 2001, complainant saw Irene
and respondent together on two occasions. On the
second occasion, he confronted them following which
Irene abandoned the conjugal house.
On April 22, 2001, complainant went uninvited to
Irene's birthday celebration at which he saw her and
respondent celebrating with her family and friends.
Out of embarrassment, anger and humiliation, he left
the venue immediately. Following that incident, Irene
went to the conjugal house and hauled off all her
personal belongings, pieces of furniture, and her share
of the household appliances.

Generally, a lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for
any misconduct, whether in his professional or private
capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral
character, in honesty, probity, and good demeanor or
unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.
(Marcelo vs. Javier, Sr., supra).
In the case at bar, respondent should have been
conscientious in seeing to it that justice permeated
every aspect of a transaction for which his services
had been engaged, in conformity with the avowed
duties of a worthy member of the Bar. He should have
fully explained the legal intricacies and consequences
of the subject transaction as would aid the parties in
making an informed decision. Such responsibility was
plainly incumbent upon him, and failing therein, he
must now face the commensurate consequences of his
PER CURIAM: Complainant later found, in the master's bedroom, a
folded social card bearing the words "I Love You" on
Joselano Guevarra (complainant) filed on March 4, its face, which card when unfolded contained a
2002 a Complaint for Disbarment1 before the handwritten letter dated October 7, 2000, the day of
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Committee on his wedding to Irene, reading:
Bar Discipline (CBD) against Atty. Jose Emmanuel M.
Eala a.k.a. Noli Eala (respondent) for "grossly immoral My everdearest Irene,
conduct and unmitigated violation of the lawyer's
oath." By the time you open this, you'll be moments away
from walking down the aisle. I will say a prayer for you
In his complaint, Guevarra gave the following account: that you may find meaning in what you're about to do.
He first met respondent in January 2000 when his Sometimes I wonder why we ever met. Is it only for me
(complainant's) then-fiancee Irene Moje (Irene) to find fleeting happiness but experience eternal pain?
introduced respondent to him as her friend who was Is it only for us to find a true love but then lose it
married to Marianne (sometimes spelled "Mary Ann") again? Or is it because there's a bigger plan for the
Tantoco with whom he had three children. two of us?
 10

about the third week of September 2001, the couple
I hope that you have experienced true happiness with attended the launch of the "Wine All You Can"
me. I have done everything humanly possible to love promotion of French wines, held at the Mega Strip of
you. And today, as you make your vows . . . I make my SM Megamall B at Mandaluyong City. Their
own vow to YOU! attendance was reported in Section B of the Manila
Standard issue of 24 September 2001, on page 21.
I will love you for the rest of my life. I loved you from Respondent and Irene were photographed together;
the first time I laid eyes on you, to the time we spent their picture was captioned: "Irene with Sportscaster
together, up to the final moments of your single life. Noli Eala." A photocopy of the report is attached as
But more importantly, I will love you until the life in Annex C.4 (Italics and emphasis in the original;
me is gone and until we are together again. CAPITALIZATION of the phrase "flaunting their
adulterous relationship" supplied),
Do not worry about me! I will be happy for you. I have
enough memories of us to last me a lifetime. Always respondent, in his ANSWER, stated:
remember though that in my heart, in my mind and in
my soul, YOU WILL ALWAYS 4. Respondent specifically denies having ever flaunted
an adulterous relationship with Irene as alleged in
. . . AND THE WONDERFUL THINGS YOU DO! paragraph 14 of the Complaint, the truth of the matter
being that their relationship was low profile and known
BE MINE . . . . AND MINE ALONE, and I WILL only to the immediate members of their respective
ALWAYS BE YOURS AND YOURS ALONE! families, and that Respondent, as far as the general
public was concerned, was still known to be legally
I LOVE YOU FOREVER, I LOVE YOU FOR ALWAYS. AS married to Mary Anne Tantoco.5 (Emphasis and
LONG AS I'M LIVING MY TWEETIE YOU'LL BE!"2 underscoring supplied)
keep his membership in the bar, the reason being that
Respondent's relationship with Irene was not under
scandalous circumstances and that as far as his
relationship with his own family:
5.1 Respondent has maintained a civil, cordial and
peaceful relationship with [his wife] Mary Anne as in
fact they still occasionally meet in public, even if Mary
Anne is aware of Respondent's special friendship with
Irene.
xxxx
5.5 Respondent also denies that he has flaunted his
aversion to the institution of marriage by calling the
institution of marriage a mere piece of paper because
his reference [in his above-quoted handwritten letter
to Irene] to the marriage between Complainant and
Irene as a piece of paper was merely with respect to
the formality of the marriage contract.7 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
Respondent admitted8 paragraph 18 of the
COMPLAINT reading:

Eternally yours, On paragraph 15 of the COMPLAINT reading: 18. The Rules of Court requires lawyers to support the
NOLI Constitution and obey the laws. The Constitution
15. Respondent's adulterous conduct with the regards marriage as an inviolable social institution and
Complainant soon saw respondent's car and that of complainant's wife and his apparent abandoning or is the foundation of the family (Article XV, Sec. 2).9
Irene constantly parked at No. 71-B 11th Street, New neglecting of his own family, demonstrate his gross
Manila where, as he was to later learn sometime in moral depravity, making him morally unfit to keep his And on paragraph 19 of the COMPLAINT reading:
April 2001, Irene was already residing. He also learned membership in the bar. He flaunted his aversion to the
still later that when his friends saw Irene on or about institution of marriage, calling it a "piece of paper." 19. Respondent's grossly immoral conduct runs afoul
January 18, 2002 together with respondent during a Morally reprehensible was his writing the love letter to of the Constitution and the laws he, as a lawyer, has
concert, she was pregnant. complainant's bride on the very day of her wedding, been sworn to uphold. In pursuing obsessively his
vowing to continue his love for her "until we are illicit love for the complainant's wife, he mocked the
In his ANSWER,3 respondent admitted having sent the together again," as now they are.6 (Underscoring institution of marriage, betrayed his own family, broke
I LOVE YOU card on which the above-quoted letter supplied), up the complainant's marriage, commits adultery with
was handwritten. his wife, and degrades the legal profession.10
respondent stated in his ANSWER as follows: (Emphasis and underscoring supplied),
On paragraph 14 of the COMPLAINT reading:
5. Respondent specifically denies the allegations in respondent, in his ANSWER, stated:
14. Respondent and Irene were even FLAUNTING paragraph 15 of the Complaint regarding his
THEIR ADULTEROUS RELATIONSHIP as they adulterous relationship and that his acts demonstrate 7. Respondent specifically denies the allegations in
attended social functions together. For instance, in or gross moral depravity thereby making him unfit to paragraph 19 of the Complaint, the reason being that

under the circumstances the acts of Respondent with
respect to his purely personal and low profile special
relationship with Irene is neither under scandalous
circumstances nor tantamount to grossly immoral
conduct as would be a ground for disbarment pursuant
to Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court.11
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
To respondent's ANSWER, complainant filed a
REPLY,12 alleging that Irene gave birth to a girl and
Irene named respondent in the Certificate of Live Birth
as the girl's father. Complainant attached to the Reply,
as Annex "A," a copy of a Certificate of Live Birth13
bearing Irene's signature and naming respondent as
the father of her daughter Samantha Irene Louise
Moje who was born on February 14, 2002 at St. Luke's
Hospital.
Complainant's REPLY merited a REJOINDER WITH
MOTION TO DISMISS14 dated January 10, 2003 from
respondent in which he denied having "personal
knowledge of the Certificate of Live Birth attached to
the complainant's Reply."15 Respondent moved to
dismiss the complaint due to the pendency of a civil
case filed by complainant for the annulment of his
marriage to Irene, and a criminal complaint for
adultery against respondent and Irene which was
pending before the Quezon City Prosecutor's Office.
During the investigation before the IBP-CBD,
complainant's Complaint-Affidavit and Reply to Answer
were adopted as his testimony on direct
examination.16 Respondent's counsel did not cross-
examine complainant.17
After investigation, IBP-CBD Investigating
Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan, in a 12-page
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION18 dated October
26, 2004, found the charge against respondent
sufficiently proven.
The Commissioner thus recommended19 that
respondent be disbarred for violating Rule 1.01 of
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
reading:
11
Respondent contends, in his Comment23 on the
Rule 1.01: A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, present petition of complainant, that there is no
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct (Underscoring evidence against him.24 The contention fails. As the
supplied), IBP-CBD Investigating Commissioner observed:
and Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 of the same Code reading: While it may be true that the love letter dated October
7, 2000 (Exh. "C") and the news item published in the
Rule 7.03: A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that Manila Standard (Exh. "D"), even taken together do
adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor not sufficiently prove that respondent is carrying on an
shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a adulterous relationship with complainant's wife, there
scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal are other pieces of evidence on record which support
profession. (Underscoring supplied) the accusation of complainant against respondent.
The IBP Board of Governors, however, annulled and It should be noted that in his Answer dated 17 October
set aside the Recommendation of the Investigating 2002, respondent through counsel made the following
Commissioner and accordingly dismissed the case for statements to wit: "Respondent specifically denies
lack of merit, by Resolution dated January 28, 2006 having [ever] flaunted an adulterous relationship with
briefly reading: Irene as alleged in paragraph [14] of the Complaint,
the truth of the matter being [that] their relationship
RESOLUTION NO. XVII-2006-06 was low profile and known only to immediate members
of their respective families . . . , and Respondent
CBD Case No. 02-936 specifically denies the allegations in paragraph 19 of
Joselano C. Guevarra vs. the complaint, the reason being that under the
Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala circumstances the acts of the respondents with respect
a.k.a. Noli Eala to his purely personal and low profile relationship with
Irene is neither under scandalous circumstances nor
RESOLVED to ANNUL and SET ASIDE, as it is hereby tantamount to grossly immoral conduct . . ."
ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE, the Recommendation of
the Investigating Commissioner, and to APPROVE the These statements of respondent in his Answer are an
DISMISSAL of the above-entitled case for lack of admission that there is indeed a "special" relationship
merit.20 (Italics and emphasis in the original) between him and complainant's wife, Irene, [which]
taken together with the Certificate of Live Birth of
Hence, the present petition21 of complainant before Samantha Louise Irene Moje (Annex "H-1") sufficiently
this Court, filed pursuant to Section 12 (c), Rule 13922 prove that there was indeed an illicit relationship
of the Rules of Court. between respondent and Irene which resulted in the
birth of the child "Samantha". In the Certificate of Live
The petition is impressed with merit. Birth of Samantha it should be noted that
complainant's wife Irene supplied the information that
Oddly enough, the IBP Board of Governors, in setting respondent was the father of the child. Given the fact
aside the Recommendation of the Investigating that the respondent admitted his special relationship
Commissioner and dismissing the case for lack of with Irene there is no reason to believe that Irene
merit, gave no reason therefor as its above-quoted 33- would lie or make any misrepresentation regarding the
word Resolution shows. paternity of the child. It should be underscored that
respondent has not categorically denied that he is the
 12

father of Samantha Louise Irene Moje.25 (Emphasis the same person. Notatu dignum is that, as the disobedience appearing as an attorney for a party to a
and underscoring supplied) Investigating Commissioner noted, respondent never case without authority so to do. The practice of
denied being the father of the child. soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either
Indeed, from respondent's Answer, he does not deny personally or through paid agents or brokers,
carrying on an adulterous relationship with Irene, Franklin A. Ricafort, the records custodian of St. constitutes malpractice.
"adultery" being defined under Art. 333 of the Revised Luke's Medical Center, in his January 29, 2003
Penal Code as that "committed by any married woman Affidavit30 which he identified at the witness stand, The disbarment or suspension of a member of the
who shall have sexual intercourse with a man not her declared that Irene gave the information in the Philippine Bar by a competent court or other
husband and by the man who has carnal knowledge of Certificate of Live Birth that the child's father is "Jose disciplinatory agency in a foreign jurisdiction where he
her, knowing her to be married, even if the marriage Emmanuel Masacaet Eala," who was 38 years old and has also been admitted as an attorney is a ground for
be subsequently declared void."26 (Italics supplied) a lawyer.31 his disbarment or suspension if the basis of such action
What respondent denies is having flaunted such includes any of the acts hereinabove enumerated.
relationship, he maintaining that it was "low profile Without doubt, the adulterous relationship between
and known only to the immediate members of their respondent and Irene has been sufficiently proven by The judgment, resolution or order of the foreign court
respective families." more than clearly preponderant evidence – that or disciplinary agency shall be prima facie evidence of
evidence adduced by one party which is more the ground for disbarment or suspension (Emphasis
In other words, respondent's denial is a negative conclusive and credible than that of the other party and underscoring supplied),
pregnant, and, therefore, has greater weight than the other32 –
which is the quantum of evidence needed in an under scandalous circumstances.34
a denial pregnant with the admission of the substantial administrative case against a lawyer.
facts in the pleading responded to which are not The immediately-quoted Rule which provides the
squarely denied. It was in effect an admission of the Administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class grounds for disbarment or suspension uses the phrase
averments it was directed at. Stated otherwise, a of their own. They are distinct from and they may "grossly immoral conduct," not "under scandalous
negative pregnant is a form of negative expression proceed independently of civil and criminal cases. circumstances." Sexual intercourse under scandalous
which carries with it in affirmation or at least an circumstances is, following Article 334 of the Revised
implication of some kind favorable to the adverse . . . of proof for these types of cases differ. In a Penal Code reading:
party. It is a denial pregnant with an admission of the criminal case, proof beyond reasonable doubt is
substantial facts alleged in the pleading. Where a fact necessary; in an administrative case for disbarment or ART. 334. Concubinage. - Any husband who shall keep
is alleged with qualifying or modifying language and suspension, "clearly preponderant evidence" is all that a mistress in the conjugal dwelling, or, shall have
the words of the allegation as so qualified or modified is required.33 (Emphasis supplied) sexual intercourse, under scandalous circumstances,
are literally denied, it has been held that the qualifying with a woman who is not his wife, or shall cohabit with
circumstances alone are denied while the fact itself is Respondent insists, however, that disbarment does not her in any other place, shall be punished by prision
admitted.27 (Citations omitted; emphasis and lie because his relationship with Irene was not, under correccional in its minimum and medium periods.
underscoring supplied) Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court,
reading: x x x x,
A negative pregnant too is respondent's denial of
having "personal knowledge" of Irene's daughter SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by an element of the crime of concubinage when a
Samantha Louise Irene Moje's Certificate of Live Birth. Supreme Court, grounds therefor. ─ A member of the married man has sexual intercourse with a woman
In said certificate, Irene named respondent – a bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as elsewhere.
"lawyer," 38 years old – as the child's father. And the attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit,
phrase "NOT MARRIED" is entered on the desired malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, "Whether a lawyer's sexual congress with a woman not
information on "DATE AND PLACE OF MARRIAGE." A grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction his wife or without the benefit of marriage should be
comparison of the signature attributed to Irene in the of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any characterized as 'grossly immoral conduct' depends on
certificate28 with her signature on the Marriage violation of the oath which he is required to take the surrounding circumstances."35 The case at bar
Certificate29 shows that they were affixed by one and before admission to practice, or for a willful involves a relationship between a married lawyer and a
 13

married woman who is not his wife. It is immaterial Respondent in fact also violated the lawyer's oath he petition for nullity of his (complainant's) marriage to
whether the affair was carried out discreetly. Apropos took before admission to practice law which goes: Irene had been granted by Branch 106 of the Quezon
is the following pronouncement of this Court in Vitug City Regional Trial Court, and that the criminal
v. Rongcal:36 I _________, having been permitted to continue in the complaint for adultery complainant filed against
practice of law in the Philippines, do solemnly swear respondent and Irene "based on the same set of facts
On the charge of immorality, respondent does not deny that I recognize the supreme authority of the Republic alleged in the instant case," which was pending review
that he had an extra-marital affair with complainant, of the Philippines; I will support its Constitution and before the Department of Justice (DOJ), on petition of
albeit brief and discreet, and which act is not "so obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly complainant, had been, on motion of complainant,
corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so constituted authorities therein; I will do no falsehood, withdrawn.
unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree" nor consent to the doing of any in court; I will not
in order to merit disciplinary sanction. We disagree. wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, The Secretary of Justice's Resolution of January 16,
false or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent to the 2004 granting complainant's Motion to Withdraw
xxxx same; I will delay no man for money or malice, and will Petition for Review reads:
conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of my
While it has been held in disbarment cases that the knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well Considering that the instant motion was filed before
mere fact of sexual relations between two unmarried as to the courts as to my clients; and I impose upon the final resolution of the petition for review, we are
adults is not sufficient to warrant administrative myself this voluntary obligation without any mental inclined to grant the same pursuant to Section 10 of
sanction for such illicit behavior, it is not so with reservation or purpose of evasion. So help me God. Department Circular No. 70 dated July 3, 2000, which
respect to betrayals of the marital vow of fidelity. Even (Underscoring supplied) provides that "notwithstanding the perfection of the
if not all forms of extra-marital relations are appeal, the petitioner may withdraw the same at any
punishable under penal law, sexual relations outside Respondent admittedly is aware of Section 2 of Article time before it is finally resolved, in which case the
marriage is considered disgraceful and immoral as it XV (The Family) of the Constitution reading: appealed resolution shall stand as though no appeal
manifests deliberate disregard of the sanctity of has been taken."42 (Emphasis supplied by
marriage and the marital vows protected by the Section 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, complainant)
Constitution and affirmed by our laws.37 (Emphasis is the foundation of the family and shall be protected
and underscoring supplied) by the State. That the marriage between complainant and Irene was
subsequently declared void ab initio is immaterial. The
And so is the pronouncement in Tucay v. Atty. In this connection, the Family Code (Executive Order acts complained of took place before the marriage was
Tucay:38 No. 209), which echoes this constitutional provision, declared null and void.43 As a lawyer, respondent
obligates the husband and the wife "to live together, should be aware that a man and a woman deporting
The Court need not delve into the question of whether observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render themselves as husband and wife are presumed, unless
or not the respondent did contract a bigamous mutual help and support."40 proven otherwise, to have entered into a lawful
marriage . . . It is enough that the records of this contract of marriage.44 In carrying on an extra-marital
administrative case substantiate the findings of the Furthermore, respondent violated Rule 1.01 of Canon affair with Irene prior to the judicial declaration that
Investigating Commissioner, as well as the IBP Board 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which her marriage with complainant was null and void, and
of Governors, i.e., that indeed respondent has been proscribes a lawyer from engaging in "unlawful, despite respondent himself being married, he showed
carrying on an illicit affair with a married woman, a dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct," and Rule disrespect for an institution held sacred by the law.
grossly immoral conduct and indicative of an 7.03 of Canon 7 of the same Code which proscribes a And he betrayed his unfitness to be a lawyer.
extremely low regard for the fundamental ethics of his lawyer from engaging in any "conduct that adversely
profession. This detestable behavior renders him reflects on his fitness to practice law." As for complainant's withdrawal of his petition for
regrettably unfit and undeserving of the treasured review before the DOJ, respondent glaringly omitted to
honor and privileges which his license confers upon Clutching at straws, respondent, during the pendency state that before complainant filed his December 23,
him.39 (Underscoring supplied) of the investigation of the case before the IBP 2003 Motion to Withdraw his Petition for Review, the
Commissioner, filed a Manifestation41 on March 22, DOJ had already promulgated a Resolution on
2005 informing the IBP-CBD that complainant's September 22, 2003 reversing the dismissal by the

Quezon City Prosecutor's Office of complainant's
complaint for adultery. In reversing the City
Prosecutor's Resolution, DOJ Secretary Simeon
Datumanong held:
Parenthetically the totality of evidence adduced by
complainant would, in the fair estimation of the
Department, sufficiently establish all the elements of
the offense of adultery on the part of both respondents.
Indeed, early on, respondent Moje conceded to
complainant that she was going out on dates with
respondent Eala, and this she did when complainant
confronted her about Eala's frequent phone calls and
text messages to her. Complainant also personally
witnessed Moje and Eala having a rendezvous on two
occasions. Respondent Eala never denied the fact that
he knew Moje to be married to complainant[.] In fact,
he (Eala) himself was married to another woman.
Moreover, Moje's eventual abandonment of their
conjugal home, after complainant had once more
confronted her about Eala, only served to confirm the
illicit relationship involving both respondents. This
becomes all the more apparent by Moje's subsequent
relocation in No. 71-B, 11th Street, New Manila,
Quezon City, which was a few blocks away from the
church where she had exchange marital vows with
complainant.
It was in this place that the two lovers apparently
cohabited. Especially since Eala's vehicle and that of
Moje's were always seen there. Moje herself admits
that she came to live in the said address whereas Eala
asserts that that was where he held office. The
happenstance that it was in that said address that Eala
and Moje had decided to hold office for the firm that
both had formed smacks too much of a coincidence.
For one, the said address appears to be a residential
house, for that was where Moje stayed all throughout
after her separation from complainant. It was both
respondent's love nest, to put short; their illicit affair
that was carried out there bore fruit a few months
later when Moje gave birth to a girl at the nearby
hospital of St. Luke's Medical Center. What finally
militates against the respondents is the indubitable
fact that in the certificate of birth of the girl, Moje
14
furnished the information that Eala was the father. his oath of office, and violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01
This speaks all too eloquently of the unlawful and and Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional
damning nature of the adulterous acts of the Responsibility.
respondents. Complainant's supposed illegal
procurement of the birth certificate is most certainly Let a copy of this Decision, which is immediately
beside the point for both respondents Eala and Moje executory, be made part of the records of respondent
have not denied, in any categorical manner, that Eala in the Office of the Bar Confidant, Supreme Court of
is the father of the child Samantha Irene Louise the Philippines. And let copies of the Decision be
Moje.45 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and
circulated to all courts.
It bears emphasis that adultery is a private offense
which cannot be prosecuted de oficio and thus leaves This Decision takes effect immediately.
the DOJ no choice but to grant complainant's motion to
withdraw his petition for review. But even if SO ORDERED.
respondent and Irene were to be acquitted of adultery
after trial, if the Information for adultery were filed in Adm. Case No. 6490 September 29, 2004
court, the same would not have been a bar to the (CBD 03-1054)
present administrative complaint.
LILIA TABANG and CONCEPCION TABANG,
Citing the ruling in Pangan v. Ramos,46 viz: complainants,
vs.
x x x The acquittal of respondent Ramos [of] the ATTY. GLENN C. GACOTT, respondent.
criminal charge is not a bar to these [administrative]
proceedings. The standards of legal profession are not R E S O L U T I O N
satisfied by conduct which merely enables one to
escape the penalties of x x x criminal law. Moreover, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
this Court, in disbarment proceedings is acting in an
entirely different capacity from that which courts On February 3, 2003, complainants Lilia Tabang and
assume in trying criminal case47 (Italics in the her mother, Concepcion Tabang, filed before the
original), Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) a verified
complaint for disbarment or suspension against
this Court in Gatchalian Promotions Talents Pools, Inc. respondent Atty. Glenn C. Gacott for gross misconduct,
v. Atty. Naldoza,48 held: deceit and gross dishonesty.
Administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class Complainants allege as follows:
of their own. They are distinct from and they may
proceed independently of civil and criminal cases. Sometime between the years 1984 and 1985, Lilia
sought the legal advice of then incumbent Judge
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Resolution Eustaquio Gacott, father of herein respondent,
No. XVII-2006-06 passed on January 28, 2006 by the regarding her desire to buy a 30-hectare agricultural
Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the land in Barangay Bacungan, Puerto Princesa, Palawan,
Philippines is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. which consists of several parcels of land belonging to
different owners. Judge Gacott informed Lilia that
Respondent, Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala, is under the agrarian reform program of the government,
DISBARRED for grossly immoral conduct, violation of she is prohibited from acquiring vast tracks of
 15

agricultural land, as she already owns other parcels of informed the trial court of this fact prompting the in the said sale is that he was authorized by the
land. Judge Gacott then advised her to put the title of latter to summon the alleged principals. To avoid registered owners to collect from the buyers the full
the lands in the names of fictitious persons and to keep embarrassment and possible sanctions from the court payment of the lands sold. He further denies that
the titles with her for easy disposition. Following the because the alleged principals are in fact fictitious, complainant Lilia Tabang is the real owner and that
advice of Judge Gacott, Lilia bought the parcels of land Lilia withdrew the case without prejudice to the re- she merely acted as a broker who was trying to
using fictitious names. Eventually, Lilia was able to filing of the same. Subsequently, Lilia filed a new set of promote the sale of the properties; that when she
secure individual titles over these parcels of land in cases for re-issuance of title, changing the signatures came to know that the properties were sold by their
the names of 7 fictitious persons to wit: of the fictitious owners. Upon knowledge that a new registered owners, she called up the law office of
set of cases was filed, respondent executed or caused respondent and demanded that she be given her share
TCT No. 12790 – Agnes Camilla to be executed several documents, among which were or "balato" in the sale of the properties equivalent to
Revocation of Special Power of Attorney and Affidavits 20% of the gross sales because of her alleged efforts
TCT No. 12794 – Andes Estoy of Recovery purportedly signed by the principals of exerted in promoting the sale of the subject parcels of
Lilia Tabang. Respondent caused the annotation of land; that when respondent turned her down, Lilia
TCT No. 12791 – Leonor Petronio these documents in the land titles covering the subject threatened to put him in bad light and seek his
properties. Thereafter, respondent caused the disbarment. Respondent further denies complainants’
TCT No. 12792 – Wilfredo Gomez publication of a notice representing himself as the allegation that he sold real properties of some of his
owner of the subject parcels of land and indicating clients to third persons claiming that in all these cases
TCT No. 12793 – Elizabeth Dungan therein his desire to sell the said properties. his role was merely to notarize the documents of sale
Eventually, respondent was able to sell the seven executed voluntarily by his clients and the buyers of
TCT No. 12476 – Wilfredo Ondoy parcels of land to seven individuals. However, only their properties.2
three of these buyers were legitimate, while the
TCT No. 12475 – Amelia Andes remaining four are dummies of respondent. As a result The case, docketed as CBD Case No. 03-1054, was
of selling the three parcels of land, respondent was assigned by the IBP to Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro
Respondent knows this fact. Later on, Lilia and able to receive ₱3,773,675.00. None of the proceeds of for report and recommendation. Commissioner
Concepcion decided to sell the subject parcels of land the sale was remitted to complainants. Navarro conducted a mandatory conference on
because they needed money for their medication and November 25, 2003 after which she required the
other necessary expenses. On the pretext that he is Complainants contend that in executing the various parties to submit their respective position papers,
going to help them sell the subject property to Revocation of Special Power of Attorney and Affidavit together with all the necessary documents and duly
prospective buyers, respondent borrowed the seven of Recovery, affixing thereon the signatures of the verified affidavits of their witnesses, if any. In a report
land titles from complainants. However, despite the fictitious registered owners of the disputed parcels of dated March 4, 2004, Commissioner Navarro found
lapse of one year from the time he borrowed the titles, land, and in arrogating the ownership over the said respondent guilty of gross misconduct for violating
respondent still failed to negotiate the sale of the lands upon himself, respondent committed gross Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
property. He informed herein complainants that he lost misconduct, dishonesty and deceit. Complainants Responsibility.3 Accordingly she recommended that
all the seven land titles. Respondent then advised likewise allege that this is not the only case wherein respondent be suspended from the practice of law for
complainants to file a petition in court for re-issuance respondent sold properties of his clients to third six months.4
of title. Following respondent’s advice, Lilia Tabang, in persons without his clients’ knowledge and consent.1
the guise of acting as the "authorized agent- On April 16, 2004, the Board of Governors of the IBP
representative" of the fictitious owners, filed a case for Respondent filed his Answer to the Complaint denying passed a resolution adopting the report of
the re-issuance of title to the seven parcels of land. the material allegations of the complainants. He claims Commissioner Navarro. However, the Board modified
However, in the course of the proceedings, the public that the seven land titles covering the subject the recommended penalty and imposed the supreme
prosecutor noticed that the signatures of the alleged properties are valid and duly executed; and denies punishment of disbarment.5
owners in the seven individual Special Power of complainants’ allegations that the alleged owners are
Attorney executed in favor of Lilia Tabang appear to fictitious. Respondent further claims that the We do not agree with the IBP Resolution. The case
have been signed by the same person because of the registered owners voluntarily sold the seven parcels of should be remanded for further proceedings.
similarities in their strokes. The public prosecutor land to different individuals and his only participation

A lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for any
violation of his oath, a patent disregard of his duties,
or an odious deportment unbecoming an attorney.
Among the grounds enumerated in Section 27, Rule
138 of the Rules of Court are deceit, malpractice,
gross misconduct in office, grossly immoral conduct,
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, any
violation of the oath which he is required to take
before admission to the practice of law, willful
disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court,
corrupt or willful appearance as an attorney for a party
to a case without authority to do so. The grounds are
not preclusive in nature even as they are broad enough
as to cover practically any kind of impropriety that a
lawyer does or commits in his professional career or in
his private life. A lawyer must at no time be wanting in
probity and moral fiber which are not only conditions
precedent to his entrance to the Bar but are likewise
essential demands for his continued membership
therein.6
Nonetheless, the power to disbar must be exercised
with great caution.
For the court to exercise its disciplinary powers, the
case against the respondent must be established by
clear, convincing and satisfactory proof. Indeed,
considering the serious consequences of the
disbarment or suspension of a member of the Bar, the
Supreme Court has consistently held that clearly
preponderant evidence is necessary to justify the
imposition of the administrative penalty.7
Moreover, in complaints for disbarment, a formal
investigation is a mandatory requirement which may
not be dispensed with except for valid and compelling
reasons.8 Rule 139-B provides for the procedure of
investigation in disbarment and disciplinary
proceedings against attorneys before the IBP, thus:
Sec. 8. Investigation. – Upon joinder of issues or upon
failure of the respondent to answer, the Investigator
shall, with deliberate speed, proceed with the
investigation of the case. He shall have the power to
issue subpoenas and administer oaths. The respondent
16
shall be given full opportunity to defend himself, to verified affidavits of witnesses, if any. On the sole basis
present witnesses on his behalf, and be heard by of the pleadings filed by both parties and of the
himself and counsel. However, if upon reasonable documents attached thereto, the Investigating
notice, the respondent fails to appear, the Commissioner submitted her Report and
investigation shall proceed ex parte. Recommendation to the IBP Board of Governors.
The Investigator shall terminate the investigation Considering the gravity of the charges imputed against
within three (3) months from the date of its the respondent and the imposition of the penalty of
commencement, unless extended for good cause by the disbarment being prayed for by complainants, the
Board of Governors upon prior application. Investigating Commissioner should not have simply
relied on the parties’ position papers and the pieces of
Willful failure or refusal to obey a subpoena or any documentary evidence submitted by them. She should
other lawful order issued by the Investigator shall be have proceeded with the investigation by conducting
dealt with as for indirect contempt of court. The formal hearings and calling upon the parties to present
corresponding charge shall be filed by the Investigator additional evidence to support their respective
before the IBP Board of Governors which shall require contentions. In the case of the complainants, the
the alleged contemnor to show cause within ten (10) Investigating Commissioner should have required the
days from notice. The IBP Board of Governors may presentation of the persons who allegedly executed the
thereafter conduct hearings, if necessary, in affidavits presented in evidence to prove the veracity
accordance with the procedure set forth in this Rule of the allegations contained in said affidavits, at the
for hearings before the Investigator. Such hearing same time affording respondent the opportunity to
shall as far as practicable be terminated within fifteencross- examine the supposed affiants. The failure of the
(15) days from its commencement. Thereafter, the IBP complainants to move for the presentation of the
Board of Governors shall within a like period of fifteenpersons alleged to have executed the subject affidavits
(15) days issue a resolution setting forth its findings does not render the IBP powerless to conduct further
and recommendations, which shall forthwith be investigation, considering its power to issue subpoena
transmitted to the Supreme Court for final action and under the Rule.
if warranted, the imposition of penalty. (Emphasis
ours) In the same manner, the Investigating Commissioner
should have compelled the persons named by the
In the present case, the Investigating Commissioner respondent as the original owners as well as the
initiated the formal investigation by conducting a buyers of the subject properties to appear before her.
mandatory conference between the complainants and The appearance of these witnesses could have easily
the respondent after both parties have filed their been facilitated considering that the residence and
complaint and answer, respectively. The mandatory office addresses of the three of the supposed buyers
conference was supposedly held for the purpose of are all located in Makati while the residence of three
defining the issues and enabling the parties to of the original owners are located within Manila and
stipulate facts. However, no definitive result was the remaining four are residing in the province of
reached during the conference as respondent Cavite which is very near Metro Manila. To repeat,
continued to deny all the allegations of the under the above-quoted Rule, the Investigating
complainants. After the mandatory conference was Commissioner is authorized to issue subpoena to
held, no further hearings were conducted. Instead, the compel the appearance of persons and witnesses
Investigating Commissioner merely required the before it.
parties to submit their respective position papers,
including all the necessary documents and duly

