The conflict about division of property area in regional

midtrial sea
A simple introduction
from the beginning of this century we hear a news from media
about what we can name " the war of oil in the Mediterranean
sea". we can find a some cases of those conflicts in the media
every day.

The Questions

what the background of this war?

and what we can write in brief about it?

outline

Chapter one I will discuss the potential energy sources of

the Eastern Mediterranean.

Chapter tow will discuss  Tactics and Strategies of

Mediterranean Countries about the oil discovered. In this
chapter I will return to a paper of Ali Hussein Bakir " great
game "which summarize all of that . we can find it in
Google .
Chapter three I will try to find the gape which can sneak
war Or where the international law of the sea has
ambiguous and if I failed I would discuss the system that
involves all of its. I will take other issues into my account.
Chapter four will talk about the whole subject in a brief
manner.
I have been interested in this conflict . and I have collected
my writing by :
1- Previous research paper in this matter.
2- And I used my internet option to search and obtain
my information.
3- Although we have great sources, references and
study material. "as we know" we have differences and
dispersion in views from every side and country
surrounding the Mediterranean.

My methodology:
I will review fast the material that I have mentioned
above and come with a summary that I can build my
analysis of gas and oil in the Mediterranean sea and
its conflicts.
Perceptions (hypothesis)
There is so much injustice in the rights of some
countries among themselves. that we can liken this
international system to a wrestling ring. A group
of countries join their forces against specific countries
to get them out of the arena(The ring), despite their
strength and constituents. Here, I refer to Turkey,
and this has an injustice to their legitimate rights, and
then the smaller and smaller states remain in the
arena. They, in turn, Gather their forces to bring out
the strongest among them, and so on, until Israel
remains victorious at the end.
Literature review
1- https://alkhaleejonline.net/‫باكير‬-‫حسين‬9-‫علي‬/‫كتاب‬
2- https://tez.yok.gov.tr/UlusalTezMerkezi/ (a site for
Turkish academic researchers ) in this site I have
reviewed the papers that talk about the midtrial
sea and international law of the sea.
 Chapter one

At the beginning of the last decade, there was a widespread belief

that the oil and gas wealth of the Eastern Mediterranean basin would
produce a geopolitical and geopolitical transformation in the region,
leading to a comprehensive peace and economic prosperity that
would go beyond regional and international concerned countries..

But as differences over the demarcation of maritime boundaries, how

to share the discovered wealth as well as the possibility of investing
and exporting it abroad, have increased, and the region's
transformations over the past decade, and the policy of regional and
international axes to support certain parties at the expense of others
from political positions, this perception has become far from
realistic..

Although the growing discoveries of wealth in the Eastern

Mediterranean basin still have the potential to bring about internal
transformations in the countries concerned, their transformation
into a material for internal, regional and international conflict, as well
as a cause of increased political and security tensions, may at some
point lead to confrontation rather than cooperation..

In this sense, this paper examines the size of the estimates

concerning the wealth in the Eastern Mediterranean basin, the most
prominent emerging and growing differences regarding this matter,
the role of international forces, the military of trade competition in
the east of the Mediterranean, as well as Turkish policy in dealing
with the policy of imposing the fait accompli in this region and
attempts to isolate it, and the path that developments can lead to..

The riches of the Eastern Mediterranean Basin:

In 2010, the U.S. Geological Survey estimated the natural wealth of the Eastern
Mediterranean Basin, concluding that the east coast, which accounts for the bulk
of the Eastern Mediterranean Basin, contains huge amounts of
unrecovered oil and gas reserves, estimated at 122 trillionm3 of gas
and 1.7 billion barrels of oil.1].
This area includes the coasts of Turkey, Syria, Lebanon, Palestine,
Israel, Cyprus and Egypt. If we exclude Egypt, which owned
quantities of gas before it later became an importer, it can be noted
that the rest of the countries have traditionally relied mainly on
importing energy from abroad, often as a burden on them in at least
two ways.:

The first is its energy security, as oil or gas is imported from a limited
number of countries, making it hostage to narrow political choices,
while failing to diversify its energy sources..

