G.R. No.

216871

OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, Petitioner

vs.
MAYOR JULIUS CESAR VERGARA, Respondent

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

For this Court’s consideration is the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court dated April 6, 2015 of
petitioner Office of the Ombudsman that seeks to reverse and set aside the Decision1 dated May 28, 2014 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 125841 rendering the penalty imposed in the Decision2 dated February 7, 2006 and Review
Order3 dated June 29, 2012 of petitioner Office of the Ombudsman against respondent Mayor Julius Cesar Vergara (Mayor
Vergara) for violation of Section 5 (a) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6713 inapplicable due to the doctrine of condonation.

The facts follow.

A complaint was filed by Bonifacio G. Garcia, on June 21, 2005 before petitioner's Office of the Environmental Ombudsman
against respondent Mayor Julius Cesar Vergara and then Vice-Mayor Raul Mendoza (Vice-Mayor Mendoza). Respondent Mayor
Vergara was then serving as Mayor of Cabanatuan City for his third term (2004-2007).

According to the complainant, respondent Vergara and then ViceMayor Mendoza maintained for quite a long time an open
burning dumpsite located at the boundaries of Barangays San Isidro and Valle Cruz in Cabanatuan City, which has long been
overdue for closure and rehabilitation. He claimed that the dumpsite is now a four-storey high mountain of mixed garbage
exposing the residents of at least eighty-seven (87) barangays of Cabanatuan City to all toxic solid wastes. He further alleged
that respondent Mayor Vergara and then Vice-Mayor Mendoza ordered and permitted the littering and dumping of the solid
wastes in the said area causing immeasurable havoc to the health of the residents of Cabanatuan and that despite the
enactment of R.A. 9003, respondent Mayor Vergara and then Vice-Mayor Mendoza allowed and permitted the collection of non-
segregated and unsorted wastes. It was also alleged that respondent Mayor Vergara and then Vice-Mayor Mendoza ignored the
complaints from local residents and the letters from the authorities of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) and from the Commissioner of the National Solid Waste Management ordering them to comply with the
provisions of the said law.

In their Joint Counter-Affidavit,4 both respondent Mayor Vergara and then Vice-Mayor Mendoza denied that they wilfully and
grossly neglected the performance of their duties pursuant to R.A. 9003. They claimed that since 1999, they were already aware
about the growing problem of garbage collection in Cabanatuan City. They also contended that even before the enactment of RA
9003, they have already prepared a master plan for the transfer of the city dumpsite in Barangay Valle into an agreement with
Lacto Asia Pacific Corporation for the establishment of Materials Recovery Facility at the motorpool compound of Cabanatuan
City as a permanent solution to the garbage problem.

Respondent Mayor Vergara was found guilty by Graft Investigation and Prosecution Officer II Ismaela B. Boco for violation of
Section 5 (a) of R.A. No. 6713, or the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees which provides
that:

Section 5. Duties of Public Officials and Employees. - In the performance of their duties, all public officials and employees are
under obligation to:

(a) Act promptly on letter and requests - All public officials and employees shall, within fifteen (15) working days from receipt
thereof, respond to letters, telegrams or other means of communications sent by the public. The reply must contain the action
taken on the request.

As such, petitioner imposed a penalty on respondent which reads as follows:

x x x Accordingly, he is meted the penalty of Suspension for six (6) months from the government service pursuant to Section 10,
Rule III of the Administrative Order No. 07, this Office, in relation to Section 25 of Republic Act No. 6770.

It is further recommended that both respondents, JULIUS CESAR VERGARA and RAUL P. MENDOZA be administratively liable for
NEGLECT OF DUTY for failing to implement RA 9003. Accordingly, each of them is meted the penalty of Suspension for six (6)
months from the government service pursuant to Section 10, Rule III of the Administrative Order No. 07, this Office, in relation
to Section 25 of Republic Act No. 6770.5
Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration contending that the assailed decision that meted him the penalty of suspension
for six (6) months from government service cannot be implemented or enforced as the same runs counter to the established
doctrine of condonation, since he was reelected as Mayor of Cabanatuan City on May 10, 2010.

The petitioner, in its Review Order dated June 29, 2012, affirmed the Decision dated February 7, 2006 but modified the penalty
imposed, thus:

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Decision dated 7 February 2006 is hereby AFFIRMED with modification. The penalty imposed on
respondent-movant Julius Cesar V. Vergara for failure to act promptly on letters and requests is reduced from six-month
suspension to reprimand in light of the foregoing disquisition.

SO ORDERED.6

Aggrieved, respondent filed a petition for review with the CA.

Respondent then filed a Motion and Manifestation dated May 16, 2013, which the CA noted, alleging that his re-election as
Mayor of Cabanatuan City in the May 2010 elections eliminated the break from his service as Mayor and, thus, qualified his case
for the application of the doctrine of condonation.

The CA, on May 28, 2014, granted respondent's petition. The CA ruled that there is no reason for it to reverse the findings of the
Office of the Ombudsman, however, the appellate court held that respondent may no longer be held administratively liable for
misconduct committed during his previous term based on the doctrine of condonation, thus:

xxxx

Contrary to the ratiocination of the Office of the Ombudsman, the application of the doctrine does not require that the official
must be reelected to the same position in the immediately succeeding election. The Supreme Court's rulings on the matter do
not distinguish the precise timing or period when the misconduct was committed, reckoned from the date of the official's
reelection, except that it must be prior to said date. Thus, when the law does not distinguish, the courts must not distinguish.

FOR THESE REASONS, the petition is GRANTED.

SO ORDERED.7

Petitioner filed a motion for partial reconsideration contending that the re-election referred to in the doctrine of condonation
refers to the immediately succeeding election. The CA, in its Resolution dated February 5, 2015, denied the motion for
reconsideration.

Hence, the present petition with the following grounds:

I.

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT HELD THAT RESPONDENT MAY NO LONGER BE HELD ADMINISTRATIVELY LIABLE FOR
MISCONDUCT COMMITTED DURING HIS PREVIOUS TERM OF OFFICE BASED ON THE DOCTRINE OF CONDON A TION.

II.

ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE DOCTRINE OF CONDON A TI ON IS APPLICABLE TO THE CASE AT BAR, PETITIONER

RESPECTFULLY BESEECHES THIS HONORABLE COURT TO REEXAMINE SAID DOCTRINE IN LIGHT OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION'S
MANDATE THAT PUBLIC OFFICE IS A PUBLIC TRUST.8

According to petitioner, the term re-election, as applied in the doctrine of condonation, is used to refer to an election
immediately preceding a term of office and it is not used to refer to a subsequent re-election following the three-term limit
break considering that it is an incumbent official serving the three-term limit break who is said to be seeking re-election. It
further argues that the factual circumstances of respondent do not warrant the application of the doctrine of condonation
considering that the same doctrine is applied only to cases where the subject public officials were elected to the same position
in the immediately succeeding election. Petitioner, likewise, contends that assuming that the doctrine of condonation is
applicable in this case, such doctrine contradicts the 1987 Constitution and the present public policy.
In his Comment dated September 23, 2015, respondent insists that he did not violate any law and that if he is indeed guilty of
violating R.A. 9003, the doctrine of condonation must be applied by virtue of his re-election.

The petition lacks merit.

Basically, this Court is presented with the single issue of whether or not respondent is entitled to the doctrine of condonation.

In November 10, 2015, this Court, in Conchita Carpio Morales v. CA and Jejomar Binay, Jr., 9 extensively discussed the doctrine of
condonation and ruled that such doctrine has no legal authority in this jurisdiction. As held in the said the decision:

The foundation of our entire legal system is the Constitution. It is the supreme law of the land; 10 thus, the unbending rule is
that every statute should be read in light of the Constitution.11 Likewise, the Constitution is a framework of a workable
government; hence, its interpretation must take into account the complexities, realities, and politics attendant to the operation
of the political branches of government.12

As earlier intimated, Pascual was a decision promulgated in 1959. Therefore, it was decided within the context of the 1935
Constitution which was silent with respect to public accountability, or of the nature of public office being a public trust. The
provision in the 1935 Constitution that comes closest in dealing with public office is Section 2, Article II which states that "[t]he
defense of the State is a prime duty of government, and in the fulfillment of this duty all citizens may be required by law
torender personal military or civil service."13 Perhaps owing to the 1935 Constitution's silence on public accountability, and
considering the dearth of jurisprudential rulings on the matter, as well as the variance in the policy considerations, there was no
glaring objection confronting the Pascual Court in adopting the condonation doctrine that originated from select US cases
existing at that time.

With the advent of the 1973 Constitution, the approach in dealing with public officers underwent a significant change. The new
charter introduced an entire article on accountability of public officers, found in Article XIII. Section 1 thereof positively
recognized, acknowledged, and declared that "[p]ublic office is a public trust." Accordingly, "[p]ublic officers and employees shall
serve with the highest degree of responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency, and shall remain accountable to the people."

After the turbulent decades of Martial Law rule, the Filipino People have framed and adopted the 1987 Constitution, which sets
forth in the Declaration of Principles and State Policies in Article II that "[t]he State shall maintain honesty and integrity in the
public service and take positive and effective measures against graft and corruption."14 Learning how unbridled power could
corrupt public servants under the regime of a dictator, the Framers put primacy on the integrity of the public service by
declaring it as a constitutional principle and a State policy. More significantly, the 1987 Constitution strengthened and solidified
what has been first proclaimed in the 1973 Constitution by commanding public officers to be accountable to the people at all
times:

Section 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them
with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency and act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.

In Belgica, it was explained that:

[t]he aphorism forged under Section 1, A1iicle XI of the 1987 Constitution, which states that "public office is a public trust," is an
overarching reminder that every instrumentality of government should exercise their official functions only in accordance with
the principles of the Constitution which embodies the parameters of the people's trust. The notion of a public trust connotes
accountability x x x.15

The same mandate is found in the Revised Administrative Code under the section of the Civil Service Commission,16 and also, in
the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees.17

For local elective officials like Binay, Jr., the grounds to discipline, suspend or remove an elective local official from office are
stated in Section 60 of Republic Act No. 7160,18 otherwise known as the "Local Government Code of 1991" (LGC), which was
approved on October 10 1991, and took effect on January 1, 1992:

Section 60. Grounds for Disciplinary Action. - An elective local official may be disciplined, suspended, or removed from office on
any of the r following grounds:

(a) Disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines;

(b) Culpable violation of the Constitution;

 (c) Dishonesty, oppression, misconduct in office, gross negligence, or dereliction of duty;

(d) Commission of any offense involving moral turpitude or an offense punishable by at least prision mayor;

(e) Abuse of authority;

(t) Unauthorized absence for fifteen (15) consecutive working days, except in the case of members of the sangguniang
panlalawigan, sangguniang panlunsod, sanggunian bayan, and sangguniang barangay;

(g) Application for, or acquisition of, foreign citizenship or residence or the status of an immigrant of another country;
and

(h) Such other grounds as may be provided in this Code and other laws.

An elective local official may be removed from office on the grounds enumerated above by order of the proper court.

Related to this provision is Section 40 (b) of the LGC which states that those removed from office as a result of an administrative
case shall be disqualified from running for any elective local position:

Section 40. Disqualifications. - The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local position:

xxxx

(b) Those removed from office as a result of an administrative case;

xxxx

In the same sense, Section 52 (a) of the RRA CCS provides that the penalty of dismissal from service carries the accessory penalty
of perpetual disqualification from holding public office:

Section 52. - Administrative Disabilities Inherent m Certain Penalties. -

The penalty of dismissal shall carry with it cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits, perpetual disqualification
from holding public office, and bar from taking the civil service examinations.

In contrast, Section 66 (b) of the LGC states that the penalty of suspension shall not exceed the unexpired term of the elective
local official nor constitute a bar to his candidacy for as long as he meets the qualifications required for the office. Note,
however, that the provision only pertains to the duration of the penalty and its effect on the official’s candidacy. Nothing therein
states that the administrative liability therefor is extinguished by the fact of re-election:

Section 66. Form and Notice of Decision. – x x x.

xxxx

(b) The penalty of suspension shall not exceed the unexpired term of the respondent or a period of six (6) months for every
administrative offense, nor shall said penalty be a bar to the candidacy of the respondent so suspended as long as he meets the
qualifications required for the office.

Reading the 1987 Constitution together with the above-cited legal provisions now leads this Court to the conclusion that the
doctrine of condonation is actually bereft of legal bases.

To begin with, the concept of public office is a public trust and the corollary requirement of accountability to the people at all
times, as mandated under the 1987 Constitution, is plainly inconsistent with the idea that an elective local official’s
administrative liability for a misconduct committed during a prior term can be wiped off by the fact that he was elected to a
second term of office, or even another elective post. Election is not a mode of condoning an administrative offense, and there is
simply no constitutional or statutory basis in our jurisdiction to support the notion that an official elected for a different term is
folly absolved of any administrative liability arising from an offense done during a prior term. In this jurisdiction, liability arising
from administrative offenses may be condoned by the President in light of Section 19, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution which
was interpreted in Llamas v. Orbos19 to apply to administrative offenses:
x x x The Constitution does not distinguish between which cases executive clemency may be exercised by the President, with the
sole exclusion of impeachment cases. By the same token, if executive clemency may be exercised only in criminal cases, it would
indeed be unnecessary to provide for the exclusion of impeachment cases from the coverage of Article VII, Section 19 of the
Constitution. Following petitioner's proposed interpretation, cases of impeachment are automatically excluded inasmuch as the
same do not necessarily involve criminal offenses.

In the same vein, We do not clearly see any valid and convincing, reason why the President cannot grant executive clemency in
administrative cases. It is Our considered view that if the President can grant reprieves, commutations and pardons, and remit
fines and forfeitures in criminal cases, with much more reason can she grant executive clemency in administrative cases, which
are clearly less serious than criminal offenses.

Also, it cannot be inferred from Section 60 of the LGC that the grounds for discipline enumerated therein cannot anymore be
invoked against an elective local official to hold him administratively liable once he is re-elected to office. In fact, Section 40 (b)
of the LGC precludes condonation since in the first place, an elective local official who is meted with the penalty of removal
could not be re-elected to an elective local position due to a direct disqualification from running for such post. In similar regard,
Section 52 (a) of the RRACCS imposes a penalty of perpetual disqualification from holding public office as an accessory to the
penalty of dismissal from service.

To compare, some of the cases adopted in Pascual were decided by US State jurisdictions wherein the doctrine of condonation
of administrative liability was supported by either a constitutional or statutory provision stating, in effect, that an officer cannot
be removed by a misconduct committed during a previous term,20 or that the disqualification to hold the office does not extend
beyond the term inwhich the official's delinquency occurred.21 In one case,22 the absence of a provision against the re-election of
an officer removed - unlike Section 40 (b) of the LGC-was the justification behind condonation. In another casc,23 it was deemed
that condonation through re-election was a policy under their constitution - which adoption in this jurisdiction runs counter to
our present Constitution's requirements on public accountability. There was even one case where the doctrine of condonation
was not adjudicated upon but only invoked by a party as a ground;24 while in another case, which was not reported in full in the
official series, the crux of the disposition was that the evidence of a prior irregularity in no way pertained to the charge at issue
and therefore, was deemed to be incompetent.25 Hence, owing to either their variance or inapplicability, none of these cases can
be used as basis for the continued adoption of the condonation doctrine under our existing laws.

At best, Section 66 (b) of the LGC prohibits the enforcement of the penalty of suspension beyond the unexpired portion of the
elective local official's prior term, and likewise allows said official to still run for reelection This treatment is similar to People ex
rel Bagshaw v. Thompson26 and Montgomery v. Novell27 both cited in Pascual, wherein it was ruled that an officer cannot be
suspended for a misconduct committed during a prior term. However, as previously stated, nothing in Section 66 (b) states that
the elective local official's administrative liability is extinguished by the fact of re-election. Thus, at all events, no legal provision
actually supports the theory that the liability is condoned.

Relatedly it should be clarified that there is no truth in Pascual’s postulation that the courts would be depriving the electorate of
their right to elect their officers if condonation were not to be sanctioned. In political law, election pertains to the process by
which a particular constituency chooses an individual to hold a public office. In this jurisdiction, there is, again, no legal basis to
conclude that election automatically implies condonation. Neither is there any legal basis to say that every democratic and
republican state has an inherent regime of condonation. If condonation of an elective official’s administrative liability would
perhaps, be allowed in this jurisdiction, then the same should have been provided by law under our governing legal mechanisms.
May it be at the time of Pascual or at present, by no means has it been shown that such a law, whether in a constitutional or
statutory provision, exists. Therefore, inferring from this manifest absence, it cannot be said that the electorate’s will has been
abdicated.

Equally infirm is Pascual’s proposition that the electorate, when reelecting a local official, are assumed to have done so with
knowledge of his life and character, and that they disregarded or forgave his faults or misconduct, if he had been guilty of any.
Suffice it to state that no such presumption exists in any statute or procedural rule.28 Besides, it is contrary to human experience
that the electorate would have full knowledge of a public official's misdeeds. The Ombudsman correctly points out the reality
that most corrupt acts by public officers are shrouded in secrecy, and concealed from the public. Misconduct committed by an
elective official is easily covered up, and is almost always unknown to the electorate when they cast their votes.29 At a
conceptual level, condonation presupposes that the condoner has actual knowledge of what is to be condoned. Thus, there
could be no condonation of an act that is unknown. As observed in Walsh v. City Council of Trenton30 decided by the New Jersey
Supreme Court:

Many of the cases holding that re-election of a public official prevents his removal for acts done in a preceding term of office are
reasoned out on the theory of condonation.1âwphi1 We cannot subscribe to that theory because condonation, implying as it
does forgiveness, connotes knowledge and in the absence of knowledge there can be no condonation. One cannot forgive
something of which one has no knowledge.
That being said, this Court simply finds no legal authority to sustain the condonation doctrine in this jurisdiction. As can be seen
from this discourse, it was a doctrine adopted from one class of US rulings way back in 1959 and thus, out of touch from - and
now rendered obsolete by - the current legal regime. In consequence, it is high time for this Court to abandon the condonation
doctrine that originated from Pascual, and affirmed in the cases following the same, such as Aguinaldo, Salalima, Mayor Garcia,
and Governor Garcia, Jr. which were all relied upon by the CA.

The above ruling, however, was explicit in its pronouncement that the abandonment of the doctrine of condonation is
prospective in application, hence, the same doctrine is still applicable in cases that transpired prior to the ruling of this Court
in Carpio Morales v. CA and Jejomar Binay, Jr. 31 Thus:

It should, however, be clarified that this Court's abandonment of the condonation doctrine should be prospective in application
for the reason that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution, until reversed, shall form part of the
legal system of the Philippines.32 Unto this Court devolves the sole authority to interpret what the Constitution means, and all
persons are bound to follow its interpretation. As explained in De Castro v. Judicial Bar Council.33

Judicial decisions assume the same authority as a statute itself and, until authoritatively abandoned, necessarily become, to the
extent that they are applicable, the criteria that must control the actuations, not only of those called upon to abide by them, but
also of those duty-bound to enforce obedience to them.34

Hence, while the future may ultimately uncover a doctrine’s error, it should be, as a general rule, recognized as "good law" prior
to its abandonment. Consequently, the people’s reliance thereupon should be respected. The landmark case on this matter
is People v. Jabinal,35 wherein it was ruled:

[W]hen a doctrine of this Court is overruled and a different view is adopted, the new doctrine should be applied prospectively,
and should not apply to parties who had relied on the old doctrine and acted on the faith thereof.

Later, in Spouses Benzonan v. CA,36 it was further elaborated:

[Pursuant to Article 8 of the Civil Code "judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of
the legal system of the Philippines." But while our decisions form part of the law of the land, they are also subject to Article 4 of
the Civil Code which provides that "laws shall have no retroactive effect unless the contrary is provided." This is expressed in the
familiar legal maxim lex prospicit, non respicit, the law looks forward not backward. The rationale against retroactivity is easy to
perceive. The retroactive application of a law usually divests rights that have already become vested or impairs the obligations of
contract and hence, is unconstitutional.37

Indeed, the lessons of history teach us that institutions can greatly benefit from hindsight and rectify its ensuing
course.1âwphi1 Thus, while it is truly perplexing to think that a doctrine which is barren of legal anchorage was able to endure in
our jurisprudence for a considerable length of time, this Court, under a new membership, takes up the cudgels and now
abandons the condonation doctrine.

Considering that the present case was instituted prior to the abovecited ruling of this Court, the doctrine of condonation may
still be applied.

It is the contention of the petitioner that the doctrine of condonation cannot be applied in this case, since there was a gap in the
re-election of the respondent. It must be remembered that the complaint against respondent was filed on June 21, 2005, or
during the latter's third term as Mayor (2004- 2007) and was only re-elected as Mayor in 2010. According to petitioner, for the
doctrine to apply, the respondent should have been re-elected in the same position in the immediately succeeding election.

This Court finds petitioner's contention unmeritorious.

The application of the doctrine does not require that the official must be re-elected to the same position in the immediately
succeeding election. In Giron v. Ochoa,38 the Court recognized that the doctrine can be applied to a public officer who was
elected to a different position provided that it is shown that the body politic electing the person to another office is the same.
Thus, the Court ruled:

On this issue, considering the ratio decidendi behind the doctrine, the Court agrees with the interpretation of the administrative
tribunalsbelow that the condonation doctrine applies to a public official elected to another office. The underlying theory is that
each term is separate from other terms. Thus, in Carpio-Morales, the basic considerations are the following: first, the penalty of
removal may not be extended beyond the term in which the public officer was elected for each term is separate and distinct;
second, an elective official's re-election serves as a condonation of previous misconduct, thereby cutting the right to remove him
therefor; and third, courts may not deprive the electorate, who are assumed to have known the life and character of candidates,
of their right to elect officers. In this case, it is a given fact that the body politic, who elected him to another office, was the
same.

From the above ruling of this Court, it is apparent that the most important consideration in the doctrine of condonation is the
fact that the misconduct was done on a prior term and that the subject public official was eventually re-elected by the same
body politic. It is inconsequential whether the said re-election be on another public office or on an election year that is not
immediately succeeding the last, as long as the electorate that re-elected the public official be the same. In this case, the
respondent was re-elected as mayor by the same electorate that voted for him when the violation was committed. As such, the
doctrine of condonation is applied and the CA did not err in so ruling.

WHEREFORE, Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court dated April 6, 2015 of petitioner Office of the
Ombudsman is DENIED. Consequently, the Decision dated May 28, 2014 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 125841
is AFFIRMED.

Executive Order No. 292 [BOOK V/Title I/Subtitle A/Chapter 7-Discipline]

Signed on July 25, 1987

CHAPTER 7

Discipline

SECTION 46. Discipline: General Provisions.—(a) No officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be suspended or dismissed
except for cause as provided by law and after due process.

(b) The following shall be grounds for disciplinary action:

(1) Dishonesty;

(2) Oppression;

(3) Neglect of duty;

(4) Misconduct;

(5) Disgraceful and immoral conduct;

(6) Being notoriously undesirable;

(7) Discourtesy in the course of official duties;

(8) Inefficiency and incompetence in the performance of official duties;

(9) Receiving for personal use of a fee, gift or other valuable thing in the course of official duties or in connection therewith
when such fee, gift, or other valuable thing is given by any person in the hope or expectation of receiving a favor or better
treatment than that accorded other persons, or committing acts punishable under the anti-graft laws;

(10) Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude;

(11) Improper or unauthorized solicitation of contributions from subordinate employees and by teachers or school officials from
school children;

(12) Violation of existing Civil Service Law and rules or reasonable office regulations;

(13) Falsification of official document;

(14) Frequent unauthorized absences or tardiness in reporting for duty, loafing or frequent unauthorized absences from duty
during regular office hours;
(15) Habitual drunkenness;

(16) Gambling prohibited by law;

(17) Refusal to perform official duty or render overtime service;

(18) Disgraceful, immoral or dishonest conduct prior to entering the service;

(19) Physical or mental incapacity or disability due to immoral or vicious habits;

(20) Borrowing money by superior officers from subordinates or lending by subordinates to superior officers;

(21) Lending money at usurious rates of interest;

(22) Willful failure to pay just debts or willful failure to pay taxes due to the government;

(23) Contracting loans of money or other property from persons with whom the office of the employee concerned has business
relations;

(24) Pursuit of private business, vocation or profession without the permission required by Civil Service rules and regulations;

(25) Insubordination;

(26) Engaging directly or indirectly in partisan political activities by one holding a non-political office;

(27) Conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service;

(28) Lobbying for personal interest or gain in legislative halls or offices without authority;

(29) Promoting the sale of tickets in behalf of private enterprises that are not intended for charitable or public welfare purposes
and even in the latter cases if there is no prior authority;

(30) Nepotism as defined in Section 60 of this Title.

(c) Except when initiated by the disciplining authority, no complaint against a civil service official or employee shall be given due
course unless the same is in writing and subscribed and sworn to by the complainant.

(d) In meting out punishment, the same penalties shall be imposed for similar offenses and only one penalty shall be imposed in
each case. The disciplining authority may impose the penalty of removal from the service, demotion in rank, suspension for not
more than one year without pay, fine in an amount not exceeding six months’ salary, or reprimand.

SECTION 47. Disciplinary Jurisdiction.—(1) The Commission shall decide upon appeal all administrative disciplinary cases
involving the imposition of a penalty of suspension for more than thirty days, or fine in an amount exceeding thirty days’ salary,
demotion in rank or salary or transfer, removal or dismissal from office. A complaint may be filed directly with the Commission
by a private citizen against a government official or employee in which case it may hear and decide the case or it may deputize
any department or agency or official or group of officials to conduct the investigation. The results of the investigation shall be
submitted to the Commission with recommendation as to the penalty to be imposed or other action to be taken.

(2) The Secretaries and heads of agencies and instrumentalities, provinces, cities and municipalities shall have jurisdiction to
investigate and decide matters involving disciplinary action against officers and employees under their jurisdiction. Their
decisions shall be final in case the penalty imposed is suspension for not more than thirty days or fine in an amount not
exceeding thirty days’ salary. In case the decision rendered by a bureau or office head is appealable to the Commission, the
same may be initially appealed to the department and finally to the Commission and pending appeal, the same shall be
executory except when the penalty is removal, in which case the same shall be executory only after confirmation by the
Secretary concerned.

(3) An investigation may be entrusted to regional director or similar officials who shall make the necessary report and
recommendation to the chief of bureau or office or department within the period specified in Paragraph (4) of the following
Section.
(4) An appeal shall not stop the decision from being executory, and in case the penalty is suspension or removal, the respondent
shall be considered as having been under preventive suspension during the pendency of the appeal in the event he wins an
appeal.

SECTION 48. Procedures in Administrative Cases Against Non-Presidential Appointees.—(1) Administrative proceedings may be
commenced against a subordinate officer or employee by the Secretary or head of office of equivalent rank, or head of local
government, or chiefs of agencies, or regional directors, or upon sworn, written complaint of any other person.

(2) In the case of a complaint filed by any other persons, the complainant shall submit sworn statements covering his testimony
and those of his witnesses together with his documentary evidence. If on the basis of such papers a prima facie case is found not
to exist, the disciplining authority shall dismiss the case. If a prima facie case exists, he shall notify the respondent in writing, of
the charges against the latter, to which shall be attached copies of the complaint, sworn statements and other documents
submitted, and the respondent shall be allowed not less than seventy-two hours after receipt of the complaint to answer the
charges in writing under oath, together with supporting sworn statements and documents, in which he shall indicate whether or
not he elects a formal investigation if his answer is not considered satisfactory. If the answer is found satisfactory, the
disciplining authority shall dismiss the case.

(3) Although a respondent does not request a formal investigation, one shall nevertheless be conducted when from the
allegations of the complaint and the answer of the respondent, including the supporting documents, the merits of the case
cannot be decided judiciously without conducting such an investigation.

(4) The investigation shall be held not earlier than five days nor later than ten days from the date of receipt of respondent’s
answer by the disciplining authority, and shall be finished within thirty days from the filing of the charges, unless the period is
extended by the Commission in meritorious cases. The decision shall be rendered by the disciplining authority within thirty days
from the termination of the investigation or submission of the report of the investigator, which report shall be submitted within
fifteen days from the conclusion of the investigation.

(5) The direct evidence for the complainant and the respondent shall consist of the sworn statement and documents submitted
in support of the complaint or answer, as the case may be, without prejudice to the presentation of additional evidence deemed
necessary but was unavailable at the time of the filing of the complaint or answer, upon which the cross-examination, by
respondent and the complainant, respectively, shall be based. Following cross-examination, there may be redirect and recross-
examination.

(6) Either party may avail himself of the services of counsel and may require the attendance of witnesses and the production of
documentary evidence in his favor through the compulsory process of subpoena or subpoena duces tecum.

(7) The investigation shall be conducted only for the purpose of ascertaining the truth and without necessarily adhering to
technical rules applicable in judicial proceedings. It shall be conducted by the disciplining authority concerned or his authorized
representative.

The phrase “any other party” shall be understood to be a complainant other than those referred to in subsection (a) hereof.

SECTION 49. Appeals.—(1) Appeals, where allowable, shall be made by the party adversely affected by the decision within
fifteen days from receipt of the decision unless a petition for reconsideration is seasonably filed, which petition shall be decided
within fifteen days. Notice of the appeal shall be filed with the disciplining office, which shall forward the records of the case,
together with the notice of appeal, to the appellate authority within fifteen days from filing of the notice of appeal, with its
comment, if any. The notice of appeal shall specifically state the date of the decision appealed from and the date of receipt
thereof. It shall also specifically set forth clearly the grounds relied upon for excepting from the decision.

(2) A petition for reconsideration shall be based only on any of the following grounds: (a) new evidence has been discovered
which materially affects the decision rendered; (b) the decision is not supported by the evidence on record; or (c) errors of law
or irregularities have been committed which are prejudicial to the interest of the respondent: Provided, That only one petition
for reconsideration shall be entertained.

SECTION 50. Summary Proceedings.—No formal investigation is necessary and the respondent may be immediately removed or
dismissed if any of the following circumstances is present:

(1) When the charge is serious and the evidence of guilt is strong;

(2) When the respondent is a recidivist or has been repeatedly charged and there is reasonable ground to believe that he is
guilty of the present charge; and
(3) When the respondent is notoriously undesirable.

Resort to summary proceedings by the disciplining authority shall be done with utmost objectivity and impartiality to the end
that no injustice is committed: Provided, That removal or dismissal except those by the President, himself or upon his order, may
be appealed to the Commission.

SECTION 51. Preventive Suspension.—The proper disciplining authority may preventively suspend any subordinate officer or
employee under his authority pending an investigation, if the charge against such officer or employee involves dishonesty,
oppression or grave misconduct, or neglect in the performance of duty, or if there are reasons to believe that the respondent is
guilty of charges which would warrant his removal from the service.

SECTION 52. Lifting of Preventive Suspension Pending Administrative Investigation.—When the administrative case against the
officer or employee under preventive suspension is not finally decided by the disciplining authority within the period of ninety
(90) days after the date of suspension of the respondent who is not a presidential appointee, the respondent shall be
automatically reinstated in the service: Provided, That when the delay in the disposition of the case is due to the fault,
negligence or petition of the respondent, the period of delay shall not be counted in computing the period of suspension herein
provided.

SECTION 53. Removal of Administrative Penalties or Disabilities.—In meritorious cases and upon recommendation of the
Commission, the President may commute or remove administrative penalties or disabilities imposed upon officers or employees
in disciplinary cases, subject to such terms and conditions as he may impose in the interest of the service.

[ G.R. Nos. 217126-27, November 10, 2015 ]

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES, IN HER CAPACITY AS THE OMBUDSMAN, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF APPEALS (SIXTH DIVISION)
AND JEJOMAR ERWIN S. BINAY, JR., RESPONDENTS.

DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
"All government is a trust, every branch of government is a trust, and immemorially acknowledged so to be[.]"[1]

The Case

Before the Court is a petition for certiorari and prohibition[2] filed on March 25, 2015 by petitioner Conchita Carpio Morales, in
her capacity as the Ombudsman (Ombudsman), through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), assailing: (a) the
Resolution[3] dated March 16, 2015 of public respondent the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453, which granted
private respondent Jejomar Erwin S. Binay, Jr.'s (Binay, Jr.) prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) against
the implementation of the Joint Order[4] dated March 10, 20,15 of the Ombudsman in OMB-C-A-15-0058 to 0063 (preventive
suspension order) preventively suspending him and several other public officers and employees of the City Government of
Makati, for six (6) months without pay; and (b) the Resolution[5] dated March 20, 2015 of the CA, ordering the Ombudsman to
comment on Binay, Jr.'s petition for contempt[6] in CA-G.R. SP No. 139504.

Pursuant to the Resolution[7] dated April 6, 2015, the CA issued a writ of preliminary injunction[8] (WPI) in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453
which further enjoined the implementation of the preventive suspension order, prompting the Ombudsman to file a
supplemental petition[9] on April 13, 2015.

The Facts

On July 22, 2014, a complaint/affidavit[10] was filed by Atty. Renato L. Bondal and Nicolas "Ching" Enciso VI before the Office of
the Ombudsman against Binay, Jr. and other public officers and employees of the City Government of Makati (Binay, Jr.,  et al),
accusing them of Plunder[11] and violation of Republic Act No. (RA) 3019,[12] otherwise known as "The Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act," in connection with the five (5) phases of the procurement and construction of the Makati City Hall Parking
Building (Makati Parking Building).[13]

On September 9, 2014, the Ombudsman constituted a Special Panel of Investigators[14] to conduct a fact-finding investigation,
submit an investigation report, and file the necessary complaint, if warranted (1st Special Panel).[15] Pursuant to the
Ombudsman's directive, on March 5, 2015, the 1st Special Panel filed a complaint[16] (OMB Complaint) against Binay, Jr., et al,
charging them with six (6) administrative cases[17] for Grave Misconduct, Serious Dishonesty, and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best
Interest of the Service, and six (6) criminal cases[18] for violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019, Malversation of Public Funds, and
Falsification of Public Documents (OMB Cases).[19]

As to Binay, Jr., the OMB Complaint alleged that he was involved in anomalous activities attending the following procurement
and construction phases of the Makati Parking Building project, committed during his previous and present terms as City Mayor
of Makati:

Binay, Jr.'s First Term (2010 to 2013)[20]

(a) On September 21, 2010, Binay, Jr. issued the Notice of Award[21] for Phase III of the Makati Parking Building project to
Hilmarc's Construction Corporation (Hilmarc's), and consequently, executed the corresponding contract[22] on September 28,
2010,[23] without the required publication and the lack of architectural design,[24] and approved the release of funds therefor in
the following amounts as follows: (1) P130,518,394.80 on December 15, 2010;[25] (2) P134,470,659.64 on January 19, 2011;[26] (3)
P92,775,202.27 on February 25, 2011;[27] (4) P57,148,625.51 on March 28, 2011;[28] (5) P40,908,750.61 on May 3, 2011;[29] and
(6) P106,672,761.90 on July 7, 2011;[30]

(b) On August 11, 2011, Binay, Jr. issued the Notice of Award[31] for Phase IV of the Makati Parking Building project to Hilmarc's,
and consequently, executed the corresponding contract[32] on August 18, 2011,[33] without the required publication and the lack
of architectural design,[34] and approved the release of funds therefor in the following amounts as follows: (1) P182,325,538.97
on October 4, 2O11;[35] (2) P173,132,606.91 on October 28,2011;[36] (3) P80,408,735.20 on December 12, 2011;[37] (4)
P62,878,291.81 on February 10, 2012;[38] and (5) P59,639,167.90 on October 1, 2012;[39]

(c) On September 6, 2012, Binay, Jr. issued the Notice of Award[40] for Phase V of the Makati Parking Building project to Hilmarc's,
and consequently, executed the corresponding contract[41] on September 13, 2012,[42] without the required publication and the
lack of architectural design,[43] and approved the release of the funds therefor in the amounts of P32,398,220.05[44] and
P30,582,629.30[45] on December 20, 2012;  and

Binay, Jr.'s Second Term (2013 to 2016) [46]

(d) On July 3, 2013 and July 4, 2013, Binay, Jr. approved the release of funds for the remaining balance of the September 13,
2012 contract with Hilmarc's for Phase V of the Makati Parking Building project in the amount of P27,443,629.97;[47] and

(e) On July 24, 2013, Binay, Jr. approved the release of funds for the remaining balance of the contract[48] with MANA
Architecture & Interior Design Co. (MANA) for the design and architectural services covering the Makati Parking Building project
in the amount of P429,011.48.[49]

On March 6, 2015, the Ombudsman created another Special Panel of Investigators to conduct a preliminary investigation and
administrative adjudication on the OMB Cases (2nd Special Panel).[50] Thereafter, on March 9, 2015, the 2nd Special Panel issued
separate orders[51] for each of the OMB Cases, requiring Binay, Jr., et al. to file their respective counter-affidavits.[52]

Before Binay, Jr.,  et al.'s  filing of their counter-affidavits, the Ombudsman, upon the recommendation of the 2nd Special Panel,
issued on March 10, 2015, the subject preventive suspension order, placing Binay, Jr., et al. under preventive suspension for not
more than six (6) months without pay, during the pendency of the OMB Cases.[53] The Ombudsman ruled that the requisites for
the preventive suspension of a public officer are present,[54] finding that: (a) the evidence of Binay, Jr.,  et al.'s guilt was strong
given that (1) the losing bidders and members of the Bids and Awards Committee of Makati City had attested to the irregularities
attending the Makati Parking Building project; (2) the documents on record negated the publication of bids; and (3) the
disbursement vouchers, checks, and official receipts showed the release of funds; and (b) (1) Binay, Jr., et al. were
administratively charged with Grave Misconduct, Serious Dishonesty, and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service;
(2) said charges, if proven to be true, warrant removal from public service under the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in
the Civil Service (RRACCS), and (3) Binay, Jr., et al.'s respective positions give them access to public records and allow them to
influence possible witnesses; hence, their continued stay in office may prejudice the investigation relative to the OMB Cases filed
against them.[55] Consequently, the Ombudsman directed the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG), through
Secretary Manuel A. Roxas II (Secretary Roxas), to immediately implement the preventive suspension order against Binay, Jr., et
al., upon receipt of the same.[56]

On March 11, 2015, a copy of the preventive suspension order was sent to the Office of the City Mayor, and received by Maricon
Ausan, a member of Binay, Jr.'s staff.[57]

The Proceedings Before the CA

On even date,[58] Binay, Jr. filed a petition for certiorari[59] before the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 139453, seeking the
nullification of the preventive suspension order, and praying for the issuance of a TRO and/or WPI to enjoin its implementation.
[60]
 Primarily, Binay, Jr. argued that he could not be held administratively liable for any anomalous activity attending any of the
five (5) phases of the Makati Parking Building project since: (a) Phases I and II were undertaken before he was elected Mayor of
Makati in 2010; and (b) Phases III to V transpired during his first term and that his re-election as City Mayor of Makati for a
second term effectively condoned his administrative liability therefor, if any, thus rendering the administrative cases against
him moot and academic.[61] In any event, Binay, Jr. claimed that the Ombudsman's preventive suspension order failed to show
that the evidence of guilt presented against him is strong, maintaining that he did not participate in any of the purported
irregularities.[62] In support of his prayer for injunctive relief, Binay, Jr. argued that he has a clear and unmistakable right to hold
public office, having won by landslide vote in the 2010 and 2013 elections, and that, in view of the condonation doctrine, as well
as the lack of evidence to sustain the charges against him, his suspension from office would undeservedly deprive the electorate
of the services of the person they have conscientiously chosen and voted into office.[63]

On March 16, 2015, at around 8:24 a.m., Secretary Roxas caused the implementation of the preventive suspension order
through the DILG National Capital Region - Regional Director, Renato L. Brion, CESO III (Director Brion), who posted a copy
thereof on the wall of the Makati City Hall after failing to personally serve the same on Binay, Jr. as the points of entry to the
Makati City Hall were closed. At around 9:47 a.m., Assistant City Prosecutor of Makati Billy C. Evangelista administered the oath
of office on Makati City Vice Mayor Romulo V. Peña, Jr. (Peña, Jr.) who thereupon assumed office as Acting Mayor.[64]

At noon of the same day, the CA issued a Resolution[65] (dated March 16, 2015), granting Binay, Jr.'s prayer for a TRO,
[66]
 notwithstanding Pena, Jr.'s assumption of duties as Acting Mayor earlier that day.[67] Citing the case of Governor Garcia, Jr. v.
CA,[68] the CA found that it was more prudent on its part to issue a TRO in view of the extreme urgency of the matter and
seriousness of the issues raised, considering that if it were established that the acts subject of the administrative cases against
Binay, Jr. were all committed during his prior term, then, applying the condonation doctrine, Binay, Jr.'s re-election meant that
he can no longer be administratively charged.[69] The CA then directed the Ombudsman to comment on Binay, Jr.'s petition for
certiorari.[70]

On March 17, 2015, the Ombudsman manifested[71] that the TRO did not state what act was being restrained and that since the
preventive suspension order had already been served and implemented, there was no longer any act to restrain.[72]

On the same day, Binay, Jr. filed a petition for contempt,[73]  docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 139504, accusing Secretary Roxas,
Director Brion, the officials of the Philippine National Police, and Pena, Jr. of deliberately refusing to obey the CA, thereby
allegedly impeding, obstructing, or degrading the administration of justice.[74] The Ombudsman and Department of Justice
Secretary Leila M. De Lima were subsequently impleaded as additional respondents upon Binay, Jr.'s filing of the amended and
supplemental petition for contempt[75] (petition for contempt) on March 19, 2015.[76] Among others, Binay, Jr. accused the
Ombudsman and other respondents therein for willfully and maliciously ignoring the TRO issued by the CA against the
preventive suspension order.[77]

In a Resolution[78] dated March 20, 2015, the CA ordered the consolidation of CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 and CA-G.R. SP No. 139504,
and, without necessarily giving due course to Binay, Jr.'s petition for contempt, directed the Ombudsman to file her comment
thereto.[79] The cases were set for hearing of oral arguments on March 30 and 31, 2015.[80]

The Proceedings Before the Court

Prior to the hearing of the oral arguments before the CA, or on March 25, 2015, the Ombudsman filed the present petition
before this Court, assailing the CA's March 16, 2015 Resolution, which granted Binay, Jr.'s prayer for TRO in CA-G.R. SP No.
139453, and the March 20, 2015 Resolution directing her to file a comment on Binay, Jr.'s petition for contempt in CA-G.R. SP
No. 139504.[81] The Ombudsman claims that: (a) the CA had no jurisdiction to grant Binay, Jr.'s prayer for a TRO, citing Section 14
of RA 6770,[82] or "The Ombudsman Act of 1989," which states that no injunctive writ could be issued to delay the Ombudsman's
investigation unless there is prima facie evidence that the subject matter thereof is outside the latter's jurisdiction;[83] and (b) the
CA's directive for the Ombudsman to comment on Binay, Jr.'s petition for contempt is illegal and improper, considering that the
Ombudsman is an impeachable officer, and therefore, cannot be subjected to contempt proceedings.[84]

In his comment[85] filed on April 6, 2015, Binay, Jr. argues that Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution specifically grants
the CA judicial power to review acts of any branch or instrumentality of government, including the Office of the Ombudsman, in
case of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, which he asserts was committed in this case when
said office issued the preventive suspension order against him.[86] Binay, Jr. posits that it was incumbent upon the Ombudsman
to1 have been apprised of the condonation doctrine as this would have weighed heavily in determining whether there was
strong evidence to warrant the issuance of the preventive suspension order.[87] In this relation, Binay, Jr. maintains that the CA
correctly enjoined the implementation of the preventive suspension order given his clear and unmistakable right to public office,
and that it is clear that he could not be held administratively liable for any of the charges against him since his subsequent re-
election in 2013 operated as a condonation of any administrative offenses he may have committed during his previous term.
[88]
 As regards the CA's order for the Ombudsman to comment on his petition for contempt, Binay, Jr. submits that while the
Ombudsman is indeed an impeachable officer and, hence, cannot be removed from office except by way of impeachment, an
action for contempt imposes the penalty of fine and imprisonment, without necessarily resulting in removal from office. Thus,
the fact that the Ombudsman is an impeachable officer should not deprive the CA of its inherent power to punish contempt.[89]

Meanwhile, the CA issued a Resolution[90] dated April 6, 2015, after the oral arguments before it were held,[91] granting Binay,
Jr.'s prayer for a WPI, which further enjoined the implementation of the preventive suspension order. In so ruling, the CA found
that Binay, Jr. has an ostensible right to the final relief prayed for, namely, the nullification of the preventive suspension order, in
view of the condonation doctrine, citing Aguinaldo v. Santos.[92] Particularly, it found that the Ombudsman can hardly impose
preventive suspension against Binay, Jr. given that his re-election in 2013 as City Mayor of Makati condoned any administrative
liability arising from anomalous activities relative to the Makati Parking Building project from 2007 to 2013.[93] In this regard, the
CA added that, although there were acts which were apparently committed by Binay, Jr. beyond his first term — namely, the
alleged payments on July 3, July 4, and July 24, 2013,[94] corresponding to the services of Hillmarc's and MANA - still, Binay, Jr.
cannot be held administratively liable therefor based on the cases of Salalima v. Guingona, Jr.,[95] and Mayor Garcia v.
Mojica[96] wherein the condonation doctrine was still applied by the Court although the payments were made after the official's
re-election, reasoning that the payments were merely effected pursuant to contracts executed before said re-election.[97] To this,
the CA added that there was no concrete evidence of Binay, Jr.'s participation for the alleged payments made on July 3, 4, and
24, 2013.[98]

In view of the CA's supervening issuance of a WPI pursuant to its April 6, 2015 Resolution, the Ombudsman filed a supplemental
petition[99] before this Court, arguing that the condonation doctrine is irrelevant to the determination of whether the evidence of
guilt is strong for purposes of issuing preventive suspension orders. The Ombudsman also maintained that a reliance on the
condonation doctrine is a matter of defense, which should have been raised by Binay, Jr. before it during the administrative
proceedings, and that, at any rate, there is no condonation because Binay, Jr. committed acts subject of the OMB Complaint
after his re-election in 2013.[100]

On April 14 and 21, 2015,[101] the Court conducted hearings for the oral arguments of the parties. Thereafter, they were required
to file their respective memoranda.[102] In compliance thereto, the Ombudsman filed her Memorandum[103] on May 20, 2015,
while Binay, Jr. submitted his Memorandum the following day.[104]

Pursuant to a Resolution[105] dated June 16, 2015, the Court directed the parties to comment on each other's memoranda, and
the OSG to comment on the Ombudsman's Memorandum, all within ten (10) days from receipt of the notice.

