TheMBA

CoreCourse

The Information practical analytical skills, and to provide a

frameworkfor case discussions and student
Technology projects. Moreover,the modelis intendedto ac-
quaint studentswith the dynamicsof information
Interaction Model: A systemsin organizationsand to help themrec-
ognizethe benefits, dangers,and/imitationsof
Foundationfor the these systems.Thepaperincludes a discussion
and examplesof howthe modelcan be usedfor
MBACore Course proactive and reactive analyses, and it con-
cludeswith observationson the model’seffec-
tivenessin the corecourse.
Keyword$: MBAcore course, interaction
By: MarkS. Silver model,information systemeffects, implemen-
Information Systems Department tation process,organizationalcontext, infor-
NYUStern School of Business mation system features, transformation,
ManagementEducation Center businesscases
44 W. 4th Street, Suite 9-73 ISRLCategories:IA01, DA, DD,GA
New York, NY 10012
U.S.A.
msilver@stern.nyu.edu

M. Lynne Markus Introduction

Information Science
Claremont Graduate School
130 East Ninth Street
Claremont, CA 91711
U.S.A.
markusm@cgsvax.claremont.edu
Cynthia Mathis Beath
Cox School of Business
SouthernMethodist University
Dallas, TX 75275
U.S.A.
cbeath~mail.cox.smu.edu
Abstract
This paperpresentsa teachingmodelthat has
beenusedsuccessfully in the MBAcore course
in informationsystemsat several universities.
The modelis referred to as the "Information
Technology Interaction Model"becauseit main-
tains that the consequencesof informationsys-
temsin organizations follow largely from the
interaction of the technologywith the organiza-
tion and its environment.Themodelserves a
numberof pedagogicalpurposes:to integrate
the variouscoursecomponents, to providea for-
malfoundationfor the coursecontent, to foster
"Thecoursewasnot sufficiently analytical."
"Thecourselackedtheory." "1 didn’t learn any-
thing I can use at work." "1 understandthe
piecesbut I don’t see how.they fit together."
Theseconcernsare typical of those voiced by
MBAstudents reaching the end of their core
course in information systems(IS). Indeed,
comparedwith other core courses they take
concurrently(for example,accounting,econom-
ics, andmarketing),studentsmayfind it difficult
to discern the fundamentalprinciples of the IS
coursethat integratethe material, that providea
theoretical foundation, andthat foster useful
businessskills. Towardremedyingthis deft-
ciency, this paperproposesa modelof the dy-
namicsof information systemsin organizations
that wehaveusedsuccessfullyin teachingthe
core coursein information systemsat several
universities.
Werefer to the modelas the "InformationTech-
nology(IT) Interaction Model"because it rests
on the premisethat the consequences of infor-
mationsystemsin organizationsfollow from the
interaction of the technologywith the organiza-
tion andits environment. Understandingthe nature
of this interaction,therefore,is centralto lever-
agingthe benefits and avoidingthe hazardsthat
information technologypresents for organiza-
tions. Consequently,understandingthe nature

MISQuartedy/September
1995361
 TheMBA
CoreCourse
of this interactionmustbeat the coreof the core
informationsystemscourse.
Themodeladdresses the interaction of an infor-
mationsystem’sfeatures with five elementsof
the organization:(1) its external environment,
(2) its strategy,(3) its structureandculture,
its business processes, and(5) its IT infrastruc-
ture. Themodelconsidersthe consequences of
this interactionfor system use,for organizational
performance,for the organization’s personnel,
andfor the firm’s future flexibility. Moreover,
the
modelrelates variousaspectsof the interaction
processto the phasesof the developmentand
implementation lifecycles.
By combiningthese various components,the
model integrates the manyaspects of the
course,including suchtopics as technologyba-
sics, whatbusinessesaccomplishwith informa-
tion technology, howIT can changefirm and
industry structure, howorganizations acquire
newapplications, howfirms manage IT stand-
ards, andso forth. At the sametime, the model
serves as a formal foundationfor the course.
Andthe modelbuilds practical skills, as well,
sinceit canbe usedproactivelyin designingand
implementing systemsor reactively to evaluate
whattranspiredafter the fact. In particular, the
modellends itself to use in casediscussions
andin studentprojects.
While the modelis baseduponand consistent
with our understandingof the information sys-
tems research literature, wemust emphasize
that the modelpresented in this paper is a
teaching model, not a research model. More-
over, unlike someapproachesto educating in
professionaldomains,the modelis not prescrip-
tive. It doesnot attemptto dictate to the stu-
dents the optimal fit betweenthe organization
and the information system--for example, to
prescribeparticular designfeatures to matcha
given organizationalstrategy or structure. In-
stead, it heightensthe students’ awareness of
information systemsdynamics,while allowing
themto drawuponparticular prescriptions as
appropriate.
Theaimof this paperis to describea modelwe
find Usefulfor pedagogical purposes in the hope
that otherswill similarly find it worthwhile
andto
contributeto the current dialogueaboutteaching
innovationand curricular reform. Of necessity,
362MISQuarterly~September
1995
this model,intended,for MBA students,reflects
a simplificationof thefull set of relationships
that
wouldinterest researchers andspecialists in the
field. Webelieve, however,that it is flexible
enoughtoserve as a starting point for discuss-
ing manyspecific theories not explicitly modeled
in it, whilenot beingso vagueandabstractas to
be meaningless..
Thefirst section of the paperstates a premise
concerningthe core MBAcoursein information
systems.Thenext section presentsthe theoreti-
cal foundationfor the model.Thefollowing sec-
tion discusseshowwemotivate the modelfor
our students,whichservesas an introduction to
presentingthe modelformally. Thesection after
that shows how the model can be used for
proactive and reactive analysesand offers an
exampleof each in the context of the core
course.Thenext section discussesmoregener-
ally the role of the modelin the courseandthen
presentsspecific pedagogicalissues. Thefinal
section reflects our observationsconcerningthe
model’seffectivenessin the course.
The Premise
Corecoursesin informationsystemsdiffer both
becauseof programmaticconstraints imposed
by the institution (for instance, the numberof
contact hoursandthe sequencing of the course
in the MBAcurriculum) and becauseof content
decisions madeby the course designers.
Amongthe content choices that vary from
schoolto schoolandare currently in disputein
the IS community are suchissues as whichtop-
ics to cover, howmuchhands-oninstruction to
provide, and whetherand howto use business
cases(Stohr, et al., 1990). Althoughwehave
strongfeelings abouta numberof these content
choices,our aimis not to debatethe objectives
or content of the core course but to proceed
froma minimalistset of objectivesandtopics we
take as givens. Webelieve that thesegivensap-
PlYto a large shareof corecourseofferings to-
day andare likely to applyto evenmoreas the
decadeprogresses.
m
Weadopt as a premise that as a core course
the only one in information systemsmanyMBA
studentswill take--Ht mustaddress’~’hat every

MBAneedsto knowabout information systems
in organizations." Whileopinions differ as to
whatconstitutes this core of required knowl-
edge, at a minimumthe course must acquaint
studentswith the dynamics of information sys-
temsin organizations so that theywill be ableto
function and manage effectively in the nowIT-
laden corporateand industrial worlds. Andto
functioneffectively, theymustrecognize that the
consequences of information technology are
non-deterministicandnot necessarilypositive.
Thatis, despite all the excitementsurrounding
the potential valueof IT for business,the bene-
fits of a given systemfor a given firm maybe
non-existent,andthe effects mayevenbe nega-
tive. Indeed, the road to information systems
successis strewnwith informationsystemsfail-
ures. To succeed,studentsmustunderstand the
rangeof potentialeffects, the set of factorsthat
contribute to these outcomes,and the connec-
tions between them.Put differently, an objective
of the core courseis the following: to increase
students’ knowledge of the potential benefits,
dangers,andlimitations of informationtechnol-
ogy and to equip themwith the basic concepts
they mustapplyto leveragethe benefits, avoid
the dangers,and surmountthe limitations. We
use the IT Interaction Modelto accomplish this
objective.
Theoretical Background
and
Foundation
In our teaching, wehave found that communi-
cating with MBAstudentsaboutIS is mostsuc-
cessfulwhenwestart with a theorythat is close
to our audience’sinitial viewof the world. We
learned the hard way that how we thought
aboutsystemsdid not alwaysfit our students’
perspective.
Consider for example,the definition of an infor-
mation system commonlyfound in the text-
books: An information system consists of
"hardware,software, data, people, and proce-
dures."When westart to think aboutthis defini-
tion fromthe students’point of view,weseethat
it considersthe key elementsof the organiza-
tion, suchas peopleand businessprocesses,to
be subsystems of an information system.If one
TheMBACoreCourse
wereto diagramthe definition, one wouldhave
a figure in whichthe informationsystemis the
inclusive supersystem, whereaspeopleand pro-
cedures--thestuff of businessprocesses--and
tools--such as computersand programs--are
the subordinatedsubsystems (see Figure 1).
contrast, the would-beMBA---a future entrepre-
neur or CEOof an enterprise---wouldnaturally
drawthe diagramshownin Figure 2. Here, the
organizationor enterprise is the supersystem,
containing, among other things, people, busi-
nessprocesses,and informationsystems.
In teachingthe core course,wehavefound it
mostuseful to embrace the latter view, andwe
therefore adopt as the starting point for our
modela perspectivethat focuseson the infor-
mationsystemwithin its organizationalcontext.
Ratherthan trying to havestudentsadopta view
alien to their ownas a prerequisitefor learning
moreaboutIS, wehavefoundit mucheasier to
build our pedagogicalmodelaroundtheir natural
worldview.By doingthis, wefind ourselvesbet-
ter able to avoid in the classroomthe severe
communication gaps that often plaguegeneral
managers and IS professionalsin the business
wodd(Wang,1994).
Moreformally,wefind justification for our peda-
gogical modelin generalsystemstheory (Buck-
ley, 1966; Churchman, 1979; von Bertalanffy,
1950).As Ackoff(1993)so eloquentlystates,
is not possible to understand a systemby ana-
lyzing it alonewthatis, by simply decomposing
it into its constituentparts. Onemustfirst syn-
thesize it---determine its function in the su-
persystem, the next higher level system of
whichit is a part. In the caseof an information
system,this supersystem is the organizational
(or interorganizationai)systemto whichit be-
longs. Briefly, the rule of thumbonegleansfrom
systems theory is "one level up, one level
down."This rule translates to informationsys-
tems as follows: Onefirst asks, "Whatis the
organizational(or interorganizational)supersys-
tem of whichthis informationsystemis a part,
and whatfunction doesthe information system
play in this supersystem?" Onlythen shouldone
ask, "Whatare the information system’s fea-
tures and component parts and howdo they en-
able the systemto serve its function in the
supersystem?" Not only is this two-part synthe-
sis-analysis procedure moreconsistentwith the
MISQuarterly~September
1995363
 TheMBACoreCourse

e Information sYst

Figure 1. IS-Centered View of an Information System

The Organization

Figure 2. Managerial View of an Information System

spirit of generalsystemstheorythanstraightfor- the modelhelps accountfor and makesenseof

warddecomposition into component parts, it is
consistent with the manager’sworld view, in
whichthe organization,not the informationsys-
tem,is the centerof the universe.
Using general systemstheory as a starting
point, the fundamental theoretical assertion of
the IT InteractionModelis that the effects of an
information systemfor an organization emerge
over timeas the result of the interaction of the
systemwith its organizational context. This
claim is basedon a large bodyof generally ac-
ceptedtheory, including webmodels(Kling and
Scacchi, 1982), the interaction perspective
(Markus, 1984; Markusand Robey,1988), and
structuration theory (DeSanctis and Poole,
1994;.OrlikowskiandRobey,1991).In addition,
a large bodyof confiicting empirical findings
aboutIT impacts(Attewell andRule, 1984;Gur-
baxani and VVhang,1991; Markus, 1994). We
provide in subsequent sections moredetails on
the relevanttheoreticalandempiricalliteratures,
but first wedescribehowwemotivatethe model
for our students.
Introducing the Model
When introducing the modelto our students, we
use a casual discussion as motivation before
presentingthe modelformally. Webeginby ask-