The other is economic security, as the import of oil and gas is a

financial burden on them and their citizens, often becoming an
intractable problem following the continued rise in oil and gas prices,
with the consequent economic problems or repercussions on the
state budget and other sectors..

Only Israel has been able to emerge from this reality, particularly
with the huge gas discoveries it recorded off the coast of Palestine
between 2009 and 2014, specifically in the Leviathan field, which is
estimated to contain 620 billionm3 of gas, and the Tamar field, which is
estimated to contain approximately 280 billionm3 of gas (see Table 1).).

The first and most significant discoveries in the Eastern Mediterranean basin
began at the beginning of the millennium, when BP discovered the
Gaza Marine field, about 35 km from the Gaza Strip, with an
estimated stockpileof nearly 1 trillionm3 of gas. 2] Although the Palestinians
were the first to discover their gas resources in the region at the beginning of
this century, Israel prevented them from investing these resources
for reasons related to political settlement, and to their economic and
security subjugation. The imbalance in the balance of power in favor
of Israel, as well as the Palestinian internal disintegration, prevented
the right of the Palestinians from being defended or invested as required. .

Exploration began to increase after the consortium led by the U.S.

company Noble Energy successfully discovered the Tamar field in
2009 off the coast of Israel, and with successive discoveries (see table
1), countries in the region became more interested in commissioning
foreign companies for exploration.3].
Estimates of the size of the wealth of the Eastern Mediterranean
basin have also led foreign companies to compete among themselves
to book a reservation, which has entailed greater foreign intervention
in the region. The discovery of gas off the coasts of Cyprus, Israel and
Egypt has prompted the rest of the countries to accelerate
exploration, and all countries in the region have entered a frantic
race, given the potential for gas to be discovered from a turning point
in the economic and energy data of these countries..

A country like Turkey, for example, pays nearly $40 billion a year in
energy imports,[4] and the discovery of huge amounts of gas would
undoubtedly free up so much money for use in other areas. The same
applies to the rest of the countries mentioned, both with regard to
Cyprus, Lebanon and Syria..

Chapter two

Differences over the investment of natural resources in the

Middle East:

Nearly two decades ago, differences over maritime boundaries

between the eastern Mediterranean nations were not what they are
today. In the past, these differences were almost dead, because there
was no major importance to the water areas of any of the countries
involved, as the dispute was practically frozen..

But with increasing discoveries and countries racing to reserve their

quotas and sign exploration agreements with foreign companies, it is
in the interest of each party to declare a position through which it
draws its maritime boundaries, for fear of losing its right or
exploiting it by neighboring countries under the policy of fait
accompli..

A survey of the eastern Mediterranean list data can be said that there
are four basic levels of disagreement: border disputes, differences
related to creating a fait accompli by commissioning foreign
companies to research and/or explore for oil and gas, disagreements
over how to export gas, and finally differences arising from the
increased military presence and military alliances in the region..
The discovery of natural revolutions has amplified these differences,
as demarcation of borders plays a role in determining the amount of
natural resources discovered. The conflict between these countries is
often governed by two elements: the first is the agreements and
international laws that draw the borderbetween each country at sea,
and the other is the balance of power in all that this term means..

With regard to the first criterion, i.e. international agreements and

laws, there are states that do not sign the Treaty on the Law of the
Sea, such as Turkey, Israel and Syria, and these countries rely on
different criteria in the drawing of their borders from signatory
states, leading to a conflict between states with common or
overlapping maritime borders..

As for the balance of power, Israel was the country that benefited
most from this criterion in shaping its borders, based on its military
capabilities and solid force against the Palestinians and the Lebanese
in particular. So is Greece in the face of Turkey, as Greece (along with
Greek Cyprus) has always benefited from European - and western -
support in the face of Turkish demands..