It bears to point out that majority of the pieces of
evidence presented by complainants and respondent
consists of affidavits and photocopies of documents.
Not one of the persons who executed these affidavits
and instruments was presented or subpoenaed by the
Commissioner to identify their affidavits and give the
adverse party opportunity to confront the witnesses in
a formal hearing.
Consequently, no judgment could be rendered fairly
and squarely on the issues raised in the subject
administrative matter.
WHEREFORE, the instant administrative case is
hereby REMANDED to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. 1048 July 14, 1995
WELLINGTON REYES, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. SALVADOR M. GAA, respondent.
PER CURIAM:
This administrative complaint for disbarment charges
respondent, a former Assistant City Fiscal of manila,
with malpractice and willful violation of his oath as an
attorney.
I the charges filed by respondent against him.
On March 30, 1971, at around 9:00 A.M. complainant
reported to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)
that he had been the victim of extortion by respondent,
an Assistant City Fiscal of Manila, who was
investigating a complaint for estafa filed by
complainant's business rival. According to
complainant, he had given respondent P500.00 on
March 1, 1971 and a total of P500.00 on three other
occasions. He said that another "payoff" was scheduled
17
at 11:00 A.M. that day in respondent's office at the On April 21, 1971, President Marcos suspended
City Hall. respondent from office pending investigation and
disposition of his administrative case (Case No. 74).
An entrapment was set up by the NBI.
Aside from the criminal complaint and Administrative
Complainant furnished the NBI agents several peso Case No. 74, two other cases were earlier filed against
bills totalling P150.00 for marking. The paper bills respondent: namely, Administrative Case No. 10 for
were sent to the Forensic and Chemistry Division of Grave Misconduct filed by one Angel Alora on October
the NBI and subsequently returned to complainant for 13, 1969, wherein respondent was found guilty as
the use in the entrapment. charged and was recommended for suspension; and
Administrative Case No. 10-A. for partiality filed by
When complainant went to respondent's office, he was Fabiola Fajardo on April 26, 1970, which was pending
told that the latter would not return until around 2:30 resolution.
P.M. So complainant and the NBI agents went back at
around 2:30 P.M. As there were other persons doing In his answer to the complaint for disbarment,
business with respondent, complainant had to wait for respondent asserted that complainant surreptitiously
thirty minutes. When finally complainant was able to planted the marked money in his pocket without his
see respondent, the latter greeted him in Tagalog "Ano knowledge and consent.
ba ang sa iyo?" Complainant answered "Hindi tayo
nagkita kaninang umaga." To which respondent He further said that the criminal case (IS No. 71-6558)
replied "Oo, kanina pa kita hinihintay." Complainant filed against him by the NBI at the instance of
then handed to respondent the marked money which complainant was still pending preliminary
he placed inside his right pocket. The NBI agents then investigation by the City Fiscal of Manila. In
apprehended respondent and brought him to the NBI connection with the incident of March 30, 1971, he
Forensic and Chemistry Division for examination. said that he had filed a criminal complaint for
Respondent's hands were found positive of the yellow incriminatory machination, perjury and attempted
florescent powder applied earlier to the marked corruption of a public official against complainant with
money. Respondent was thereafter taken to the Office the City Fiscal of Manila.
of the Anti-Organized Crime Division of the NBI where
he was photographed, fingerprinted and record In reply to the answer, complainant denied that the
checked. Respondent declined to give a sworn several cases against respondent were motivated by
statement to explain his side of the case, invoking his revenge, malice or personal ill will. He said that the
right against self-incrimination. investigating fiscal had recommended the dismissal of
On the same date, the NBI recommended the
prosecution of respondent for violation of Section 3(b) In a resolution dated December 23, 1971, this Court
of R.A. No. 3019. resolved to refer the disbarment case to the Solicitor
General for investigation, report and recommendation.
On April 13, 1971, the NBI recommended to the However, upon the adoption of Rule 139-B of the
Secretary of Justice the filing of administrative charges Revised Rules of Court., the case was transferred to
and the institution of disbarment proceedings against the IBP Board of Governors for investigation and
him. disposition.
On March 15, 1993, Commissioner Vicente Q. Roxas of
the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated
 18

Bar of the Philippines (IBP) recommended that The lawyer's oath is a source of his obligations and its
In our resolution dated May 5, 1980, issued
respondent be disbarred. Said recommendation was violation is a ground for his suspension, disbarment or
consequent to the Report and Recommendation of the
approved by the IBP Board of Governors in its other disciplinary action (Agpalo, Legal Ethics 66-67 Office of the Solicitor General submitted to this Court
resolution dated March 26, 1994. [1983]). on April 21, 1980, we ordered the suspension of
respondent Navarro from the practice of law during
II WHEREFORE, respondent is DISBARRED and his the pendency of these cases. 3
name is ordered STRICKEN OFF from the Roll of
We agree with the recommendation of the IBP Board Attorneys. Let a copy of this resolution be furnished The investigative phase was conducted by said office
of Governors. the Bar Confidant and the Integrated Bar of the pursuant to our resolutions of February 14, 1975 and
Philippines and spread on the personal records of September 13, 1976 in G.R. Nos.
In the case at bench, respondent was caught in respondent. L- 39386 and L-39620-29, entitled "Florentina Nuguid
flagrante delicto in the act of receiving the marked Vda. de Haberer vs. Court of Appeals, et al." With
money from complainant during the entrapment SO ORDERED. commendable thoroughness and attention to detail,
conducted by the NBI agents, which resulted in his two reports were submitted which, in order to vividly
arrest and the subsequent filing of administrative and A.C. No. 2033 May 9, 1990 portray the scope and magnitude of respondent's
criminal cases against him. In his defense, respondent operations and how he was able to perpetrate the
merely denied the charge of extortion and retorted E. CONRAD and VIRGINIA BEWLEY GEESLIN, anomalous transactions complained of, we quote
that the marked money was planted by complainant. complainants, extensively from said reports which are sustained by
vs. the evidence of record.
It is settled that affirmative testimony is given greater ATTY. FELIPE C. NAVARRO, respondent.
weight than negative testimony (Delos Reyes v. Aznar, I. The antecedent facts on which Administrative Case
179 SCRA 653 [1989]). When the integrity of a A.C. No. 2148 May 9, 1990 No. 2148 is premised are reported by then Solicitor
member of the bar is challenged, it is not enough that General Estelito P. Mendoza, as follows:
he denies the charges against him; he must meet the ATTY. FRANCISCO ORTIGAS, JR. and ATTY. EULOGIO
issue and overcome the evidence against him R. RODRIGUEZ, complainants, PREPATORY STATEMENT
(Malcolm, Legal and Judicial Ethics 93 [1949]). He vs.
must show proof that he still maintains that degree of ATTY. FELIPE C. NAVARRO, respondent. This unnumbered administrative case against
morality and integrity which at all times is expected of respondent Atty. Felipe C. Navarro (hereinafter called
him (Bayasen v. Court of Appeals, 103 SCRA 197 Quasha, Asperilla, Ancheta, Valmonte, Peña & Marcos respondent NAVARRO, for short) originally stemmed
[1981]; Vda. de Ramos v. Court of Appeals, 81 SCRA for complainants in AC No. 2033. from the letter of a certain Angelito B. Cayanan to the
393 [1978]). Honorable Supreme Court dated January 25, 1975
Felipe C. Navarro for and in his own behalf. which reads as follows:
Where the misconduct of a lawyer as a government
official is of such a character as to affect his xxx xxx xxx
qualification as a lawyer or to show moral delinquency, PER CURIAM:
then he may be disciplined as a member of the bar on I wish to respectfully inform your good office that I
such grounds (Gonzales-Austria v. Abaya, 176 SCRA We write this finale to the dispiriting charges filed by bought a few lots on installment basis from Atty. Felipe
634 [1989]). complainants Francisco Ortigas, Jr. and Eulogio R. C. Navarro of Ruby Hills Subdivision as evidenced by
Rodriguez in Administrative Case No. 2148 1 and by the attached OR Nos. 0512 and 0519 and a "Contract
The extortion committed by respondent constitutes spouses E. Conrad and Virginia Bewley Geeslin in of Sale".
misconduct as a public official, which also constitutes a Administrative Case No. 2033 2 seeking the
violation of his oath as a lawyer. The lawyer's oath disbarment of respondent Atty. Felipe C. Navarro for Atty. Navarro, some officials and representative of the
(Revised Rules of Court, Rule 138, Section 18; People malpractice and gross misconduct. said company claim that although there is a pending
v. De Luna, 102 Phil. 968 [1958]), imposes upon every case No. L-39386 under Decree No. 1425 on the
lawyer the duty to delay no man for money or malice. property being sold, the case is almost won in their
 19

favor and are just waiting for your final decision within City) for suspension or removal from the office of x x x xxx xxx
a couple of months or even less. attorney and for appropriate action.
Dear Justice Teehankee,
In this connection, I am respectfully writing you this Aside from Mr. Cayanan, the Solicitor General is
letter in order to bring to your attention this directed to communicate in the premises with Atty. This is to apprise your Office of the latest activities of
transaction and to protect my rights in the event that Eulogio R. Rodriguez of the law firm of Ortigas & Atty. Felipe C. Navarro who has previously been
any unfavorable circumstances may arise in the future. Ortigas (with address at 10th Floor, Ortigas Bldg. reported to the Supreme Court as selling properties
Ortigas Ave., Pasig, Rizal), who under letter of June 10, titled in the name of this Company.
xxx xxx xxx 1974 on file in Administrative Case No. 1154 has
offered to make available documents in their We have just secured a new "subdivision plan" of Atty.
Acting on the aforesaid letter, the Supreme Court, per possession showing other sales made by Atty. Navarro Navarro showing that the lots he is now selling to the
Resolution dated February 14, 1975, referred the copy of properties titled in the name of other persons, public include those titled in the names of the heirs of
of Mr. Cayanan's letter to the Solicitor General for involving a total selling price of P75 million and down the late Don Vicente Madrigal and this Company in
"investigation of the existence of sufficient ground to payments of almost P 0.6 million. Quezon City. Atty. Navarro has thus expanded his
proceed with the prosecution of Atty. Felipe C. activities despite recent detention by the Military. As
Navarro (whose address of record is No. 66 Azucena, On April 4, 1975, Assistant Solicitor General (now could be seen from the attached "plan", Navarro
Roxas District, Quezon City) for suspension or removal Justice of the Court of Appeals) Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr. claims to be the owner of that huge property (actually
from the office of attorney and for appropriate action." wrote Mr. Angelito B. Cayanan asking him to submit titled in the name of the Madrigals and this Company)
The resolution reads as follows: his affidavit embodying the circumstances surrounding bounded by Ortigas Avenue, E. delos Santos Avenue,
the matters contained in his letter dated January 25, White Plains Road and R. Rodriguez Avenue,
L-39386 and L-39620-29 (Florentina Nuguid Vda. de 1975, especially the second paragraph thereof. The comprising approximately of 260 hectares.
Haberer vs. Court of Appeals, et al.) The court NOTED letter was sent to Mr. Cayanan by registered mail but
the letter dated January 25, 1975 of Mr. Angelito B. the same was returned unserved for the reason that As reported in our previous letters to the Court,
Cayanan with its attachments (copy thereof has been the addressee had moved to another address. Navarro claims to be the owner of some 4,000
furnished Atty. Felipe C. Navarro, counsel for hectares of land in the Greater Manila Area in virtue of
respondents) and RESOLVED to instruct the Clerk of On the same date, April 4, 1975, Assistant Solicitor his handling the case of some squatters on a 1.2-
Court to inform him of the status of the cases at bar. General Gutierrez, Jr. also wrote to Atty. Eulogio R. hectare lot in Mandaluyong, Rizal owned by Dona
Rodriguez requesting him for copies of the documents Florentina Nuguid Vda. de Haberer. He contends that
It appearing from said letter that Atty. Felipe C. evidencing the sales made by respondent Navarro. whereas his squatters-clients occupy only about a
Navarro has been selling the lots in litigation herein on hectare, he has become, in virtue of his contract of
installment basis to the public (among them, Mr. On February 13, 1976, this Honorable Court issued a legal services' with them, the owner of thousands of
Cayanan) as "absolute owner by virtue of this contract Resolution in L-39386 and L-39620-29 (Florentina hectares of land as these are allegedly0 covered by
of legal services in Civil Case No. 8321, etc. of the Nuguid Vda. de Haberer vs. Court of Appeals, et al.) void titles. Navarro thus started to openly sell these
Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasig" (see Ruby Hills referring the letter of Atty. Francisco Ortigas, Jr. dated properties.
Subdivision Contract of Sale), which lots are titled in January 13, 1976 "for investigation of the existence of
the name of herein petitioner and not in Atty. sufficient grounds for the prosecution of Atty. Felipe C. Navarro's Ruby Hills and Bluehills Subdivisions, for
Navarro's name and that the unwarranted claim is Navarro for suspension or removal from office and for instance, cover properties already with buildings and
made on his behalf that 'the case is almost won in their appropriate action" and directing "Mr. Ortigas, Jr., to other improvements. He has nevertheless been quite
favor' (see Mr. Cayanan's letter), the Court RESOLVED furnish the Office of the Solicitor General for the successful in selling portions thereof, as when he sold
FURTHER to refer copy of Mr. Cayanan's said letter purpose with a copy of said letter and all its pertinent lots within the De La Salle College, Wack-Wack Golf &
with its attachments to the Solicitor General under attachments." Country Club, ABM Sison Hospital, etc. His modus
Rule 139, Sections 1, 3, 4 and 5 for investigation of the operandi is described in this Company's letter
existence of sufficient ground to proceed with the The aforementioned letter of Atty. Francisco Ortigas, complaint dated April 8, 1974 to Gen. Prospero Olivas,
prosecution of Atty. Felipe C. Navarro (whose address Jr. dated January 13, 1976 reads as follows: copy of which is attached hereto for ready reference.
of record is No. 66 Azucena, Roxas District, Quezon
 20

Navarro continues to defy the authorities, for only the HABERER'S title and ordering the eviction of the Further, defendants recognized plaintiffs ownership
after a brief lull he is now again openly selling titled defendants-squatters clients of respondent NAVARRO over the property in question when they filed a petition
properties of other persons. We have provided more (Exhibit W). In finding for the plaintiff, Judge Salas with the People's Homesite & Housing Corporation
than sufficient documentary evidence to the Court and stated as follows: wherein they sought the latter's intervention for the
the Solicitor General and we hope that formal acquisition of the property and for the subdividing
administrative charges can now be filed against After due consideration of the evidence adduced by thereof into small lots to be sold to them at nominal
Navarro to prevent him from further perpetrating a both parties, this Court finds that most of the cost. In said petition defendants not only named the
large scale fraud upon the public. documentary evidence submitted by defendants are plaintiff as the owner of the property in question but
irrelevant to the case since they pertain to defendants they also indicated therein her title to the land as
xxx xxx xxx claim of ownership over 10,000 hectares of land when Transfer Certificate of Title No. 15043 of the Register
the area of the property subject matter of the of Deeds of Pasig, Rizal. We quote hereunder the
Thereafter, hearings were conducted on various dates. complaint is only 12,700 square meters. This Court pertinent facts and data concerning the property in
also believes that the above-mentioned claims of question in defendants' petition submitted to the
COMPLAINANTS' EVIDENCE defendants are untenable. General Manager of the People's Homesite & Housing
Corporation, as follows:
The evidence for the complainants consist mainly of Plaintiffs ownership over the property in question is
documents, most of which were presented in Criminal evidenced by the issuance in her name, since 1929, of xxx xxx xxx
Cases Nos. 3158 and 3159 of the Court of First Transfer Certificate of Title No. 15043. It is a settled
Instance of Rizal and in the various civil cases before rule in this jurisdiction that a certificate of title serves 1) Location of land: Barrio Burol, Mandaluyong, Rizal
the said court involving Florentina Nuguid Vda. de as evidence of an indefeasible title to the property in
Haberer. Complainants' sole witness, Reynaldo favor of the person whose name appears therein. After 2) Name of registered owner: Florentina Nuguid Vda.
Morallos, merely identified the various documentary the expiration of the one-year period from the issuance de Haberer
exhibits presented by the complainants. of the decree of registration upon which it is based, it
becomes incontrovertible (see case of Pamintuan vs. 3) Address of owner: 1288 Burgos St., Paco, Manila, or
From the evidence adduced by the complainants, it San Agustin, 43 Phil. 558; Reyes & Nadres vs. Borbon c/o Bausa, Ampil, & Suarez Law Offices, Madrigal
appears that a certain Florentina Nuguid Vda. de & Director of Lands, 50 Phil. 791; Manuel Sy Juco, et Bldg., Manila
Haberer (hereinafter called HABERER, for short) filed al. vs. Luis Francisco, 53 O.G., p. 2186, April 15,1957;
in the Court of First Instance of Rizal twenty-two (22) Brizuela et al. vs. Ciriaco Vda. de Vargas, 53 O.G., p. 4) Certificate of Title No. (attach photostatic copy):
cases for recovery of possession of her 1.2 hectare 2822, May 15, 1957). 15043
property in Mandaluyong, Rizal titled in her name, and
to eject the twenty-two (22) families squatting thereat.
Defendants' claim that they became owners of the land 5) Area of land, Lot & Block & Survey Nos. 12,700
Eleven (11) of these cases were raffled to Judge Emilioin question by adverse possession is without merit square meters(Exh G).
Salas, while the other eleven (11) cases were assigned considering that title to land becomes non-
to Judge Pedro Navarro. All the twenty-two (22) prescriptible Sec. 42 of Act No. 496 provides that no As regards defendants' claim that Transfer Certificate
defendants-squatters were represented by respondent title to registered land in derogation to that of the of Title No. 15043 issued since 1929 in the name of
NAVARRO. On behalf of his clients, respondent registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or plaintiff is null and void, this Court is of the opinion
NAVARRO interposed as principal defense, the alleged adverse possession (Corporation de Pp. Agustines vs. that defendants cannot assail the validity of said title
nullity of the HABERER'S title, claiming that the Crisostomo, 42 Phil. 427). A title once registered in this proceeding, which is for recovery of possession.
mother title from which it emanated actually cannot be defeated even by adverse, open and Any attack on the decree of registration of title must
originated from Decree No. 1425 issued in G.L.R.O. notorious possession. Registered title under the be direct and not by collateral proceeding. The title
Record No. 917, which he claims to be non-existent. Torrens System cannot be defeated by prescription. which may be issued in pursuance of said decree
The title, once registered, is notice to the World. All cannot be changed, altered, modified, enlarged or
The two sets of cases were decided differently. In the persons must take notice. No one can plead ignorance diminished in a collateral proceeding (Legarda, et al.
first set of eleven (11) cases, Judge Salas rendered a of registration (Legarda vs. Saleeby, 3 Phil. 590, 595). vs. Saleeby, 31 Phil. 590). In the case of Director of
decision on August 31, 1970 sustaining the validity of Land vs. Gan Tan, G.R. No. L-2664, May 30, 1951, our

Supreme Court, in reversing the decision of the trial
court where the registered owner was considered
disqualified to acquire land under the Constitution and
consequently was denied the right to constitute his
title, said: "That the disqualification raised by the
Court is untenable in the light of the theory that a
Torrens title cannot be collateraly attacked. That issue
can only be raised in an action instituted expressly for
that purpose". (See also Ramon Chua Yu Sun vs. The
Hon. Ceferino de los Santos, et al., G.R. No. 4347,
November 23,1951; James (sic) G.R. No. L-4013, Dec.
29,1951; Samonte, et al. vs. Descallar et al., No. L-
12964, Feb. 29,1960).
In view of the above-mentioned ruling of the Supreme
Court, it is our opinion that there is no need to discuss
the merits of the reasons claimed by defendants why
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 15043 in the name of
plaintiff is null and void. (Exh. W) Decision in Civil
Cases Nos. 8322, 8323, 8327, 8370, 8375, 8374, 8382,
8691, 8693, 8696 & 8699, at pages 6-7; 9-10).
In the second set of eleven (11) cases, Judge Pedro
Navarro decided in favor of the defendants-squatters
clients of respondent NAVARRO. In his decision dated
May 26, 1971, dismissing the complaints, Judge
Navarro stated as follows:
Plaintiff claims to be the registered owner of a parcel
of land containing an area of 12,000 square meters
situated at the corner of A. Luna, Harapin Ang Bukas
and J.C. Zuluete Streets, Mandaluyong, Rizal, which is
covered by, and more particularly described in,
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 15043 of the Register The Court has read copy of this decision of our Branch
of Deeds of Rizal and indicated in the sketch plan XV and observed findings of facts too ponderous to be
attached to the complaint as Annex A. ignored.
xxx xxx xxx
It likewise appears that ejectment proceedings have
been filed in the Municipal Court of Pasig, Rizal, and in
the City Court of Quezon City against several persons
occupying other parcels by Ortigas and Company,
Limited Partnership, where decisions have been
rendered in favor of said Partnership. In order to
forestall executions of these decisions defendants in
said ejectment cases filed class suit before this Court
by the occupants of the land which was heard and
tried before Branch XV in which the Director of Lands
was impleaded as a party-defendant. The decision of
Branch XV in said class suit is made part of the
evidence of these defendants in the herein eleven
cases for whatever the same may be worth as aid in
the determination of the merits of the issues raised
herein.
As may be gleaned from said decision of Branch XV
plaintiff therein assailed the validity of Decree No.
1425 as null and void and or fictitious and the
proceedings in GLRO Rec. No. 917 upon which the
decree was based as also null and void. The Court
sustained the herein plaintiffs claim and rendered
judgment declaring (1) the proceedings in GLRO Rec.
No. 917 null and void; (2) the Decree No. 1425 null
and void; (3) all original certificates of title issued by
virtue of and pursuant to the judgment in GLRO Rec.
No. 917 and Decree No. 1425 utter nullities; (4) all
transfer certificates of title derived from the original
certificates of title declared void under No. 3 above,
particularly but not exclusively, Transfer Certificate of
Title Nos. 77652 and 77653 of the Register of Deeds of
Quezon City and 126575 and its derivative Transfer
Certificate of 'title No. 135879 of the Register of Deeds
of Rizal, null and void; (5) that the rightful owners of
the litigated lands covered by Transfer Certificates of
Title Nos. 77652, 77653, 126575 (or 135879) are the
herein plaintiffs . . . and so forth.
That case before Branch XV directly assails the nullity
of the proceedings leading to the proceedings in GLRO
Record No. 917 and, as an inevitable corollary, the
nullity of Decree No. 1425 issue by virtue of such void
proceedings as well as the original certificates of title
issued as consequence thereof.
21
In said proceeding before Branch XV the Court, among
other things, found that while the decision in GLRO
917 was supposedly rendered on April 25, 1905, the
survey of the property subject matter of therein
application was not made until June 16 to August 16,
1906, or some one year after the decision. It found no
proof of initial hearing of the application for
registration being published as required by law
without which the Land Registration Court could not
have acquired jurisdiction over the case. Said decision
also made inference that since the survey of the
property was not made until a year after the rendition
of the judgment the technical descriptions appearing
in the original certificates of title issued under GLRO
Rec. No. 917 Decree No. 1425, could not have been
those appearing in the notice of initial hearing, if any.
Publication of accurate technical description being an
essential jurisdictional requirement which cannot be
dispensed with and non-compliance with this
requirement renders the proceedings and the decision
and decree and titles issued arising therefrom null and
void.
The same decision of Branch XV also made its findings
that James Ross who was said to have penned the
decision in GLRO Rec. No. 917, never was a judge of
the Court of Land Registration at the time the decision
was supposedly rendered because the Gaceta Official
for the year 1905 does not show that James Ross was
listed as Judge of the Land Registration Court or that
he was ever appointed in that capacity. Furthermore,
the Court found that while J.C. Welson was the Clerk
of Court on April 26, 1905, one A.K. Jones issued the
decree and he signed it as Clerk of Court. The Court
even found the supposed decision in that proceedings
missing and made its conclusion that since the decree
which was supposedly issued by a person who was not
the Clerk of Court at the time and which decree did
not contain the description of the property ordered in
the decision to be rendered because the survey of the
property was only made some one year later and that
said decree cannot now even be found, the decision
rendered therein is void for lack of jurisdiction.
 22

Now, as we have said, the foregoing findings of facts Register of Deeds of Rizal to cancel Transfer also adversely affects the interests of other persons
are too ponderous to be ignored. It is indeed a truism Certificate of Title No. 15043 of the Register of Deeds and entities like the Ortigas & Company, Limited
that a void original certificate of title cannot be the of Rizal issued in favor of the plaintiff Florentina Partnership, which is not a party herein, because the
source of a valid transfer certificate of title and a void Nuguid Vda. de Haberer and in view thereof issue new certificate of title of the plaintiff is also a derivative of
judgment is, in the eyes of the law, inexistent and certificates of title in favor of the defendants subject to GLRO 917 and Decree No. 1425 from which Ortigas
cannot give source to any legal right. the lien for attorney's fees in favor of Attorney Felipe and Company, Limited Partnership, derives titles over
Navarro in accordance with the terms of the wide tracts of land. Since Ortigas & Company, Limited
The evidence now shows that the plaintiffs in said Civil "Kasunduan Hinggil sa Serbisyo ng Abogado" which is Partnership, is not a party in this case whatever orders
Case No. 7-M(10339) before Branch XV of this Court quoted in his ex-parte motion for clarification and/or or decisions are made in this case cannot be made to
are also the defendants in the herein eleven cases in modification of the decision. affect the said company. Decisions and orders can only
which their properties are also involved. Since the affect parties to the case.
case before Branch XV directly assails the nullity of the As so modified the decision stands in all other
proceedings by virtue of which Decree No. 1425 and respects. The Court therefore arrives at the conclusion that the
the alleged title of the plaintiff over the parcels of land order dated June 21, 1971, must be reconsidered on
occupied by the herein eleven defendants is a SO ORDERED. two grounds (1) because the decision of Branch XV is
derivative from such decree, it is the considered now being the subject of further proceedings and (2)
opinion of this Court that until and unless the decision (Exhibit S, pp. 4-5). because it has the effect of adversely affecting the
of Branch XV of this Court is reversed or set aside by interest of Ortigas & Company, Limited Partnership,
final judgment, plaintiffs prayer to order the herein On July 23, 1971, HABERER filed a motion for which is not even a party herein.
eleven defendants in these eleven cases to vacate the reconsideration of the aforesaid order, and on
parcels which they occupy and on which their September 15, 1972, Judge Navarro issued the WHEREFORE, as prayed, the order dated June 21,
respective houses are built has become premature. It following order: 1971, is set aside. However, the decision dated May
goes without saying that if said decision of Branch XV 26, 1971, insofar as it denies the ejectment of the
will be finally affirmed, or that the same becomes final In the order dated July 17, 1971, the Court had present occupants of the land as stated in the decision
and executory, all the claims of rights to ownership occasion to reiterate that its decision in this case was stands.
and possession of properties embraced in the decision mainly predicated on the decision of Branch XV of this
in GLRO Rec. No. 917 and Decree No. 1425 shall Court that the certificate of title emanating from the SO ORDERED.
become absolute nullities. Possessions by actual proceedings in GLRO Record No. 917 were null and
occupants of all these properties had better be void and plaintiffs title happened to be one of them. (Exhibit T, at pp. 2-3).
maintained until after final decision in Civil Case No. The Court opined that until said decision is reversed
7-M(10339) shall have been rendered. (Exh. R, the actual occupants had better be maintained in their HABERER appealed from the decision of Judge
Decision in Civil Cases Nos. 8320, 8321, 8326, 8369, possessions of the land. Navarro while the defendants-clients of respondent
8379, 8383, 8385, 8386, 8387 and 8700, at pp. 2, 5-9). NAVARRO appealed from the decision of Judge Salas.
Pursuant to the same order the motion for The Navarro order of June 21, 1971 was not appealed
On June 21, 1971, Judge Navarro, acting on the motion reconsideration and new trial was set only for by respondent NAVARRO's clients.
filed by respondent NAVARRO, issued an order reception of alleged newly discovered evidence.
cancelling HABERER's title over her property in After the rendition of the Navarro decision which made
question and directing the issuance of a new title in The Court now understands that the decision of reference to the decision rendered by Judge Vivencio
lieu thereof in favor of respondent's clients Thus — Branch XV is now under review by order of our Ruiz of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XV,
Appellate Court. respondent NAVARRO published in the Manila Times
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is on July 4, 1971 the following:
hereby rendered dismissing the complaints in the It has also come to the understanding of the Court that
above-entitled cases (Nos. 8320, 8321, 8326, 8329, the order of June 21, 1971, sought to be reconsidered LEGAL NOTICE TO ALL THOSE INVOLVED:
8376, 8379, 8383, 8386, 8685, 8687 and 8700) all with insofar as it ordered the cancellation of Transfer
costs against the plaintiff and hereby ordering the Certificate of Title No. 15043 in favor of the plaintiff,
 23