364MISQuarterly~September
1995

ing students whyorganizations build information
systems. They usually respond by identifying a
variety of economicbenefits: "to makemoney,"
"for greater efficiency," andso on. After probing
a bit, we ask: "Do systems always have these
effects?" Here, we often get into a stimulating
discussion of failures and "non-impacts"m
everything from the recent CONFIRM debacle to
the Productivity Paradox(Brynjolfsson, 1993).
Next, weask about the potential for negative im-
pacts. Job loss, deskilling, loss of security, and
computer-monitoring usually surface, among
others.
This discussion of effects sets the stage for us
to ask the questions that introduce our model:
So, now that we have determined that
information systemsdo not alwayshave the
intendedbenefits, whatcan you do to ensure
that (1) failure doesnot occur, (2) negative
effects donot occur,and(3) positive effects
occur?Canyou do this by directing all your
managerial attention and resources to the
informationsystemitself?. Of coursenot. You
mustconsideryour information systemin the
context of your organization and what your
organization is trying to accomplishin its
transactions with its environment.
At this point we ask students how businesses
succeed and fail. After somefumbling around,
weusually arrive at somethingthat begins to re-
semble Peter Drucker’s (1994) ’~Theory of the
Business." Whenall goes well, (1) businesses
understand their external environments of po-
tential markets and various trends, (2) busi-
nesses undertakemissions consistent with their
markets, and (3) businesses develop the core
competencies needed to accomplish their mis-
sions. Failure can result from inadequate per-
formanceon any of these core tasks.
Now, we are ready to address information tech-
nology. ’NVheredoesIT fit into the theory of the
business?" we ask. Here, we can get into an in-
teresting discussion of IT as strategic versus IT
as support (Cash, et al., 1992). The ante starts
to rise as we ask what factors determine an or-
ganization’s ability to use IT either strategically
or supportively. This surfaces ideas that relate
to the concept of IT infrastructure. For exam-
ple, students might volunteer that managers’IT
knowledgeand skills (key elementsof a firm’s IT
infrastructure, in our view) can affect the firm’s
The MBACorn Course
ability to deploy IT effectively. Fromthere, we
can Probethe details of IT infrastructure, such
as networks, skills in application development,
andso forth.
If students by this time have not raised the
question of ’Where do information ,systems
comefrom," we seed the discussion by asking it
point blank. Webriefly describe (1) tl~e tradi-
tional systemdevelopmentlife cycle, (2) the ma-
jor alternative methodsof acquiring systems,
and (3) how system acquisition itself needs
b~ viewed in the context of the larger system
implementation process. To makethe point,
weask the following:
Ok, nowsupposeyou have goneout and paid
$100million for customsoftwarefor a strategic
information system. Someone drops off a
bunchof diskettes on people’s desks with a
post-it notesaying’1 think you’regoingto like
this. Just install the system
onyourharddrive,
reboot, andclick your waythroughthe online
tutorial. Sincerely, DPJones,systemsanalyst
jr. grade.’ Whatdoyouthink will happen?
Not surprisingly, this questiontriggers students’
imaginations about, and prior experiences with,
system implementation and the characteristics
of implementationsuccess.
At this point, we have comefull circle. Weare
nowready to tackle the moredifficult questions
of when and why systems sometimes have
negative effects that mayreduce or even elimi-
nate the positive economicbenefits that organi-
zations hope for when they make sizable
investmentsin IT:
When westarted this discussion,wenotedthat
informationsystemssometimes fail to havethe
expectedbenefits. Wehavejust shownthat the
implementation process can influence
information systemsuccessor failure. Does
this mean that, as longas weimplement it well,
anyinformationsystemis capableof producing
positive economic benefits?Or, couldit be the
casethat, to havebenefits, the systemmust
not only be well implemented but mustalso be
’a goodsystem?’
Usually, students will concedethat the system
itself has to be good.
"So, what constitutes a goodsystem?"
Nowthere is muchdiscussion of interface and
user friendliness, anda few IT-literate souls will
MISQuarterly~September
1995365
TheMBA
CoreCourse
venture comments about object-oriented sys-
tems, DBMS, 4th-generationlanguages,and the
like. Finally, weworkour wayaroundto the idea
that systemshave"designfeatures" that define
howthe systemoperatesin its larger organiza-
tional and business context. Thesefeatures
mustfit the organizationandits environmentfor
benefits.to occur.
Anynumberof different conceptscan be used
to illustrate the notion of "interaction between
information system features and organiza-
tional "context’ in our model. Wemight use
suchfeaturesas Silver’s (1991)restrictiveness
and guidanceattributes. Wemight use Zuboffs
(1988) automate/informate dichotomy. Or
might considerthe distinction madeby reengi-
neering experts betweendesigning a system
that automatesthe existing process and one
that transformsit. Theseillustrations also allow
us to connectwith the implementationissues
discussedearlier, makingthe point that in order
for the featuresto fit, the systemto be"good,"
andsystemeffects to be positive, there mustbe
THE
/ Y
\ II
Figure 3. The Information TechnologyInteraction Model
366MISQuarterly~September
1995
an extremelyeffective collaboration betweenIS
professionals on the one hand and managers
anduserson the other.
This introductoryclass discussionservesto pre-
viewthe topics that will beaddressed duringthe
schoolterm and to demonstrate to the students
that these subjects are highly interconnected.
Thenext section presents the modelmorefor-
mally and discusseseach elementmorefully.
Eachcomponent of the modelis fleshed out in
somewhat greater detail, providing pointers to
relevanttheoretical,empirical,andpractical lit-
eraturethat maybeusefulto the instructor.
The Model
Wepresent the modelto the students in dia-
grammatic form, as shownin Figure 3. The
schematic,whichcapturesthe mainelementsof
the modeland depicts the principal relation-
ships, servesseveralpurposes.It highlights the
IMPLEMENTATION PRO
\ " \
/
 The MBACore Course

Table1. Components
of the IT Interaction Model:
SomeExamples,Elements,and Descriptors

The Extemal Environment: BusinessProcesses:

CompetitiveStructureof the ¯ OrderFulfillment

Industry
¯ MaterialsAcquisition
¯ Relative Powerof Buyersand
¯ NewProduct Devlopment
Sellers
¯ Basisof Competition
IT Infrastructure
¯ Growing/Shrinking/Stable
¯ Regulation ¯ ComputingHardware
¯ TechnologicalDeployment ¯ SoftwareDevelopment
Tools and
Program
Libraries
FirmStrategies: ¯ Databases
¯ Telecommunications Networks
¯ Differentiation
¯ TrainingMaterialsandFacilities
¯ Low-CostProduction ¯ Capabilitiesof IT Personnel
¯ Quality/Service ¯ Users’Skills with IT
¯ GoingGlobal ¯ Compatibility,Connectivity,Reach,and
¯ Right-Sizing Range
¯ Customer/SupplierIntimacy
¯ Just-In-TimeInventory/ InformationSystem
Features:
Manufacturing
¯ Functionality(whatthe systemcando)
OrganizationalStructure: ¯ Interface(howthe userinteractswith it)
¯ Restrictiveness
¯ Centralizationvs. Decentralization ¯ Guidance
¯ Functional,
Divisional,Matrix,or
NetworkedOrganization ¯ Automate
vs. Informate
¯ ¯ Anonymity
vs. Identity
ReportingRelationships
¯ Recentralizationof DecisionMaking
OrganizationalCulture:
TheImplementation
Process:
¯ Artifacts, Shared Values,Basic
Assumptions ¯ Initiation
¯ Individuality (or Teamwork) ¯ Build/Buy
¯ Biggeris Better(or not) ¯ Introduction
¯ RiskAversion(or Risk Taking) ¯ Adaptation

key components and helps the students see
the relationships amongthem. It also helps
the students remember those components
and relationships. The figure allows us to fo-
cus easily on one portion of the model, with-
out losing sight of howthat componentfits into
the big picture. Andit helps the students appre-
ciate the model’s dynamics. Table 1 accompa-
nies the schematic, outlining and exemplifying
the model’s salient features. The table is in-
tendednot to define the components but to illus-
trate them, providing links to topics students