On July 15, 2015, both parties filed their respective comments to each other's memoranda.[106] Meanwhile, on July 16, 2015, the
OSG filed its Manifestation In Lieu of Comment,[107] simply stating that it was mutually agreed upon that the Office of the
Ombudsman would file its Memorandum, consistent with its desire to state its "institutional position."[108] In her Memorandum
and Comment to Binay, Jr.'s Memorandum, the Ombudsman pleaded, among others, that this Court abandon the condonation
doctrine.[109] In view of the foregoing, the case was deemed submitted for resolution.

The Issues Before the Court

 Based on the parties' respective pleadings, and as raised during the oral arguments conducted before this Court, the main issues
to be resolved in seriatim are as follows:

I. Whether or not the present petition, and not motions for reconsideration of the assailed CA issuances in CA-G.R. SP No.
139453 and CA-G.R. SP No. 139504, is the Ombudsman's plain, speedy, and adequate remedy;

II. Whether or not the CA has subject matter jurisdiction over the main petition for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453;
III. Whether or not the CA has subject matter jurisdiction to issue a TRO and/or WPI enjoining the implementation of a
preventive suspension order issued by the Ombudsman;
IV. Whether or not the CA gravely abused its discretion in issuing the TRO and eventually, the WPI in CA-G.R. SP No.
139453 enjoining the implementation of the preventive suspension order against Binay, Jr. based on the condonation
doctrine; and
V. Whether or not the CA's directive for the Ombudsman to ' comment on Binay, Jr.'s petition for contempt in CA- G.R. SP
No. 139504 is improper and illegal.

The Ruling of the Court

The petition is partly meritorious.

I.

A common requirement to both a petition for certiorari and a petition for prohibition taken under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure is that the petitioner has no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Sections 1
and 2 thereof provide:

Section 1. Petition for certiorari. - When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted
without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and
there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may
file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or
modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.

xxxx

Section 2. Petition for prohibition. - When the proceedings of any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person, whether
exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, are without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy
in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts r with
certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the respondent to desist from further proceedings in the action
or matter specified therein, or otherwise granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.

x x x x (Emphases supplied)

Hence, as a general rule, a motion for reconsideration must first be filed with the lower court prior to resorting to the
extraordinary remedy of certiorari or prohibition since a motion for reconsideration may still be considered as a plain, speedy,
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The rationale for the pre-requisite is to grant an opportunity for the lower
court or agency to correct any actual or perceived error attributed to it by the re-examination of the legal and factual
circumstances of the case.[110]

Jurisprudence states that "[i]t is [the] inadequacy, [and] not the mere absence of all other legal remedies and the danger of
failure of justice without the writ, that must usually determine the propriety of certiorari [or prohibition]. A remedy is plain,
speedy[,] and adequate if it will promptly relieve the petitioner from the injurious effects of the judgment, order, or resolution
of the lower court or agency, x x x."[111]

In this light, certain exceptions were crafted to the general rule requiring a prior motion for reconsideration before the filing of a
petition for certiorari, which exceptions also apply to a petition for prohibition.[112] These are: (a) where the order is a patent
nullity, as where the court a quo has no jurisdiction; (b) where the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have been duly
raised and passed upon by the lower court, or are the same as those raised and passed upon in the lower court; (c) where there
is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any further delay would prejudice the interests of the Government
or of the petitioner or the subject matter of the action is perishable; (d) where, under the circumstances, a motion for
reconsideration would be useless; (e) where petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency for relief; (f)
where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting of such relief by the trial court is improbable;
(g) where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process; (h) where the proceedings were ex parte  or in
which the petitioner had no opportunity to object; and (i) where the issue raised is one purely of law or where public interest is
involved.[113]

In this case, it is ineluctably clear that the above-highlighted exceptions attend since, for the first time, the question on the
authority of the CA - and of this Court, for that matter - to enjoin the implementation of a preventive suspension order issued by
the Office of the Ombudsman is put to the fore. This case tests the constitutional and statutory limits of the fundamental powers
of key government institutions - namely, the Office of the Ombudsman, the Legislature, and the Judiciary - and hence, involves
an issue of transcendental public importance that demands no less than a careful but expeditious resolution. Also raised is the
equally important issue on the propriety of the continuous application of the condonation doctrine as invoked by a public officer
who desires exculpation from administrative liability. As such, the Ombudsman's direct resort to certiorari and prohibition
before this Court, notwithstanding her failure to move for the prior reconsideration of the assailed issuances in CA-G.R. SP No.
139453 and CA-G.R. SP No. 139504 before the CA, is justified.

II.

Albeit raised for the first time by the Ombudsman in her Memorandum,[114] it is nonetheless proper to resolve the issue on the
CA's lack of subject matter jurisdiction over the main petition for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453, in view of the well-
established rule that a court's jurisdiction over the subject matter may be raised at any stage of the proceedings. The rationale is
that subject matter jurisdiction is conferred by law, and the lack of it affects the very authority of the court to take cognizance of
and to render judgment on the action.[115] Hence, it should be preliminarily determined if the CA indeed had subject matter
jurisdiction over the main CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 petition, as the same determines the validity of all subsequent proceedings
relative thereto. It is noteworthy to point out that Binay, Jr. was given the opportunity by this Court to be heard on this issue,
[116]
 as he, in fact, duly submitted his opposition through his comment to the Ombudsman's Memorandum.[117] That being said,
the Court perceives no reasonable objection against ruling on this issue.

The Ombudsman's argument against the CA's lack of subject matter jurisdiction over the main petition, and her corollary prayer
for its dismissal, is based on her interpretation of Section 14, RA 6770, or the Ombudsman Act,[118] which reads in full:

Section 14. Restrictions. - No writ of injunction shall be issued by any court to delay an investigation being conducted by the
Ombudsman under this Act, unless there is a prima facie evidence that the subject matter of the investigation is outside the
jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman.

No court shall hear any appeal or application for remedy against the decision or findings of the Ombudsman, except the
Supreme Court, on pure question of law.

The subject provision may be dissected into two (2) parts.

The first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 is a prohibition against any court (except the Supreme Court[119]) from issuing a writ
of injunction to delay an investigation being conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman. Generally speaking, "[injunction is a
judicial writ, process or proceeding whereby a party is ordered to do or refrain from doing a certain act. It may be the main
action or merely a provisional remedy for and as an incident in the main action."[120] Considering the textual qualifier "to delay,"
which connotes a suspension of an action while the main case remains pending, the "writ of injunction" mentioned in this
paragraph could only refer to injunctions of the provisional kind, consistent with the nature of a provisional injunctive relief.

The exception to the no injunction policy is when there is prima facie evidence that the subject matter of the investigation is
outside the office's jurisdiction. The Office of the Ombudsman has disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive officials
of the government and its subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies, with the exception only of impeachable officers,
Members of Congress, and the Judiciary.[121] Nonetheless, the Ombudsman retains the power to investigate any serious
misconduct in office allegedly committed by officials removable by impeachment, for the purpose of filing a verified complaint
for impeachment, if warranted.[122] Note that the Ombudsman has concurrent jurisdiction over certain administrative cases
which are within the jurisdiction of the regular courts or administrative agencies, but has primary jurisdiction to investigate any
act or omission of a public officer or employee who is under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.[123]

On the other hand, the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 provides that no appeal or application for remedy may be
heard against the decision or findings of the Ombudsman, with the exception of the Supreme Court on pure questions of law.
This paragraph, which the Ombudsman particularly relies on in arguing that the CA had no jurisdiction over the main CA-G.R. SP
No. 139453 petition, as it is supposedly this Court which has the sole jurisdiction to conduct a judicial review of its decisions or
findings, is vague for two (2) reasons: (1) it is unclear what the phrase "application for remedy" or the word "findings" refers to;
and (2) it does not specify what procedural remedy is solely allowable to this Court, save that the same be taken only against a
pure question of law. The task then, is to apply the relevant principles of statutory construction to resolve the ambiguity.

"The underlying principle of all construction is that the intent of the legislature should be sought in the words employed to
express it, and that when found[,] it should be made to govern, x x x. If the words of the law seem to be of doubtful import, it
may then perhaps become necessary to look beyond them in order to ascertain what was in the legislative mind at the time the
law was enacted; what the circumstances were, under which the action was taken; what evil, if any, was meant to be redressed;
x x x [a]nd where the law has contemporaneously been put into operation, and in doing so a construction has necessarily been
put upon it, this construction, especially if followed for some considerable period, is entitled to great respect, as being very
probably a true expression of the legislative purpose, and is not lightly to be overruled, although it is not conclusive."[124]

As an aid to construction, courts may avail themselves of the actual proceedings of the legislative body in interpreting a statute
of doubtful meaning. In case of doubt as to what a provision of a statute means, the meaning put to the provision during the
legislative deliberations may be adopted,[125] albeit not controlling in the interpretation of the law.[126]

A. The Senate deliberations cited by the

Ombudsman do not pertain to the second
paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770.

The Ombudsman submits that the legislative intent behind Section 14, RA 6770, particularly on the matter of judicial review of
her office's decisions or findings, is supposedly clear from the following Senate deliberations:[127]

Senator [Edgardo J.] Angara, x x x. On page 15, Mr. President, line 14, after the phrase "petition for" delete the word "review"
and in lieu thereof, insert the word CERTIORARI. So that, review or appeal from the decision of the Ombudsman would only be
taken not on a petition for review, but on certiorari.

The President [Jovito R. Salonga]. What is the practical effect of that? Will it be more difficult to reverse the decision under
review?

Senator Angara. It has two practical effect ways, Mr. President. First is that the findings of facts of the Ombudsman would be
almost conclusive if supported by substantial evidence. Second, we would not unnecessarily clog the docket of the Supreme
Court. So, it in effect will be a very strict appeal procedure.

xxxx

Senator [Teofisto T.] Guingona, [Jr.]. Does this mean that, for example, if there are exhaustive remedies available to a
respondent, the respondent himself has the right to exhaust the administrative remedies available to him?

Senator Angara. Yes, Mr. President, that is correct.

Senator Guingona. And he himself may cut the proceeding short by appealing to the Supreme Court only on certiorari?

Senator Angara. On question of law, yes.

Senator Guingona. And no other remedy is available to him?

Senator Angara. Going to the Supreme Court, Mr. President?

Senator Guingona. Yes. What I mean to say is, at what stage, for example, if he is a presidential appointee who is the
respondent, if there is f no certiorari  available, is the respondent given the right to exhaust his administrative remedies first
before the Ombudsman can take the appropriate action?

Senator Angara. Yes, Mr. President, because we do not intend to change the administrative law principle that before one can go
to court, he must exhaust all administrative remedies xxx available to him before he goes and seeks judicial review.

xxxx

Senator [Neptali A.] Gonzales. What is the purpose of the Committee in changing the method of appeal from one of a petition
for review to a petition for certiorari?

Senator Angara. To make it consistent, Mr. President, with the provision here in the bill to the effect that the finding of facts
of the Ombudsman is conclusive if supported by substantial evidence.

Senator Gonzales. A statement has been made by the Honorable Presiding Officer to which I concur, that in an appeal by
certiorari, the appeal is more difficult. Because in certiorari it is a matter of discretion on the part of the court, whether to give
due course to the petition or dismiss it outright. Is that not correct, Mr. President?

Senator Angara. That is absolutely correct, Mr. President

Senator Gonzales. And in a petition for certiorari, the issue is limited to whether or not the Ombudsman here has acted
without jurisdiction and has committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Is that not the
consequence, Mr. President.

Senator Angara. That is correct, Mr. President.

Senator Gonzales. And it is, therefore, in this sense that the intention of the Committee is to make it harder to have a judicial
review, but should be limited only to cases that I have enumerated.

Senator Angara. Yes, Mr. President.

Senator Gonzales. I think, Mr. President, our Supreme Court has made a distinction between a petition for review and a petition
for certiorari; because before, under the 1935 Constitution appeal from any order, ruling or decision of the COMELEC shall be by
means of review. But under the Constitution it is now by certiorari and the Supreme Court said that by this change, the court
exercising judicial review will not inquire into the facts, into the evidence, because we will not go deeply by way of review into
the evidence on record but its authority will be limited to a determination of whether the administrative agency acted without,
or in excess of, jurisdiction, or committed a grave abuse of discretion. So, I assume that that is the purpose of this amendment,
Mr. President.

Senator Angara. The distinguished Gentleman has stated it so well.

Senator Gonzales. I just want to put that in the Record. Senator Angara. It is very well stated, Mr. President.

xxxx

The President.  It is evident that there must be some final authority to render decisions. Should it be the Ombudsman or
should it be the Supreme Court?

Senator Angara. As I understand it, under our scheme of government, Mr. President, it is and has to be the Supreme Court to
make the final determination.
The President. Then if that is so, we have to modify Section 17.

Senator Angara. That is why, Mr. President, some of our Colleagues have made a reservation to introduce an appropriate
change during the period of Individual Amendments.

xxxx

The President. All right. Is there any objection to the amendment inserting the word CERTIORARI instead of "review"? [Silence]
Hearing none, the same is approved.[128]

Upon an assiduous scrutiny of these deliberations, the Court is, however, unconvinced that the provision debated on was
Section 14, RA 6770, as the Ombudsman invokes. Note that the exchange begins with the suggestion of Senator Angara to delete
the word "review" that comes after the phrase "petition for review" and, in its stead, insert the word "certiorari" so that the
"review or appeal from the decision of the Ombudsman would not only be taken on a petition for review, but on certiorari" The
ensuing exchange between Senators Gonzales and Angara then dwells on the purpose of changing the method of review from
one of a petition for review to a petition for certiorari - that is, to make "the appeal x x x more difficult." Ultimately, the
amendment to the change in wording, from "petition for review" to "petition for certiorari" was approved.

Noticeably, these references to a "petition for review" and the proposed "petition for certiorari" are nowhere to be found in the
text of Section 14, RA 6770. In fact, it was earlier mentioned that this provision, particularly its second paragraph, does not
indicate what specific procedural remedy one should take in assailing a decision or finding of the Ombudsman; it only reveals
that the remedy be taken to this Court based on pure questions of law. More so, it was even commented upon during the oral
arguments of this case[129] that there was no debate or clarification made on the current formulation of the second paragraph of
Section 14, RA 6770 per the available excerpts of the Senate deliberations. In any case, at least for the above-cited deliberations,
the Court finds no adequate support to sustain the Ombudsman's entreaty that the CA had no subject matter jurisdiction over
the main CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 petition.

On the contrary, it actually makes greater sense to posit that these deliberations refer to another Ombudsman Act provision,
namely Section 27, RA 6770. This is because the latter textually reflects the approval of Senator Angara's suggested
amendment, i.e., that the Ombudsman's decision or finding may be assailed in a petition for certiorari to this Court (fourth
paragraph), and further, his comment on the conclusive nature of the factual findings of the Ombudsman, if supported by
substantial evidence (third paragraph):

Section 27. Effectivity and Finality of Decisions.— (1) All provisionary orders of the Office of the Ombudsman are immediately
effective and executory.

A motion for reconsideration of any order, directive or decision of the Office of the Ombudsman must be filed within five (5)
days after receipt of written notice and shall be entertained only on any of the following grounds:
(1) New evidence has been discovered which materially affects the order, directive or decision;

(2) Errors of law or irregularities have been committed prejudicial to the interest of the movant. The motion for reconsideration
shall be resolved within three (3) days from filing: Provided, That only one motion for reconsideration shall be entertained.

Findings of fact by the Office of the Ombudsman when supported by substantial evidence are conclusive. Any order, directive or
decision imposing the penalty of public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than one (1) month's salary shall be final
and unappealable.

In all administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives, or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to
the Supreme Court by filing a petition for certiorari within ten (10) days from receipt of the written notice of the order,
directive or decision or denial of the motion for reconsideration in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

The above rules may be amended or modified by the Office of the ' Ombudsman as the interest of justice may require.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
At first blush, it appears that Section 27, RA 6770 is equally ambiguous in stating that a "petition for certiorari" should be taken
in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, as it is well-known that under the present 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
petitions for certiorari are governed by Rule 65 of the said Rules. However, it should be discerned that the Ombudsman Act was
passed way back in 1989[130] and, hence, before the advent of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.[131] At that time, the
governing 1964 Rules of Court,[132] consistent with Section 27, RA 6770, referred to the appeal taken thereunder as a petition for
certiorari, thus possibly explaining the remedy's textual denomination, at least in the provision's final approved version:

RULE 45
Appeal from Court of Appeals to Supreme Court

SECTION 1. Filing of Petition with Supreme Court. - A party may appeal by certiorari, from a judgment of the Court of Appeals, by
filing with the Supreme Court a petition for  certiorari, within fifteen (15) days from notice of judgment or of the denial of his
motion for reconsideration filed in due time, and paying at the same time, to the clerk of said court the corresponding docketing
fee. The petition shall not be acted upon without proof of service of a copy thereof to the Court of Appeals. (Emphasis supplied)

B. Construing the second paragraph of

Section 14, RA 6770.

The Senate deliberations' lack of discussion on the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 notwithstanding, the other
principles of statutory construction can apply to ascertain the meaning of the provision.

To recount, the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 states that "[n]o court shall hear any appeal or application for
remedy against the decision or findings of the Ombudsman, except the Supreme Court, on pure question of law."    ;

As a general rule, the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 bans the whole range of remedies against issuances of the
Ombudsman, by prohibiting: (a) an appeal against any decision or finding of the Ombudsman, and (b) "any application of
remedy" (subject to the exception below) against the same. To clarify, the phrase "application for remedy," being a generally
worded provision, and being separated from the term "appeal" by the disjunctive "or",[133] refers to any remedy (whether taken
mainly or provisionally), except an appeal, following the maxim generalia verba sunt generaliter intelligenda: general words are
to be understood in a general sense.[134] By the same principle, the word "findings," which is also separated from the word
"decision" by the disjunctive "or", would therefore refer to any finding made by the Ombudsman (whether final or provisional),
except a decision.

The subject provision, however, crafts an exception to the foregoing general rule. While the specific procedural vehicle is not
explicit from its text, it is fairly deducible that the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 excepts, as the only allowable
remedy against "the decision or findings of the Ombudsman," a Rule 45 appeal, for the reason that it is the only remedy taken
to the Supreme Court on "pure questions of law," whether under the 1964 Rules of Court or the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure:

Rule 45, 1964 Rules of Court

RULE 45
Appeal from Court of Appeals to Supreme Court

xxxx

Section 2. Contents of Petition. — The petition shall contain a concise statement of the matters involved, the assignment of
errors made in the court below, and the reasons relied on for the allowance of the petition, and it should be accompanied with a
true copy of the judgment sought to be reviewed, together with twelve (12) copies of the record on appeal, if any, and of the
petitioner's brief as filed in the Court of Appeals. A verified statement of the date when notice of judgment and denial of the
motion for reconsideration, if any, were received shall accompany the petition.

Only questions of law may be raised in the petition and must be distinctly set forth. If no record on appeal has been filed in the
Court of Appeals, the clerk of the Supreme Court, upon admission of the petition, shall demand from the Court of Appeals the
elevation of the whole record of the case. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Rule 45, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure

RULE 45
Appeal by Certiorari to the Supreme Court

Section 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court. - A party desiring to appeal by certiorari from a judgment, final order or
resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Court of Tax Appeals, the Regional Trial Court or other courts,
whenever authorized by law, may file with the Supreme Court a verified petition for review on certiorari. The petition may
include an application for a writ of preliminary injunction or other provisional remedies and shall raise only questions of law,
which must be distinctly set forth. The petitioner may seek the same provisional remedies by verified motion filed in the same
action or proceeding at any time during its pendency. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

That the remedy excepted in the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 could be a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
1964 Rules of Court or the 1997 Rules of Procedure is a suggestion that defies traditional norms of procedure. It is basic
procedural law that a Rule 65 petition is based on errors of jurisdiction, and not errors of judgment to which the classifications of
(a) questions of fact, (b) questions of law, or (c) questions of mixed fact and law, relate to. In fact, there is no procedural rule,
whether in the old or new Rules, which grounds a Rule 65 petition on pure questions of law. Indeed, it is also a statutory
construction principle that the lawmaking body cannot be said to have intended the establishment of conflicting and hostile
systems on the same subject. Such a result would render legislation a useless and idle ceremony, and subject the laws to
uncertainty and unintelligibility.[135] There should then be no confusion that the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 refers
to a Rule 45 appeal to this Court, and no other. In sum, the appropriate construction of this Ombudsman Act provision is that all
remedies against issuances of the Office of the Ombudsman are prohibited, except the above-stated Rule 45 remedy to the
Court on pure questions of law.

C. Validity of the second paragraph of

Section 14, RA 6770.

Of course, the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770's extremely limited restriction on remedies is inappropriate since a Rule
45 appeal -which is within the sphere of the rules of procedure promulgated by this Court - can only be taken against final
decisions or orders of lower courts,[136] and not against "findings" of quasi-judicial agencies. As will be later elaborated upon,
Congress cannot interfere with matters of procedure; hence, it cannot alter the scope of a Rule 45 appeal so as to apply to
interlocutory "findings" issued by the Ombudsman. More significantly, by confining the remedy to a Rule 45 appeal, the
provision takes away the remedy of certiorari, grounded on errors of jurisdiction, in denigration of the judicial power
constitutionally vested in courts. In this light, the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 also increased this Court's appellate
jurisdiction, without a showing, however, that it gave its consent to the same. The provision is, in fact, very similar to the fourth
paragraph of Section 27, RA 6770 (as above-cited), which was invalidated in the case of Fabian v. Desiertoni[137] (Fabian).[138]

In Fabian, the Court struck down the fourth paragraph of Section 27, RA 6770 as unconstitutional since it had the effect of
increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the Court without its advice and concurrence in violation of Section 30, Article VI of the
1987 Constitution.[139] Moreover, this provision was found to be inconsistent with Section 1, Rule 45 of the present 1997 Rules of
Procedure which, as above-intimated, applies only to a review of "judgments or final orders of the Court of Appeals, the
Sandiganbayan, the Court of Tax Appeals, the Regional Trial Court, or other courts authorized by law;" and not of quasi-judicial
agencies, such as the Office of the Ombudsman, the remedy now being a Rule 43 appeal to the Court of Appeals. In Ruivivar v.
Office of the Ombudsman,[140] the Court's ratiocinations and ruling in Fabian  were recounted:

The case of Fabian v. Desierto arose from the doubt created in the application of Section 27 of R.A. No. 6770 (The Ombudsman's
Act) and Section 7, Rule III of A.O. No. 7 (Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman) on the availability of appeal before
the Supreme Court to assail a decision or order of the Ombudsman in administrative cases. In Fabian, we invalidated Section 27
of R.A. No. 6770 (and Section 7, Rule III of A.O. No. 7 and the other rules implementing the Act) insofar as it provided for
appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 from the decisions or orders of the Ombudsman in administrative cases. We held that
Section 27 of R.A. No. 6770 had the effect, not only of increasing the appellate jurisdiction of this Court without its advice and
concurrence in violation of Section 30, Article VI of the Constitution; it was also inconsistent with Section 1, Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court which provides that a petition for review on certiorari shall apply only to a review of "judgments or final orders
of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Court of Tax Appeals, the Regional Trial Court, or other courts authorized by
law." We pointedly said:
As a consequence of our ratiocination that Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 should be struck down as unconstitutional, and in
line with the regulatory philosophy adopted in appeals from quasi-judicial agencies in the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure,
appeals from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases should be taken to the CA under the
provisions of Rule 43.[141] (Emphasis supplied)

Since the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 limits the remedy against "decision or findings" of the Ombudsman to a Rule
45 appeal and thus - similar to the fourth paragraph of Section 27, RA 6770[142] - attempts to effectively increase the Supreme
Court's appellate jurisdiction without its advice and concurrence,[143] it is therefore concluded that the former provision is also
unconstitutional and perforce, invalid. Contrary to the Ombudsman's posturing,[144] Fabian should squarely apply since the
above-stated Ombudsman Act provisions are in part materia  in that they "cover the same specific or particular subject
matter,"[145] that is, the manner of judicial review over issuances of the Ombudsman.

Note that since the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 is clearly determinative of the existence of the CA's subject matter
jurisdiction over the main CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 petition, including all subsequent proceedings relative thereto, as the
Ombudsman herself has developed, the Court deems it proper to resolve this issue ex mero motu  (on its own motion[146]). This
procedure, as was similarly adopted in Fabian, finds its bearings in settled case law:

The conventional rule, however, is that a challenge on constitutional grounds must be raised by a party to the case, neither of
whom did so in this case, but that is not an inflexible rule, as we shall explain.

Since the constitution is intended for the observance of the judiciary and other departments of the government and the judges
are sworn to support its provisions, the courts are not at liberty to overlook or disregard its commands or countenance evasions
thereof. When it is clear , that a statute transgresses the authority vested in a legislative body, it is the duty of the courts to
declare that the constitution, and not the statute, governs in a case before them for judgment.

Thus, while courts will not ordinarily pass upon constitutional questions which are not raised in the pleadings, the rule has been
recognized to admit of certain exceptions. It does not preclude a court from inquiring into its own jurisdiction or compel it to
enter a judgment that it lacks jurisdiction to enter. If a statute on which a court's jurisdiction in a proceeding depends is
unconstitutional, the court has no jurisdiction in the proceeding, and since it may determine whether or not it has jurisdiction, it
necessarily follows that it may inquire into the constitutionality of the statute.

Constitutional questions, not raised in the regular and orderly procedure in the trial are ordinarily rejected unless the
jurisdiction of the court below or that of the appellate court is involved in which case it may be raised at any time or on the
court's own motion. The Court ex mero motu may take cognizance of lack of jurisdiction at any point in the case where that fact
is developed. The court has a clearly recognized right to determine its own jurisdiction in any proceeding.[147] (Emphasis supplied)

D. Consequence of invalidity.

In this case, the Rule 65 petition for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 was filed by Binay, Jr. before the CA in order to nullify
the preventive suspension order issued by the Ombudsman, an interlocutory order,[148] hence, unappealable.[149]

In several cases decided after Fabian, the Court has ruled that Rule 65 petitions for certiorari against unappelable issuances[150] of
the Ombudsman should be filed before the CA, and not directly before this Court:

In Office of the Ombudsman v. Capulong[151] (March 12, 2014), wherein a preventive suspension order issued by the Office of the
Ombudsman was - similar to this case - assailed through a Rule 65 petition for certiorari filed by the public officer before the CA,
the Court held that "[t]here being a finding of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Ombudsman, it was certainly
imperative for the CA to grant incidental reliefs, as sanctioned by Section 1 of Rule 65."[152]
In Dagan v. Office of the Ombudsman[153] (November 19, 2013), involving a Rule 65 petition for certiorari assailing a final and
unappealable order of the Office of the Ombudsman in an administrative case, the Court remarked that "petitioner employed
the correct mode of review in this case, i.e., a special civil action for certiorari before the Court of Appeals."[154] In this relation, it
stated that while "a special civil action for Certiorari is within the concurrent original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and the
Court of Appeals, such petition should be initially filed with the Court of Appeals in observance of the doctrine of hierarchy of
courts." Further, the Court upheld Barata v. Abalos, Jr.[155] (June 6, 2001), wherein it was ruled that the remedy against final and
unappealable orders of the Office of the Ombudsman in an administrative case was a Rule 65 petition to the CA. The same
verdict was reached in Ruivivar[156] (September 16, 2008).

Thus, with the unconstitutionality of the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770, the Court, consistent with existing
jurisprudence, concludes that the CA has subject matter jurisdiction over the main CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 petition. That being
said, the Court now examines the objections of the Ombudsman, this time against the CA's authority to issue the assailed TRO
and WPI against the implementation of the preventive suspension order, incidental to that main case.

III.

From the inception of these proceedings, the Ombudsman has been adamant that the CA has no jurisdiction to issue any
provisional injunctive writ against her office to enjoin its preventive suspension orders. As basis, she invokes the first paragraph
of Section 14, RA 6770 in conjunction with her office's independence under the 1987 Constitution. She advances the idea that
"[i]n order to further ensure [her office's] independence, [RA 6770] likewise insulated it from judicial
intervention,"[157] particularly, "from injunctive reliefs traditionally obtainable from the courts,"[158] claiming that said writs may
work "just as effectively as direct harassment or political pressure would."[159]

A. The concept of Ombudsman independence.

Section 5, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution guarantees the independence of the Office of the Ombudsman:

Section 5. There is hereby created the independent Office of the Ombudsman, composed of the Ombudsman to be known as
Tanodbayan, one overall Deputy and at least one Deputy each for Luzon, Visayas[,] and Mindanao. A separate Deputy for the
military establishment may likewise be appointed. (Emphasis supplied)

In Gonzales III v. Office of the President[160] (Gonzales III), the Court traced the historical underpinnings of the Office of the
Ombudsman:

Prior to the 1973 Constitution, past presidents established several Ombudsman-like agencies to serve as the people's medium
for airing grievances and for direct redress against abuses and misconduct in the government. Ultimately, however, these
agencies failed to fully realize their objective for lack of the political independence necessary for the effective performance of
their function as government critic.

It was under the 1973 Constitution that the Office of the Ombudsman became a constitutionally-mandated office to give it
political independence and adequate powers to enforce its mandate. Pursuant to the ( 1973 Constitution, President Ferdinand
Marcos enacted Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1487, as amended by PD No. 1607 and PD No. 1630, creating the Office of the
Ombudsman to be known as Tanodbayan. It was tasked principally to investigate, on complaint or motu proprio, any
administrative act of any administrative agency, including any government-owned or controlled corporation. When the Office of
the Tanodbayan was reorganized in 1979, the powers previously vested in the Special Prosecutor were transferred to the
Tanodbayan himself. He was given the exclusive authority to conduct preliminary investigation of all cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan, file the corresponding information, and control the prosecution of these cases.

With the advent of the 1987 Constitution, a new Office of the Ombudsman was created by constitutional fiat. Unlike in the 1973
Constitution, its independence was expressly and constitutionally guaranteed. Its objectives are to enforce the state policy in
Section 27, Article II and the standard of accountability in public service under Section 1, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution.
These provisions read:
Section 27. The State shall maintain honesty and integrity in the public service and take positive and effective measures against
graft and corruption.
Section 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must, at all times, be accountable to the people, serve
them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency; act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.
[161]
 (Emphasis supplied)

More significantly, Gonzales III  explained the broad scope of the office's mandate, and in correlation, the impetus behind its
independence:

Under Section 12, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, the Office of the Ombudsman is envisioned to be the "protector of the
people" against the inept, abusive, and corrupt in the Government, to function essentially as a complaints and action bureau.
This constitutional vision of a Philippine Ombudsman practically intends to make the Ombudsman an authority to directly check
and guard against the ills, abuses and excesses , of the bureaucracy. Pursuant to Section 13 (8), Article XI of the 1987
Constitution, Congress enacted RA No. 6770 to enable it to further realize the vision of the Constitution. Section 21 of RA No.
6770 provides:
Section 21. Official Subject to Disciplinary Authority; Exceptions. - The Office of the Ombudsman shall have disciplinary authority
over all elective and appointive officials of the Government and its subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies, including
Members of the Cabinet, local government, government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries, except over
officials who may be removed only by impeachment or over Members of Congress, and the Judiciary.

As the Ombudsman is expected to be an "activist watchman," the < Court has upheld its actions, although not squarely falling
under the broad powers granted [to] it by the Constitution and by RA No. 6770, if these actions are reasonably in line with its
official function and consistent with the law and the Constitution.

The Ombudsman's broad investigative and disciplinary powers include all acts of malfeasance, misfeasance, and nonfeasance of
all public officials, including Members of the Cabinet and key Executive officers, during their tenure. To support these broad
powers, the Constitution saw it fit to insulate the Office of the Ombudsman from the pressures and influence of officialdom
and partisan politics and from fear of external reprisal by making it an "independent" office, x x x.

xxxx

Given the scope of its disciplinary authority, the Office of the Ombudsman is a very powerful government constitutional agency
that is considered "a notch above other grievance-handling investigative bodies." It has powers, both constitutional and
statutory, that are commensurate , with its daunting task of enforcing accountability of public officers.[162] (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

Gonzales III is the first case which grappled with the meaning of the Ombudsman's independence vis-a-vis the independence of
the other constitutional bodies. Pertinently, the Court observed:

(1) "[T]he independence enjoyed by the Office of the Ombudsman and by the Constitutional Commissions shares certain
characteristics - they do not owe their existence to any act of Congress, but are created by the Constitution itself; additionally,
they all enjoy fiscal autonomy. In general terms, the framers of the Constitution intended that these 'independent' bodies be
insulated from political pressure to the extent that the absence of 'independence' would result in the impairment of their core
functions"[163];

(2) "[T]he Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman must have the independence and flexibility needed in
the discharge of their constitutional duties. The imposition of restrictions and constraints on the manner the independent
constitutional offices allocate and utilize the funds appropriated for their operations is anathema to fiscal autonomy and
violative not only [of] the express mandate of the Constitution, but especially as regards the Supreme Court, of the
independence and separation of powers upon which the entire fabric of our constitutional system is based";[164] and

(3) "[T]he constitutional deliberations explain the Constitutional Commissions' need for independence. In the deliberations of
the 1973 Constitution, the delegates amended the 1935 Constitution by providing for a constitutionally-created Civil Service
Commission, instead of one created by law, on the premise that the effectivity of this body is dependent on its freedom from
the tentacles of politics. In a similar manner, the deliberations of the 1987 Constitution on the Commission on Audit highlighted
the developments in the past Constitutions geared towards insulating the Commission on Audit from political pressure."[165]
At bottom, the decisive ruling in Gonzales III, however, was that the independence of the Office of the Ombudsman, as well as
that of the foregoing independent bodies, meant freedom from control or supervision of the Executive Department:

[T]he independent constitutional commissions have been consistently intended by the framers to be independent from
executive control or supervision or any form of political influence. At least insofar as these bodies are concerned, jurisprudence
is not scarce on how the "independence" granted to these bodies prevents presidential interference.

In Brillantes, Jr. v. Yorac (G.R. No. 93867, December 18, 1990, 192 SCRA 358), we emphasized that the Constitutional
Commissions, which have been characterized under the Constitution as "independent," are not under the control of the
President, even if they discharge functions that are executive in nature. The Court declared as unconstitutional the President's
act of temporarily appointing the respondent in that case as Acting Chairman of the [Commission on Elections] "however well-
meaning" it might have been.

In Bautista v. Senator Salonga (254 Phil. 156, 179 [1989]), the Court categorically stated that the tenure of the commissioners of
the independent Commission on Human Rights could not be placed under the discretionary power of the President.

xxxx

The kind of independence enjoyed by the Office of the Ombudsman certainly cannot be inferior - but is similar in degree and
kind - to the independence similarly guaranteed by the Constitution to the Constitutional Commissions since all these offices fill
the political interstices of a republican democracy that are crucial to its existence and proper functioning.[166] (Emphases and
underscoring supplied)

Thus, in Gonzales III, the Court declared Section 8 (2), RA 6770, which provides that "[a] Deputy or the Special Prosecutor, may
be removed from office by the President for any of the grounds provided for the removal of the Ombudsman, and after due
process," partially unconstitutional insofar as it subjected the Deputy Ombudsman to the disciplinary authority of the President
for violating the principle of independence. Meanwhile, the validity of Section 8 (2), RA 6770 was maintained insofar as the
Office of the Special Prosecutor was concerned since said office was not considered to be constitutionally within the Office of the
Ombudsman and is, hence, not entitled to the independence the latter enjoys under the Constitution.[167]

As may be deduced from the various discourses in Gonzales III, the concept of Ombudsman's independence covers three (3)
things:

First: creation by the Constitution, which means that the office cannot be abolished, nor its constitutionally specified functions
and privileges, be removed, altered, or modified by law, unless the Constitution itself allows, or an amendment thereto is made;

Second: fiscal autonomy, which means that the office "may not be obstructed from [its] freedom to use or dispose of [its] funds
for purposes germane to [its] functions;[168] hence, its budget cannot be strategically decreased by officials of the political
branches of government so as to impair said functions; and

Third: insulation from executive supervision and control, which means that those within the ranks of the office can only be
disciplined by an internal authority.