PURSUANT TO THE PROVISIONS OF LAW AS The Civil Code confirms certain time-honored RIZAL RETURNING TO THE SAME PLACE AT NOON
INTERPRETED BY OUR SUPREME COURT principles of the law of property. One of those is the FOR LUNCH CELEBRATING TILL MIDNIGHT.
RESPECTING A VAST TRACT OF LAND LATIFUNDIO principle of accession whereby the owner of property
COVERING MANDALUYONG, SAN JUAN, PASIG, acquires not only that which it produces but that which (Sgd.) FELIPE C. NAVARRO
MARIKINA, AND QUEZON CITY, THE DECISION it united to it either naturally or artificially. Whatever
DATED MAY 26, 1971 REITERATING AND is built, planted or sown on the land of another, and Counsel for the Defense
REPEATING THE DECLARATION AND ORDER THAT the improvements or repairs made thereon, belong to
ALL ORIGINAL AND TRANSFER CERTIFICATES OF the owner of the land. Where however, the planter, 60 Azucena, Roxas District, Quezon City
TITLE DERIVED FROM DECREE NO. 1425 ARE NULL builder or sower has acted in good faith, a conflict of
AND VOID AB INITIO RENDERED BY THE COURT OF rights arises between the owners and it becomes (Exhibit D, at pages 6-8).
FIRST INSTANCE OF RIZAL IN FAVOR OF THE necessary to protect the owner of the improvements
MYRIAD CLIENTS OF THE UNDERSIGNED HAS without causing injustice to the owner of the land. In Thereafter, respondent NAVARRO claimed ownership
AUTOMATICALLY BY MERE LAPSE OF THE view of the impracticability of creating what Manresa of properties originally covered by Decree 1425
REGLEMENTARY PERIOD) BECOME FINAL AND calls a state of "forced co-ownership" (Vol. 3, 4th ed., including the parcels of land owned by Ortigas &
EXECUTORY. p. 213), the law has provided a just and equitable Company, Limited Partnership (hereinafter called
solution by giving the owner of the land the option to ORTIGAS, for short), and started selling them.
But to every possessor in good faith there comes a acquire the improvements after the payment of the
time when he is considered a possessor in bad faith. proper indemnity or to oblige the builder or planter to In view of the aforementioned publication, panic
When the owner or possessor with a better right pay for the land and the sower to pay the proper rent. ensued among the lot buyers of ORTIGAS and among
comes along, when he becomes aware that what he It is the owner of the land who is allowed to exercise the property owners whose titles were derived from
had taken for granted is at least doubtful, and when he the option because his right is older and because, by Decree No. 1425. As a counter measure to allay the
learns the grounds in support of the adverse the principle of accession, he is entitled to the fears of the panicky lot buyers and owners, ORTIGAS
contention, good faith ceases. The possessor may still ownership of the accessory thing." Bernardo vs. caused the publication in the Manila Times on July 19
believe that his right is more secure, because we Bataclan, 66 Phil. 598, 602; see also Filipinas Colleges, and 17, 1971 the following:
resign ourselves with difficulty to the sight of our Inc. vs. Garcia Timbang, et al., 106 Phil. 247, 254).
vanishing hopes, but when the final judgment of the WARNING
court deprives him of the possession, all illusion So caveat emptor (buyers beware) of possesors in bad
necessarily disappears. (Tacas vs. Robon, 53 Phil. 356, faith as we are ready to ask for the execution of the SO THE PUBLIC MAY KNOW
361-362 citing Manresa and Articles 528, 545, and decision pursuant to law and avoid a scire facias
1123 of our present Civil Code). Ordinary prudence requires that those involved may In reply to numerous inquiries received by Ortigas &
please make some kind of arrangements with the Company, Limited Partnership with reference to an
He who builds, plants or sows in bad faith on the land undersigned before execution by calling through the advertisement published in the Manila Times on July 4,
of another, loses what is built, planted or sown without following telephones: 1971 supposedly affecting the validity of all original
right to indemnity (Art 449, Civil Code) certificates of title and transfer certificates of title
xxx xxx xxx derived from Decree No. 1425, Ortigas & Company,
HOWEVER, IT IS NOT THE DESIRE OF THE Limited Partnership wishes to announce that it is not a
UNDERSIGNED PREVAILING PARTY AND BY THE WAY, YOU ARE ALL INVITED TO JOIN party to ANY case allegedly decided on May 26, 1971
SUCCESSOR BY TITLE ACQUIRED AFTER THE THEMOTORCADE OF OUR PEOPLE'S VICTORY by the Supreme Court or any other court and therefore
ACTIONS WERE BEGUN BY VIRTUE OF HIS WHICH WILL PASS THROUGH THE PRINCIPAL ALL ITS TITLES DERIVED FROM DECREE NO. 1425
CONTRACT OF LEGAL SERVICES TO DEMAND FOR STREETS OF MANDALUYONG, SAN JUAN, PASIG, ARE NOT IN ANY WAY AFFECTED BY SAID
THE DEMOLITION OR REMOVAL OF THE MARIKINA, AND QUEZON CITY FROM 9 A.M. TO 12 DECISION.
IMPROVEMENTS AT THE EXPENSE OF THE NOON TODAY, SUNDAY, JULY 4, 1971, THE
POSSESSOR IN BAD FAITH FOR: MOTORCADE WILL BEGIN FROM NO. 61 AMADO T. The public is hereby requested to be wary of any
REYES STREET, BARRIO BUROL, MANDALUYONG, person selling lands and/or rights to lands belonging to
 24

and in the name of Ortigas & Company, Limited arguing that (1) there was no publication for the any and all persons acting in their behalves, refrain
Partnership. Notice of Initial Hearing set in 1905; (2) there was no and desist absolute (sic) and perpetually from
survey of the property sought to be registered; (3) the proceeding with or taking any action on Civil Cases
The public is also warned to be wary of MISLEADING judge presiding over the defunct Court of Land Nos. 1134, II 13865, II-13869, II-13877, II-13913, and
adverstisements and/or persons basing their rights to Registration was fake; and (4) the Clerk of Court of the II-13921 filed by the herein defendant Partnership
lands of Ortigas & Company, Limited Partnership on said Court was also fake. The dispositive portion of the against some of the herein plaintiffs;
such "decision" of May 26, 1971 which is claimed to be Ruiz decision reads as follows:
"final and executory." 8. That the case be dismissed as against defendant
WHEREFORE, and in view of all the foregoing, the Director of Lands;
ORTIGAS & COMPANY, LIMITED PARTNERSHIP Court hereby declares and/or orders:
9. That the defendant Partnership pay to the plaintiffs
(Exhibit D, at pages 4-5). 1. That the proceedings in G.L.R.O. Rec. No. 917 are the sum of P50,000.00 as and for attorney's fees;
null and void;
After the publication of the foregoing notices, 10. That the defendant Partnership pay to the plaintiffs
respondent NAVARRO filed with the Court of First 2. That Decree No. 1425 is null and void and/or the costs of the suit; and
Instance of Rizal, Branch VIII, two (2) complaints for fictitious;
libel against the officers of ORTIGAS and the officials Defendant Partnership's counterclaim is hereby
of the defunct Manila 'times. Respondent NAVARRO 3. That all the original certificates of title issued by dismissed for lack of merit.
sought to recover in said cases damages allegedly virtue of and pursuant to the judgments in G.L.R.0
sustained by him on account of his failure to Rec. No. 917 and Decree No. 1425 were utter nullities; SO ORDERED.
consummate thousands of sales by reason of the
publication of the above notice. In support of his 4. That all transfer certificates of title derived from the (Exhibit EE at pages 5-6).
allegation, respondent NAVARRO presented 169 deeds original certificates of title declared void under No. (3)
of sale over lots in his various subdivisions, the above, particularly but not exclusively, Transfer ORTIGAS appealed the Ruiz decision to the Court of
locations of which overlap the properties owned by Certificates of Title Nos. 77652 and 77653 of the Appeals. On November 21, 1971, the Court of Appeals
ORTIGAS (marked as Exhibit F, F-1 to F-168 in the Register of Deeds of Quezon City and 126575 and its rendered a decision setting aside the decision of Judge
instant proceedings). derivative Transfer Certificate of Title No. 135879 of Ruiz and ordering a new trial to enable the petitioner
the Register of Deeds of Rizal, were and are null and to introduce newly discovered evidence. The case was
On December 13, 1971, Judge Benjamin H. Aquino void; then remanded to the lower Court. On November 3,
dismissed these two cases for libel for lack of merit 1973, Judge Arsenio A. Alcantara, who took the place
(Exhibit D). 5. That the rightfully (sic) owners of the litigated lands of Judge Ruiz who was separated from the service by
covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 77652, the President of the Philippines, rendered a decision
Apart from the documents pertaining to the HABERER 77653, 126575 (or 135879) are the herein plaintiffs, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
cases and the libel cases, the complainants also the portions owned by them being as indicated in
presented documents relating to Civil Case No. 7- Exhibit P; WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of
M(10339), Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XV, the defendant, Ortigas & Company, Limited
entitled "Pedro del Rosario, et al. vs. Ortigas & 6. That the defendant Partnership cease and desist Partnership, as against the plaintiffs:
Company, Limited Partnership, et al." and Civil Case from molesting the plaintiffs in the enjoyment and
No. Q-16265, Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon peaceful possession of their respective landholdings; 1. Dismissing the amended complaint;
City, Branch XVI, entitled "Ortigas & Company,
Limited Partnership vs. Felipe C. Navarro." 7. That the Hon. Andres Siochi, as Presiding Judge, 2. Confirming the validity of Decree No. 1425, issued
Municipal Court, Pasig, Rizal, and Hon. Ricardo in Expediente 917 and all titles emanating therefrom;
In Civil Case No. 7-M (10339), the plaintiffs therein Tensuan, as Presiding Judge, Branch II, City Court of
sought to enjoin ORTIGAS from ejecting them. Judge Quezon City, and the defendant Ortigas and Company, 3. Directing each of the plaintiffs to individually pay
Vivencio M. Ruiz decided in favor of the plaintiffs, Limited Partnership, their agents, representatives and the defendant Company:

(a) P30.00 per month as rental of the premises
occupied by them from the time of the filing of the
complaint on October 20, 1967, with legal rate of
interest, until they surrender the possession thereof to
defendant Company;
(b) P5,000.00 as attorney's fees.
(4) Ordering plaintiff and their successors-in-interest,
agents or any person or persons acting in their behalf,
who are found to be in possession of defendant
company's land to vacate the same and remove and
demolish their improvements thereon at plaintiffs
expenses;
(5) Ordering Atty. Emilio D. Castellanes to return the
attorney's fees in the amount of P 1,030.00 he
prematurely collected from defendant company, with
interest; and
(6) To pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
(Exhibit DD at pages 44-45).
The aforesaid decision was appealed. During the
pendency of the approval of the record on appeal,
ORTIGAS filed a motion for immediate execution of
judgment. After exchange of pleadings by the parties,
the trial court presided by Judge Alcantara granted the
motion and ordered the issuance of a writ of execution
in favor of Ortigas upon filing a bond in the amount of
P250,000.00. Del Rosario, et al. filed a motion for
reconsideration of the aforesaid order. Despite
opposition by Ortigas, Judge Florellana Castro-
Bartolome, who was appointed to Branch XV vice
Judge Alcantara, granted the motion for
reconsideration and set aside the order of Judge
Alcantara. Ortigas contested the order of Judge
Bartolome through a petition for certiorari and
prohibition with preliminary injunction, docketed as
CA-G.R. No. SP-04060.
25
On September 1, 1975, the Court of Appeals
promulgated a decision in the aforesaid case, the Defendant, in his answer and motion to dismiss,
dispositive portion of which reads as follows: alleged that as a result of the issuance of the
restraining order, he suffered damages in the amount
WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari is granted. The of Pl,000,000.00 daily.
order of the respondent Judge dated February 25,
1975, is hereby annulled and set aside and the order of Firstly, the same was not raised as a counterclaim.
Judge Arsenio Alcantara, granting immediate Therefore, this court can only treat it as an affirmative
execution, is hereby revived, with instructions to the defense.
respondent judge to fully implement the latter order,
including the approval of the petitioner's bond and the Secondly, no evidence was submitted to prove this
issuance of the necessary writ or writs of execution. claim of damages. Under the same authorities cited in
The restraining order issued at the inception of this support of the denial of plaintiffs claim for damages,
action is hereby (sic) permanent. therefore, he has failed to establish what damages he
had suffered.
No costs.
Lastly, the court has found that plaintiff is entitled to
SO ORDERED. the injunction prayed for. It follows, therefore, that the
issuance of the restraining order was proper and,
(Exhibit EE at pages 50-51). hence, can not be the basis for a claim for damages.
This decision was the subject of a petition for review This court cannot help but end this decision with a
filed by respondents Del Rosario, et al., but the same note of admonition and hope. The people who will
was denied. So also with the motion for ultimately suffer the most from defendant's acts in
reconsideration filed with the Supreme Court (Annex question are his buyers, who in all probability are
"A" of Exhibit FF) middle class people who themselves wanted to make
money out of the apparent sad predicament that
In order to stop respondent NAVARRO from selling its defendant had brought upon the plaintiff. It is the
titled properties, ORTIGAS also filed Civil Case No. Q- fervent hope of this court, therefore, that with the
16265, Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City advent of the NEW SOCIETY defendant will turn a new
Branch XVI, entitled "Ortigas & Company, Limited page and make a fresh start in life.
Partnership vs. Felipe C. Navarro.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
On December 16, 1972, Judge Sergio A.F. Apostol
rendered a decision in favor of Ortigas as follows: 1. Upholding the validity and indefeasibility of
plaintiffs Transfer Certificates of Title over the land in
xxx xxx xxx question;
It having been found that defendant was guilty of bad 2. As a consequence thereof, forever enjoining and
faith and fraud in claiming and selling plaintiff's land, barring the defendant, his successors-in-interest,
plaintiff is entitled to attomey's fees. This court finds assigns, agents or any person or persons acting for or
the amount of attorney's fees in the sum of P50,000.00 in his behalf, from selling and advertising, verbally, or
to be fair and reasonable considering the extent and in writing, the sale of the lands in question and from
value of the property involved and the nature of the asserting any claim or dominion or possession
case.
 26

whatsoever on or over the said property, directly or testimony dwelt only on these two matters and on the ibaba ng mga kanikaniyang katibayan o kung sila man
indirectly, adverse to the plaintiff; and identification of his Exhibits 1 to 9. ay mayhawak ng titulo na sakup ng diumano'y
Kautusan Blg. 1425 ay babagohin iyan o mapapalitan
3. Ordering the defendant to pay attorney's fees in the On cross-examination, respondent NAVARRO testified ng maybisa galing sa Hukuman upang matahimik at
sum of P50,000.00 plus cost of suit. that he is the counsel for the defendants in the twenty- mapayapa ang dahilan paninirahan kanilang mula't
two (22) cases before Judge Pedro Navarro and Judge sapul ay kanila nang pinamamayanan sa buong
SO ORDERED. Emilio Salas of the Court of First Instance of Rizal; kaalaman ng sambayanan at walang paglilihim ng
that he became the owner of the lands not occupied by kanilang mapayapang pagmamay-ari ng mga lupain na
(Exhibit II-I-a, at pages 409-411 of Exhibit II). his clients by virtue of his contract of legal services sa mula't sapul ay pinaninirahan ng mga nakalagda sa
signed by them (pp. 76-78, t.s.n., July 7, 1977; pp. 7- ibaba ng kasunduang ito at ng kanilang ninuno o
The afore-quoted decision was appealed to the Court 10, t.s.n., Sept. 9, 1977). Said contract for legal nagpamana (predecessors-in-interest) na siyang mga
of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. No. L-53125-R. services, which appears on pages 224-232 of Exhibit pangyayari ay sapat na upang maigawad ang mabisang
"1", reads as follows: titulo sapagkat ang nasabing lupain kailanmay di
On December 13, 1978, the Court of Appeals naging pambayan kungdi pribado o di kaya'y sariling
promulgated a decision in the aforesaid case affirming KASUNDUAN HINGGIL SA SERBISYO NG ABOGADO pag-aari ng nakalagdang may-ari sa ibaba ng
the decision of Judge Apostol. SA MGA KINAUUKULAN NA ANG MGA BAGAY NA kasunduang ito, dahil sa mga nabanggit ng mga
ITO AY MALAMAN AT MAKARATING pangyayari na 'natamo sa pamamagitan ng pagbibigay-
Respondent NAVARRO elevated the case to this bisa ng batas di lamang ng karapatan sa pag-aangkin
Honorable Tribunal (G.R. No. L-50156). Again, his Itong kasulatan na ito ay nagpapatibay at nagbibigay- ng lupain kungdi maging ang karapatang ipinagkaloob
petition was denied for lack of merit. His subsequent bisa hinggil sa serbisyo ni Atty. Felipe C. Navarro sa kanila ng pamahalaan ay nagsasaad na ang aktuwal
motion for reconsideration was also denied. tungkol sa aming karapatan sa lupaing nasasakop ng na pagkakaloob sa kanila ng pamahalaan ng titulo ay
Consequently, the issue brought forth in the sala of diumanoy Kautusan-Blg. 1425 (Decree No. 1425) sa di na kinakailangan upang ang nasabing karapatan ay
Judge Apostol has now been laid to rest. diumanoy Usapin Blg. 699, 875, 917, aip (Cases Nos. di kilanlin o pagtibayin ng Hukuman (Susi vs. Razon
699, 875, 917, etc.) sa dating Hukuman ng and Director of Lands, 48 Phil. 242; Director of Lands
EVIDENCE FOR THE RESPONDENT Pagpapatala ng Lupain defunct Court of Land vs. Abaldonado CA-G.R. No. 177-R, Jan. 12, 1948, 45
Registration) na ang nasabing diumano'y Kautusan Off. Gaz 2188). Ngunit sa dahilang mayroon huwad na
Respondent NAVARRO presented both testimonial and Blg. 1425 na siyang pinagbatayan ng ipinapatalang titulo ang mga nag-aangkin ng mga lupain at
documentary evidence. His testimonial evidence gawagawang dalawanput anim (26) ng mga Original nararapat iharap sa Hukuman ang bagay na ito upang
consist of his testimony and those of Atty. Eulogio R. Certificates of Title ng Register of Deeds ng Pasig at ang Hukuman magpatibay at magbigay-bisa ng mga
Rodriguez, one of the complainants; and Arsenio de nagbunga ito ng maraming Transfer Certificates of titulo sa mga nakalagda sa ibaba ng kasunduang ito
Guzman, Chief of Section of the Bureau of Lands. His Title na sa kasalukuyan iginigiit ng mga mayhawak ayon sa Section 10 ng Rule 39 ng Rules of Court.
documentary evidence consist of Exhibits 1 to 13, ngunit yan ay wala namang bisa at katuturan (Viz., Sapagkat ang pamumusisyon sa isang bagay ang
inclusive. City of Manila vs. Lack, 19 Phil. 324, 340) dahil sa batayang di mapagtatalunan hinggil sa kalaunan ng
kapaltosan ng nasabing diumano'y Kautusan Blg. 1425 pagmamay-ari nito ng makalipas ang mahabang
On direct examination, respondent NAVARRO testified na sa mula't sapul magpahanggang ngayon sa panahong takda ng batas, maging ito man ay walang
that the present charges are the same as the charges kasalukuyan ay iginigiit sa mga nakalagda sa ibaba ng karampatang titulo o mabuting hangarin ay
in administrative Case No. 1154, entitled, "In Re: Atty. kasunduang ito kasama na rin ang mga dati at ibang nagpapahina at sumisira sa saklaw-bisa at halaga ng
Felipe C. Navarro, respondent", which was referred to mga kliyente ni Atty. Felipe C. Navarro na ngayon ay pinakamahusay na titulo na maaring nasa bagay na
the Office of the Solicitor General for investigation. He siyang nararapat maging kalahok sa animnapung iyon na pinanghahawakan ng taong hindi nagmamay-
further declared that this Honorable Court deferred usapin na sa kasalukuyang hawak ni Atty. Felipe C. ari. Bunga nito, ang pamumusisyon ng mahigit sa
action on the said administrative case until such time Navarro (Civil Cases Nos. 8322, etc. of the Court of tatlumpung (30) taon na tinatamasa ng isang tao
that G.R. Nos. L-42699-42709, the heirs of the late First Instance of Rizal, Branches I, II, and VI bilang may-ari kahit na walang karampatang titulo o
Florentina Nuguid Vda. de Haberer vs. Court of contesting the genuineness and due execution of mabuting hangarin ay gumaganap ng sapat na titulo
Appeals, et al. is terminated. Respondent's direct Decree No. 1425 of the defunct Court of Land upang makuha ang pag-aari ng lupaing tangan
Registration) upang mabigyan ang mga nakalagda sa sapagkat ang lampas-bisa o ang panahong itinakda ng

batas sa pamamagitan ng pamumusisyon ng mahigit
na tatlumpung (30) taon ay tiyakang hadlang na
maging ang pinakamahusay na titulo na kinikilala ng
batas ay hindi makatitinag o makapangingibabaw
(Kincaid vs. Cabututan, 35 Phil. 383).' Hindi maaring
sabihin o ipagmalakdan ng mga nangamkam na sa
pamamagitan ng kanilang huwad na titulo ay naangkin
na nila ang lupain o di kayay gawing batayan ang
kanilang huwad na titulo upang masabing sila ay
nagmamay-ari ng lupa. Hindi ito maaring maganap
sapagkat ang krimen at panlilinlang ay hindi maaring
maging batayan ng panimula ng ay isang tunay at
mabisang titulo kahit na ipinagbili at nabili sa isang
mabuti ang hangarin ng bumili ng karampatang halaga
ng lupain (Levin vs. Bass, 91 Phil. 419, 439). Dahil sa
itinuring ng batas na sila ay 'constructive trustees,
lamang kaya hindi maganap ang lampas-bisa
(Gayondato vs. Treasurer of the Philippine Islands, 49
Phil. 244-249). Subali't dahilan sa ilang katiwalian ng
katotohanan na di nabatid ng mga nakalagda sa ibaba
ng kasunduang ito na di-umano'y siyang naganap na
pangyayari ngunit ang tunay na katotohanan ay di
naman ito naganap at naliligaw sa paniniwalang
nararapat silang nagbayad ng rentas o alkila at ang
ilan ay binili ang lupain gayong ang katotohanan ay
sila ang nararapat at tunay na may-ari sa di-umano'y
Kautusan Blg. 1425 (Decree No. 1425) ng defunct
Court of Land Registration na nagbunga ng gawa-
gawang titulo na sumasakop sa buong kalawakan ng
humigit kumulang ng 4,000 hectares na samakatuwid
ay apatnapung (40) milyong metro kuwadrado ng
lupaing ngayon ay matatagpuan sa buong bayan ng
Mandaluyong, ang buong bayan ng San Juan sapagkat
sakop ito noon ng bayan San Felipe Neri ayon sa Act
No. 942, ang bahagi ng Punta sa Maynila sapagkat
sakop ito noon ng Mandaluyong na ngayon, kalahati ng
bayan ng Pasig, kalahati ng bayang Mariquina, at
kalahati ng Lungsod ng Quezon sapagka't pinilas
lamang ito buhat sa bayan ng Mariquina, Pasig, San
Juan at Mandaluyong sa pamamagitan ng
Commonwealth Act No. 502 na pinagtibay noong
Oktubre 12, 1939 at sang-ayon sa mga paglalarawan
ng di-umano'y pagsusukat o survey nagsimula sa
Maytunas creek patungong ilog ng San Juan
patungong dakong ibaba ng agos ng ilog ng San Juan
hanggang sa bahaging matatagpuan ang ilog ng Pasig
sa Punta, Maynila at lumilisya sa patungong itaas ng
agos ng ilog Pasig na nababanggit ang sapa ng
Buayang Bato sa Namayan, Mandaluyong pagkatapos
ay pabalik sa ilog Pasig sa dakong pataas ng agos ng
ilog hanggang sa ilog ng Mariquina at pagsunod sa
dakong pataas ng agos ng ilog ng Mariquina hanggang
sa sapa ng Pinagpatayang Buaya at lumalakdaw
hanggang sa pinagmulan ng sapa ng Diliman na
umaagos ng pababa patungong ilog ng San Juan at
pabalik sa sapa ng Maytunas na ang nasabing baybay-
sukat o survey sa abot makakaya ng sino mang may
sapat ng kakayahang agrimensor (surveyor) ay di
makabuo ng ni isa man lamang maramihang-gilid na
hugis o anyo (polygon).
Dahilan sa mga nabanggit na pangyayari, ang mga
nakalagda sa ibaba ng Kasunduang ito ay sumasang-
ayon na kasunduin ang paglilingkod ni Atty. Felipe C.
Navarro ng No. 66 Azucena, Roxas District, Quezon
City upang gumawa ng karampatang hakbang sa
Hukuman ng Unang Dulungan ng Rizal pati Quezon
City hanggang sa Corte Suprema kung kinakailangan
at gawin ang anumang paraang isinasaisip niyang
tumpak at nararapat gawin sang-ayon sa batas upang
matamo ng mga makalagda sa ibaba ng kasunduang
ito ang kani-kaniyang titulo ayon sa paraang
minamarapat ng batas at kaming mga nakalagda sa
ibaba ng kasunduang ito ay nagkakaloob ng buong
kapangyarihan kay Atty. Felipe C. Navarro na ilagay sa
kanyang pangalan at kung sa kanino man niya naising
ipagkaloob ang ibang bahagi ng lupain na aming
minana o pinagsundan (predecessors-in-interest)
nguni't ipinaubaya na namin kay Atty. Felipe C.
Navarro bilang bahagi ng buong kabayaran ng
kanyang serbisyo at karapatang maangkin niya
sangayon sa mga inilalahad ng kasunduang ito maliban
na lamang doon sa bahagi ng lupaing nais naming
mapatituluhan sa ilalim ng aming kani-kaniyang
pangalan at sumasangayon kami sa pagbabayad ng
karampatang halaga sa paglilingkod ni Atty. Felipe C.
Navarro nang naayon sa isinasaad ng kasunduang ito.
Na sa bawa't kilos na magaganap sa pagpapatitulo ng
aming mga ariarian ang mamamahala sa mga gastos o
kabayaran ay si Atty. Felipe C. Navarro na ang ibig
27
sabihin na mula sa pagpapasukat (survey) ng mga ari-
arian hanggang sa pagbibigay ng mga plano ng mga
sukat upang mapagtibay ito ng Kagawaran ng Lupain
(Bureau of Lands), paghahanda at pagnonotaryo ng
mga affidavit' ng pagmay-ari, pagkuha ng mga
katibayan ng pagkamayari, bayad sa pagpasok sa
husgado (filing fees), pagpapatala (registration),
paggawa ng mga kasulatan (documentation), pagsalin
ng mga rekord (transcripts), pagpapatunay
(certifications) at iba pang mga kinakailangang
bayaran at pagkagastuhan ay nasa kalayaan na ni Atty.
Felipe C. Navarro na pagpasiyahan ng naaayon sa
kaniyang sariling kagustuhan na ang nilalayon sa
bandang huli at ang tunay na hangarin ay ang
mapatituluhan ng ayon sa batas ang aming kani-
kaniyang mga lupain sa aming kani-kaniyang pangalan
na sa pamamagitan ng mga tungkuling iniatang namin
kay Atty. Felipe C. Navarro sa pamamagitan ng
kasunduang ito, sumasang-ayon kami at natatalian o
nabibigkisan ng kasunduang ito na magbayad ng
halagang Dalawampu't Limang Piso (P25.00) sa bawat
metro kuwadrado ng lupaing matitituluhan sa aming
pangalan bilang kabayaran sa serbisyo o paglilingkod
ni Atty. Felipe C. Navarro; ang halagang Sampung Piso
(P10.00) sa bawat metro kuwadrado ay aming
magiging paunang-bayad upang ang proyektong ito ay
mapanimulan kaagad sa lalong madaling panahon at
ang matitirang dapat bayarang halaga na Labing-
limang Piso (P15.00) bawa't metro kuwadrado ay
aming babayaran kapag naipagkaloob na ang titulo ng
lupa sa amin sa kasunduang kapag buhat sa isang taon
mula sa petsang ipinagkaloob ang titulo ng lupa ay
hindi kami nakababayad ng buo sa halagang natitira o
balanse na Labing-limang Piso (P15.00) sa bawat
metro kuwadrado, ang titulo ng lupain ay mapupunta
sa pangalan ni Atty. Felipe C. Navarro nguni't ang
kasunduang ito na isang taong pagbibigay-palugit ni
Atty. Felipe C. Navarro upang siya ay mabigyan ng
kabuuang kabayaran sa kanyang mga paglilingkod sa
usaping ito at sumasang-ayon si Atty. Felipe C.
Navarro na kami ay pahintulutang isangla ang aming
mga ari-ariang may karampatang titulo na di huwad at
pinagtibay ng batas sa alinmang bangko upang ito ang
magsilbing bayad sa mga paglilingkod ni Atty. Felipe
C. Navarro sa usaping ito at iyon lamang ang
 28

natatanging sandali o panahong kami ay mawawalan din ng kasunduang ito at kasama ng paglagda ng said decision is ineffectual because the same has been
na ng obligasyon o tungkuling bayaran ang aming mga pangalan na siyang nais naming pangalang appealed. (pp. 33-34, t.s.n., Sept. 9, 1977). 4
Dalawampu't Limang Piso (P25.00) sa bawat metro lumitaw sa titulo, ang aming kani-kaniyang tirahan,
kuwadrado ng lupaing ikinasundo namin ang serbisyo kalawakan ng lupain, paraang pagbabayad at petsa na On the basis of the foregoing report, the Solicitor
ni Atty. Felipe C. Navarro upang matituluhan nang kami'y lumagda sa kasunduang ito bilang General filed a complaint with Francisco Ortigas, Jr. as
naayon sa batas. Sumasang-ayon din si Atty. Felipe C. pagpapatunay sa aming taos-pusong pagsang-ayon at complainant, praying that respondent Navarro be
Navarro na ang sinuman sa aming nakalagda sa ibaba hangarin tumupad sa lahat ng napapaloob sa disbarred, that his name be stricken from the roll of
ng kasunduang ito na hindi kayang magbayad ng KASULATANG ITO. attorneys, and that his certificate of admission to the
paunang-halaga na Sampung Piso (P10.00) sa bawa't bar be recalled.
metro kuwadrado ay bibigyan ng karampatang In the course of the proceedings, respondent
magbayad ng makahalintulad na halaga sa bawa't NAVARRO admitted that he has sold, and is still On May 23, 1980, respondent Navarro filed his answer
buwan sa loob ng sampu (10) o dalawampung (20) selling, properties covered by Torrens titles in the with prayer to lift the order of suspension. 5
taon sang-ayon sa mga hinihingi ng pangyayari, ang names of ORTIGAS & CO., Madrigal, and others, but Complainant Ortigas, Jr. filed an opposition to said
titulo ng lupain ay ipagkakaloob lamang sa nagnanais he claims that the titles of said parties are null and motion to lift suspension .6 Respondent Navarro
umangkin nito kung mababayaran na ang kabuuan ng void because they emanated from Decree No. 1425; reiterated his plea in his manifestation dated August 8,
paglilingkod ni Atty. Felipe C. Navarro kasama na ang that he has no title over the properties sold by him 1980. 7 In a resolution dated September 2, 1980, this
"legal interest" at ang amortization nito ngunit except the contract of legal services which his clients Court denied the motion to lift the order of suspension.
kinakailangan magbigay sila ng paunang bayad na allegedly signed; that he has no approved plans for the 8
Limangpung Piso (P50.00) upang panimulan ang various subdivisions allegedly owned by him; that he
pagbabayad buwan-buwan (monthly installment has not obtained any certificate of registration or On October 29, 1980, respondent Navarro filed an
condition) at magiging mabisa lamang ito kung license to sell from the National Housing Authority; urgent ex parte motion praying for the lifting of the
matutupad ng buong katapatan ang pagbabayad ng that he has not declared for taxation purposes the order of suspension 9 which was denied by this Court
hulugang buwan-buwan (monthly installment) na thousands of hectares of prime lands in Mandaluyong, on November 13, 1980. 10 He reiterated his prayer in
maaring magbuhat sa halagang Limang Piso (P5.00) San Juan, Pasig, Quezon City and Marikina, allegedly another motion filed on January 5, 1981 11 but the
hanggang Limangpung Piso (P50.00) sa bawat buwan owned by him; and that he has not filed any case same was likewise denied in our resolution of January
nang naayon sa laki o kalawakan ng lupaing nararapat directly attacking the title of ORTIGAS and others (pp. 22, 1981. 12
na mapasa-amin ayon sa batas. Sa dahilang ang buhay 7-33, t.s.n., Sept. 9, 1977; Exhibit J).
ng tao ay walang katiyakang magtatagal na habang II. Administrative Case No. 2033 arose from a letter-
panahon ay isinasalin namin ang aming mga karapatan Respondent NAVARRO also admits that he is the complaint, dated March 13, 1979, filed by the spouses
at tungkulin sa aming tagapagmana lamang at gayon defendant in the "25-Billion-peso-case" before Judge E. Conrad and Virginia Geeslin with the Integrated Bar
din si Atty. Felipe C. Navarro na maaring manahin ang Sergio Apostol, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-16265, of the Philippines, charging respondent Navarro with
kanyang karapatan sa kasunduang ito sa mga entitled "Ortigas & Company Limited Partnership vs. deceit, malpractice and gross misconduct in office, and
tagapagmana lamang niya upang itaguyod nila ang Felipe C. Navarro's Court of First Instance of Rizal, blatant violation of the Attorney's Oath. Said letter was
paglilingkod sa anumang paraan ayon sa batas. Branch XVI, Quezon City"; that said case covers lands thereafter referred to this Court by Integrated Bar of
in Mandaluyong, San Juan, Pasig, Marikina and the Philippines President (now Chief Justice) Marcelo
SA KATUNAYAN AT KATIBAYAN NG LAHAT NG Quezon City including those involved in the present B. Fernan for appropriate action. 13
NABANGGIT NA KASUNDUANG ITO case (pp. 8-21, t.s.n., July 7, 1977; Exhibits F, F-I to F-
168). Pursuant to our resolution of June 4, 1979, 14
ay lumalagda kami sa kasunduang ito na aming respondent Navarro filed his answer with motion to
tutuparin ang lahat ng isinasaad sa kasunduang ito na Despite the decision of Judge Apostol upholding the dismiss on June 29, 1979. 15 The corresponding
sinasang-ayunan din ni Atty. Felipe C. Navarro na validity of the Ortigas Transfer Certificate of Title and reply 16 and rejoinder 17 were subsequently filed. In a
kanyang tuparin ang kanyang tungkulin bilang enjoining respondent NAVARRO from selling lots resolution of this Court dated October 1, 1985, the
manananggol na tutulong sa amin upang kami ay covered by said title, NAVARRO still continued selling case was referred to the Office of the Solicitor General
mapagkalooban ng Hukuman ng titulo sa aming kani- properties covered by the injunction claiming that the for investigation, report and recommendation. 18
kaniyang lupain ng naayon sa batas at siyang isinasaad
 29