MIS Quarterly~September
1995367
TheMBACoreCourse
havestudiedor will studyin their otherbusiness
courses.
Whatfollows is an overviewof the essentialsof
the model:
¯ SystemEffects
¯ The Organizational Context: The Environ-
ment.andElementsof the Organization
¯ TheFeaturesof the Information System
¯ The Fit BetweenSystemFeatures and Or-
ganizationalContext
¯ The ImplementationProcess
Systemeffects
Webegin at the end, discussing first the sys-
tem’s effects, becauseultimately these are
what will matter for the students whenthey
enter the workplace.Organizationsemployin-
formationtechnologywith the objective of pro-
ducingpositive effects and, if they are savvy,
with an eye toward avoiding negative ones.
An essential assumptionunderlying our peda-
gogical modelis that systemeffects are non-
deterministic and not necessarily those
intended or anticipated by the system’s de-
signers. It follows that MBAcandidatesmust
learn how to manage,influence, and cope
with those effects as best they can. Knowl-
edge of the potential interactions between
systemsand various elementsof the organi-
zation is just the tool theyneedto do this.
System effects fit into threestages.Although not
alwaysthoughtof as an effect, one of the most
fundamental results of introducing an informa-
tion systeminto anorganizationis that the sys-
temeither is usedor is not. Thisfirst-order effect
mustnot be neglectedbecauseit is quite com-
monfor systemsnot to be used, and suchnon-
useis a majorreasonfor systemsnot achieving
their designers’ objectives (Markusand Keil,
1994).If the systemis used,the questionof how
the systemis used---when,by whom,for what
purpose,andso forthmremains a significant is-
sue. Systems are often usedin waysother than
intended, sometimeswith positive conse-
quences, as whena decision support system
also servesas a tool for improvingcustomer re-
lations (Keen and Scott Morton, 1978), and
368MISQuarterly/September
1995
sometimeswith negative consequences,as
whenan executive information systemis used
to intimidatesubordinates, therebystifling crea-
tivity. Sounderstanding if andhowa systemis
usedis an essentialfirst step in evaluatingsys-
temeffects.
Thesecondstageof evaluatingeffects is to as-
sess the consequences of the systemfor the or-
ganization. Themodelfocuseson three classes
of outcomes: (1) performance effects, (2) conse-
quencesfor people(the organization’s person-
nel), and(3) future flexibility. Performance,
indicatedby a "$" in Figure3, includessuchbot-
tom-line results as profit, gross revenue,and
marketshare. For somefirms, quality, service,
and customersatisfaction are also considered
performanceeffects. Consequences for people
include such outcomesas shifts in powerand
influence, job enrichment, anddeskilling. Future
flexibility (the infinity signin thefigure)refers
the waysthe systemmayenableor constrain fuo
ture informationsystems andstrategicinitiatives
by the organization (Keen,1991). For example,
companies that haveinvested heavily in main-
frame computerarchitectures and mainframe-
related skills are predicted to incur great
difficulty andexpense convertingto object-ori-
entedandclient-server architectures (Fichman
and Kemerer,1993).
The consequences of an IS are not necessarily
uniform. Somemaybe desirable while others
maynot. Performanceeffects maybe at odds
with peopleeffects; for example,a systemmight
improveprofits at the expenseof the quality of
worklife for company personnel. Various as-
pects of performancemaydash; increasing
long-runmarketsharemayconflict with increas-
ing short-run profit. Andthe consequences for
peoplemaydiffer from onepersonto another; a
systemthat enrichesor empowers one person’s
job maydeskill or disempowersomeone else’s
(Attewell and Rule, 1984;Zuboff and Bronsema,
1984).
A third-order effect of implementingan informa-
tion systemis that as a result of howthe system
is usedand its perceivedconsequences for per-
formance,people,andfuture flexibility, adapta-
tions will be madeovertime to the system,other
elementsof the organization,or both. At Fdto-
Lay, for example,changesdue to the hand-held
computer project andthe improved IT infrastruc-

ture enabledthe organization to shift from a
one-yearplanningcycle to a three-times-a-year
planningcycle, dramaticallyimprovingthe rate
of organizational learning (Applegate,1995).
Similarly, it hasbeensuggestedthat, as with
any newtechnology,a period of learning, ad-
justment, and restructuring maybe necessary
before the full return on an IT investmentis
reaped(Brynjolfsson, 1993). Figure 3 depicts
theseadaptiveeffects in the formof a feedback
loop at the bottomof the diagram.
Managingthe effects of an information system
entails not only understandingthe rangeof pos-
sible outcomes but also understanding the fac-
tors and dynamicsthat producethose effects¯
Armedwith an understandingof the effects to
look out for, wenowturn to the organizational
context that makes particular effects desirable
or undesirableand that influences if and how
sucheffects occur.
Theorganizational context:
environment and elements of the
organization
In our view, the effects of informationsystems
ensuefrom interactions betweensystemdesign
features and the organizationalcontext, which
includesthe organization’sexternal environment
as well as suchinternal elementsof the organi-
zation as its strategy, structure, andculture.
Moreover,a system’sdesignfeatures are them-
selvesoften heavily influencedby the organiza-
tional context. For example,the Republicof
Singapore’s extreme dependenceon foreign
trade led it to build an information system
(Tradenet)that wouldsignificantly reducethe
timerequiredfor shippersto clear customs,be-
causethis wasbelievedlikely to give it competi-
tive advantageover other ports in the region
(Konsynskiand King 1990;Neo, et al., 1994).
Andthe extent to which Tradenetactually re-
sulted in the desiredeffect depended heavily on
interactions between its variousfeatures anda
variety of contextualfactors, suchas the behav-
ior of potentialusersandcompetitors.
It follows that an adequate
understandingof the
organizationalcontextis importantfor two rea-
sons. First, the organizationalcontext deter-
mines what the features of an information
system should be, if an organization is to
TheMBACoreCourse
achievebenefits fromits IT =nvestment. Second
the organizationalcontextinteractswith the fea-
tures of the informationsystemthe organization
actually implements (whichmaynot be the fea-
tures it needs)to determinethe system’sef-
fects. Thesetwo reasonsfor understanding the
organizational context correspondto the two
ways we discuss later for using th~ model
(proactivelyandreactively).
Of course,the organizationalcontextis not the
only influence on an information system’sde-
sign features and effects. Themannerin which
the systemis built and introducedinto the or-
ganization also matters. Consequences will de-
pend,for example,on whetherthe organization
developscustomsoftwareto meetits needsex-
actly or whetherit makesdowith anoff-the-shelf
package.This section, however,is primarily
concerned with the organizationalcontext; other
factors are addressed subsequently.
Whatfollows are brief descriptionsof the dimen-
sions of the organizationalcontextandsomeex-
amplesof the kinds of interactions the model
helps illustrate. For the purposesof under-
standing the dynamicsof information systems
interventions,wefind it usefulto distinguishbe-
tweenthe organization’s external environment
and internal elements(Laudon, 1985). More-
over, wefind it pedagogically usefulto groupthe
internal elementsinto four components:the
firm’s strategy,its structureandculture,its busi-
nessprocesses, andits IT infrastructure.
TheExternal Environment
A firm’s external environment is definedby such
factorsas the competitivestructureof its indus-
try, the relative powerof buyersandsellers, the
basis of competition, whetherthe industry is
growing,shrinking,or stable, the state of regula-
tion, andthe state of technologicaldeployment
(McFarlan,1984;Porter, 1980).Of particular in-
terest is howthe. firm is situatedin its external
environmentmfor example,the competitive po-
sition of the firm, its relationshipswith its cus-
tomers and suppliers, and its relative
technologicalcapabilities. Theexternal environ-
mentarid the firm’s positionin it influencewhich
information systemsa firm choosesto imple-
ment,the designfeaturesof thosesystems,and
MISQuarte#y/September
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 TheMBACoreCourse
their effects for the firm andthe industry(Orlik-
owskiand Robey,1992).
VVhilethe external environment often influences
internal information systems--for example,
regulatory changesfrequently impacta firm’s
transaction processingand reporting systems--
consideringthe external environmentalis espe-
cially importantfor understanding thosesystems
that link oneorganizationwith another(interor-
ganizational systems).Electronic DataInter-
change(EDI) provides a good exampleof how
industrial factors influencetechnologicaladop-
tion: Somefirms embarked on EDI only follow-
ing pressure from their trading partners
(Bouchardand Markus,1995). Other firms re-
sponded not to direct pressurefrom their part-
ners but to the indirect pressure of their
competitors’successfuldeployment of EDItech-
nology (Clemons and Kimbrough, 1986;
Clemonsand Row,1987). In a numberof nota-
ble cases (for example,Konsynskiand Warbe-
low, 1987;Palmer,1994),industry associations
havefacilitated the industry-widedeployment of
EDI. Fudhermore,these sameforces (trading
partners, competitors, andindustry practices)
mayinfluence systemdesign decisions, suchas
whether to use proprietary protocols and
whether to employ a value-added network
(Boynton and Crowell, 1990; Choudhury,
1991), and the consequences of those design
decisions.
Regardingsystemeffects, interorganizational
systems(lOS) can improvea firm’s performance
in a number of ways,including reducingtransac-
tions costs anddifferentiating a firm fromits
competitors. But the consequences for onefirm
maybe different from thosefor another(buyers
versus sellers, industry leaders versus small
players, and so forth). Consider,for example,
the differing effects of the Sabreairline reserva-
tion system for American (Copeland and
McKenney,1988; Hopper, 1990), which re-
ceives substantial revenuefrom Sabreand the
now-defunctFrontier (Vitale, 1983). Moreover,
suchsystemsmayaffect not only the perform-
anceof an individual firm but maychangethe
externalenvironment itself by altering the basis
of competition in the industryor shifting the bal-
anceof powerbetweenbuyersand sellers. The
ASAPsystem at American ~Hospital Supply
Company (Short and Venkatraman, 1992; Vitale
370M/SQuarterly~September
1995
1988;Vitale andKonsynski,1991)is a classic
caseof suchenvironmental
effects.
Firm Strategy
Manyinformation systemsprojects in organiza-
tions todayare closely linked to corporatestrat-
egy. In somecases,the informationsystemis a
key elementin executinga marketingor manu-
facturingstrategy;in othercases,it is at thevery
essenceof the strategy. For analyzingmanyin-
formation systems, therefore, examiningfirm
strategyis a critical factor. Among the business
strategies that are nowreceivingmuchattention
for their IT implicationsare differentiation, low-
cost production,a focuson quality andservice,
globalization, right-sizing, customerintimacy,
supplierintimacy,andjust-in-time inventoryand
manufacturing (Boynton,et al., 1993;Ives and
Learmonth,1984;Lucas, 1994; McFarlan,1984;
Palmer,1994;Porter and Millar, 1985;Treacy
and Wiersema,1993;).
In additionto the typical treatmentof the infor-
mationsystem-firmstrategy relationship, which
employsa variety of examples together with the
five-forces model(Porter, 1980)or value chain
analysis(Porter, 1985)to explainhowfirm strat-
egycan drive the effective use of IT, wealso
considerwhatcango awryin this arena.For ex-
ample,had Bankof America’sMasternetproject
succeeded,it might nowbe another exampleof
the strategic useof IT, leapfroggingB of A into
the 1990sandcatapultingit into trust-fund lead-
.ership. But a combination of factors including a
bad implementation process,inability to lever-
agethe existing IT infrastructure, andquestion-
able objectives led instead to disaster. In
particular, it wasnot clear that the information
system’sobjectiveswerea goodfit with the or-
ganization’s strategic needs.Similarly, many
firms are finding that the benefitsof reengineer-
ing projects do not "alwaysdrop to the bottom
line" unlessthe projects are carefully chosen on
the basisof strategicf’~ (Hall, et aL,1993).
OrganizationalStructureandCulture
A firm’s internal designelements--itsstructure
and its culture--mayinfluence informationsys-
temsdesignas well as informationsystemssuc-
cess. Conversely,an organization’sinformation