Evidently, all three aspects of independence intend to protect the Office of the Ombudsman from political harassment and
pressure, so as to free it from the "insidious tentacles of politics."[169]

That being the case, the concept of Ombudsman independence cannot be invoked as basis to insulate the Ombudsman from
judicial power constitutionally vested unto the courts. Courts are apolitical bodies, which are ordained to act as impartial
tribunals and apply even justice to all. Hence, the Ombudsman's notion that it can be exempt from an incident of judicial power -
that is, a provisional writ of injunction against a preventive suspension order - clearly strays from the concept's rationale of
insulating the office from political harassment or pressure.

B. The first paragraph of Section 14, RA

6770 in light of the powers of Congress and the
Court under the 1987 Constitution.

The Ombudsman's erroneous abstraction of her office's independence notwithstanding, it remains that the first paragraph of
Section 14, RA 6770 textually prohibits courts from extending provisional injunctive relief to delay any investigation conducted
by her office. Despite the usage of the general phrase "[n]o writ of injunction shall be issued by any court," the Ombudsman
herself concedes that the prohibition does not cover the Supreme Court.[170] As support, she cites the following Senate
deliberations:

Senator [Ernesto M.] Maceda. Mr. President, I do not know if an amendment is necessary. I would just like to inquire for the
record whether below the Supreme Court, it is understood that there is no injunction policy against the Ombudsman by lower
courts. Or, is it necessary to have a special paragraph for that?

Senator Angara. Well, there is no provision here, Mr. President, that will prevent an injunction against the Ombudsman being
issued.

Senator Maceda. In which case, I think that the intention, this being one of the highest constitutional bodies, is to subject this
only to certiorari to the Supreme Court. I think an injunction from the Supreme Court is, of course, in order but no lower courts
should be allowed to interfere.  We had a very bad experience with even, let us say, the Forestry Code where no injunction is
supposed to be issued against the Department of Natural Resources.  Injunctions are issued right and left by RTC judges all over
the country.

The President. Why do we not make an express provision to that effect?

Senator Angara. We would welcome that, Mr. President.

The President. No [writs of injunction] from the trial courts other than the Supreme Court.

Senator Maceda. I so move, Mr. President, for that amendment.

The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] Hearing none, the same is approved.[171]

Further, she acknowledges that by virtue of Sections 1 and 5 (1), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, acts of the Ombudsman,
including interlocutory orders, are subject to the Supreme Court's power of judicial review As a corollary, the Supreme Court
may issue ancillary mjunctive writs or provisional remedies in the exercise of its power of judicial review over matters pertaining
to ongoing investigations by the Office of the Ombudsman. Respecting the CA, however, the Ombudsman begs to differ.[172]

With these submissions, it is therefore apt to examine the validity of the first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 insofar as it
prohibits all courts, except this Court, from issuing provisional writs of injunction to enjoin an Ombudsman investigation. That
the constitutionality of this provision is the lis mota of this case has not been seriously disputed. In fact, the issue anent its
constitutionality was properly raised and presented during the course of these proceedings.[173] More importantly, its resolution
is clearly necessary to the complete disposition of this case.[174]

In the enduring words of Justice Laurel in Angara v. The Electoral Commission (Angara),[175] the "Constitution has blocked out
with deft strokes and in bold lines, allotment of power to the executive, the legislative[,] and the judicial departments of the
government."[176] The constitutional demarcation of the three fundamental powers of government is more commonly known as
the principle of separation of powers. In the landmark case of Belgica v. Ochoa, Jr. (Belgica),[177] the Court held that "there is a
violation of the separation of powers principle when one branch of government unduly encroaches on the domain of
another."[178] In particular, "there is a violation of the principle when there is impermissible (a) interference with and/or (b)
assumption of another department's functions."[179]

Under Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, judicial power is allocated to the Supreme Court and all such lower
courts:

Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.

This Court is the only court established by the Constitution, while all other lower courts may be established by laws passed by
Congress.  Thus, through the passage of Batas Pambansa Bilang (BP) 129,[180] known as "The Judiciary Reorganization Act of
1980," the Court of Appeals,[181] the Regional Trial Courts,[182] and the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts[183] were established. Later, through the passage of RA 1125,[184] and Presidential Decree No. (PD)
1486,[185] the Court of Tax Appeals, and the Sandiganbayan were respectively established.

In addition to the authority to establish lower courts, Section 2, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution empowers Congress to
define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of all courts, except that it may not deprive the Supreme Court of its
jurisdiction over cases enumerated in Section 5[186] of the same Article:

Section 2. The Congress shall have the power to define, prescribe, ' and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts but may
not deprive the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction over cases enumerated in Section 5 hereof.

xxxx

Jurisdiction, as hereinabove used, more accurately pertains to jurisdiction over the subject matter of an action. In The Diocese of
Bacolod v. Commission on Elections,[187] subject matter jurisdiction was defined as "the authority 'to hear and determine cases
of the general class to which the proceedings in question belong and is conferred by the sovereign authority which organizes
the court and defines its powers.'"

Among others, Congress defined, prescribed, and apportioned the subject matter jurisdiction of this Court (subject to the
aforementioned constitutional limitations), the Court of Appeals, and the trial courts, through the passage of BP 129, as
amended.

In this case, the basis for the CA's subject matter jurisdiction over Binay, Jr.'s main petition for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No.
139453 is Section 9(1), Chapter I of BP 129, as amended:

Section 9. Jurisdiction. - The Court of Appeals shall exercise:

1. Original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, and quo warranto, and auxiliary
writs or processes, whether or not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction[.]

Note that the CA's certiorari jurisdiction, as above-stated, is not only original but also concurrent with the Regional Trial Courts
(under Section 21 (1), Chapter II of BP 129), and the Supreme Court (under Section 5, Article VIII of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution). In view of the concurrence of these courts' jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, the doctrine of hierarchy of
courts should be followed. In People v. Cuaresma,[188] the doctrine was explained as follows:

[T]his concurrence of jurisdiction is not x x x to be taken as according to parties seeking any of the writs an absolute,
unrestrained freedom of choice of the court to which application therefor will be directed. There is after all a hierarchy of
courts. That hierarchy is determinative of the venue of appeals, and should also serve as a general determinant of the
appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs. A becoming regard for that judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates
that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against first level ("inferior") courts should be filed with the Regional Trial
Court, and those against the latter, with the Court of Appeals.[189]

When a court has subject matter jurisdiction over a particular case, as conferred unto it by law, said court may then exercise its
jurisdiction acquired over that case, which is called judicial power.

Judicial power, as vested in the Supreme Court and all other courts established by law, has been defined as the "totality of
powers a court exercises when it assumes jurisdiction and hears and decides a case."[190] Under Section 1, Article VIII of the
1987 Constitution, it includes "the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government."
In Oposa v. Factoran, Jr.[191] the Court explained the expanded scope of judicial power under the 1987 Constitution:

The first part of the authority represents the traditional concept of judicial power, involving the settlement of conflicting rights
as conferred by law. The second part of the authority represents a broadening of f judicial power to enable the courts of justice
to review what was before forbidden territory, to wit, the discretion of the political departments of the government.

As worded, the new provision vests in the judiciary, and particularly the Supreme Court, the power to rule upon even the
wisdom of the decisions of the executive and the legislature and to declare their acts invalid for lack or excess of jurisdiction
because they are tainted with grave abuse of discretion. The catch, of course, is the meaning of "grave abuse of discretion,"
which is a very elastic phrase that can expand or contract according to the disposition of the judiciary.[192]

Judicial power is never exercised in a vacuum. A court's exercise of the jurisdiction it has acquired over a particular case
conforms to the limits and parameters of the rules of procedure duly promulgated by this Court. In other words, procedure is
the framework within which judicial power is exercised. In Manila Railroad Co. v. Attorney-General,[193] the Court elucidated that
"[t]he power or authority of the court over the subject matter existed and was fixed before procedure in a given cause
began. Procedure does not alter or change that power or authority; it simply directs the manner in which it shall be fully and
justly exercised.  To be sure, in certain cases, if that power is not exercised in conformity with the provisions of the procedural
law, purely, the court attempting to exercise it loses the power to exercise it legally. This does not mean that it loses jurisdiction
of the subject matter."[194]

While the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts is, by constitutional design, vested
unto Congress, the power to promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading,
practice, and procedure in all courts belongs exclusively to this Court. Section 5 (5), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution reads:

Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

xxxx

(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in
all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall
provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same
grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial
bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

In Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice[195] (Echegaray), the Court traced the evolution of its rule-making authority, which, under the
1935[196] and 1973 Constitutions,[197] had been priorly subjected to a power-sharing scheme with Congress.[198] As it now stands,
the 1987 Constitution textually altered the old provisions by deleting the concurrent power of Congress to amend the rules,
thus solidifying in one body the Court's rule-making powers, in line with the Framers' vision of institutionalizing a "[s]tronger
and more independent judiciary."[199]

The records of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission would show[200] that the Framers debated on whether or not
the Court's rule-making powers should be shared with Congress. There was an initial suggestion to insert the sentence "The
National Assembly may repeal, alter, or supplement the said rules with the advice and concurrence of the Supreme Court", right
after the phrase "Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and
procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the integrated bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged" in
the enumeration of powers of the Supreme Court. Later, Commissioner Felicitas S. Aquino proposed to delete the former
sentence and, instead, after the word "[underprivileged," place a comma (,) to be followed by "the phrase with the concurrence
of the National Assembly." Eventually, a compromise formulation was reached wherein (a) the Committee members agreed to
Commissioner Aquino's proposal to delete the phrase "the National Assembly may repeal, alter, or supplement the said rules
with the advice and concurrence of the Supreme Court" and (b) in turn, Commissioner Aquino agreed to withdraw his proposal
to add "the phrase with the concurrence of the National Assembly." The changes were approved, thereby leading to the
present lack of textual reference to any form of Congressional participation in Section 5 (5), Article VIII, supra. The prevailing
consideration was that "both bodies, the Supreme Court and the Legislature, have their inherent powers."[201]
Thus, as it now stands, Congress has no authority to repeal, alter, or supplement rules concerning pleading, practice, and
procedure. As pronounced in Echegaray:

The rule making power of this Court was expanded. This Court for the first time was given the power to promulgate rules
concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights. The Court was also r granted for the first time the power to
disapprove rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies. But most importantly, the 1987 Constitution took
away the power of Congress to repeal, alter, or supplement rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure. In fine, the
power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is no longer shared by this Court with Congress, more so with
the Executive.[202] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Under its rule-making authority, the Court has periodically passed various rules of procedure, among others, the current 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure. Identifying the appropriate procedural remedies needed for the reasonable exercise of every court's
judicial power, the provisional remedies of temporary restraining orders and writs of preliminary injunction were thus
provided.

A temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction both constitute temporary measures availed of during the
pendency of the action. They are, by nature, ancillary because they are mere incidents in and are dependent upon the result of
the main action. It is well-settled that the sole object of a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction,
whether prohibitory or mandatory, is to preserve the status quo[203] until the merits of the case can be heard. They are usually
granted when it is made to appear that there is a substantial controversy between the parties and one of them is committing an
act or threatening the immediate commission of an act that will cause irreparable injury or destroy the status quo of the
controversy before a full hearing can be had on the merits of the case. In other words, they are preservative remedies for the
protection of substantive rights or interests, and, hence, not a cause of action in itself, but merely adjunct to a main suit.[204] In a
sense, they are regulatory processes meant to prevent a case from being mooted by the interim acts of the parties.

Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure generally governs the provisional remedies of a TRO and a WPI. A preliminary
injunction is defined under Section 1,[205] Rule 58, while Section 3[206] of the same Rule enumerates the grounds for its issuance.
Meanwhile, under Section 5[207] thereof, a TRO may be issued as a precursor to the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
under certain procedural parameters.

The power of a court to issue these provisional injunctive reliefs coincides with its inherent power to issue all auxiliary writs,
processes, and other means necessary to carry its acquired jurisdiction into effect under Section 6, Rule 135 of the Rules of
Court which reads:

Section 6. Means to carry jurisdiction into effect. - When by law jurisdiction is conferred on a court or judicial officer, all auxiliary
writs, f processes and other means necessary to carry it into effect may be employed by such court or officer; and if the
procedure to be followed in the exercise of such jurisdiction is not specifically pointed out by law[208] or by these rules, any
suitable process or mode of proceeding may be adopted which appears comfortable to the spirit of the said law or rules.

In City of Manila v. Grecia-Cuerdo,[209] which is a case involving "[t]he supervisory power or jurisdiction of the [Court of Tax
Appeals] to issue a writ of certiorari in aid of its appellate jurisdiction"[210] over "decisions, orders or resolutions of the RTCs in
local tax cases originally decided or resolved by them in the exercise of their original or appellate jurisdiction,"[211] the Court ruled
that said power "should coexist with, and be a complement to, its appellate jurisdiction to review, by appeal, the final orders
and decisions of the RTC, in order to have complete supervision over the acts of the latter:"[212]

A grant of appellate jurisdiction implies that there is included in it the power necessary to exercise it effectively, to make all
orders that ; will preserve the subject of the action, and to give effect to the final determination of the appeal. It carries with it
the power to protect that jurisdiction and to make the decisions of the court thereunder effective. The court, in aid of its
appellate jurisdiction, has authority to control all auxiliary and incidental matters necessary to the efficient and proper exercise
of that jurisdiction. For this purpose, it may, when necessary, prohibit or restrain the performance of any act which might
interfere with the proper exercise of its rightful jurisdiction in cases pending before it.[213] (Emphasis supplied)

In this light, the Court expounded on the inherent powers of a court endowed with subject matter jurisdiction:
[A] court which is endowed with a particular jurisdiction should have powers which are necessary to enable it to act effectively
within such jurisdiction. These should be regarded as powers which are inherent in its jurisdiction and the court must possess
them in order to enforce its rules of practice and to suppress any abuses of its process and to t defeat any attempted
thwarting of such process.

x x x x 

Indeed, courts possess certain inherent powers which may be said to be implied from a general grant of jurisdiction, in addition
to those expressly conferred on them. These inherent powers are such powers as are necessary for the ordinary and efficient
exercise of jurisdiction; or are essential to the existence, dignity and functions of the courts, as well as to the due
administration of justice; or are directly appropriate, convenient and suitable to the execution of their granted powers; and
include the power to maintain the court's jurisdiction and render it effective in behalf of the litigants. [214] (Emphases and
underscoring supplied)

Broadly speaking, the inherent powers of the courts resonates the long-entrenched constitutional principle, articulated way back
in the 1936 case of Angara, that "where a general power is conferred or duty enjoined, every particular power necessary for the
exercise of the one or the performance of the other is also conferred."[215]

In the United States, the "inherent powers doctrine refers to the principle, by which the courts deal with diverse matters over
which they are thought to have intrinsic authority like procedural [rule-making] and general judicial housekeeping. To justify the
invocation or exercise of inherent powers, a court must show that the powers are reasonably necessary to achieve the specific
purpose for which the exercise is sought. Inherent powers enable the judiciary to accomplish its constitutionally mandated
functions."[216]

In Smothers v. Lewis[217] (Smothers), a case involving the constitutionality of a statute which prohibited courts from enjoining the
enforcement of a revocation order of an alcohol beverage license pending appeal,[218] the Supreme Court of Kentucky held:

[T]he Court is x x x vested with certain "inherent" powers to do that which is reasonably necessary for the administration of
justice within the scope of their jurisdiction. x x x [W]e said while considering the rule making power and the judicial power to
be one and the same that ". . . the grant of judicial power [rule making power] to the courts by the constitution carries with it,
as a necessary incident, the right to make that power effective in the administration of justice." (Emphases supplied)

Significantly, Smothers characterized a court's issuance of provisional injunctive relief as an exercise of the court's inherent
power, and to this end, stated that any attempt on the part of Congress to interfere with the same was constitutionally
impermissible:

It is a result of this foregoing line of thinking that we now adopt the language framework of 28 Am.Jur.2d, Injunctions, Section
15, and once and for all make clear that a court, once having obtained jurisdiction of a cause of action, has, as an incidental to its
constitutional grant of power, inherent power to do all things reasonably necessary to the administration of justice in the case
before it. In the exercise of this power, a court, when necessary in order to protect or preserve the subject matter of the
litigation, to protect its jurisdiction and to make its judgment effective, may grant or issue a temporary injunction in aid of or
ancillary to the principal action.

The control over this inherent judicial power, in this particular instance the injunction, is exclusively within the constitutional
realm of the courts. As such, it is not within the purview of the legislature to grant or deny the power nor is it within the
purview of the legislature to shape or fashion circumstances under which this inherently judicial power may be or may not be
granted or denied.

This Court has historically recognized constitutional limitations upon the power of the legislature to interfere with or to inhibit
the performance of constitutionally granted and inherently provided judicial functions, x x x

xxxx

We reiterate our previously adopted language, ". . . a court, once having obtained jurisdiction of a cause of action, has, as
incidental to its general jurisdiction, inherent power to do all things reasonably necessary f to the administration of justice in the
case before it. . ." This includes the inherent power to issue injunctions. (Emphases supplied)

Smothers also pointed out that the legislature's authority to provide a right to appeal in the statute does not necessarily mean
that it could control the appellate judicial proceeding:

However, the fact that the legislature statutorily provided for this appeal does not give it the right to encroach upon the
constitutionally granted powers of the judiciary. Once the administrative action has ended and the right to appeal arises the
legislature is void of any right to control a subsequent appellate judicial proceeding. The judicial rules have come into play
and have preempted the field.[219] (Emphasis supplied)

With these considerations in mind, the Court rules that when Congress passed the first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 and, in
so doing, took away from the courts their power to issue a TRO and/or WPI to enjoin an investigation conducted by the
Ombudsman, it encroached upon this Court's constitutional rule-making authority. Clearly, these issuances, which are, by
nature, provisional reliefs and auxiliary writs created under the provisions of the Rules of Court, are matters of procedure which
belong exclusively within the province of this Court. Rule 58 of the Rules of Court did not create, define, and regulate a right but
merely prescribed the means of implementing an existing right[220] since it only provided for temporary reliefs to preserve the
applicant's right in esse which is threatened to be violated during the course of a pending litigation. In the case of Fabian,[221] it
was stated that:

If the rule takes away a vested right, it is not procedural. If the rule creates a right such as the right to appeal, it may be classified
as a substantive matter; but if it operates as a means of implementing an existing right then the rule deals merely with
procedure.

Notably, there have been similar attempts on the part of Congress, in the exercise of its legislative power, to amend the Rules of
Court, as in the cases of: (a) In Re: Exemption of The National Power Corporation from Payment of Filing/ Docket Fees;[222] (b) Re:
Petition for Recognition of the Exemption of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) from Payment of Legal Fees; [223] and
(c)  Baguio Market Vendors Multi-Purpose Cooperative (BAMARVEMPCO) v. Cabato-Cortes [224] While these cases involved
legislative enactments exempting government owned and controlled corporations and cooperatives from paying filing fees, thus,
effectively modifying Rule 141 of the Rules of Court (Rule on Legal Fees), it was, nonetheless, ruled that the prerogative to
amend, repeal or even establish new rules of procedure[225] solely belongs to the Court, to the exclusion of the legislative and
executive branches of government. On this score, the Court described its authority to promulgate rules on pleading, practice,
and procedure as exclusive and "[o]ne of the safeguards of [its] institutional independence."[226]

That Congress has been vested with the authority to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts under
Section 2, Article VIII supra, as well as to create statutory courts under Section 1, Article VIII supra, does not result in an
abnegation of the Court's own power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice, and procedure under Section 5 (5), Article VIII
supra. Albeit operatively interrelated, these powers are nonetheless institutionally separate and distinct, each to be preserved
under its own sphere of authority. When Congress creates a court and delimits its jurisdiction, the procedure for which its
jurisdiction is exercised is fixed by the Court through the rules it promulgates. The first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770
is not a jurisdiction-vesting provision, as the Ombudsman misconceives,[227] because it does not define, prescribe, and apportion
the subject matter jurisdiction of courts to act on certiorari cases; the certiorari jurisdiction of courts, particularly the CA, stands
under the relevant sections of BP 129 which were not shown to have been repealed. Instead, through this provision, Congress
interfered with a provisional remedy that was created by this Court under its duly promulgated rules of procedure, which
utility is both integral and inherent to every court's exercise of judicial power. Without the Court's consent to the
proscription, as may be manifested by an adoption of the same as part of the rules of procedure through an administrative
circular issued therefor, there thus, stands to be a violation of the separation of powers principle.

In addition, it should be pointed out that the breach of Congress in prohibiting provisional injunctions, such as in the first
paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770, does not only undermine the constitutional allocation of powers; it also practically dilutes a
court's ability to carry out its functions. This is so since a particular case can easily be mooted by supervening events if no
provisional injunctive relief is extended while the court is hearing the same. Accordingly, the court's acquired jurisdiction,
through which it exercises its judicial power, is rendered nugatory. Indeed, the force of judicial power, especially under the
present Constitution, cannot be enervated due to a court's inability to regulate what occurs during a proceeding's course. As
earlier intimated, when jurisdiction over the subject matter is accorded by law and has been acquired by a court, its exercise
thereof should be undipped. To give true meaning to the judicial power contemplated by the Framers of our Constitution, the
Court's duly promulgated rules of procedure should therefore remain unabridged, this, even by statute. Truth be told, the policy
against provisional injunctive writs in whatever variant should only subsist under rules of procedure duly promulgated by the
Court given its sole prerogative over the same.

The following exchange between Associate Justice Marvic Mario Victor F. Leonen (Justice Leonen) and the Acting Solicitor
General Florin T. Hilbay (Acting Solicitor General Hilbay) mirrors the foregoing observations:

JUSTICE LEONEN:
Okay. Now, would you know what rule covers injunction in the Rules of Court?

ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY:

Rule 58, Your Honor.

JUSTICE LEONEN:
58, that is under the general rubric if Justice Bersamin will correct me if I will be mistaken under the rubric of what is called
provisional remedies, our resident expert because Justice Peralta is not here so Justice Bersamin for a while. So provisional
remedy you have injunction, x x x.

xxxx

JUSTICE LEONEN:
Okay, Now, we go to the Constitution. Section 5, subparagraph 5 of Article VIII of the Constitution, if you have a copy of the
Constitution, can you please read that provision? Section 5, Article VIII the Judiciary subparagraph 5, would you kindly read that
provision?

ACTING SOLICTOR GENERAL HILBAY.

"Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice and procedure in all
courts..."

JUSTICE LEONEN:
Okay, we can stop with that, promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts. This is the power, the
competence, the jurisdiction of what constitutional organ?

ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY:

The Supreme Court, Your Honor.

JUSTICE LEONEN:
The Supreme Court. This is different from Article VIII Sections 1 and 2 which we've already been discussed with you by my other
colleagues, is that not correct?

ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY:

Correct, Your Honor.

JUSTICE LEONEN:
Okay, so in Section 2, [apportion] jurisdiction that is the power of Congress, is that not correct?

ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY:

Correct, Your Honor.

JUSTICE LEONEN:
On the other hand, the power to promulgate rules is with the Court, is that not correct?

ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY:

Correct, Your Honor.
JUSTICE LEONEN:
A TRO and a writ of preliminary injunction, would it be a separate case or is it part of litigation in an ordinary case?

ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY:

It is an ancillary remedy, Your Honor.

JUSTICE LEONEN:
In fact, it originated as an equitable remedy, is that not correct?

ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY:

Correct, Your Honor.

JUSTICE LEONEN:
In order to preserve the power of a court so that at the end of litigation, it will not be rendered moot and academic, is that
not correct?

ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY:

Correct, Your Honor.

JUSTICE LEONEN:
In that view, isn't Section 14, first paragraph, unconstitutional?

ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY:

No, Your Honor.

xxxx

JUSTICE LEONEN.
Can Congress say that a Court cannot prescribe Motions to Dismiss under Rule 16?

ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY:

Your Honor, Congress cannot impair the power of the Court to create remedies, x x x.

JUSTICE LEONEN.
What about bill [of] particulars, can Congress say, no Court shall have the power to issue the supplemental pleading called the
bill of t particular [s]? It cannot, because that's part of procedure...

ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY:

That is true.

JUSTICE LEONEN
...or for that matter, no Court shall act on a Motion to Quash, is that not correct?

ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY:

Correct.

JUSTICE LEONEN:
So what's different with the writ of injunction?

ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY:

Writ of injunction, Your Honor, requires the existence of jurisdiction on the part of a court that was created by Congress. In the
absence of jurisdiction... (interrupted)

JUSTICE LEONEN:
No, writ of injunction does not attach to a court. In other words, when they create a special agrarian court it has all procedures
with it but it does not attach particularly to that particular court, is that not correct?

ACTING SOLICTOR GENERAL HILBAY:

When Congress, Your Honor, creates a special court...

JUSTICE LEONEN:
Again, Counsel, what statute provides for a TRO, created the concept of a TRO? It was a Rule. A rule of procedure and the Rules
of Court, is that not correct?

ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY:

Yes, Your Honor.

JUSTICE LEONEN:
And a TRO and a writ of preliminary injunction does not exist unless it is [an] ancillary to a particular injunction in a court, is that
not correct?

ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY:

Correct, Your Honor.

xxxx[228] (Emphasis supplied)

In Biraogo v. The Philippine Truth Commission of 2010,[229] the Court instructed that "[i]t is through the Constitution that the
fundamental powers of government are established, limited and defined, and by which these powers are distributed among the
several departments. The Constitution is the basic and paramount law to which all other laws must conform and to which all
persons, including the highest officials of the land, must defer." It would then follow that laws that do not conform to the
Constitution shall be stricken down for being unconstitutional.[230]

However, despite the ostensible breach of the separation of powers principle, the Court is not oblivious to the policy
considerations behind the first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770, as well as other statutory provisions of similar import. Thus,
pending deliberation on whether or not to adopt the same, the Court, under its sole prerogative and authority over all matters
of procedure, deems it proper to declare as ineffective the prohibition against courts other than the Supreme Court from issuing
provisional injunctive writs to enjoin investigations conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman, until it is adopted as part of the
rules of procedure through an administrative circular duly issued therefor.

Hence, with Congress interfering with matters of procedure (through passing the first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770) without
the Court's consent thereto, it remains that the CA had the authority to issue the questioned injunctive writs enjoining the
implementation of the preventive suspension order against Binay, Jr. At the risk of belaboring the point, these issuances were
merely ancillary to the exercise of the CA's certiorari jurisdiction conferred to it under Section 9 (1), Chapter I of BP 129, as
amended, and which it had already acquired over the main CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 case.

IV.

The foregoing notwithstanding, the issue of whether or not the CA gravely abused its jurisdiction in issuing the TRO and WPI in
CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 against the preventive suspension order is a persisting objection to the validity of said injunctive writs.
For its proper analysis, the Court first provides the context of the assailed injunctive writs.

A. Subject matter of the CA's iniunctive writs is the preventive suspension order.

By nature, a preventive suspension order is not a penalty but only a preventive measure. In Quimbo v. Acting Ombudsman
Gervacio,[231] the Court explained the distinction, stating that its purpose is to prevent the official to be suspended from using
his position and the powers and prerogatives of his office to influence potential witnesses or tamper with records which may
be vital in the prosecution of the case against him:
Jurisprudential law establishes a clear-cut distinction between suspension as preventive measure and suspension as penalty. The
distinction, by considering the purpose aspect of the suspensions, is readily cognizable as they have different ends sought to be
achieved.

Preventive suspension is merely a preventive measure, a preliminary step in an administrative investigation. The purpose of
the suspension order is to prevent the accused from using his position and the powers and prerogatives of his office to
influence potential witnesses or tamper with records which may be vital in the prosecution of the case against him. If after
such investigation, the charge is established and the person investigated is found guilty of acts warranting his suspension or
removal, then he is suspended, removed or dismissed. This is the penalty.

That preventive suspension is not a penalty is in fact explicitly provided by Section 24 of Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules
Implementing Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive Order No. 292) and other Pertinent Civil Service Laws.
Section. 24. Preventive suspension is not a punishment or penalty for misconduct in office but is considered to be a preventive
measure. (Emphasis supplied)

Not being a penalty, the period within which one is under preventive suspension is not considered part of the actual penalty of
suspension. So Section 25 of the same Rule XIV provides:

Section 25. The period within which a public officer or employee charged is placed under preventive suspension shall not be
considered part of the actual penalty of suspension imposed upon the employee found guilty.[232] (Emphases supplied)

The requisites for issuing a preventive suspension order are explicitly stated in Section 24, RA 6770:

Section 24. Preventive Suspension. - The Ombudsman or his Deputy may preventively suspend any officer or employee under his
authority pending an investigation, if in his judgment the evidence of guilt is strong, and (a) the charge against such officer or
employee involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty; (b) the charges would
warrant removal from the service; or (c) the respondent's continued stay in office may prejudice the case filed against him.

The preventive suspension shall continue until the case is terminated by the Office of the Ombudsman but not more than six (6)
months, without pay, except when the delay in the disposition of the case by the Office of the Ombudsman is due to the fault,
negligence or petition of the respondent, in which case the period of such delay shall not be counted in computing the period of
suspension herein provided. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

In other words, the law sets forth two (2) conditions that must be satisfied to justify the issuance of an order of preventive
suspension pending an investigation, namely:

(1) The evidence of guilt is strong; and

(2) Either of the following circumstances co-exist with the first requirement:
(a) The charge involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty;

(b) The charge would warrant removal from the service; or

(c) The respondent's continued stay in office may prejudice the case filed against him.[233]

B. The basis of the CA's injunctive writs is the condonation doctrine.

Examining the CA's Resolutions in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 would, however, show that the Ombudsman's non-compliance with
the requisites provided in Section 24, RA 6770 was not the basis for the issuance of the assailed injunctive writs.

The CA's March 16, 2015 Resolution which directed the issuance of the assailed TRO was based on the case of Governor Garcia,
Jr. v. CA[234] (Governor Garcia, Jr.), wherein the Court emphasized that "if it were established in the CA that the acts subject of
the administrative complaint were indeed committed during petitioner [Garcia's] prior term, then, following settled
jurisprudence, he can no longer be administratively charged."[235] Thus, the Court, contemplating the application of the
condonation doctrine, among others, cautioned, in the said case, that "it would have been more prudent for [the appellate
court] to have, at the very least, on account of the extreme urgency of the matter and the seriousness of the issues raised in
the certiorari petition, issued a TRO x x x"[236] during the pendency of the proceedings.

Similarly, the CA's April 6, 2015 Resolution which directed the issuance of the assailed WPI was based on the condonation
doctrine, citing the case of Aguinaldo v. Santos[237] The CA held that Binay, Jr. has an ostensible right to the final relief prayed
for, i.e., the nullification of the preventive suspension order, finding that the Ombudsman can hardly impose preventive
suspension against Binay, Jr. given that his re-election in 2013 as City Mayor of Makati condoned any administrative liability
arising from anomalous activities relative to the Makati Parking Building project from 2007 to 2013.[238] Moreover, the CA
observed that although there were acts which were apparently committed by Binay, Jr. beyond his first term , i.e., the alleged
payments on July 3, 4, and 24, 2013,[239] corresponding to the services of Hillmarc's and MANA - still, Binay, Jr. cannot be held
administratively liable therefor based on the cases of Salalima v. Guingona, Jr.,[240] and Mayor Garcia v. Mojica,[241] wherein the
condonation dobtrine was applied by the Court although the payments were made after the official's election, reasoning that
the payments were merely effected pursuant to contracts executed before said re-election.[242]

The Ombudsman contends that it was inappropriate for the CA to have considered the condonation doctrine since it was a
matter of defense which should have been raised and passed upon by her office during the administrative disciplinary
proceedings.[243] However, the Court agrees with the CA that it was not precluded from considering the same given that it was
material to the propriety of according provisional injunctive relief in conformity with the ruling in Governor Garcia, Jr., which was
the subsisting jurisprudence at that time. Thus, since condonation was duly raised by Binay, Jr. in his petition in CA-G.R. SP No.
139453,[244] the CA did not err in passing upon the same. Note that although Binay, Jr. secondarily argued that the evidence of
guilt against him was not strong in his petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453,[245] it appears that the CA found that the application of
the condonation doctrine was already sufficient to enjoin the implementation of the preventive suspension order. Again, there is
nothing aberrant with this since, as remarked in the same case of Governor Garcia, Jr., if it was established that the acts subject
of the administrative complaint were indeed committed during Binay, Jr.'s prior term, then, following the condonation doctrine,
he can no longer be administratively charged. In other words, with condonation having been invoked by Binay, Jr. as an
exculpatory affirmative defense at the onset, the CA deemed it unnecessary to determine if the evidence of guilt against him
was strong, at least for the purpose of issuing the subject injunctive writs.

With the preliminary objection resolved and the basis of the assailed writs herein laid down, the Court now proceeds to
determine if the CA gravely abused its discretion in applying the condonation doctrine.

C. The origin of the condonation doctrine.

Generally speaking, condonation has been defined as "[a] victim's express or implied forgiveness of an offense, [especially] by
treating the offender as if there had been no offense."[246]

The condonation doctrine - which connotes this same sense of complete extinguishment of liability as will be herein elaborated
upon - is not based on statutory law. It is a jurisprudential creation that originated from the 1959 case of Pascual v. Hon.
Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija,[247] (Pascual),  which was therefore decided under the 1935 Constitution.

In Pascual, therein petitioner, Arturo Pascual, was elected Mayor of San Jose, Nueva Ecija, sometime in November 1951, and
was later re-elected to the same position in 1955. During his second term, or on October 6, 1956, the Acting Provincial Governor
filed administrative charges before the Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija against him for grave abuse of authority and usurpation
of judicial functions for acting on a criminal complaint in Criminal Case No. 3556 on December 18 and 20, 1954. In defense,
Arturo Pascual argued that he cannot be made liable for the acts charged against him since they were committed during his
previous term of office, and therefore, invalid grounds for disciplining him during his second term. The Provincial Board, as well
as the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, later decided against Arturo Pascual, and when the case reached this Court on
appeal, it recognized that the controversy posed a novel issue - that is, whether or not an elective official may be disciplined for
a wrongful act committed by him during his immediately preceding term of office.

As there was no legal precedent on the issue at that time, the Court, in Pascual, resorted to American authorities and "found
that cases on the matter are conflicting due in part, probably, to differences in statutes and constitutional provisions, and also, in
part, to a divergence of views with respect to the question of whether the subsequent election or appointment condones the
prior misconduct."[248] Without going into the variables of these conflicting views and cases, it proceeded to state that:
The weight of authorities x x x seems to incline toward the rule denying the right to remove one from office because of
misconduct during a prior term, to which we fully subscribe.[249] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The conclusion is at once problematic since this Court has now uncovered that there is really no established weight of authority
in the United States (US) favoring the doctrine of condonation, which, in the words of Pascual, theorizes that an official's re-
election denies the right to remove him from office due to a misconduct during a prior term. In fact, as pointed out during the
oral arguments of this case, at least seventeen (17) states in the US have abandoned the condonation doctrine.[250] The
Ombudsman aptly cites several rulings of various US State courts, as well as literature published on the matter, to demonstrate
the fact that the doctrine is not uniformly applied across all state jurisdictions. Indeed, the treatment is nuanced:

(1) For one, it has been widely recognized that the propriety of removing a public officer from his current term or office for
misconduct which he allegedly committed in a prior term of office is governed by the language of the statute or constitutional
provision applicable to the facts of a particular case (see In Re Removal of Member of Council Coppola).[251] As an example, a
Texas statute, on the one hand, expressly allows removal only for an act committed during a present term: "no officer shall be
prosecuted or removed from office for any act he may have committed prior to his election to office" (see State ex rel. Rowlings
v. Loomis).[252] On the other hand, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma allows removal from office for "acts of commission, omission,
or neglect committed, done or omitted during a previous or preceding term of office" (see State v. Bailey)[253] Meanwhile, in
some states where the removal statute is silent or unclear, the case's resolution was contingent upon the interpretation of the
phrase "in office." On one end, the Supreme Court of Ohio strictly construed a removal statute containing the phrase
"misfeasance of malfeasance in office" and thereby declared that, in the absence of clear legislative language making, the word
"office" must be limited to the single term during which the offense charged against the public officer occurred (see State ex rel.
Stokes v. Probate Court of Cuyahoga County)[254] Similarly, the Common Pleas Court of Allegheny County, Pennsylvania decided
that the phrase "in office" in its state constitution was a time limitation with regard to the grounds of removal, so that an officer
could not be removed for misbehaviour which occurred; prior to the taking of the office (see Commonwealth v. Rudman)[255] The
opposite was construed in the Supreme Court of Louisiana which took the view that an officer's inability to hold an office
resulted from the commission of certain offenses, and at once rendered him unfit to continue in office, adding the fact that the
officer had been re-elected did not condone or purge the offense (see State ex rel. Billon v. Bourgeois).[256] Also, in the Supreme
Court of New York, Apellate Division, Fourth Department, the court construed the words "in office" to refer not to a particular
term of office but to an entire tenure; it stated that the whole purpose of the legislature in enacting the statute in question
could easily be lost sight of, and the intent of the law-making body be thwarted, if an unworthy official could not be removed
during one term for misconduct for a previous one (Newman v. Strobel).[257]

(2) For another, condonation depended on whether or not the public officer was a successor in the same office for which he has
been administratively charged. The "own-successor theory," which is recognized in numerous States as an exception to
condonation doctrine, is premised on the idea that each term of a re-elected incumbent is not taken as separate and distinct,
but rather, regarded as one continuous term of office. Thus, infractions committed in a previous term are grounds for removal
because a re-elected incumbent has no prior term to speak of[258] (see Attorney-General v. Tufts;[259] State v. Welsh;[260] Hawkins v.
Common Council of Grand Rapids; [261] Territory v. Sanches;[262] and Tibbs v. City of Atlanta).[263]

(3) Furthermore, some State courts took into consideration the continuing nature of an offense in cases where the condonation
doctrine was invoked. In State ex rel. Douglas v. Megaarden, [264] the public officer charged with malversation of public funds was
denied the defense of condonation by the Supreme Court of Minnesota, observing that "the large sums of money illegally
collected during the previous years are still retained by him." In State ex rel. Beck v. Harvey[265] the Supreme Court of Kansas
ruled that "there is no necessity" of applying the condonation doctrine since "the misconduct continued in the present term of
office[;] [thus] there was a duty upon defendant to restore this money on demand of the county commissioners." Moreover,
in State ex rel. Londerholm v. Schroeder, [266] the Supreme Court of Kansas held that "insofar as nondelivery and excessive prices
are concerned, x x x there remains a continuing duty on the part of the defendant to make restitution to the country x x x, this
duty extends into the present term, and neglect to discharge it constitutes misconduct."

Overall, the foregoing data clearly contravenes the preliminary conclusion in Pascual that there is a "weight of authority" in the
US on the condonation doctrine. In fact, without any cogent exegesis to show that Pascual had accounted for the numerous
factors relevant to the debate on condonation, an outright adoption of the doctrine in this jurisdiction would not have been
proper.

At any rate, these US cases are only of persuasive value in the process of this Court's decision-making. "[They] are not relied
upon as precedents, but as guides of interpretation."[267] Therefore, the ultimate analysis is on whether or not the condonation
doctrine, as espoused in Pascual, and carried over in numerous cases after, can be held up against prevailing legal norms. Note
that the doctrine of stare decisis does not preclude this Court from revisiting existing doctrine. As adjudged in the case
of Belgica, the stare decisis rule should not operate when there are powerful countervailing considerations against its
application.[268] In other words, stare decisis becomes an intractable rule only when circumstances exist to preclude reversal of
standing precedent.[269] As the Ombudsman correctly points out, jurisprudence, after all, is not a rigid, atemporal abstraction; it is
an organic creature that develops and devolves along with the society within which it thrives.[270] In the words of a recent US
Supreme Court Decision, "[w]hat we can decide, we can undecide."[271]

In this case, the Court agrees with the Ombudsman that since the time Pascual  was decided, the legal landscape has radically
shifted. Again, Pascual was a 1959 case decided under the 1935 Constitution, which dated provisions do not reflect the
experience of the Filipino People under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions. Therefore, the plain difference in setting, including, of
course, the sheer impact of the condonation doctrine on public accountability, calls for Pascual's judicious re-examination.