On August 28, 1989, the Office of the Solicitor General contempt for facts, the law of the land and for the before the Honorable Court of Appeals docketed as
submitted its report, with the following findings and Courts. CA-G.R. No. S.P. 08928 entitled "Adolfo Corpus, et al.
recommendation: 'vs. Hon. Minerva Genovea et al." Copies of the
c. Mr. Navarro persists in misrepresenting to the Petition and the undersigned attorney's Comments
CHARGES Court that the title covering the land subject of the thereto are hereto attached as Annexes "D" and "E",
above cases had been declared null and void in the respectively. (pp. 2-4, Record)
In their Complaint dated March 13, 1979, "final and executory" decision of the Court of First
complainants charged respondent with deceit, Instance of Rizal, Branch II. He deliberately omits to RESPONDENTS ANSWER
malpractice and gross conduct in office, and blatant give the title of the case and its docket number for the
violation of the Attorney's Oath, for having deliberately obvious and malicious reason that the case he relies In his Answer dated June 29, 1979, respondent
misrepresented the facts and the law while acting as upon (Heirs of Nuguid vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. averred:
counsel for the defendants in the following civil cases: 42699-42709) is still pending resolution before the
Supreme Court and hence cannot be "final and 1. From the face of the Resolution itself showing that
a. His insistence that our clients are no longer owners executory." the undersigned respondent was never furnished with
of the land subject of the cases mentioned above; he a copy of the complaint, it can be gathered therefrom
falsely alleged that to his personal knowledge the title d. He misrepresents to the Court that the land subject that the complaint is clearly intended to prevent the
to the land is in the name of one Leopoldo Cojuangco. of the cases heretofore enumerated is not within the undersigned respondent to proceed in defending his
This false allegation was made despite the final territorial jurisdiction of the Quezon City Court and clients' cause in CA-G.R. No. SP-08928 (Adolfo M.
decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch hence the court has no jurisdiction. Further, that title Corpuz, et al. vs. Hon. Minerva C. Genovea, the
XVII, in Civil Case No. Q-18221 entitled "E Conrad and thereto having described the land to be part of the Spouses Conrad E. Geeslin and Virginia Bewley
Virginia B. Geeslin vs. Leopoldo Cojuangco, et al." (1) Municipality of San Juan del Monte, is void. He cannot Geeslin, et al.) still pending at this writing before the
declaring the transfer of the lot to Leopoldo Cojuangco disclaim knowledge however of the fact that the area Court of Appeals. To allow complainants to harass
was fraudulent and had been effected thru in the vicinity of Santolan Road in Quezon City was respondent while the case (is) still pending in our
falsification; and, (2) ordering the cancellation of the originally part of the Municipality of San Juan del courts of justice is an act in contempt of court for
title issued to Cojuangco and the reversion of the title Monte territory of Quezon City when the latter was which complainants and their counsel is (sic) liable.
to our clients. Copies of the Complaint and the created on 14 June 1950. In the light of this fact, Mr.
Decision in said case are hereto attached as Annexes Navarro's representation is false and malicious. 2. Undersigned respondent as counsel for the
"B" and "C", respectively. defendants Adolfo Corpuz, et al. gave his entire
e. Mr. Navarro has shown a complete and total devotion to the interest of his clients, warm zeal in the
b. Mr. Navarro persisted and still persists in disregard for basic norms of honesty and decency in maintenance and defense of their rights and the
representing that our clients' title was rendered null that having prejudiced the interest of his clients exertion of his utmost learning and ability to the end
and void by virtue of the expiration of the Parity because of his gross neglect to appeal in a timely that nothing be taken or be withheld from his clients,
Amendment and the decision of the Supreme Court in manner from the decision of the court and having save by the rules of law, legally applied; for his clients
the case of Quasha vs. Republic, 46 SCRA 160. Our adopted the wrong remedy, in complete ignorance of are entitled to the benefit of any and every remedy and
clients' title to the aforesaid property was acquired by the law, he had influenced his clients into commencing defense that is authorized by law as was done by the
hereditary succession from the late Dr. Luther Bewley a case before the Tanod Bayan against the Presiding undersigned respondent in the ejectment case filed by
who acquired said land in 1925. The ownership Judge of the City Court of Quezon City, Branch 1, and the complainants Conrad E. Geeslin and Virginia B.
therefore of our clients is protected both under the Hon. Minerva Genovea The case is obviously Geeslin against the several clients of the undersigned.
1935 and 1972 Constitutions. Any lawyer, even a law calculated to harrass and coerce the Honorable (pp. 42-43, Record)
student, knows that the Parity Amendment and the Presiding Judge. Mr. Navarro's conduct speaks ill of
decision in the Quasha case, supra, covers cases where his respect for the law and the courts. After complainants filed a Reply dated July 17, 1979
property was acquired by virtue of the Parity pointing out that respondent's Answer does not deny
Amendment. Mr. Navarro is either guilty of abysmal f. The penchant of Mr. Navarro to misrepresent and any of the six (6) counts of charges specified in the
ignorance of the law or of complete and unabashed deceive did not stop before the City Court of Quezon Complaint, respondent filed a Rejoinder dated
City. He continues to do so in the petition he filed September 7, 1979, wherein he averred:

1. The complainants alien spouses Conrad E. Geeslin
and Virginia B. Geeslin who are citizens of the United
States of America held TCT No. 153657 which was
cancelled on December 31, 1970 by TCT No. 180231
issued in the name of Leopoldo A. Cojuangco both of
which TCTs are described to be located at Santolan
Road, Municipality of San Juan, Province of Rizal, (now
part of Metro-Manila) filed ejectment proceedings
before the City Court of Quezon City against my clients
Victorino Manaois and Adolfo Corpuz and twenty
others in Civil Case Nos. I-29872 to I-29931 which
later were elevated to the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
No. SP-08928 entitled Adolfo M. Corpuz, et al. vs. Hon.
Minerva C. Genovea the Spouses Conrad E. Geeslin
and Virginia Bewley Geeslin, et al.
2. Undersigned respondent being retained as counsel
for the defendants Victorino Manaois and Adolfo
Corpuz and the twenty (20) other defendants did his
bounden duty in defense of their rights and exerted his
utmost learning and ability within what the law allows
that at this stage, the controversy is still under
litigation before the courts as stated above.
3. Under the foregoing circumstances, the
administrative action must have been resorted to by
the complainants at the instigation of their counsel
who failed in wanting to defeat the defendants of their
God-given rights to the land in litigation that there can
be no other conclusion left but that the administrative
complaint against the respondent is 'pure' harassment.
(pp. 53-54, Record)
FINDINGS
When the case was set for hearing by the Office of the
Solicitor General, the parties agreed that there is no
dispute as to the fact of the case. Hence, they were
granted a period of thirty (30) days within which to file
their respective memoranda, if they so desire, after
which the case will be considered submitted for
resolution.
30
Since respondent did not deny the allegations of the
Complaint, and in fact admitted during the hearing of 2. If in the affirmative, whether or not such acts
the case set by the Office of the Solicitor General that constitute sufficient grounds for suspension or
there is no dispute as to the facts of this case, it disbarment.
follows that the specifications of the charges against
him, which are duly supported by documents, are Respondent reiterated in his answer that the transfer
deemed sufficiently proven. certificates of title of Ortigas & Company, Limited
Partnership and Florentina Nuguid Vda. de Haberer
The only justification invoked by respondent is that he were declared null and void in the decision dated
"gave his entire devotion to the interest of his clients" March 31, 1970 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
and that he "did his bounden duty in defense of their Branch XV, in Civil Case No. 7-M (10339) entitled
rights and exerted his utmost learning and ability. "Pedro del Rosario, et al. vs. Ortigas & Co., Ltd.
Partnership, et al.," and in the order dated June 21,
Consequently, respondent is deemed to have 1971 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch II,
committed the misrepresentations specified by in Civil Cases Nos. 8320, 8321, 8326, 8369, 8376,
complainants, as quoted above. 8379, 8383, 8685, 8686 and 8700 entitled "Florentina
Nuguid Vda. de Haberer vs. Federico Martinez, et al."
RECOMMENDATION Respondent likewise reiterated his claim of ownership
over all parcels of land (including those of Ortigas &
Respondent was also charged in Administrative Case Company, Limited Partnership and Florentina Nuguid
No. 2148 entitled Ortigas vs. Navarro and has been Vda. de Haberer) covered by Decree No. 1425,
suspended from the practice of law since May 5, 1980. G.L.R.O. Record No. 917, which was declared null and
His suspension is still in effect. void in the decision dated March 31, 1970 of Branch
XV of the Court of First Instance of Rizal. 20
The acts complained of in the present case also Furthermore, he asserts ownership over the subject
warrant the suspension of respondent from the properties as payment for his legal services rendered
practice of law. in the ejectment cases filed against his clients in
Branches I and II of the former Court of First Instance
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully recommended that of Rizal.
respondent Atty. Felipe C. Navarro be likewise
suspended from the practice of law. 1. To clarify, Civil Case No. 7-M(10339)filed before
Branch XV of the then Court of First Instance of Rizal
Makati, for Manila, August 17, 1989. 19 directly assailed the nullity of the proceedings in
G.L.R.O. Record No. 917 by virtue of which Decree No.
No justiciable issue was raised in Administrative Case 1425 was issued, as well as the original certificates of
No. 2033 as respondent Navarro failed to deny the title issued as a consequence thereof. These original
material allegations in the complaint of the spouses E. certificates of title include the properties belonging to
Conrad and Virginia B. Geeslin. Ortigas & Company, Limited Partnership and
Florentina Nuguid Vda. de Haberer. On March 31,
The two main issues raised by the Solicitor General in 1970, Judge Vivencio M. Ruiz then presiding over said
Administrative Case No. 2148 are: Branch XV rendered a decision declaring Decree No.
1425, as well as the original certificates of title issued
1. Whether or not respondent Navarro sold properties pursuant thereto, null and void. Ortigas appealed the
titled in the names of other persons without the Ruiz decision to the Court of Appeals which set the
consent of the latter; and same aside and remanded the case to Branch XV for

new trial. On November 3, 1973, Judge Arsenio A.
Alcantara, who replaced Judge Ruiz, rendered a
decision confirming the validity of Decree No. 1425
and all titles emanating therefrom. The said decision
was pending appeal with the Court of Appeals when
the investigation of respondent by the Solicitor
General was conducted.
We take judicial notice of the fact that on December
29, 1983, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision
affirming in toto the November 3, 1973 decision of
Judge Alcantara, which became final and executory on
May 25, 1984 insofar as plaintiffs-appellants Pascual
Santos, et al. are concerned. The plaintiffs-appellants
Pedro del Rosario, et al. appealed to the Supreme
Court in a petition for review on certiorari which was,
however, denied on February 18, 1985. The denial
became final and executory on April 10, 1985.
Thereafter, the records of the case were remanded to
Branch XV of the Court of First Instance of Rizal for
execution.
The records further show that the March 31, 1970
decision of Branch XV in Civil Case No. 7-M (10339)
became the basis of the decision rendered by Judge
Pedro Navarro of Branch II on May 21, 1971 which
dismissed the complaint for ejectment filed by Haberer
against the clients of respondent Navarro. However,
Judge Navarro in his decision categorically stated that
"it is the considered opinion of this court that until and
unless the decision of Branch XV of this court is
reversed or set aside by final judgment, plaintiffs
prayer to order the herein eleven defendants in these
eleven cases to vacate the parcels which they occupy
and on which their respective houses are built has
become premature." This condition was reiterated in
Judge Navarro's order of September 15, 1972 wherein
he stated that:
In the order dated July 17, 1971, the Court had
occasion to reiterate that its decision in this case was
mainly predicated on the decision of Branch XV of this
Court that the certificate of title emanating from the
proceedings in GLRO Record No. 917 were null and
void and plaintiffs title happened to be one of them.
31
The Court opined that until said decision is reversed The Court therefore arrives at the conclusion that the
the actual occupants had better be maintained in their order dated June 21, 1971, must be reconsidered on
possessions of the land. 21 two grounds (1) because the decision of Branch XV is
now being the subject of further proceedings and (2)
However, to repeat, the March 31, 1970 decision of because it has the effect of adversely affecting the
Branch XV was set aside by the Court of Appeals which interest of Ortigas & Company, Limited Partnership,
remanded the case for new trial and another one was which is not even a party herein.
rendered, this time by a different judge on November
3, 1973 upholding the validity of Decree No. 1425 and WHEREFORE, as prayed, the order dated June 21,
all titles issued as a consequence thereof. Respondent 1971, is set aside. However, the decision dated May
cannot feign ignorance of the November 3, 1973 26, 1971, insofar as it denies the ejectment of the
decision, which superseded the March 31, 1970 present occupants of the land as stated in the decision
decision, for the simple reason that it was his clients stands. (Emphasis supplied) 22
who appealed the former decision to the Court of
Appeals. In spite thereof and indicative of his bad faith, It is apparent, therefore, that since the order of June
he stubbornly continues to invoke the decision of 21, 1971, was set aside, the inescapable conclusion is
March 31, 1970 as the source of his alleged ownership that Transfer Certificate of Title No. 15043 stands and
rights over the Ortigas properties. remains in the name of Florentina Nuguid Vda. de
Haberer. Consequently, the defendants therein never
2. In the order of June 21, 1971, Judge Pedro Navarro acquired title to the property covered by the title of
of Branch II ordered the cancellation of Transfer Haberer. And, since respondent Navarro merely
Certificate of Title No. 15043 issued in the name of derives his supposed title to the properties as a mere
Haberer and the issuance of new titles in the name of transferee, with more reason can he not validly
the defendants, subject to the lien for attorney's fees in become the owner of the above properties.
favor of respondent pursuant to the terms of the
contract for his legal services. However, the same 3. Respondent intransigently relies on his contract for
judge issued an amendatory order dated September legal services executed with his clients, the defendants
15, 1972, which provides in part that: in the Haberer case, as another basis of his claim of
ownership over the entire property covered by Decree
It has also come to the understanding of the Court that No. 1425. It must be noted that the said contract was
the order of June 21, 1971, sought to be reconsidered executed pursuant to the ejectment cases filed against
insofar as it ordered the cancellation of Transfer respondent Navarro's clients which involve only the
Certificate of Title No. 15043 in favor of the plaintiff, property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
also adversely affects the interests of other persons 15043 containing an aggregate area of 12,700 square
and entities like the Ortigas and Company, Limited meters, more or less. It appears that the defendants
Partnership, which is not a party herein, because the assigned rights to respondent Navarro over properties
certificate of title of the plaintiff is also a derivative of which they did not actually occupy and which virtually
GLRO 917 and Decree No. 1425 from which Ortigas & extended to all the properties covered by titles issued
Company, Limited Partnership, derives titles over wide under Decree No. 1425. As correctly observed by the
tracts of land. Since Ortigas & Company, Limited Solicitor General, said defendants have not presented
Partnership, is not a party in this case whatever orders any document evidencing their ownership of the
of decisions are made in this case cannot be made to parcels of land they assigned to their lawyer.
affect the said company. Decisions and orders can only
affect parties to the case. From the foregoing considerations, it is
incontrovertible that respondent's pretended

ownership rights over the parcels of land covered by
Decree No. 1425 have no bases whatsoever, either in
fact or in law, and it is an assault on credulity to
assume that he was not aware of the vacuity of his
pretensions and misrepresentations.
In resolving this disbarment case, we must perforce
initially focus on the degree of integrity and
respectability required and expected of the law
profession. There is no denying that membership in the
legal profession is achieved only after a long and
laborious study. By years of patience, zeal and ability
the attorney acquires a fixed means of support for
himself and his family. This is not to say, however, that
the emphasis is on the pecuniary value of this
profession but rather on the social prestige and
intellectual standing necessarily arising from and
attached to the same by reason of the fact that
everyone is deemed an officer of the court. 23
The importance of the dual aspects of the legal
profession has been judiciously stated by Chief Justice
Marshall of the United States Supreme Court in this
wise:
On one hand, the profession of an Atty. is of great
importance to an individual and the prosperity of his
life may depend on its exercise. The right to exercise it
ought not to be lightly or capriciously taken from him.
On the other hand, it is extremely desirable that the
respectability of the Bar should be maintained and that
its harmony with the bench should be preserved. For
these objects, some controlling power, some
discretion, ought to be exercised with great
moderation and judgment, but it must be exercised. 24
In a number of cases, we have repeatedly explained
and stressed that the purpose of disbarment is not
meant as a punishment to deprive an attorney of a
means of livelihood but is rather intended to protect
the courts and the public from the misconduct of the
officers of the court and to ensure the proper
administration of justice by requiring that those who
exercise this important function shall be competent,
honorable and trustworthy men in whom courts and
32
clients may repose confidence. 25 Its objectives are to interest, their possession must be maintained and
compel the lawyer to deal fairly and honestly with his respected. 30
client and to remove from the profession a person
whose misconduct has proven him unfit for the duties Thereafter, on June 21, 1971, the aforesaid judgment
and responsibilities belonging to the office of an of dismissal dated May 26, 1971 was modified, and the
attorney. 26 Register of Deeds was thereafter ordered to cancel the
transfer certificate of title issued in favor of plaintiff
As a rule, an attorney enjoys the legal presumption and to issue new titles in the name of defendants
that he is innocent of the charges until the contrary is subject to the lien for attorney's fees in favor of herein
proved, and that, as an officer of the court, he has respondent in accordance with the contract for legal
performed his duty in accordance with his oath. 27 services hereinbefore discussed.
Therefore, in disbarment proceedings, the burden of
proof rests upon the complainant 28, and for the court Eventually, however, this subsequent order was
to exercise its disciplinary powers, the case against the
reconsidered and set aside in the order of September
respondent must be established by clear, convincing 15, 1972, "because it has the effect of adversely
and satisfactory proof. 29 affecting the interest of Ortigas & Co., Ltd.
Partnership, which is not even a party herein," but it
We have painstakingly scrutinized and evaluated the reinstated the decision of May 26, 1971 insofar as it
records of these two administrative cases and we denied the ejectment of the present occupants.
cannot but find that strong and unassailable evidence
exist to render it our irremissible duty to impose the As earlier noted, there is nothing in the records to
ultimate sanction of disbarment on respondent. show that the defendants in the ejectment cases were
declared the true owners of the land subject of said
Respondent's defense is anchored primarily on the cases. Only the fact of possession was ruled upon, and
contract for legal services, executed by his clients what the courts recognized was merely the defendants'
whom he represented in the twenty-two ejectment right of possession. They, therefore, never become the
cases filed before Branches I and II of the former owners of the subject lots in any sense of the word in
Court of First Instance of Rizal, and quoted in full in the absence of any declaration to that effect, by reason
the earlier part of this discussion. of which they could not have legally transmitted any
ownership rights or interests to herein respondent.
It is extremely relevant to note that both of the Furthermore, we have seen that any further claim of
aforesaid two branches of the trial court made no ownership on their part was finally settled by the order
finding as to the validity of the claim of ownership of September 15, 1972, setting aside the order of June
favorable to the defendants therein. On the contrary, 21, 1971, wherein the trial court correctly held that
Judge Salas of Branch I found for the plaintiff and the earlier order unjustifiedly affected adversely the
ordered the defendants, clients of respondent, to rights of Ortigas & Company, Limited Partnership. In
vacate the premises. addition, said court specifically excluded the title of
said partnership from the effects of its decision.
In the case before Judge Navarro of Branch II, the
complaint was dismissed merely on the ground that Pursuant to the provisions of the contract of legal
"since the evidence is uncontroverted that the services, the defendants-clients agreed to convey to
defendants in all these eleven cases have been in open, respondent whatever properties may be adjudicated in
continuous, and adverse possession of their respective their favor in the event of their failure to pay the
parcels dating back since their predecessors in attorney's fees agreed upon. As hereinbefore stated,
there was nothing awarded to the said defendants

except the right to possess for the nonce the lots they
were occupying, nothing more. That respondent
acquired no better right than the defendants from
whom he supposedly derived his claim is further
confirmed in the order of Judge Navarro, dated June
21, 1971, denying the issuance of new certificates of
title to herein respondent who, to further stress the
obvious, was not even a party but only a lawyer of the
defendants therein. It follows that his act of selling the
Ortigas properties is patently and indisputably illegal.
Respondent admits that he has no Torrens title but
insists on the puerile theory that his title is his
contract of legal services. 31 Considering that the
effectivity of the provisions of that contract is squarely
premised on the award of said properties to the
therein defendants, and since there was no such
adjudication, respondent's pretense is unmasked as an
unmitigated deception. Furthermore, it will be recalled
that the land involved in the two ejectment cases
consists of only 1.2 hectares whereas respondent is
claiming ownership over thousands of hectares of land,
the sheer absurdity of which he could not be unaware.
Respondent further admits that he has been and is
continuously selling, up to the present, the entirety of
the land covered by Decree No. 1425 32 pursuant to
the decision of Branch XV of the then Court of First
Instance of Rizal, dated March 31, 1970, declaring the
said decree null and void as well as the titles derived
therefrom.
It must nonetheless be remembered that the decision
of Judge Navarro recognizing the defendants' right of
possession is subject to the final outcome of the March
31, 1970 decision of Branch XV which nullified Decree
No. 1425. The latter decision, at the time the decision
of Judge Navarro was rendered, was pending appeal.
This is precisely the reason why Judge Navarro had to
amend his decision a third time by setting aside the
order of registration of the land in the name of the
defendants. He could not properly rule on the
ownership rights of defendants therein pending a final
determination of the validity of said decree, which thus
prompted him to find merely on the fact of possession.
33
Besides, a mere declaration of nullity cannot, per se these pronouncements and his awareness thereof,
justify the performance of any act of ownership over respondent NAVARRO still continued to sell properties
lands titled in the name of other persons pursuant to titled in the name of Ortigas & Company and the
said decree. To cap it all, as earlier discussed, that Madrigals. 34
decision dated March 31, 1970 has been reversed and
set aside, and a new one entered confirming the Lastly, the motion to dismiss filed by respondent
validity of Decree No. 1425, which latter decision has should be, as it is hereby, denied for lack of merit.
long become final and executory. Respondent inexplicably posits that the charges
against him should be dismissed on the ground that his
In Civil Case No. Q-16265, entitled "Ortigas and Co., suspension was automatically lifted by virtue of our
Ltd. Partnership vs. Navarro," herein respondent was resolution, dated June 30, 1980, which merely reads:
enjoined from selling, offering for sale and advertising
properties of the plaintiff therein. We have seen that a The manifestation of counsel for respondent stating
decision was subsequently rendered therein on among other things that the complaint against
December 16, 1972 by Branch XVI of the Court of First respondent could not prosper if respondent's
Instance of Rizal upholding the validity of the transfer manifestation dated March 3, 1980 in G.R. No. L-
certificates of title issued in the name of Ortigas and 42699-42709 and his request for certification by the
Co., Limited Partnership which became final and Chief Justice to the effect that the petition in G.R. Nos.
executory after respondent's petition for review was L-42699-42709 is deemed dismissed pursuant to Sec.
denied by this Court. However, respondent continued 11(2) of Art. X of the Constitution are granted, are
to sell properties belonging to Ortigas in blatant NOTED.
disregard of said decision. This was categorically
admitted by respondent himself during the There is absolutely nothing in the resolution to support
investigation conducted by the Solicitor respondent's typical distortion of facts. On the
General. 33 contrary, our resolutions dated September 2, 1980,
November 8, 1980, and January 22, 1981 repeatedly
Respondent avers that the said decision cannot be denied respondent's motions for the lifting of his
enforced during the pendency of the appeal therefrom. suspension.
Even if this were true, the fact that respondent was
enjoined by the court from selling portions of the It further bears mention at this juncture that despite
Ortigas properties is compelling reason enough for the suspension of respondent Navarro from the
him to desist from continuing with his illegal practice of law, he continues to do so in clear violation
transactions. and open defiance of the original resolution of
suspension and the aforestated resolutions reiterating
As correctly observed by the Solicitor General: and maintaining the same. Thus, the records of this
Court disclose that in G.R. No. L-78103, entitled "Jose
Respondent Navarro knew that the decision of Judge de Leon, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al.," a Second
Vivencio Ruiz declaring as null and void certificates of Division case filed on April 25, 1987, counsel for
titles emanating from Decree No. 1425 was reversed private respondents therein questioned herein
and set aside. He knew that Judge Pedro Navarro of respondent Navarro's personality to intervene in the
the Rizal Court of First Instance exempted Ortigas & case since he was under suspension, to which
Company from the effects of his decision. He also knew respondent Navarro rejoined by insisting that his
that Judge Sergio Apostol of the Rizal Court of First suspension had allegedly been lifted already. In G.R.
Instance in Quezon City had upheld the validity of the No. 85973, entitled "Hilario Abalos vs. Court of
certificates of title of Ortigas & Company. Despite all Appeals, et al.," the petition wherein was filed on

December 2, 1988 and assigned to the First Division,
respondent Navarro also appeared as counsel for
therein petitioner. Said petition was denied since the
same was prepared, signed and verified by respondent
Navarro, a suspended member of the Philippine Bar.
Over his expostulation that his suspension had already
been lifted, the Court directed the Bar Confidant to
take appropriate action to enforce the same. Again, in
G.R. No. 90873, entitled "Matilde Cabugwang et al. vs.
Court of Appeals, et al.," the Second Division, in a
resolution dated January 31, 1990, imposed a fine of
P1,000.00 upon said respondent for appearing therein
as counsel for petitioner which fine he paid on
February 5, 1990.
In at least three (3) other cases in the Second Division,
respondent Navarro appeared before the Court as
counsel for petitioners therein, viz: (1) G.R. No. L-
74792 (Lorenzo Valdez, et al., vs Intermediate
Appellate Court, et al.), filed on June 11, 1986 and
decided on December 7, 1986; (2) G.R. No.
L-76589 (Atty. Felipe C. Navarro, et al. vs. Court of
Appeals, et al.), filed on November 28, 1986 and
decided on May 4,1987; and (3) G.R. No. 81482
(Ricardo Rasalan vs. Flaviano Pascua, et al.), filed on
January 30, 1988 and decided on February 15, 1988.
The rollos in said cases show that he also appeared as
counsel for the petitioners in the Court of Appeals, but
since the lower courts' original records were not
forwarded to this Court, said rollos do not reflect
whether he also appeared before the different courts a
quo.
Such acts of respondent are evidential of flouting
resistance to lawful orders of constituted authority and
illustrate his incorrigible despiciency for an attorney's
duty to society. Verily, respondent has proven himself
unworthy of the trust and confidence reposed in him
by law and by this Court, through his deliberate
rejection of his oath as an officer of the court.
WHEREFORE, respondent Felipe C. Navarro is hereby
DISBARRED and his name is ordered STRICKEN from
the Roll of Attorneys. Let a copy of this resolution be
furnished to the Bar Confidant and the Integrated Bar
34
of the Philippines and spread on the personal records
of respondent. This resolution is immediately Consequently, four (4) informations were filed against
executory. respondent with the Regional Trial Court of Manila: (a)
one for estafa, docketed as Criminal Case No. 85-
38358; and (b) three (3) for violation of B.P. Blg. 22,
docketed respectively as Criminal Cases Nos. 85-
38359, 85-38360 and 85-38361. In due time, after trial,
A.M. No. 3360 January 30, 1990 the trial court rendered a decision dated 25 August
1987 which:
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, complainant
vs. (a) acquitted respondent of the charge of estafa; and
ATTY. FE T. TUANDA, respondent.
(b) convicted respondent of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 in
all three (3) cases, and sentenced respondent to pay a
PER CURIAM: fine of P6,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency and to indemnify the complainant in
In a Motion to Lift Order of Suspension dated 12 July the amount of P5,400.00 in Criminal Case No.
1989, respondent Fe T. Tuanda, a member of the 8538359;
Philippine Bar, asks this Court to lift the suspension
from the practice of law imposed upon her by a to pay a fine of P 6,000.00, with subsidiary
decision of the Court of Appeals dated 17 October imprisonment in case of insolvency and to indemnify
1988 in C.A.-G.R. CR No. 05093. the complainant in the amount of P5,400.00, in
Criminal Case No. 85-38360; and
On 17 December 1983, respondent received from one
Herminia A. Marquez several pieces of jewelry, with a to pay a fine of P16,000.00, with subsidiary
total stated value of P36,000.00, for sale on a imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to indemnify
commission basis, with the condition that the the complainant in the amount of P15,450.00, in
respondent would turn over the sales proceeds and Criminal Case No. 85-38361, and to pay the costs in all
return the unsold items to Ms. Marquez on or before three (3) cases.
14 February 1984. Sometime in February 1984,
respondent, instead of returning the unsold pieces of On appeal, the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CR No.
jewelry which then amounted to approximately 05093 affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court
P26,250.00, issued three checks: (a) a check dated 16 but, in addition, suspended respondent Tuanda from
February 1984 for the amount of P5,400.00; (b) a the practice of law. The pertinent portion of the
check dated 23 February 1984 also for the amount of decision read as follows:
P5,400.00; and (c) a check dated 25 February 1984 for
the amount of P15,450.00. Upon presentment for For reasons above stated and finding the evidence
payment within ninety (90) days after their issuance, sufficient to sustain the conviction, the judgment is
all three (3) checks were dishonored by the drawee hereby AFFIRMED subject to this modification.
bank, Traders Royal Bank, for insufficiency of funds.
Notwithstanding receipt of the notice of dishonor, It appearing from the records that the accused Fe
respondent made no arrangements with the bank Tuanda is a member of the Bar, and the offense for
concerning the honoring of checks which had bounced (sic) which she is found guilty involved moral
and made no effort to settle her obligations to Ms. turpitude, she is hereby ordered suspended from the
Marquez. practice of law and shall not practice her profession

until further action from the Supreme Court, in
accordance with Sections 27 and 28 of Rule 138 of the
Rules of Court. A copy of this decision must be
forwarded to the Supreme Court as required by
Section 29 of the same Rule.
SO ORDERED. 1
On 16 December 1988, respondent filed a Notice of
Appeal with the Court of Appeals. The Court of
Appeals, in a Resolution dated 9 January 1989, noted
respondent's Notice of Appeal and advised her "to
address her Notice of Appeal to the Honorable
Supreme Court, the proper forum." On 1 February
1989, respondent filed with this Court a Notice of
Appeal.
In a Resolution dated 31 May 1989, the Supreme Court
noted without action respondent's Notice of Appeal
and declared that the Court of Appeals' decision of 17
October 1988 had become final and executory upon
expiration of the period for filing a petition for review
on certiorari on 16 December 1988. In that Resolution,
the Court found that respondent had lost her right to
appeal by certiorari when she posted with this Court a
Notice of Appeal instead of filing a petition for review
on certiorari under Section 1, Rule 45 of the Revised
Rules of Court within the reglementary period.
In the instant Motion to Lift Order of Suspension,
respondent states:
that suspension from the practice of law is indeed a
harsh if not a not painful penalty aggravating the
lower court's penalty of fine considering that accused-
appellant's action on the case during the trial on the
merits at the lower court has always been motivated
purely by sincere belief that she is innocent of the
offense charged nor of the intention to cause damage
to the herein plaintiff-appellee.
We read the above statement as a claim by the
respondent that, she had not violated her oath as a
member of the Philippine Bar upon the ground that
when she issued the checks which bounced, she did
35
not intend to cause damage to complainant Ms. of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court provide as
Marquez. follows:
The Court affirms the suspension from the practice of Sec. 27. Attorneys renewed or suspended by Supreme
law imposed by the Court of Appeals upon respondent Court on what grounds. A member of the bar may be
Tuanda. The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that "the removed or suspended from his office as attorney by
offense [of] which she is found guilty involved moral the Supreme Court of any deceit, malpractice, or other
turpitude." We should add that violation of B.P. Blg. 22 gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral
is a serious criminal offense which deleteriously affects conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime
public interest and public order. In Lozano v. involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the
Martinez,2 the Court explained the nature of the oath which he is required to take before admission to
offense of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 in the following practice, or for a wilful disobedience of any lawful
terms: order of a superior court, or for corruptly or wilfully
appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without
xxx xxx xxx authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at
law for the purpose of gain, either personally or
The gravamen of the offense punished by B.P. Blg. 22 through paid agents or brokers, constitutes
is the act of making and issuing a worthless check or a malpractice. (Italics supplied)
check that is dishonored upon its presentation for
payment. . . . The thrust of the law is to prohibit under Sec. 28. Suspension of attorney by the Court of
pain of penal sanctions, the making of worthless Appeals or a Court of First Instance. — The Court of
checks and putting them in circulation. Because of its Appeals or a Court of First Instance may suspend an
deleterious effects on the public interest, the practice attorney from practice for any of the causes named in
is prescribed by the law. The law punishes the act not the last preceding section, and after such suspension
as an offense against property but an offense against such attorney shall not practice his profession until
public order. further action of the Supreme Court in the premises.
(Italics supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
We should add that the crimes of which respondent
The effects of the issuance of a worthless check was convicted also import deceit and violation of her
transcends the private interests of the parties directly attorney's oath and the Code of Professional
involved in the transaction and touches the interests of Responsibility under both of which she was bound to
the community at large. The mischief it creates is not "obey the laws of the land." Conviction of a crime
only a wrong to the payee or holder, but also an injury involving moral turpitude might not (as in the instant
to the public. The harmful practice of putting valueless case, violation of B.P. Blg. 22 does not) relate to the
commercial papers in circulation, multiplied a exercise of the profession of a lawyer; however, it
thousandfold, can very well pollute the channels of certainly relates to and affects the good moral
trade and commerce, injure the banking system and character of a person convicted of such offense. In
eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public Melendrez v. Decena, 4 this Court stressed that:
interest. 3(Italics supplied)
the nature of the office of an attorney at law requires
Respondent was thus correctly suspended from the that she shall be a person of good moral
practice of law because she had been convicted of character.1âwphi1 This qualification is not only a
crimes involving moral turpitude. Sections 27 and 28 condition precedent to an admission to the practice of
 36

law; its continued possession is also essential for Concordia Abesamis), Francisco Abesamis, Perpetua the defendants. On February 7, 1931, the court
remaining in the practice of law. 5 Abesamis, Isaias Abesamis and Pedro Abesamis in the ordered the commissioners of partition to declare as
manner and under the conditions stated sole heiress Concordia Cuevas to the exclusion of
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to DENY the therein.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual Francisco and Isaias
Motion to Lift Order of Suspension. Respondent shall law library Abesamis.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
remain suspended from the practice of law until virtual law library
further orders from this Court. A copy of this On March 15, 1928, however, Pedro Abesamis and
Resolution shall be forwarded to the Bar Confidant and twenty-five others entered their opposition to the On March 3, 1931, the partition commissioners
to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and spread on distribution of the properties described in the will, for submitted their report, upon which the court declared
the record of respondent. the reason that "a que dichos bienes son de propiedad that "no hay lugar a aprobar por ahora el informe de
pro indiviso entre los aqui opositores y la los comisionados partidores hasta que se haya
G.R. No. L-47431 December 19, 1940 testamentaria," and simultaneously informed the court verificado la particion en dicha testamentaria en la
that they had commenced an action for the partition of cual pueden las partes de esta causa hacer valer los
In the matter of the estate of Crescenciano Abesamis, said properties.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles derechos que pudieran tener sobre los terrenos en
deceased. virtual law library cuestion." A motion for reconsideration having been
CONCORDIA CUEVAS ( alias CONCORDIA denied on September 15, 1932, plaintiffs, on February
ABESAMIS), executrix-appellant, vs. PEDRO On May 14, 1928, the will was admitted to probate and 14, 1934, moved for the approval of the project of
ABESAMIS, 2. o ET AL., oppositors-appellees. Concordia Cuevas was appointed executrix with a partition filed by the commissioners . On February 26,
bond of P1,000.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles 1934, the court ordered the suspension of the approval
Villasan, Valenton and Santiago for appellant. virtual law library of the partition of the properties until the termination
Angel Cecilio for appellees. of the testamentary
On May 13, 1928, Pedro Abesamis and the other proceedings.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
LAUREL, J.: chanrobles virtual law library oppositors did institute civil case No. 4816 in the Court virtual law library
of First Instance of Nueva Ecija against the estate of
This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First Crescenciano Abesamis, Concordia Nuevas, Francisco On January 9, 1937, Concordia Cuevas presented to
Instance of Nueva Ecija dated May 27, 1937, the Abesamis and Isaias Abesamis for the partition, the probate court a partition plan adjudicating the
dispositive part of which reads as follows: alleging that said properties belonged, in the first three lots and the two carabaos in favor of the legatees
instance, to Anacleto Mercado, their common mentioned in the will. This was rejected by the court
Wherefore, the court sustains the opposition to the causante, who entrusted them to Crescenciano for the reason that it was not in conformity with the
approval of the amended project of partition presented Abesamis with the understanding that they were not to inventory of the estate and the decision in civil case
by the executrix and hereby orders the latter to be subdivided as long as the minor children of her No. 4816. On January 26, 1937, the executrix
present another inventory and another project of other deceased son, Teodorico Abesamis, were living submitted an amended inventory and later another
partition which shall include only the property with the Crescenciano. A demurrer interposed by the project of partition distributing the properties of the
adjudicated to the defendants in the final decision of defendants on the ground that there was another estate in accordance with the terms of the will, which
this court in case No. 4816, consisting of only one- pending action involving the same subject matter was were objected by the defendants, because these
eight (1/8) of the three parcels of land described in the sustained after which the plaintiffs were required to included their legitimate shares under the decision in
will of the deceased Crescenciano Abesamis. amend their complaint, the amendment consisting civil case No. 4816. The opposition was upheld by the
simply in eliminating therefrom the estate of court in kits decision of May 27, 1937, the dispositive
On February 11, 1928, Crescenciano Cuevas submitted Crescenciano Abesamis and leaving as party part of which is quoted in the beginning of this
for probate in the court of First Instance of Nueva defendants Concordia Cuevas, Francisco Abesamis and opinion.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
Ecija the last will and testament of her deceased Isaias Abesamis. As these defendants failed to answer law library
natural father, Crescenciano Abesamis, which the amended complaint, they were declared in default
bequeathed three parcels of land, one share of stock in and , on July 3, 1930, judgment was rendered The executrix-appellant assigns the following errors:
the "Gallera de Peñaranda" of a par value of P100, and adjudicating seven-eights (7/8) of the properties in
two carabaos worth P100 to Concordia Cuevas ( alias favor of the plaintiffs and the other one-eight (1/8) for
 37