systemsmaycontribute to changes
in its struc-
ture andculture.
By organizationalstructure wemeanformal as-
pectsof organizationalfunctioning,suchas the
division of labor, hierarchicalauthority, andjob
descriptions. Structure typically includes
whetherthe firm is centralizedor decentralized,
whetherit usesa divisional, functional, matrix,
or networked organization,its reportingrelation-
ships,andits rewardstructure.
Organizationalstructure can influenceinforma-
tion systems consequencesin a numberof
ways. For example,while advancesin IT are
breakingdownthe technologicalbarriers to the
sharingof informationin organizations,organ-
izational structure often remainsa formidable
barrier to the timely sharingof accurateinforma-
tion because organizationalunits fear the nega-
tive political consequences that mayaccompany
sharing their data with others (Keen, 1981;
MarkusandPfeffer, 1983).Insteadof realizing
the intendedbenefits, organizationsmayfind
that thesefears lead to non-use or misuseof the
information system. Similarly, systemsthat
share data across departmentalboundariesare
especially vulnerableto resistance from users
dueto lost flexibility (Goodhue,
et al., 1992).
As a consequence of the deploymentof infor-
mation technology, there are often dramatic
changesin organizationalstructure. For exam-
ple, improved data management can lead to
greater centralization of decisionmakingin an
organization,evenwhenit is not a designobjec-
tive (Goodhue,et al., 1988).Or, alternatively,in-
formation technologycan pushdecision making
downin the organization.Frito-Lay,for instance,
usedits information systemsto promotea "hy-
brid" organizational structurereflecting "directed
decentralization"--greaterdecision-making power
at lowerorganizational levels coupledwithgreater
opportunities
for controlanddirectionat higherlev-
els. Moreover, giventhe informationsharingand
communicationcapabilities of IT, traditional or-
ganizationalhierarchiesare giving wayto adhoc-
racies and networkedorganizations (Drucker,
1988; Powell, 1987). Among the resourceswe
maydrawuponfor discussingthis subject are
Huber(1990) and Gurbaxaniand Whang (1991).
By culture wemean (following Schein,1992)the
pattern of sharedbasic assumptionsthat an or-
TheMBACoreCourse
ganizationlearnsas it becomes integratedinto a
wholeand adaptsto its environment.The es-
sence of these assumptionsbecomesembed-
dedinto the organizationandis passedalongto
new members.Elements of culture include
whetherthe organizationvaluesindividuality or
teamwork, whetherbiggeris better, andwhether
risk taking, suchas that commonly associated
with IT innovations,is rewarded or reproached.
Like organizationalstructure, culture caninflu-
encethe consequences of an information sys-
tem.For example,in an organizationthat values
individuality over teamwork,groupwaresys-
tems ospecially those that operate with ano-
nymity---may fail to achieve their desired
consequences of promotingproductivecollabo-
rative work. Onthe other hand, whencoupled
with other measures,such a groupwaresystem
mightbe usedas part of a consciouseffort to
makethe corporateculture moreteamoriented.
BusinessProcesses
Businessprocessesare the sets of activities,
often cutting across the major functional
boundarieswithin organizations(for instance,
sales, manufacturing,and engineering, among
others), by whichorganizationsaccomplish their
missions. Examplesof businessprocessesin-
cludeorderfulfillment, materialsacquisition,and
new product development(Davenport, 1993;
Hammer and Champy,1993).
Ever since computerswere first used in com-
mercial situations, organizationshavetried to
improvethe operation of their businessproc-
essesthrough the application of information
technology in waysthat have cometo be de-
scribed as "automation."While automationhas
achievedmanystunning successes,experts in
management and information technology have
begunto recognizeits considerable limitations.
In brief, whenbusiness processesare auto-
matedwithout first streamliningand improving
them(for instanceby eliminating redundant ac-
tivities), organizationsgenerallyfail to achieve
significant benefitsfromtheir large investments
in information technology (Markusand Soh,
1993)oAlso, whenautomationefforts are con-
fined to small pieces of a business process
(such as those pieces that fall within the
boundaries of a particular functionalunit of the
MISQuarterly~September
1995371
TheMBA
CoreCourse
organization),it canhappen
that the larger proc-
ess is suboptimized, and performanceis de-
gradedrather than improved(Markusand Keil,
1994).
Growing recognitionof the limitations of the tra-
ditional "automation"paradigm,hasled experts
to urge ,managers to conducttheir systemsac-
quisition andsystemsdevelopment activities in
the contextof larger organizational"reengineer-
ing" efforts (Davenport, 1993; Hammer and
Champy,1993). By carefully scoping out the
boundariesof the wholebusinessprocessand
identifying its critical performancemeasures and
the majorpoints of leverageon thembefore se-
lecting or developingan information system,
managers canavoid the twin automationpitfalls
of automatinga bad processand automatingthe
wrongprocess. For example,the designers of
Singapore’s Tradenet beganby considering
whichbusinessprocesseswerekey to the suc-
cess of the economyand which were not. By
every measure,trade wasthe most important
economicsector. Within trade, the business
processesjudgedto have the greatest impact
on economiccompetitive~tesswere those that
directly influencedthe speedof transit; among
these, customsclearancewasthe mostvisible
andhad the biggest impact. Tradenet’sdesign-
ers werenot content with the incremental im-
provementsthey wouldachieve by automating
all the customsclearanceactivities that were
thenperformed.Insteadthey radically simplified
the process,transforming it, andin doingso sig-
nificantly improvingthe time required to clear
most shipments.
IT Infrastructure
IT infrastructure is a term that appearsfre-
quently in the IS literature, but whosemeaning
varies from sourceto source. Theterm "infra-
structure" in general refers to aspectsof our
physical and social environments that are
sharedfor the public good:highwaysenablethe
movement of goodsand people, languagesen-
able the sharingof ideas and information, and
monetarysystemsenable our global economy.
In our model,the IT infrastructure encompasses
the physical components,the data and docu-
mentrepositories,the technicalcapabilitiesof IS
professionals and users, and the technology
372MISQuarterly/September
1995
strategies that enablecurrent businessproc-
essesandequipthe firm to createnewIT appli-
cations. For this courseweemphasize that the
IT infrastructure representsthe organizational
resourcesthat give the firm the capacityto gen-
erate newIT applications. As such, it is both
enablingandconstraining.
Thephysicalpart of the IT infrastructure, some-
times called "the platform" (Keen, 1991), in-
cludes computer and communicationsnetwork
components, operating systems,and utilities.
Databases, including the relatively static data-
basesdescribingthe firm’s accountingsystem,
products, customers,and employees, as well as
such less-structured documentrepositories as
Lotus Notes"databases"and engineeringdraw-
ing files, are anotherpotentially leverageable
component of the IT infrastructure. Application
programs,especially common or sharedappli-
cations, or reusable programmodulesand ob-
jects mayalso enablethe development of new
informationsystems.
Thecapabilities of technical andnon-technical
peoplein the organizationto developand man-
age information technologyare an often over-
looked but equally important part of the IT
infrastructure (DavenportandLinder, 1993).
includeas part of the IT infrastructurethe firm’s
knowledgeof the languagesand protocols of
the platform, as well as expertise in developing
and using information systems.The IT infra-
structure also includes procedures, such as
those inherent in systemsdevelopmentmeth-
ods, CASE tools, anddata dictionaries, because
these easeor speedinformation systemsdevel-
opment.Finally, wealso consider the firm’s
strategies, plans, architectures, and stand-
ards---all of whichdirect development toward
firm goals--to be critical componentsof a
shared, enablingIT infrastructure (Henderson
and Venkatraman, 1993).
Some argue that the systematicdevelopment of
core information technology componentsand
competencies will lead to sustainable advan-
tages in productivity, fiexibility, or speed
(Clemons,1991; Markusand Soh, 1993; Weill,
et al., in press). Similar argumentsfavoringca-
pabilities over strategic thrusts canbe foundin
the recant strategy literature (Barney, 1991;
Dierickx and Cool, 1989; Hameland Prahalad,
1990;Stalk, et al., 1992). Usingour model,we