D. Testing the Condonation Doctrine.

Pascual's ratio decidendi may be dissected into three (3) parts:

First, the penalty of removal may not be extended beyond the term in which the public officer was elected for each term is
separate and distinct:

Offenses committed, or acts done, during previous term are generally held not to furnish cause for removal and this is
especially true where the constitution provides that the penalty in proceedings for removal shall not extend beyond the
removal from office, and disqualification from holding office for the term for which the officer was elected or appointed. (67
C.J.S. p. 248, citing Rice vs. State, 161 S.W. 2d. 401; Montgomery vs. Nowell, 40 S.W. 2d. 418; People ex rel. Bagshaw vs.
Thompson, 130 P. 2d. 237; Board of Com'rs of Kingfisher County vs. Shutter, 281 P. 222; State vs. Blake, 280 P. 388; In re
Fudula, 147 A. 67; State vs. Ward, 43 S.W. 2d. 217).
The underlying theory is that each term is separate from other terms x x x.[272]

Second, an elective official's re-election serves as a condonation of previous misconduct, thereby cutting the right to remove him
therefor; and

[T]hat the reelection to office operates as a condonation of the officer's previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right
to remove him therefor. (43 Am. Jur. p. 45, citing Atty. Gen. vs. Hasty, 184 Ala. 121, 63 So. 559, 50 L.R.A. (NS) 553.[273] (emphasis
supplied)

Third, courts may not deprive the electorate, who are assumed to have known the life and character of candidates, of their right
to elect officers:

As held in  Conant vs. Grogan (1887) 6 N.Y.S.R. 322, cited in 17 A.I.R. 281, 63 So. 559, 50 LRA (NS) 553 —
The Court should never remove a public officer for acts done prior to his present term of office. To do otherwise would be to
deprive the people of their right to elect their officers. When the people have elected a man to office, it must be assumed that
they did this with knowledge of his life and character, and that they disregarded or forgave his faults or misconduct, if he had
been guilty of any. It is not for the court, by reason of such faults or misconduct to practically overrule the will of the people.
[274]
 (Emphases supplied)

The notable cases on condonation following Pascual are as follows:

(1) Lizares v. Hechanova[275] (May 17, 1966) - wherein the Court first applied the condonation doctrine, thereby quoting the
above-stated passages from Pascual in verbatim.

(2) Insco v. Sanchez, et al.[276] (December 18, 1967) - wherein the Court clarified that the condonation doctrine does not apply to
a criminal case. It was explained that a criminal case is different from an administrative case in that the former involves the
People of the Philippines as a community, and is a public wrong to the State at large; whereas, in the latter, only the populace of
the constituency he serves is affected. In addition, the Court noted that it is only the President who may pardon a criminal
offense.

(3) Aguinaldo v. Santos[277] (Aguinaldo; August 21, 1992) - a case decided under the 1987 Constitution wherein the condonation
doctrine was applied in favor of then Cagayan Governor Rodolfo E. Aguinaldo although his re-election merely supervened the
pendency of, the proceedings.

(4) Salalima v. Guinsona, Jr.[278] (Salalima; May 22, 1996) -wherein the Court reinforced the condonation doctrine by stating
that the same is justified by "sound public policy." According to the Court, condonation prevented the elective official from
being "hounded" by administrative cases filed by his "political enemies" during a new term, for which he has to defend himself
"to the detriment of public service." Also, the Court mentioned that the administrative liability condoned by re-election covered
the execution of the contract and the incidents related therewith.[279]

(5) Mayor Garcia v. Mojica[280] (Mayor Garcia; September 10, 1999) - wherein the benefit of the doctrine was extended to then
Cebu City Mayor Alvin B. Garcia who was administratively charged for his involvement in an anomalous contract for the supply
of asphalt for Cebu City, executed only four (4) days before the upcoming elections. The Court ruled that notwithstanding the
timing of the contract's execution, the electorate is presumed to have known the petitioner's background and character,
including his past misconduct; hence, his subsequent re-election was deemed a condonation of his prior transgressions. More
importantly, the Court held that the determinative time element in applying the condonation doctrine should be the time when
the contract was perfected; this meant that as long as the contract was entered into during a prior term, acts which were done
to implement the same, even if done during a succeeding term, do not negate the application of the condonation doctrine in
favor of the elective official.

(6) Salumbides, Jr. v. Office of the Ombudsman[281] (Salumbides, Jr.; April 23, 2010) - wherein the Court explained the doctrinal
innovations in the Salalima and Mayor Garcia rulings, to wit:

Salalima v. Guingona, Jr. and Mayor Garcia v. Hon. Mojica reinforced the doctrine. The condonation rule was applied even if
the administrative complaint was not filed before the reelection of the public official, and even if the alleged misconduct
occurred four days before the elections, respectively. Salalima did not distinguish as to the date of filing of the administrative
complaint, as long as the alleged misconduct was committed during the prior term, the precise timing or period of
which Garcia did not further distinguish, as long as the wrongdoing that gave rise to the public official's culpability was
committed prior to the date of reelection.[282] (Emphasis supplied)

The Court, citing Civil Service Commission v. Sojor,[283] also clarified that the condonation doctrine would not apply to appointive
officials since, as to them, there is no sovereign will to disenfranchise.

(7) And finally, the above discussed case of Governor Garcia, Jr. -wherein the Court remarked that it would have been prudent
for the appellate court therein to have issued a temporary restraining order against the implementation of a preventive
suspension order issued by the Ombudsman in view of the condonation doctrine.

A thorough review of the cases post-1987, among others, Aguinaldo, Salalima, Mayor Garcia, and Governor Garcia, Jr. - all cited
by the CA to justify its March 16, 2015 and April 6, 2015 Resolutions directing the issuance of the assailed injunctive writs -
would show that the basis for condonation under the prevailing constitutional and statutory framework was never accounted
for. What remains apparent from the text of these cases is that the basis for condonation, as jurisprudential doctrine, was - and
still remains - the above-cited postulates of Pascual, which was lifted from rulings of US courts where condonation was amply
supported by their own state laws. With respect to its applicability to administrative cases, the core premise of condonation -
that is, an elective official's re-election cuts qff the right to remove him for an administrative offense committed during a prior
term - was adopted hook, line, and sinker in our jurisprudence largely because the legality of that doctrine was never tested
against existing legal norms. As in the US, the propriety of condonation is - as it should be -dependent on the legal foundation of
the adjudicating jurisdiction. Hence, the Court undertakes an examination of our current laws in order to determine if there is
legal basis for the continued application of the doctrine of condonation.

The foundation of our entire legal system is the Constitution. It is the supreme law of the land;[284] thus, the unbending rule is
that every statute should be read in light of the Constitution.[285] Likewise, the Constitution is a framework of a workable
government; hence, its interpretation must take into account the complexities, realities, and politics attendant to the operation
of the political branches of government.[286]

As earlier intimated, Pascual was a decision promulgated in 1959. Therefore, it was decided within the context of the 1935
Constitution which was silent with respect to public accountability, or of the nature of public office being a public trust. The
provision in the 1935 Constitution that comes closest in dealing with public office is Section 2, Article II which states that "[t]he
defense of the State is a prime duty of government, and in the fulfillment of this duty all citizens may be required by law to
render personal military or civil service."[287] Perhaps owing to the 1935 Constitution's silence on public accountability, and
considering the dearth of jurisprudential rulings on the matter, as well as the variance in the policy considerations, there was no
glaring objection confronting the Pascual Court in adopting the condonation doctrine that originated from select US cases
existing at that time.

With the advent of the 1973 Constitution, the approach in dealing with public officers underwent a significant change. The new
charter introduced an entire article on accountability of public officers, found in Article XIII. Section 1 thereof positively
recognized, acknowledged, and declared that "[p]ublic office is a public trust." Accordingly, "[p]ublic officers and employees
shall serve with the highest degree of responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency, and shall remain accountable to the
people."

After the turbulent decades of Martial Law rule, the Filipino People have framed and adopted the 1987 Constitution, which sets
forth in the Declaration of Principles and State Policies in Article II that "[t]he State shall maintain honesty and integrity in the
public service and take positive and effective measures against graft and corruption."[288] Learning how unbridled power could
corrupt public servants under the regime of a dictator, the Framers put primacy on the integrity of the public service by
declaring it as a constitutional principle and a State policy. More significantly, the 1987 Constitution strengthened and solidified
what has been first proclaimed in the 1973 Constitution by commanding public officers to be accountable to the people at all
times:

Section 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve
them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency and act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.

In Belgica, it was explained that:

[t]he aphorism forged under Section 1, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, which states that "public office is a public trust," is an
overarching reminder that every instrumentality of government should exercise their official functions only in accordance with
the principles of the Constitution which embodies the parameters of the people's trust. The notion of a public trust connotes
accountability x x x.[289] (Emphasis supplied)

The same mandate is found in the Revised Administrative Code under the section of the Civil Service Commission,[290] and also, in
the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees.[291]

For local elective officials like Binay, Jr., the grounds to discipline, suspend or remove an elective local official from office are
stated in Section 60 of Republic Act No. 7160,[292] otherwise known as the "Local Government Code of 1991" (LGC), which was
approved on October 10 1991, and took effect on January 1, 1992:

Section 60. Grounds for Disciplinary Action. - An elective local official may be disciplined, suspended, or removed from office on
any of the r following grounds:
(a) Disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines;
(b) Culpable violation of the Constitution;
(c) Dishonesty, oppression, misconduct in office, gross negligence, or dereliction of duty;
(d) Commission of any offense involving moral turpitude or an offense punishable by at least prision mayor;
(e) Abuse of authority;
(f) Unauthorized absence for fifteen (15) consecutive working days, except in the case of members of the sangguniang
panlalawigan, sangguniang panlunsod, sanggunian bayan, and sangguniang barangay;
(g) Application for, or acquisition of, foreign citizenship or residence or the status of an immigrant of another country; and
(h) Such other grounds as may be provided in this Code and other laws.

An elective local official may be removed from office on the grounds enumerated above by order of the proper court.
Related to this provision is Section 40 (b) of the LGC which states that those removed from office as a result of an
administrative case shall be disqualified from running for any elective local position:

Section 40. Disqualifications. - The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local position:

xxxx

(b) Those removed from office as a result of an administrative case;

x x x x (Emphasis supplied)

In the same sense, Section 52 (a) of the RRACCS provides that the penalty of dismissal from service carries the accessory
penalty of perpetual disqualification from holding public office:

Section 52. - Administrative Disabilities Inherent in Certain Penalties. -

a. The penalty of dismissal shall carry with it cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits, perpetual
disqualification from holding public office, and bar from taking the civil service examinations.

In contrast, Section 66 (b) of the LGC states that the penalty of suspension shall not exceed the unexpired term of the elective
local official nor constitute a bar to his candidacy for as long as he meets the qualifications required for the office. Note,
however, that the provision only pertains to the duration of the penalty and its effect on the official's candidacy. Nothing therein
states that the administrative liability therefor is extinguished by the fact of re-election:

Section 66. Form and Notice of Decision.  - x x x.

xxxx

(b) The penalty of suspension shall not exceed the unexpired term of the respondent or a period of six (6) months for every
administrative offense, nor shall said penalty be a bar to the candidacy of the respondent so suspended as long as he meets the
qualifications required for the office.

Reading the 1987 Constitution together with the above-cited legal provisions now leads this Court to the conclusion that the
doctrine of condonation is actually bereft of legal bases.

To begin with, the concept of public office is a public trust and the corollary requirement of accountability to the people at all
times, as mandated under the 1987 Constitution, is plainly inconsistent with the idea that an elective local official's
administrative liability for a misconduct committed during a prior term can be wiped off by the fact that he was elected to a
second term of office, or even another elective post. Election is not a mode of condoning an administrative offense, and there
is simply no constitutional or statutory basis in our jurisdiction to support the notion that an official elected for a different term
is fully absolved of any administrative liability arising from an offense done during a prior term. In this jurisdiction, liability
arising from administrative offenses may be condoned bv the President in light of Section 19, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution which was interpreted in Llamas v. Orbos[293] to apply to administrative offenses:

The Constitution does not distinguish between which cases executive clemency may be exercised by the President, with the sole
exclusion of impeachment cases. By the same token, if executive clemency may be exercised only in criminal cases, it would
indeed be unnecessary to provide for the exclusion of impeachment cases from the coverage of Article VII, Section 19 of the
Constitution. Following petitioner's proposed interpretation, cases of impeachment are automatically excluded inasmuch as the
same do not necessarily involve criminal offenses.

In the same vein, We do not clearly see any valid and convincing , reason why the President cannot grant executive clemency in
administrative cases. It is Our considered view that if the President can grant reprieves, commutations and pardons, and remit
fines and forfeitures in criminal cases, with much more reason can she grant executive clemency in administrative cases, which
are clearly less serious than criminal offenses.
Also, it cannot be inferred from Section 60 of the LGC that the grounds for discipline enumerated therein cannot anymore be
invoked against an elective local official to hold him administratively liable once he is re-elected to office. In fact, Section 40 (b)
of the LGC precludes condonation since in the first place, an elective local official who is meted with the penalty of removal
could not be re-elected to an elective local position due to a direct disqualification from running for such post. In similar regard,
Section 52 (a) of the RRACCS imposes a penalty of perpetual disqualification from holding public office as an accessory to the
penalty of dismissal from service.

To compare, some of the cases adopted in Pascual were decided by US State jurisdictions wherein the doctrine of condonation
of administrative liability was supported by either a constitutional or statutory provision stating, in effect, that an officer cannot
be removed by a misconduct committed during a previous term,[294] or that the disqualification to hold the office does not
extend beyond the term in which the official's delinquency occurred. [295] In one case,[296] the absence of a provision against the
re-election of an officer removed - unlike Section 40 (b) of the LGC-was the justification behind condonation. In another case,
[297]
 it was deemed that condonation through re-election was a policy under their constitution - which adoption in this
jurisdiction runs counter to our present Constitution's requirements on public accountability. There was even one case where
the doctrine of condonation was not adjudicated upon but only invoked by a party as a ground;[298] while in another case, which
was not reported in full in the official series, the crux of the disposition was that the evidence of a prior irregularity in no way
pertained to the charge at issue and therefore, was deemed to be incompetent.[299] Hence, owing to either their variance or
inapplicability, none of these cases can be used as basis for the continued adoption of the condonation doctrine under
our existing laws.

At best, Section 66 (b) of the LGC prohibits the enforcement of the penalty of suspension beyond the unexpired portion of the
elective local official's prior term, and likewise allows said official to still run for re-election This treatment is similar to People ex
rel Bagshaw v. Thompson[300] and Montgomery v. Novell[301] both cited in Pascual, wherein it was ruled that an officer cannot
be suspended for a misconduct committed during a prior term. However, as previously stated, nothing in Section 66 (b) states
that the elective local official's administrative liability is extinguished by the fact of re-election. Thus, at all events, no legal
provision actually supports the theory that the liability is condoned.

Relatedly it should be clarified that there is no truth in Pascual's postulation that the courts would be depriving the electorate of
their right to elect their officers if condonation were not to be sanctioned. In political law, election pertains to the process by
which a particular constituency chooses an individual to hold a public office. In this jurisdiction, there is, again, no legal basis to
conclude that election automatically implies condonation. Neither is there any legal basis to say that every democratic and
republican state has an inherent regime of condonation. If condonation of an elective official's administrative liability would
perhaps, be allowed in this jurisdiction, then the same should have been provided by law under our governing legal mechanisms.
May it be at the time of Pascual or at present, by no means has it been shown that such a law, whether in a constitutional or
statutory provision, exists. Therefore, inferring from this manifest absence, it cannot be said that the electorate's will has been
abdicated.

Equally infirm is Pascual's proposition that the electorate, when re-electing a local official, are assumed to have done so with
knowledge of his life and character, and that they disregarded or forgave his faults or misconduct, if he had been guilty of any.
Suffice it to state that no such presumption exists in any statute or procedural rule. [302] Besides, it is contrary to human
experience that the electorate would have full knowledge of a public official's misdeeds. The Ombudsman correctly points out
the reality that most corrupt acts by public officers are shrouded in secrecy, and concealed from the public. Misconduct
committed by an elective official is easily covered up, and is almost always unknown to the electorate when they cast their
votes.[303] At a conceptual level, condonation presupposes that the condoner has actual knowledge of what is to be
condoned. Thus, there could be no condonation of an act that is unknown. As observed in Walsh v. City Council of
Trenton[304] decided by the New Jersey Supreme Court:

Many of the cases holding that re-election of a public official prevents his removal for acts done in a preceding term of office are
reasoned out on the theory of condonation. We cannot subscribe to that theory because condonation, implying as it does
forgiveness, connotes knowledge and in the absence of knowledge there can be no condonation. One cannot forgive something
of which one has no knowledge.

That being said, this Court simply finds no legal authority to sustain the condonation doctrine in this jurisdiction. As can be seen
from this discourse, it was a doctrine adopted from one class of US rulings way back in 1959 and thus, out of touch from - and
now rendered obsolete by - the current legal regime. In consequence, it is high time for this Court to abandon the condonation
doctrine that originated from Pascual, and affirmed in the cases following the same, such as Aguinaldo, Salalima, Mayor
Garcia, and Governor Garcia, Jr. which were all relied upon by the CA.

It should, however, be clarified that this Court's abandonment of the condonation doctrine should be prospective in application
for the reason that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution, until reversed, shall form part of the
legal system of the Philippines.[305] Unto this Court devolves the sole authority to interpret what the Constitution means, and all
persons are bound to follow its interpretation. As explained in De Castro v. Judicial Bar Council.[306]

Judicial decisions assume the same authority as a statute itself and, until authoritatively abandoned, necessarily become, to the
extent that they are applicable, the criteria that must control the actuations, not only of those called upon to abide by them, but
also of those duty-bound to enforce obedience to them.[307]

Hence, while the future may ultimately uncover a doctrine's error, it should be, as a general rule, recognized as "good law" prior
to its abandonment. Consequently, the people's reliance thereupon should be respected. The landmark case on this matter
is People v. Jabinal,[308] wherein it was ruled:

[W]hen a doctrine of this Court is overruled and a different view is adopted, the new doctrine should be applied prospectively,
and should not apply to parties who had relied on the old doctrine and acted on the faith thereof.

Later, in Spouses Benzonan v. CA,[309] it was further elaborated:

[Pursuant to Article 8 of the Civil Code "judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of
the legal system of the Philippines." But while our decisions form part of the law of the land, they are also subject to Article 4 of
the Civil Code which provides that "laws shall have no retroactive effect unless the contrary is provided." This is expressed in the
familiar legal maxim lex prospicit, non respicit, the law looks forward not backward. The rationale against retroactivity is easy to
perceive. The retroactive application of a law usually divests rights that have already become vested or impairs the obligations of
contract and hence, is unconstitutional.[310]

Indeed, the lessons of history teach us that institutions can greatly benefit from hindsight and rectify its ensuing course. Thus,
while it is truly perplexing to think that a doctrine which is barren of legal anchorage was able to endure in our jurisprudence for
a considerable length of time, this Court, under a new membership, takes up the cudgels and now abandons the condonation
doctrine.

E. Consequence of ruling.

As for this section of the Decision, the issue to be resolved is whether or not the CA committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed injunctive writs.

It is well-settled that an act of a court or tribunal can only be considered as with grave abuse of discretion when such act is done
in a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so
patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act
at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and
hostility.[311] It has also been held that "grave abuse of discretion arises when a lower court or tribunal patently violates the
Constitution, the law or existing jurisprudence."[312]

As earlier established, records disclose that the CA's resolutions directing the issuance of the assailed injunctive writs were all
hinged on cases enunciating the condonation doctrine. To recount, the March 16, 2015 Resolution directing the issuance of the
subject TRO was based on the case of Governor Garcia, Jr., while the April 6, 2015 Resolution directing the issuance of the
subject WPI was based on the cases of Aguinaldo, Salalima, Mayor Garcia, and again, Governor Garcia, Jr. Thus, by merely
following settled precedents on the condonation doctrine, which at that time, unwittingly remained "good law," it cannot be
concluded that the CA committed a grave abuse of discretion based on its legal attribution above. Accordingly, the WPI against
the Ombudsman's preventive suspension order was correctly issued.

With this, the ensuing course of action should have been for the CA to resolve the main petition for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No.
139453 on the merits. However, considering that the Ombudsman, on October 9, 2015, had already found Binay, Jr.
administratively liable and imposed upon him the penalty of dismissal, which carries the accessory penalty of perpetual
disqualification from holding public office, for the present administrative charges against him, the said CA petition appears to
have been mooted.[313] As initially intimated, the preventive suspension order is only an ancillary issuance that, at its core, serves
the purpose of assisting the Office of the Ombudsman in its investigation. It therefore has no more purpose - and perforce,
dissolves - upon the termination of the office's process of investigation in the instant administrative case.

F. Exceptions to the mootness principle.

This notwithstanding, this Court deems it apt to clarify that the mootness of the issue regarding the validity of the preventive
suspension order subject of this case does not preclude any of its foregoing determinations, particularly, its abandonment of the
condonation doctrine. As explained in Belgica, '"the moot and academic principle' is not a magical formula that can
automatically dissuade the Court in resolving a case. The Court will decide cases, otherwise moot, if: first, there is a grave
violation of the Constitution; second, the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is
involved; third, when the constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar,
and the public; and fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet evading review."[314] All of these scenarios obtain in this case:

First, it would be a violation of the Court's own duty to uphold and defend the Constitution if it were not to abandon the
condonation doctrine now that its infirmities have become apparent. As extensively discussed, the continued application of the
condonation doctrine is simply impermissible under the auspices of the present Constitution which explicitly mandates that
public office is a public trust and that public officials shall be accountable to the people at all times.

Second, the condonation doctrine is a peculiar jurisprudential creation that has persisted as a defense of elective officials to
escape administrative liability. It is the first time that the legal intricacies of this doctrine have been brought to light; thus, this is
a situation of exceptional character which this Court must ultimately resolve. Further, since the doctrine has served as a
perennial obstacle against exacting public accountability from the multitude of elective local officials throughout the years, it is
indubitable that paramount public interest is involved.

Third, the issue on the validity of the condonation doctrine clearly requires the formulation of controlling principles to guide the
bench, the bar, and the public. The issue does not only involve an in-depth exegesis of administrative law principles, but also
puts to the forefront of legal discourse the potency of the accountability provisions of the 1987 Constitution. The Court owes it
to the bench, the bar, and the public to explain how this controversial doctrine came about, and now, its reasons for abandoning
the same in view of its relevance on the parameters of public office.

And fourth, the defense of condonation has been consistently invoked by elective local officials against the administrative
charges filed against them. To provide a sample size, the Ombudsman has informed the Court that "for the period of July 2013
to December 2014 alone, 85 cases from the Luzon Office and 24 cases from the Central Office were dismissed on the ground of
condonation. Thus, in just one and a half years, over a hundred cases of alleged misconduct - involving infractions such as
dishonesty, oppression, gross neglect of duty and grave misconduct - were placed beyond the reach of the Ombudsman's
investigatory and prosecutorial powers."[315] Evidently, this fortifies the finding that the case is capable of repetition and must
therefore, not evade review.

In any event, the abandonment of a doctrine is wholly within the prerogative of the Court. As mentioned, it is its own
jurisprudential creation and may therefore, pursuant to its mandate to uphold and defend the Constitution, revoke it
notwithstanding supervening events that render the subject of discussion moot.

V.

With all matters pertaining to CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 passed upon, the Court now rules on the final issue on whether or not the
CA's Resolution[316] dated March 20, 2015 directing the Ombudsman to comment on Binay, Jr.'s petition for contempt in CA-G.R.
SP No. 139504 is improper and illegal.

The sole premise of the Ombudsman's contention is that, as an impeachable officer, she cannot be the subject of a charge for
indirect contempt[317] because this action is criminal in nature and the penalty therefor would result in her effective removal
from office.[318] However, a reading of the aforesaid March 20, 2015 Resolution does not show that she has already been
subjected to contempt proceedings. This issuance, in? fact, makes it clear that notwithstanding the directive for the
Ombudsman to comment, the CA has not necessarily given due course to Binay, Jr.'s contempt petition:

Without necessarily giving due course to the Petition for Contempt respondents [Hon. Conchita Carpio Morales, in her capacity
as the Ombudsman, and the Department of Interior and Local Government] are hereby DIRECTED to file Comment on the
Petition/Amended and Supplemental Petition for Contempt (CA-G.R. SP No. 139504) within an inextendible period of three (3)
days from receipt hereof. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Thus, even if the Ombudsman accedes to the CA's directive by filing a comment, wherein she may properly raise her objections
to the contempt proceedings by virtue of her being an impeachable officer, the CA, in the exercise of its sound judicial
discretion, may still opt not to give due course to Binay, Jr.'s contempt petition and accordingly, dismiss the same. Sjmply put,
absent any indication that the contempt petition has been given due course by the CA, it would then be premature for this Court
to rule on the issue. The submission of the Ombudsman on this score is perforce denied.

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. Under the premises of this Decision, the Court resolves as follows:

(a) the second paragraph of Section 14 of Republic Act No. 6770 is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL, while the policy against the
issuance of provisional injunctive writs by courts other than the Supreme Court to enjoin an investigation conducted by the
Office of the Ombudsman under the first paragraph of the said provision is DECLARED ineffective until the Court adopts the
same as part of the rules of procedure through an administrative circular duly issued therefor;

(b) The condonation doctrine is ABANDONED, but the abandonment is PROSPECTIVE in effect;

(c) The Court of Appeals (CA) is DIRECTED to act on respondent Jejomar Erwin S. Binay, Jr.'s (Binay, Jr.) petition for certiorari in
CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 in light of the Office of the Ombudsman's supervening issuance of its Joint Decision dated October 9,
2015 finding Binay, Jr. administratively liable in the six (6) administrative complamts, docketed as OMB-C-A-15-0058, OMB-C-A-
15-0059, OMB-C-A-15-0060, OMB-C-A-15-0061, OMB-C-A-15-0062, and OMB-C-A-15-0063; and

(d) After the filing of petitioner Ombudsman Conchita Carpio Morales's comment, the CA is DIRECTED to resolve Binay, Jr.'s
petition for contempt in CA-G.R. SP No. 139504 with utmost dispatch.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 237428

REPUBLIC of the PHILIPPINES, represented by SOLICITOR GENERAL JOSE C. CALIDA, Petitioner

vs.
MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO, Respondent

RESOLUTION

TIJAM, J.:

This resolution treats of the following motions:

1. Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno’s (respondent) Ad Cautelam Motion for Reconsideration of this Court's Decision 1 dated May 11,
2018, the dispositive portion of which states:

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Quo Warranto is GRANTED. Respondent Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno is found DISQUALIFIED from
and is here y adjudged GUILTY of UNLAWFULLY HOLDING and EXERCISING the OFFICE OF THE CHIEF JUSTICE. Accordingly,
Respondent Maria Lourdes P.A. Sereno is OUSTED and EXCLUDED therefrom.

The position of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court is declared vacant and the Judicial and Bar Council is directed to
commence the application and nomination process.

This Decision is immediately executory without need of further action from the Court.
Respondent Maria Lourdes P.A. Sereno is ordered to SHOW CAUSE within ten (10) days from receipt hereof why she should not
be sanctioned for violating the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Code of Judicial Conduct for transgressing
the subjudice rule and for casting aspersions and ill motives to the Members of the Supreme Court.

SO ORDERED.2

2. Respondent’s Ad Cautelam Motion for Extension of Time to File Reply (to the Show Cause Order dated 11 May 2018).

We first dispose of respondent's Motion for Reconsideration.

Respondent claims denial of due process because her case was allegedly not heard by an impartial tribunal. She reiterates that
the six (6) Justices ought to have inhibited themselves on the grounds of actual bias, of having personal knowledge of disputed
evidentiary facts, and of having acted as a material witness in the matter in controversy. Respondent also argues denial of due
process when the Court supposedly took notice of extraneous matters as corroborative evidence and when the Court based its
main Decision on facts without observing the mandatory procedure for reception of evidence.

She reiterates her arguments that the Court is without jurisdiction to oust an impeachable officer through quo warranto; that
the official acts of the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) and the President involves political questions that cannot be annulled absent
any allegation of grave abuse of discretion; that the petition for quo warranto is time-barred; and that respondent was and is a
person of proven integrity.

By way of Comment, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), seeks a denial
of respondent's motion for reconsideration for being proforma. In any case, the OSG argues that respondent's motion lacks
merit as there was no denial of due process and that quo warranto is the appropriate remedy to oust an ineligible impeachable
officer. The OSG adds that the issue of whether respondent is a person of proven integrity is justiciable considering that the
decision-making powers of the JBC are limited by judicially discoverable standards. Undeviating from its position, the OSG
maintains that the petition is not time-barred as Section 11, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court does not apply to the State and that
the peculiar circumstances of the instant case preclude the strict application of the prescriptive period.

Disputing respondent's claims, the OSG reiterates that respondent's repeated failure to file her Statement of Assets, Liabilities
and Net Worth (SALN) and her non-submission thereof to the JBC which the latter required to prove the integrity of an applicant
affect respondent's integrity. The OSG concludes that respondent, not having possessed of proven integrity, failed to meet the
constitutional requirement for appointment to the Judiciary.

Carefully weighing the arguments advanced by both parties, this Court finds no reason to reverse its earlier Decision.

Respondent is seriously in error for claiming denial of due process. Respondent refuses to recognize the Court's jurisdiction over
the subject matter and over her person on the ground that respondent, as a purported impeachable official, can only be
removed exclusively by impeachment. Reiterating this argument, respondent filed her Comment to the Petition, moved that her
case be heard on Oral Argument, filed her Memorandum, filed her Reply/Supplement to the OSG's Memorandum and now,
presently moves for reconsideration. All these representations were made ad cautelam which, stripped of its legal parlance,
simply means that she asks to be heard by the Court which jurisdiction she does not acknowledge. She asked relief from the
Court and was in fact heard by the Court, and yet she claims to have been denied of due process. She repeatedly discussed the
supposed merits of her opposition to the present quo warranto petition in various social and traditional media, and yet she
claims denial of due process. The preposterousness of her claim deserves scant consideration.

Respondent also harps on the alleged bias on the part of the six (6) Justices and that supposedly, their failure to inhibit
themselves from deciding the instant petition amounts to a denial of due process.

Respondent's contentions were merely a rehash of the issues already taken into consideration and properly resolved by the
Court. To reiterate, mere imputation of bias or partiality is not enough ground for inhibition, especially when the charge is
without basis. Acts or conduct clearly indicative of arbitrariness or prejudice has to be shown.3 Verily, for bias and prejudice to
be considered sufficient justification for the inhibition of a Member of this Court, mere suspicion is not enough.

Moreover, as discussed in the main Decision, respondent's allegations on the grounds for inhibition were merely based on
speculations, or on distortions of the language, context and meaning of the answers given by the concerned Justices as resource
persons in the proceedings of the Committee on Justice of the House of Representatives. These matters were squarely resolved
by the Court in its main Decision, as well as in the respective separate opinions of the Justices involved.
Indeed, the Members of the Court's right to inhibit are weighed against their duty to adjudicate the case without fear of
repression. Respondent's motion to require the inhibition of Justices Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro, Lucas P. Bersamin,
Diosdado M. Peralta, Francis H. Jardeleza, Samuel R. Martires, and Noel Gimenez Tijam, who all concurred to the main Decision,
would open the floodgates to the worst kind of forum shopping, and on its face, would allow respondent to shop for a Member
of the Court who she perceives to be more compassionate and friendly to her cause, and is clearly antithetical to the fair
administration of justice.

Bordering on the absurd, respondent alleges prejudice based on the footnotes of the main Decision which show that the draft
thereof was being prepared as early as March 15, 2018 when respondent has yet to file her Comment. Respondent forgets to
mention that the Petition itself was filed on March 5, 2018 where the propriety of the remedy of quo warranto was specifically
raised. Certainly, there is nothing irregular nor suspicious for the Member-in-Charge, nor for any of the Justices for that matter,
to have made a requisite initial determination on the matter of jurisdiction. In professing such argument, respondent imputes
fault on the part of the Justices for having been diligent in the performance of their work.

Respondent also considers as irregular the query made by the Member-in-Charge with the JBC Office of the Executive Officer
(OEO) headed by Atty. Annaliza S. Ty-Capacite (Atty. Capacite ). Respondent points out that the same is not allowed and shows
prejudice on the part of the Court.

For respondent's information, the data were gathered pursuant to the Court En Bane’s Resolution dated March 20, 2018
wherein the Clerk of Court En Banc and the JBC, as custodian and repositories of the documents submitted by respondent, were
directed to provide the Court with documents pertinent to respondent's application and appointment as an Associate Justice in
2010 and as Chief Justice of the Court in 2012 for the purpose of arriving at a judicious, complete, and efficient resolution of the
instant case. In the same manner, the "corroborative evidence" referred to by respondent simply refers to respondent's acts and
representations ascertainable through an examination of the documentary evidence appended by both parties to their
respective pleadings as well as their representations during the Oral Argument. Reference to respondent's subsequent acts
committed during her incumbency as Chief Justice, on the other hand, are plainly matters of public record and already
determined by the House of Representatives as constituting probable cause for impeachment.

II

The Court reaffirms its authority to decide the instant quo warranto action. This authority is expressly conferred on the Supreme
Court by the Constitution under Section 5, Article VIII which states that:

Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

1. Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and over petitions
for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus,  quo  warranto, and habeas corpus.

x x x x (Emphasis ours)

Section 5 of Article VIII does not limit the Court's quo warranto jurisdiction only to certain public officials or that excludes
impeachable officials therefrom. In Sarmiento v. Mison, 4 the Court ruled:

The task of the Court is rendered lighter by the existence of relatively clear provisions in the Constitution. In cases like this, we
follow what the Court, speaking through Mr. Justice (later, Chief Justice) Jose Abad Santos stated in Gold Creek Mining
Corp. v. Rodriguez, that:

The fundamental principle of constitutional construction is to give effect to the intent of the framers of the organic law and of
the people adopting it. The intention to which force is to be given is that which is embodied and expressed in the
constitutional provisions themselves.5 (Emphasis ours)

The Constitution defines judicial power as a "duty" to be performed by the courts of justice.6 Thus, for the Court to repudiate its
own jurisdiction over this case would be to abdicate a constitutionally imposed responsibility.

As the Court pointed out in its Decision, this is not the first time the Court took cognizance of a quo warranto petition against an
impeachable officer. In the consolidated cases of Estrada v. Macapagal-Arroyo7 and Estrada v. Desierto, 8 the Court assumed
jurisdiction over a quo warranto petition that challenged Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo's title to the presidency.

Arguing that the aforesaid cases cannot serve as precedent for the Court to take cognizance of this case, respondent makes it
appear that they involved a totally different issue, one that concerned Joseph E. Estrada's immunity from suit, specifically:
"Whether conviction in the impeachment proceedings is a condition precedent for the criminal prosecution of petitioner
Estrada. In the negative and on the assumption that petitioner is still President, whether he is immune from criminal
prosecution."9

Respondent's allegation is utterly false and misleading. A cursory reading of the cases will reveal that Estrada's immunity from
suit was just one of the issues raised therein. Estrada in fact sought a quo warranto inquiry into Macapagal-Arroyo's right to
assume the presidency, claiming he was simply a President on leave.

Respondent also asserts that Estrada cannot serve as precedent for the Court to decide this case because it was dismissed, and
unlike the instant petition, it was filed within the prescribed one (1)-year period under Section 11, Rule 66 of the Rules of
Court. 10

The argument fails to persuade. Estrada was dismissed not because the Court had no jurisdiction over the quo warranto petition
but because Estrada's challenge to Macapagal-Arroyo's presidency had no merit. In ruling upon the merits of Estrada's quo
warranto petition, the Court has undeniably exercised its jurisdiction under Section 5(1) of Article VIII. Thus, Estrada clearly
demonstrates that the Court's quo warranto jurisdiction extends to impeachable officers.

Furthermore, as will be discussed elsewhere in this Resolution, the filing of the instant petition was not time-barred. The issue of
prescription must be addressed in light of the public interest that quo warranto is meant to protect.

Accordingly, the Court could, as it did in Estrada, assume jurisdiction over the instant quo warranto petition against an
impeachable officer.

Quo warranto and impeachment are two distinct proceedings, although both may result in the ouster of a public officer. Strictly
speaking, quo warranto grants the relief of "ouster", while impeachment affords "removal."

A quo warranto proceeding is the proper legal remedy to determine a person's right or title to a public office and to oust the
holder from its enjoyment. 11 It is the proper action to inquire into a public officer's eligibility12 or the validity of his
appointment. 13 Under Rule 66 of the Rules of Court, a quo warranto proceeding involves a judicial determination of the right to
the use or exercise of the office.

Impeachment, on the other hand, is a political process undertaken by the legislature to determine whether the public officer
committed any of the impeachable offenses, namely, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and
corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. 14 It does not ascertain the officer's eligibility for appointment or
election, or challenge the legality of his assumption of office. Conviction for any of the impeachable offenses shall result in the
removal of the impeachable official from office. 15

The OSG 's quo warranto petition challenged respondent's right and title to the position of Chief Justice. He averred that in
failing to regularly disclose her assets, liabilities and net worth as a member of the career service prior to her appointment as an
Associate Justice of the Court, respondent could not be said to possess the requirement of proven integrity demanded of every
aspiring member of the Judiciary. The OSG thus prayed that respondent's appointment as Chief Justice be declared void.

Clearly, the OSG questioned the respondent's eligibility for appointment as Chief Justice and sought to invalidate such
appointment. The OSG's petition, therefore, is one for quo warranto over which the Court exercises original jurisdiction.

As the Court previously held, "where the dispute is on the eligibility to perform the duties by the person sought to be ousted or
disqualified a quo warranto is the proper action." 16

Respondent harps on the supposed intent of the framers of the Constitution for impeachable officers to be removed only
through impeachment. 17 However, a circumspect examination of the deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission will
reveal that the framers presumed that the impeachable officers had duly qualified for the position. Indeed, the deliberations
which respondent herself cited 18 showed that the framers did not contemplate a situation where the impeachable officer was
unqualified for appointment or election.

Accordingly, respondent's continued reliance on the Court's pronouncement in Mayor Lecaroz v. Sandiganbayan, 19 Cuenca v.
Hon. Fernan,20 Jn Re Gonzales,21 Jarque v. Desierto22 and Marcoleta v. Borra23 (Lecaroz etc.) is misplaced. Not one of these cases
concerned the validity of an impeachable officer's appointment. To repeat, Lecaroz involved a criminal charge against a mayor
before the Sandiganbayan, while the rest were disbarment cases filed against impeachable officers principally for acts done
during their tenure in public office. The officers' eligibility or the validity of their appointment was not raised before the Court.
The principle laid down in said cases is to the effect that during their incumbency, impeachable officers cannot be criminally
prosecuted for an offense that carries with it the penalty of removal, and if they are required to be members of the Philippine
Bar to qualify for their positions, they cannot be charged with disbarment. The proscription does not extend to actions assailing
the public officer's title or right to the office he or she occupies. The ruling therefore cannot serve as authority to hold that a quo
warranto action can never be filed against an impeachable officer.

The Court's quo warranto jurisdiction over impeachable officers also finds basis in paragraph 7, Section 4, Article VII of the
Constitution which designates it as the sole judge of the qualifications of the President and Vice-President, both of whom are
impeachable officers. With this authority, the remedy of quo warranto was provided in the rules of the Court sitting as the
Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET).

Respondent, however, argues that quo warranto petitions may be filed against the President and Vice-President under the PET
Rules "only because the Constitution specifically permits" them under Section 4, Article VII. According to respondent, no
counterpart provision exists in the Constitution giving the same authority to the Court over the Chief Justice, the members of the
Constitutional Commissions and the Ombudsman. Respondent, thus, asserts that the Constitution made a distinction between
elected and appointive impeachable officials, and limited quo warranto to elected impeachable officials. For these reasons,
respondent concludes that by constitutional design, the Court is denied power to remove any of its members.24

The Court is not convinced. The argument, to begin with, acknowledges that the Constitution in fact allows quo warranto actions
against impeachable officers, albeit respondent limits them to the President and Vice-President. This admission refutes the very
position taken by respondent that all impeachable officials cannot be sued through quo warranto because they belong to a
"privileged class" of officers who can be removed only through impeachment.25 To be sure, Lecaroz, etc. did not distinguish
between elected and appointed impeachable officers.

Furthermore, that the Constitution does not show a counterpart provision to paragraph 7 of Section 4, Article VII for members of
this Court or the Constitutional Commissions does not mean that quo warranto cannot extend to non-elected impeachable
officers. The authority to hear quo warranto petitions against appointive impeachable officers emanates from Section 5(1) of
Article VIII which grants quo warranto jurisdiction to this Court without qualification as to the class of public officers over whom
the same may be exercised.

Respondent argues that Section 5(1) of Article VIII is not a blanket authority, otherwise paragraph 7 of Section 4, Article VII
would be "superfluous." Superfluity, however, is not the same as inconsistency. Section 4, Article VII is not repugnant to, and
clearly confirms, the Court's quo warranto jurisdiction under Section 5(1) of Article VIII. Respondent herself has not alleged any
irreconcilability in these provisions.