The dispute between Turkey and Greek Cyprus, as well as the one
between Lebanon and Israel, is one of the most prominent in the
Eastern Mediterranean. These differences are not only about water
boundaries, but also geo-political conflict, which makes the issue
more complicated than portraying it as a border dispute..

a) The Lebanese-Israeli dispute:

These two countries are in an open state of war, with some short and
long-term. This situation impedes the possibility of demarcating the
border between them in general, as well as the maritime border.
Lebanon's interest in demarcating its maritime border with Israel
has begun to increase significantly after talk of huge amounts of gas
off its coast..

Fearing that Israel would accelerate the exploitation of the wealth

within Lebanon's maritime rights, depending on the power of Cairo
or de facto, Lebanon was quick to claim its rights. This resulted in a
dispute between the parties over a sea area of approximately 850
km2,where the parties' claims of rights in areas 8, 9 and 10 of the
Exclusive Economic Zone of Lebanon, particularly Area 9, which is
believed to contain vast natural resources of gas and oil,[5] intersect
(see table 2).).

Map showing the patches in which Israel claims rights:

Lebanon, on the other hand, rejects these Israeli claims and considers
that Israel's reliance on the Blue Line to draw maritime boundaries is
illegal and unreliable. The Lebanese government also rejects the
demarcation agreement between Cyprus and Israel, because it
violates its rights, and demands that Cyprus amend it, but rejects it.].

b) Turkish-Greek Cypriot dispute:

This dispute is complex, and four key actors overlap: Turkey, Turkish
Cyprus, Greek Cyprus and Greece. This dispute had begun to roll over
as a snowball was being taken by Greek Cyprus in unilateral steps to
demarcate its maritime borders and invest wealth within those
borders. This has caused problems with Turkey and Turkish Cyprus
for several reasons, most notthemore.[7]]:

That the demarcation agreements between the water border sought

by Greek Cyprus, particularly with Egypt and Israel, violate Turkey's
rights to its water borders, in accordance with the same UN laws (see
Table 3).).

The demarcation of special oil and gas exploration areas independent

of the will of the Turkish Cypriots, who are supposed to be a major
component and have rights on the island with a lack of political
division, constitutes a clear violation of these rights..

Assuming that the Turkish Cypriots do not have the rights to object
to the demarcation conducted by the south, this demarcation violates
the maritime boundaries of the northern part as well as Turkey. As a
result, there are areas that are in conflict, even within the
demarcation that took place..

Commissioning foreign companies to explore for oil and gas in the

areas that have been established violates the rights of Turks and
Turkish Cypriots as well.

Map showing the entrance of the fields identified by Greek Cyprus for
exploration.

With the borders of Turkish Cyprus and the borders of the

continental shelf of Turkey

I
n parallel with this disagreement, there is another disagreement over
the role of Turkey and Egypt as a hub for the export of gas from the
region to Europe. Each country takes advantage of its advantages in
presenting itself as a key player. By virtue of its middle geographical
position among the world's major energy producers and consumers,
Turkey has long marketed itself as an energy distribution hub
supported by a strong economy, internal stability and military power.
Therefore, it is practically prepared to play this role, and its chances
have increased with the pipelines being built/constructed to
transport gas from Central Asia, Russia and the regional
neighbourhood to Europe (see map)).

Turkey: Existing or planned gas pipeline projects in the future

Egypt is positioning itself as the appropriate political alternative with

good relations with Israel, Cyprus and Greece, which has already
ceded to Tel Aviv and Cyprus some areas of the maritime border to
facilitate the formation of the required line- up. Furthermore, the
discoveries of large quantities of gas off Egypt and in the Dahar field
make it a powerful player, and it can use gas liquefaction plants on its
coasts without the need to construct new plants, in order to liquefy
and export gas to Europe.[8]].

Potential gas transmission lines from the eastern Mediterranean to

Europe
 Chapter three

The role of the great powers:

There are three major forces that follow the developments related to
the ongoing competition east of the Mediterranean basin closely, and
are engaged in many of the issues related to it in one way or another,
starting with the political situation, through the participation of its
companies in the process of economic exploration, and not ending by
relying on its military power in the region to ensure the security of its
interests, and these forces are:

1)European Union :

It is one of the world's largest energy consumers and is a primary

target for producers looking to secure a market. But the EU's main
problem is that it relies almost entirely on gas imported from Russia,
leaving the EU countries at Moscow's political, economic and security
mercy. Therefore, the Union is trying to diversify energy imports
further, and from this point of view, the eastern Mediterranean basin
is a valuable opportunity to achieve this goal, given the estimates
available on the extent of oil and gas wealth that they first take, the
participation of many oil and gas exploration companies of the States
of the Second And finally, the geographical proximity of the region to
the Union, compared to the oil and gas resources it imports from the
United States..