arguethat the management of the IT infrastruc-
ture-that is, the thoughtful accumulationof
long-termIT capabilitynis a task best sharedby
information technologyprofessionals and the
rest of the firm’s management (Henderson,
1990;Rockart,1988).
In our model,any application of information
technologycan leverageor extendthe existing
IT infrastructure.A giveninformationsystemlev-
eragesthe infrastructure whenit drawsuponthe
resourcesthe existing infrastructure offers. An
informationsystemextendsthe infrastructure by
contributing physicalor non-physicalresources
that can be drawnuponby other applications.
Theimplementationof the Tradenetsystemin
Singapore illustrates this leveragingandextend-
ing of the IT infrastructure. TheTradenet system
leveragedexisting governmentaltransaction
processingsystemsby linking traders to these
systems.In addition, the processof implement-
ing Tradenetwasmanaged so that a consider-
able increasewasmadein Singapore’sstock of
information-systems-related skills, both in the
private andpublic sectors. Moreover,thesein-
formationsystemskills, the Tradenetconcept,
andits EDIarchitecture weresubsequently lev-
eragedas Singaporequickly implemented simi-
lar systems for its medical,legal, manufacturing,
apparel,andreal estateindustries(Neo,et al.,
1993).
Features of the information system
Moststudentsenteringthe coursethink of an in-
formation system as a computer, somepro-
grams,and perhapssomedata. Thetraditional
IS view that an information sYstemconsists of
hardware,software, data, people, and proce-
dures is a major improvement on the students’
naiveviewbecauseit highlights that manypeo-
ple andprocedures are required"behindthe ter-
minal" (Kling andScacchi,1982)if systemsare
to run reliably withoutconsiderablepainandsuf-
fering on the user’s part (Gasser, 1986). The
traditional viewis misleading,however,because
it puts the primaryemphasis on the information
systemwhenit should be on the organization
whoseperformancethe information systemis
intendedto improve.As shownin Figure 3, we
encircle the informationsystemwithin the organ-
izational rectangleto emphasize the relationship
TheMBACoreCourse
betweenthe informationsystemand the organi-
zation.Wetell studentstheycanthink of the cir-
cle as a lens---a magnifyingglass--that focuses
our attentionon a particular subsetof the firm’s
computertechnology,people,and procedures.
Nomatterhowmuch this traditional definition of
an informationsystemimproveson students’in-
itial views,it doesnot go far enough to support
insightful proactiveor reactive analysesof the
factors that contribute to information system
success.To designeffective information sys-
tems,andto understand andpredict their effects
after the fact, one mustconsidernot just the
system’sconstituent elementsbut also the de-
sign featuresof the systemas a whole.
In the spirit of Markus(1984),wedefine system
designfeaturesas thosepropertiesof an infor-
mation systemthat affect systemuse and the
consequences thereof. Thesepropertiesreflect,
usually somewhat imperfectly, the designers’at-
temptsto translate their intentions for changed
functioning into systemattributes. A system’s
featuresandthe designers’intentionsdiffer be-
causea given user’s perceptionsof whathe or
she cando with a systemoften differs fromthe
capabilities designers are trying to build in. In-
deed,an entire bodyof literature in the com-
puter-humaninteraction field is devoted to
users’ mentalmodelsof software(Carroll and
Olson,1988)and to the affordancesof technol-
ogy (Norman,1988).
Wediscussfeatures in two ways.First, wecon-
templatefeatures in termsof general, broadly
applicableconceptssuchas systemfunctional-
ity (what the systemdoes), the interface (how
usersinteract with it), restrictivenessandguid-
ance(Silver, 1991),automating versusinformat-
ing (Zuboff, 1988), and anonymity versus
identity (DeSanctisandGallupe, 1987;Jessup,
et al., 1990;Nunamaker, et al., 1987;Valacich,
et al., 1991). Some executivesupport systems,
for example,restrict users to predefineddis-
plays (Houdesheland Watson,1987), whereas
others support personal analysis as well
(RockartandTreacy,1982). Similarly, one ex-
pert system might producedecisions for the
user, whereasanothermight be designedas an
expertsupportsystem(Luconi, et al., 1986)that
assists the user in arriving at a decision.More-
over, the consequences of a given feature may
be mixed;the morerestrictive systemmaypro-
MISQuarterly~September
1995373
TheMBACoreCourse
duce better performancein the short-run but
deskill the organization’speoplein the longrun.
Wealso discussfeatures in termsof the highly
specific decisionsmadeby systemdesignersin
particular cases.For instance,in the caseof the
CONFIGexpert system (Markus and Keil,
1994),designersdeliberately decided,over the
objectionsof usersthey involvedin design,not
to integratethe expertsystemwith anotherinfor-
mation system the users had to employ.This
decision had a major adverse effect on how
muchtl~e systemwasused, and consequently
the systemdid not achievethe intended busi-
nessresults.
Whiie topologies of general features can go a
Iohg waytowardhelping studentsdesigneffec-
tive systemsand analyze their impacts, much
skill is involvedin identifyingthe keyspecificde-
sign featuresthat will makea differencein any
givencase. Wethereforefind it useful, through
pedagogicalcasestudies and studentprojects,
to providenumerous examples that reinforce the
students’growingintuitions aboutthosefeatures
of systemsthat must"fit" with the other ele-
mentsof the organization and those that can
andshouldbe allowedto clashi
Fit betweeninformationsystems
featuresandthe organizational
context
Central to understanding the interaction of the
informationsystemwith its organizationalcon-
text is the conceptof "fit." Thenotionthat a sys-
temmust"fit" its context~heorganization,its
strategy, its businessprocesses,its environ-
ment~s intuitively appealing.Thingsthat fit are
good;misfits are bad.Systemsthat do not fit po-
litical dynamics (Markus,1983), managerialas-
sumptions (Zuboff, 1988), users’ cognitive
technologyframes(Orlikowski and Gash,1994),
or users’ incentives(MarkusandKeil, 1994)are
likely to be resisted (DeLuca,1993),underused,
misused,actively sabotaged,andso forth. This
suggeststhat organizationswishingto introduce
newsystemsshouldconducta careful diagnosis
of usersandtheir needsprior to systemsdevel-
opmentto produce a system that fits well
enoughto promotepositive effects and system
SUCceSS.
374MISQuarter/y/September
1995
But whatif the organizationwantsto useinfor-
mation technologyto changeusers’ behavior,
organizational culture, or businessperform-
ance?In this case,a strongfit between the sys-
temandthe existing organizationis likely to be
counterproductive; the new system maybe
used,but the organizationis not likely to change
very much,and the desired consequences are
not likely to occur.In this situation,the organiza-
tion mustconfront the needto changeother as-
pectsof the organization(structure, culture, and
so forth), either prior to or simultaneously with
B
the introduction of the system.This strategy
wherethe information systemclasheswith the
pre-existingorganizationbut fits with the trans-
formedone~othcreates the fit neededto en-
sure that the information systemis used and
changesthe broaderorganizational systeminto
a newconfiguration, enablingthe improvements
in performance.
Indeed, the businessprocessreengineeringap-
proach (Hammerand Champy,1993; Daven-
port, 1993)wasdeveloped precisely to address
this tension betweenthe needfor fit and the
need for change. Hammer (1990) has argued~
that systemsdevelopershave for years sought
fit at the expenseof changeby "automating"
flawed businessprocesses,rather than reengi-
neering them. In so doing, they have merely
"pavedover the cowpaths,"producingat best in-
cremental improvements.Reengineeringaims
to accomplishradical improvementsby com-
plete redesign of business processes sup-
ported and enabledby the use of information
technology.
This analysis suggeststhat, whendeveloping
newinformation systems,organizations adopt
one of two strategies. Theymayengagein in-
cremental improvementor in a moreradical
transformation(reengineering).In either case,
examiningthe fit betweenthe organizationand
the information systemshedslight on the ef-
fects. In instancesof incrementalchange,for
example,a goodfit mayexplain desirable ef-
fects, anda poorfit mayexplain negativeones.
In instancesof transformation,the situation is
morecomplexbecausethe newsystemcan fail
at its missioneit.herby fitting theexistingorgani-
zation too well so that not enoughchangeoc-
Curs, or too poorly, fostering resistance if

correspondingchangesare not madein other
organizationaldesignelements.In particular,
reengineering’shigh failure rate can often be
tracedto the "misfit" it produces
in the organiza-
tion (Bashein,et al., 1994).Thekey to success-
ful reengineeringis to balancethe desire to
"obliterate" (Hammer, 1990)dysfunctionalbusi-
nessprocesseswith the needto re-establish a
harmonious organizationalfit betweensystems,
processes,and suchother aspectsof organiza-
tion as structureandculture. Achievingthis bal-
ance is the goal of effective "information
systemsimplementation."
The implementation process
Thusfar in our discussionof the model,wehave
only consideredtwo causal relationships--the
effects of the organizationalcontextoninforma-
tion systemsdesignfeaturesand on information
systemseffects. Anothermajorinfluence, how-
ever, on information systemsdesign features
and on information systemsimpactsis the im-
plementationprocess.
Theterm implementationhas multiple meanings
in the contextof IS andin Englishlanguage us-
agemoregenerally, accordingto our dictionary
(Webster’sNewWodd Dictionary, CollegeEdition,
1968). Systemsdevelopersoften use the word
mostnarrowlyas a synonym for "coding"or "re-
alizing the systemdesigner’sintention" (Swan-
son, 1988). This is consonant with the
dictionary’sthird definition: "3. to providewith
implements."Among behaviorally oriented re-
searchers,the termis often usedin a somewhat
broadersenseto refer to the user-orientedac-
tivities that generallyoccurafter coding.These
activities includetraining, support,communica-
tion, and establishing policies regardinguse
(Bikson and Eveland, 1990; 1991; Tornatzky
andFleisher, 1990). This perspectivereflects
implementation’ssecondmeaning:"2. to pro-
vide with the means for carrying into effect or
fulfilling; givepracticaleffectto."
It is our experiencethat "clients"mthe manag-
ers whofund systemsdevelopment effortsmim-
plicitly use the broadest, most inclusive
definitions of the term "implementation,"which
our dictionaryholdsas "1. to carry into effect;
fulfill; accomplish."Managers,wefind, are not
simply concernedthat a systemhas beenbuilt
¯TheMBA.Core
Course
successfully,or eventhat the intendedusersare
usingit. Theyare also critically concerned
that
useof a built systemdelivers on its promiseof
improvedorganizationalperformance.
In our view,the different usesof the termimple-
mentationare not just wordplayor a ~emantic
curiosity; theyreflect real cultural andc0mmuni-
cation gaps (Keen, 1995; Wang,1994) among
systemsdevelopers, researchers, and manag-
ers. Students who have a thorough under-
standingof the miscommunication po.ssibilities
inherentin this onetermare muchbetter able to
understandthe importanceof undertaking an
active, evenproactive, personalrole in systems
development efforts in the future. Amongthe re-
sourceswedrawon in our discussionof imple-
mentation are Leonard-Barton(1988; 1990),
Markusand Keil (1994), Markus and Robey
(1995), McKersieand Walton(1991), and
ton (1989).
While webelieve that discussing the various
perspectiveson implementationin class is im-
portant, our modelemploysthe broadest, most
inclusive view (definition 1). Moreover,the
model’streatmentof the implementationproc-
ess neither adoptsnor dependsuponany par-
ticular view of the systems development
process.It is intendedto be compatible with the
variousversionsof the traditional Systems De-
velopmentLifecycle (SDLC)as well as with
suchalternative lifecycles as those associated
with prototyping or outsourcing. Conse-
quently, weidentify four genericstagesin the
implementation process:(1) initiation, (2)
quisition (build/buy), (3) introduction, and
adaptation. In Figure 3, time proceedsfrom
left to right, but the processis deliberatelyleft
"open-ended" to reflect that adaptationof both
the organizationand the information systemis
ongoing.
Thedownward arrowsin the figure indicate that
the implementationprocessinfluences the or-
ganization--inparticular, the designof the infor-
mationsystem---and mediatesthe effects of the
organization-system interaction. For example,in
caseswherethe newsystemis in conflict with
the existing organization,the waythe implemen-
tation processis handledmayfacilitate organ-
izational changeand system acceptanceor,
alternatively, mayprovokegreaterresistance.
M/SQuarterly/September
1995375
 TheMBA
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Usingthe IT Interaction mustbe given to the various modelelements.In

Model: Proactive and
Reactive Analyses
TheIT interaction modelcanbe usedin two fun-
dament.allydifferent ways:
¯ Proactively,to analyzethe issuesinvolvedin
implementing an informationsystemandto make
appropriaterecommendations for action, or
¯ Reactively,to analyzewhattranspired after
an information systemwasintroduced into
the organization and to makerecommenda-
tions for improvement.
Whendesigning an information system, the
modelcan be used proactively in the early
stages of developmentto anticipate conse-
quencesand to design systemfeatures accord-
ingly. Onewayto dothis is by first studyingthe
elementsof the existing organizationalenviron-
mentand then contemplatingthe consequences
of the plannedsystem,taking into accountboth
intendedeffects to be targetedas well as unde-
sirable side-effects to be avoided. Following
these analyses, the major design choice be-
tween incremental improvementand radical
change(transformation) is made.And, then,
throughoutthe implementation processattention
the case of incremental improvement, this
means ensuringan adequatefit betweenthe ex-
isting environment and the system.In the case
of transformation, it entails tiffing some elements
of the environmentwhile deliberately dashing
with others (Gersick, 1991; Markusand Keil,
1994; Tushmanand Romanelli, 1985). More-
over, in all cases,the implementation processit-
self mustbe appropriate andeffect.iv." e. In
particular, whenthe information systemis transfor-
mative,implementationmust supportandfacilitate
the organizationaltransformation,whichoften re-
quires changes in other aspectsof the organiza-
tion in additionto the information system
itself.
Theinteraction modelcan also be usedreac-
tively to analyzethe outcome of an information
systemproject. Suchanalysis might be useful
either for academic purposesor as part of the
adaptiveprocessof revising the system.When
usingthe model reactively,a goodstartingpoint is
to ask whetherthe designobjective wasto im-
proveor transform.If the objectivewasimprove-
ment,then the results mightbest be understood
by lookingfor placeswheretheremaybe a lack of
fit betweenthe systemandthe organization.If the
objectivewastransformation, the results mightde-
pendon understanding wherethere werefits and
wherethere were dashes. Table 2 presents a

Table 2. Reactive Analysis of an Information System

¯ Was
the information
system’s
designobjectiveto IMPROVE
theorganization
incrementally
or to
TRANSFORM it?

¯ Whatare the informationsystem’sFEATURES? Whatdoesit do?