Indeed, contrary to respondent's claim, Section 4 of Article VII is not meant to limit the Court's quo warranto jurisdiction under
Article VIII of the Constitution. In fact, We held that "[t]he power wielded by PET is "a derivative of the plenary judicial power
allocated to the courts of law, expressly provided in the Constitution."26 Thus, the authority under Section 4 of Article VII to
hear quo warranto petitions assailing the qualifications of the President and Vice-President is simply a component of the
Court's quo warranto jurisdiction under Article VIII. This finds support in the nature of quo warranto as a remedy to determine a
person's right or title to a public office, 27 which is not confined to claims of ineligibility but extends to other instances or claims
of usurpation or unlawful holding of public office as in the cases of Lota v. CA and Sangalang,28 Moro v. Del Castillo,
Jr.,29 Mendoza v. Allas,30 Sen. Defensor Santiago v. Sen. Guingona, Jr. 31 and Estrada. It will be recalled that in Estrada, the Court
took cognizance of, and ruled upon, a quo warranto challenge to a vice-president's assumption of the presidency; the challenge
was based, not on ineligibility, but on therein petitioner's claim that he had not resigned and was simply a president on leave. To
sustain respondent's argument, therefore, is to unduly curtail the Court's judicial power and to dilute the efficacy of quo
warranto as a remedy against the "unauthorized arbitrary assumption and exercise of power by one without color of title or who
is not entitled by law thereto."32 It bears to reiterate that:

While an appointment is an essentially discretionary executive power, it is subject to the limitation that the appointee should
possess none of the disqualifications but all the qualifications required by law. Where the law prescribes certain qualifications
for a given office or position, courts may determine whether the appointee has the requisite qualifications, absent which, his
right or title thereto may be declared void. 33 (Citations omitted and emphasis ours)

This Court has the constitutional mandate to exercise jurisdiction over quo warranto petitions. And as Estrada and the PET Rules
show, impeachable officers are not immune to quo warranto actions. Thus, a refusal by the Court to take cognizance of this case
would not only be a breach of its duty under the Constitution, it would also accord respondent an exemption not given to other
impeachable officers. Such privilege finds no justification either in law, as impeachable officers are treated without distinction
under the impeachment provisions34 of the Constitution, or in reason, as the qualifications of the Chief Justice are no less
important than the President's or the Vice-President's.

Respondent's insistence that she could not be removed from office except through impeachment is predicated on Section 2,
Article XI of the Constitution. It reads:
Sec. 2. The President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme Court, the Members of the Constitutional Commissions,
and the Ombudsman may be removed from office on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the
Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All other public officers and
employees may be removed from office as provided by law, but not by impeachment. (Emphasis ours)

By its plain language, however, Section 2 of Article XI does not preclude a quo warranto action questioning an impeachable
officer's qualifications to assume office. These qualifications include age, citizenship and professional experience - matters which
are manifestly outside the purview of impeachment under the above-cited provision.

Furthermore, Section 2 of Article XI cannot be read in isolation from Section 5(1) of Article VIII of the Constitution which gives
this Court its quo warranto jurisdiction, or from Section 4, paragraph 7 of Article VII of the Constitution which designates the
Court as the sole judge of the qualifications of the President and Vice-President.

In Civil Liberties Union v. The Executive Secretary, 35 the Court held:

It is a well-established rule in constitutional construction that no one provision of the Constitution is to be separated from all the
others, to be considered alone, but that all the provisions bearing upon a particular subject are to be brought into view and to
be so interpreted as to effectuate the great purposes of the instrument. Sections bearing on a particular subject should be
considered and interpreted together as to effectuate the whole purpose of the Constitution and one section is not to be allowed
to defeat another, if by any reasonable construction, the two can be made to stand together.

In other words, the court must harmonize them, if practicable, and must lean in favor of a construction which will render every
word operative, rather than one which may make the words idle and nugatory. 36 (Citations omitted)

Section 2 of Article XI provides that the impeachable officers may be removed from office on impeachment for and conviction of
culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. Lack
of qualifications for appointment or election is evidently not among the stated grounds for impeachment. It is, however, a
ground for a quo warranto action over which this Court was given original jurisdiction under Section 5(1) of Article VIII. The grant
of jurisdiction was not confined to unimpeachable officers. In fact, under Section 4, paragraph 7 of Article VII, this Court was
expressly authorized to pass upon the qualifications of the President and Vice-President. Thus, the proscription against the
removal of public officers other than by impeachment does not apply to quo warranto actions assailing the impeachable officer's
eligibility for appointment or election.

This construction allows all three provisions to stand together and to give effect to the clear intent of the Constitution to address
not only the impeachable offenses but also the issue of qualifications of public officers, including impeachable officers.

As this Court intoned in its Decision, to take appointments of impeachable officers beyond the reach of judicial review is to
cleanse them of any possible defect pertaining to the constitutionally prescribed qualifications which cannot otherwise be raised
in an impeachment proceeding.

To illustrate this, the Court cited the requirement that the impeachable officer must be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines.
We explained that if it turns out that the impeachable officer is in fact of foreign nationality, respondent's argument will prevent
this Court from inquiring into this important qualification that directly affects the officer's ability to protect the interests of the
State. Unless convicted of an impeachable offense, the officer will continue in office despite being clearly disqualified from
holding it. We stressed that this could not have been the intent of the framers of the Constitution.

Respondent, however, contends that the above-cited defect will actually constitute a ground for impeachment because the
appointee's continued exercise of public functions despite knowledge of his foreign nationality amounts to a culpable violation
of the Constitution.

The argument is untenable. Citizenship is a qualification issue which this Court has the authority to resolve. Thus, in Kilosbayan
Foundation v. Exec. Sec. Ermita,37 where the appointment of Sandiganbayan Justice Gregory S. Ong (Ong) to this Court was
sought to be annulled for the latter's supposed failure to comply with the citizenship requirement under the Constitution, We
stated that:

Third, as to the proper forum for litigating the issue of respondent Ong's qualification for membership of this Court. This case is
a matter of primordial importance involving compliance with a Constitutional mandate. As the body tasked with the
determination of the merits of conflicting claims under the Constitution, the Court is the proper forum for resolving the issue,
even as the JBC has the initial competence to do so. 38 (Citation omitted and emphasis ours)
In the subsequent case of Topacio v. Assoc. Justice Gregory Santos Ong, et al.,39 Ong's citizenship was raised anew, this time to
prevent him from further exercising the office of a Sandiganbayan Associate Justice. The Court held that the challenge was one
against Ong's title to the office which must be raised in a quo warranto proceeding, thus:

While denominated as a petition for certiorari and prohibition, the petition partakes of the nature of a quo
warranto proceeding with respect to Ong, for it effectively seeks to declare null and void his appointment as an Associate
Justice of the Sandiganbayan for being unconstitutional. While the petition professes to be one for certiorari and prohibition,
petitioner even adverts to a quo warranto aspect of the petition.

Being a collateral attack on a public officer's title, the present petition for certiorari and prohibition must be dismissed.

The title to a public office may not be contested except directly, by quo warranto proceedings; and it cannot be assailed
collaterally, even through mandamus or a motion to annul or set aside order. In Nacionalista Party v. De Vera, the Court ruled
that prohibition does not lie to inquire into the validity of the appointment of a public officer.

x x x [T]he writ of prohibition, even when directed against persons acting as judges or other judicial officers, cannot be treated
as a substitute for quo warranto or be rightfully called upon to perform any of the functions of the writ. If there is a court,
judge or officer de facto, the title to the office and the right to act cannot be questioned by prohibition. If an intruder takes
possession of a judicial office, the person dispossessed cannot obtain relief through a writ of prohibition commanding the
alleged intruder to cease from performing judicial acts, since in its very nature prohibition is an improper remedy by which to
determine the title to an office.40 (Citations omitted and emphasis ours)

Determining title to the office on the basis of a public officer's qualifications is the function of quo warranto. For this reason,
impeachment cannot be treated as a substitute for quo warranto.

Furthermore, impeachment was designed as a mechanism "to check abuse of power."41 The grounds for impeachment, including
culpable violation of the Constitution, have been described as referring to "serious crimes or misconduct"42 of the "vicious and
malevolent" kind.43 Citizenship issues are hardly within the ambit of this constitutional standard.

The Constitution must be construed in light of the object sought to be accomplished and the evils sought to be prevented or
remedied.44 An interpretation that would cause absurdity is not favored.45

It thus bears to reiterate that even the PET Rules expressly provide for the remedy of election protest. Following respondent's
theory that an impeachable officer can be removed only through impeachment means that a President or Vice-President against
whom an election protest has been filed can demand for the dismissal of the protest on the ground that it can potentially cause
his/her removal from office through a mode other than by impeachment. To sustain respondent's position is to render election
protests under the PET Rules nugatory. The Constitution could not have intended such absurdity since fraud and irregularities in
elections cannot be countenanced, and the will of the people as reflected in their votes must be determined and respected.

The preposterousness of allowing unqualified public officials to continue occupying their positions by making impeachment the
sole mode of removing them was likewise aptly discussed by Our esteemed colleague Justice Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe when she
stated that qualification should precede authority, viz:

Owing to both the "political" and "offense-based" nature of these grounds, I am thus inclined to believe that impeachment is not
the sole mode of "removing" impeachable officials as it be clearly absurd for any of them to remain in office despite their failure
to meet the minimum eligibility requirements, which failure does not constitute a ground for impeachment. Sensibly, there
should be a remedy to oust all our public officials, no matter how high-ranking they are or criticial their functions may be, upon a
determination that they have not actually qualified for election or appointment. While I do recognize the wisdom of insulating
impeachable officials from suits that may impede the performance of vital public functions, ultimately, this concern cannot
override the basic qualification requirements of public office. There is no doubt that qualification should precede
authority. Every public office is created and conferred by law.xx x. 46 (Emphasis in the original)

Underlying all constitutional provisions on government service is the principle that public office is a public trust.47 The people,
therefore, have the right to have only qualified individuals appointed to public office. To construe Section 2, Article XI of the
Constitution as proscribing a quo warranto petition is to deprive the State of a remedy to correct a public wrong arising from
defective or void appointments. Equity, however, will not suffer a wrong to be without remedy.48 It stands to reason, therefore,
that quo warranto should be available to question the validity of appointments especially of impeachable officers since they
occupy the upper echelons of government and are capable of wielding vast power and influence on matters of law and policy.

III
  

Much noise and hysteria have been made that a sitting Chief Justice can only be removed by impeachment and that quo
warranto is an improper remedy not sanctioned by the Constitution. The wind of disinformation was further fanned by
respondent who claimed that her ouster was orchestrated by the President. This campaign of misinformation attempted to
conceal and obfuscate the fact that the main issue in the petition which the Court is tasked to resolve is the qualification of
respondent.

In the instant motion, respondent made mention of Senate Resolution No. 738,49 which urges this Court to review Our May 11,
2018 Decision as it sets a "dangerous precedent that transgresses the exclusive powers of the legislative branch to initiate, try
and decide all cases of impeachment." This Resolution was supposedly aimed to express "the sense of the Senate to uphold the
Constitution on the matter of removing a Chief Justice from office." We have to remind the respondent, however, that while a
majority of the Senators - 14 out of the 23 members - signed the said Resolution, the same has not yet been adopted by the
Senate to date. In fact, the Court takes judicial notice that on May 31, 2018, the Senate adjourned its interpellation without any
conclusion as to whether the Resolution is adopted. 50 Without such approval, the Senate Resolution amounts to nothing but a
mere scrap of paper at present.

The Senate Resolution also appears to have been drafted, signed by some Senators, and interpellated on while respondent's
motion for reconsideration is still pending consideration by the Court. While the concerned Members of the Senate insist on
non-encroachment of powers, the Senate Resolution itself tends to influence, if not exert undue pressure on, the Court on how
it should resolve the pending motion for reconsideration. The importance and high regard for the institution that is the Senate is
undisputed. But the Court, in the discharge of its Constitutional duty, is also entitled to the same degree of respect and
deference.

At any rate, and with due regard to the Members of the Senate, We emphasize that the judicial determination of actual
controversies presented before the courts is within the exclusive domain of the Judiciary. "The separation of powers doctrine is
the backbone of our tripartite system of government. It is implicit in the manner that our Constitution lays out in separate and
distinct Articles the powers and prerogatives of each co-equal branch of government."51 Thus, the act of some of the Senators
questioning the Court's judicial action is clearly an unwarranted intrusion to the Court's powers and mandate.

To disabuse wandering minds, there is nothing violative or intrusive of the Senate's power to remove impeachable officials in the
main Decision. In fact, in the said assailed Decision, We recognized that the Senate has the sole power to try and decide all cases
of impeachment. We have extensively discussed therein that the Court merely exercised its Constitutional duty to resolve a legal
question referring to respondent's qualification as a Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. We also emphasized that this Court's
action never intends to deprive the Congress of its mandate to make a determination on impeachable officials' culpability for
acts committed while in office. We even explained that impeachment and quo warranto may proceed independently and
simultaneously, albeit a ruling of removal or ouster of the respondent in one case will preclude the same ruling in the other due
to legal impossibility and mootness.

Quo warranto is not a figment of imagination or invention of this Court. It is a mandate boldly enshrined in the
Constitution52 where the judiciary is conferred original jurisdiction to the exclusion of the other branches of the
government. Quo warranto, not impeachment, is the constitutional remedy prescribed to adjudicate and resolve questions
relating to qualifications, eligibility and entitlement to public office. Those who chose to ignore this fact are Constitutionally
blind. US Supreme Court Justice Scalia once said: "If it is in the Constitution, it is there. If it is not in the Constitution, it is not
there." 53 There is nothing in Our Constitution that says that impeachable officers are immuned, exempted, or excluded
from quo warranto proceedings when the very issue to be determined therein is the status of an officer as such. No amount of
public indignation can rewrite or deface the Constitution.

IV

The plain issue in the instant case is whether respondent is eligible to occupy the position of Chief Justice. To determine whether
or not respondent is eligible, the primordial consideration is whether respondent met the requisite Constitutional requirements
for the position. Questions on eligibility therefore present a justiciable issue, which can be resolved by juxtaposing the facts with
the Constitution, as well as pertinent laws and jurisprudence. In Kilosbayan Foundation, 54 the Court affirmed its jurisdiction to
resolve the issue on the qualification for membership of this Court as the body tasked with the determination of the merits of
conflicting claims under the Constitution, even when the JBC has the initial competence to do so. 55

True enough, constitutionally committed to the JBC is the principal function of recommending appointees to the Judiciary. The
function to recommend appointees carries with it the concomitant duty to screen applicants therefor. The JBC's exercise of its
recommendatory function must nevertheless conform with the basic premise that the appointee possesses the non-negotiable
qualifications prescribed by the Constitution. While the JBC enjoys a certain leeway in screening aspiring magistrates, such
remains to be tightly circumscribed by the Constitutional qualifications for aspiring members of the Judiciary. 56 These
Constitutional prerequisites are therefore deemed written into the rules and standards which the JBC may prescribe in the
discharge of its primary function. The JBC cannot go beyond or less than what the Constitution prescribes.

The surrender to the JBC of the details as to how these qualifications are to be determined is rendered necessary and in keeping
with its recommendatory function which is nevertheless made expressly subject to the Court's exercise of supervision.

As an incident of its power of supervision over the JBC, the Court has the authority to insure that the JBC performs its duties
under the Constitution and complies with its own rules and standards. Indeed, supervision is an active power and implies the
authority to inquire into facts and conditions that renders the power of supervision real and effective. 57 Under its power of
supervision, the Court has ample authority to look into the processes leading to respondent's nomination for the position of
Chief Justice on the face of the Republic's contention that respondent was ineligible to be a candidate to the position to begin
with.

Arguments were raised against the Court's assumption over the quo warranto petition on the premise that the determination of
the integrity requirement lies solely on the JBC's discretion and thus, a prior nullification of the JBC's act on the ground of grave
abuse of discretion through a certiorari petition is the proper legal route.

The question of whether or not a nominee possesses the reqms1te qualifications is determined based on facts and as such,
generates no exercise of discretion on the part of the nominating body. Thus, whether a nominee is of the requisite age, is a
natural-born citizen, has met the years of law practice, and is of proven competence, integrity, probity, and independence are to
be determined based on facts and cannot be made dependent on inference or discretion, much less concessions, which the
recommending authority may make or extend. To say that the determination of whether a nominee is of "proven integrity" is a
task absolutely contingent upon the discretion of the JBC is to place the integrity requirement on a plateau different from the
rest of the Constitutional requirements, when no such distinction is assigned by the Constitution. As well, to treat as
discretionary on the part of the JBC the question of whether a nominee is of "proven integrity" is to render the Court impotent
to nullify an otherwise unconstitutional nomination unless the Court's jurisdiction is invoked on the ground of grave abuse of
discretion. Such severely limiting course of action would effectively diminish the Court's collegial power of supervision over the
JBC.

To re-align the issue in this petition, the Republic charges respondent of unlawfully holding or exercising the position of Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court. The contents of the petition pose an attack to respondent's authority to hold or exercise the
position. Unmoving is the rule that title to a public office may not be contested except directly, by quo
warranto proceedings. 58 As it cannot be assailed collaterally, certiorari is an infirm remedy for this purpose. It is for this reason
that the Court previously denied a certiorari and prohibition petition which sought to annul appointment to the Judiciary of an
alleged naturalized citizen. 59

Aguinaldo, et al. v. Aquino, et al., 60 settles that when it is the qualification for the position that is in issue, the proper remedy
is quo warranto pursuant to Topacio. 61 But when it is the act of the appointing power that is placed under scrutiny and not any
disqualification on the part of the appointee, a petition for certiorari challenging the appointment for being unconstitutional or
for having been done in grave abuse of discretion is the apt legal course. In Aguinaldo, the Court elucidated:

The Court recognized in Jardeleza v. Sereno that a petition for certiorari is a proper remedy to question the act of any branch or
instrumentality of the government on the ground of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by any
branch or instrumentality of the government, even if the latter does not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions.

In opposing the instant Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, the OSG cites Topacio in which the Court declares that title to a
public office may not be contested except directly, by quo warranto proceedings; and it cannot be assailed collaterally, such as
by certiorari and prohibition.

However, Topacio is not on all fours with the instant case. In Topacio, the writs of certiorari and prohibition were sought against
Sandiganbayan Associate Justice Gregory S. Ong on the ground that he lacked the qualification of Filipino citizenship for said
position. In contrast, the present Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition puts under scrutiny, not any disqualification on the part
of respondents Musngi and Econg, but the act of President Aquino in appointing respondents Musngi and Econg as
Sandiganbayan Associate Justices without regard for the clustering of nominees into six separate shortlists by the JBC, which
allegedly violated the Constitution and constituted grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. This
would not be the first time that the Court, in the exercise of its expanded power of judicial review, takes cognizance of a petition
for certiorari that challenges a presidential appointment for being unconstitutional or for having been done in grave abuse of
discretion.xx x.62 (Italics and citations omitted.)
A certiorari petition also lacks the safeguards installed in a quo warranto action specifically designed to promote stability in
public office and remove perpetual uncertainty in the title of the person holding the office. For one, a certiorari petition thrives
on allegation and proof of grave abuse of discretion. In a quo warranto action, it is imperative to demonstrate that the
respondent have usurped, intruded into or unlawfully held or exercised a public office, position or franchise.

For another, certiorari may be filed by any person alleging to have been aggrieved by an act done with grave abuse of discretion.
In a quo warranto action, it is the Solicitor General or a public prosecutor, when directed by the President or when upon
complaint or when he has good reason to believe that the grounds for quo warranto can be established by proof, who must
commence the action. The only instance when an individual is allowed to commence such action is when he or she claims to be
entitled to a public office or position usurped or unlawfully held or exercised by another. In such case, it is incumbent upon the
private person to present proof of a clear and indubitable right to the office. If certiorari is accepted as the proper legal vehicle
to assail eligibility to public office then any person, although unable to demonstrate clear and indubitable right to the office, and
merely upon claim of grave abuse of discretion, can place title to public office in uncertainty.

Tellingly also, the rules on quo warranto do not require that the recommending or appointing authority be impleaded as a
necessary party, much less makes the nullification of the act of the recommending authority a condition precedent before the
remedy of quo warranto can be availed of. The JBC itself did not bother to intervene in the instant petition.

Under Section 6, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court, when the action is against a person for usurping a public office, position or
franchise, it is only required that, if there be a person who claims to be entitled thereto, his or her name should be set forth in
the petition with an averment of his or her right to the office, position or franchise and that the respondent is unlawfully in
possession thereof. All persons claiming to be entitled to the public office, position or franchise may be made parties and their
respective rights may be determined in the same quo warranto action. The appointing authority, or in this case the
recommending authority which is the JBC, is therefore not a necessary party in a quo warranto action.

Peculiar also to the instant petition is the surrounding circumstance that an administrative matter directly pertaining to the
nomination of respondent is pending before the Court. While the administrative matter aims to determine whether there is
culpability or lapses on the part of the JBC members, the factual narrative offered by the latter are all extant on record which the
Court can take judicial notice of. Thus, considerations regarding the lack of due process on the part of the JBC present only a
superficial resistance to the Court's assumption of jurisdiction over the instant quo warranto petition.

In any case, the rules on quo warranto vests upon the Court ancillary jurisdiction to render such further judgment as "justice
requires."63 Indeed, the doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction implies the grant of necessary and usual incidental powers essential to
effectuate its jurisdiction and subject to existing laws and constitutional provisions, every regularly constituted court has power
to do all things that are reasonably necessary for the administration of justice within the scope of its jurisdiction and for the
enforcement of its judgments and mandates. 64 Accordingly, "demands, matters or questions ancillary or incidental to, or
growing out of, the main action, and coming within the above principles, may be taken cognizance of by the court and
determined, since such jurisdiction is in aid of its authority over the principal matter, even though the court may thus be called
on to consider and decide matters which, as original causes of action, would not be within its cognizance."65

This Court had likewise amply laid down the legal and factual bases for its ruling against the dismissal of the instant petition on
the ground of prescription. Our ruling on this matter is anchored upon the very purpose of such prescriptive period as
consistently held by this Court for decades and also upon consideration of the unique underlying circumstances in this case
which cannot be ignored.

In addition to the catena of cases cited in the assailed Decision, the Court, in Madrigal v. Prov. Gov. Lecaroz, 66 exhaustively
explained the rationale behind the prescriptive period:

The unbending jurisprudence in this jurisdiction is to the effect that a petition for quo warranto and mandamus affecting titles to
public office must be filed within one (1) year from the date the petitioner is ousted from his position. xx x The reason behind
this being was expounded in the case of Unabia v. City Mayor, etc., x x x where We said:

"x x x[W]e note that in actions of quo warranto involving right to an office, the action must be instituted within the period of one
year. This has been the law in the island since 1901, the period having been originally fixed in Section 216 of the Code of Civil
Procedure (Act No. 190). We find this provision to be an expression of policy on the part of the State that persons claiming a
right to an office of which they are illegally dispossessed should immediately take steps to recover said office and that if they
do not do so within a period of one year, they shall be considered as having lost their right thereto by abandonment. There
are weighty reasons of public policy and convenience that demand the adoption of a similar period for persons claiming rights to
positions in the civil service. There must be stability in the service so that public business may [not] be unduly retarded; delays
in the statement of the right to positions in the service must be discouraged. The following considerations as to public officers,
by Mr. Justice Bengzon, may well be applicable to employees in the civil service:

'Furthermore, constitutional rights may certainly be waived, and the inaction of the officer for one year could be validly
considered as waiver, i.e., a renunciation which no principle of justice may prevent, he being at liberty to resign his position
anytime he pleases.

And there is good justification for the limitation period; it is not proper that the title to public office should be subjected to
continued uncertain[t]y, and the peoples' interest require that such right should be determined as speedily as practicable.'

"Further, the Government must be immediately informed or advised if any person claims to be entitled to an office or a
position in the civil service as against another actually holding it, so that the Government may not be faced with the
predicament of having to pay the salaries, one, for the person actually holding the office, although illegally, and another, for
one not actually rendering service although entitled to do so.xx x."67 (Citations omitted and emphasis ours)

The long line of cases decided by this Court since the l 900's, which specifically explained the spirit behind the rule providing a
prescriptive period for the filing of an action for quo warranto, reveals that such limitation can be applied only against private
individuals claiming rights to a public office, not against the State.

Indeed, there is no proprietary right over a public office. Hence, a claimed right over a public office may be waived. In fact, even
Constitutionally-protected rights may be waived. Thus, We have consistently held that the inaction of a person claiming right
over a public office to assert the same within the prescriptive period provided by the rules, may be considered a waiver of such
right. This is where the difference between a quo warranto filed by a private individual as opposed to one filed by the State
through the Solicitor General lies. There is no claim of right over a public office where it is the State itself, through the Solicitor
General, which files a petition for quo warranto to question the eligibility of the person holding the public office. As We have
emphasized in the assailed Decision, unlike Constitutionally-protected rights, Constitutionally-required qualifications for a public
office can never be waived either deliberately or by mere passage of time. While a private individual may, in proper instances,
be deemed to have waived his or her right over title to public office and/or to have acquiesced or consented to the loss of such
right, no organized society would allow, much more a prudent court would consider, the State to have waived by mere lapse of
time, its right to uphold and ensure compliance with the requirements for such office, fixed by no less than the Constitution, the
fundamental law upon which the foundations of a State stand, especially so when the government cannot be faulted for such
lapse.

On another point, the one-year prescriptive period was necessary for the government to be immediately informed if any person
claims title to an office so that the government may not be faced with the predicament of having to pay two salaries, one for the
person actually holding it albeit illegally, and another to the person not rendering service although entitled to do so. It would
thus be absurd to require the filing of a petition for quo warranto within the one-year period for such purpose when it is the
State itself which files the same not for the purpose of determining who among two private individuals are entitled to the office.
Stated in a different manner, the purpose of the instant petition is not to inform the government that it is facing a predicament
of having to pay two salaries; rather, the government, having learned of the predicament that it might be paying an unqualified
person, is acting upon it head-on.

Most importantly, urgency to resolve the controversy on the title to a public office to prevent a hiatus or disruption in the
delivery of public service is the ultimate consideration in prescribing a limitation on when an action for quo warranto may be
instituted. However, it is this very same concern that precludes the application of the prescriptive period when it is the State
which questions the eligibility of the person holding a public office and not merely the personal interest of a private individual
claiming title thereto. Again, as We have stated in the assailed Decision, when the government is the real party in interest and
asserts its rights, there can be no defense on the ground of laches or limitation, 68 otherwise, it would be injurious to public
interest if this Court will not act upon the case presented before it by the Republic and merely allow the uncertainty and
controversy surrounding the Chief Justice position to continue.

Worthy to mention is the fact that this is not the first time that this Court precluded the application of the prescriptive period in
filing a petition for quo warranto. In Cristobal v. Melchor,69 the Court considered certain exceptional circumstances attending the
case, which took it out of the rule on the one-year prescriptive period. Also, in Agcaoili v. Suguitan, 70 the Court considered,
among others, therein petitioner's good faith and the injustice that he suffered due to his forcible ouster from office in ruling
that he is not bound by the provision on the prescriptive period in filing his action for quo warranto to assert his right to the
public office. When the Court in several cases exercised liberality in the application of the statute of limitations in favor of
private individuals so as not to defeat their personal interests on a public position, is it not but proper, just, reasonable, and
more in accord with the spirit of the rule for this Court to decide against the application of the prescriptive period considering
the public interest involved? Certainly, it is every citizen's interest to have qualified individuals to hold public office, especially
which of the highest position in the Judiciary.
From the foregoing disquisition, it is clear that this Court's ruling on the issue of prescription is not grounded upon provisions of
the Civil Code, specifically Article 1108(4)71 thereof. Instead, the mention thereof was intended merely to convey that if the
principle that "prescription does not lie against the State" can be applied with regard to property disputes, what more if the
underlying consideration is public interest.

To be clear, this Court is not abolishing the limitation set by the rules in instituting a petition for quo warranto. The one-year
prescriptive period under Section 11, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court still stands. However, for reasons explained above and in the
main Decision, this Court made distinctions as to when such prescriptive period applies, to wit: (1) when filed by the State at its
own instance, through the Solicitor General, 72 prescription shall not apply. This, of course, does not equate to a blanket
authority given to the Solicitor General to indiscriminately file baseless quo warranto actions in disregard of the constitutionally-
protected rights of individuals; (2) when filed by the Solicitor General or public prosecutor at the request and upon relation of
another person, with leave of court, 73 prescription shall apply except when established jurisprudential exceptions 74 are present;
and (3) when filed by an individual in his or her own name, 75 prescription shall apply, except when established jurisprudential
exceptions are present. In fine, Our pronouncement in the assailed Decision as to this matter explained that certain
circumstances preclude the absolute and strict application of the prescriptive period provided under the rules in filing a petition
for quo warranto.

Thus, this Court finds no reason to reverse its ruling that an action for quo warranto is imprescriptible if brought by the State at
its own instance, as in the instant case.

In any case, and as aptly discussed in the main Decision, the peculiarities of the instant case preclude strict application of the
one-year prescriptive period against the State. As observed by Justice Perlas-Bernabe in her Separate Opinion, "x x x if there is
one thing that is glaringly apparent from these proceedings, it is actually the lack of respondent's candor and forthrightness in
the submission of her SALNs."76 Respondent's actions prevented the State from discovering her disqualification within the
prescriptive period. Most certainly, thus the instant case is one of those proper cases where the one-year prescriptive period set
under Section 11, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court should not apply.

VI

Respondent reiterates her argument that her case should be treated similarly as in Concerned Taxpayer v. Doblada Jr. 77

As extensively discussed in the main Decision, respondent, unlike Doblada, did not present contrary proof to rebut the
Certifications from U.P. HRDO that respondent's SALNs for 1986, 1987, 1988, 1992, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2003, 2004, 2005 and
2006 are not in its possession and from the Ombudsman that based on its records, there is no SALN filed by respondent except
that for 1998. Being uncontroverted, these documents suffice to support this Court's conclusion that respondent failed to file
her SALNs in accordance with law.

In Doblada, the contrary proof was in the form of the letter of the head of the personnel of Branch 155 that the SALN for
2000 exists and was duly transmitted and received by the Office of the Court Administrator as the repository agency. In
respondent's case, other than her bare allegations attacking the credibility of the aforesaid certifications from U.P. HR.DO and
the Ombudsman, no supporting proof was presented. It bears to note that these certifications from the aforesaid public
agencies enjoy a presumption that official duty has been regularly performed. These certifications suffice as proof of
respondent's failure to file her SALN until contradicted or overcome by sufficient evidence. Consequently, absent a
countervailing evidence, such disputable presumption becomes conclusive. 78

As what this Court has stated in its May 11, 2018 Decision, while government employees cannot be required to keep their SALNs
for more than 10 years based from the provisions of Section 8, paragraph C(4) of Republic Act No. 6713,79 the same cannot
substitute for respondent's manifest ineligibility at the time of her application. Verily, even her more recent SALNs, such as those
in the years of 2002 to 2006, which in the ordinary course of things would have been easier to retrieve, were not presented nor
accounted for by respondent.

Respondent attempts to strike a parallelism with Doblada by claiming that she, too, religiously filed her SALNs. The similarity
however, ends there. Unlike in Doblada, respondent failed to present contrary proof to rebut the evidence of non-filing. If,
indeed, she never missed filing her SALNs and the same were merely lost, or missing in the records of the repository agency, this
Court sees nothing that would prevent respondent from securing a Certification which would provide a valid or legal reason for
the copies' non-production.

VII
Respondent insists that the filing of SALNs bears no relation to the Constitutional qualification of integrity.1âwphi1 For her, the
measure of integrity should be as what the JBC sets it to be and that in any case, the SALN laws, being malum prohibitum, do not
concern adherence to moral and ethical principles.

Respondent's argument, however, dangerously disregards that the filing of SALN is not only a requirement under the law, but a
positive duty required from every public officer or employee, first and foremost by the Constitution. 80 The SALN laws were
passed in aid of the enforcement of the Constitutional duty to submit a declaration under oath of one's assets, liabilities, and net
worth. This positive Constitutional duty of filing one's SALN is so sensitive and important that it even shares the same category
as the Constitutional duty imposed upon public officers and employees to owe allegiance to the State and the Constitution. 81 As
such, offenses against the SALN laws are not ordinary offenses but violations of a duty which every public officer and employee
owes to the State and the Constitution. In other words, the violation of SALN laws, by itself, defeats any claim of integrity as it is
inherently immoral to violate the will of the legislature and to violate the Constitution.

Integrity, as what this Court has defined in the assailed Decision, in relation to a judge's qualifications, should not be viewed
separately from the institution he or she represents. Integrity contemplates both adherence to the highest moral standards and
obedience to laws and legislations. Integrity, at its minimum, entails compliance with the law.

In sum, respondent has not presented any convincing ground that would merit a modification or reversal of Our May 11, 2018
Decision. Respondent, at the time of her application, lacked proven integrity on account of her failure to file a substantial
number of SALNs and also, her failure to submit the required SALNs to the JBC during her application for the position. Although
deviating from the majority opinion as to the proper remedy, Justice Antonio T. Carpio shares the same finding:

Since respondent took her oath and assumed her posit10n as Associate Justice of the Supreme Court on 16 August 2010, she
was required to file under oath her SALN within thirty (30) days after assumption of office, or until 15 September 2010, and the
statements must be reckoned as of her first day of service, pursuant to the relevant provisions on SALN filing.

However, respondent failed to file a SALN containing sworn statements reckoned as of her first day of service within thirty
(30) days after assuming office. While she allegedly submitted an "entry SALN" on 16 September 2010, it was unsubscribed and
the statements of her assets, liabilities and net worth were reckoned as of 31 December 2009, and not as of her first day of
service, or as of 16 August 2010. x x x

xxxx

The Constitution, law, and rules clearly require that the sworn entry SALN "must be reckoned as of his/her first day of service"
and must be filed "within thirty (30) days after assumption of office." Evidently, respondent failed to file under oath a SALN
reckoned as of her first day of service, or as of 16 August 2010, within the prescribed period of thirty (30) days after her
assumption of office. In other words, respondent failed to file the required SALN upon her assumption of office, which is a
clear violation of Section 17, Article XI of the Constitution. In light of her previous failure to file her SALNs for several years while
she was a UP College of Law Professor, her failure to file her SALN upon assuming office in 2010 as Associate Justice of this Court
constitutes culpable violation of the Constitution, a violation committed while she was already serving as an impeachable
office.82 (Citation omitted and emphasis ours)

Having settled respondent's ineligibility and ouster from the position, the Court reiterates its directive to the JBC to immediately
commence the application, nomination and recommendation process for the position of Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.

WHEREFORE, respondent Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno's Ad Cautelam Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED with FINALITY for

lack of merit. No further pleadings shall be entertained. Let entry of judgment be made immediately.

The Court REITERATES its order to the Judicial and Bar Council to commence the application and nomination process for the
position of the Chief Justice without delay. The ninety-day (90) period83 for filling the vacancy shall be reckoned from the date of
the promulgation of this Resolution.

SO ORDERED.

RULES OF PROCEDURE IN IMPEACHMENT PROCEEDINGS

RULE I
APPLICABILITY OF RULES

Section 1. Applicability of Rules. - These Rules shall apply to all proceedings for impeachment in the House of Representatives
against the President, Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme Court, the Members of the Constitutional Commissions and
the Ombudsman for culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes or betrayal
of public trust.

RULE II
INITIATING IMPEACHMENT

Section 2. Mode of Initiating Impeachment. - Impeachment shall be initiated by the filing and subsequent referral to the
Committee on Justice of: *

(a) a verified complaint for impeachment filed by any Member of the House of Representatives; or

(b) a verified complaint filed by any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any Member thereof; or

(c) a verified complaint or resolution of impeachment filed by at least one-third (1/3) of all Members of the House.

Section 3. Filing and Referral of Verified Complaints. - A verified complaint for impeachment by a Member of the House or by
any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any Member thereof shall be filed with the office of the Secretary General and
immediately referred to the Speaker.

The Speaker shall have it included in the Order of Business within ten (10) session days from receipt. It shall then be referred to
the Committee on Justice within three (3) session days thereafter.

RULE III
FINDING A PROBABLE CAUSE

A. COMMITTEE PROCEEDINGS

Section 4. Determination of Sufficiency in Form and Substance. - Upon due referral, the Committee on Justice shall determine
whether the complaint is sufficient in from and substance. If the committee finds that the complaint is insufficient in form, it
shall return the same to the Secretary General within three (3) session days with a written explanation of the insufficiency. The
Secretary General shall return the same to the complaint(s) together with the committee's written explanation within three (3)
session days from receipt of the committee resolution finding the complaint insufficient in form.

Should the committee find the complaint sufficient in form, it shall then determine if the complaint is sufficient in substance. The
requirement of substance is met if there is a recital of facts constituting the offense charged and determinative of the
jurisdiction of the committee. If the committee finds that the complaint is not sufficient in substance, it shall dismiss the
complaint and shall submit its report as provided hereunder.

Section 5. Notice to Respondents and Time to Plead. - If the committee finds the complaint sufficient in form and substance, it
shall immediately furnish the respondent(s) with a copy of the resolution and/or verified complaint, as the case may be, with
written notice thereof and serve a copy of the answer to the complaint(s). No motion to dismiss shall be allowed within the
period to answer the complaint.

The answer, which shall be under oath, may include affirmative defenses. If the respondent fails or refuses to file an answer
within the reglementary period, he/she is deemed to have interposed a general denial to the complaint. Within three (3) days
from receipt of the answer, the complainant may file a reply, serving a copy thereof to the respondent who may file a rejoinder
within three (3) days from receipt of the reply, serving a copy thereof to the complainant. If the complainant fails to file a reply,
all the material allegations in the answer are deemed controverted. Together with their pleadings, the parties shall file their
affidavits or counter-affidavits, as the case may be, with their documentary evidence. Such affidavits or counter-affidavits shall
be subscribed before the Chairperson of the Committee on Justice or the Secretary General. Notwithstanding all the foregoing,
failure presenting evidence in support of his/her defenses.

When there are more than one respondent, each shall be furnished with copy of the verified complaint from a Member of the
House or a copy of the verified complaint from a private citizen together with the resolution of endorsement by a Member of
the House of Representatives and a written notice to answer and in that case, reference to respondent in these Rules shall be
understood as respondents.

Section 6. Submission of Evidences and Memoranda. - After receipt of the pleadings and affidavits and counter-affidavits and
relevant documents provided for in Section 5, or the expiration of the time within which they may be filed, the Committee shall
determine whether the complaint alleges sufficient grounds for impeachment.
If it finds that sufficient grounds for impeachment do not exist, the Committee shall dismiss the complaint and submit the report
required hereunder. If the Committee finds that sufficient grounds for impeachment exist, the Committee shall conduct a
hearing. To that end, the Committee, through the Chairperson, may limit the period of examination and cross-examination. The
Committee shall have the power to issue compulsory processes for the attendance of witnesses as well as the production of
documents and other related evidence.

The hearing before the Committee shall be open to the public except when the security of the State or public interest requires
that the hearing be held in executive session.

After the submission of evidence, the Committee may require the submission of memoranda, after which the matter shall be
submitted for resolution.

Section 7. Protection to Complainants or Witnesses. - The House may, upon proper petition, provide adequate protection to a
complainant or witness if it is shown that his/her personal safety is in jeopardy because of his/her participation in an
impeachment proceeding.

Section 8. Report and Recommendation. - The Committee on Justice after hearing, and by a majority vote of all its Members,
shall submit its report to the House containing its findings and recommendations within sixty (60) session days from the referral
to it of the verified complaint and/or resolution. Together with the report shall be a formal resolution of the Committee
regarding the disposition of the complaint which shall be calendar for consideration by the House within ten (10) session days
from receipt thereof.

If the Committee finds by a vote of the majority of all its Members that a probable cause exists, it shall submit with its report a
resolution setting forth the Articles of Impeachment on the basis of the evidence adduced before the Committee. Otherwise, the
complaint shall be dismissed subject to Section 11 of these Rules.

Section 9. Report to be Calendared. - The Committee on Rules shall calendar the report and the accompanying resolution of the
Committee on Justice regarding the disposition of the complaint in accordance with the Rules of the House of Representatives.
The House shall dispose of the report within sixty (60) session days from its submission by the Committee on Justice.

B. HOUSE ACTION

Section 10.  Vote Required for Approval. - A vote of at least one-third (1/3) of all Members of the House is necessary for the
approval of the resolution setting forth the Articles of Impeachment. If the resolution is approved by the required vote, it shall
then be endorsed to the Senate for its trial.

On the other hand, should the resolution fail to secure the approval by the required vote, the same result in the dismissal of the
complaint for impeachment.

Section 11. Where Dismissal Recommended. - When the report of the Committee on Justice dismisses the complaint, it shall
submit to the House a resolution for the dismissal of the verified complaint and/or resolution of impeachment. A vote of at least
one-third (1/3) of all the Members of the House shall be necessary to override such resolution, in which case the Committee on
Justice shall forthwith prepare the Articles of Impeachment.

Section 12. Vote by Roll Call. - The voting on a favorable resolution with the Articles of Impeachment of the Committee on
Justice or a contrary resolution shall be by roll call, and the Secretary General shall records the vote of each Member.

RULE IV
VERIFIED COMPLAINT/RESOLUTION BY ONE-THIRD OF MEMBERS

Section 13.  Endorsement of the Complaint/Resolution to the Senate. - A verified complaint/resolution of impeachment filed by
at least one-third (1/3) of all the Members of the House shall constitute the Articles of Impeachment, and in this case the
verified complaint/resolution shall be endorsed to the Senate in the same manner as an approved bill of the House.

The complaint/resolution must, at the time of filing, be verified and sworn to before the Secretary General by each of the
Members constituting at least one-third (1/3) of all Members of the House.

The contents of the verification shall be as follows:

"We, after being sworn in accordance with law, depose and state: That we are the complainants in the above-entitled
complaint/resolution of impeachment; that we have caused the said complaint/resolution to be prepared and have read the
contents thereof; and that the allegations therein are true of our own knowledge and belief on the basis of our reading and
appreciation of documents and other records pertinent thereto.

___________________
(Signature)          

RULE V
BAR AGAINST IMPEACHMENT

Section 14.  Scope of Bar. - No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a
period of one (1) year.