The EU's position on the east-middle-east rivalry is clearly biased

towards Greek Cyprus and Greece against Turkey. The bias violates
many international norms and laws in accordance with the Turkish
view, and contradicts efforts to find a peaceful solution to the
reunification of cyprus, as support for unilateral actions of Greek
Cyprus would create a new area of disagreement and strengthen the
Greek side's rejection of peaceful solutions..

The EU's position stems from a political bias not only in terms of
support for Greece and Greek Cyprus, but also in terms of taking an
opposite position to Turkey that seeks to reduce it. Therefore, this
position may be reflected in the dispute over the route of gas
pipelines being worked on to transport gas from the region and
Europe..

2) Russia :

Moscow's priority is to maintain its leading position in the gas market and its
market share, so it is interested in monitoring any emerging competition
from any country or community, particularly with successive gas
discoveries in multiple regions at the same time. Moreover, it wants
to keep its clients hostage to political influence, so it is in their
interest to prevent new gas competitors, particularly with regard to
Europe. :

Gas exploration companies, through contracts with Lebanon[10]].

Financing existing projects, through partnership with Cyprus and

Greece[11]].

Military presence and bilateral agreements, as with Syria[12]].

Acquiring stakes in existing projects, as with Egypt.

It can be noted that Russia has relations with the various parties to
the conflict in the Eastern Mediterranean basin, which are politically,
economically and security ally intertwined, ensuring more room for
maneuvers later, thereby achieving its interests in the region. At
some point, Russia may become a "dome egg" or a confidence that
likely to be enough for any of the opposing parties in the region,
particularly with regard to the dispute between Turkey and Greek
Cyprus on the one hand, and Israel and Lebanon on the other..

3)United States : 

They are strongly present in the region politically, economically and

militarily, as well as through their oil and gas exploration companies,
and through their relations with key countries engaged in
cooperation or competition in the eastern Mediterranean. The U.S.
position is mainly supportive and biased towards Israel, and by
extension to the states that orbit Israel in the Eastern Mediterranean.
The United States, too, does not want to be absent from the scene, as
competition between regional states and international powers
intensifies. It has recently been noted that Washington has played
two contradictory roles at the same time there..

The first is to facilitate mediation[13] between Israel and Lebanon

over the dispute over the demarcation of maritime borders and the
sectors in which each side claims to have a right. This effort reflects a
conciliatory grant from an American point of view, perhaps aimed at
facilitating Israel's desire to end the dispute, to speed up the
discovery and export processes later..

Washington's other role, which contrasts with the former, is the

passage of the Eastern Mediterranean Security and Energy
Partnership Act of 2019,[14] which establishes Washington's
stronger and larger role on the Eastern Mediterranean issue and
reflects a clear bias against Turkey (as his statement will be said to
be)).

A comprehensive map of the situation in the eastern Mediterranean

Militarization of competition in the Eastern Mediterranean:

In January 2019, the East Mediterranean Gas Forum was established

in Cairo, a practically Israeli-led gathering of Egypt, Greece, Jordan,
Palestine and Italy. This forum is presented as a regional platform to
take advantage of efforts to explore and export gas, benefiting the
countries participating in the Forum,[15] and therefore emerges
from this perspective as a geo-economic grouping. But in fact, this
gathering takes a three-dimensional form, and while it is presented
as a geo-economic grouping, it also has a geo-political and geo-
security character that indicates that one of its unstated objectives:

Israel's economic integration into the region.

The formation of a security-military axis in the Eastern

Mediterranean, which strengthens the interests of Israel and its
allies.