¯ Howdoesthe informationsystemFIT the firm’s EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENT?
¯ Howdoesthe systemFIT the firm’s STRATEGY?
¯ Howdoesthe systemFIT the firm’s BUSINESS PROCESSES?
,,Howdoesthe systemFIT the organizationalSTRUCTURE andCULTURE?
¯ Canthe organization’sexisting IT INFRASTRUCTURE supportthe system?
Doestheinformationsystemleveragetheinfrastructure?
Does
it extendit?
¯ Howandhoweffectively wasthe systemIMPLEMENTED?
¯ WhoUSES the systemandhowdo they USE it? As intended?
¯ Whatare the CONSEQUENCES of the systemfor PERFORMANCE, PEOPLE,
and FUTURE
FLEXIBILITY?
Didthe system accomplishits objectives?

376 MISQuarterly~September
1995

checklistof questionsto considerwhenperforming
suchan analysis. Notethat not everyquestion--
everypossibleinteraction--will be importantfor
every situation. Thechallengeis to determine
whicharethe salientissuesfor a givenproject.
Thesetwo real-world uses of the modelcorre-
spondwith two usesin the classroom.Thereac-
tive approachox post analysis of a "systems
project---lendsitself to retrospectiveanalysisof
business cases. Students are encouragedto
recognize whetherthe objective wasimprove-
mentor transformation,to considerwhetherthis
objectivehadmerit, to contemplate the full set of
consequences (not just the obvious ones of
profit or market
share),to identify the salientele-
mentsof the modelthat contributed to these
outcomes,and to makerecommendations con-
cerningwhatcould havebeendonedifferently.
This approachcan also be usedfor comparative
case analyses, to help students examinehow
different mixesof organizationalfactors andsys-
temfeatures contributedto different outcomes.
Themodelcan be usedeither for written case
analysesor as the basisfor classdiscussions.
Theproactive approachalso has multiple uses
in the core MBAcourse. Manysuchcoursesin-
clude small systemsanalysis and design pro-
jects, andothers include term-longdevelopment
projects. In someinstancestheseare "textbook
cases," wherestudents design systemsbased
onpredeflnedscenarios.In othersthey are "liv-
ing cases,"whichallow the studentsto studythe
environment andinterview the peopledirectly.
Either way, the interaction modelcan be used
proactively to guide systemsanalysis and de-
sign. Theproactive approachmayalso be ap-
propriate for "action" business cases where
studentsare presentedwith a businesssituation
andaskedwhatthe organizationshoulddo next.
To makethe IT Interaction Modeland its uses
moreconcrete, wedescribetwo examplesof how
weusethe modelin the corecourse.Thefirst ex-
ampleillustrates the role of proactiveanalysisin
studentprojects, and the secondshowsreactive
analysisusingthe OTISLINE businesscase.
A rivingcase:a proactive
illustration
Wehave used the modelas a foundation for a
variety of student projects including systems
TheMBACoreCourse
analysisanddesignassignments (base,d onpre-
defined case descriptions) and field-based
analysis projects (wherethe teamsfoundtheir
ownsites). Oneapproachwefound especially
worthwhilefor the studentswasto engagethe
class in a term-longliving casewherethe teamsi
all servedas IT consultantsto the sameclient.
For each section of the core course,’we se-
leoteda different unit in the business schoolthat
had expressed a need for IT support. These
units includedthe planningoffice, ~placement,
center, andadmissions office. Early in the term
wedevotedoneclass sessionto introducingthe
interaction modelandanotherto a presentation
by the client. Theformalchargeto the students
wasto "advisethe client aboutIT-relate~l prob-
lemsandopportunities,"but the client briefings
typically focusedon a particular issuewherethe’
client felt IT couldbeapplied.Thestudentswere
strongly encouraged to applythe modelin mak-
ing their recommendations. During the term,
while the class sessionsweredevotedto read-
ings and caseson topics such as management
of IT resourcesor different typesof applications,
students scheduledfollow-up interviews with
members of the client organizationsandothers
whoseinput wasdesired. Classtime wasallo-
cated as neededto address issues of impor-
tance to morethan oneteam.At the endof the
term, eachteamsubmitteda written report and
presentedan oral summary to the class and the
client.
Examiningthe differences across teamshigh-
lights howthe students used the model.Some
groupstook a very technical approachto the
task, devotinga gooddeal of their effort to de-
signingandbuilding prototypes.VVhiletheir de-
mosweregenerallyslick, other teamsthat took
a broaderand morebehavioralapproachgener-
ally madegreater use of the modeland pro-
ducedricher analyses.Theteamsvaried in their
assessments of whetherit wasbest to automate
or obliterate. SometeamsmadeIow-tech rec-
ommendations, arguingthat little newtechnol-
ogy wasneededbut that changesto the unit’s
processesand procedureswere essential. Oth-
ers arguedfor incrementalimprovement, auto-
matingexisting approaches. Still others argued
for moreradical reengineering or transformation.
Theteamsidentified an assortmentof factors
within the organizationalenvironment
that con-
MISQuarterly~September
1995377
 TheMBACoreCourse
strained the systemsdesignor hadthe potential
to affect c;utcomes.For example,a numberof
teamsexpressedconcems about the ability of
the existing. IT infrastructure to supportwhat
they sawas the ideal solution to the problem.
Concerns-abouthardwareresources, software
compatibility, data availability,, andcomputer
skills ledsomegroups to recommend extending
the infrastructure andother groupsto scaleback
their proposedsolutions. Similarly, internal
structure andculture wereoften seenas addi-
tional constraints. Difficulties in sharingdata
across units, a Iow-techatmosphere,and com-
petition amongunits for central computerre-
sources were all seen as factors requiring
attentioi~. Mostgroupspointedto areaswhere
businbss processescould be improved,if not
t~nsformed.Andalthoughthese wereUnits of a
non-profit organization, the external environ-
ment also played a role. Units such as the
placementcenter and admissionsoffice were
sensitiveto the behaviorof their, counterparts
at
competitorinstitutions, andthis influencedthe
project goalsandparameters. In their analyses,
studentswerealso able to identify sourcesof
potentialresistance.
Based on the written reports, oral presentations,
follow-up discussionswith students, and feed-
back from clients, webelieve that the model
helpedthe studentsappreciatet.he dynamics of
information systemsin the client organizations
andto recognizethe opportunities, dangers,and
limitations that the client environment posedfor
the application of information technology. Of
course,since the students’ term-longparticipa-
tion reflectedonly the initiation stageof the im-
plementation process, they were not able to
experiencefirst-hand the interactions andcon-
sequencesthat would ensue as the projects
progressed. For this reason, we recommend
coupling the proactive analysis of the project
with reactive analysesof a numberof business
cases.
O TISLINE:a reactive illustration
The OTISLINE(McFarlan and Stoddard, 1988)
caseis a popularbusinesscasethat illustrates
howOtis used information technology to en-
hanceits competitiveposition in the elevatorin-
378MISQuarterly/September
1995
dustry. Thecaseis dchwith respectto manyas-
pectsof the IT InteractionModel.
In brief, the casedescribeshowOtis centralized
its dispatchingandmonitoringof service calls,
thereby improving the quality of service and
achievinga variety of related competitivebene-
fits. Ourobjectivein the discussionis to recog-
nize what transpired and to analyze why. The
wayweopenthe discussionis usually to ask if
OTISLINE wassuccessful.
Students generally concludethat the system
wasa successby noting that Otis strengthened
its number-one shareof the service market(per-
formance).Andthey point to a numberof sec-
ond-ordercompetitivebenefitsthat also followed
from the system,suchas the edgesin manufac-
turing andselling elevators that OTISLINE pro-
ducedindirectly. Further analysis also reveals
that OTISLINE served as the springboard for
additional technological innovationsthat Otis
planneddownthe road. Wepress the students
on this issueof future flexibility versuscurrent
performance,askingquestionssuchas the fol-
lowing: Howdependentis Otis on OTISLINE?
HowcanOtis insulate itself fromthe risks of de-
pendence? Is Otis blinding itself to other, better
approaches that mightbe inventedin the future?
Next weask what madeOTISLINE a success. It
is usually agreedthat OTISLINE metthe firm’s
strategic businessneedand wasresponsiveto
the competitiveproblemsOtis facedin the ele-
vator service industry. But weprobe further.
Whilethe systemmayhavebeena goodstrate-
gic fit, consonant with the demandsof the exter-
nal environment, OTISLINErepresented a
transformation within the organization. Otis
movedfrom a highly decentralized handlingof
elevator service, controlled by the field office
managers,to a highly centralized approach.
Manyof the immediateand future benefits of
OTISLINE follow from this radical change,which
wasnot just a redesignof the businessprocess
of dispatching,but a transformationof manage-
rial controlwithinthefirm.
Weprobestill further. Thecasenotesthat Otis
wasonly able to implementOTISLINE so rapidly
becausea critical database wasalready in
place. SoOTISLINE’s successwasattributable,
in part, to havingnecessaryinfrastructure al-
readyin position that couldbe leveragedto sup-