RULE VI
PROSECUTOR IN ALL IMPEACHMENT PROCEEDINGS

Section 15.  Impeachment Prosecutor. - The House of Representatives shall act as the sole prosecutor at the trial in the Senate
through a committee of eleven (11) Members thereof to be elected by a majority vote.

RULE VII
APPLICABILITY OF THE RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

Section 16.  Rules of Procedure. - The Rules of Criminal Procedure under the Rules of Court shall, as far as practicable, apply to
impeachment proceedings before the House.

Adopted, 3 August 2010

End Note

*
 The Supreme Court decision in Francisco et al. vs. House of Representatives (GR No. 160261, 10 November 2003),
states that Impeachment proceedings are initiated upon filing of the complaint and/or resolution and its referral to the
Committee on Justice.

G.R. No. 193459               February 15, 2011

MA. MERCEDITAS N. GUTIERREZ Petitioner,

vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE, RISA HONTIVEROS-BARAQUEL, DANILO D. LIM, FELIPE PESTAÑO,
EVELYN PESTAÑO, RENATO M. REYES, JR., SECRETARY GENERAL OF BAGONG ALYANSANG MAKABAYAN (BAYAN); MOTHER
MARY JOHN MANANZAN, CO-CHAIRPERSON OF PAGBABAGO; DANILO RAMOS, SECRETARY-GENERAL OF KILUSANG
MAGBUBUKID NG PILIPINAS (KMP); ATTY. EDRE OLALIA, ACTING SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL UNION OF PEOPLE'S
LAWYERS (NUPL); FERDINAND R. GAITE, CHAIRPERSON, CONFEDERATION FOR UNITY, RECOGNITION AND ADVANCEMENT OF
GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES (COURAGE); and JAMES TERRY RIDON OF THE LEAGUE OF FILIPINO STUDENTS (LFS), Respondents.
FELICIANO BELMONTE, JR., Respondent-Intervenor.

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

The Ombudsman, Ma. Merceditas Gutierrez (petitioner), challenges via petition for certiorari and prohibition the Resolutions of
September 1 and 7, 2010 of the House of Representatives Committee on Justice (public respondent).

Before the 15th Congress opened its first session on July 26, 2010 (the fourth Monday of July, in accordance with Section 15,
Article VI of the Constitution) or on July 22, 2010, private respondents Risa Hontiveros-Baraquel, Danilo Lim, and spouses Felipe
and Evelyn Pestaño (Baraquel group) filed an impeachment complaint1 against petitioner, upon the endorsement of Party-List
Representatives Arlene Bag-ao and Walden Bello.2
A day after the opening of the 15th Congress or on July 27, 2010, Atty. Marilyn Barua-Yap, Secretary General of the House of
Representatives, transmitted the impeachment complaint to House Speaker Feliciano Belmonte, Jr.3 who, by Memorandum of
August 2, 2010, directed the Committee on Rules to include it in the Order of Business.4

On August 3, 2010, private respondents Renato Reyes, Jr., Mother Mary John Mananzan, Danilo Ramos, Edre Olalia, Ferdinand
Gaite and James Terry Ridon (Reyes group) filed another impeachment complaint5 against petitioner with a resolution of
endorsement by Party-List Representatives Neri Javier Colmenares, Teodoro Casiño, Rafael Mariano, Luzviminda Ilagan, Antonio
Tinio and Emerenciana de Jesus.6 On even date, the House of Representatives provisionally adopted the Rules of Procedure in
Impeachment Proceedings of the 14th Congress. By letter still of even date,7 the Secretary General transmitted the Reyes
group’s complaint to Speaker Belmonte who, by Memorandum of August 9, 2010,8 also directed the Committee on Rules to
include it in the Order of Business.

On August 10, 2010, House Majority Leader Neptali Gonzales II, as chairperson of the Committee on Rules,9 instructed Atty.
Artemio Adasa, Jr., Deputy Secretary General for Operations, through Atty. Cesar Pareja, Executive Director of the Plenary Affairs
Department, to include the two complaints in the Order of Business,10 which was complied with by their inclusion in the Order of
Business for the following day, August 11, 2010.

On August 11, 2010 at 4:47 p.m., during its plenary session, the House of Representatives simultaneously referred both
complaints to public respondent.11

After hearing, public respondent, by Resolution of September 1, 2010, found both complaints sufficient in form, which
complaints it considered to have been referred to it at exactly the same time.

Meanwhile, the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings of the 15th Congress was published on September 2, 2010.

On September 6, 2010, petitioner tried to file a motion to reconsider the September 1, 2010 Resolution of public respondent.
Public respondent refused to accept the motion, however, for prematurity; instead, it advised petitioner to await the notice for
her to file an answer to the complaints, drawing petitioner to furnish copies of her motion to each of the 55 members of public
respondent.

After hearing, public respondent, by Resolution of September 7, 2010, found the two complaints, which both allege culpable
violation of the Constitution and betrayal of public trust,12 sufficient in substance. The determination of the sufficiency of
substance of the complaints by public respondent, which assumed hypothetically the truth of their allegations, hinged on the
issue of whether valid judgment to impeach could be rendered thereon. Petitioner was served also on September 7, 2010 a
notice directing her to file an answer to the complaints within 10 days.13

Six days following her receipt of the notice to file answer or on September 13, 2010, petitioner filed with this Court the present
petition with application for injunctive reliefs. The following day or on September 14, 2010, the Court En Banc RESOLVED to
direct the issuance of a status quo ante order14 and to require respondents to comment on the petition in 10 days. The Court
subsequently, by Resolution of September 21, 2010, directed the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to file in 10 days its
Comment on the petition

The Baraquel group which filed the first complaint, the Reyes group which filed the second complaint, and public respondent
(through the OSG and private counsel) filed their respective Comments on September 27, 29 and 30, 2010.

Speaker Belmonte filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene dated October 4, 2010 which the Court granted by Resolution of
October 5, 2010.

Under an Advisory15 issued by the Court, oral arguments were conducted on October 5 and 12, 2010, followed by petitioner’s
filing of a Consolidated Reply of October 15, 2010 and the filing by the parties of Memoranda within the given 15-day period.

The petition is harangued by procedural objections which the Court shall first resolve.

Respondents raise the impropriety of the remedies of certiorari and prohibition. They argue that public respondent was not
exercising any judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial function in taking cognizance of the two impeachment complaints as it was
exercising a political act that is discretionary in nature,16 and that its function is inquisitorial that is akin to a preliminary
investigation.17

These same arguments were raised in Francisco, Jr. v. House of Representatives.18 The argument that impeachment proceedings
are beyond the reach of judicial review was debunked in this wise:
The major difference between the judicial power of the Philippine Supreme Court and that of the U.S. Supreme Court is that
while the power of judicial review is only impliedly granted to the U.S. Supreme Court and is discretionary in nature, that
granted to the Philippine Supreme Court and lower courts, as expressly provided for in the Constitution, is not just a power but
also a duty, and it was given an expanded definition to include the power to correct any grave abuse of discretion on the part of
any government branch or instrumentality.

There are also glaring distinctions between the U.S. Constitution and the Philippine Constitution with respect to the power of the
House of Representatives over impeachment proceedings. While the U.S. Constitution bestows sole power of impeachment to
the House of Representatives without limitation, our Constitution, though vesting in the House of Representatives the exclusive
power to initiate impeachment cases, provides for several limitations to the exercise of such power as embodied in Section 3(2),
(3), (4) and (5), Article XI thereof. These limitations include the manner of filing, required vote to impeach, and the one year bar
on the impeachment of one and the same official.

Respondents are also of the view that judicial review of impeachments undermines their finality and may also lead to conflicts
between Congress and the judiciary. Thus, they call upon this Court to exercise judicial statesmanship on the principle that
"whenever possible, the Court should defer to the judgment of the people expressed legislatively, recognizing full well the perils
of judicial willfulness and pride."

But did not the people also express their will when they instituted the above-mentioned safeguards in the Constitution? This
shows that the Constitution did not intend to leave the matter of impeachment to the sole discretion of Congress. Instead, it
provided for certain well-defined limits, or in the language of Baker v. Carr,"judicially discoverable standards" for determining
the validity of the exercise of such discretion, through the power of judicial review.

xxxx

There is indeed a plethora of cases in which this Court exercised the power of judicial review over congressional action. Thus,
in Santiago v. Guingona, Jr., this Court ruled that it is well within the power and jurisdiction of the Court to inquire whether the
Senate or its officials committed a violation of the Constitution or grave abuse of discretion in the exercise of their functions and
prerogatives. In Tañada v. Angara, in seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it contravened the
Constitution, it held that the petition raises a justiciable controversy and that when an action of the legislative branch is seriously
alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute.
In Bondoc v. Pineda, this Court declared null and void a resolution of the House of Representatives withdrawing the nomination,
and rescinding the election, of a congressman as a member of the House Electoral Tribunal for being violative of Section 17,
Article VI of the Constitution. In Coseteng v. Mitra, it held that the resolution of whether the House representation in the
Commission on Appointments was based on proportional representation of the political parties as provided in Section 18, Article
VI of the Constitution is subject to judicial review. In Daza v. Singson, it held that the act of the House of Representatives in
removing the petitioner from the Commission on Appointments is subject to judicial review. In Tañada v. Cuenco, it held that
although under the Constitution, the legislative power is vested exclusively in Congress, this does not detract from the power of
the courts to pass upon the constitutionality of acts of Congress. In Angara v. Electoral Commission, it ruled that confirmation by
the National Assembly of the election of any member, irrespective of whether his election is contested, is not essential before
such member-elect may discharge the duties and enjoy the privileges of a member of the National Assembly.

Finally, there exists no constitutional basis for the contention that the exercise of judicial review over impeachment proceedings
would upset the system of checks and balances. Verily, the Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole and "one section is not to
be allowed to defeat another." Both are integral components of the calibrated system of independence and interdependence
that insures that no branch of government act beyond the powers assigned to it by the Constitution.19 (citations omitted; italics
in the original; underscoring supplied)

Francisco characterizes the power of judicial review as a duty which, as the expanded certiorari jurisdiction20 of this Court
reflects, includes the power to "determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government."21

In the present case, petitioner invokes the Court’s expanded certiorari jurisdiction, using the special civil actions of certiorari and
prohibition as procedural vehicles. The Court finds it well-within its power to determine whether public respondent committed a
violation of the Constitution or gravely abused its discretion in the exercise of its functions and prerogatives that could translate
as lack or excess of jurisdiction, which would require corrective measures from the Court.

Indubitably, the Court is not asserting its ascendancy over the Legislature in this instance, but simply upholding the supremacy of
the Constitution as the repository of the sovereign will.22
Respondents do not seriously contest all the essential requisites for the exercise of judicial review, as they only assert that the
petition is premature and not yet ripe for adjudication since petitioner has at her disposal a plain, speedy and adequate remedy
in the course of the proceedings before public respondent. Public respondent argues that when petitioner filed the present
petition23 on September 13, 2010, it had not gone beyond the determination of the sufficiency of form and substance of the two
complaints.

An aspect of the "case-or-controversy" requirement is the requisite of ripeness.24 The question of ripeness is especially relevant
in light of the direct, adverse effect on an individual by the challenged conduct.25 In the present petition, there is no doubt that
questions on, inter alia, the validity of the simultaneous referral of the two complaints and on the need to publish as a mode of
promulgating the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings of the House (Impeachment Rules) present constitutional
vagaries which call for immediate interpretation.

The unusual act of simultaneously referring to public respondent two impeachment complaints presents a novel situation to
invoke judicial power. Petitioner cannot thus be considered to have acted prematurely when she took the cue from the
constitutional limitation that only one impeachment proceeding should be initiated against an impeachable officer within a
period of one year.

And so the Court proceeds to resolve the substantive issue ─ whether public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing its two assailed Resolutions. Petitioner basically anchors her claim
on alleged violation of the due process clause (Art. III, Sec. 1) and of the one-year bar provision (Art. XI, Sec 3, par. 5) of the
Constitution.

Due process of law

Petitioner alleges that public respondent’s chairperson, Representative Niel Tupas, Jr. (Rep. Tupas), is the subject of an
investigation she is conducting, while his father, former Iloilo Governor Niel Tupas, Sr., had been charged by her with violation of
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act before the Sandiganbayan. To petitioner, the actions taken by her office against Rep.
Tupas and his father influenced the proceedings taken by public respondent in such a way that bias and vindictiveness played a
big part in arriving at the finding of sufficiency of form and substance of the complaints against her.

The Court finds petitioner’s allegations of bias and vindictiveness bereft of merit, there being hardly any indication thereof. Mere
suspicion of partiality does not suffice.26

The act of the head of a collegial body cannot be considered as that of the entire body itself. So GMCR, Inc. v. Bell
Telecommunications Phils.27 teaches:

First. We hereby declare that the NTC is a collegial body requiring a majority vote out of the three members of the commission
in order to validly decide a case or any incident therein. Corollarily, the vote alone of the chairman of the commission, as in this
case, the vote of Commissioner Kintanar, absent the required concurring vote coming from the rest of the membership of the
commission to at least arrive at a majority decision, is not sufficient to legally render an NTC order, resolution or decision.

Simply put, Commissioner Kintanar is not the National Telecommunications Commission. He alone does not speak and in behalf
of the NTC. The NTC acts through a three-man body x x x. 28

In the present case, Rep. Tupas, public respondent informs, did not, in fact, vote and merely presided over the proceedings
when it decided on the sufficiency of form and substance of the complaints.29

Even petitioner’s counsel conceded during the oral arguments that there are no grounds to compel the inhibition of Rep. Tupas.

JUSTICE CUEVAS:

Well, the Committee is headed by a gentleman who happened to be a respondent in the charges that the Ombudsman filed. In
addition to that[,] his father was likewise a respondent in another case. How can he be expected to act with impartiality, in
fairness and in accordance with law under that matter, he is only human we grant him that benefit.

JUSTICE MORALES:

Is he a one-man committee?

JUSTICE CUEVAS:
He is not a one-man committee, Your Honor, but he decides.

JUSTICE MORALES:

Do we presume good faith or we presume bad faith?

JUSTICE CUEVAS:

We presume that he is acting in good faith, Your Honor, but then (interrupted)

JUSTICE MORALES:

So, that he was found liable for violation of the Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, does that mean that your client will be
deprived of due process of law?

JUSTICE CUEVAS:

No, what we are stating, Your Honor, is that expectation of a client goes with the Ombudsman, which goes with the element of
due process is the lack of impartiality that may be expected of him.

JUSTICE MORALES:

But as you admitted the Committee is not a one-man committee?

JUSTICE CUEVAS:

That is correct, Your Honor.

JUSTICE MORALES:

So, why do you say then that there is a lack of impartiality?

JUSTICE CUEVAS:

Because if anything before anything goes (sic) he is the presiding officer of the committee as in this case there were objections
relative to the existence of the implementing rules not heard, there was objection made by Congressman Golez to the effect
that this may give rise to a constitutional crisis.

JUSTICE MORALES:

That called for a voluntary inhibition. Is there any law or rule you can cite which makes it mandatory for the chair of the
committee to inhibit given that he had previously been found liable for violation of a law[?]

JUSTICE CUEVAS:

There is nothing, Your Honor. In our jurisprudence which deals with the situation whereby with that background as the material
or pertinent antecedent that there could be no violation of the right of the petitioner to due process. What is the effect of
notice, hearing if the judgment cannot come from an impartial adjudicator.30 (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Petitioner contends that the "indecent and precipitate haste" of public respondent in finding the two complaints sufficient in
form and substance is a clear indication of bias, she pointing out that it only took public respondent five minutes to arrive
thereat.lawphi1

An abbreviated pace in the conduct of proceedings is not per se an indication of bias, however. So Santos-Concio v. Department
of Justice31 holds:

Speed in the conduct of proceedings by a judicial or quasi-judicial officer cannot per se be instantly attributed to an injudicious
performance of functions. For one’s prompt dispatch may be another’s undue haste. The orderly administration of justice
remains as the paramount and constant consideration, with particular regard of the circumstances peculiar to each case.
The presumption of regularity includes the public officer’s official actuations in all phases of work. Consistent with such
presumption, it was incumbent upon petitioners to present contradictory evidence other than a mere tallying of days or
numerical calculation. This, petitioners failed to discharge. The swift completion of the Investigating Panel’s initial task cannot be
relegated as shoddy or shady without discounting the presumably regular performance of not just one but five state
prosecutors.32 (italics in the original; emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Petitioner goes on to contend that her participation in the determination of sufficiency of form and substance was
indispensable. As mandated by the Impeachment Rules, however, and as, in fact, conceded by petitioner’s counsel, the
participation of the impeachable officer starts with the filing of an answer.

JUSTICE MORALES:

Is it not that the Committee should first determine that there is sufficiency in form and substance before she is asked to file her
answer (interrupted)

JUSTICE CUEVAS:

That is correct, Your Honor.

JUSTICE MORALES:

During which she can raise any defenses she can assail the regularity of the proceedings and related irregularities?

JUSTICE CUEVAS:

Yes. We are in total conformity and in full accord with that statement, Your Honor, because it is only after a determination that
the complaint is sufficient in form and substance that a complaint may be filed, Your Honor, without that but it may be asked,
how is not your action premature, Your Honor, our answer is- no, because of the other violations involved and that is
(interrupted).33 (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Rule III(A) of the Impeachment Rules of the 15th Congress reflects the impeachment procedure at the Committee-level,
particularly Section 534 which denotes that petitioner’s initial participation in the impeachment proceedings – the opportunity to
file an Answer – starts after the Committee on Justice finds the complaint sufficient in form and substance. That the Committee
refused to accept petitioner’s motion for reconsideration from its finding of sufficiency of form of the impeachment complaints
is apposite, conformably with the Impeachment Rules.

Petitioner further claims that public respondent failed to ascertain the sufficiency of form and substance of the complaints on
the basis of the standards set by the Constitution and its own Impeachment Rules.35

The claim fails.

The determination of sufficiency of form and substance of an impeachment complaint is an exponent of the express
constitutional grant of rule-making powers of the House of Representatives which committed such determinative function to
public respondent. In the discharge of that power and in the exercise of its discretion, the House has formulated determinable
standards as to the form and substance of an impeachment complaint. Prudential considerations behoove the Court to respect
the compliance by the House of its duty to effectively carry out the constitutional purpose, absent any contravention of the
minimum constitutional guidelines.

Contrary to petitioner’s position that the Impeachment Rules do not provide for comprehensible standards in determining the
sufficiency of form and substance, the Impeachment Rules are clear in echoing the constitutional requirements and providing
that there must be a "verified complaint or resolution,"36 and that the substance requirement is met if there is "a recital of facts
constituting the offense charged and determinative of the jurisdiction of the committee."37

Notatu dignum is the fact that it is only in the Impeachment Rules where a determination of sufficiency of form and substance of
an impeachment complaint is made necessary. This requirement is not explicitly found in the organic law, as Section 3(2), Article
XI of the Constitution basically merely requires a "hearing."38 In the discharge of its constitutional duty, the House deemed that a
finding of sufficiency of form and substance in an impeachment complaint is vital "to effectively carry out" the impeachment
process, hence, such additional requirement in the Impeachment Rules.
Petitioner urges the Court to look into the narration of facts constitutive of the offenses vis-à-vis her submissions disclaiming the
allegations in the complaints.

This the Court cannot do.

Francisco instructs that this issue would "require the Court to make a determination of what constitutes an impeachable
offense. Such a determination is a purely political question which the Constitution has left to the sound discretion of the
legislature. Such an intent is clear from the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission. x x x x Clearly, the issue calls upon
this court to decide a non-justiciable political question which is beyond the scope of its judicial power[.]"39 Worse, petitioner
urges the Court to make a preliminary assessment of certain grounds raised, upon a hypothetical admission of the facts alleged
in the complaints, which involve matters of defense.

In another vein, petitioner, pursuing her claim of denial of due process, questions the lack of or, more accurately, delay in the
publication of the Impeachment Rules.

To recall, days after the 15th Congress opened on July 26, 2010 or on August 3, 2010, public respondent provisionally adopted
the Impeachment Rules of the 14th Congress and thereafter published on September 2, 2010 its Impeachment Rules, admittedly
substantially identical with that of the 14th Congress, in two newspapers of general circulation.40

Citing Tañada v. Tuvera,41 petitioner contends that she was deprived of due process since the Impeachment Rules was published
only on September 2, 2010 a day after public respondent ruled on the sufficiency of form of the complaints. She likewise tacks
her contention on Section 3(8), Article XI of the Constitution which directs that "Congress shall promulgate its rules on
impeachment to effectively carry out the purpose of this section."

Public respondent counters that "promulgation" in this case refers to "the publication of rules in any medium of information, not
necessarily in the Official Gazette or newspaper of general circulation."42

Differentiating Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations43 which held that the
Constitution categorically requires publication of the rules of procedure in legislative inquiries, public respondent explains that
the Impeachment Rules is intended to merely enable Congress to effectively carry out the purpose of Section 3(8), Art. XI of
Constitution.

Black’s Law Dictionary broadly defines promulgate as

To publish; to announce officially; to make public as important or obligatory. The formal act of announcing a statute or rule of
court. An administrative order that is given to cause an agency law or regulation to become known or obligatory.44 (emphasis
supplied)

While "promulgation" would seem synonymous to "publication," there is a statutory difference in their usage.

The Constitution notably uses the word "promulgate" 12 times.45 A number of those instances involves the promulgation of
various rules, reports and issuances emanating from Congress, this Court, the Office of the Ombudsman as well as other
constitutional offices.

To appreciate the statutory difference in the usage of the terms "promulgate" and "publish," the case of the Judiciary is in point.
In promulgating rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice and procedure in all
courts, the Court has invariably required the publication of these rules for their effectivity. As far as promulgation of judgments
is concerned, however, promulgation means "the delivery of the decision to the clerk of court for filing and publication."46

Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution contains a similar provision directing Congress to "promulgate its rules for the
canvassing of the certificates" in the presidential and vice presidential elections. Notably, when Congress approved its
canvassing rules for the May 14, 2010 national elections on May 25, 2010,47 it did not require the publication thereof for its
effectivity. Rather, Congress made the canvassing rules effective upon its adoption.

In the case of administrative agencies, "promulgation" and "publication" likewise take on different meanings as they are part of
a multi-stage procedure in quasi-legislation. As detailed in one case,48 the publication of implementing rules occurs after their
promulgation or adoption.
Promulgation must thus be used in the context in which it is generally understood—that is, to make known. Generalia verba
sunt generaliter inteligencia. What is generally spoken shall be generally understood. Between the restricted sense and the
general meaning of a word, the general must prevail unless it was clearly intended that the restricted sense was to be used.49

Since the Constitutional Commission did not restrict "promulgation" to "publication," the former should be understood to have
been used in its general sense. It is within the discretion of Congress to determine on how to promulgate its Impeachment Rules,
in much the same way that the Judiciary is permitted to determine that to promulgate a decision means to deliver the decision
to the clerk of court for filing and publication.

It is not for this Court to tell a co-equal branch of government how to promulgate when the Constitution itself has not
prescribed a specific method of promulgation. The Court is in no position to dictate a mode of promulgation beyond the dictates
of the Constitution.

Publication in the Official Gazette or a newspaper of general circulation is but one avenue for Congress to make known its rules.
Jurisprudence emphatically teaches that

x x x in the absence of constitutional or statutory guidelines or specific rules, this Court is devoid of any basis upon which to
determine the legality of the acts of the Senate relative thereto. On grounds of respect for the basic concept of separation of
powers, courts may not intervene in the internal affairs of the legislature; it is not within the province of courts to direct
Congress how to do its work. In the words of Justice Florentino P. Feliciano, this Court is of the opinion that where no specific,
operable norms and standards are shown to exist, then the legislature must be given a real and effective opportunity to fashion
and promulgate as well as to implement them, before the courts may intervene.50 (italics in the original; emphasis and
underscoring supplied; citations omitted)

Had the Constitution intended to have the Impeachment Rules published, it could have stated so as categorically as it did in the
case of the rules of procedure in legislative inquiries, per Neri. Other than "promulgate," there is no other single formal term in
the English language to appropriately refer to an issuance without need of it being published.

IN FINE, petitioner cannot take refuge in Neri since inquiries in aid of legislation under Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution is
the sole instance in the Constitution where there is a categorical directive to duly publish a set of rules of procedure.
Significantly notable in Neri is that with respect to the issue of publication, the Court anchored its ruling on the 1987
Constitution’s directive, without any reliance on or reference to the 1986 case of Tañada v. Tuvera.51 Tañada naturally could
neither have interpreted a forthcoming 1987 Constitution nor had kept a tight rein on the Constitution’s intentions as expressed
through the allowance of either a categorical term or a general sense of making known the issuances.

From the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, then Commissioner, now retired Associate Justice Florenz Regalado
intended Section 3(8), Article XI to be the vehicle for the House to fill the gaps in the impeachment process.

MR. REGALADO. Mr. Presiding Officer, I have decided to put in an additional section because, for instance, under Section 3 (2),
there is mention of indorsing a verified complaint for impeachment by any citizen alleging ultimate facts constituting a ground or
grounds for impeachment. In other words, it is just like a provision in the rules of court. Instead, I propose that this procedural
requirement, like indorsement of a complaint by a citizen to avoid harassment or crank complaints, could very well be taken up
in a new section 4 which shall read as follows: THE CONGRESS SHALL PROMULGATE ITS RULES ON IMPEACHMENT TO
EFFECTIVELY CARRY OUT THE PURPOSES THEREOF. I think all these other procedural requirements could be taken care of by the
Rules of Congress.52 (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The discussion clearly rejects the notion that the impeachment provisions are not self-executing. Section 3(8) does not, in any
circumstance, operate to suspend the entire impeachment mechanism which the Constitutional Commission took pains in
designing even its details.

As against constitutions of the past, modern constitutions have been generally drafted upon a different principle and have often
become in effect extensive codes of laws intended to operate directly upon the people in a manner similar to that of statutory
enactments, and the function of constitutional conventions has evolved into one more like that of a legislative body. Hence,
unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate, the presumption now is
that all provisions of the constitution are self-executing. If the constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation
instead of self-executing, the legislature would have the power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental
law. This can be cataclysmic. That is why the prevailing view is, as it has always been, that —

. . . in case of doubt, the Constitution should be considered self-executing rather than non-self-executing . . . . Unless the
contrary is clearly intended, the provisions of the Constitution should be considered self-executing, as a contrary rule would give
the legislature discretion to determine when, or whether, they shall be effective. These provisions would be subordinated to the
will of the lawmaking body, which could make them entirely meaningless by simply refusing to pass the needed implementing
statute.53 (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Even assuming arguendo that publication is required, lack of it does not nullify the proceedings taken prior to the effectivity of
the Impeachment Rules which faithfully comply with the relevant self-executing provisions of the Constitution. Otherwise, in
cases where impeachment complaints are filed at the start of each Congress, the mandated periods under Section 3, Article XI of
the Constitution would already run or even lapse while awaiting the expiration of the 15-day period of publication prior to the
effectivity of the Impeachment Rules. In effect, the House would already violate the Constitution for its inaction on the
impeachment complaints pending the completion of the publication requirement.

Given that the Constitution itself states that any promulgation of the rules on impeachment is aimed at "effectively carry[ing]
out the purpose" of impeachment proceedings, the Court finds no grave abuse of discretion when the House deemed it proper
to provisionally adopt the Rules on Impeachment of the 14th Congress, to meet the exigency in such situation of early filing and
in keeping with the "effective" implementation of the "purpose" of the impeachment provisions. In other words, the provisional
adoption of the previous Congress’ Impeachment Rules is within the power of the House to promulgate its rules on
impeachment to effectively carry out the avowed purpose.

Moreover, the rules on impeachment, as contemplated by the framers of the Constitution, merely aid or supplement the
procedural aspects of impeachment. Being procedural in nature, they may be given retroactive application to pending actions.
"It is axiomatic that the retroactive application of procedural laws does not violate any right of a person who may feel that he is
adversely affected, nor is it constitutionally objectionable. The reason for this is that, as a general rule, no vested right may
attach to, nor arise from, procedural laws."54 In the present case, petitioner fails to allege any impairment of vested rights.

It bears stressing that, unlike the process of inquiry in aid of legislation where the rights of witnesses are involved, impeachment
is primarily for the protection of the people as a body politic, and not for the punishment of the offender.55

Even Neri concedes that the unpublished rules of legislative inquiries were not considered null and void in its entirety. Rather,

x x x [o]nly those that result in violation of the rights of witnesses should be considered null and void, considering that
the rationale for the publication is to protect the rights of witnesses as expressed in Section 21, Article VI of the
Constitution. Sans such violation, orders and proceedings are considered valid and effective.56 (emphasis and underscoring
supplied)

Petitioner in fact does not deny that she was fully apprised of the proper procedure. She even availed of and invoked certain
provisions57 of the Impeachment Rules when she, on September 7, 2010, filed the motion for reconsideration and later filed the
present petition. The Court thus finds no violation of the due process clause.

The one-year bar rule

Article XI, Section 3, paragraph (5) of the Constitution reads: "No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same
official more than once within a period of one year."

Petitioner reckons the start of the one-year bar from the filing of the first impeachment complaint against her on July 22, 2010
or four days before the opening on July 26, 2010 of the 15th Congress. She posits that within one year from July 22, 2010, no
second impeachment complaint may be accepted and referred to public respondent.

On the other hand, public respondent, respondent Reyes group and respondent-intervenor submit that the initiation starts with
the filing of the impeachment complaint and ends with the referral to the Committee, following Francisco, but venture to
alternatively proffer that the initiation ends somewhere between the conclusion of the Committee Report and the transmittal of
the Articles of Impeachment to the Senate. Respondent Baraquel group, meanwhile, essentially maintains that under either the
prevailing doctrine or the parties’ interpretation, its impeachment complaint could withstand constitutional scrutiny.

Contrary to petitioner’s asseveration, Francisco58 states that the term "initiate" means to file the complaint and take initial action
on it.59 The initiation starts with the filing of the complaint which must be accompanied with an action to set the complaint
moving. It refers to the filing of the impeachment complaint coupled with Congress’ taking initial action of said complaint. The
initial action taken by the House on the complaint is the referral of the complaint to the Committee on Justice.

Petitioner misreads the remark of Commissioner Joaquin Bernas, S.J. that "no second verified impeachment may be accepted
and referred to the Committee on Justice for action"60 which contemplates a situation where a first impeachment complaint had
already been referred. Bernas and Regalado, who both acted as amici curiae in Francisco, affirmed that the act of
initiating includes the act of taking initial action on the complaint.
From the records of the Constitutional Commission, to the amicus curiae  briefs of two former Constitutional Commissioners, it is
without a doubt that the term "to initiate" refers to the filing of the impeachment complaint coupled with Congress' taking
initial action of said complaint.

Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing and referral or endorsement of the impeachment complaint
to the House Committee on Justice or, by the filing by at least one-third61 of the members of the House of Representatives with
the Secretary General of the House, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment
complaint has been initiated, another impeachment complaint may not be filed against the same official within a one year
period.62 (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The Court, in Francisco, thus found that the assailed provisions of the 12th Congress’ Rules of Procedure in Impeachment
Proceedings ─ Sections 1663 and 1764 of Rule V thereof ─ "clearly contravene Section 3(5) of Article XI since they g[a]ve the term
‘initiate’ a meaning different from filing and referral."65

Petitioner highlights certain portions of Francisco which delve on the relevant records of the Constitutional Commission,
particularly Commissioner Maambong’s statements66 that the initiation starts with the filing of the complaint.

Petitioner fails to consider the verb "starts" as the operative word. Commissioner Maambong was all too keen to stress that the
filing of the complaint indeed  starts the initiation and that the House’s action on the committee report/resolution is not part of
that initiation phase.

Commissioner Maambong saw the need "to be very technical about this,"67 for certain exchanges in the Constitutional
Commission deliberations loosely used the term, as shown in the following exchanges.

MR. DAVIDE. That is for conviction, but not for initiation. Initiation of impeachment proceedings still requires a vote of one-fifth
of the membership of the House under the 1935 Constitution.

MR. MONSOD. A two-thirds vote of the membership of the House is required to initiate proceedings.

MR. DAVIDE. No. for initiation of impeachment proceedings, only one-fifth vote of the membership of the House is required; for
conviction, a two-thirds vote of the membership is required.

xxxx

MR. DAVIDE. However, if we allow one-fifth of the membership of the legislature to overturn a report of the committee, we
have here Section 3 (4) which reads:

No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year.

So, necessarily, under this particular subsection, we will, in effect, disallow one-fifth of the members of the National Assembly to
revive an impeachment move by an individual or an ordinary Member.

MR. ROMULO. Yes. May I say that Section 3 (4) is there to look towards the possibility of a very liberal impeachment proceeding.
Second, we were ourselves struggling with that problem where we are faced with just a verified complaint rather than the
signatures of one-fifth, or whatever it is we decide, of the Members of the House. So whether to put a period for the Committee
to report, whether we should not allow the Committee to overrule a mere verified complaint, are some of the questions we
would like to be discussed.

MR. DAVIDE. We can probably overrule a rejection by the Committee by providing that it can be overturned by, say, one-half or
a majority, or one-fifth of the members of the legislature, and that such overturning will not amount to a refiling which is
prohibited under Section 3 (4).

Another point, Madam President. x x x68 (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

An apparent effort to clarify the term "initiate" was made by Commissioner Teodulo Natividad:

MR. NATIVIDAD. How many votes are needed to initiate?

MR. BENGZON. One-third.

MR. NATIVIDAD. To initiate is different from to impeach; to impeach is different from to convict. To impeach means to file the
case before the Senate.

MR. REGALADO. When we speak of "initiative," we refer here to the Articles of Impeachment.

MR. NATIVIDAD. So, that is the impeachment itself, because when we impeach, we are charging him with the Articles of
Impeachment. That is my understanding.69 (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Capping these above-quoted discussions was the explanation of Commissioner Maambong delivered on at least two occasions:

[I]

MR. MAAMBONG. Mr. Presiding Officer, I am not moving for a reconsideration of the approval of the amendment submitted by
Commissioner Regalado, but I will just make of record my thinking that we do not really initiate the filing of the Articles of
Impeachment on the floor. The procedure, as I have pointed out earlier, was that the initiation starts with the filing of the
complaint. And what is actually done on the floor is that the committee resolution containing the Articles of Impeachment is the
one approved by the body.

As the phraseology now runs, which may be corrected by the Committee on Style, it appears that the initiation starts on the
floor. If we only have time, I could cite examples in the case of the impeachment proceedings of President Richard Nixon
wherein the Committee on the Judiciary submitted the recommendation, the resolution, and the Articles of Impeachment to the
body, and it was the body who approved the resolution. It is not the body which initiates it. It only approves or disapproves the
resolution. So, on that score, probably the Committee on Style could help in rearranging the words because we have to be very
technical about this. I have been bringing with me The Rules of the House of Representatives of the U.S. Congress. The Senate
Rules are with me. The proceedings on the case of Richard Nixon are with me. I have submitted my proposal, but the Committee
has already decided. Nevertheless, I just want to indicate this on record.

Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer.70 (italics in the original; emphasis and underscoring supplied)

[II]

MR. MAAMBONG. I would just like to move for a reconsideration of the approval of Section 3 (3). My reconsideration will not at
all affect the substance, but it is only with keeping with the exact formulation of the Rules of the House of Representatives of the
United States regarding impeachment.

I am proposing, Madam President, without doing damage to any of its provision, that on page 2, Section 3 (3), from lines 17 to
18, we delete the words which read: "to initiate impeachment proceedings" and the comma (,) and insert on line 19 after the
word "resolution" the phrase WITH THE ARTICLES, and then capitalize the letter "i" in "impeachment" and replace the word "by"
with OF, so that the whole section will now read: "A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be
necessary either to affirm a resolution WITH THE ARTICLES of impeachment OF the committee or to override its contrary
resolution. The vote of each Member shall be recorded."

I already mentioned earlier yesterday that the initiation, as far as the House of Representatives of the United States is
concerned, really starts from the filing of the verified complaint and every resolution to impeach always carries with it the
Articles of Impeachment. As a matter of fact, the words "Articles of Impeachment" are mentioned on line 25 in the case of the
direct filing of a verified complaint of one-third of all the Members of the House. I will mention again, Madam President, that my
amendment will not vary the substance in any way. It is only in keeping with the uniform procedure of the House of
Representatives of the United States Congress.

Thank you, Madam President.71 (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

To the next logical question of what ends or completes the initiation, Commissioners Bernas and Regalado lucidly explained that
the filing of the complaint must be accompanied by the referral to the Committee on Justice, which is the action that sets the
complaint moving. Francisco cannot be any clearer in pointing out the material dates.

Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the impeachment complaint and referral to the House
Committee on Justice, the initial action taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an
impeachment complaint has been initiated in the foregoing manner, another may not be filed against the same official within a
one year period following Article XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution.
In fine, considering that the first impeachment complaint was filed by former President Estrada against Chief Justice Hilario G.
Davide, Jr., along with seven associate justices of this Court, on June 2, 2003 and referred to the House Committee on Justice
on August 5, 2003, the second impeachment complaint filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William
Fuentebella against the Chief Justice on October 23, 2003 violates the constitutional prohibition against the initiation of
impeachment proceedings against the same impeachable officer within a one-year period.72 (emphasis, italics and underscoring
supplied)

These clear pronouncements notwithstanding, petitioner posits that the date of referral was considered irrelevant in Francisco.
She submits that referral could not be the reckoning point of initiation because "something prior to that had already been
done,"73 apparently citing Bernas’ discussion.

The Court cannot countenance any attempt at obscurantism.

What the cited discussion was rejecting was the view that the House’s action on the committee report initiates the
impeachment proceedings. It did not state that to determine the initiating step, absolutely nothing prior to it must be done.
Following petitioner’s line of reasoning, the verification of the complaint or the endorsement by a member of the House – steps
done prior to the filing – would already initiate the impeachment proceedings.

Contrary to petitioner’s emphasis on impeachment complaint, what the Constitution mentions is impeachment "proceedings."
Her reliance on the singular tense of the word "complaint"74 to denote the limit prescribed by the Constitution goes against the
basic rule of statutory construction that a word covers its enlarged and plural sense.75

The Court, of course, does not downplay the importance of an impeachment complaint, for it is the matchstick that kindles the
candle of impeachment proceedings. The filing of an impeachment complaint is like the lighting of a matchstick. Lighting the
matchstick alone, however, cannot light up the candle, unless the lighted matchstick reaches or torches the candle
wick. Referring the complaint to the proper committee ignites the impeachment proceeding. With a simultaneous referral of
multiple complaints filed, more than one lighted matchsticks light the candle at the same time. What is important is that there
should only be ONE CANDLE that is kindled in a year, such that once the candle starts burning, subsequent matchsticks can no
longer rekindle the candle.

A restrictive interpretation renders the impeachment mechanism both illusive and illusory.

For one, it puts premium on senseless haste. Petitioner’s stance suggests that whoever files the first impeachment complaint
exclusively gets the attention of Congress which sets in motion an exceptional once-a-year mechanism wherein government
resources are devoted. A prospective complainant, regardless of ill motives or best intentions, can wittingly or unwittingly
desecrate the entire process by the expediency of submitting a haphazard complaint out of sheer hope to be the first in line. It
also puts to naught the effort of other prospective complainants who, after diligently gathering evidence first to buttress the
case, would be barred days or even hours later from filing an impeachment complaint.

Placing an exceedingly narrow gateway to the avenue of impeachment proceedings turns its laudable purpose into a laughable
matter. One needs only to be an early bird even without seriously intending to catch the worm, when the process is precisely
intended to effectively weed out "worms" in high offices which could otherwise be ably caught by other prompt birds within the
ultra-limited season.

Moreover, the first-to-file scheme places undue strain on the part of the actual complainants, injured party or principal
witnesses who, by mere happenstance of an almost always unforeseeable filing of a first impeachment complaint, would be
brushed aside and restricted from directly participating in the impeachment process.

Further, prospective complainants, along with their counsel and members of the House of Representatives who sign, endorse
and file subsequent impeachment complaints against the same impeachable officer run the risk of violating the Constitution
since they would have already initiated a second impeachment proceeding within the same year. Virtually anybody can initiate a
second or third impeachment proceeding by the mere filing of endorsed impeachment complaints. Without any public notice
that could charge them with knowledge, even members of the House of Representatives could not readily ascertain whether no
other impeachment complaint has been filed at the time of committing their endorsement.

The question as to who should administer or pronounce that an impeachment proceeding has been initiated rests also on the
body that administers the proceedings prior to the impeachment trial. As gathered from Commissioner Bernas’
disquisition76 in Francisco, a proceeding which "takes place not in the Senate but in the House"77 precedes the bringing of an
impeachment case to the Senate. In fact, petitioner concedes that the initiation of impeachment proceedings is within the sole
and absolute control of the House of Representatives.78 Conscious of the legal import of each step, the House, in taking charge
of its own proceedings, must deliberately decide to initiate an impeachment proceeding, subject to the time frame and other
limitations imposed by the Constitution. This chamber of Congress alone, not its officers or members or any private individual,
should own up to its processes.

The Constitution did not place the power of the "final say" on the lips of the House Secretary General who would otherwise be
calling the shots in forwarding or freezing any impeachment complaint. Referral of the complaint to the proper committee is not
done by the House Speaker alone either, which explains why there is a need to include it in the Order of Business of the House.
It is the House of Representatives, in public plenary session, which has the power to set its own chamber into special operation
by referring the complaint or to otherwise guard against the initiation of a second impeachment proceeding by rejecting a
patently unconstitutional complaint.