1. The court erred in not holding that the decision in decision in that case, we are of the opinion that the would divest them of their right of ownership. To
civil case No. 4816 of the Court of First Instance of appellant cannot now be permitted to assail its conclude otherwise would be to permit the executrix to
Nueva Ecija, declaring that the estate of Crescenciano virtuality not to regard it as totally ineffectual against enrich herself at the expense of the
Abesamis is entitled only to one-eight (1/8) of the the testate estate. The rights to the succession of a oppositors.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
property described in the will, is a nullity and can not person are transmitted from the moment of virtual law library
bind the estate of Crescenciano death(article 657, Civil Code), and where, as in this
Abesamis.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles case the heir is of legal age and the estate is not The decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with
virtual law library burdened with any debts, said heir immediately costs against the appellants. So
succeeds, by force of law, to the dominio n, ownership ordered.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
2. The court erred in not approving the amended and possession of the properties of his predecessor, law library
project of partition presented by the executrix on and consequently stands legally in the shoes of the
February 8, 1937, and in not distributing the estate of latter. (Ilustre vs. Alaras Frondosa, 17 Phil., 321; Dais
the deceased Crescenciano Abesamis according to the vs. Court of First Instance of Capiz, 51 Phil., 396.) In A.C. No. 190 September 26, 1964
provision of the will.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary the absence of a special proceeding for the settlement
chanrobles virtual law library of the estate, there is no necessity of a previous MARCOS MEDINA, complainant,
declaration of status and the heir or heirs can sue and vs.
3. The court erred in not finding that it has no be sued in that capacity (Arsenio de Vera et al. vs. LORETO U. BAUTISTA, Respondent.
jurisdiction as a probate court to decide the question Cleotilde Galauran, 37 Off. Gaz., 1821). This disposes
of ownership of the property involved in these likewise of the second assignment of BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:chanrobles virtual law library
proceedings part of which is claimed by the oppositors error.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
to be their property not by virtue of any right of law library In a complaint filed on September 15, 1954,
inheritance from the deceased Crescenciano Abesamis Marcos Medina charged respondent Atty. Loreto U.
but by title adverse to that of the deceased and his With reference to the third assignment of error, it Bautista with the commission of certain acts
estate.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual should be observed that the oppositors instituted a constituting malpractice and conduct unbecoming a
law library separate action (civil case No. 4816) for the partition member of the bar. To this complaint respondent filed
of the properties described in the will of Crescenciano an answer on October 19, 1954. The case was referred
4. The court erred in not holding that the oppositors Abesamis. No question of ownership, therefore, was in to the Solicitor General for investigation, report and
have no personality to object to the project of partition fact determined in the testamentary proceedings (civil recommendation. This official in turn referred the case
presented by the executrix on February 8, 1937, which case No. 4797) by the probate court. It results that to the provincial fiscal of Cagayan for investigation and
was drafted in accordance with the provision of the when, on February 8, 1937, the court disapproved the report. Later after the reception of the corresponding
will of the deceased Crescenciano Abesamis. project partition filed by the executrix, it did not evidence, the Solicitor General submitted his report to
decide adverse claims of proprietorship but only lent this Court finding respondent guilty of the acts of
Under the first assignment of error, appellant impugns force and effect to the decision rendered in civil case malpractice complained of and recommending his
the validity of the decision of the lower court in civil No. 4816.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles disbarment. Together with this report he submitted a
case No. 4816 declaring that the legatees here, virtual law library complaint formally charging respondent with acts
defendants in that action, are entitled only to one-eight constituting the alleged malpractice as found in his
of the property on the ground that the estate of Under the fourth and last assignment of errors, it is investigation with the prayer that the name of
Crescenciano Abesamis was not a party in said vigorously contended that only heirs or legatees may respondent be stricken off from the roll of
proceeding. It should be noted that all the coheirs, present an opposition, and that only inasmuch as the attorneys.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual
except Perpetua Abesamis, were defendants therein, oppositors-appellees are not heirs or legatees, they law library
and that by order of the court, in its instructions to the have no legal personality to object to the approval of
partition commissioners dated February 7, 1931, the the project of partition. By virtue of the judgment in A copy of this formal complaint was served on
herein executrix-appellant was pronounced by the sole civil case No. 4816 adjudicating seven-eights of the respondent so that he may answer it if he so desires in
heiress of the deceased. As said defendants were property in their favor, the herein oppositors had the accordance with the rules. Thereupon, he answered
declared in default and are, to be sure, bound by the right to oppose any project of partition which, in effect, the complaint denying the material allegations thereof

and praying that it be dismissed. He, however, also
prayed that he be allowed to introduce additional
evidence. This was allowed and the case was set for
hearing. The first hearing was set on May 4, 1964,
which, by agreement of the parties was postponed to
June 22, 1964. On this last date, however, no hearing
was held, and so it was again postponed to July 22,
1964. And having neither respondent nor his counsel
appeared on the last date set, complainant and his
counsel submitted additional evidence consisting of
several decisions of the Court of Appeals showing that
respondent was found guilty of estafa. Thereafter, the
case was submitted for
decision.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual
law library
It appears that sometime in 1953, Maria Ragsac
Cabel filed a complaint for reconveyance of a parcel of
land before the Court of First Instance of Cagayan
against complainant Marcos Medina. In the early of
January, 1954, complainant Medina approached the
plaintiff seeking a compromise of the case. Plaintiff
told him to see her lawyer Loreto Bautista, respondent
herein, whereupon he went to see the latter in his
office at Aparri, Cagayan. Respondent demanded
P500.00 as a consideration for the amicable
settlement, and as complainant had no ready cash
then, he asked to be allowed to pay the same in small
installments paying on that occasion the sum of
P35.00. Respondent agreed and thereupon prepared a
motion for an extension of time to file his answer in the
case. Complainant returned to his
hometown.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library
One month later, complainant received an order
declaring him in default and so he went to respondent
to ask him why in spite of their agreement he was
declared in default. Respondent assured him that he
had nothing to worry about, and on that occasion
respondent again asked for P50.00 which then and
there complainant gave. Before complainant left
respondent told him to look for more
money.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual
law library
38
respondent would raise the additional P400.00 to
It turned out that respondent opposed his own complete the sum of P1,200.00 which was fixed by the
motion for an extension of time to file an answer for, in court as the consideration of the reconveyance of the
lieu thereof, he filed a motion to declare complainant property. After inquiry, Atty. Jimenez found that there
in default. Consequently, a decision was rendered was no such amount deposited in court, and in order to
detrimental to complainant since the court allowed correct the wrong generated by the two fictitious
plaintiff to repurchase the property in litigation for thedocuments, Atty. Jimenez prepared another document
sum ofembodying the terms of the amicable settlement which
P1,200.00.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles they agreed would be submitted in the civil case. This
virtual law library settlement having been carried out, it put an end to
the controversy. According to complainant, he paid all
On March 2, 1954, complainant again went to in all to respondent the sum of
the office of respondent in Luna, Mt. Province P500.00.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual
apparently with the purpose of having the papers for law library
the amicable settlement of the case prepared, but on
this occasion respondent prepared two documents, From the foregoing narration, the following facts
Exhibits C and D, wherein, on one hand, it was made are deemed to have been established: (1) respondent
to appear that Maria Ragsac Cabel sold the property to after agreeing with complainant to settle the case
complainant in consideration of the sum of P8,000.00 amicably prepared a motion for extension of time to
and, on the other, the latter reconveyed the same file an answer, but instead he filed a motion to declare
property to the former for the sum of P1,200.00. Both the latter in default; (2) being fully aware of the
documents were witnessed by respondent. Both decision rendered in the civil case, respondent
documents were also found to be fictitious in the sense prepared two fictitious deeds of sale in the sense that
that the considerations mentioned therein were never the consideration in either was never in fact received;
received. Maria Ragsac Cabel was asked by (3) pretending to arrange an amicable settlement of
respondent to sign Exhibit C without knowing its the case, respondent received on different occasions
contents upon the assurance that it was necessary in from complainant several sums totalling P500.00. (4)
order that she could recover the respondent, taking advantage of the ignorance of his
land.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law client Maria Ragsac Cabel, ask her to sign a document
library wherein it was made to appear that she received
P8,000.00 when in truth and in fact she did not receive
Sometime later, complainant received a letter said amount; and (5) respondent received from his
from Atty. Bienvenido Jimenez, co-counsel of client Mrs. Cabel the amount of P800.00 with the
respondent in the civil case, requesting him to bring understanding that the amount was to be deposited in
the title of the property pursuant to the decision of the court for the repurchase of the property, but instead of
court, and complying with this request complainant depositing it he misappropriated the money. These
went to see Atty. Jimenez but instead of bringing the facts constitute malpractice and conduct unbecoming a
title he showed him the document which he was made member of the
to sign purporting to be a deed of sale by Maria bar.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
Ragsac Cabel in his favor of the property for the library
consideration of P8,000.00. Atty. Jimenez asked Mrs.
Cabel if she received the amount mentioned therein, In addition, the record shows that in CA-G.R. No.
which she denied. Instead Mrs. Cabel told Atty. 18560-R, respondent was convicted of estafa and
Jimenez that she had given P800.00 to respondent to sentenced to an indeterminate penalty ranging from 4
be deposited in court with the understanding that said months of arresto mayor to 1 year and 1 day of prision
 39

correccional, with the accessories of the law, and to In re: DALMACIO DE LOS ANGELES, respondent. It is therefore ordered that respondent be removed
indemnify the offended party in the sum of P800.00, from his office as attorney and that his name be
with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. Office of the Solicitor General Edilberto Barot and stricken out from the Roll of Attorneys. So ordered.
And in CA-G.R. No. 21796-R, the Court of Appeals Solicitor Emerito M. Salva for the Government.
made the following derogatory comment against Dalmacio de los Angeles and Luis F. Gabinete for [G.R. AC-UNAV. April 30, 1957.]
respondent: respondent.
In Re Charges of LILIAN F. VILLASANTA for
A lengthy discourse of the relationship of BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.: Immorality, v. HILARION M. PERALTA, Respondent.
attorney and client need not be indulged in. Suffice it
to say that a lawyer should be scrupulously careful in Atty. Dalmacio de los Angeles was convicted of the Ramon J. Diaz for Respondent.
handling money entrusted to him in his professional crime of attempted bribery in a final decision rendered
capacity. A high degree of fidelity and good faith on his by the Court of Appeals and was sentenced to two (2)
part is exacted. (Alindogan v. Gerona Adm. Case No. years, four (40 months, and one (1) day of destierro, SYLLABUS
221, May 21, 1958). Here, appellee (herein respondent and to pay a fine of P2,300, with subsidiary destierro
Bautista) violated the trust. He was bound to deposit in case of insolvency (CA-G.R. No. 11411-R), and under
the P800.00 in court. But he did not; he converted it to section 1, Rule 128, of the Rules of Court, he was 1. ATTORNEYS-AT-LAW; CONVICTION OF A CRIME
his own use and benefit to the damage of appellant. required to show cause why he should not be INVOLVING MORAL TURPITUDE;
Indeed, he was convicted of estafa. Not only that. The disbarred from the practice of his profession. DISQUALIFICATION FOR ADMISSION TO THE BAR.
confidence reposed in him by appellant was once again — Respondent made a mockery of marriage which is a
infringed when he lent his signature to Exhibits 2 and In his written explanation he appealed to the sympathy sacred institution demanding respect and dignity and
3 which he knew to be spurious. Upon these and mercy of this Court considering that he has six his conviction of violation of Art. 350 of the Revised
documents, appellant - for nothing - lost the land children to support the eldest being 16 years old and Penal Code involves moral turpitude. His act in
already won in court. She had to compromise with the the youngest 4 years who will bear the stigma of contracting the second marriage even his act in
defeated suitor. But she got the very short end of the dishonor if disciplinary action be taken against him. He making love to another woman while his first wife is
bargain. And yet, appellee had the temerity to come to made manifest to this Court that if he ever committed still alive and their marriage still valid and existing is
court for attorney's fees. Good morals and sound what is attributed to him, it was merely due to an error contrary to honesty, justice, decency and morality.
public policy bar the portals of justice to him. Guilty of of judgment which he honestly and sincerely deplores. Thus lacking the good moral character required by the
fraud on one count and bad faith on another, he has Rules of Court, the respondent is disqualified from
forfeited all legal claims for services in procuring the Under section 25, Rule 127, a member of the bar may being admitted to the bar.
judgment in Case No. 634-A of the Cagayan Court (6 be removed from his office as attorney if he is
C.J. 725; C.J.S. 1025; 5 Am. Jur. 363; Martin, Legal and convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude the
Judicial Ethics, 2nd Ed. [1961], p. 99). reason behind this rule being that the continued D E C I S I O N
possession of a good moral character is a requisite
There is no question that the crime of estafa is condition for the rightful continuance of the lawyer in
one which involves moral turpitude within the purview the practice of law with the result that the loss of such PARAS, C.J. :
of Section 27, Rule 138, of the Rules of qualification justifies his disbarment (Mortel vs.
Court.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual Aspiras 100 Phil., 586; 53 Off. Gaz., No. 3, 628). And
law library since bribery is admittedly a felony involving moral G. R. No. L-9513 has a direct bearing on the present
turpitude (7 C.J.S., p. 736; 5 Am. Jur. p. 428), this complaint. Said case originated from a criminal action
WHEREFORE, respondent Loreto U. Bautista is Court, much as it sympathizes with the plight of filed in the Court of First Instance of Cagayan by the
hereby disbarred and, as a consequence, his name is respondent, is constrained to decree his disbarment as complainant against the respondent for a violation of
ordered stricken off from the roll of attorneys. ordained by section 25 of Rule 127. Article 350 of the Revised Penal Code of which the
respondent was found guilty. The verdict, when
A.C. No. 350 August 7, 1959 appealed to the Court of Appeals, was affirmed. The
 40

appeal by certiorari taken to this Court by the Thus lacking the good moral character required by the Apparently, Judge Veloso married Ligaya Veluz when
respondent was dismissed for lack of merit. Rules of Court, the respondent is hereby declared he had already begotten three children. (In his
disqualified from being admitted to the bar. So personal reference sheet of September 10, 1947, he
The complaint seeks to disqualify the respondent, a ordered. indicated that he was married with two children
1954 successful bar candidate, from being admitted to named Linda and Nonong but he did not mention his
the bar. The basic facts are the same as those found by wife's name. In his information sheet for GSIS
the Court of Appeals, to wit: On April 16, 1939, the A.M. No. 689-MJ April 13, 1978 insurance dated November 9, 1960 he named his
respondent was married to Rizalina E. Valdez in Rizal, children as Ulpiano, Evangelina and Asuncion, twelve,
Nueva Ecija. On or before March 8, 1951, he courted FELIX LEYNES, complainant, ten and six years old, respectively. Again, he did not
the complainant who fell in love with him. To have vs. state his wife's name. See pages 7 and 58 of his
carnal knowledge of her, the respondent procured the MUNICIPAL JUDGE PEDRO D. VELOSO of General personal record).
preparation of a fake marriage contract which was Nakar, Quezon, respondent.
then a blank document. He made her sign it on March The respondent admits that the thirty-seven-year old
8, 1951. A week after, the document was brought back A.M. No. 809-MJ April 13, 1978 Gloria Tropicales (his alleged housemaid) is his
by the respondent to the complainant, signed by the mistress. Out of their union, two children, named
Justice of the Peace and the Civil Registrar of San BENJAMIN H. VIRREY, complainant, Juana and Paulo, were born in 1970 and 1972 when
Manuel, Tarlac, and by two witnesses. Since then the vs. the respondent was already a sex-agenarian. *
complainant and the respondent lived together as MUNICIPAL JUDGE PEDRO D. VELOSO of General
husband and wife. Sometime later, the complainant Nakar, Quezon, respondent. Respondent Judge, invoking "the interest of justice"
insisted on a religious ratification of their marriage and article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, prays for
and on July 7, 1951, the corresponding ceremony was the dismissal of the immorality charge on the ground
performed in Aparri by the parish priest of said AQUINO, J: that his wife, Rosario V. Veluz (she is named Ligaya in
municipality. The priest no longer required the the marriage certificate), condoned his acts of
production of a marriage license because of the civil For having illicit relations with a concubine under concubinage, as shown in her affidavit of November
marriage contract shown to him. After the ceremony in scandalous circumstances in a house located at the 21, 1974. In that affidavit, she unabashedly stated that,
Aparri, the couple returned to Manila as husband and poblacion of General Nakar, Quezon, Pedro D. Veloso, because her husband's thighbone was broken in a
wife and lived with some friends. The complainant the municipal judge of that town, was charged by Atty. vehicular accident in 1955, she chose Gloria Tropicales
then discovered that the respondent was previously Benjamin H. Virrey with immorality in public office to serve her husband, like a real wife ("upang
married to someone else; whereupon, she filed the (Complaint dated October 23, 1974, p. 10, Rollo of paglingkuran ang aking asawa na ang gagawin niyang
criminal action for a violation of Article 350 of the Administrative Matter No. 809- MJ). paglilingkod ay parang tunay na asawa"). She gave the
Revised Penal Code in the Court of First Instance of assurance that she would not prosecute their offspring.
Cagayan and the present complaint for immorality in Judge Veloso, who is now sixty-eight years old and who
this court. was admitted to the bar in 1938, started his judicial The respondent also presented to the Investigating
career in 1946 as a justice of the peace of Infanta, Judge the affidavit dated March 5, 1976 of complainant
Upon consideration of the records of G. R. No. L-9513 Quezon. Since 1950, he has been functioning as the Virrey wherein the latter withdrew his complaint for
and the complaint, this Court is of the opinion that the incumbent judge of General Nakar. immorality (on the condition that he would not incur
respondent is immoral. He made a mockery of any liability) because he was convinced that Mrs.
marriage which is a sacred institution demanding The respondent contracted marriage with Ligaya Veluz Veloso hired her husband's mistress to take care of
respect and dignity. His conviction in the criminal case at the parish church of Infanta on October 24, 1955. him (Exh. A).
involves moral turpitude. The act of respondent in Curiously enough, that was the date (one day after his
contracting the second marriage (even his act in 46th birthday) when he suffered serious injuries in a Respondent's counsel in his memorandum in lieu of the
making love to another woman while his first wife is vehicular accident at Infanta and when he was brought oral argument scheduled before the Court en banc on
still alive and their marriage still valid and existing) is by plane to Manila and admitted to the V. Luna December 9, 1976 made the preposterous contention
contrary to honesty, justice, decency and morality. General Hospital at six- thirty in the evening. that the respondent should be exonerated because
 41

there was no evidence presented against him since the A judge suffers from moral obtuseness or has a weird IN RE — ATTORNEY JOSE AVANCEÑA, respondent.
complainant did not appear at the hearing. notion of morality in public office when he labors
under the delusion that he can be a judge and at the J. Gonzales and Orense for respondent.
Respondent and his counsel should know that since he same time have a mistress in defiance of the mores Office of the Solicitor General for complainant.
had admitted the commission of concubinage, that and sense of morality of the community. The absence
charge is conclusively established and it does not have of criminal liability does not preclude disciplinary ANGELES, J.:
to be proven anymore. His admission is a confession action by reason of his highly unconventional and
(Sec. 2, Rule 129 and secs. 22 and 29, Rule 130, Rules censurable behavior. On January 12, 1951, the Supreme Court entered a
of Court). resolution as follows:
Nor does the withdrawal by complainant Virrey of his
We hold that Judge Veloso should be dismissed by charge render the administrative case moot. This In Administrative Case No. 407, In re Atty. Jose
reason of his immoral conduct. His moral delinquency Court may motu proprio investigate a judge for his Avanceña, it appearing that respondent was convicted
renders him unfit for the office of municipal judge and continuing, grossly immoral conduct. in criminal case No. 10220 of the Court of First
warrants his removal from office (Sec. 97, Judiciary Instance of Manila, entitled People of the Philippines
Law). Felix Leynes, who complained against Judge Veloso for vs. Jose Avanceña, of the crime of falsification of public
acquitting Ricardo Pujeda and Esperidion Pujeda of document under Art. 172 of the Revised Penal Code,
A lawyer, of course, should have good moral character. the charge of having assaulted his son, Juancho Leynes and that in the decision rendered to that effect the
He may be disbarred for grossly immoral conduct or (Criminal Case No. 872), adopted the charge of Court has found that said respondent has taken
when he is convicted of a crime involving moral immorality withdrawn by Virrey. advantage of the law profession in committing said
turpitude such as concubinage (Secs. 2 and 27, Rule crime to defraud his clients, the Court ordered that
138, Rules of Court; In re Isada, 60 Phil. 915). According to Leynes's counsel, the respondent lives respondent be, as he is hereby, provisionally
with his concubine in a house just across the municipal suspended from the practice of law, pending final
If good moral character is required of a lawyer, with hall and plaza. Leynes posed a rhetorical question: termination of the criminal case No. 10220, now
more reason that requirement should be exacted of a how can the inhabitants of a town have confidence in pending appeal in the Court of Appeals.
member of the judiciary who at all times is expected to the administration of justice by an immoral judge who
observe irreproachable behavior and is bound not to himself violates the law? (p. 326, Rollo of Jose Avanceña, a member of the Bar, was charged with
outrage public decency (Canon 3 of Judicial Ethics, Administrative Matter No. 489- MJ). falsification of public document before the Court of
Administrative Order No. 162 of the Secretary of First Instance of Manila, in criminal case No. 10220.
Justice, August 1, 1946. 42 O.G. 1803). In view of the result arrived at in this case, it becomes After trial, he was found guilty as charged and was
unnecessary to make any adjudication on the charge of sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of two
Judge Veloso, in relying on his wife's condonation of Leynes that Judge Veloso was guilty of partiality in the years to six years of prision correccional, to pay a fine
his immorality, erroneously confounded or equated the disposition of Criminal Case No. 872 and the other of P5,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
extinction of his criminal liability with his moral fitness charges of Virrey imputing to the respondent malicious insolvency, and to pay the costs. The trial court also
to occupy the position of town magistrate. While the delay in the administration of justice, misconduct in found that he took advantage of the law profession in
moral stigma connected with concubinage may be office, neglect of duty and failure to hear, try and committing the crime of falsification of public
tolerated in a private person by those who are not decide Election Case No. 8. document to defraud his clients. A copy of the decision
fastifious, it is intolerable when the concubinage is was sent to the Supreme Court for whatever the action
committed by a judge and even if the spouse of the WHEREFORE, respondent Veloso is removed from the it may deem appropriate to take in the premises.
judge allegedly condones the offense. (See marital office as municipal judge. His application for disability Conformably thereto, the Supreme Court adopted the
disqualification rule in section 20, Rule 130, Rules of retirement is disapproved. resolution hereinabove quoted.
Court; Ordoño vs. Daquigan, L-39012, January 31,
1975, 62 SCRA 270, SO ORDERED. From the decision of the lower court, Jose Avanceña
272-3). appealed to the Court of Appeals. On February 28,
A.C. No. 407 August 15, 1967 1962, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the
lower court.
 42

EN SU VIRTUD, habiendose probado fuera de toda be ordered to surrender his certificate of attorney and
On a petition for review of the decision of the Court of duda racional la culpabilidad del apelante, y la that he be forever prohibited from taking the bar
Appeals to the Supreme Court, the latter Court, on decision apelada estando de conformidad con las examination. An answer to the report has been
June 13, 1962, dismissed the petition for lack of merit. pruebas y la ley, la misma se confirmation in toto, con permitted to be made, in which the court is asked to
las costas contra el apelante. disapprove the report and to direct the setting aside of
On January 21, 1963, Jose Avanceña was committed to the suspension to practice law by the respondent,
prison at the National Penitentiary.1äwphï1.ñët There can, therefore, be no doubt, that Jose Avanceña heretofore ordered by the court.
has committed the crime of falsification of public
On September 25, 1963, the President of the document against his clients with grave abuse of Felipe del Rosario was a candidate in the bar
Philippines extended conditional pardon to Jose confidence, having been found guilty thereof by final examination who failed for the second time in 1925.
Avanceña. judgment of competent jurisdiction. His acts amount to He presented himself for the succeeding bar
deceit, malpractice or misconduct in office as an examination in 1926 and again was unable to obtain
On October 1, 1963, Jose Avanceña was discharged attorney, which constitute grounds for removal from the required rating. Then on March 29, 1927, he
from confinement. office under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, authorized the filing of a motion for the revision of his
not to mention conviction by final judgment of a crime papers for 1925 based on an alleged mistake in the
In the decision of the trial court, the following is said: involving moral turpitude. computation of his grades. The court, acting in good
faith, granted this motion, and admitted Felipe del
The evidence on record conclusively establish the guilt The fact that the respondent was extended conditional Rosario to the bar, but with justices dissenting.
of the accused beyond reasonable doubt as the author pardon by the Chief Executive is of no moment. Such Subsequently, during the general investigation of bar
of the falsification of the Power of Attorney (Exhibit A), conditional pardon merely partially relieved him of the examination matters being conducted by the city fiscal,
with grave abuse of confidence. The accused is a penal consequences of his act, but did not operate as a this case was taken up, with the result that a criminal
lawyer and has taken advantage of the law profession bar to his disbarment, especially so when he is being charge was lodged in the Court of First Instance of
in committing the crime of falsification of a public disbarred on the ground of professional misconduct for Manila against Juan Villaflor, a former employee of the
document to defraud his clients. A lawyer of the type which he had been convicted by final judgment. (Cf. In court and Felipe del Rosario. Villaflor pleaded guilty to
of the accused is a disgrace to the law profession and re Lontok, 43 Phil. 293.) the information and was sentenced accordingly. Del
should be disbarred. Rosario pleaded not guilty, and at the conclusion of the
Wherefore, judgment is hereby entered declaring Jose trial was acquitted for lack of evidence.
In affirming the decision of the trial court, the Court of Avanceña disbarred from the practice of law, and
Appeals said: striking his name from the roll of attorneys. The acquittal of Felipe del Rosario upon the criminal
charge is not a bar to these proceedings. The court is
A la vista de los datos expuestos el Juzgado cree y asi December 7, 1928 now acting in an entirely different capacity from that
concluye que el apelante no ha explicado which courts assume in trying criminal cases. It is
satisfactoriamente como Ilego a su posesion el poder In re FELIPE DEL ROSARIO asking a great deal of the members of the court to
especial Exhibito A; la presuncion es concluyente que have them believe that Felipe del Rosario was totally
aquel es el autor de la falsification de las firmas de los Felipe del Rosario in his own behalf. unaware of the illegal machinations culminating in the
hermanos Joa que aparecen en el poder especial City Fiscal Guevara for the Government. falsification of public documents, of which he was the
Exhibito A. (People vs. Astudillo, 60 Phil. 338). sole beneficiary. Indeed, the conviction of Juan Villaflor
in itself demonstrates that Felipe del Rosario has no
La conclusion es, pues, que el apelante fue quien MALCOLM, J.: legal right to his attorney's certificate. While to admit
preparo el exhibito A; fue quien falsifico las firmas de Felipe del Rosario again to the bar examination would
los hermanos Jao que aparecen en dicho document; y, The supplementary report on bar examination be tantamount to a declaration of professional purity
fue quien Ilevo dicho documento a la oficina del irregularities of the fiscal of the City of Manila, dealing which we are totally unable to pronounce. The practice
notario Tumblos para su ratificacion. with the case of Felipe del Rosario, has been laid of the law is not an absolute right to be granted every
before the court for consideration and action. It is one who demands it, but is a privilege to be extended
recommended by the city fiscal that Felipe del Rosario or withheld in the exercise of a sound discretion. The
 43

standards of the legal profession are not satisfied by The Code of Civil Procedure, section 21, provides that MAGDALENA T. ARCIGA, Complainant, v.
conduct which merely enables one to escape the "A member of the bar may be removed or suspended SEGUNDINO D. MANIWANG, Respondent.
penalties of the criminal law. It would be a disgrace to from his office of lawyer by the Supreme Court by
the Judiciary to receive one whose integrity is reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral SYNOPSIS
questionable as an officer of the court, to clothe him turpitude . . ." The sole question presented, therefore,
with all the prestige of its confidence, and then to is whether the crime of abduction with consent, as Complainant Magdalena T. Arciga filed a complaint for
permit him to hold himself out as a duly authorized punished by article 446 of the Penal Code, involves disbarment against lawyer Segundino D. Maniwang on
member of the bar. (In re Terrell [1903], 2 Phil., 266; moral turpitude. the ground of grossly immoral conduct because he
People ex rel. Colorado Bar Association vs. Thomas refused to fulfill his promise of marriage to her- After
[1906], 36 Colo., 126; 10 Ann. Cas., 886 and note; "Moral turpitude," it has been said, "includes repeated acts of cohabitation between complainant
People vs. Macauley [1907], 230 Ill., 208; Ex parte everything which is done contrary to justice, honesty, and respondent, then a medical technology student
Wall [1882], 107 U. S., 265.)1awphi1.net modesty, or good morals." (Bouvier's Law Dictionary, and a law student respectively, who were sweethearts,
cited by numerous courts.) Although no decision can their illicit relationship resulted in the birth of their
The recommendation contained in the special report be found which has decided the exact question, it child, Michael Dino Maniwang. Despite Segundino’s
pertaining to Felipe del Rosario is approved, and cannot admit of doubt that crimes of this character repeated assurance to Magdalena that he would marry
within a period of ten days from receipt of notice, the involve moral turpitude. The inherent nature of the act her once he passed the bar examinations and even
respondent shall surrender his attorney's certificate to is such that it is against good morals and the accepted made Magdalena’s father believe that they were
the clerk of this court. rule of right conduct. (In re Hopkins [1909], 54 Wash., already married but that the church wedding was
569; Pollard vs. Lyon [1875], 91 U.S., 225; 5 Ops. being deferred until after he has passed said
December 7, 1920 Atty.-Gen. P. I., 46, 185; decisions of the Supreme examinations, he married another woman after his
Court of Spain of November 30, 1876 and June 15, oath taking. In his answer he admitted the allegations
In re CARLOS S. BASA 1895.) of the complaint against him but claimed that he
breached his promise because of Magdalena’s shady
Pedro Guevara for respondent. When we come next, as we must, to determine the past. The Solicitor General recommends the dismissal
Attorney-General Feria for the Government. exact action which should be taken by the court, we do of the case on the ground that such cohabitation and
so regretfully and reluctantly. On the one hand, the renegade on the promise to marry do not warrant his
violation of the criminal law by the respondent disbarment.
MALCOLM, J.: attorney cannot be lightly passed over. On the other
hand, we are willing to strain the limits of our The Supreme Court, while holding that it is difficult to
The Attorney-General asks that an order issue for the compassion to the uttermost in order that so promising state with precision and to fix an inflexible standard as
disbarment of Attorney Carlos S. Basa. a career may not be utterly ruined. to what is "grossly immoral conduct" differentiated the
instant ease from the cases where disbarment of a
Carlos S. Basa is a young man about 29 years of age, It is the order of the court that beginning with the day lawyer for grossly immoral conduct is illustrated and
admitted to the bars of California and the Philippine when Carlos S. Basa shall be discharged from prison, ruled that this case is similar to the case of Soberano
Islands. Recently he was charged in the Court of Fist he be suspended from his office of lawyer for one year. v. Villanueva, 116 Phil. 1206 where respondent’s
Instance of the city of Manila with the crime of So ordered.lawphi1.net refusal to marry the complainant was not so corrupt
abduction with consent, was found guilt in a decision nor unprincipled as to warrant disbarment.
rendered by the Honorable M.V. del Rosario, Judge of Mapa, C.J., Araullo, Street, Avanceña and Villamor, JJ.,
First Instance, and was sentenced to be imprisoned for concur. Complaint dismissed.
a period of two years, eleven months and eleven days
of prision correccional. On appeal, this decision was
affirmed in a judgment handed down by the second SYLLABUS
division of the Supreme Court. 1 [A.C. No. 1608. August 14, 1981.]
 44