Turkey's political and economic isolation in relation to the wealth of

the Eastern Mediterranean, and its military deterrence.

This can be seen through an increasing number of indicators,

perhaps the most important of which:

1) With regard to the Israeli role :

Tel Aviv is trying to exploit gas discoveries to become a exporter, and

after the previous heavy reliance on importing Egyptian gas at
preferential prices, Tel Aviv is exporting gas as well. Although it has
been targeting European and international markets, it has secured
regional consumer markets first, in order to secure the sale of gas
pending the completion of the infrastructure needed to export it to
distant markets. To that end, Israel has linked itself to Egypt, the
Palestinian Authority and Jordan, enabling it to achieve four goals.:

Securing a market for gas for gas, in the face of difficulty in exporting
to international markets.

Achieving Israel's economic integration in the region without having

to make concessions to Arab countries in return.
Turning gas into a political and security lever that Tel Aviv can move
forward with the normalization process, and it also retains a paper
that would put pressure on some of these countries when it wants,
namely, the energy paper..

The emergence of the nucleus of a military alliance between Israel,

Cyprus and Greece, together with Egypt indirectly.

2) With regard to attempts to isolate Turkey :

Israel is seeking to exploit the Turkish-Greek dispute over Cyprus to

play a greater security role in the region. Over the past few years, Tel
Aviv has succeeded in strengthening its relations with the Republic of
Cyprus and Greece, at a time when Turkey's relations with these
three countries have been deteriorating. The eastern Mediterranean
gas issue was therefore an important entry point and pretext for
establishing a partnership between Israel, Greece and Cyprus. Then
Egypt also got on the line, for three reasons.:

First, the Sisi regime was looking for a way to legitimize his rule, and
to join such an ideal would provide him with this, especially after the
regime made concessions to Israel and Cyprus in demarcating
maritime borders..

The Egyptian regime wants, through new gas discoveries, to play the
role of the main hub for gas transport and export between producing
and consuming countries, the same role that Turkey has been
promoting, due to its geographical location in the middle between the
world's major gas and energy producers and consumers..

The Sisi regime views Turkey as an adversary because it considers it

a coup d'état, and for embracing a number of Egyptian opposition
leaders, as well as being a regional rival in contrast to the Egyptian
regime in a number of regional issues, starting from the Gulf and not
ending in North Africa, and therefore, coordination with Cyprus,
Greece and behind them Israel will help to put more pressure on
Turkey, to prevent it from benefiting from the East Asian Basin of the
Mediterranean Basin..

In late July 2019, France expressed its intention to join the rally, as
did the United States. Here, it should be noted that Paris and
Washington own oil companies (Total Of France, Noble Energy and
ExxonMobil of the Americas) licensed by Greek Cyprus to survey and
extract gas, which means that they have linked it to a network of
interests, and these countries (i.e., France and America) also have
enough military power in the Medium to defend the interests of their
companies. Moreover, there have been two significant developments
in this area recently.:

The first is france's agreement with Greek Cyprus to develop the

island's naval military base, to be able to host large ships, including
aircraft carriers, and is a dangerous indicator of readiness for future
use of military power, given the increasing form of competition in the
region..

The second development is the passage of the Eastern Mediterranean

Security and Energy Partnership Act of 2019 in the U.S. Congress last
June. The law can be summarized on six key points::

Lifting the arms embargo on the Greek Republic of Cyprus.

U.S. Energy Center in the East Middle East to facilitate energy

cooperation between America, Israel, Greece and Cyprus.

Allowing $3 million in military financial assistance to Greece.

International Military Education and Training Assistance Leave for

Greece and Cyprus 2020-2022.

Ban on the transfer of F-35 fighters to Turkey as long as it continues

with Russia's S-400 deal.

The Administration is required to provide a strategy to enhance

security and energy cooperation with the Countries of the Eastern
Mediterranean Basin, in addition to pursuing malicious activities by
Russia and other countries in the region..

It is clear from the wording and content of the law that it is directed
primarily against Turkey, and that it raises the risk of military
engagement in the region..