port the newsystem. Wealso encouragethe
students to consider the implementationproc-
ess; they generally note a numberof implemen-
tation factors that further contributed to
OTISLINE’ssuccess.
At this point, the discussionmayseemcomplete
to manystudents, but wehavenot yet consid-
eredthe effects on people.Theseeffects varied
by position. Centralizeddispatchingmeantre-
placing local dispatcherswith newonesat the
central site. For mechanics, the improveddis-
patchingmadetheir lives better in someways,
but it also subjected their performanceto
greater monitoring. Andfield office managers
found themselves bypassedbecauseservice
data floweddirectly to corporateheadquarters,
whichbeganto intercedein local service opera-
tions. So, the consequences for peoplein the
organization were very mixed. In this sense,
OTISLINE is similar to manysystems, we be-
lieve, whichis whywefind it so effective to use
this casein conjunctionwith our model.
Weuse the IT Interaction Modelto presentour
conclusions.Among the conclusionswereachis
that OTISLINE wasa goodfit with strategic
need,but that it wasnot the technology or the fit
alone that producedthe successful outcomes.
Havingan appropriate infrastructure and em-
ploying a goodimplementation process also
contributed. Andthe key ingredient wastrans-
formingthe organizationthroughcentralization.
Whilethis transformationhada positive effect
on performance, it hada variety of negativeef-
fects on manypeople’sjobs. This conclusioncan
supporta discussionof alternativesystems design
featuresor alternative implementation strategies
that mighthaveproduced different results.
TheRole of the Modelin the
Course
Therole of the modelin the MBA coursecanbe
summarizedas follows. The IT Interaction
Modelis both a foundationfor, andan integra-
tion of, virtually all the materialwecoverduring
the term. Wehaveusedthe modelthis waywith
a variety of corecoursestructures; the Appendix
providesa sampleoutline for onesuchcourse.
TheMBACoreCourse
Like manyIS core courses, the courseis de-
signedaroundthe followingmaintopics:
¯ Thebasics of information technology(hard-
ware, software, databases,and telecommu-
nications),
IT applications(transaction processingsys-
tems, interorganizational systems,decision
supportsystems,groupware, expert systems,
and more),
¯ IS development(the traditional systemsde-
velopment
lifecycle, prototyping,out~ourcing,
and end-user development), and ~’
¯ ManagingIT (for instance,implementdtionis-
sues,IT planning, resourceallocation, .and
downsizing).
Eachof thesetopics is reflected prominentlyin
the model,yet interwoven
with the othersas it is
in the businessworld. Considersomeexamples:
Thebasicsof technologyplay a role in at least
three waysin the model. Technologyconcepts
matterfor assessing the IT infrastructure,for de-
scribing systemfeatures, andfor examiningthe
relationship between the capabilities of the ex-
isting infrastructureandthe demands of the pro-
posedsystem. Indeed, the modelhelps those
studentswhomightotherwisebe resistant to the
technologicalcomponent of the courseappreci-
ate whythey needto learn this material. For ex-
ample, OTISLINE provides an excellent
illustration of the importance of voicetechnology
(automaticcall distribution) complementing com-
puting technology(databases).
Thesystemsdevelopment portion of the course
is reflected by the implementationprocesstime-
line that runs acrossthe top of the model.The
modelportrays an abstracted processcompris-
ing four generic phases,but systemsdevelop-
mentand implementation receive proper and
complete attention duringthe course.In particu-
lar, our treatmentof thesetopics paysspecial
attention to the systemsanalysis and design
phases and to implementation tactics and
strategies. Wepoint out the importanceof the
implementation process,noting that it also afo
fects systemuse, consequences, adaptation,
andsuccess.Theimplementationprocessstruc-
tures the modelvisually just as, in the real
world, it is the processthat carries us fromthe
MISQuarterly/September
1995379
 TheMBA
Core Course
existing organizationto the newinformationsys-
temto the effectsof their interaction.
Our objective in the IT applicationssection of
the course.is twofold. Onegoal is to acquaint
studentswith the rangeof applicationtypesthey
are likely to encounterin the workplace.The
other aimis to familiarize themwith the dynam-
ics of these various applications in organiza-
¯ tions. Werely on the modelheavily to realize
this secondaim. In the paragraphsthat follow
weuse expert systems,group decision support
systems,executiveinformationsystems,andin-
terorganizational
systemsto illustrate briefly this
useof ti~e model.
In addition to explaining the routine charac-
teristics of expert systems(Leonard-Barton and
Sviokla, 1988)---what rule-based expert sys-
tems are, howthey work, what tasks they are
suited for, andwhatbenefits they offer the or-
ganization----we use the interaction modelto
providea morepenetratinganalysis. VVhatare
the consequences of an expert systemfor peo-
ple in the organization?Is sucha systeminher-
ently job enriching or deskilling? Are the
consequences the samefor experts as for nov-
ices?Howcanthe potential deskilling effects of
expert systemsbe preventedor mitigated? How
might this systemconstrain the organization’s
future flexibility? For instance,mightthe system
lead to deskilling, whichin the long run could
lead to a loss of knowledge andexpertisefor the
firm?
Similarly, weuse the modeltO probe the fea-
tures of group decision support systems
(GDSS).OneGDSS feature that has received
muchattentionis the possibility of sharingideas
anonymously(DeSanctis and Gallupe, 1987;
Jessup,et al., 1990;Nunamaker, et al., 1987;
Valacich, et al., 1991). Suchanonymous com-
municationoffers potential advantages as well
as potential disadvantages.For example,while
anonymitymight promotegreater participation
andmoreeffective brainstormingby reducingin-
hibitions, it might also suppressparticipation
since individuals are not rewarded
for their con-
tributions. Whetheranonymityproducesgoodor
bad results, therefore, may depend upon
whetherthe organizational culture encourages
or stifles open communi~ation and upon
whetherthe organizationalrewardstructure fa-
vors individual or groupperformance. Anorgani-
380MISQuarterly/September
1995
zation might set anonymityon or off in conso-
nancewith its existingstructureandculture,or it
might do the opposite, using the system, to-
getherwith a careful implementationprocess,to
transformthe structureandculture.
ExecutiveInformationSystems (EIS) are rapidly
turning into "EverybodyInformation Systems,"
proliferating throughoutthe firm as a means of
sharing valuable corporate data (Information
Week,1990). In somefirms, efforts toward
corporate-wide information systems maybe
stymiedby inadequatetechnologicalinfrastruc-
tures. In others, the infrastructures maynowbe
robust enough to supportsuchdata sharing, but
structuralandcultural barriersmaystill blockit.
A systemintendedto promotea moreinformed,
data-rich business environmentmayinstead
evokeresistance accompanied by the withhold-
ing andfalsifying of data. Here,again, success
maydependupon a well-managedtransforma-
tion of the organization.
Interorganizationalsystems (lOS) that electroni-
cally link one firm with another(CashandKon-
synski, 1985; Malone,et alo, 1989) are also
growingrapidly in popularity. Whethera given
firm will benefit fromhookingup with its suppli-
ers and customers electronically, however,and
what the most appropriate type of connection
will be(for example, an electronicmarketversus
an electronichierarchyor a proprietaryversusa
standard EDI protocol) dependuponsuch ele-
mentsof the external environmentas the con-
centrationof sellers in the industry,the relative
powerof buyersand sellers, and the basis of
competition. The Reynolds AluminumSupply
Company(RASCO")case (Boynton and Crow-
ell, 1990)illustrates a number of theseissues.
In addition to these maintopics--technology,
development, and applicationsmtwo themes
that run throughoutthe courseare (1) the strate-
gic useof informationtechnologyand(2) busi-
nessprocessreengineering.As noted earlier,
the modelcapturesthese themesas well. Stra-
tegic useof technologyis coveredwhenwedis-
cussthe external environment andfirm strategy.
Andreengineeringis at the center of both the
proactiveandreactive usesof the model.
Becausethe modelis an integrative framework
for the course,the studentsemergewith a bet-
ter understandingof howthe piecesfit together

and whyeach is important for a soundunder-
standing of information systemsin business.
Andby presenting the studentswith a formal,
causalmodelof information systemsin organi-
zations--albeit in the form of a schematicand
not a set of equationsor prepositions---wecon-
vey the message that the course and the sub-
ject are not a collectionof looselyrelatedtopics,
but an integrated wholeresting on a well-de-
fined theoretical foundation.It is reassuringto
the studentsto be able to point to the modelas
the core of the course.If the studentsgraspthe
model,they canfeel comfortablewith their un-
derstandingof the theorythat underliesIS. And
our use of the modelalso makesthe students
awareof whatweexpectthemto learn from the
class.
Thewayweemploythe modelin the coursefos-
ters a numberof importantbusinessproficien-
cies that shouldservethe studentswell in the
workplace.As ’~he line takes the leadership"
(Boynton,et al:, 1992;Rockart, 1988)and the
partnership betweenIT professionals and line
managersgrows, MBAsare likely to have re-
sponsibility for managing sometechnologyre-
sources and to participate in information
systemsdevelopmentprojects in a numberof
significant ways:as project sponsors,as mem-
bers of the designteam,as managers of devel-
opment,as end-userdevelopers,and as project
funders. At a minimum, managers should expect
to be interviewed during systemsanalysis and
design. Experience with proactive useof the IT
interaction modelwill enablethemto servemore
competentlyin these capacities, increasingthe
likelihood of positive consequences and de-
creasingthe chancesof negativeones. Systems
will alwayshaveunanticipatedeffects, but the
morepeopleunderstandabout the dynamicsof
informationsystems,the better theywill be able
to minimizetheseunanticipatedeffects, to rec-
ognize themwhenthey occur, and to copewith
them.As citizens of wired organizations, MBAs
shouldexpectto encounterfirst-hand the conse-
quences of their firms’ IT undertakings.Experi-
encewith reactive useof the modelwill enable
themto comprehend howa given systemis af-
fecting themandtheir organizationsandto rec-
ommend any necessarycorrective actions. This
combinationof proactive andreactive analytic
ability shouldpreparethe studentswell for the
demands of the workplace.
. TheMBA
CoreCourse
Other Pedagogical Issues
Thissectionbriefly discussesseveraladditional
pedagogicalissues that have not alPeadybeen
addressed: at what point in the course the
modelshould be introduced, the independence
of the modelfrom the particular sequenceof
topics, andthe relationship betweentl~e model
and other MBAcore courses.
First, weadvocate introducingthe modelearly in
the core course. Someinstructors maywish to
presentthe modelat the outsetof the termto lay
a foundationfor whatis to come.Wefi.nd that it
is often usefulto deferintroducingthe modelfor-
mally until the studentshaveencountered some
basic course material and have analyzed at
least one businesscase. This approachserves
to motivatethe needfor a modeland to provide
a contextfor appreciatingthe issues the model
raises. OTISLINE (A) is a goodchoicefor such
a case. The case can be discussed in class
prior to introducingthe model,andit canthen
be usedas an illustration while presentingthe
model.
Second,the IT interaction modeldoesnot de-
pendon a particular sequenceof topics. Many
core coursesbeginwith technologybasics, then
discuss the development process,and conclude
with specific typesof applications.Othersfollow
different orders, andstill othersintegrate the
topics (for example,by spreadingbasic technol-
ogyconceptsthroughoutthe discussionof appli-
cations or by teachingdevelopment approaches
in the contextof particular classesof applica-
tions). Overthe years, wehavevaried the order
of presentation and wehaveupdatedthe con-
cepts and supplementary readings; but wehave
made only a few changesto our graphical repre-
sentation of the model.Themodelrepresentsa
higherlevel of coursestructure, compatible with
a varietyof topic sequences,that canpull together
a giveninstructor’s preferredcoursematerials.
Third, although our modeluses conceptssuch
as strategy,structure, andculturefoundin other
core MBA courses,it is not our intention in the
core IS courseto teach suchsubjects. Depend-
ing on whetherthese coursesare taken by the
studentsbefore, concurrently,or subsequently,
the level of detail that weemployin presenting
the components of the organizational environ-
mentvaries. For example,in someinstanceswe
MISQuarterly~September
1995381
TheMBACoreCourse_
maymakea formaldistinction betweenstructure
and culture, while in others wemaynot. For
those MBAprogramsfocusing on cross-func-
tional integration of the curriculum,the model
providesan excellent opportunityfor collabora-
tive teaching with the management and other
core courses.
Observations on the
Model’s Effectiveness
Basedon our experiencesat several universi-
ties, w,ebelievethat the IT InteractionModel
is a
qseful mechanism for addressing a numberof
practical teaching concerns as well as for
achievingour maincourseobjectives. Withre-
spectto the pedagogicalissues, the modeluni-
fies whatis often perceivedas a ,~opics"course,
it offers a formalfoundationfor whatstudents
sometimesconsider a "soft" or "nonrigorous"
subject, it providesa consistentframework for
caseanalyses,discussions,andgroupprojects,
and it fosters critical businesscompetencies.
Since the modelwasintroduced several years
ago, the feedbackwehave received has shown
a markedreduction in student concern about
thesematters.
Withrespectto the courseobjectives,recall that
our coursegoals as stated earlier are to ac-
quaint studentswith the dynamics of information
systems in organizations
and,in particular, to in-
crease students’ knowledgeof the potential
benefits, dangers,andlimitations of information
technology, equipping them to leverage the
benefits, avoid the dangers,and surmountthe
limitations. Basedon the waystudentsprogress
throughthe term, as evidencedin casediscus-
sions, written caseanalyses,andstudent pro-
jects, webelieve that the modelaccomplishes
theseobjectives. VVhilestudents.tend to enter
the course as ’~echnological determinists"
(Markus and Robey, 1988), the model shows
themthat informationtechnologyis just one of
manyimportantcontributors to informationsys-
tems outcomesand that an assortmentof fac-
tors interact to produce
results. At the beginning
of the term, studentsoften focuson technologi-
cal issues and positive outcomes. Midway
throughthe course,the focus tendsto shift in
382 MISQuarterly~September
1995
the otherdirection, suchthat theyare inclinedto
see only the limitations andthe organizational
dangers. By the end of the term a balanceis
achieved.
Oneconcern we have is that somestudents
may be memorizing the model rather than
learningto applyit effectively. Just as in other
courses students maymemorizeequations and
invoke themby rote, somestudents absorbthe
IT Interaction Modelonly superficially. These
studentsinclude all the buzzwordsin their writ-
ten analysesand class participation, but they
do not demonstratean understanding of the
concepts.For example,the better analysesand
comments focus on the subset of modelele-
mentsthat are salient for the caseat hand.The
weakerones, however,list all the components
without conveyingsignificant insight. Wecom-
bat this tendencyin a numberof ways:through
oral andwritten feedback,by providinga series
of written assignments and casediscussionsso
studentscandeveloptheir analytic skills, and
through group projects so the moreperspica-
cious students can share their insights with
their peers.
Wehave foundthat the modelis most success-
ful whenusedfor both businesscasesand stu-
dent projects. Webelieve that the modelis
effective for analyzingmostIS cases,but be-
cause there is a dearth of IS businesscases
and becausethe existing oneswerewritten in-
dependentlyof the model,finding a set of com-
plementarycasesthat are rich with respectto
the modelis difficult. Writing IS caseswhile
keepingthe modelin mind would therefore be
helpful. For example,if the studentswerepro-
vided with rich andthoroughdescriptions, they
couldbe challengedto identify whichmodelfea-
tures arethe salient factorsin thecase.
Conclusion
TheIT Interaction Modelis best thoughtof as a
stylized viewof the dynamics of informationsys-
temsin organizations.It represents a distillation
of the theoretical andempiricalresearchlitera-
ture into a pedagogicalmodelwhile at the same
time incorporating the concepts,models,and
theories that are traditionally coveredin the