1. REMEDIAL LAW; ATTORNEYS AND ADMISSION jurisprudence, disbarment of a lawyer for grossly Segundino in a motel in January, 1971, Segundino
TO THE BAR; GOOD MORAL CHARACTER; A PRE- immoral conduct is illustrated in: (Almirez v. Lopez, stopped visiting her.
REQUISITE TO ADMISSION. — An applicant for Administrative Case No. 481, February 28, 1969, 27
admission to the bar should have good moral SCRA 169. See Sarmiento v. Cui, 100 Phil. 1102; Their paths crossed again during a Valentine’s Day
character. He is required to produce before this CourtCabrera v. Agustin, 106 Phil. 256; Toledo v. Toledo, party in the following month. They renewed their
satisfactory evidence of good moral character and that117 Phil. 768; Villasanta v. Peralta, 101 Phil. 313 relationship. After they had dinner one night in March,
no charges against him, involving moral turpitude, hawBolivar v. Simbol, 123 Phil. 450; Quingwa v. Puno, 1971 and finding themselves alone (like Adam and
been filed or are pending in any court. Administrative Case No. 389, February 28,1967,19 Eve) in her boarding house since the other boarders
SCRA 439; Mortel v. Aspiras, 100 Phil. 586; and had gone on vacation, they had sexual congress. When
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; A REQUISITE FOR RETAINING Roying v. Oblena, 117 Phil. 865). Segundino asked Magdalena why she had refused his
MEMBERSHIP TO THE BAR. — If good moral earlier proposal to have sexual intercourse with him,
character is a sine qua non for admission to the bar, 6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; REFUSAL TO MARRY IN CASE AT she jokingly said that she was in love with another man
then the continued possession of good moral character BAR, NOT SO CORRUPT OR UNPRINCIPLED TO and that she had a child with still another man.
is also a requisite for retaining membership in the WARRANT DISBARMENT. — The instant ease can Segundino remarked that even if that be the case, he
legal profession. Membership in the bar may be easily be differentiated from the cases where did not mind because he loved her very much.
terminated when a lawyer ceases to have good moral disbarment of a lawyer for grossly immoral conduct is
character (Royong v. Oblena, 117 Phil. 865). illustrated. This case is similar to the case of Soberano Thereafter, they had repeated acts of cohabitation.
v. Villanueva, 116 Phil. 1206 where this Court found Segundino started telling his acquaintances that he
3. ID.; ID.; DISBARMENT; "GROSSLY IMMORAL that respondent’s refusal to marry the complainant and Magdalena were secretly married.
CONDUCT," A GROUND FOR DISBARMENT. — A was not as corrupt nor unprincipled as to warrant
lawyer may be disbarred for "grossly immoral conduct disbarment. In 1972 Segundino transferred his residence to
or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving Padada, Davao del Sur. He continued his law studies in
moral turpitude." A member of the bar should have Davao City. Magdalena remained in Cebu. He sent to
moral integrity in addition to professional probity. DECISION her letters and telegrams professing his love for her
(Exh. K to Z).
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; IMMORAL CONDUCT; DEFINED. —
Immoral conduct has been defined as "that conduct AQUINO, J.: When Magdalena discovered in January, 1973 that she
which is willful, flagrant or shameless, and which was pregnant, she and Segundino went to her
shows a moral indifference to the opinion of the good hometown, Ivisan, Capiz, to apprise Magdalena’s
and respectable members of the community" (7 C.J.S. Magdalena T. Arciga in her complaint of February 24, parents that they were married although they were not
959). 1976 asked for the disbarment of lawyer Segundino D. really so. Segundino convinced Magdalena’s father to
Maniwang (admitted to the Bar in 1975) on the ground have the church wedding deferred until after he had
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; GROSSLY IMMORAL CONDUCT; of grossly immoral conduct because he refused to passed the bar examinations. He secured his birth
WHEN A LAWYER’S SEXUAL CONGRESS WITH A fulfill his promise of marriage to her. Their illicit certificate preparatory to applying for a marriage
WOMAN NOT HIS WIFE WILL FALL THEREUNDER. relationship resulted in the birth on September 4, 1973 license.
— Whether a lawyer’s sexual congress with a woman of their child, Michael Dino
not his wife or without the benefit of a marriage should Maniwang.chanrobles.com:cralaw:red Segundino continued sending letters to Magdalena
be characterized as "grossly immoral conduct" will wherein he expressed his love and concern for the
depend on the surrounding circumstances. In Magdalena and Segundino got acquainted sometime in baby in Magdalena’s womb. He reassured her time and
American jurisprudence, where an unmarried female October, 1970 at Cebu City. Magdalena was then a again that he would marry her once he passed the bar
dwarf possessing the intellect of a child became medical technology student in the Cebu Institute of examinations. He was not present when Magdalena
pregnant by reason of intimacy with a married lawyer Medicine while Segundino was a law student in the gave birth to their child on September 4, 1973 in the
who was the father of six children, disbarment of the San Jose Recoletos College. They became sweethearts Cebu Community Hospital. He went to Cebu in
attorney on the ground of immoral conduct was but when Magdalena refused to have a tryst with December, 1973 for the baptism of his child.
justified (In re Hicks, 20 Pac. 2nd 896). In Philippine
 45

Segundino passed the bar examinations. The results moral character is also a requisite for retaining depend on the surrounding circumstances.chanrobles
were released on April 25, 1975. Several days after his membership in the legal profession. Membership in the virtual lawlibrary
oathtaking, which Magdalena also attended, he bar may be terminated when a lawyer ceases to have
stopped corresponding with Magdalena. Fearing that good moral character (Royong v. Oblena, 117 Phil. This Court in a decision rendered in 1925, when old-
there was something amiss, Magdalena went to Davao 865). fashioned morality still prevailed, observed that "the
in July, 1975 to contact her lover. Segundino told her legislator well knows the frailty of the flesh and the
that they could not get married for lack of money. She A lawyer may be disbarred for "grossly immoral ease with which a man, whose sense of dignity, honor
went back to Ivisan.chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime and morality is not well cultivated, falls into
library involving moral turpitude." A member of the bar temptation when alone with one of the fair sex toward
should have moral integrity in addition to professional whom he feels himself attracted. An occasion is so
In December, 1975 she made another trip to Davao but probity. inducive to sin or crime that the saying `A fair booty
failed to see Segundino who was then in Malaybalay, makes many a thief’ or `An open door may tempt a
Bukidnon. She followed him there only to be told that It is difficult to state with precision and to fix an saint’ has become general." (People v. De la Cruz, 48
their marriage could not take place because he had inflexible standard as to what is "grossly immoral Phil. 533, 535).
married Erlinda Ang on November 25, 1975. She was conduct" or to specify the moral delinquency and
broken-hearted when she returned to Davao. obliquity which render a lawyer unworthy of Disbarment of a lawyer for grossly immoral conduct is
continuing as a member of the bar. The rule implies illustrated in the following cases:chanrob1es virtual
Segundino followed her there and inflicted physical that what appears to be unconventional behavior to 1aw library
injuries upon her because she had a confrontation with the straight-laced may not be the immoral conduct that
his wife, Erlinda Ang. She reported the assault to the warrants disbarment. (1) Where lawyer Arturo P. Lopez succeeded in having
commander of the Padada police station and secured carnal knowledge of Virginia C. Almirez, under
medical treatment in a hospital (Exh. I and J). Immoral conduct has been defined as "that conduct promise of marriage, which he refused to fulfill,
which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which although they had already a marriage license and
Segundino admits in his answer that he and shows a moral indifference to the opinion of the good despite the birth of a child in consequence of their
Magdalena were lovers and that he is the father of the and respectable members of the community" (7 C.J.S. sexual intercourse; he married another woman, and
child Michael. He also admits that he repeatedly 959). during Virginia’s pregnancy, Lopez urged her to take
promised to marry Magdalena and that he breached pills to hasten the flow of her menstruation and he
that promise because of Magdalena’s shady past. She Where an unmarried female dwarf possessing the tried to convince her to have an abortion, to which she
had allegedly been accused in court of oral defamation intellect of a child became pregnant by reason of did not agree. (Almirez v. Lopez, Administrative Case
and had already an illegitimate child before Michael intimacy with a married lawyer who was the father of No. 481, February 28, 1969, 27 SCRA 169. See
was born. six children, disbarment of the attorney on the ground Sarmiento v. Cui, 100 Phil. 1102).
of immoral conduct was justified (In re Hicks, 20 Pac.
The Solicitor General recommends the dismissal of the 2nd 896). (2) Where lawyer Francisco Agustin made Anita
case. In his opinion, respondent’s cohabitation with the Cabrera believe that they were married before Leoncio
complainant and his reneging on his promise of There is an area where a lawyer’s conduct may not be V. Aglubat in the City Hall of Manila, and, after such
marriage do not warrant his disbarment. in consonance with the canons of the moral code but fake marriage, they cohabited and she later give birth
he is not subject to disciplinary action because his to their child (Cabrera v. Agustin, 106 Phil. 256).
An applicant for admission to the bar should have good misbehavior or deviation from the path of rectitude is
moral character. He is required to produce before this not glaringly scandalous. It is in connection with a (3) Where lawyer Jesus B. Toledo abandoned his lawful
Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character lawyer’s behavior to the opposite sex where the wife and cohabited with another woman who had
and that no charges against him, involving moral question of immorality usually arises. Whether a borne him a child (Toledo v. Toledo, 117 Phil. 768. As
turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any court. lawyer’s sexual congress with a woman not his wife or to disbarment for contracting a bigamous marriage,
without the benefit of marriage should be see Villasanta v. Peralta, 101 Phil. 313).
If good moral character is a sine qua non for admission characterized as "grossly immoral conduct" will
to the bar, then the continued possession of good
 46

(4) The conduct of Abelardo Simbol in making a dupe Soberano v. Villanueva, 116 Phil. 1206, where lawyer respondent Ariston J. Oblena, a member of the
of Concepcion Bolivar by living on her bounty and Eugenio V. Villanueva had sexual relations with Philippine Bar, with rape allegedly committed on her
allowing her to spend for his schooling and other Mercedes H. Soberano before his admission to the bar person in the manner described therein. Upon
personal necessities, while dangling before her the in 1954. They indulged in frequent sexual intercourse. requirement of this Court, the respondent filed his
mirage of a marriage, marrying another girl as soon as She wrote to him in 1950 and 1951 several letters answer denying all the allegations in the complaint and
he had finished his studies, keeping his marriage a making reference to their trysts in hotels.chanrobles praying that he be not disbarred. On February 3, 1959,
secret while continuing to demand money from the virtual lawlibrary this Court referred the case to the Solicitor General for
complainant, and trying to sponge on her and investigation, report and recommendation.
persuade her to resume their broken relationship after One letter in 1951 contains expressions of such a
the latter’s discovery of his perfidy are indicative of a highly sensual, tantalizing and vulgar nature as to On July 10, 1961, the Solicitor General submitted his
character not worthy of a member of the bar (Bolivar render them unquotable and to impart the firm report on the case with the recommendation that the
v. Simbol, 123 Phil. 450). conviction that, because of the close intimacy between respondent "be permanently removed from his office
the complainant and the respondent, she felt no lawyer and his name be stricken from the roll of
(5) Where Flora Quingwa, a public school teacher, who restraint whatsoever in writing to him with impudicity. attorneys". The pertinent part of the report reads as
was engaged to lawyer Armando Puno, was prevailed follows:
upon by him to have sexual congress with him inside a According to the complainant, two children were born
hotel by telling her that it was alright to have sexual as a consequence of her long intimacy with the The complainant testified that after lunch on August 5,
intercourse because, anyway, they were going to get Respondent. In 1955, she filed a complaint for 1958, Cecilia Angeles, her foster mother, left her alone
married. She used to give Puno money upon his disbarment against Villanueva. in their house and went down to the pig sty to feed the
request. After she became pregnant and gave birth to pigs. At about 1:00 p.m., while she" (complainant) was
a baby boy, Puno refused to marry her. (Quingwa v. This Court found that respondent’s refusal to marry ironing clothes on the second floor of the house the
Puno, Administrative Case No. 389, February 28, 1967, the complainant was not so corrupt nor unprincipled respondent entered and read a newspaper at her back.
19 SCRA 439). as to warrant disbarment. (See Montaña v. Ruado, Suddenly he covered her mouth with one hand and
Administrative Case No. 507, February 24, 1975, 62 with the other hand dragged her to one of the
(6) Where lawyer Anacleto Aspiras, a married man, SCRA 382; Reyes v. Wong, Administrative Case No bedrooms of the house and forced her to lie down on
misrepresenting that he was single and making a 547, January 29, 1975, 63 SCRA 667; Viojan v. Duran, the floor. She did not shout for help because he
promise of marriage, succeeded in having sexual 114 Phil. 322; Abaigar v. Paz, Administrative Case No. threatened her and her family with death. He next
intercourse with Josefina Mortel. Aspiras faked a 997, September 10, 1979, 93 SCRA 91). undressed as she lay on the floor, then had sexual
marriage between Josefina and his own son Cesar. intercourse with her after he removed her panties and
Aspiras wrote to Josefina: "You are alone in my life till Considering the facts of this case and the aforecited gave her hard blows on the thigh with his fist to
the end of my years in this world. I will bring you along precedents, the complaint for disbarment against the subdue her resistance. After the sexual intercourse, he
with me before the altar of matrimony." "Through thick respondent is hereby dismissed. warned her not to report him to her foster parents,
and thin, for better or for worse, in life or in death, my otherwise, he would kill her and all the members of
Josephine you will always be the first, middle and the SO ORDERED. her family. She resumed ironing clothes after he left
last in my life." (Mortel v. Aspiras, 100 Phil. 586). until 5:00 o'clock that afternoon when she joined her
A.C. No. 376 April 30, 1963 foster mother on the first floor of the house. As a result
(7) Where lawyer Ariston Oblena, who had been having of the sexual intercourse she became pregnant and
adulterous relations for fifteen years with Briccia JOSEFINA ROYONG, complainant, gave birth to a baby on June 2, 1959 (pp. 4-8, 21, 23,
Angeles, a married woman separated from her vs. 26, 27, t.s.n., hearing of Aug. 5, 1959).
husband, seduced her eighteen-year-old niece who ATTY. ARISTON OBLENA, respondent.
became pregnant and begot a child. (Royong v. She admitted that had she shouted for help she would
Oblena, 117 Phil. 865). BARRERA, J.: have been heard by the neighbors that she did not
report the outrage to anyone because of the threat
The instant case can easily be differentiated from the In a verified complaint filed with this Court on January made by the respondent; that she still frequented the
foregoing cases. This case is similar to the case of 14, 1959, complainant Josefina Royong charged the respondent's house after August 5, 1959, sometimes
 47

when he was alone, ran errands for him, cooked his FINDINGS AND COMMENT But he was not then the person of good moral
coffee, and received his mail for him. Once, on character he represented himself to be. From 1942 to
November 14, 1958, when respondent was sick of There is no controversy that the respondent had carnal the present, he has continuously lived an adulterous
influenza, she was left alone with him in his house knowledge of the complainant. The complainant claims life with Briccia Angeles whose husband is still alive,
while her aunt Briccia Angeles left for Manila to buy she surrendered to him under circumstances of knowing that his concubine is a married woman and
medicine (pp. 11, 14-18, 24, t.s.n., hearing of August 5, violence and intimidation, but the undersigned are that her marriage still subsists. This fact permanently
1959). convinced that the sexual intercourse was performed disqualified him from taking the bar examinations, and
not once but repeatedly and with her consent. From had it been known to the Supreme Court in 1954, he
The respondent on the witness stand denied that he her behaviour before and after the alleged rape, she would not have been permitted to take the bar
raped the complainant (p. 3, t.s.n., hearing of March appears to have been more a sweetheart than of the examinations that year or thereafter, or to take his
25 1960). He testified that after lunch on August 5, victim of an outrage involving her honor .... oath of office as a lawyer. As he was then permanently
1958, he went to the Commission Of Civil Service to disqualified from admission to the Philippine Bar by
follow up his appointment as technical assistant in the But the foregoing observations notwithstanding, the reason of his adulterous relations with a married
office of the mayor of Makati, Rizal, and read the undersigned cannot in conscience recommend woman, it is submitted that the same misconduct
record of the administrative case against respondent's exoneration. The respondent tempted should be sufficient ground for his permanent
Buenaventura Perez (pp. 23, 24, 34, t.s.n., hearing of Briccia Angeles to live maritally with him not long disbarment, unless we recognize a double standard of
March 25, 1960, Exhs. 1 and 2). after she and her husband parted, and it is not morality, one for membership to the Philippine Bar and
improbable that the spouses never reconciled because another for disbarment from the office of a lawyer.
The respondent, however, admitted that he had illicit of him. His own evidence shows that, tiring of her after
relations with the complainant from January, 1957 to more than fifteen years of adulterous relationship with xxx xxx xxx
December, 1958, when their clandestine affair was her and on the convenient excuse that she, Briccia
discovered by the complainant's foster parents, but to Angeles, could not bear a child, he seduced Josefina RECOMMENDATION
avoid criminal liability for seduction, according to him, Andalis, then 17 or 18 years of age, resulting in her
he limited himself to kissing and embracing her and pregnancy and the birth of a child, on June 2, 1959. Wherefore, the undersigned respectfully recommend
sucking her tongue before she completed her The seduction was accomplished with grave abuse of that after due hearing, respondent Ariston J. Oblena be
eighteenth birthday. They had their first sexual confidence and by means of promises of marriage permanently removed from his office as a lawyer and
intercourse on May 11, 1958, after she had reached which he knew he could not fulfill without grievous his name be stricken from the roll of attorneys.
eighteen, and the second one week later, on May 18. injury to the woman who forsook her husband so that
The last intercourse took place before Christmas in he, respondent, could have all of her. He also took In view of his own findings as a result of his
December, 1958. In all, they had sexual intercourse advantage of his moral influence over her. From investigation, that even if respondent did not commit
about fifty times, mostly in her house and sometimes in childhood, Josefina Andalis, treated him as an uncle the alleged rape nevertheless he was guilty of other
his house whenever they had the opportunity. He and called him 'tata' (uncle), undoubtedly because he misconduct, the Solicitor General formulated another
intended to marry her when she could legally contract is the paramour of a sister of her mother. Considering complaint which he appended to his report, charging
marriage without her foster parents' intervention, 'in her age (she was 17 or 18 years old then), it is not the respondent of falsely and deliberately alleging in
case occasion will permit ... because we cannot ask difficult to see why she could not resist him. his application for admission to the bar that he is a
permission to marry, for her foster parents will object person of good moral character; of living adulterously
and even my common-law wife, will object.' After the The evidence further shows that on July 22, 1954, the with Briccia Angeles at the same time maintaining
discovery of their relationship by the complainant's respondent filed a sworn petition dated May 22, 1954 illicit relations with the complainant Josefina Royong,
foster parents, he confessed the affair to Briccia, alleging "that he is a person of good moral character" niece of Briccia, thus rendering him unworthy of public
explaining that he wanted to have a child, something (Par. 3) and praying that the Supreme Court permit confidence and unfit and unsafe to manage the legal
she (Briccia) could not give him. (pp. 14-16, 19-25, him "to take the bar examinations to be given on the business of others, and praying that this Court render
t.s.n., hearing of March 25, 1960). first Saturday of August, 1954, or at any time as the judgment ordering "the permanent removal of the
Court may fix.." respondent ... from his office as a lawyer and the
xxx xxx xxx cancellation of his name from the roll of attorneys."
 48

In his answer to this formal complaint, respondent Cecilia, were then told to stay at respondent's house, been living together as common-law husband and wife;
alleged the special defense that "the complaint does respondent courted her (t.s.n. 26). Respondent asked that 2 or 3 weeks thereafter, he asked Briccia to marry
not merit action", since the causes of action in the said her if she was married and she told him 'we will talk him, but she confessed she was already married, and
complaint are different and foreign from the original about that later on' (t.s.n. 26). She told respondent she maybe her husband (Arines) was still living in Iriga;
cause of action for rape and that "the complaint lacks was married (to Arines) when she and respondent that he could not then drive Briccia away, because she
the necessary formalities called for in Sec. 1, Rule 128 were already living together as 'husband and wife', in was a stranger in the place, nor could he urge her to
of the Rules of Court." Respondent prayed that after 1942( t.s.n. 26). Respondent asked her to marry him, join her sister Cecilia, as the latter had left Pagsanjan;
due notice and hearing for additional evidence, the when they were living as husband and wife (t.s.n. 27). that in 1943 she told Briccia to separate from him and
complaint be dismissed. Her sister Cecilia left Cavinti 2 months after their to return to Iriga, and urged her never to see him
arrival thereat, but she did not go with her because again; that contrary to his expectations, Briccia
On September 13, 1961, this Court designated the she and respondent 'had already a good returned to Cavinti 3 months thereafter; that Briccia
Court Investigators to receive the additional evidence. understanding'(sexual relations) [t.s.n. 27]. Later, she strongly insisted to live with him again, telling him
Accordingly the case was set for hearing of which the left Cavinti and went to her hometown in Iriga, that she cannot separate from him anymore, as he was
parties were duly notified. On September 29, 1961, Camarines Sur, because respondent was already ashamed; that Briccia's father told him that Briccia's
respondent asked leave to submit a memorandum reluctant to live with her and he told her it was better husband (Arines) had agreed not to molest them as in
which was granted, and on October 9, 1961 the same for her to go home to Iriga (t.s.n. 25). Arriving at Iriga, fact he (Arines) was already living with another
was filed, alleging the following: 1) That the charge of she met her legitimate husband (Arines), who told her woman; that he had 'no choice but to live with her'
rape has not been proven; 2) That no act of seduction he had already a wife, named Conching Guevara (t.s.n. (Briccia) again; that when he filed his petition to take
was committed by the respondent; 3) That no act of 28-29). She then went back to Cavinti (in 1943), with the bar examinations in 1954, he 'did not have the
perjury or fraudulent concealment was committed by her father, and lived with respondent (t.s.n. 29). slightest intention to hide' from this Court the fact of
the respondent when he filed his petition for admission Respondent eventually agreed that she live with him his 'open cohabitation with a married woman' (Briccia
to the bar; and 4) That the respondent is not morally (t.s.n. 35); in fact, she is still presently living with Angeles); that he did not state said fact in his petition,
unfit to be a member of the bar. respondent (t.s.n. 35) [Report of Court Investigators, because he did not see in the form of the petition being
March 6, 1962, pp. 5-6]." used in 1954 that the fact must be stated; and that
Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the since his birth, he thought and believed he was a man
foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted and Thereafter, respondent requested permission to submit of good moral character, and it was only from the
approved by this Honorable Court, without prejudice an affidavit at a later date, which request was also Solicitor General that he first learned he was not so;
to the parties adducing other evidence to prove their granted. The affidavit was filed on December 16, 1961, and that he did not commit perjury or fraudulent
case not covered by this stipulation of facts. the respondent averring, among others, the following:. concealment when he filed his petition to take the bar
1äwphï1.ñët examinations in 1954." (Report of the Court
... That he never committed any act or crime of Investigators, pp. 6-8, March 6, 1962).
At the hearing on November 16, 1961, respondent seduction against the complainant, because the latter
presented his common-law wife, Briccia Angeles, who was born on February 19, 1940, and his first sexual After hearing, the investigators submitted a report
testified as follows: intercourse with her took place on May 11, 1958, when with the finding that: 1) Respondent used his
she was already above 18 years of age; that he had knowledge of the law to take advantage by having
... Respondent is her common-law husband (t.s.n. 23). been living with his common-law wife, Briccia Angeles, illicit relations with complainant, knowing as he did,
She first met respondent on December 16, 1941 at for almost 20 years, but from the time he began that by committing immoral acts on her, he was free
Cavinti, Laguna (t.s.n. 23). She and her sister Cecilia courting her, he 'had no intention to alienate' her love from any criminal liability; and 2) Respondent
Angeles-Royong were evacuated to Cavinti by the Red for her husband, Arines, or to commit the crime of committed gross immorality by continuously
Cross (t.s.n. 23). She was already married (to Teodoro adultery; that he courted Briccia on October 16, 1941, cohabiting with a married woman even after he
Arines) at the time (t.s.n. 24). She and Arines are from and was shortly thereafter accepted by her; that on became a lawyer in 1955 to the present; and 3) That
Iriga, Camarines Sur (t.s.n. 24). Respondent and one February 21, 1942, he found Briccia alone in his respondent falsified the truth as to his moral character
Mr. Flores registered them (t.s.n. 24) as evacuees. house, who told him that her sister, Cecilia, had gone in his petition to take the 1954 bar examinations,
When Mr. Flores asked her about her status she told to Pagsanjan with the other evacuees; that from said being then immorally (adulterously) in cohabitation
him she was 'single' (t.s.n. 25). She and her sister, date (February 21), to the present, he and Briccia had with his common-law wife, Briccia Angeles, a married

woman. The investigators also recommended that the
respondent be disbarred or alternatively, be
suspended from the practice of law for a period of one
year.
Upon the submission of this report, a copy of which
was served on respondent, through his counsel of
record, the case was set for hearing before the Court
on April 30, 1962. Respondent asked leave to file his
memorandum in lieu of oral argument. This was
granted and the corresponding memorandum was duly
filed.
It is an admitted and uncontroverted fact that the
respondent had sexual relations with the complainant
several times, and as a consequence she bore him a
child on June 2, 1959; and that he likewise
continuously cohabited with Briccia Angeles, in an
adulterous manner, from 1942 up to the present.
The main point in issue is thus limited illicit relations
with the complainant Josefina Royong the and the open
cohabitation with Briccia Angeles, a married woman,
are sufficient grounds to cause the respondent's
disbarment.
It is argued by the respondent that he is not liable for
disbarment notwithstanding his illicit relations with
the complainant and his open cohabitation with Briccia
Angeles, a married woman, because he has not been
convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude. It is
true that the respondent has not been convicted of
rape, seduction, or adultery on this count, and that the
grounds upon which the disbarment proceedings is
based are not among those enumerated by Section 25,
Rule 127 of the Rules of Court for which a lawyer may
be disbarred. But it has already been held that this
enumeration is not exclusive and that the power of the
courts to exclude unfit and unworthy members of the
profession is inherent; it is a necessary incident to the
proper administration of justice; it may be exercised
without any special statutory authority, and in all
proper cases unless positively prohibited by statute;
and the power may be exercised in any manner that
will give the party be disbarred a fair trial and a fair
opportunity to be heard. (1 Francisco, Rules of Court
[1958 ed.] 698, citing In Re Pelaez, 44 Phil. 567).
Although it is a well settled rule that the legislature (or
the Supreme Court by virtue of its rule-making power)
may provide that certain acts or conduct shall require
disbarment, the accepted doctrine is that statutes and
rules merely regulate the power to disbar instead of
creating it, and that such statutes (or rules) do not
restrict the general powers of the court over attorneys,
who are its officers, and that they may be removed for
other than statutory grounds (7 C.J.S. 734). In the
United States, where from our system of legal ethics is
derived, "the continued possession of a fair private and
professional character or a good moral character is a
requisite condition for the rightful continuance in the
practice of law for one who has been admitted, and its
loss requires suspension or disbarment even though
the statutes do not specify that as a ground of
disbarment". The moral turpitude for which an
attorney may be disbarred may consist of misconduct
in either his professional or non-professional activities
(5 Am. Jur. 417). The tendency of the decisions of this
Court has been toward the conclusion that a member
of the bar may be removed or suspended from office as
a lawyer for other than statutory grounds. Indeed, the
rule is so phrased as to be broad enough to cover
practically any misconduct of a lawyer (In Re Pelaez,
44 Phil. 567). In the case at bar, the moral depravity of
the respondent is most apparent. His pretension that
before complainant completed her eighteenth
birthday, he refrained from having sexual intercourse
with her, so as not to incur criminal liability, as he
himself declared — and that he limited himself merely
to kissing and embracing her and sucking her tongue,
indicates a scheming mind, which together with his
knowledge of the law, he took advantage of, for his
lurid purpose.
Moreover, his act becomes more despicable
considering that the complainant was the niece of his
common-law wife and that he enjoyed a moral
ascendancy over her who looked up to him as her
uncle. As the Solicitor General observed: "He also took
advantage of his moral influence over her. From
childhood, Josefina Andalis (Royong), treated him as an
49
uncle and called him 'tata' (uncle), undoubtedly
because he is the paramour of a sister of her mother.
Considering her age (she was 17 or 18 years old then),
her inexperience and his moral ascendency over her, it
is not difficult to see why she could not resist him."
Furthermore, the blunt admission of his illicit relations
with the complainant reveals the respondent to be a
person who would suffer no moral compunction for his
acts if the same could be done without fear of criminal
liability. He has, by these acts, proven himself to be
devoid of the moral integrity expected of a member of
the bar.
The respondent's misconduct, although unrelated to
his office, may constitute sufficient grounds for
disbarment. This is a principle we have followed since
the ruling in In Re Pelaez, 44 Phil. 567, where this
Court quoted with approval the following portion of
the decision of the Supreme Court of Kansas in the
case of Peyton's Appeal (12 Kan. 398, 404), to wit:.
The nature of the office, the trust relation which exists
between attorney and client, as well as between court
and attorney, and the statutory rule prescribing the
qualifications of attorneys, uniformly require that an
attorney be a person of good moral character. If that
qualification is a condition precedent to a license or
privilege to enter upon the practice of the law, it would
seem to be equally essential during the continuance of
the practice and the exercise of the privilege. So it is
held that an attorney will be removed not only for
malpractice and dishonesty in his profession, but also
for gross misconduct not connected with his
professional duties, which shows him to be unfit for
the office and unworthy of the privileges which his
license and the law confer upon him. (Emphasis
supplied).
Respondent's conduct though unrelated to his office
and in no way directly bearing on his profession, has
nevertheless rendered him unfit and unworthy of the
privileges of a lawyer. We cannot give sanction to his
acts. For us to do so would be — as the Solicitor
General puts it — recognizing "a double standard of
morality, one for membership to the Philippine Bar,

and another for disbarment from the office of the
lawyer." If we concede that respondent's adulterous
relations and his simultaneous seduction of his
paramour's niece did not and do not disqualify him
from continuing with his office of lawyer, this Court
would in effect be requiring moral integrity as an
essential prerequisite for admission to the bar, only to
later on tolerate and close its eyes to the moral
depravity and character degeneration of the members
of the bar.
The decisions relied upon by the respondent in
justifying his stand that even if he admittedly
committed fornication, this is no ground for
disbarment, are not controlling. Fornication, if
committed under such scandalous or revolting
circumstances as have proven in this case, as to shock
common sense of decency, certainly may justify
positive action by the Court in protecting the prestige
of the noble profession of the law. The reasons
advanced by the respondent why he continued his
adulterous relations with Briccia Angeles, in that she
helped him in some way finish his law studies, and that
his "sense of propriety and Christian charity" did not
allow him to abandon her after his admission to the
bar after almost 13 years of cohabitation, are hardly an
excuse for his moral dereliction. The means he
employed, as he stated, in order to extricate himself
from the predicament he found himself in, by courting
the complainant and maintaining sexual relations with
her makes his conduct more revolting. An immoral act
cannot justify another immoral act. The noblest means
he could have employed was to have married the
complainant as he was then free to do so. But to
continue maintaining adulterous relations with a
married woman and simultaneously maintaining
promiscuous relations with the latter's niece is moral
perversion that can not be condoned. Respondent's
conduct therefore renders him unfit and unworthy for
the privileges of the legal profession. As good
character is an essential qualification for admission of
an attorney to practice, he may be removed therefrom
whenever he ceases to possess such character (7 C.J.S.
735).
50
The respondent further maintains that the Solicitor approximation of himself is not a gauge to his moral
General exceeded his authority in filing the present character. Moral character is not a subjective term,
complaint against him for seduction, adultery and but one which corresponds to objective reality. Moral
perjury, as it charges an offense or offenses different character is what a person really is, and not what he or
from those originally charged in the complaint of other people think he is. As former Chief Justice Moran
January 14, 1959 for rape, and cites as authority observed: An applicant for license to practice law is
Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 128 of the Rules of Court, required to show good moral character, or what he
which state:. really is, as distinguished from good reputation, or
from the opinion generally entertained of him, the
SEC. 4. Report of the Solicitor General.— Based upon estimate in which he is held by the public in the place
the evidence adduced at the hearing, if the Solicitor where he is known. As has been said, ante the
General finds no sufficient ground to proceed against standard of personal and professional integrity which
the respondent, he shall submit a report to the should be applied to persons admitted to practice law
Supreme Court containing his findings of fact and is not satisfied by such conduct as merely enables
conclusion, whereupon the respondent shall be them to escape the penalties of criminal law. Good
exonerated unless the court orders differently. moral character includes at least common honesty (3
Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, [1957 ed.]
SEC. 5. Complaint of the Solicitor General. Answer of 626, citing In Re Weinstein, 42 P. [2d] 744 B.L.D.,
the respondent. — If the Solicitor General finds Cooper v. Greeley. 1 Den. [N.Y.] 3447; In Re Del
sufficient ground to proceed against the respondent, Rosario, 52 Phil. 399; and People v. Macauley, 82 N.E.
he shall file the corresponding complaint, accompanied 612). Respondent, therefore, did not possess a good
with all the evidence introduced in his investigation, moral character at the time he applied for admission to
with the Supreme Court, and the respondent shall be the bar. He lived an adulterous life with Briccia
served by the clerk of the Supreme Court with a copy Angeles, and the fact that people who knew him
of the complaint with direction to answer the same seemed to have acquiesced to his status, did not
within fifteen days. render him a person of good moral character. It is of
no moment that his immoral state was discovered then
The contention is devoid of merit. Nothing in the or now as he is clearly not fit to remain a member of
language of the foregoing rules requires the Solicitor the bar.
General to charge in his complaint the same offense
charged in the complaint originally filed by the WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby entered striking the
complainant for disbarment. Precisely, the law name of herein respondent, Ariston J. Oblena, from the
provides that should the Solicitor General find roll of attorneys.
sufficient grounds to proceed against the respondent,
he shall file the corresponding complaint, accompanied
by the evidence introduced in his investigation. The
Solicitor General therefore is at liberty to file any case
against the respondent he may be justified by the
evidence adduced during the investigation..
The respondent also maintains that he did not falsify
his petition to take the bar examinations in 1954 since [A.M. No. RTJ-92-904. December 7, 1993.]
according to his own opinion and estimation of himself
at that time, he was a person of good moral character.
This contention is clearly erroneous. One's own
 51