Turkish Policy on Developments in the Middle East:

Turkey has the largest naval power in the Eastern Mediterranean,
has the second largest NATO army after the United States, and when
it comes to Cyprus or Turkish Cypriot rights, it is difficult for the
Turks to back down regardless of possible consequences or threats.
The Turks have differences, opinions and conflicting views on how
their country's foreign policy should be, but despite their differences
they agree on one issue: the need to protect Turkey's rights to its
continental shelf, and to protect the rights of Turkish Cypriots,
whatever it takes..

When it comes to Cyprus, Ankara had previously challenged

everyone in the 1970s (1974), even its allies, endured a
comprehensive arms embargo imposed by the United States in 1975,
and rejected the de facto steps greece had tried to impose on the
island by supporting an armed coup for its Greek Cypriot followers.
Today, the Turks restate that nothing will prevent them from taking
the appropriate steps if the fait accompli is repeated again..

Turkish policy in the eastern Mediterranean has been gradual in

responding to the de facto policy imposed by Greek Cyprus, through
various measures, perhaps the most important of which is that:

I have always rejected all unilateral actions of Greek Cyprus..

I suggested that all operations be suspended and that a Turkish-

Greek-Cypriot bilateral agreement be reached, which would unify the
island, and thus make the most of the agreement on oil and gas
exploration and extraction..

I suggested an agreement between Turkish and Greek Cyprus to

determine the mandates of foreign companies, share returns, and
move away from the overlapping areas of the parties..

Attempts to prevent foreign company ships from surveying or

prospecting in disputed areas, including the rights of Turkey or
Turkish Cyprus.

It sent its own ships to survey and explore for oil and gas in areas it
says belong to it and to Turkish Cyprus, which interferewith what
Greek Cyprus says are its rights..
Agreement with Turkish Cyprus on maritime demarcation and oil
and gas exploration and extraction.

Increasingly deployed more naval pieces to protect its ships in

disputed areas.

Ankara also appears to be trying to form a parallel to the Israeli-led

coalition, by bringing together marginalized or excluded states such
as Lebanon and Turkish Cyprus. In August 2019, Turkish Foreign
Minister Mouloud Chauyşoğ lu visited Lebanon, during which he
expressed Turkey's readiness to help Lebanon extract energy
resources from the Mediterranean and export it to European
countries via a gas pipeline linking Lebanon to Turkey, while
stressing that "Turkey is careful not to attack any of the regional
parties on Lebanon's rights to energy resources".].

In a move that underscores the turkish's strongness in the face of

ongoing efforts to isolate them and digest their rights, the four
parties represented in the Turkish parliament issued a joint
statement in July,[17] denouncing the European measures and
expressing support for the state's efforts. In gas exploration in the
Eastern Mediterranean region, Turkey and Turkey are not accepting
pressure on exploration in the eastern Mediterranean, as they have
the ability to protect their legitimate rights in accordance with
international law. The Turkish president outlined the scene in
January, during a speech at the Military Academy in Ankara, when he
said: "If you do not have military, political and economic power, you
should know that no one will take you seriously.».

Medium gas from a chance of peace to the prospect of war:

The Lebanese-Israeli dispute over the demarcation of the maritime

border has not yet ended, but it has receded under the cover of the
U.S. mediator of the two parties to the agreement, relying on the
willingness of both countries to come up with a formula to take
advantage of the conflicting areas. This means that an economic
necessity dictated the need for such an agreement, at least from the
Lebanese point of view, as the urgent need for gas seems to be a
motive for making the Lebanese more eager to resolve the dispute
with Israel..

Although the economic factor is not absent from the equation from
the Israeli side, particularly with regard to the liberalization of
potential obstacles to Tel Aviv's exploitation of The Sector No. 9's
potential in which it is opposed to Lebanon, there are also those who
believe that there are political and security calculations behind the
search for a deal with the Lebanese side, noting that this is
strategically important because it weakens Hezbollah.[18]].