MBAcore course. This type of synthesis is
rarely, if ever,foundin the existingtextbooks.
Wehavefoundthe IT Interaction Modelto be a
valuable tool for teachingthe MBAcore course
in information systemsin a numberof academic
settings. Our hopeis that as a teachingmodel
that encompasses the full rangeof applicable
topics,that highlightsthe critical issues,andthat
focuseson the essential relationshipswhile re-
maining independent of particular content
choices,the interaction modelwill proveuseful
to othersas well. Webelieve the modelcanalso
serve as a vehicle for advancingthe ongoing
dialogueconcerningthe design of the IS core
course.
Acknowledgements
Weare indebtedto Burt Swanson for his contri-
butions to the design of the MBAcore course
that producedthe modelpresentedin this pa-
per. Weare also grateful for the valuablesug-
gestions provided by Ted Stohr, by the
associateeditor, andby the three reviewers.
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Aboutthe Authors
MarkS. Silver is associateprofessorin the In-
formation SystemsDepartmentof the Stern
School of Business at NewYork University.
Prior to arriving at NYU,he wasa member of
the faculty at the Anderson GraduateSchoolof
Management at UCLAoHe received his Ph.D.
from the VVhartonSchoolof the University of
Pennsylvania. ProfessorSilver is the author of
Systemsthat Support Decision Makers: De-
scription andAnalysis.His current researchin-
terests focus on studying the effects decision
support systemshave on managerialdecision-
MISQuarterly/September
1995387
TheMBACoreCourse

makingprocessesand on analyzingthe restric- the author of Systemsin Organizations: Bugs

tivenessof informationsystems. andFeaturesandnumerous joumalarticles.

M. LynneMarku$is professor of management Cynthia Mathis Beath is associate professor

and informbtion science at the Claremont
Graduate School.Her current researchinterests
include organizational changeand reengineer-
ing, the valueof investments
in informationtech-
nology, and the role and skills of information
systemsprofessionals. ProfessorMarkuswasa
memberof the faculties of UCLA’sAnderson
Graduate School of Managementand MIT’s
Sloan Schoolof Management. Shehas received
research grants from the NSF,the Office of
Technology Assessment, and The Advanced
Practices Council of SIMInternational. Sheis
of management information sciences at the
Edwin L. Cox School of Business, Southern
MethodistUniversity. Shereceivedher doctor-
ate in 1986fromthe University of California,
Los Angeles. Her researchinterests focus on
the relationship betweenthe information sys-
tems organization and its clients, and on the
joint management of information technology
by this partnership.Sheis currently investigat-
ing the sharedmanagement of the information
technologyinfrastructure and the sharedman-
agementof softwaresourcing.

Appendix
Sample Course Outline
Usingthe IT Interaction Modelas an integral part of the MBA core coursedoesnot depend on a particu-
lar structurefor the course.Thecourseoutline presentedin this Appendixillustrates oneof the waysthat
the modelcan be usedto integrate a 14-week,non-hands-on MBAcore coursethat includes a term-long
living case.Shortercoursescanreducethe number of applicationscasesor eliminate the living case.
Hands-on coursescan replacesomeof the businesscasesor the living casewith hands-onelements.
Theitalicized annotationsat the beginningof eachmodulediscussthe role of the modelin that module.
Thefunction of the modelin manyof the individual class sessionso.g., the oneson expert systems,
executivesupportsystems,andIT infrastructure~is discussedin the bodyof the paper.
Theselectedreadingsindicated in the outline are intendedto supplement
assignedreadingsin an ap-
propriatetextbook.Complete
citations for the readingsandcasescanbefoundin the list of references.
Theoutline doesnot identify specific sessionsaddressingsuchimportant topics as businessprocess
reengineeringandstrategic use of IT becausethese topics run throughoutthe term andare considered
in manyof the sessions.Alternatively, onecouldspecify particular sessionsandcasesto addressthese
topics.
Theoutline presentsthe underlyingtechnology(hardware,software, database,andtelecommunications)
as a distinct moduleearly in the term.Analternativeto this approach is to integratethe technologywith
the applications, introducingtechnologiessuchas database and telecommunications "just-in-time" when
they become necessaryfor discussingthe applicationscases.

388MISQuarterly~September
1995
 The MBACore Course

SampleCourseOutline

Week Firat Session Second Session

Introduction: The openingsession motivates the model andthe course by engagingstudents in a discussion of IT success
and failure. The coursecontinues with a pair of cases illustrating the successful and unsuccessful application of 1Z
Pairing these cases demonstratesthat positive consequencesof IT are attainable but not automaticand thereby helps
students recognize early in the term the importanceof knowin 8 howto leverage the benefits andavoid the pitfalls of lT
applications. The openingdiscussion and the two cases introduce the majorconcepts that will be examinedduring the
term, especially the factors that interact to influence system consequences.The OTISLINE case is then discussed as a
precursorto presentingthe IT lnteraction Modelformally. A briefing by the client kicks-off the living cnse, and students
are encouragedto consider the proactive use of the interaction modelin the living case project.

1 Introduction and Motivation An IT Suecess Story

Read: Rockart (1988) Case: Baxter Healthcare or Tradenet (A)
Read: Maloneet al. (1989)

AnIT Disaster Story The IT Interaction Model

Case: Bank of Amedea’sMastemet or Case: OTISLINE(A)
CONFIRM Read: Hammer(1990)

Living Case: The Client Briefing Electronic Commerce

Case: Digital Equipment: The Intemet Co. (A)

I
InformationTechnology:This section of the course presents a brief overviewof the major informationtechnologies that
are employedin information systems and ties them together by concludingwith a discussion of IT architecture and
infrastructure. The technologyconcepts presented here are important subsequently in the course as business case analyses
andthe living case require students to assess the IT infrastructure, describe systemfeatures, and examinethe relationship
betweenthe capabilities of the existing infrastructure and the demandsof a proposedsystem. Introducingand using the
model prior to the technologysection helps those students whomight otherwise be resistant to the technological component
of the courseappreciate whythey need to learn this material.

4 HardwareBasics SoftwaroBasics

5 Documents,Data, and Images TelecommunicationsI

6 TelecommunicationsII IT Infrastructure
Digital Media Convergence ComputerArchitectures
Cliant-Server Computing

MIS Quarterly~September1995 389

 The MBACore Course

WeekFirst Session SecondSession

Applications: This section of the course, focusing on business applications of informationtechnology, has two objectives.
One.objectiveis to familiarize students with the range of applications they are likely to encounterin the workplace.The
secondobjective is to acquaint students with the dynamicsof information systems in organizations. These dual objectives
are accomplishedlargely through a sequenceof carefully selected cases, analyzed through the reactive use of the
interactionraodel.

Operational Systems Decision and Executive Support Systems

Case: Chrysler Corporation: JIT & EDI (A) Case: Lockheed-Georgia Co.: EIS

8 Knowledge-BasedSystems (Expert Systems) Midterm Examination

Case: Profiling at National~Mutual(A)

9 Cooperative Work--Groupware Applications Wrap-UpSession

Case: Chemical Bank: .Teeh. Support for Coop. Work Case: Mrs. Fields Cookies

I
DevelopingInformation Systents and ManagingInformation Technology:The first half of this short modulepresents the
traditional SDLCandits alternatives. Thetreatment of these subjects incorporatesthe proactive use of the interaction
model, paying special attention to issues of business process reengineering. Thesecond half of the moduleaddresses
selected topics in MolS.Focusingon implementationillustrates howimplementationstrategies and tactics mediate the
effects of informationsystem-organizationinteractions.

10 Traditioaal Development Alternative DevelopmentApproaches

(including SystemsAnalysis and Design) Outsoureing, Prototyping, End-User Computing

11 ImplementationStrategies and Tactics Down-sizing IT

Case:Profiling at National Mutual(B) and (C) Case: Newhall Land a~ld Farming (B)

Conclusion: The two-case "Frito-Lay: A Strategic Transition" sequence integrates manyof the themes of the course and
is well suited for analysis throughreactive use of the interaction model. Similarly, the discussion of the living case
presentations provides a chanceto discuss the students’ experiences in the proactive use of the model.

12 CapstoneI: CapstoneII:
Case: Frito-Lay: AStrategic Transition (1980-1986) Case: Frit~,-Lay:. AStrategic Transition (1987-1993)

13 Living Case: GroupProject Presentations ’Living Case: GroupProject Presentations

14 Living Case: Client Responseand Follow-up Discussion Conclusion

Read: Drueker (1988)

390 MIS Quarterly~September 1995