DR. NORBERT L. ALFONSO, Complainant, v. JUDGE part of the narration but not as evidence of the truth THIS CASE. — But even if the admission of Sol were to
MODESTO C. JUANSON, Branch 30, Regional Trial thereof. If they were then allowed by the Investigating be taken as proof of the truth of the facts so admitted,
Court of Manila, Respondent. Justice as merely "part of the narration," they should considering, however, that Sol’s admission that she
only be considered as independently relevant engaged in sexual intercourse on five occasions made
Nicanor B. Padilla and Roberto A. Demigillo for statements, i.e., as proof that Sol made statements or no reference to specific dates, that their affair
complainant. admissions, but not as proof of the truth of facts antedated Sol’s marriage, that their last proven tryst
revealed in the said statements or admissions. was in Hongkong in 1989, and that there is an absence
S.N. Barlongay and W.B. Lachica for Respondent. Elsewise stated, the admission in evidence of the of positive and competent evidence to show that any of
words spoken by Sol is not to be used in determining the five acts of sexual intercourse took place after the
the issue of their truth. (FRANCISCO, V.J., The Revised respondent’s appointment to the judiciary, it cannot be
SYLLABUS Rules of Court in the Philippines, vol. VII, Part I, 1973 safely presumed that the respondent committed any of
ed., 438). This being so, the acts of sexual intercourse the sexual indiscretions after he became a judge.
admitted by Sol cannot, insofar as the respondent is Respondent is not charged for immorality committed
1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; RES INTER ALIOS concerned, be deemed proven by the said admission or before his appointment. Accordingly, proof of prior
ACTA RULE; THE ACTS OF SEXUAL INTERCOURSE confession. While it is true that technical rules of immoral conduct cannot be a basis for his
ADMITTED BY SOL WERE TAKEN MERELY AS PART evidence should not be applied in administrative cases, administrative discipline in this case. The respondent
OF THE NARRATION BUT NOT AS EVIDENCE OF however, since the Investigating Justice herself had may have undergone moral reformation after his
THE TRUTH THEREOF; THUS THERE IS IN THIS specifically allowed the hearsay answers merely as appointment, or his appointment could have
CASE NO DIRECT AND COMPETENT EVIDENCE part of the narration, or more specifically as completely transformed him upon the solemn
AGAINST THE RESPONDENT THAT HE HAD ILLICIT independently relevant statements, it would be unfair realization that a public office is a public trust and
SEX WITH SOL. — Sol’s admission or confession to the and arbitrary to thereafter disregard the ruling. All public officers and employees must at all times be
complainant that she had carnal knowledge of the told, there is in this case no direct and competent accountable to the people, serve them with utmost
respondent on five occasions made no reference to evidence against the respondent that he had illicit sex responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency, act with
specific dates and is hearsay. In his direct with Sol. patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives. (Section
examination, the complainant’s counsel exerted no 1, Article XI, 1987 Constitution). It would be
further effort to obtain clarifications as to the dates 2. ID.; SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE IS THE QUANTUM unreasonable and unfair to presume that since he had
thereof. He perhaps realized its futility because the OF TRUTH REQUIRED IN ADMINISTRATIVE CASES; wandered from the path of moral righteousness, he
narration by the complainant of the information clearly COMPLAINANT FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THIS could never retrace his steps and walk proud and tall
indicated that the complainant did not ask Sol to REQUIREMENT. — The imputation of illicit sexual acts again in that path. No man is beyond reformation and
elaborate on the five illicit sexual acts. On cross- upon the incumbent judge must be proven by redemption. A lawyer who aspires for the exalted
examination, counsel for the respondent carefully substantial evidence, which is the quantum of proof position of a magistrate knows, or ought to know, that
avoided any entanglement with the details of the required in administrative cases. This the complainant he must pay a high price for that honor — his private
admission not only because it might have provided an failed to do. The meetings of the respondent and Sol at and official conduct must at all times be free from the
occasion for the complainant to elaborate thereon, but Unit 412-A of Citihomes on 11 July and 17 July 1992 do appearance of impropriety. (Jugueta v. Boncaros, 60
because it would have operated as a waiver of his not by themselves prove that these were trysts for SCRA 27 [1974]). And the lawyer who is thereafter
objection to the testimony as hearsay. The transcripts libidinal gratification. Evidence was offered by the appointed thereto must perforce be presumed to have
of the stenographic notes disclose that the counsel for respondent to prove otherwise. However, considering solemnly bound himself to a way of conduct free from
the respondent objected and entered a continuing their prior special relationship, the respondent and any hint or suspicion of impropriety.
objection to questions directed to elicit or which Sol’s meetings could reasonably incite suspicion of
tended to elicit statements or admissions supposedly either its continuance or revival and the concomitant 4. ID.; IMMORALITY; NOT BASED ALONE OR ILLICIT
made or given by Sol on grounds that any such intimacies expressive of such relationship. SEXUAL INTERCOURSE. — Finally, a word on the
statements or admissions would be hearsay or respondent’s defense that he could not have sexual
otherwise barred by the res inter alios acta rule. 3. JUDICIAL ETHICS; ANY PROOF OF PRIOR congress with Sol because he was suffering from
Justice Jaguros recognized the merit of the objection; IMMORAL CONDUCT CANNOT BE A BASIS FOR diabetes mellitus and prostatitis. The claim is both self-
hence, she allowed the answers to be taken merely as RESPONDENT’S ADMINISTRATIVE DISCIPLINE IN serving and irrelevant. No expert testimony was

presented to prove the stage, extent or degree of
seriousness of the diseases and their effects on his
capacity to copulate. The physicians who purportedly
issued the medical certificates did not testify thereon.
Besides, immorality — for which the respondent is
charged — is not based alone on illicit sexual
intercourse. It is settled that: "immorality has not been
confined to sexual matters, but includes conduct
inconsistent with rectitude, or indicative of corruption,
indecency, depravity, and dissoluteness; or is wilful,
flagrant, or shameless conduct showing moral
indifference to opinions of respectable members of the
community, and as an inconsiderate attitude toward
good order and public welfare." (Black’s Law
Dictionary, Sixth ed., 1990, 751).
5. ID.; RESPONDENT THUS CANON 3, CANONS OF
JUDICIAL ETHICS, AND CANON 2, CODE OF
JUDICIAL CONDUCT; HE VIOLATED LIKEWISE THE
RULE REGARDING OFFICIAL SESSION HOURS;
FINE OF P2,000 AS PENALTY THEREFOR. — In short,
the respondent suddenly became indiscreet; he
succumbed to the sweet memories of the past and he
was unable to disappoint Sol who asked for his legal
advice on a matter which involved her employment.
Such indiscretions indubitably cast upon his conduct
an appearance of impropriety. He thus violated Canon
3 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics which mandates
that" [a] judge’s official conduct should be free from
the appearance of impropriety, and his personal
behavior, not only upon the bench and in the
performance of judicial duties, but also in his everyday
life, should be beyond reproach," and Canon 2 of the
Code of Judicial Conduct which provides that" [a]
judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of
impropriety in all activities." It has been said that a
magistrate of the law must comport himself at all times
in such manner that his conduct, official or otherwise,
can bear the most searching scrutiny of the public that
looks up to him as the epitome of integrity and justice.
(Dia-Añonuevo v. Bercacio, 68 SCRA 81 [1975]). The
ethical principles and sense of propriety of a judge are
essential to the preservation of the faith of the people
in the judiciary. (Candia v. Tagabucba, 79 SCRA 51
[1977]). Wherefore, for violations of the Code of
Judicial Conduct, the Canons of Judicial Ethics, and the
rule on official time, respondent Judge Modesto C.
Juanson is hereby sentenced to pay a FINE of TWO
THOUSAND PESOS (P2,000.00) and, further, sternly
warned that a repetition of the same or similar acts
shall be dealt with more severely.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
On 15 September 1992, the complainant, a doctor of
medicine by profession, filed with this Court a sworn
complaint charging the respondent with immorality
and violation of the Code of Judicial Ethics. He accuses
the respondent of maintaining illicit sexual relations
with his wife. Sol Dinglasan Alfonso. The complainant
and his wife were married on 10 December 1988 and
their union bore them three children, all boys, ages 3
years old, 2 years old, and 4 months old, respectively.
He alleges that their married life was peaceful and
happy until the discovery of the sordid affair, which
came about in this manner:chanrobles.com.ph : virtual
law library
Sometime in February 1991, the complainant received
a phone call from the wife of the respondent who
informed him that Sol and her husband (respondent)
have been carrying on an affair and that she has in her
possession the love letters of Sol which she wants to
show to the complainant. Although he did not believe
the information and even berated Mrs. Juanson for
trying to ruin his family, he, nevertheless, told Sol
about it. Sol assured him of her love and concern for
their family and claimed that the respondent was just a
client of her former office, the Banco Filipino (EDSA
Cubao Branch). Two weeks later, Mrs. Juanson called
him again to inquire if he had received the photocopies
of Sol’s love letters to the Respondent. He again
scolded Mrs. Juanson and told her not to call him up
anymore. On 12 June 1992, he and Sol left for the
United States of America (USA) for a vacation. He
stayed there up to 19 July 1992; however, Sol returned
52
ahead of him on 10 July 1992. During his absence,
specifically on 17 June 1992, Mrs. Juanson called up
his father, Atty. Norberto Alfonso, and divulged to the
latter the illicit affair between the respondent and Sol.
On 20 June 1992, Mrs. Juanson sent to Atty. Alfonso
photocopies of Sol’s love letters to the Respondent.
During their pre-arranged meeting on 25 June 1992,
Mrs. Juanson delivered the original copies of Sol’s
alleged love letters to Atty. Alfonso who was
accompanied by the complainant’s sister, Celestine A.
Barreto.
When Sol arrived in the Philippines on 10 July 1992,
Atty. Alfonso decided to hire a private investigating
agency to undertake an inquiry on the alleged illicit
affair between Sol and the Respondent. Through
surveillance conducted by its private investigators, the
agency found out that Sol had met with the respondent
on 11 and 17 July 1992 at Unit 412-A of Citihomes at
130 San Francisco St., Mandaluyong, Metro Manila,
and that they stayed inside the unit for two to three
hours.cralawnad
Complainant further alleges that on 25 July 1992, five
days after his arrival from the USA, his sister Celestine
told him about the illicit relationship between Sol and
the Respondent. Celestine showed him the pictures
taken by the private investigators and the alleged love
letters of Sol. In the evening of the said date, in the
presence of their respective parents, the complainant
confronted Sol and showed her the proofs; Sol still
denied the affair and insisted that she was just
discussing some business with the Respondent. Later,
however, at about 1:30 a.m. in their house, Sol finally
admitted to having an illicit sexual affair with the
respondent since late 1983 when she was an employee
of Banco Filipino (EDSA Cubao Branch) and that
before they left for the USA, she met the respondent at
Unit 412-A Citihomes.
As a result of this revelation, the complainant sent his
wife out of the house. He and Sol have been living
separately since 26 July 1992. He also subsequently
discovered from the statement of billing from Pacific
Bell for overseas calls which he and Sol made while
 53

they were in the USA that on 17 and 25 June 1992 Sol On 4 May 1993, the Court referred the case to "O"). Complainant followed in returning home only on
had made calls to the respondent’s office at the Manila Associate Justice Lourdes T. Jaguros of the Court of July 19, 1992 (Exh. "O-1").
Regional Trial Court.chanrobles.com:cralaw:red Appeals for investigation, report and recommendation.
On July 25, 1992, Complainant was invited by his
Complainant submits that the respondent is Justice Jaguros conducted a full-blown investigation. At father, Atty. Norberto Alfonso to his sister Celestine
undeserving of the noble office of the judiciary and the hearings on 17, 18, 21 and 29 of June 1993 and 6, Barreto’s house, and there his father showed him five
prays that he be meted the appropriate administrative 8, 9 and 12 of July 1993, the parties submitted (5) loveletters written by Complainant’s wife Sol with
sanction for immorality and violation of the Code of testimonial and documentary evidence. On 4 October envelopes addressed to Atty. Modesto C. Juanson
Judicial Ethics. 1993, she submitted her Report and Recommendation (Exhs. "A" to "E" and submarking), and pictures taken
dated 30 September 1993. Pertinent portions of her by private investigators of Complainant’s wife and
In compliance with this Court’s Resolution of 22 findings of facts read as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph respondent Judge in company of each other (Exhs. "F-
October 1992, the respondent filed his Comment on 21 5" to "F-22", "G-2" to "G-14"). Complainant recognized
December 1992. He admits that he knows Sol and that "As culled from the evidence of this case, Complainant the handwriting of his wife Sol in said love letters,
"they have been communicating with each other Dr. Norbert L. Alfonso and Sol Dinglasan were married specifically the GAIN memo pad paper used by Sol in
casually and innocently," but denies that they are at the Sta. Ana Catholic Church on December 10, 1988 her love letter (Exh. "D") which is a prescription pad of
lovers and were having an illicit affair, that Sol has as evidenced by a marriage contract (Exh. "N"). Three Complainant to his patients. Likewise, in the pictures,
been sending love letters to him, and that, except for children were born of this marriage. John Jason, three Complainant recognized his wife Sol holding a
the 11 and 17 July 1992 meetings, he and Sol had been (3) years old, Jan Norbert, two (2) years old, and the "Payless" bag (Exh. "F-6") with the Respondent Judge
going to the apartment situated at 130 San Francisco youngest Jan Joseph, four (4) months old. Complainant holding the same bag later on (Exh. "F-14"). In
St., Mandaluyong, Metro Manila, and staying there for and his family lived a happy and normal life with their practically all the pictures, Complainant identified his
hours. He asserts that he came to know Sol sometime Sundays spent on outings after the Sunday mass. (p. 9, wife Sol and Respondent Judge. The Respondent Judge
in 1987 when she engaged his professional services in tsn, June 29, 1993). was no stranger to Complainant as the latter knows
connection with five criminal cases filed by her in the said Judge personally. Said Judge is one of the best
Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal and in the friends of Complainant’s parents-in-law and was even a
Regional Trial Court of Pasig. In the course of their In February, 1991, Complainant received phone calls sponsor in the wedding of Complainant’s sister-in-law.
attorney-client relationship, Sol sought legal advice from a woman introducing herself as a concerned Both Complainant and Respondent Judge had met
from him and during those occasions they usually friend telling that complainant’s wife is having an illicit thrice and talked with each other.chanrobles
talked over the phone and not in the office. In June affair with her said woman caller’s husband. Said lawlibrary : rednad
1992, he received an overseas call from Sol who was caller did not identify herself but only said she was in
then in the USA. Sol asked for advice concerning her possession of love letters of complainant’s wife Sol to The five love letters, including a picture of the
problem with her employer, the Security Bank and said caller’s husband. After two weeks, said Respondent Judge (Exh. "K") were handed to
Trust Co. (Dau Central Branch). They agreed that Sol `concerned friend’ called up the Complainant again to Complainant’s father, Atty. Norberto Alfonso by a lady
would see him upon her return to the Philippines. On ask him if he had received said caller’s registered mail. who introduced herself, as Mrs. Ceferina Juanson in
11 July 1992, shortly after her arrival from the USA, he Complainant after both calls asked his wife Sol about the presence of Complainant’s sister, Celestine
and Sol met at the aforementioned apartment, which her having an affair with another man, and in both Barreto. The three met at the front entrance of the Sto.
was leased not by the respondent but by Celestino instances, Sol assured him of her love. Then the calls Domingo Church, Quezon Boulevard, Quezon City and
Esteban. After discussing her problem, with Celestino stopped for the rest of the year 1991 and early part of proceeded to the City Diners Restaurant in the same
and two other persons present, he and Sol left the 1991 although Complainant noticed that his wife Sol city where the three had a talk and where Mrs.
apartment and took a late lunch at Fastfood, Robinson. used to go out alone every Juanson handed to Atty. Alfonso the five love letters
He reassures the complainant "that his wife has always Saturday.chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law library with a picture, at about 10:30 to 11:30 a.m. in late
been faithful to him and that he would do nothing as June 1992. Prior to said meeting on June 17, 1992, at
would tarnish their warm relationship, much less On June 12, 1992, Complainant and his wife Sol went about 11:00 a.m. a "concerned woman" had called up
destroy complainant’s family." to U.S.A. for a vacation but the latter decided to return Atty. Alfonso at his home and in the vernacular had
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary to Manila ahead of the former on July 10, 1992 (Exh. said "Tinataihan ang ulo ng anak mo ng babaeng iyan"
referring to Complainant’s wife. To clear Atty.
 54

Alfonso’s doubt, the woman promised to send proofs of Respondent Judge and Sol were marked and offered
which Atty. Alfonso received by LBC in a parcel as Exhibits "F-5" to "F-22" .chanroblesvirtualawlibrary x x x
containing the xerox copies of Complainant’s wife’s
love letters to Atty. Modesto C. Juanson. The other team of the Truth Verifier System, Inc. led
by Edgardo Tamayo practically corroborated the A She took a deep breath again and told me,
After the meeting with the lady who identified herself findings of the Marjorie Juinio team. A formal report ‘Sweetheart, I am very, very, very sorry, I made a
as Mrs. Ceferina Juanson, Atty. Alfonso got an marked and offered as Exhibit "G" to "G-1", and mistake.’ I asked, ‘What mistake is that?’ She replied ‘I
overseas call from Complainant that his wife Sol was pictures taken of Respondent Judge and Complainant’s had sexual intercourse with the Judge.’
coming home to Manila earlier so that Atty. Alfonso wife Sol marked and offered as Exhibits "G-2" to "G-
engaged the services of a private investigating agency, 14" were presented before the Investigator. x x x
Truth Verifier System, Inc., to conduct surveillance of
the activities of Complainant’s wife, Sol upon her Five days after the arrival of Complainant Dr. Norbert
arrival from the U.S.A. Sol Alfonso did arrive on July L. Alfonso, he was invited by his father, Atty. Norberto Q What else, if any, happened during that
10, 1992, and on July 11 and 17, 1992, the Truth Alfonso to Norbert’s sister’s house in San Juan, Metro confrontation?
Verifier System Inc. through Marjorie Juinio and Manila. In the house of Celestine Alfonso Barreto, Atty.
Edgardo Tamayo, licensed private detectives Alfonso showed his son, Norbert the love letters A I asked my wife ‘How many times did you have
conducted surveillance operation on Mrs. Sol written by his wife Sol to Respondent Judge (Exhs. "A" sexual intercourse with the Judge’?
Dinglasan and respondent Judge Modesto Juanson. On to "E"). Complainant recognized the handwritings of
said date of July 17, 1992, said private detectives his wife Sol and even the GAIN memo stationery which Q Was there any response?
together with Raymond Tabangcura and Edgar Complainant was using as his prescription pad for his
Naquila, saw, Sol Dinglasan Alfonso go out of her patients (Exh. "D"). He recognized his wife Sol and A She answered five times and then right away I said,
house carrying a bag, take a tricycle and alight at Respondent Judge in the pictures taken by the private ‘Putangina mo, five times lang. Alam mo ba kung ilang
Lamayan St., walk towards Sta. Ana Church then detectives. On said day, Complainant Norbert Alfonso beses kitang naganyan? Tarantado ka.’ With my voice
board a taxicab. Following said taxicab, the taxi experienced the greatest shock of his life and not so loud because the door and the windows were
stopped at City Homes, San Francisco Street, wondered what happened to his life. His father, Atty. opened. If I shout the neighbors will hear and then the
Mandaluyong, Metro Manila. Sol went inside Unit 412- Alfonso, however, advised him not to hurt his wife Sol. yayas will go down right away.
A Citihomes, and stayed inside for about three hours. In that same party, Complainant showed Sol the
Respondent Judge Modesto Juanson came out first of pictures and the loveletters which made Sol turn pale Q What was your wife doing at that time?
said unit, wearing blue walking shorts and light and stammer when talking. Sol’s own parents were
colored polo and carrying the plastic bag which Sol embarrassed and walked out of the party. A My wife was crying and saying, ‘Sweetheart, I am
was seen carrying earlier, and then followed by Sol. At very, very sorry. Forgive me.’ She was kneeling before
around 1:00 p.m., the Respondent Judge and Sol were On the same night at about 10 in the evening, me and begging forgiveness.’Forgive me, sweetheart, I
inside said Respondent’s Wrangler jeep on their way to Complainant Dr. Norbert Alfonso confronted his wife love you.’chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
Robinson Galeria at EDSA. The two ate at Mongolian Sol as to the truth of her relationship with Respondent
Restaurant and at Gusto Unico, then they proceeded to Judge. Before the Investigator said Complainant made I told my wife, ‘you do not love me, you love your
Robinson’s Supermarket. Inside the supermarket, the following testimony on direct stupid Judge.’
Marjorie Juinio saw the Respondent Judge put his arm examination:chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
on the shoulder of Sol, and they were also seen holding Q Is there anything else that you discussed during that
hands (pp. 23-26, tsn, June 21, 1993). Then the two, x x x confrontation aside from the admission?
Respondent Judge and Sol boarded the Wrangler jeep.
At about 3:45 p.m., Sol alighted at the corner of Suter A After that admittance of my wife having sexual
and Roxas Streets and then boarded a tricycle while ATTY. DEMIGILLO:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library relationship with the Judge, reminiscing the past
the jeep left. The formal report of the Truth and events when we were together I told my wife, ‘That’s
Verifier System, Inc. has been offered by Complainant Q What else did your wife tell you during that why pala every Saturday umaalis ka dito. Sinong
as Exhibit "F-1" to "F-4" while the many pictures taken confrontation, her exact words?
 55

pinupuntahan mo?’ And definitely, she admitted to me, Some elaboration of the respondent’s version is him the letter from the Security Bank and after
‘To the Judge.’ (pp. 35-41, tsn, June 29, 1993). necessary. He is now 56 years old. (TSN, 8 July 1993, interviewing her he promised to prepare a draft of a
31). He and his wife, Ceferina, were married in 1961 "reply." Present at that time were Celestino Esteban,
The confrontation between Complainant and his wife and have two sons. Ceferina is eight years his senior. lessee of the unit who is his friend, George Zari, and
Sol ended at about 5:00 a.m. of the following day, July (TSN, 12 July 1993, 4-5). From 1967 to 1969, he was his live-in partner, Marissa. Forty-five minutes later,
16, 1992 with Complainant asking Sol to leave the the Chief Legal Officer in the Office of the City Mayor he decided to go home. Sol requested for a ride in his
house. of Quezon City and from 1969 to 1982 he was the vehicle in order to alight at the place of her employer
Second Assistant City Fiscal of Quezon City. After that along EDSA and Shaw Boulevard to which he obliged.
Sol also admitted to Complainant that when she went and until November 1990, when he was appointed While on their way, Sol invited him for lunch and they
to Hongkong on December 26, 1989 up to December Judge of the Regional Trial Court at Urdaneta, went to the Mongolian Restaurant at Robinson’s where
29, 1989 she was with Respondent Judge, and records Pangasinan, he was in the private practice of law. In they had lunch. They had coffee nearby and then
of the Commission on Immigration for said dates show April 1992, he was assigned to Branch 30 of the parted ways. Thereafter, on separate days, Sol called
that both Sol Alfonso and Respondent Judge Modesto Regional Trial Court of Manila. (TSN, 8 July 1993, 32). him by phone to ask about the draft of the reply. On
Juanson departed for Hongkong via Cathay Pacific He first came to know Sol when she hired his services the second call, he told her that since he would meet
plane on December 26, 1989 and returned to Manila as her counsel in six criminal cases involving George Zari on the 17th of July at Unit 412-A of
on December 29, 1989 (Exhs. "P" and "P- dishonored checks she filed against Santiago Maramag Citihomes, she might just as well meet him there. She
1").chanrobles virtual lawlibrary and Evangeline Maramag. (Id., 33-39). In 1989, he saw acceded and on that date he left his office at about
Sol at the wedding of her sister Jennifer to Romeo 11:00 o’clock in the morning and arrived at Unit 412-A
Also, Complainant received from his sister in Dizon; he stood as sponsor for the groom then. In June thirty minutes later. (TSN, 12 July 1993, 25). Sometime
California, U.S.A., a Pacific Bell Statement of 1992, Romeo saw him at his office at the City Hall in after Sol arrived, he gave to her the draft of the reply
Telephone Calls reflecting two calls made by his wife Manila and sought advice regarding the letter Sol had and instructed her to type the letter, date and sign it,
Sol to Manila, at numbers 632 476120. Number 632 is received from the Security Bank requiring her to and then send it to her employer. He also referred her
the country code while number 476120 is the phone explain why she should not be declared absent without to Atty. Lachica to whom she should henceforth
number of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 30, where leave (AWOL) for leaving her work without an communicate because he, respondent, is busy in his
Respondent Judge is the Presiding Judge. approved leave of absence. He told Romeo that he office. When he was about to leave, Sol asked if she
would not be able to give any advice unless he saw the might ride in his vehicle in order to alight at EDSA-
As of now, Complainant Dr. Norbert Alfonso and his letter and talked with Sol. A few days later, he Shaw Boulevard to which he agreed. After that he did
wife Sol live separately, and their three children are received an overseas call from Sol who said that she not meet Sol again. (TSN, 9 July 1993, 3-
alternately in the custody of Complainant or Sol for left the Philippines sometime after 10 June 1992. He 15).chanrobles law library
certain number of days. told her that he could not give any written or oral
advice until he read the letter and talked with her. This Respondent denies having gone to Hongkong with Sol
Upon the other hand, Respondent Judge main defense overseas call might have been the 17 June 1992 call on 26 December 1989 and having seen her in
is denial as he advances the position that Sol referred to in the Pacific Bell Statement. (Exhibit "Q"). Hongkong. According to him, his traveling companion
Dinglasan Alfonso was a former client when He was not able to talk to her in the second overseas was Cua Sen. (Id., 16-23). Cua Sen corroborated him
Respondent Judge was still a practicing lawyer, and call referred to in Exhibit "Q." Two or three weeks on this point. (TSN, 6 July 1993, 5-10). When
that from time to time Sol would consult him regarding later, he received a local call from Sol who told him confronted about the charge of immorality and
her cases. As to the Hongkong trip, Respondent Judge that she was back and that she has the letter. Sol unethical conduct for having illicit relations with Sol,
simply accompanied a former client who was looking begged to see him at his office. He, however, told her he answered: "I deny it very strongly, your Honor."
for a house to buy in Hongkong, and as to the visit in that he was busy; besides, it was already late in the (Id., 32).
the Citihomes unit, Respondent Judge claimed that he afternoon. She got frantic and so he told her that they
was only visiting his godson George Zari who spent a could meet the following day at Unit 412-A, Citihomes, Respondent further suggests that it was impossible for
vacation in the Philippines for a month."cralaw at 130 San Francisco St., Mandaluyong, since he was him to have sexual intercourse with Sol because he has
virtua1aw library to meet his godson, George Zari, in the said place. been suffering from two debilitating diseases —
They did meet there at 11:00 o’clock in the morning of diabetes mellitus, for which he has been "taking
the following day — 11 July 1992, a Saturday. Sol gave insulin" since 1987, and prostatitis — which have
 56