While progress in the negotiations does not eliminate the possibility

of a full-blown confrontation over rights in the Eastern
Mediterranean, it is indicative of a decline in the Lebanese-Israeli
conflict, which reduces the possibility of an open conflict or
confrontation between the two parties, which does not currently
apply to the ongoing dispute between Turkey and Greek Cyprus, with
the latter heading towards escalation as a result of greek Cypriot
unilateral steps, backed by broad regional and international cover..

More recently, the EU has been pouring oil on fire by supporting the
movement of Greek Cyprus and Greece, and imposing sanctions on
Turkey for sending oil exploration vessels in the vicinity of Turkish
Cyprus, in response to greek Cypriot unilateral actions. The recently
proposed U.S. law on the Eastern Mediterranean is moving in the
same direction, which means that things are getting more
complicated, that there is widening gaps between the parties, and
that political and economic tension is slowly shifting to a military
tension that threatens the possibility of a war on resources in the
future..

In addition to the recent Israeli, European and American positions,

Greek Cyprus signed an agreement with the French company Total
and Italy's I, extending what is known as Patch 7, a patch that the
Turks consider to be their right because they are within their
continental shelf registered with the United Nations. Turkey
responded to the measure by saying that "from now on, no foreign
country, company or ship will be given the opportunity to operate
within its maritime borders to explore or extract hydrocarbons
without any approval, and will continue to take the necessary
measures to protect the rights of Warning of "unilateral actions of the
Greek Southern Cyprus administration, which are aimed at usurping
the rights of Turkish Cypriots, will not contribute to peace and
stability in the eastern Mediterranean",[20] which means that the file
is nominated. To step up in the future..

Chapter four
Conclusions
Depending on the increasing energy needs across the world,
various energy organizations have grown an interest in the
energy reserves in region that are defined as risky zones.
This increasing interest is closely related to the Eastern
Mediterranean covering also the Middle East. As a matter of
fact, border disputes that have not yet been solved in
mainland have paved the way for the Arabian Peninsula to
remain far from political and economic stability.
The energy reserves explored in the Eastern Mediterranean
have been both advantegous and disadvantegous for the
region. The advantage for the region undoubtedly is
increased cooperation, economic welfare and adoption of
democratic rules. The disadvantege, on the other hand, is the
increased continuation of the problems. In this context, it is
important for consumer countries to ensure their energy
supply security and for prducer countries to ensure their
energy demand security.