Under the Rules of the House, a motion to refer is not among those motions that shall be decided without debate, but any
debate thereon is only made subject to the five-minute rule.79 Moreover, it is common parliamentary practice that a motion to
refer a matter or question to a committee may be debated upon, not as to the merits thereof, but only as to the propriety of the
referral.80 With respect to complaints for impeachment, the House has the discretion not to refer a subsequent impeachment
complaint to the Committee on Justice where official records and further debate show that an impeachment complaint filed
against the same impeachable officer has already been referred to the said committee and the one year period has not yet
expired, lest it becomes instrumental in perpetrating a constitutionally prohibited second impeachment proceeding. Far from
being mechanical, before the referral stage, a period of deliberation is afforded the House, as the Constitution, in fact, grants a
maximum of three session days within which to make the proper referral.

As mentioned, one limitation imposed on the House in initiating an impeachment proceeding deals with deadlines. The
Constitution states that "[a] verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House of Representatives
or by any citizen upon a resolution or endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be included in the Order of
Business within ten session days, and referred to the proper Committee within three session days thereafter."

In the present case, petitioner failed to establish grave abuse of discretion on the allegedly "belated" referral of the first
impeachment complaint filed by the Baraquel group. For while the said complaint was filed on July 22, 2010, there was yet then
no session in Congress. It was only four days later or on July 26, 2010 that the 15th Congress opened from which date the 10-day
session period started to run. When, by Memorandum of August 2, 2010, Speaker Belmonte directed the Committee on Rules to
include the complaint in its Order of Business, it was well within the said 10-day session period.81

There is no evident point in rushing at closing the door the moment an impeachment complaint is filed. Depriving the people
(recall that impeachment is primarily for the protection of the people as a body politic) of reasonable access to the limited
political vent simply prolongs the agony and frustrates the collective rage of an entire citizenry whose trust has been betrayed
by an impeachable officer. It shortchanges the promise of reasonable opportunity to remove an impeachable officer through the
mechanism enshrined in the Constitution.

But neither does the Court find merit in respondents’ alternative contention that the initiation of the impeachment proceedings,
which sets into motion the one-year bar, should include or await, at the earliest, the Committee on Justice report. To public
respondent, the reckoning point of initiation should refer to the disposition of the complaint by the vote of at least one-third
(1/3) of all the members of the House.82 To the Reyes group, initiation means the act of transmitting the Articles of Impeachment
to the Senate.83 To respondent-intervenor, it should last until the Committee on Justice’s recommendation to the House
plenary.84

The Court, in Francisco, rejected a parallel thesis in which a related proposition was inputed in the therein assailed provisions of
the Impeachment Rules of the 12th Congress. The present case involving an impeachment proceeding against the Ombudsman
offers no cogent reason for the Court to deviate from what was settled in Francisco that dealt with the impeachment proceeding
against the then Chief Justice. To change the reckoning point of initiation on no other basis but to accommodate the socio-
political considerations of respondents does not sit well in a court of law.

x x x We ought to be guided by the doctrine of stare decisis et non quieta movere. This doctrine, which is really "adherence to
precedents," mandates that once a case has been decided one way, then another case involving exactly the same point at issue
should be decided in the same manner. This doctrine is one of policy grounded on the necessity for securing certainty and
stability of judicial decisions. As the renowned jurist Benjamin Cardozo stated in his treatise The Nature of the Judicial Process:

It will not do to decide the same question one way between one set of litigants and the opposite way between another. "If a
group of cases involves the same point, the parties expect the same decision. It would be a gross injustice to decide alternate
cases on opposite principles. If a case was decided against me yesterday when I was a defendant, I shall look for the same
judgment today if I am plaintiff. To decide differently would raise a feeling of resentment and wrong in my breast; it would be an
infringement, material and moral, of my rights." Adherence to precedent must then be the rule rather than the exception if
litigants are to have faith in the even-handed administration of justice in the courts.85
As pointed out in Francisco, the impeachment proceeding is not initiated "when the House deliberates on the resolution passed
on to it by the Committee, because something prior to that has already been done. The action of the House is already a further
step in the proceeding, not its initiation or beginning. Rather, the proceeding is initiated or begins, when a verified complaint is
filed and referred to the Committee on Justice for action. This is the initiating step which triggers the series of steps that
follow."86

Allowing an expansive construction of the term "initiate" beyond the act of referral allows the unmitigated influx of successive
complaints, each having their own respective 60-session-day period of disposition from referral. Worse, the Committee shall
conduct overlapping hearings until and unless the disposition of one of the complaints ends with the affirmance of a resolution
for impeachment or the overriding87 of a contrary resolution (as espoused by public respondent), or the House transmits the
Articles of Impeachment (as advocated by the Reyes group),88 or the Committee on Justice concludes its first report to the House
plenary regardless of the recommendation (as posited by respondent-intervenor). Each of these scenarios runs roughshod the
very purpose behind the constitutionally imposed one-year bar. Opening the floodgates too loosely would disrupt the series of
steps operating in unison under one proceeding.

The Court does not lose sight of the salutary reason of confining only one impeachment proceeding in a year. Petitioner
concededly cites Justice Adolfo Azcuna’s separate opinion that concurred with the Francisco ruling.89 Justice Azcuna stated that
the purpose of the one-year bar is two-fold: "to prevent undue or too frequent harassment; and 2) to allow the legislature to do
its principal task [of] legislation," with main reference to the records of the Constitutional Commission, that reads:

MR. ROMULO. Yes, the intention here really is to limit. This is not only to protect public officials who, in this case, are of the
highest category from harassment but also to allow the legislative body to do its work which is lawmaking. Impeachment
proceedings take a lot of time. And if we allow multiple impeachment charges on the same individual to take place, the
legislature will do nothing else but that.90 (underscoring supplied)

It becomes clear that the consideration behind the intended limitation refers to the element of time, and not the number of
complaints. The impeachable officer should defend himself in only one impeachment proceeding, so that he will not be
precluded from performing his official functions and duties. Similarly, Congress should run only one impeachment proceeding so
as not to leave it with little time to attend to its main work of law-making. The doctrine laid down in Francisco that initiation
means filing and referral remains congruent to the rationale of the constitutional provision.

Petitioner complains that an impeachable officer may be subjected to harassment by the filing of multiple impeachment
complaints during the intervening period of a maximum of 13 session days between the date of the filing of the first
impeachment complaint to the date of referral.

As pointed out during the oral arguments91 by the counsel for respondent-intervenor, the framework of privilege and layers of
protection for an impeachable officer abound. The requirements or restrictions of a one-year bar, a single proceeding,
verification of complaint, endorsement by a House member, and a finding of sufficiency of form and substance – all these must
be met before bothering a respondent to answer – already weigh heavily in favor of an impeachable officer.

Aside from the probability of an early referral and the improbability of inclusion in the agenda of a complaint filed on the 11th
hour (owing to pre-agenda standard operating procedure), the number of complaints may still be filtered or reduced to nil after
the Committee decides once and for all on the sufficiency of form and substance. Besides, if only to douse petitioner’s fear, a
complaint will not last the primary stage if it does not have the stated preliminary requisites.

To petitioner, disturbance of her performance of official duties and the deleterious effects of bad publicity are enough
oppression.

Petitioner’s claim is based on the premise that the exertion of time, energy and other resources runs directly proportional to the
number of complaints filed. This is non sequitur. What the Constitution assures an impeachable officer is not freedom from
arduous effort to defend oneself, which depends on the qualitative assessment of the charges and evidence and not on the
quantitative aspect of complaints or offenses. In considering the side of the impeachable officers, the Constitution does not
promise an absolutely smooth ride for them, especially if the charges entail genuine and grave issues. The framers of the
Constitution did not concern themselves with the media tolerance level or internal disposition of an impeachable officer when
they deliberated on the impairment of performance of official functions. The measure of protection afforded by the Constitution
is that if the impeachable officer is made to undergo such ride, he or she should be made to traverse it just once. Similarly, if
Congress is called upon to operate itself as a vehicle, it should do so just once. There is no repeat ride for one full year. This is
the whole import of the constitutional safeguard of one-year bar rule.

Applicability of the Rules on Criminal Procedure

On another plane, petitioner posits that public respondent gravely abused its discretion when it disregarded its own
Impeachment Rules, the same rules she earlier chastised.

In the exercise of the power to promulgate rules "to effectively carry out" the provisions of Section 3, Article XI of the
Constitution, the House promulgated the Impeachment Rules, Section 16 of which provides that "the Rules
of Criminal Procedure under the Rules of Court shall, as far as practicable, apply to impeachment proceedings before the
House."

Finding that the Constitution, by express grant, permits the application of additional adjective rules that Congress may consider
in effectively carrying out its mandate, petitioner either asserts or rejects two procedural devices.

First is on the "one offense, one complaint" rule. By way of reference to Section 16 of the Impeachment Rules, petitioner invokes
the application of Section 13, Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure which states that "[a] complaint or information must
charge only one offense, except when the law prescribes a single punishment for various offenses." To petitioner, the two
impeachment complaints are insufficient in form and substance since each charges her with both culpable violation of the
Constitution and betrayal of public trust. She concludes that public respondent gravely abused its discretion when it disregarded
its own rules.

Petitioner adds that heaping two or more charges in one complaint will confuse her in preparing her defense; expose her to the
grave dangers of the highly political nature of the impeachment process; constitute a whimsical disregard of certain rules; impair
her performance of official functions as well as that of the House; and prevent public respondent from completing its report
within the deadline.

Public respondent counters that there is no requirement in the Constitution that an impeachment complaint must charge only
one offense, and the nature of impeachable offenses precludes the application of the above-said Rule on Criminal Procedure
since the broad terms cannot be defined with the same precision required in defining crimes. It adds that the determination of
the grounds for impeachment is an exercise of political judgment, which issue respondent-intervenor also considers as non-
justiciable, and to which the Baraquel group adds that impeachment is a political process and not a criminal prosecution, during
which criminal prosecution stage the complaint or information referred thereto and cited by petitioner, unlike an impeachment
complaint, must already be in the name of the People of the Philippines.

The Baraquel group deems that there are provisions92 outside the Rules on Criminal Procedure that are more relevant to the
issue. Both the Baraquel and Reyes groups point out that even if Sec. 13 of Rule 110 is made to apply, petitioner’s case falls
under the exception since impeachment prescribes a single punishment – removal from office and disqualification to hold any
public office – even for various offenses. Both groups also observe that petitioner concededly and admittedly was not keen on
pursuing this issue during the oral arguments.

Petitioner’s claim deserves scant consideration.

Without going into the effectiveness of the suppletory application of the Rules on Criminal Procedure in carrying out the relevant
constitutional provisions, which prerogative the Constitution vests on Congress, and without delving into the practicability of the
application of the one offense per complaint rule, the initial determination of which must be made by the House93 which has yet
to pass upon the question, the Court finds that petitioner’s invocation of that particular rule of Criminal Procedure does not lie.
Suffice it to state that the Constitution allows the indictment for multiple impeachment offenses, with each charge representing
an article of impeachment, assembled in one set known as the "Articles of Impeachment."94 It, therefore, follows that an
impeachment complaint need not allege only one impeachable offense.

The second procedural matter deals with the rule on consolidation. In rejecting a consolidation, petitioner maintains that the
Constitution allows only one impeachment complaint against her within one year.

Records show that public respondent disavowed any immediate need to consolidate. Its chairperson Rep. Tupas stated that
"[c]onsolidation depends on the Committee whether to consolidate[; c]onsolidation may come today or may come later on after
determination of the sufficiency in form and substance," and that "for purposes of consolidation, the Committee will decide
when is the time to consolidate[, a]nd if, indeed, we need to consolidate."95 Petitioner’s petition, in fact, initially describes the
consolidation as merely "contemplated."96

Since public respondent, whether motu proprio or upon motion, did not yet order a consolidation, the Court will not venture to
make a determination on this matter, as it would be premature, conjectural or anticipatory.97
Even if the Court assumes petitioner’s change of stance that the two impeachment complaints were deemed consolidated,98 her
claim that consolidation is a legal anomaly fails. Petitioner’s theory obviously springs from her "proceeding = complaint"
equation which the Court already brushed aside.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The assailed Resolutions of September 1, 2010 and September 7, 2010 of public
respondent, the House of Representatives Committee on Justice, are NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The Status Quo Ante Order
issued by the Court on September 14, 2010 is LIFTED.

SO ORDERED.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES Criminal Case No. 26558

Plaintiff, For: PLUNDER

-    versus –  

JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA, PRESENT:

Former President of the
Republic of the Philippines, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, PJ,
Chairperson
JOSE "JINGGOY" ESTRADA,
CHARLIE "ATONG" TIU HAY SY ANG, VILLARUZ, JR., and
EDWARD S. SERAPIO, PERALTA, JJ.
YOLANDA T. RICAFORTE,
ALMA ALFARO,  
JOHN DOE also known as
ELEUTERIO RAMOS TAN or MR. UY,
PROMULGATED:
JANE DOE also known as
DELIA RAJAS,
September 12, 2007
JOHN DOES and JANE DOES, Accused.

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

Republic Act (RA) No. 7080 as amended was approved on July 12, 1991, creating and introducing into our criminal legal system
the crime of "plunder". This law penalizes public officers who would amass immense wealth through a series or combination of
overt or criminal acts described in the statute in violation of the public trust. RA No. 7080 or the Anti-Plunder Law was a
consolidation of Senate Bill no. 733 and House Bill No. 22752. The Explanatory Note of Senate Bill No. 733, quoted in the case
of Estrada v. Sandiganbayan (G.R. No. 148965, February 26, 2002, 377 SCRA 538, 555), explains the reason behind the law as
follows:

Plunder, a term chosen from other equally apt terminologies like kleptocracy and economic treason, punishes the use
of high office for personal enrichment, committed thru a series of acts done not in the public eye but in stealth and
secrecy over a period of time, that may involve so many persons, here and abroad, and which touch so many states and
territorial units. The acts and/or omissions sought to be penalized do not involve simple cases of malversation of public
funds, bribery, extortion, theft and graft but constitute plunder of an entire nation resulting in material damage to the
national economy. The above-described crime does not yet exist in Philippine statute books. Thus, the need to come up
with a legislation as a safeguard against the possible recurrence of the depravities of the previous regime and as a
deterrent to those with similar inclination to succumb to the corrupting influence of power.

The majority opinion in the above-cited case, penned by Honorable Justice Josue N. Bellosillo, further explained the rationale
behind the Anti-Plunder Law in this manner:

Our nation has been racked by scandals of corruption and obscene profligacy of officials in high places which have
shaken its very foundation. The anatomy of graft and corruption has become more elaborate in the corridors of time as
unscrupulous people relentlessly contrive more and more ingenious ways to milk the coffers of the government. Drastic
and radical measures are imperative to fight the increasingly sophisticated, extraordinarily methodical and
economically catastrophic looting of the national treasury. Such is the Plunder Law, especially designed to disentangle
those ghastly tissues of grand-scale corruption which, if left unchecked, will spread like a malignant tumor and
ultimately consume the moral and institutional fiber of our nation. The Plunder Law, indeed, is a living testament to the
 will of the legislature to ultimately eradicate this scourge and thus secure society against the avarice and other
venalities in public office.

These are times that try men’s souls. In the checkered history of this nation, few issues of national importance can
equal the amount of interest and passion generated by petitioner’s ignominious fall from the highest office, and his
eventual prosecution and trial under a virginal statute. This continuing saga has driven a wedge of dissension among
our people that may linger for a long time. Only by responding to the clarion call for patriotism, to rise above
factionalism and prejudices, shall we emerge triumphant in the midst of ferment. [Emphasis Supplied]

The present case is the first of its kind to be filed charging the highest official of the land, a former President, among others, of
the offense of plunder. Needless to state, the resolution of this case shall set significant historical and legal precedents.

Throughout the six years over which the court proceedings in this case unfolded, this Court confronted numerous novel and
complicated legal issues (including the constitutionality of the plunder law, propriety of house arrest, among others), heard
lengthy testimonies from several dozens of witnesses from both sides and perused voluminous documentary evidence and
pleadings from the parties. Considering the personalities involved and the nature of the crime charged, the present case aroused
particularly intense interest from the public. Speculations on the probable outcome of the case received unparalleled attention
from the media and other sectors of society. Indeed, the factual and legal complexities of the case are further compounded by
attempts to sensationalize the proceedings for various ends.

However, this Court is ever mindful of its imperative duty to act as an impartial arbiter: (a) to serve the interest of the State and
the public in punishing those who would so severely abuse their public office and those private individuals would aid them or
conspire with them and (b) to protect the right of the accused to be only convicted upon guilt proven beyond reasonable doubt.
Thus, the decision of this Court follows, upon no other consideration other than the law and a review of the evidence on record.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

AND THE PROCEEDINGS
__________________________

This case for plunder commenced with the filing on April 4, 2001 of the Information which is quoted hereunder:

INFORMATION

The undersigned Ombudsman Prosecutor and OIC-Director, EPIB, Office of the Ombudsman, hereby accuses former
Joseph Ejercito Estrada, together with Jose "Jinggoy" Estrada, Charlie ‘Atong" Ang, Edward Serapio, Yolanda T.
Ricaforte, Alma Alfaro, Eleuterio Tan a.k.a. Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas, and John & Jane
Does, of the crime of Plunder, defined and penalized under R.A. No. 7080, as amended by Sec. 12 of R.A. No. 7659,
committed as follows:

That during the period from June, 1998 to January, 2001, in the Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, accused Joseph Ejercito Estrada, by himself and in conspiracy with his co-accused, business
associates and persons heretofore named, by taking advantage of his official position, authority, connection or
influence as President of the Republic of the Philippines, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally
amass, accumulate and acquire ill-gotten wealth, and unjustly enrich himself in the aggregate amount of
P4,097,804,173.17, more or less, through a combination and series of overt and criminal acts, described as
follows:

(a)              by receiving, collecting, directly or indirectly, on many instances, so-called "jueteng money" from
gambling operators in connivance with co-accused Jose ‘Jinggoy’ Estrada, Yolanda T. Ricaforte and Edward
Serapio, as witnessed by Gov. Luis ‘Chavit’ Singson, among other witnesses, in the aggregate amount of FIVE
HUNDRED FORTY-FIVE MILLION PESOS (P545,000,000.00), more or less, in consideration of their protection
from arrest or interference by law enforcers in their illegal "jueteng" activities; and

(b)              by misappropriating, converting and miusing for his gain and benefit public fund in the amount of
ONE HUNDRRED THIRTY MILLION PESOS (P130,000,000.00), more or less, representing a portion of the One
Hundred Seventy Million Pesos (P170,000,000.00) tobacco excise tax share allocated for the Province of Ilocos
Sur under R.A. No. 7171, in conspiracy with co-accused Charlie ‘Atong’ Ang, Alma Alfaro, Eleuterio Tan a.k.a
Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, and Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas, as witnessed by Gov. Luis ‘Chavit’ Singson,
among other witnesses; and
 (c)              by directing, ordering and compelling the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) and the
Social Security System (SSS) to purchase and buy a combined total of 681,733,000 shares of stock of the Belle
Corporatiion in the aggregate gross value of One Billion Eight Hundred Forty-Seven Million Five Hundred
Seventy Eight Thousand Fifty Seven Pesos and Fifty Centavos (P1,847,578,057.50), for the purpose of collecting
for his personal gain and benefit, as in fact he did collect and receive the sum of ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY NINE
MILLION SEVEN HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P 189,700,000.00), as commission from said stock purchase;
and

(d)              by unjustly enriching himself in the amount of THREE BILLION TWO HUNDRED THIRTY THREE
MILLION ONE HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE PESOS AND SEVENTEEN CENTAVOS
(P 3,233,104,173.17) comprising his unexplained wealth acquired, accumulated and amassed by him under his
account name "Jose Velarde" with Equitable PCI Bank;

to the damage and prejudice of the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Various motions were filed by accused Former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada (FPres. Estrada), Jose "Jinggoy" Estrada (Jinggoy
Estrada), and Edward S. Serapio (Serapio). Accused Serapio filed his Urgent Omnibus Motion (a) to Hold in abeyance the issuance
of warrant of arrest and further Proceedings; (b) to conduct a determination of probable cause; (c) for leave to file accused’s
motion for reconsideration and /or reinvestigation; and (d) to direct the Ombudsman to conduct a reinvestigation of the charges
against accused Serapio dated April 6, 2001. While accused FPres. Estrada filed three (3) motions; (1) Urgent Motion to Defer
Proceedings, dated April 9, 2001, (2) Position Paper Re: Probable Cause (ex abundante ad cautelam) dated April 9, 2001 which
was joined by accused Jinggoy Estrada, and (3) Motion to (a) remand the case to the Ombudsman for preliminary investigation
consistent with the Honorable Supreme Court’s Resolution in G.R. No. 147512-19 (Joseph E. Estrada v. Hon. Aniano Desierto, et
al.); and (b) hold in abeyance judicial action in the case particularly the issuance of a warrant of arrest and steps leading thereto
until after the conduct of a proper preliminary investigation, dated April 11, 2001.

In a Resolution promulgated on April 16, 2001, the Court directed the prosecution to submit to the Court not later than April 18,
2001 the required affidavits, counter-affidavits, and supporting evidence as well as other supporting documents accompanying
the Information, which were needed to determine the existence of probable cause for the issuance or non-issuance of a warrant
of arrest. As directed, the prosecution filed on April 18, 2001 its Manifestation and Compliance.

On April 19, 2001, the prosecution filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to admit Amended Information, which is quoted hereunder:

AMENDED INFORMATION

The undersigned Ombudsman Prosecutor and OIC-Director, EPIB, Office of the Ombudsman, hereby accuses
former PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES, Joseph Ejercito Estrada a.k.a. "ASIONG SALONGA" AND a.k.a. "JOSE
VELARDE", together with Jose ‘Jinggoy’ Estrada, Charlie "Atong" Ang, Edward Serapio, Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Alma
Alfaro, JOHN DOE a.k.a. Eleuterio Tan OR Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas, and John DOES &
Jane Does, of the crime of Plunder, defined and penalized under R.A. No. 7080, as amended by Sec. 12 of R.A. No. 7659,
committed as follows:

That during the period from June, 1998 to January, 2001, in the Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, accused Joseph Ejercito Estrada, THEN A PUBLIC OFFICER, BEING THEN THE PRESIDENT OF
THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, by himself AND/OR in CONNIVANCE/CONSPIRACY with his co-
accused, WHO ARE MEMBERS OF HIS FAMILY, RELATIVES BY AFFINITY OR CONSANGUINITY, BUSINESS
ASSOCIATES, SUBORDINATES AND/OR OTHER PERSONS, BY TAKING UNDUE ADVANTAGE OF HIS OFFICIAL
POSITION, AUTHORITY, RELATIONSHIP, CONNECTION, OR INFLUENCE, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and criminally amass, accumulate and acquire BY HIMSELF, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, ill-gotten wealth in the
aggregate amount OR TOTAL VALUE of FOUR BILLION NINETY SEVEN MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FOUR
THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE PESOS AND SEVENTEEN CENTAVOS [P4,097,804,173.17], more or
less, THEREBY UNJUSTLY ENRICHING HIMSELF OR THEMSELVES AT THE EXPENSE AND TO THE DAMAGE OF THE
FILIPINO PEOPLE AND THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, through ANY OR A combination OR A series of
overt OR criminal acts, OR SIMILAR SCHEMES OR MEANS, described as follows:

(a)              by receiving OR collecting, directly or indirectly, on SEVERAL INSTANCES, MONEY IN THE

AGGREGATE AMOUNT OF FIVE HUNDRED FORTY-FIVE MILLION PESOS (P545,000,000.00), MORE OR LESS,
FROM ILLEGAL GAMBLING IN THE FORM OF GIFT, SHARE, PERCENTAGE, KICKBACK OR ANY FORM OF
PECUNIARY BENEFIT, BY HIMSELF AND/OR in connivance with co-accused CHARLIE ‘ATONG’ ANG, JOSE
 ‘Jinggoy’ Estrada, Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Edward Serapio, AND JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, in consideration OF
TOLERATION OR PROTECTION OF ILLEGAL GAMBLING;

(b)              by DIVERTING, RECEIVING, misappropriating, converting OR misusing DIRECTLY OR

INDIRECTLY, for HIS OR THEIR PERSONAL gain and benefit, public funds in the amount of ONE HUNDRED
THIRTY MILLION PESOS [P130,000,000.00], more or less, representing a portion of the TWO HUNDRED
MILLION PESOS [P200,000,000.00] tobacco excise tax share allocated for the Province of Ilocos Sur under R.A.
No. 7171, BY HIMSELF AND/OR in CONNIVANCE with co-accused Charlie ‘Atong’ Ang, Alma Alfaro, JOHN DOE
a.k.a. Eleuterio Tan OR Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, and Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas, AND OTHER JOHN DOES
AND JANE DOES;

(c)              by directing, ordering and compelling, FOR HIS PERSONAL GAIN AND BENEFIT, the Government
Service Insurance System (GSIS) TO PURCHASE, 351,878,000 SHARES OF STOCKS, MORE OR LESS, and the
Social Security System (SSS), 329,855,000 SHARES OF STOCK, MORE OR LESS, OF THE BELLE CORPORATION IN
THE AMOUNT OF MORE OR LESS ONE BILLION ONE HUNDRED TWO MILLION NINE HUNDRED SIXTY FIVE
THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED SEVEN PESOS AND FIFTY CENTAVOS [P1,102,965,607.50] AND MORE OR LESS SEVEN
HUNDRED FORTY FOUR MILLION SIX HUNDRED TWELVE THOUSAND AND FOUR HUNDRED FIFTY PESOS
[P744,612,450.00], RESPECTIVELY, OR A TOTAL OF MORE OR LESS ONE BILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FORTY SEVEN
MILLION FIVE HUNDRED SEVENTY EIGHT THOUSAND FIFTY SEVEN PESOS AND FIFTY CENTAVOS
[P1,847,578,057.50]; AND BY COLLECTING OR RECEIVING, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, BY HIMSELF AND/OR IN
CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, COMMISSIONS OR PERCENTAGES BY REASON OF SAID
PURCHASES OF SHARES OF STOCK IN THE AMOUNT OF ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY NINE MILLION SEVEN HUNDRED
THOUSAND PESOS [P189,700,000.00], MORE OR LESS, FROM THE BELLE CORPORATION WHICH BECAME PART
OF THE DEPOSIT IN THE EQUITABLE-PCI BANK UNDER THE ACCOUNT NAME "JOSE VELARDE";

(d)              by unjustly enriching himself FROM COMMISSIONS, GIFTS, SHARES, PERCENTAGES, KICKBACKS, OR

ANY FORM OF PECUNIARY BENEFITS, IN CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, in the amount
of MORE OR LESS THREE BILLION TWO HNDRED THIRTY THREE MILLION ONE HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND AND
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE PESOS AND SEVENTEEN CENTAVOS [P3,233,104,173.17] AND DEPOSITING THE
SAME UNDER HIS ACCOUNT NAME "JOSE VELARDE" AT THE EQUITABLE-PCI BANK.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

On April 20, 2001, the Court in its Minute Resolution granted and admitted the prosecution’s Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Admit
Amended Information dated April 18, 2001.

On April 25, 2001, the Court promulgated its Resolution which stated:

xxx       xxx       xxx the Court finds and so hold that probable cause for the offense of PLUNDER exists to justify issuance
of warrants for the arrest of accused Former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada, Mayor Jose "Jinggoy" Estrada, Charlie
"Atong" Ang, Edward Serapio, Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Alma Alfaro, John Doe a.k.a. Eleuterio Tan or Eleuterio Ramos Tan
or Mr. Uy, and Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas.

No bail is fixed for the provisional liberty of the accused for the reason that the penalty imposable for the offense of
plunder under RA No. 7080, as amended by Sec. 12 of RA No. 7659, is reclusion perpetua to death.

Director General Leandro R. Mendoza, Chief of the Philippine National Police, shall implement the warrant of arrest
upon service to him by Mr. Edgardo A. Urieta, Chief of the Sheriff and Security Services Division of the Sandiganbayan.
Once arrested, all the accused shall undergo the required processes and be detained at the PNP Detention Center,
Camp Crame, Quezon City subject to, and until, further orders from this Court.

On the 25th day of April 2001, on the basis of the said resolution, the Court issued an Order of Arrest and Hold Departure Order
for all the named accused in the present information. The Philippine National Police (PNP) submittd its Report of Compliance
dated April 25, 2001 which stated:

1.              That in compliance with the Order of Arrest issued by the Honorable Court in the above captioned criminal
case, accused Joseph E. Estrada and Jose "Jinggoy" Estrada, both residence of no. 1 Polk Street, North Greenhills, San
Juan, Metro Manila voluntarily surrendered to the undersigned on 25 April 2001 at about 3:00 o’clock PM at said
residence in the presence of their counsels.
 2. That right after their surrender, they were brought inside Camp Crame, Quezon City for the required processes and
pending further orders from this Honorable Court they shall be kept in Camp Crame;

A Compliance/Return of Warrant of Arrest was also filed on April 26, 2001 by P/Chief Superintendent Nestor B. Gualberto.

As to accused Serapio, the PNP’s Report of Compliance reads in part:

2. That one of the accused named therein, Atty. Edward S. Serapio, surrendered to the Chief, Philippine National Police,
through the Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG) in Camp Crame, Quezon City on April 25, 2001 at about
9:45 PM where the required processes were administered to him and pending further orders from this Honorable Court
he shall be kept in Camp Crame;

The Court, in its Minute Resolution dated April 26, 2001, set the arraignment of the detained accused on May 3, 2001 which was
cancelled due to the different motions filed by the accused. Accused Jinggoy Estrada filed his Motion to Quash or Suspend dated
April 24, 2001 and a Very Urgent Omnibus Motion dated April 30, 2001. Among other motions, accused FPres. Estrada filed his
Motion to Quash dated June 7, 2001 and accused Serapio filed his Motion to Quash (Re: Amended Information dated April 18,
2001) dated June 26, 2001. In its Resolution dated July 9, 2001, the Court denied all the aforesaid motions to quash and accused
Jinggoy Estrada’s Very Urgent Omnibus Motion dated April 30, 2001. The Court’s Resolution dated July 9, 2001 was sustained by
the Honorable Supreme Court in the Decisions rendered in Joseph Ejercito Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan (G.R. No. 148560,
November 19, 2001) and Jose "Jinggoy" Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan (G.R. No. 148965, February 26, 2002).

On July 10, 2001, the Court denied the motion to defer filed by accused FPres. Estrada and Jinggoy Estrada and proceeded with
the arraignment of accused FPres. Estrada, Jinggoy Estrada, and Serapio under the Amended Information. The accused having
refused to enter a plea, the Court entered a plea of not guilty for all the three (3) accused.

Petitions for Bail / House Arrest

With the detention of accused FPres. Estrada and Jinggoy Estrada in Camp Crame on April 25, 2001, both accused filed on the
same day an Urgent Ex-parte Motion to Place on House Arrest.

The Court on June 9, 2001, issued a Resolution denying accused FPres. Estrada’s Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Place on House
Arrest and issued an Order for the confinement of accused FPres. Estrada and Jinggoy Estrada at Fort Sto. Domingo, Sta. Rosa,
Laguna, subject to the need for their continued confinement at the Veterans Memorial Medical Center (VMMC) where they
were then confined. In view of the said resolution, accused FPres. Estrada and Jinggoy Estrada, on June 13, 2001, filed an
Omnibus Motion (Re: Resolution promulgated on June 9, 2001) pressing in the alternative a Motion for Detention in Tanay, Rizal.

On March 17, 2004, FPres. Estrada filed a Motion to Modify Custodial Arrangement dated March 17, 2004 and, on March 30,
2004, the counsel de officio of accused FPres. Estrada filed a Manifestation dated March 29, 2004 informing the Court, among
others, that the said accused was willing to have his property in Tanay, Rizal placed under the control and supervision of the
Court and the Philippine National Police for the duration of his detention.

On July 12, 2004, the Court issued a joint resolution granting FPres. Estrada’s motion to modify Custodial Arrangement dated
March 29, 2004 subject to the conditions imposed by the Court. Accused FPres. Estrada filed a Compliance and Acceptance of
Conditions on July 13, 2004. Since then, accused FPres. Estrada has been detained in his property at Tanay, Rizal.

When the Court ordered the arrest and detention of the accused in these cases, accused Serapio filed his petition for bail on
April 27, 2001. Accused Jinggoy Estrada’s petition for bail was included in his Very Urgent Omnibus Motion dated April 30, 2001.

Accused Serapio’s Petition for Bail was deferred indefinitely as prayed for by the said accused while, on August 14, 2001,
accused Jinggoy Estrada filed an Urgent Second Motion for Bail for Medical Reasons dated August 16, 2001 which the
prosecution opposed. On December 20, 2001, the Court issued its Resolution denying accused Jinggoy Estrada’s Urgent Second
Motion for Bail for Medical Reasons.

Considering the denial of the said motion for bail for medical reasons, accused Jinggoy Estrada, on April 17, 2002, filed an
Omnibus Application for Bail dated April 16, 2002. After hearing, the Court issued a Resolution on March 6, 2003 which granted
accused Jinggoy Estrada’s Omnibus Application for Bail. The prosecution’s Motion for Reconsideration dated March 13, 2003
was denied in this Court’s Resolution dated April 30, 2003. The aforesaid Resolutions granting bail to Mayor Jinggoy Estrada
were upheld by the Honorable Supreme Court in a Decision promulgated in G.R. No. 158754, People vs. Sandiganbayan (Special
Division) and Jose "Jinggoy" Estrada (August 10, 2007).
As to accused Serapio, the Court’s Resolution dated September 12, 2003 also granted accused-movant Serapio’s Urgent Petition
for Bail dated April 27, 2001. The Court fixed the amount of bail of accused Serapio and Jinggoy Estrada at Five Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) each which was to paid in cash.

While the case was already in the trial stage, on January 4, 2002 the counsels for the accused Estradas wrote a letter to the
Acting Presiding Justice requesting for a re-raffle of the cases against the accused, citing as grounds the continuing uncertain
composition of the justices handling the cases against the accused Former President, et al., at that time. The prosecution filed its
Opposition to Request for Re-Raffle On January 9, 2002 and its Comment/Suggestion on January 10, 2002 that a Special Third
Division be constituted to be composed of the present Presiding Justice, the only remaining member of the Third Division to
which the case was raffled, and two other Sandiganbayan Justices who are not retirables within the next three (3) years. Justice
Anacleto Badoy, the Chairman of the Third Division, was due to retire on October 2002, while Justice Ilarde, the other member,
retired on November 27, 2001. On January 11, 2002, the Sandiganbayan En Banc issued its Resolution 01-2002 recommending to
the Supreme Court that the cases against accused FPres. Estrada, et al., be referred to a Special Division. The Supreme Court on
January 21, 2002 promulgated its Resolution Creating the Special Division of the Sandiganbayan which shall hear, try and decide
with dispatch the Plunder Case and all related cases filed or may hereafter be filed against accused FPres. Estrada, and those
accused with him, until they are resolved, decided and terminated. In the Special Division of the Sandiganbayan, the Supreme
Court retained, as Junior Member, the present Presiding Justice who was then the only remaining member of the Third Division
to which the Plunder Case was raffled, and designated the then Presiding Justice Minita V. Chico-Nazario, as Chairperson, and
Associate Justice Edilberto G. Sandoval as Senior Member. This was not the first time that a Special Division of the
Sandiganbayan was constituted to try a case. A Special Division was previously constituted to try and decide the Aquino-Galman
cases in that composition of the said Division was also maintained until the case was decided notwithstanding the subsequent
changes in the composition of the Division due to promotions and/or retirement of its members.

During the same year, the counsel de parte of accused FPres. Estrada and Jinggoy Estrada all withdrew their appearances. The
Court on March 1, 2002, in order to protect the rights and interest of the accused, appointed the Public Attorneys Office (PAO)
and those who have been recommended by the Board of Governor of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, to represent accused
FPres. Estrada and Jinggoy Estrada as counsel de oficio, namely, Former Presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan Manuel
Pamaran, Atty. Prospero Crescini, Atty. Irene Jurado and Atty. Manuel Malaya. The PAO lawyers mentioned their duration as
counsel de oficio, hence, (Ret.) Presiding Justice Pamaran and the private practitioners represented accused FPres. Estrada and
Jinggoy Estrada up to the time the prosecution rested its case and submitted to the Court its Formal Offer of Evidence. However,
before the presentation of the evidence for the defense, accused FPres. Estrada, in a Letter dated September 1, 2004, informed
the Court that he have decided to re-engage the services of the members of his original de parte panel of lawyers.

Upon conclusion of the presentation of prosecution evidence and after the Court have ruled on the offer of evidence of the
prosecution, accused FPres. Estrada, Jinggoy Estrada and Serapio filed their respective motion for leave of court to file demurrer
to evidence. In a Joint Resolution dated March 10, 2004, the Court granted accused FPres. Estrada’s Motion for Leave to File
Demurrer to Evidence in Criminal Case Nos. 26905 and 26565 while it denied the same motion of all the accused in Criminal Case
No. 26558 for lack of merit. Subsequently, the Demurrer to Evidence of accused FPres. Estrada was filed. In its Joint Resolution
dated July 12, 2004, the Court resolved to deny FPres. Estrada’s Demurrer to Evidence in Criminal Case No. 26905 but granted
the Demurrer to Evidence of FPres. Estrada in Criminal Case No. 26565.

After the presentation of the evidence for accused FPres. Estrada and Jinggoy Estrada, accused Serapio manifested that he opted
not to present his own evidence but adopted the evidence presented by FPres. Estrada and Jinggoy Estrada. The said accused
then formally offered their evidence. The Court issued its resolution on the formal offer of evidence for accused FPres. Estrada,
Jinggoy Estrada and Serapio. On the other hand, the prosecution manifested that it was not presenting any rebuttal evidence but
formally offered additional evidence and tendered excluded evidence in its Supplemental Formal Offer of Exhibits [Re: Exhibits
Identified, Presented, and Marked during the Cross Examination of Defense Witnesses] with Tender of Excluded Evidence dated
March 29, 2007. The Court issued its Minute Resolution dated April 19, 2007 on the said additional offer of evidence of the
prosecution.

In an Order dated May 9, 2007, the Court gave the parties a period of time to file their respective memoranda and scheduled the
Oral Summation requested by accused FPres. Estrada and Jinggoy Estrada on June 15, 2007. After the Oral Summation, the case
was submitted for decision.

Incidentally, on November 10, 2006, the National Bureau of Investigation filed its Return of "Alias" Order of Arrest, informing the
Court that one of the accused in this case, Atong Ang was extradited from the United States of America and was already under
the custody of the said agency. At his arraignment, accused Atong Ang refused to enter a plea and the Court entered a plea of
not guilty for the said accused.

On January 24, 2007, when the case was scheduled for Pre-Trial only for accused Atong Ang, the prosecution and the said
accused, assisted by his counsel, manifested in open court that they had executed a Plea Bargaining Agreement. The Court’s
Resolution dated March 14, 2007 approved the Plea Bargaining Agreement entered into by the parties.
On March 19, 2007, during accused Atong Ang’s re-arraignment, the said accused pleaded guilty to a lesser offense of
Corruption of Public Officials under Article 212 in relation to Article 211 of the Revised Penal Code. On the same day, the Court
rendered its decision against accused Atong Ang sentencing said accused to "two (2) years and four (4) months of prision
correccional minimum, as minimum, to six (6) years of prision correccional maximum, as maximum, and to pay the amount of
P25,000,000.00 to the Government as his civil liability". Accused Atong Ang immediately filed a Petition for Probation (with
Motion to Deduct Period of Preventive Imprisonment from the Term of Imprisonment and to Post Bail Pending Resolution
thereof) which the Court granted in a Resolution dated May 25, 2007. Accused Atong Ang is now under probation.

STATEMENT OF THE STIPULATIONS

OF THE PARTIES AT PRE-TRIAL
________________________________

After the arraignment of the accused, the pre-trial was conducted which led to the issuance of the Amended Pre-Trial Order
dated June 14, 2001, quoted in part hereunder:

When this case was called for pre-trial on September 3, 2001, accused JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA, JOSE "Jinggoy" P.
ESTRADA appeared, assisted by counsels, Atty. Jose B. Flaminiano, Atty. Cleofe Villar-Verzola, Atty. Rene A. V. Saguisag
and Atty. Raymond Parsifal A. Fortun. Accused Edward S. Serapio likewise appeared, assisted by his counsels, Atty.
Sabino Acut, Jr. and Atty. Martin Israel L. Pison. The People was represented by Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto,
Deputy Ombudsman Margarito P. Gervacio, Jr., Deputy Special Prosecutor Robert E. Kallos, Ombudsman Prosecutor III
Antonio T. Manzano and Humphrey T. Monteroso.

The accused Estradas and Edward S. Serapio submitted their WAIVER OF APPEARANCE dated September 3, 2001 stating
as follows:

Accused Joseph Estrada, Jose "Jinggoy" Estrada and Edward S. Serapio hereby waive their appearance during the pre-
trial and the trial of this case subject to the conditions that:

a. whenever his/her/their name/s/are mentioned at any stage of the proceedings of this/ these case/s
whether in testimonial or documentary evidence, such name/s refer/s to his/her/them; and
b. whenever his/her/their appearance shall be require by the Court at any time, they will appear,
otherwise warrant/s shall issue for their arrest.