seriously affected his sexual potency. In his own more imperative to conduct an assiduous examination presented in evidence. If she did, they could have been
words, he "could hardly make it," and that he has "no and evaluation of the records and the evidence. kept with Exhibits "A" to "E" in some secret place
erection whatsoever." (Id., 29-32; Exhibits "11" and which was not, however, unknown anymore to the
"12"). There is no doubt in our minds that a very special respondent’s wife. Sol’s admission or confession to the
relationship existed between the respondent and the complainant that she had carnal knowledge of the
Justice Jaguros gives full faith and credit to the complainant’s wife. For one, there are the cards or respondent on five occasions made no reference to
complainant’s version for she finds no reason not to notes, which the complainant and the Investigating specific dates and is hearsay. In his direct
believe the complainant. Accordingly to her," [n]o man Justice described as love letters. These five "love examination, the complainant’s counsel exerted no
in his correct mind would come forward and claim that letters" are marked as Exhibits "A," "B," "C," "D," and further effort to obtain clarifications as to the dates
his honor and good name have been stained by an "E," and dated 3 July 1987, 23 May 1988, 15 February thereof. He perhaps realized its futility because the
adulterous wife, doubt the paternity of his children, 1988, 11 January 1989, and 7 March 1989, narration by the complainant of the information clearly
and in the process destroy his family and home." She respectively. For another, if we were to give full credit indicated that the complainant did not ask Sol to
ruled that the testimonies of the witnesses for the to the complainant’s testimony that during their elaborate on the five illicit sexual acts. On cross-
respondent — Cua Sen, Celestino Esteban and former confrontation Sol had admitted having sexual examination, counsel for the respondent carefully
Judge Zari — do not inspire belief. intercourse with the respondent on five occasions avoided any entanglement with the details of the
(TSN, 29 June 1993, 39-40), it would appear that the admission not only because it might have provided an
Justice Jaguros then concludes that the immoral relationship had developed into an extra-marital occasion for the complainant to elaborate thereon, but
conduct of the respondent has ruined two families — liaison. It was furthermore established that both Sol because it would have operated as a waiver of his
his own and that of the complainant. Respondent and the respondent took the same flights of Cathay objection to the testimony as hearsay. The transcripts
"cannot escape from the blame and sin of what he has Pacific aircraft to Hongkong on 26 December 1989 and of the stenographic notes disclose that the counsel for
caused Complainant’s once happy family." More back to the Philippines on 29 December 1989. There the respondent objected and entered a continuing
pertinently she adds:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph is, however, no evidence that they stayed together in objection to questions directed to elicit or which
the same hotel in Hongkong. On the other hand, there tended to elicit statements or admissions supposedly
"But beyond the domestic confines of these two is the unrebutted testimony of Mr. Cua Sen that he, a made or given by Sol on grounds that any such
families, Respondent Judge is no ordinary mortal who client of the respondent, was the latter’s travelling statements or admissions would be hearsay or
can live the life he pleases having two women at the companion.chanrobles lawlibrary : rednad otherwise barred by the res inter alios acta rule.
same time — his wife and worst [sic], another man’s Justice Jaguros recognized the merit of the objection;
wife. He is a Judge who symbolizes the law and the From the foregoing, it is clear that their affair began hence, she allowed the answers to be taken merely as
highest degree of morality in the community. The before Sol and the complainant were married on 10 part of the narration but not as evidence of the truth
citizens look up to him as the embodiment of justice December 1988 and might have blossomed from the thereof. Thus:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
and decency, as he decides cases brought to his court. attorney-client relationship between the respondent
He can be no less." cralawnad and Sol. Her marriage to the complainant did not "ATTY. DEMIGILLO:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
diminish Sol’s love for the respondent, for even after
And invoking our decision in Leynes v. Veloso (82 she committed herself to the complainant alone and Q What was her response to your exhortation?
SCRA 325 [1978]) and Castillo v. Calanog (199 SCRA made a vow of fidelity to him till death at the solemn
75 [1991]) as precedent and moral compass, she ceremony of marriage, she still sneaked out her love A After a few minutes she took a deep breath and said,
asserts that she has no other alternative but to find notes to the Respondent. "Sweetheart, patawarin mo ako, nagkaroon ako ng
respondent "GUILTY as charged of Immorality and kasalanan sa iyo."cralaw virtua1aw library
Violation of Judicial Conduct" and to recommend his It must, however, be stressed that the respondent is
"DISMISSAL . . . from office."cralaw virtua1aw library not charged with immorality or misconduct committed ATTY. BARLONGAY:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
before he was appointed to the judiciary. As to the
In the light of the conclusions of the Investigating post-appointment period, we find the evidence for the At this juncture, Your Honor, we would like to register
Justice and her recommendation for the imposition complainant insufficient to prove that the respondent our objection as to the issue of the truth of the
upon the respondent of the severest administrative and Sol continued their extramarital affair. No love statement as purported to be answered by her wife for
penalty — dismissal from the service — it is all the notes written by her after November 1990 were

two reasons: One, it is hearsay. We have no
opportunity to cross-examine the . . . Excuse me, I have some manifestations . . .
COURT:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library COURT:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
As part of his narration. You have a continuing objection?
ATTY. BARLONGAY:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library ATTY. BARLONGAY:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Yes, as part of the narration but just for purposes of Yes, I am not going to do this at every turn. I just want
record we would like to register our objection as to the to say that our objection is a continuing one." (TSN, 29
truth of the statement itself. First, it is hearsay; second June 1993, 36-39).
...
If they were then allowed by the Investigating Justice
COURT:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library as merely "part of the narration," they should only be
considered as independently relevant statements, i.e.,
Precisely, admitted only as part of his narration. as proof that Sol made statements or admissions, but
not as proof of the truth of facts revealed in the said
ATTY. BARLONGAY:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library statements or admissions. Elsewise stated, the
admission in evidence of the words spoken by Sol is
That is alright. Second, it is . . . on the basis of the not to be used in determining the issue of their truth.
inter-alia [sic] rule, the admission of a party should not (FRANCISCO, V.J., The Revised Rules of Court in the
prejudice the rights of Philippines, vol. VII, Part I, 1973 ed., 438). This being
another.chanrobles.com:cralaw:red so, the acts of sexual intercourse admitted by Sol
cannot, insofar as the respondent is concerned, be
x x x deemed proven by the said admission or confession.
While it is true that technical rules of evidence should
not be applied in administrative cases, however, since
ATTY. DEMIGILLO:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library the Investigating Justice herself had specifically
allowed the hearsay answers merely as part of the
Q What was the exact statement of your wife? narration, or more specifically as independently
relevant statements, it would be unfair and arbitrary to
x x x thereafter disregard the ruling. All told, there is in this
case no direct and competent evidence against the
respondent that he had illicit sex with
ATTY. BARLONGAY:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library Sol.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Again, subject to the observation of this Honorable But even if the admission of Sol were to be taken as
Court, we would register our objections on these two proof of the truth of the facts so admitted, considering,
grounds: Hearsay and res inter alia [sic] rule. however, that Sol’s admission that she engaged in
sexual intercourse on five occasions made no reference
x x x to specific dates, that their affair antedated Sol’s
marriage, that their last proven tryst was in Hongkong
in 1989, and that there is an absence of positive and
ATTY. BARLONGAY:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library competent evidence to show that any of the five acts of
57
sexual intercourse took place after the respondent’s
appointment to the judiciary, it cannot be safely
presumed that the respondent committed any of the
sexual indiscretions after he became a judge.
Respondent is not charged for immorality committed
before his appointment. Accordingly, proof of prior
immoral conduct cannot be a basis for his
administrative discipline in this case. The respondent
may have undergone moral reformation after his
appointment, or his appointment could have
completely transformed him upon the solemn
realization that a public office is a public trust and
public officers and employees must at all times be
accountable to the people, serve them with utmost
responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency, act with
patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives. (Section
1, Article XI, 1987 Constitution). It would be
unreasonable and unfair to presume that since he had
wandered from the path of moral righteousness, he
could never retrace his steps and walk proud and tall
again in that path. No man is beyond reformation and
redemption. A lawyer who aspires for the exalted
position of a magistrate knows, or ought to know, that
he must pay a high price for that honor — his private
and official conduct must at all times be free from the
appearance of impropriety. (Jugueta v. Boncaros, 60
SCRA 27 [1974]). And the lawyer who is thereafter
appointed thereto must perforce be presumed to have
solemnly bound himself to a way of conduct free from
any hint or suspicion of impropriety. The imputation of
illicit sexual acts upon the incumbent judge must be
proven by substantial evidence, which is the quantum
of proof required in administrative cases. This the
complainant failed to do. The meetings of the
respondent and Sol at Unit 412-A of Citihomes on 11
July and 17 July 1992 do not by themselves prove that
these were trysts for libidinal gratification. Evidence
was offered by the respondent to prove otherwise.
However, considering their prior special relationship,
the respondent and Sol’s meetings could reasonably
incite suspicion of either its continuance or revival and
the concomitant intimacies expressive of such
relationship. In short, the respondent suddenly became
indiscreet; he succumbed to the sweet memories of the
past and he was unable to disappoint Sol who asked

for his legal advice on a matter which involved her
employment. Such indiscretions indubitably cast upon
his conduct an appearance of impropriety. He thus
violated Canon 3 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics which
mandates that" [a] judge’s official conduct should be
free from the appearance of impropriety, and his
personal behavior, not only upon the bench and in the
performance of judicial duties, but also in his everyday
life, should be beyond reproach," and Canon 2 of the
Code of Judicial Conduct which provides that" [a]
judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of
impropriety in all activities." It has been said that a
magistrate of the law must comport himself at all times
in such manner that his conduct, official or otherwise,
can bear the most searching scrutiny of the public that
looks up to him as the epitome of integrity and justice.
(Dia-Añonuevo v. Bercacio, 68 SCRA 81 [1975]). The
ethical principles and sense of propriety of a judge are
essential to the preservation of the faith of the people
in the judiciary. (Candia v. Tagabucba, 79 SCRA 51
[1977]).chanrobles.com : virtual law library
It is to be noted that 17 July 1992 fell on a Friday. On
that date, the respondent left his office at the City Hall
of Manila at about 11:00 o’clock in the morning and
arrived at Unit 412-A Citihomes thirty minutes later.
(TSN, 12 July 1993, 25). Per report of the private
detectives (Exhibit "G"), the respondent and Sol left
the unit at 1:30 o’clock in the afternoon on board a
vehicle and that twenty-five minutes later, Sol alighted
near the crossing overpass at United Street. It is,
therefore, clear that on 17 July 1992 the respondent
had left his office during office hours and, considering
the distance between Mandaluyong and his office at
the City Hall of Manila and the usual traffic condition,
it was impossible for him to have reached his office —
if at all he did proceed to it — in time for the
commencement of the official session hours in the
afternoon, i.e., 2:00 p.m. (Paragraph 5, Interim and
Transitional Rules and Guidelines Relative to the
Implementation of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of
1981). Thus, for purely personal reasons, he violated
the rule regarding official session hours. Such violation
amounted to neglect of duty.
Finally, a word on the respondent’s defense that he
could not have sexual congress with Sol because he
was suffering from diabetes mellitus and prostatitis.
The claim is both self-serving and irrelevant. No expert
testimony was presented to prove the stage, extent or
degree of seriousness of the diseases and their effects
on his capacity to copulate. The physicians who
purportedly issued the medical certificates did not
testify thereon. Besides, immorality — for which the
respondent is charged — is not based alone on illicit
sexual intercourse. It is settled
that:chanrobles.com:cralaw:red
"immorality has not been confined to sexual matters,
but includes conduct inconsistent with rectitude, or
indicative of corruption, indecency, depravity, and
dissoluteness; or is wilful, flagrant, or shameless
conduct showing moral indifference to opinions of
respectable members of the community, and as an
inconsiderate attitude toward good order and public
welfare." (Black’s Law Dictionary, Sixth ed., 1990,
751).
WHEREFORE, for violations of the Code of Judicial
Conduct, the Canons of Judicial Ethics, and the rule on
official time, respondent JUDGE MODESTO C.
JUANSON is hereby sentenced to pay a FINE of TWO
THOUSAND PESOS (P2,000.00) and, further, sternly
warned that a repetition of the same or similar acts
shall be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 266 April 27, 1963
PAZ ARELLANO TOLEDO, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. JESUS B. TOLEDO, respondent.
PADILLA, J.:
This is a disbarment proceedings under Rule 128 of
the Rules of Court.
58
On 9 July 1956 Paz Arellano Toledo filed in this Court a
sworn complaint in the form of a letter alleging that
she is the wife of Jesus B. Toledo, a member of the
Bar;1 that they were married on 27 December 1946
while he was still a second year student of law; that
she supported him and spent for his studies; that after
passing the bar examination and becoming a full-
fledged member of the Bar he abandoned her; that he
is at present employed in the Bureau of Mines2 and
stationed at Cagayan de Oro City; and that he is
cohabiting with another woman who had borne him
three children. She prayed that the respondent be
disbarred from the practice of law. On 11, July 1956,
this Court directed the respondent to answer the
complaint within ten days from receipt of notice and a
copy of the complaint.3 The respondent mailed his
answer in the form of a letter, which was received in
this Court on 4, October 1956, averring that the
complaint was not in due form because "It does not set
out distinctly, clearly and concisely the legal causes for
the suspension or disbarment of a member of the
Philippine Bar as provided in the Rules of Court hence
his "answer could not be made in the logical sequence
of a formal pleading;" that there seems to be an
irregularity in the filing of the complaint because while
the letter-complaint was dated 25, June 1956, and
received at the Docket Section of this Court on 2, July
1956, by an employee whose initials are "A.L."4 It was
subscribed and sworn to before a notary public on a
later date, 5 July 1956; and the alleged information
furnished by Esperanza D. Almonte that the
respondent was cohabiting with another woman who
had borne him three children is not true because her
very informant, whose true name is Leoncia D.
Almonte, executed an affidavit to the effect that the
respondent was employed in the Bureau of Lands, not
in the Bureau of Mines, and that the three children
referred to by the complainant were the children of
Mr. and Mrs. Ruperto Ll. Jose, with whom the
respondent was boarding. Attached to his answer are
the affidavit of Leoncia D. Almonte and a copy of his
answer to a complaint filed by the complainant with
the Director of Lands for abandonment and
immorality. In 9 October 1956, this Court referred the
case to the Solicitor General for investigation, report

and recommendation and on 11 October 1956 the
record of the case was received by the Office of the
Solicitor General. On 19 November 1956, 10
December 1956, 7, 8, 14, and 15 February 1957, 18
March 1957 and 5 August 1957, the office of the
Solicitor General conducted hearings during which the
complainant presented her evidence both oral and
documentary and the respondent, who appeared in his
own behalf, cross-examined her witnesses. The
respondent did not present evidence in his behalf but
reserved the right to present it under the provisions of
Section 6, Rule 128. After finding that there is
sufficient ground to proceed against the respondent,
on 24 July 1958 the Solicitor General filed a complaint
in this Court charging the respondent with
abandonment of his wife and immorality for cohabiting
with another woman by whom he has a child, and
praying that he be disbarred or suspended from the
practice of law. On 30 July 1958 the Clerk of Court
sent to the respondent by mail a copy of the complaint
filed by the Solicitor General and directed him to
answer the same within 15 days from receipt thereof,
pursuant to Section 5, Rule 128. On 28 August 1958
the respondent filed in this Court a motion to dismiss
the complaint on the ground "that the charges
contained therein are not based on and supported by
the facts and evidence adduced at the investigation
conducted by the Office of the Solicitor General." On 2
September 1958 this Court set the case for hearing on
17 September 1958 at 9:30 o'clock in the morning. On
13 September 1958 the respondent filed a motion
praying that his motion to dismiss filed on 28 August
1958 be first resolved or, that, should it be denied, he
be given a period of ten days within which to file an
answer; that upon receipt of his answer the case be
returned to the Solicitor General for reception of his
evidence pursuant to Section 6, Rule 128; and that the
hearing of the case set for 17 September 1958 at 9:30
o'clock in the morning be held in abeyance pending
resolution of his motion. At the hearing of the case on
17 September 1958, counsel for the respondent
appeared and was given a period of 15 days within
which to submit a written memorandum in lieu of oral
argument, and the Solicitor General the same period of
time from receipt of a copy of the respondent's
memorandum within which to reply. On 22 October
1958, within the extension of time previously granted,
the respondent filed his memorandum and on 17
November 1958, also within the extension of time
previously granted, the Solicitor General, his
memorandum in reply.
Section 6, Rule 128, provides:
The evidence produced before the Solicitor General in
his investigation may be considered, by the Supreme
Court in the final decision of the case, if the
respondent had an opportunity to object and cross-
examine. If in the respondent's answer no statement is
made as to any intention of introducing additional
evidence, the case shall be set down for hearing, upon
the filing of such answer or upon the expiration of the
time to file the same. (Emphasis supplied)
The above-quoted rule in no uncertain terms requires
the respondent in disbarment or suspension
proceedings from the practice of law to file an answer
to the complaint filed by the Solicitor General after
investigation and, should he desire to present evidence
in his behalf, to expressly say so in the answer. Instead
of doing what the rule requires, the respondent filed a
motion to dismiss without stating that he intended to
present evidence in his behalf, thereby waiving his
right. The fact that at the close of the hearing
conducted by the Solicitor General, he made of record
his desire to present evidence in his behalf, is not
sufficient. The correct manner and proper time for him
to make known his intention is by and in the answer
seasonably filed in this Court.
The complainant testified as follows: On 27 December
1946 she, a dentist by profession, and the respondent,
then a second year law student, were married civilly in
Camiling, Tarlac, by the Justice of the Peace (Exhibit
A). For a period of two weeks after their wedding, they
lived in the house of her parents at No. 76 General del
Pilar street in Camiling. After two weeks, the
respondent went to Manila to resume his studies at the Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the
Far Eastern University,5 and she remained in Camiling foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted and
to practice her profession. While the respondent was approved by this Honorable Court, without prejudice
59
still studying, he either returned to Camiling once a
week or she came to Manila twice a week to visit with
each other. Sometimes the respondent stayed with her
in Camiling for a week, and when she came to Manila
to buy dental materials she slept with him at his
boarding house or at the house on Economia street
where he on lived with his brother Cleto and Aniceto
and cousin Felisa Bacera, who cooked their meals for
them. They were in good terms until about three or
four months before his graduation. On the day of his
graduation, he showed her indifference and humiliated
and embarrassed her by calling her a "provinciana"
and telling her that she was a nuisance whenever she
came to see him. Nevertheless, being his wife, she
continued to see him while he was reviewing for the
bar examinations. She specifically mentioned that
three days before the last examination, she came to
see him. A week after the bar examinations, she again
came to see him. Since then they became actually
separated and she never saw him again until the
hearing of the case. Through Mrs. Esperanza Almonte,
she learned that the respondent was employed in the
Bureau of Lands and stationed at Cagayan de Oro City.
The respondent never wrote to her and asked her to
follow him at his place of work and she did not care to
either.
Marina Payot gave the following testimony: From 28
February to 3 June 1955 she lived and worked as maid,
laundress and cook for the respondent, his family
composed of himself, Mrs. Corazon Toledo and their
child in Malaybalay, Bukidnon. The respondent and
Corazon Toledo lived as husband and wife, and have a
child named Angie who was less than a year old at the
time she lived with them. The couple slept together in
the same room with their daughter Angie and ate their
meals together although sometimes Corazon ate alone
when the respondent was out somewhere. The
respondent used to call Corazon "Honey" and Corazon
used to call the respondent "Jess". Corazon Toledo is
not the same person as the complainant.
 60

to the parties adducing other evidence to prove their testify at the investigation, or whether anybody taught answered in the affirmative. Questioned as to the
case not covered by this stipulation of facts. or coached her on what to testify or whether she description of the respondent's paramour, the witness
1äwphï1.ñët testified because of any promise of reward or stated that Corazon is fair in complexion, five feet tall;
consideration, Marina Payot without hesitation and in that she is taller and fairer in complexion, more
Lino Domingo testified in the following manner: He is a straight forward manner answered that the beautiful and has a nicer figure than the complainant.
employed as operator-mechanic in the Bureau of complainant, Mr. Domingo and Mr. Reyes (the latter is
Public Highways in Malaybalay, Bukidnon, and has the complainant's counsel) spoke to her and told her to The testimony of these two witnesses are worthy of
resided there since 1952. He knows the respondent tell nothing but the truth about the respondent's affair credence. Marina Payot is a simple girl of eighteen
because he headed a survey party that surveyed public with his paramour in Malaybalay; that nobody taught years, a mere maid, scant in education, and
lands in Malaybalay for distribution to the landless. or coached her on what to testify at the investigation; understands little English. She did not even finish the
Sometime in March 1955 he went to the respondent's and that she was not promised anything by way of sixth grade of the elementary course. The sharp and
place of residence and office at Moreno street, where reward or consideration or given money for testifying. incisive questions propounded to her by the
his friend Mr. Nieva, an Ilocano, also resided to apply Going further in his investigation, the Solicitor asked investigating Solicitor and the lengthy cross-
for a parcel of public land, and about ten times he the witness how she was treated by the respondent to examination to which she was subjected by the
went to the respondent's place of residence and office. find out if she harbors any ill-feeling or grudge against respondent himself would have revealed herself if she
Among those who lived with the respondent were Mrs. him and his alleged paramour, which could be a motive was lying. The apparent inconsistencies in her answers
Corazon Toledo, Mr. Nieva, a maid and Mr. Abad (the for falsely testifying against them, and she answered may be attributed to her innocence and simple-
latter only slept at the place whenever he was in that she was well treated by the Toledos; that they mindedness and her failure to understand the
town). He knew that Corazon Toledo, who is not the considered her a sister; that they paid regularly her questions propounded to her. Moreover, she could not
same person as Paz Arellano Toledo, was the wife of salary of P15 a month; that they bought her a dress be expected to remember the dates asked of her in the
the respondent. At the respondent's place of residence during the town fiesta on May 15; that Corazon never same way that a person of more than average
and office, he saw a room where the respondent, scolded her for she was a woman of few words, was intelligence would. Add to this the fact that she was
Corazon and a baby slept and where man's pajamas kind and did not know how to get angry; and that the subjected to a thorough examination by three lawyers
and shirts were hung. One day at about 2:00 o'clock in reason she left them was because she just felt and her confusion was compounded. Lino Domingo's
the afternoon, while the respondent and his (the lonesome for her parents. Further testing her frank and ready answers to the questions propounded
witness') friend Mr. Abad were repairing the front credibility, the Solicitor asked how the respondent's by the Solicitor show sincerity and do not reveal any
mudguard and seats of a station wagon behind the paramour looked, and she described her as a woman of intention to pervert the truth. And even if his
respondent's place of residence and office, his friend fair complexion. Comparing her (Corazon) to the testimony be discarded, still the testimony of Marina
Mr. Abad introduced him to the respondent. He helped complainant, she said that the complainant was more Payot stands unrebutted.
Abad place the seats of the station wagon in their beautiful but Corazon was not ugly and that the latter
proper places and while he was helping Abad, he had a nicer figure, because she was stouter and taller The annexes attached to the respondent's
heard the respondent address Corazon as "Mama" and than the complainant. To find out if it was another and memorandum cannot be taken into consideration for
ask her for money to buy cigarettes. His friends Nieva not the respondent who lived with Corazon, the they were not properly introduced in evidence during
and Abad used to address Corazon as "Mrs. Toledo." Solicitor asked her if she had not seen Teodoro Nieva, the investigation.
who lived with the respondent and Corazon in the
The respondent admits that he is married to the same house, kiss or embrace Corazon, and she replied The respondent, by abandoning his lawful wife and
complainant (p. 14, t.s.n.).The fact that he is that she had not. cohabiting with another woman who had borne him a
cohabiting with another woman who had borne him a child, has failed to maintain the highest degree of
child has been established by the testimony of Marina Testing the credibility of Lino Domingo, the morality expected and required of a member of the
Payot and Lino Domingo, whose sincerity and investigating Solicitor asked him whether he was Bar.6
truthfulness have been put to a severe and searching related to Claudio Arellano, brother of the
test by the investigating Solicitor in the presence of complainant, and Lino readily answered that he is his THEREFORE, the respondent is disbarred from the
the respondent who appeared in his own behalf and brother-in-law and added that he (Lino) is the cousin of practice of law.
cross-examined the witnesses during the investigation. the wife of Claudio. Asked if he had been asked by the
Asked by the investigating Solicitor how she came to complainant to testify at the hearing, he frankly [Adm. Case. No. 1392. April 2, 1984.]
 61

Obusan (Exh. D). Generoso came to know that Felix Manalo Street but only for the purpose of giving
PRECIOSA R. OBUSAN, Complainant, v. GENEROSO Natividad’s marriage to Tony Garcia was subsisting or financial assistance to his son, Jun-Jun. Lawyer Rogelio
B. OBUSAN, JR., Respondent. undissolved.chanrobles law library Panotes, the ninong of Jun-Jun, corroborated
respondent’s testimony.
Roger Castuciano for complainant. Four days after the birth of the child or on December
1, 1972, Generoso, 33, married Preciosa, 37, in a civil He denied the testimonies of the maid, the laundress
Roemo J. Callejo for Respondent. ceremony. The marriage was ratified in a religious and the plumber. He claims that they were paid
ceremony held on December 30, 1972 (Exh. C and C- witnesses. He declared that he did not live with
SYLLABUS 1). Natividad. He resided with his sister at Cypress
Village, San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City.
1. LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS; ATTORNEYS; The couple lived with the wife’s mother at 993 Sto.
DISBARMENT; ABANDONING LEGAL WIFE AND Cristo Street, Tondo, Manila for more than one year. In On the other hand, he claimed that he was constrained
COHABITING WITH FORMER PARAMOUR the evening of April 13, 1974, when his wife was out of to leave the conjugal home because he could not
CONSTITUTE GROSS IMMORAL CONDUCT. — the house, lawyer Obusan asked permission from his endure the nagging of his wife, their violent quarrels,
Respondent was not able to overcome the evidence of mother-in-law to leave the house and take a vacation in her absences from the conjugal home (she allegedly
his wife that he was guilty of grossly immoral conduct. his hometown, Daet, Camarines Norte. Since then, he went to Baguio, Luneta and San Andres Street) and
Abandoning one’s wife and resuming casual relations has never returned to the conjugal abode. her interference with his professional obligations.
with a former paramour, a married woman, falls within
"that conduct which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, Preciosa immediately started looking for her husband. The case was investigated by the Office of the Solicitor
and which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of After much patient investigation and surveillance, she General. He filed a complaint for disbarment against
the good and respectable members of the community" discovered that he was living and cohabiting with the Respondent. Obusan did not answer the complaint.
(7 C.J.S. 959; Arciga v. Maniwang, Adm. Case No. Natividad in an apartment located at 85-A Felix He waived the presentation of additional evidence. His
1608, August 14, 1981, 106 SCRA 591). Thus, a lawyer Manalo Street, Cubao, Quezon City. He had brought lawyer did not file any memorandum.chanrobles
was disbarred when he abandoned his lawful wife and his car to that place. virtual lawlibrary
cohabited with another woman who had borne him a
child. He failed to maintain the highest degree of The fact that Obusan and Natividad lived as husband After an examination of the record, we find that the
morality expected and required of a member of the bar and wife was corroborated by Linda Delfin, their complainant has sustained the burden of proof. She
(Toledo v. Toledo, 117 Phil. 768). housemaid in 1974; Remedios Bernal, a laundress, and has proven his abandonment of her and his adulterous
Ernesto Bernal, a plumber, their neighbors staying at relations with a married woman separated from her
DECISION 94 Felix Manalo Street. The three executed the own husband.
affidavits, Exhibits A, B and F, which were confirmed
AQUINO, J.: by their testimonies. Respondent was not able to overcome the evidence of
his wife that he was guilty of grossly immoral conduct.
Romegil Q. Magana, a pook leader, testified that Abandoning one’s wife and resuming casual relations
This is a disbarment case filed in 1974 by Preciosa Obusan introduced himself as the head of the family with a former paramour, a married woman, falls within
Razon against her husband Generoso B. Obusan, Jr. on (25-30 tsn Nov. 26, 1976). His name is at the head of "that conduct which is willful, flagrant, or shameless,
the ground of adultery or grossly immoral conduct. He the barangay list (Exh. E, G and H). Nieves Cacnio, the and which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of
was admitted to the bar in 1968. owner of the apartment, came to know Obusan as Mr. the good and respectable members of the community"
Estabillo. She identified five photographs, Exhibits I to (7 C.J.S. 959; Arciga v. Maniwang, Adm. Case No.
In 1967, when Generoso B. Obusan, Jr. was working in I-D, where respondent Obusan appeared as the man 1608, August 14, 1981, 106 SCRA 591).
the Peoples Homesite and Housing Corporation, he wearing eyeglasses.
became acquainted with Natividad Estabillo who Thus, a lawyer was disbarred when he abandoned his
represented to him that she was a widow. They had Respondent’s defense was that his relationship with lawful wife and cohabited with another woman who
carnal relations. He begot with her a son who was Natividad was terminated when he married Preciosa. had borne him a child. He failed to maintain the
born on November 27, 1972. He was named John He admitted that from time to time he went to 85-A highest degree of morality expected and required of a
 62

member of the bar (Toledo v. Toledo, 117 Phil. 768). notarizing the document in the absence of most of the Section 1, Public Act No. 2103, otherwise known as
signatories/affiants; and that he should be sanctioned the Notarial Law states:
in accordance with Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules
WHEREFORE, respondent is disbarred. His name is of Code and Code of Professional Responsibility. The acknowledgment shall be before a notary public or
stricken off the Roll of Attorneys. Complainant further alleged that Atty. Cabucana an officer duly authorized by law of the country to take
uttered grave threats against him on July 20, 2004 acknowledgments of instruments or documents in the
SO ORDERED. after the hearing of the said case in MTCC. place where the act is done. The notary public or the
officer taking the acknowledgment shall certify that
A.C. No. 10185 March 12, 2014 In his Answer, Atty. Cabucana averred that the the person acknowledging the instrument or document
complaint was intended to harass him because he was is known to him and that he is the same person who
LICERIO DIZON, Complainant, the private prosecutor in a criminal case filed against executed it, acknowledged that the same is his free act
vs. complainant before the MTCC; that complainant had and deed. The certificate shall be made under the
ATTY. MARCELINO CABUCANA, JR., Respondent. no cause of action as his right was not violated official seal, if he is required by law to keep a seal, and
because he was just a "would be" buyer and not a if not, his certificate shall so state.
RESOLUTION party to the compromise agreement; and that
complainant would not suffer any damage by the The requirement of affiant's personal appearance was
MENDOZA, J.: pendency of the case or by any defects obtaining in the further emphasized in Section 2 (b) of Rule IV of the
notarization of the compromise agreement. Rules on Notarial Practice of 2004 which provides
On May 14, 2004, complainant Licerio Dizon that:
(complainant) filed a petition against Atty. Marcelino In its Report and Recommendation,1 dated January 22,
Cabucana, Jr. (Atty. Cabucana), before the Integrated 2007, the Investigating Commissioner found that Atty. A person shall not perform a notarial act if the person
Bar of the Philippines (IBP), praying for the Cabucana violated Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of involved as signatory to the instrument or document –
disbarment of the latter for falsification of public Professional Responsibility when he notarized the
document. compromise agreement without the presence of all the (1) is not in the notary's presence personally at the
parties, and recommended that he be suspended as time of the notarization; and
In his petition, complainant alleged that he was one of Notary Public for a period of two (2) years and from
the would-be-buyers of a parcel of land owned by the the practice of law for six (6) months. (2) is not personally known to the notary public or
heirs of the late Florentino Callangan, namely, Susana, otherwise identified by the notary public through
Jun and Angeleta, all surnamed Callangan who were In its Resolution,2 dated May 31, 2007, the IBP Board competent evidence of identity as defined by these
parties in Civil Case No. 1-689 filed before the of Governors adopted and approved the Report and Rules.
Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch I, Santiago City Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner
(MTCC); that on November 6, 2003, a compromise with modification that Atty. Cabucana be suspended As a notary public, Atty. Cabucana should not notarize
agreement was executed by the parties in the said for only six (6) months for violation of his obligation as a document unless the person who signs it is the same
case and notarized before Atty. Cabucana on the same Notary Public. person executing it and personally appearing before
date it was signed at the MTCC; that at the hearing him to attest to the truth of its contents. This is to
conducted on December 11, 2003 regarding the due On motion for reconsideration, the IBP Board of enable him to verify the genuineness of the signature
execution and the veracity of the compromise Governors, in a Resolution,3 modified its earlier of the acknowledging party and to ascertain that the
agreement, the signatories therein testified that they resolution and suspended Atty. Cabucana from the document is the party's free and voluntary act and
signed the instrument in the court room of MTCC but practice of law for one (1) month and disqualified him deed.
not in the presence of Atty. Cabucana as Notary from re-appointment as notary public for one (1) year.
Public; that because of the irregularity in the due WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Atty.
execution of the Compromise Agreement, there was The Court agrees with the recommendation of the IBP Marcelino Cabucana, Jr. GUILTY of violating Rule 1.01,
undue delay in the resolution/decision of Civil Case No. Board of Governors except as to the penalty. Canon l of the Code of Professional
1-689 which caused damage and injury to complainant; Responsibility.1âwphi1 Accordingly, the Court
that Atty. Cabucana violated the Notarial Law in SUSPENDS him from the practice of law for three (3)
 63

months, REVOKES his incumbent notarial commission,

if any, and PROHIBITS him from being commissioned
as a notary public for two (2) years, effective
immediately, with a stern WARNING that a repetition
of the same or similar offense shall be dealt with more
severely.

Let copies of this resolution be furnished the Bar

Confidant to be included in the records of the
respondent; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for
distribution to all its chapters; and the Office of the
Court Administrator for dissemination to all cou1is
throughout the country.

SO ORDERED.