It seems that the understanding of security, which has

been of great importance for many years, will exist for many
more. Therefore, energy security will continue to be
important for international relations. Energy security, which
is the biggest trigger of the never ending wars, will continue
to exist unless the world is completely depleted. The
governments have turned energy security into national
issues. Thus, states make assessments for their own survival
and interests from a security perspective. Energy plays a
major role in today’s world. Oil and natural gas, which are
non-renewable energy sources, are important in almost all
areas of life. However, the world's energy resources are not
shared equally, the Middle East and the Caspian Basin are
known as oil-rich regions. Recently, one has been added to
the regions rich in hydrocarbon resources: the Eastern
Mediterranean. The Mediterranean and in particular the
Eastern Mediterranean region which has been the focus of
global powers throughout history, still maintains its
actuality. In 80 addition to its strategic location, the energy
resources identified in the region in 2009-2010 doubled its
importance. Especially the natural gas resources discovered
in the Levant basin promise great hope and opportunities
for the future of the region. However, the conflicts between
the coastal countries of the Eastern Mediterranean for the
sharing of maritime jurisdictions have recently became
much more severe. Israel-Lebanon conflict for the sharing of
maritime jurisdiction areas(sovereignty areas-EEZ) and
Turkey and Greek Cypriot Administration are the main
factors that create obstacles in benefiting from the energy
opportunities. Another problematic area associated with the
future state of hydrocarbon resources is in the Israeli
waters. Israel thinks that the natural gas source extracted
from the Tamar and Levant basin will pay the country's
domestic demand more than enough. Therefore, Israel plans
to export some of its natural gas resources. Considering the
international conjuncture and Israel's relations with
countries in the region, different scenarios emerge. Israel's
effort to extract its energy supply at sea or on land should be
considered with the danger of creating both security and
environmental problems. The country's cooperation with
Palestine in the field of energy is already difficult when the
relations between the states are examined. However, in the
opinion of some experts, newly discovered hydrocarbon
sources are in a position to have harmful effects on bilateral
relations. In other words, energy sources can be the
triggering factor in the resolution of the longstanding
dispute between the parties. However, it can be seen as a
very optimistic approach that Israel will make great
progress in the field of energy with Palestine in a short time.
81 One of the countries Israel can export its newly
discovered resources is Jordan. Even though the two sides
reached a rapprochement enough to sign a natural gas
agreement in 2014, the opposition in Jordan has responded
with great reaction. From this point, Jordan does not seem to
be the most suitable and right partner for Israel. Technically,
it is possible to build a pipeline from Israel to Syria, Egypt
and Lebanon. However, when the international conjuncture
and regional security sectors are analyzed, it seems difficult
to realize this scenario. Because Syria is in the civil war that
started in 2011. And much more crucially military
engagements erupt between Israel and Syria from time to
time. As such, a cooperation with this country seems not
possible. As for Egypt, the country, which provided Israel
with energy for many years, became an importer after a
certain period. At the same time, the relations between the
two states have not been maintained in a stable and good
way throughout history. Therefore, the possibility of long-
term cooperation is considered low given the political
turmoil in Egypt. Furthermore, the ENI Italian company's
detection of natural gas in the Egyptian Zohr deposit is a
harbinger for Egypt's future exportation. When the
Lebanese-Israeli relations are examined, it is clear that the
parties who have been in war for years have faced the issue
of sharing maritime jurisdictions(EEZ). Therefore, it is not
possible to cooperate in the field of energy between the two
states. Another scenario is the projects that can be executed
with the participation of Greece and Southern Cyprus.
However, Israel's pipeline to Greece, the possible
liquefaction plant project in the Greek Cypriot
Administration is very costly. Israel is considering building
an LNG facility in the Southern Cyprus. However, as
highlighted, this project is demanding large investment from
Israel. Therefore, the state authorities consider this
possibility more difficult. 82 Another option is the East-Med
pipeline project between Southern Cyprus-Israel-Greece.
However, the length of this line is the biggest disadvantage
of the project. Because a long pipeline creates some
problems both in terms of energy supply security and cost.
Still being the case, the most appropriate partner to Israel,
Turkey seems to be. The cost of the pipeline to Turkey, is
known as the lowest. Via a possible cooperation with
Turkey, Israel will not only reach the Turkish market, but
the European markets will be available for her. Therefore,
both countries will have won in this case. Israel-Turkey
relations were to continue at the same level throughout
history. Although there have been some crises, the parties
have recently taken great steps towards normalizing
bilateral relations. This is also disproves the theory that an
energy cooperation between Israel and Turkey could not be
possible. This project would be several advantages for
Turkey is clear. First of all, Turkey, has been diversifying its
energy supply, it will be able to easily meet the demand for
energy. In addition, Turkey will have the chance to become
an energy center. Furthermore, it will prevent the
rapprochement between Israel and Greece and increase its
influence on the Cyprus issue. For Israel, it can improve its
relations with Turkey and it can be free from isolation in the
region. From an economic point of view, although it has rich
energy reserves, Israel will not benefit from it unless it can
export. Turkey can be the most reliable and profitable
energy route for Israel.

Resources
1- The New Energy Policies in the Eastern Mediterranean: Situation of Turkey’s SELİM
BAŞKAR

2- DOĞU AKDENİZ’DE MÜNHASIR EKONOMİK BÖLGE UYUŞMAZLIĞI Yüksek Lisans Tezi

Fatma Betül TEKİN İstanbul, 2019
3- https://alkhaleejonline.net/‫باكير‬-‫حسين‬9-‫علي‬/‫كتاب‬
4- https://tez.yok.gov.tr/UlusalTezMerkezi/ (a site for
Turkish academic researchers ) in this site I have
reviewed the papers that talk about the midtrial sea
and international law of the sea.

By jalalaldeen saad alaymoun

8170510
5/5/2020