The aforementioned three (3) accused verbally manifested in open Court that they fully understand and agree with
their conditions contained in their Waiver of Appearance.

xxx       xxx       xxx

The prosecution, the accused Estradas and accused Serapio agreed to stipulate on the following facts, as proposed by
the prosecution to wit:

1. That accused Joseph Estrada (“Estrada” for short) took his oath of office as President of the Republic
of the Philippines on 30th June 1998, [cf. Proposal No. 1(For all specifications) of accused Estrada’s
Proposed Stipulation of Facts of the defense dated 01 August 2001];
2. That accused Joseph Estrada is married to Dra. (now Senator) Luisa P. Ejercito; [cf. Proposal No. 2 (For
all Specifications) of accused Estrada’s Proposed Stipulation of Facts of the defense dated 01 August
2001];
3. That accused Jose “Jinggoy” Estrada, Jr. (“Jinggoy” for short) is the son of accused Joseph Estrada; [cf.
Proposal No. 3 (For all Specifications) of accused Estrada’s Proposed Stipulation of Facts of the
defense dated 01 August 2001;
4. Edward S. Serapio is a lawyer and a former professor of law at the Ateneo de Manila University School
of Law; [cf. Proposal No. 1 of accused Atty. Edward Serapio’s Request for Stipulation of Facts and
Admission of Documents dated 01 August 2001;
5. On April 29 1999, Atty. Serapio was appointed by President Joseph Estrada as Presidential Assistant
for Political Affairs with the rank of Undersecretary. [cf. Proposal No. 2 of accused Atty. Edward
Serapio’s Request for Stipulation of Facts and Admission of Documents dated 01 August 2001;
6. He accepted such appointment. [cf. Proposal No. 2. 1 of specification of accused Atty. Edward
Serapio’s Request for Stipulation of Facts and Admission of documents dated 01 August 2001.

The other stipulations of facts proposed by the accused Estradas and admitted by the prosecution were:
 1. That From 1998-2001, Mr. Luis "Chavit" Singson was elected Governor of the province of Ilocos Sur;
[cf. Proposal No. 6 (For all Specifications) of accused Estrada’s Proposed Stipulation of Facts of the
defense dated 01 August 2001];
2. That the amount of P40 Million was withdrawn by a person representing herself to be accused Alma
Alfaro from Land Bank of the Philippines-Shaw Branch on 28th August 1998; [cf. Proposal No. 5 of
specification (b) of accused Joseph E. Estrada and Jose "Jinggoy" Estrada’s Stipulation of Facts and
Admission of Documents dated 01 August 2001.

The accused Estradas proposed and the prosecution admitted the following stipulation of facts:

1. That accused Joseph Estrada personally knows Mr. Rodolfo "Bong" Pineda; [cf. Paragraph 13 of the
Prosecution’s Additional Stipulation of Facts dated 01 August 2001];
2. That accused Joseph Estrada personally knows "Atong" Ang; [cf. Paragraph 17 of the Prosecution’s
Additional stipulation of Facts dated 01 August 2001];
3. That accused Joseph Estrada personally knows Mr. Lucio Co; [cf. Paragraph 23 of the Prosecution’s
Additional Stipulation of Facts dated 01 August 2001];
4. That accused Joseph Estrada personally knows Mr. Jaime Dichaves; [cf. Paragraph 24 of the
Prosecution’s Additional Stipulation of Facts dated 01 August 2001];
5. That accused President Estrada is a close and childhood friend of Carlos A. Arellano; [cf. Paragraph 1
Re: Belle case of the Prosecution’s Additional Stipulation of Facts dated 01 August 2001];
6. That accused President Estrada appointed Carlos A. Arellano as Chairman of the Social Security
System on July 1, 1998; [cf. Paragraph 2 re: Belle case of the Prosecution’s Additional Stipulation of
Facts dated 01 August 2001];
7. That Carlos A. Arellano was appointed by accused President Estrada as President and Chief Executive
Officer of the Social Security System; [cf. Paragraph 3 re: Belle case of the Prosecution’s Additional
Stipulation of Facts dated 01 August 2001];
8. That accused President Estrada knew of the existence of Belle Corporation; [cf. Paragraph 7 re: Belle
case of the Prosecution’s Additional Stipulation of Facts dated 01 August 2001];

Proposed Stipulation of Facts of the prosecution admitted by accused Serapio:

1.               That Erap Muslim Youth Foundation (hereinafter the "Foundation") has a huge fund of
more than P211 Million.

The only issue that was raised by the parties for resolution is whether or not accused JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA, JOSE
"Jinggoy" P. ESTRADA and ATTY. EDWARD S. SERAPIO are guilty of the offense charged in the Amended Information.

The accused Estradas raise also the issue of whether or not the allegations in the information would constitute the
crime of plunder as defined by R.A. No. 7080. (COMMENT ON, AND MOTION TO CORRECT PRE-TRIAL ORDER DATED
SEPTEMBER 13, 2001, filed by accused Estrada’s on September 21, 2001)

The evidence submitted by the prosecution and the defense in support of, or in denial, of the speculations of the predicate acts
adverted to in each of the paragraphs are discussed hereunder in seriatim:

EVIDENCE PRESENTED:

RE: SUB-PARAGRAPH A OF THE

AMENDED INFORMATION
____________________________

(a) by receiving OR collecting, directly or indirectly, on SEVERAL INSTANCES, MONEY IN THE AGGREGATE

AMOUNT OF FIVE HUNDRED FORTY-FIVE MILLION PESOS (P545,000,000.00), MORE OR LESS, FROM ILLEGAL
GAMBLING IN THE FORM OF GIFT, SHARE, PERCENTAGE, KICKBACK OR ANY FORM OF PECUNIARY BENEFIT, BY
HIMSELF AND/OR in connivance with co-accused CHARLIE ‘ATONG’ ANG, JOSE ‘Jinggoy’ Estrada, Yolanda T.
Ricaforte, Edward Serapio, AND JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, in consideration OF TOLERATION OR
PROTECTION OF ILLEGAL GAMBLING;

The alleged co-conspirators of accused Former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada named in this paragraph (a) are: Charlie
"Atong" Tiu Hay Sy Ang (Atong Ang), Jose "Jinggoy" Estrada, Yolanda T. Ricaforte (Ricaforte) and Edward S. Serapio. The
paragraph also refers to unidentified co-conspirators by the usual "Jane Does" and "John Does".
I. EVIDENCE FOR THE PROSECUTION

The principal witness of the prosecution in this first specification of the predicate acts of plunder is Former Ilocos Sur Governor
Luis "Chavit" C. Singson. He testified extensively on the charge that FPres. Estrada accumulated ill-gotten wealth in the above-
mentioned amount through the monthly remittance to him of seems of money collected from operations of illegal gambling,
commonly known as "jueteng", based in the different provinces of the country allegedly in consideration of the prosecution or
unimpeded operation of said illegal gambling.

The gist of the testimony of Singson relative to paragraph (a) of the Amended Information is set forth hereunder:

GOVERNOR LUIS "CHAVIT" CRISOLOGO SINGSON (Gov. Singson) was 61 years old, married, a businessman, and a resident of
Mabini Street, Poblacion, Vigan, Province of Ilocos Sur at the time he took the witness stand as prosecution witness. The
examination of the witness was done by Solicitor General Simeon Marcelo under the control and supervision of the Ombudsman
who was present. The counsel de oficio of accused FPres. Estrada and Jinggoy Estrada, (Ret.) Justice Manuel R. Pamaran,
objected to the appearance of the Solicitor General, which the Court noted. [TSN dated July 17, 2002, pp. 166-167] The
testimony of Gov. Singson was presented to corroborate the testimonies of prosecution witnesses Maria Carmencita Itchon,
Emma B. Lim and the Equitable PCI Bank Branch Managers where Ricaforte opened accounts, and to prove that accused FPres.
Estrada, Jinggoy Estrada, Atong Ang, Ricaforte, Serapio and the other accused, in conspiracy with one another, amassed and
accumulated ill-gotten wealth for principal accused FPres. Estrada’s benefit while he was the 13th President of the Republic of
the Philippines in the amount of Four Billion Ninety Seven Million Eight Hundred Four Thousand One Hundred Seventy-Three
Pesos and Seventeen Centavos (P4,097,804,173.17), part of which was derived from:

(1) the collection of jueteng protection money from November 1998 to August 2000, in the amount of Five Hundred
Forty Five Million Pesos (P545,000,000.00) more or less and the amount of Two Hundred Million Pesos
(P200,000,000.00) also from the said illegal gambling protection money; and

(2) misappropriation, diversion and conversion for his personal gain as benefit public funds in the amount of One
Hundred Thirty Million Pesos (P130,000,000.00) more or less, representing a portion of the Two Hundred Million pesos
(P200,000,000.00) Tobacco Excise Share allocated for the Province of Ilocos Sur under Republic Act No. 7171.

Gov. Singson was also presented by the prosecution to prove that Jinggoy Estrada and Serapio conspired with and/or acted as
co-principals by indispensable cooperation of FPres. Estrada in the running of the illegal numbers game of jueteng and in the
receipt by FPres. Estrada of jueteng protection money; that accused Jinggoy Estrada regularly collected jueteng protection
money every month from January of 1999 to August 15, 2000, as an indispensable part of the amassing and accumulating ill-
gotten wealth by principal accused FPres. Estrada and as part of the series and/or combination of overt or criminal acts
constituting the crime of plunder; that Serapio conspired with FPres. Estrada and the other accused in receiving the Two
Hundred Million Pesos (P200,000,000.00) which came from jueteng operations and in hiding and/or laundering the same
through the banking system and that Serapio was the personal lawyer of FPres. Estrada and that in furtherance of the conspiracy
he set up various juridical entities to mask and/or hide various illegal proprietary and business interests of FPres. Estrada. Gov.
Singson would also identify certain documents, checks, pictures and other facts relevant to the foregoing, which tend to prove
the combination and/or series of overt and criminal acts, constitutive of the crime of plunder (and to oppose the petition for bail
of Jinggoy Estrada. Gov. Singson’s testimony was also offered to prove the illegal use of alias). [TSN dated July 17, 2002, pp. 168-
174]

Gov. Singson testified that he was called by FPres. Estrada at his house in Polk Street, Greenhills, on August of 1998. Gov.
Singson was then the Provincial Governor of Ilocos Sur. Gov. Singson went to Polk Street in the evening. He was assisted by a
security guard towards the kitchen where he found Atong Ang and FPres. Estrada talking how to expand the operations of
jueteng, an illegal numbers game, in the provinces where there was yet no jueteng protection money. Shortly, Bong Pineda
arrived. Gov. Singson heard FPres. Estrada told Bong Pineda that starting on that day not to bring money at his house because it
was very obvious. Gov. Singson did not know Bong Pineda very much but he saw Bong Pineda in Congress when he was
investigated regarding jueteng. The jueteng money would protect jueteng operator from being arrested. FPres. Estrada then
instructed Bong Pineda to give the money to Atong Ang or to Gov. Singson because the latter was a Governor so it would not be
obvious if he brought money to FPres. Estrada. [TSN dated July 17, 2002, pp. 178-187]

According to Gov. Singson, the day after the aforementioned meeting, Atong Ang started meeting with the jueteng operators in
his office near the municipal hall of San Juan. [Ibid, p. 188] Atong Ang and the operators were bargaining how much protection
money from each province will be given to FPres. Estrada. [Ibid, p. 193] After the final talk, they started collecting jueteng
protection money, specifically from August of 1998. [Ibid, p. 203]

Gov. Singson knew FPres. Estrada for almost thirty (30) years before August of 1998. FPres. Estrada was not yet a mayor but a
movie actor as Gov. Singson’s mother was a producer. [Ibid, p. 191] Gov. Singson first met Atong Ang at the cockpit and
gambling places. He had known Atong Ang for a long time even when FPres. Estrada was still the Vice President. According to
Gov. Singson, Bong Pineda was a close "compadre" of FPres. Estrada while his son, Jinggoy Estrada, was Bong Pineda’s godson by
marriage. [Ibid, p. 197]

Gov. Singson claimed that he was present in not all but several meetings of Atong Ang with the jueteng collectors. He was
present when there was an agreement on the three percent (3%) of total collections in every province, as fixed by Atong Ang.
[TSN dated July 22, 2002, pp. 12-13] Jueteng money was delivered to FPres. Estrada initially every end of the month, starting
September of 1998 and later every 15th and at the end of the month. [Ibid, p.14]

On October of 1998, Gov. Singson and Atong Ang brought the jueteng protection money of about Nine Million Pesos
(P9,000,000.00) for the said month to FPres. Estrada at his house, in No. 1 Polk Street in Greenhills, but FPres. Estrada and Atong
Ang had a nasty quarrel about the sugar allocation request of Atong Ang which was denied by FPres. Estrada. Gov. Singson
brought home the said P9,000,000.00 but, the following day, FPres. Estrada called him up asking him to pay F.P. Estrada’s
obligations which went on until the said amount was consumed and Gov. Singson was instructed by FPres. Estrada to continue
the collection of the jueteng money. [Ibid,  pp. 26, 22-23]

Gov. Singson continued the collection as instructed by FPres. Estrada, still with the help of Atong Ang, from November of 1998
until August of 2000. The amounts of money collected from jueteng during the said period were listed in the ledger per month
and per province. The ledger also listed the expenses paid for using the jueteng protection money. [Ibid, pp. 24-27]

Every fifteen (15) days, Gov. Singson himself delivered protection money to FPres. Estrada in the amount of Five Million Pesos
(P5,000,000.00) or a total of Ten Million Pesos (P10,000,000.00) every month. Emma B. Lim delivered once the jueteng money to
FPres. Estrada in Malacañang. The protection money was delivered usually in cash but sometimes in check. Chavit Singon
presented to this court two (2) sets of ledger. The first set consisted of nine (9) pages covering the month of November of 1998
up to July of 1999 (Exh. W7 to Exh. E8). The September 1998 and October 1998 collections were not reflected in the said ledger
since the ledger was done only after FPres. Estrada and Atong Ang quarreled in October 1998. The second set of ledger covered
the months of August of 1999 to August of 2000 (Exh.A-4 to Exh. A-4-d). [TSN dated July 22, 2002, p. 27-31]

Gov. Singson prepared the pages of the first set of ledger (Exh. W7 to E8) with the help of Emma B. Lim and Ma. Carmencita
Itchon and on the following year, Ricaforte joined them. [Ibid, pp. 35-36]

The pages of the second set of ledgers starting August of 1999 to August of 2000 [Exhibit A-4 and submarkings] were prepared
by Ricaforte under the supervision of Gov. Singson who also checked the said ledger. [Ibid, pp. 36-37]

Ricaforte was introduced to Gov. Singson by FPres. Estrada before his birthday on April 19, 1999. She was designated by FPres.
Estrada as auditor because FPres. Estrada was strict with money. Gov. Singson was thankful for Ricaforte’s designation because
he did not want FPres. Estrada to distrust him. [Ibid,  p. 40] Gov. Singson considered Ricaforte as the employee of FPres. Estrada
with respect to the jueteng collections because not only was she introduced to Singson by FPres. Estrada, the latter also told
Singson to give her Eighty Thousand Pesos (P80, 000.00) monthly salary.

Ricaforte held office at LCS Building owned by Gov. Singson. [Ibid, pp. 42-43] Gov. Singson did not know Yolanda Ricaforte or her
husband Orestes Ricaforte before April of 1999. Gov. Singson identified Ricaforte from a picture (Exh. A-6-b-1) where she was
seated beside Menchu Itchon, the assistant of Gov. Singson. The picture was taken during the wedding of Raquel, the daughter
of Gov. Singson where FPres. Estrada and his wife Senator Loi Ejercito stood as wedding sponsors. [Ibid, p. 45-48]

According to Gov. Singson, the jueteng collections were placed in a scratch paper as they came every fifteen (15) days, at the
middle and the end of the month or five (5) days after the end of the month. When all the collections had arrived, the list was
finalized and then transferred to the computer. The ledgers were prepared upon instructions of FPres. Estrada because the latter
was strict with money. [Ibid, pp. 37-40, 41-42]

Gov. Singson explained in detail the entries on the left hand portion of the ledger for November of 1998 up to July of 1999. In
the province of Ilocos Sur, the total collection for fifteen (15) days was Seven Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (P750,000.00), in
the province of La Union for 15 days, Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) total collection, while in Bulacan for 15 days,
One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) total collection (Exh. W7) of protection money for FPres. Estrada. The entries for the other
provinces were similar. On the left side column were the names of the provinces, the middle column pertained to the number of
days, i.e., whether for 15 or 30 days and the right column, the total amount of collections of jueteng protection money, in order
that jueteng operators will not be "arrested" or apprehended. There was one (1) collector for three (3) provinces. [Ibid, pp. 53-
54]
In the second set of ledger (Exh. A-4 to A-4-d) Ricaforte gave a code name for every province below the title "Theme". The
number of days, either 15 or 30, under the title "days" and the total amount of protection money for FPres. Estrada below the
title "points" were indicated in the ledger. [Ibid, pp. 55-56]

Gov. Singson narrated that when FPres. Estrada was still the Vice President, they were already collecting jueteng money but not
in all provinces. When FPres. Estrada assumed the presidency, he called Gov. Singson and Atong Ang to start jueteng collections
in provinces without protection money. Atong Ang talked to certain persons in the said provinces so that the collection of
protection money could start. Every province had a collector but sometimes there was one collector for three (3) provinces. The
collections were submitted to Gov. Singson but sometimes they would get the money from the house of the collectors. The
jueteng collections which FPres. Estrada asked Gov. Singson to operate for FPres. Estrada’s own benefit was at the national level,
meaning nationwide. They did not interfere with jueteng operations at the lower level. Before there were "Kangaroo" type of
jueteng operations or "Guerilla Type". They did it on their own and they did not pay protection money. When the jueteng
operators gave protection money to FPres. Estrada, they were not apprehended anymore although there were instructions to
the contrary which were for show or for record purposes only. [Ibid, pp. 59-64]

There were local officials who did not allow jueteng like Governor Lina in Laguna. He changed the Provincial Commander several
times but jueteng still continued. In the other places the protection money for jueteng given to the local officials was different
from that given to the higher levels. [Ibid, pp. 65-66]

In Exhibit A-4, ULAC stands for Bulacan and the figure 1.00 means One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) for fifteen (15) days, as
protection money for FPres. Estrada. If the number of days was blank it meant 15 days, otherwise the number 30 was indicated.

In the ledger (Exh A-4-C up to A-4-I) covering the periods of January of 2000 up to August of 2000, the same figures appeared
but the code names of the provinces were replaced by their original names as instructed by FPres. Estrada who was confused
with the code names. Under the sub-title "amount", the total amount of protection money given to FPres. Estrada was reflected.
For instance, in Ilocos Sur, the amount of 500 meant Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00). [Ibid, pp. 67-68]

The other entries were similar, except for the substitution of the code names with actual names of the provinces. For instance,
the amount of protection money given to FPres. Estrada corresponding to Ilocos Sur entered as 500, was Five Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00). For the province of Bulacan the number of days was blank and the figure 1,000 was entered. This
means that for Bulacan for 15 days the total protection money given to FPres. Estrada was One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00).
According to Gov. Singson, the collections were delivered in exact amount so they removed the zeroes in the ledger so as not to
lengthen the entries. [Ibid, pp. 69-70]

The two boxes of entries at the right bottom of the ledger marked as Exhibits A-4 to A-4-l, reflected the expenses to show where
some of the money collected went. [Ibid, p. 70] The first entry (Exh. W7-1) showed that Two Million Pesos (P2,000,000.00) went
to "Jimpol", which referred to then Secretary Jimmy Policarpio. The latter confirmed to Gov. Singson this receipt of the said
amount from Bong Pineda which Secretary Policarpio, then a political liaison officer for Congress, would use for the media. [Ibid,
pp. 74-75] In the ledger for November of 1998, the entry 300 Goma (Exh W7-2) means that Three Million Pesos (P3,000,000.00)
was given to the Office of the Chief of the Philippine National Police (PNP). [Ibid, pp.74-76] Gov. Singson himself brought the
money at first to General Lastimoso, the Chief of the PNP but he refused to receive the money. Later Atong Ang identified the
persons from PNP who will pick up the money and help them in the operation. Gov. Singson called up FPres. Estrada to inform
him that Lastimoso refused to receive the money. Gov. Singson was worried Lastimoso may not coordinate with them. One time,
Gov. Singson was called to Malacanang and he met General Lastimoso there and FPres. Estrada told the latter to coordinate with
Gov. Singson about the operation of jueteng. General Lastimoso expressed the need to coordinate with the Regional
Commanders to apprehend jueteng operations for show only ("kunwari"). [Ibid, pp. 77-80]

The entry "November 1998, 5.00, AS Sunday" (Exh W7-3) means that the amount for Five Million Pesos (P5,000,000.00)
protection money was given to FPres. Estrada, whose code name was "Asiong Salonga" on a Sunday. Gov. Singson himself gave
the money to FPres. Estrada. The next entry "1.000 Jing" (Exh W7-4), would show that One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) was
given to Jinggoy Estrada, whose code name was "Jing". According to Gov. Singson, Jinggoy Estrada was the collector of
protection money for the Province of Bulacan which should be Three Million Pesos (P3,000,000.00) for every month but Jinggoy
Estrada kept the One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) and remit to Gov. Singson only Two Million Pesos (P2,000,000.00) or One
Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) for every 15 days. [Ibid, pp. 80-82]

Atong Ang told Gov. Singson that Jinggoy Estrada got One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) and Jinggoy Estrada confirmed it but
when they told FPres. Estrada about it, he instructed them not to give Jinggoy Estrada money and he will be the one to give
money to Jinggoy Estrada. Gov. Singson removed the name of Jinggoy Estrada from the list and they kept it a secret from FPres.
Estrada that Jinggoy Estrada was taking jueteng money because Jinggoy Estrada will get angry too if he was not given a share.
Jinggoy Estrada was then the Mayor of the Municipality of San Juan. Jinggoy Estrada collected money from the Province of
Bulacan at the later part of January of 1999. [Ibid, p. 82-85]
The entry "500 JD" (Exh W7-5) means that Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) went to Jude Estrada, a son of FPres.
Estrada. Jude confirmed to Gov. Singson that he received the said amount of jueteng protection money from Atong Ang who
reported that to Gov. Singson. The entry "1.800 ad check" (Exh W7-6) refers to One Million Eight Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P1,800,000.00) covered by a bad check, part of jueteng money, which bounced. This was PCI Bank Check No. 0019063 (Exh. F8)
given to Gov. Singson by one Celso De Los Angeles. The entry "17.300 total expenses" (Exh. W7-7) represents the Seventeen
Million Three Hundred Pesos (P17,300,000.00) the amount of total expenses for the month of November of 1998. The total
expenses every month were entered in the ledger (Exh. X7 to E8, and Exh. A-4 to A-4-d. [Ibid, pp. 85-92])

In the entry for December of 1998 (Exh. X7), the first entry "5.00, AS" (Exh. X7-1) shows the Five Million Pesos (P5,000,000.00)
that was given by Gov. Singson to FPres. Estrada from the collection of jueteng protection money. The ledger for January 1999
bearing as first entry "6.00 cash January 2, AS" (Exh Y7-1), reflected the Six Million Pesos (P6,000,000.00) cash from the same
source given personally by Gov. Singson to FPres. Estrada. The entry "3.00 check, February 1, 1999, AS" (Exh. W7-2) shows that
Three Million Pesos (P3,000,000.00) in check was given to FPres. Estrada on February 1, 1999 as part of protection money. [Ibid,
pp. 93-95] Another entry "5.00 check, February 1, 1999 AS" (Exh Y7-3), refers to the Five Million Pesos (P5,000,000.00) Check
given by Gov. Singson to FPres. Estrada from jueteng protection money. This check (Metrobank Check No.0000917, Exh G8-1)
was deposited in the account of Paul Boghart, who was mentioned during the impeachment trial at the Senate as a foreigner
assisting in the "PR" of FPres. Estrada. [Ibid, pp. 93-97]

The entry "3.500 cash, January 19, AS" (Exh. Y7-4) pertains to Three Million Five Hundred Pesos (P3,500,000.00) cash from the
protection money given by Gov. Singson to FPres. Estrada on January 19 (1999). The entry "5.00, February 18, AS" (Exh. Z7-1)
refers to the Five Million Pesos (P5,000,000.00) given by Gov. Singson to FPres. on February 18, 1999 from the same protection
money. Gov. Singson explained that the entry "400 tax" (Exh Z7-2) at the right hand portion of Exhibit Z7, refers to the Four
Hundred Thousand Pesos (P400,000.00) which he got for reimbursement of the expenses that he paid or would pay but were
not recorded in the ledger. In the ledger for March 1999 (Exh. A8), April 1999 (Exh. B8), May 1999 (Exh. C8), June 1999 (Exh. D8),
July 1999 (Exh. E8), and August 1999 (Exh A-4) there were similar entries of "tax" which were also intended for the same
purpose. Gov. Singson called them "butal". Gov. Singson had the permission of FPres. Estrada that all amounts less than One
Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) were considered "butal" which Gov. Singson kept for reimbursement of expenses which FPres.
Estrada would ask Gov. Singson to pay. If the total amount collection was Four Million Two Hundred Pesos (P4,200,000.00), Gov.
Singson got Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000.00) of the said collection as "butal" and included the same in the ledger as
"tax". [Ibid, pp. 98-101]

In the ledger for February 1999 collection appears a handwritten entry "+ 4.00 capitol February 3, 1999". This entry pertains to
the Four Million Pesos (P4,000,000.00) "kickback" which FPres. Estrada asked Gov. Singson to give him on February 3, 1999 out
of the Twenty Million Pesos (P20,000,000.00) allotted for the repair of the capitol of Ilocos Sur. This P4 Million was added to the
"total to date" of the collection which consequently amounted to Thirty Eight Million Pesos (P38,000,000.00). [Ibid, pp. 102-103]

In the ledger for March 1999 (Exh. A8), the first entry "5.00, 4/6/99, AS" (Exh. A8-1) shows that Five Mllion Pesos (P5,000,000.00)
that Gov. Singson gave FPres. Estrada on April 6, 1999. Gov. Singson wrote on the ledger "AS", i.e. Asiong Salonga, the code
name of FPres. Estrada [Ibid, p. 103]

Regarding the entry "500 3/23 c/0 Malou AS" (Exh A8-2), Gov. Singson explained that Malou Florendo, the Secretary of FPres.
Estrada, coordinated with Gov. Singson by telephone for the delivery of the amount of Five Million Pesos (P5,000,000.00) to
FPres. Estrada. Emma B. Lim delivered the money as Gov. Singson was in the province when FPres. Estrada called up Gov.
Singson to tell him he needed money very badly. [Ibid, pp. 104-106]

On April 1, 1999, Five Million Pesos (P5,000,000.00) were given by Gov. Singson to FPres. Estrada from jueteng protection
money as shown by the entry "5.00 4/1/99 AS" (Exh B8-1). The next entry, "1.00, William Gatchalian" (Exh "B8-2), refers to the
One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) given by Gov. Singson to William Gatchalian upon instruction of FPres. Estrada. Gatchalian
had a Twenty Million Pesos (P20,000,000.00) check but FPres. Estrada won only Nineteen Million Pesos (P19,000,000.00) in their
mahjong game, so FPres. Estrada asked Gov. Singson to give to Gatchalian the change of One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00)
charged to the jueteng protection money. Gov. Singson gave Gatchalian the said amount through a Metrobank Check No.
0001066 (Exh H8 and H8-1). [Ibid, pp.106-109]

The entry in Exhibit B8 which reads "200 Jerry and Len" (Exh B8-3) reflects the One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) each
given to then Secretary Lenny De Jesus and Secretary Jerry Barican, or a total amount of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P200,000.00), as "balato" as instructed by FPres. Estrada. [Ibid,  pp. 109-110]

Senator Tessie Oreta and Sonny Osmena were also given One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) each or a total of Two Million Pesos
(P2,000,000.00) in Cebu aboard the Presidential Yatch "Ang Pangulo" as shown by the entry "2.00 Tessie and Sonny" (Exh. B8).
Gov. Singson gave the said sums of money to the Senators, which he funded through the jueteng protection money, in the form
of Metrobank Check No. 0001081 (Exhs. I8 and I8 -1 and Metrobank Check No. 0001082 (Exhs. J8 and J8-1) upon instruction of
FPres. Estrada, as their "balato" for the winning of the latter in "Mahjong". [Ibid, pp. 112-114]

The amount of Five Million Pesos (P5,000,000.00) was given by Gov. Singson to FPres. Estrada from the jueteng protection
money on each of the following dates as shown by the entries in the ledger: (1) May 1, 1999 ("5.00 5/1/99 AS" – Exh. C8-1); (2)
May 18, 1999 ("5.00 5/18/99 AS" – Exh. C8-2); (3) June 1, 1999 ("5.00 6/1/99 AS" – Exh. D8-1); (4) June 18, 1999 ("5.00 6/18/99
AS" – Exh. D8-2); (5) July 31, 1999 ("5.00 7/1/99 AS" – Exh. E8-1); and (6) July 19, 1999 ("5.00 7/19/99 AS" – Exh. E8-2). From May
1, 1999 to July 19, 1999, the total amount of money given by Gov. Singson to FPres. Estrada would amount to Thirty Million
Pesos (P30,000,000.00) based on the ledger. [Ibid, pp.115-118]

The entry reading "123,000 total to date" (Exh E8-3) represents the total amount of One Hundred Twenty Three Million Pesos
(P123,000,000.00) that remained as of July 1999. [Ibid, pp. 118-119]

After July 1999, particularly on August 1999, FPres. Estrada called Gov. Singson, Ricaforte and Serapio to a meeting at
Mandaluyong. Gov. Singson was instructed by FPres. Estrada in the presence of Ricaforte and Serapio to turn-over all the
balance of the money from jueteng to the account of Ricaforte. Gov. Singson was keeping most of the above-mentioned
P123,000,000.00 in the bank and the others in cash in his office because FPres. Estrada would ask for money from time to time.
Gov. Singson turned-over the aforementioned balance of the jueteng money partly in check and partly in cash in the office of
FPres. Estrada. Ricaforte and Serapio were there with the Former President. [Ibid, pp.119-123]

Part of the aforesaid P123,000,000.00 was covered by Metrobank Check No. 0001360 (Exh K8 and K8-1) of Gov. Singson in the
amount of Seventeen Million Two Hundred Ten Thousand Pesos (P17,210,000.00) [Ibid, p. 123]. The second and third checks
(Exhs A-2-b and A-7-c) were PCI Bank checks in the account name of William Gatchalian each in the amount of Thirty-Five Million
Pesos (P35,000,000.00) or a total of Seventy Million Pesos (P70,000,000.00). Gov. Singson narrated that the amount of Sixty-Two
Million Pesos (P62,000,000.00) from the jueteng protection money was lent to William Gatchalian. Out of this transaction, FPres.
Estrada earned Eight Million Pesos (P8,000,000.00) such that William Gatchalian paid a total of Seventy Million Pesos
(P70,000,000.00). [Ibid, pp. 124-125]

Gov. Singson presented Metrobank Check No. 0001332 with account name Governor Luis "Chavit" Singson, in the amount of
Forty-Six Million Three Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (P46,350,000,00) payable to William Gatchalian (Exh L8 and L8-1). This
check, according to Gov. Singson was part of the jueteng protection money lent to William Gatchalian. The rest of the
P62,000,000.00 were in cash and covered by other checks. [Ibid, pp. 126-127]

The Eight Million Pesos (P8,000,000.00) earned from the loan by FPres. Estrada was taken as advance by the latter before due
date of the P70,000,000.00 of Gatchalian. For this reason, the P8,000,000.00 was not anymore added to the balance of
P123,000,000.00 of jueteng money. [Ibid,  pp. 127-130] The advance of P8,000,000.00 was covered by Metrobank Check No.
0001388 with the account name Governor Luis "Chavit" Singson (Exhs. M8 and M8-1). During the impeachment trial at the
Senate, it turned out that the P8,000,000.00 was deposited in the account of Senator Loi Estrada [Ibid, pp. 130-131,139]

The fourth check which covered part of the total balance of P123,000,000.00 jueteng protection money was a Far East bank
Check in the amount of Thirty-Four Million Six Hundred Forty Two Thousand Four Hundred Forty Two Pesos (P34,642,442.00)
payable to the order of Fontain Bleau, Inc. (Exh B6). [Ibid, p. 124] According to Gov. Singson, the Far East Bank check payable to
the order of Fontaine Bleau, Inc. was paid by Fontana to Fontaine Bleau, Inc. which was a casino owned by FPres. Estrada and
built with the use of jueteng protection money. The bulk of the P123,000,000.00 were turned-over by Gov. Singson in the form
of checks. The cash amounted only to Eight Hundred Thousand Pesos (P800,000.00) only. [TSN dated July 24, 2002, pp.8-9]

In the second set of ledger covering the months of August 1999 to August 2000 (Exh A-4) are found the following entries: (1)
"3.00 AS 9/6 8 o’clock a.m." (Exh A-4.1) and (2) "5.00 AS 8/16/99" (Exh A-4.2). The entries represent the two (2) Five Million
Pesos (P5,000,000.00) given by Gov. Singson to FPres. Estrada on September 6 at 8 o’clock in the morning and on August 16,
1999 or a total of Ten Million Pesos (P10,000,000.00) as part of jueteng collection. [Ibid, pp. 10-13]

The other entries in the said ledger are: (1) "16.310 August 1-15" (A-4-3); (2) "13.150 August 16-31" (Exh. A-4-4); (3) "29.460
total for August" (Exh. A-4-5); (4) "15.200 expenses" (Exh. A-4-6); (5) "14.260 subtotal" (Exh. A-4-7); (6) ".260 tax" (Exh. A-4-8);
(7) "14.000 total to date" (Exh. A-4-9). Gov. Singson explained that the entries mean (1) that the total collection for August 1-15,
1999 amounted to Sixteen Million Three Hundred Ten Thousand Pesos (P16,310,000.00); (2) that from August 16-31, 1999 the
total collection was Thirteen Million One Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (P13,150,000.00); (3) that the total collection for the
whole month of August 1999 was Twenty Nine Million Four Hundred Sixty Thousand Pesos (P29,460,000.00) which all went to
FPres. Estrada. The expenses for the said month reached Fifteen Million Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P15,200,000.00). The
said amount of expenses was deducted from the total collection for the same month. The remainder, described as "subtotal",
amounted to Fourteen Million Two Hundred Sixty Thousand Pesos (P14,260,000.00). Of the latter sum of money, Two Hundred
Sixty Thousand Pesos (P260,000.00) was treated as "butal" and taken by Gov. Singson to be used as reimbursement for expenses
which Gov. Singson was requested by FPres. Estrada to pay. The balance of Fourteen Million Pesos (P14,000,000.00) was
deposited in the bank for President Estrada. [Ibid, pp. 14-18]

The "tax" entries in the ledger, starting Exhibit Z to Z-7, covered the amounts less than One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) which
were treated as "butal" that remained with Gov. Singson to reimburse him for expenses which were not recorded in the ledger
but should be deducted from the money of FPres. Estrada. [Ibid, pp. 19-21]

Gov. Singson mentioned that he personally gave or handed to FPres. Estrada even if Malou Florendo, FPres. Estrada’s secretary,
was around. Gov. Singson either left the money beside FPres. Estrada or behind the latter’s chair. FPres. Estrada would count the
money by the bundle [Ibid, pp. 22-23]. The Five Million Pesos (P5,000,000.00) delivered by Emma B. Lim to Malou Florendo not
to FPres. Estrada personally was confirmed by the latter to have been received by him. Emma B. Lim delivered the money to the
Malacañang Palace because of the changes in the instructions given by FPres. Estrada. [Ibid, pp. 23-24]

The net balance of Fourteen Million Pesos (P14,000,000.00) for August 1999 was deposited by Ricaforte at Equitable PCI Bank.
The same was done to the net monthly balances for September 1999, October 1999, November 1999, December 1999, January
2000, February 2000, March 2000, April 2000 and May 2000. [Ibid, pp. 25-27]

The other entries in the second set of ledger for September 1999 and October 1999 as follows: (1) "AS 11:30 am/258 5.000" (Exh
A-4-a-1); (2) "10/29 AS/258 5.000" (Exh A-4-b-1"); (3) 10/14 AS/258 5.000 (Exh A-4-b-2), mean that Gov. Singson whose code
name was "258" gave FPres. Estrada, referred to as "AS", which stands for Asiong Salonga Five Million Pesos (P5,000,000.00) on
each of the following dates: (a) in September 1999 at 11:30 in the morning; (b) on October 29, 1999; and (c) on October 14,
1999.

In the November 1999 ledger (Exh A-4-c), the following entries appear (1) "11/30 laptop comp./print.105,850" (Exh. A-4-c-1) (2)
"11/30 2 Starex 800 each/258 1.600" (Exh. A-4-C-2); (3) "11:30 AS/258 12p.m PG5.000" (Exh. A-4-C-3); (4) "11/15 AS/258 at
4p.m 5.000" ( Exh. A-4-C-4 ), and (5) "11/08 Jimpol 2.400".

Gov. Singson explained the foregoing entries in the November 1999 ledger as follows: On November 30, 1999, the amount of
P105,850.00 was used to buy the laptop computer with printer of Ricaforte. On November 30, 1999, Gov. Singson purchased
Two (2) units of Starex at Eight Hundred Thousand Pesos each or a total amount of One Million Six Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P1,600,000.00). One unit of Starex went to Ricaforte and was registered in her name. The other was left in their office. At 12:00
noon on November 30, 1999, Gov. Singson brought Five Million Pesos (P5,000,000.00) to FPres. Estrada in his house at P.
Guevarra St. at Greenhills as part of jueteng protection money. At that time, Guia Gomez, one of the most loved of FPres.
Estrada, resided at the said house. Gov. Singson also gave Five Million Pesos (P5,000,000.00) to former FPres. Estrada on
November 15, 1999 at 4:00 o’clock in the afternoon. On November 8, 1999, the amount of Two Million Four Hundred Thousand
Pesos (P2,400,000.00) was given by Bong Pineda to Secretary Jimmy Policarpio, as confirmed by both of them to Singson. During
the prior months, only Two Million Pesos (P2,000,000.00) per month were given to Policarpio, as shown by the ledger, but this
was increased by Four Hundred Thousand Pesos (P400,000.00) because Policarpio told Gov. Singson that the Media was costly
("Magastos"). [Ibid, pp. 30-39]

The ledger for December 1999 (Exh. A-4-d), contains the following entries: (1) "12/30 AS/258 5.000" (Exh A-4-d-1) and (2) "12/04
AS/258 5.00" (Exh A-4-d-2). According to Gov. Singson the aforesaid entries show that he gave to FPres. Estrada, as part of
Jueteng protection, the amount of Five Million Pesos (P5,000,000.00) on December 30, 1999 and another Five Million Pesos (P5
Million) on December 4, 1999. [Ibid, pp.39-41]

The ledger for January 2000 (Exh A-4-E) contains the following entries: (1) "1/31/00 AS at PR 5.000" (Exh A-4-E-1); and (2)
"1/15/00 AS at Pr 5.000". According to Gov. Singson "PR" stands for Presidential Residence and "AS" for Asiong Salonga, that he
gave to FPres. Estrada the amount of Five Million Pesos (P5,000,000.00) twice, one on January 31, 2000 and the other January
14, 2000, at the Presidential Residence. [Ibid, pp.41-43]

According to Gov. Singson, he was ordered by FPres. Estrada to give to him Five Million Pesos (P5,000,000.00) of the jueteng
collection every fifteen (15) days of the month. All the jueteng collections were for FPres. Estrada. The total amount of Ten
Million Pesos (P10,000,000.00) were given to him every month plus the expenses ("gastos") and the remainder or the rest of the
collection were deposited in the bank for FPres. Estrada in the name of Ricaforte. A total amount of Two Hundred Sixteen
Million Pesos (P216,000,000.00) were deposited in the bank for FPres. Estrada. [Ibid, pp. 43-44]

Gov. Singson agreed at first that he would not earn anything from jueteng, provided that the share of Ilocos Sur from the excise
tax under R.A. No. 7171 amounting to billions of pesos would be released to them for their projects. Gov. Singson testified that,
after the One Hundred Thirty Million Pesos (P130,000,000.00) were taken from him, the release of the funds did not continue.
The Former President did not comply with the agreement. [Ibid, pp. 44-46]
In the ledger for February 2000 (Exh A-4-F), the following entries appear: (1) "AS/258 5.000" (Exh A-4-F-1); and (2) "2/17/00 AS
258 5.000" (Exh A-4-F-2). Gov. Singson testified that these entries mean that he gave to FPres. Estrada, Five Million Pesos
(P5,000,000.00) as part of jueteng protection money in an unspecified day in February of 2000 and another Five Million Pesos
(P5,000,000.00) of the same money on February 17, 2000. [Ibid, pp. 48-49]

The ledger for March 2000 (Exh A-4-G), bears the following entries: (1) "3/16/00 AS/258 5.000" (Exh A-4-g-1); and (2) "4/3/00
AS/258 5.000" (Exh A-4-G-2). According to Gov. Singson the entries mean that he gave Five Million Pesos (P5 Million) on March
16, 2000 and another Five Million Pesos (P5,000,000.00) on April 3,2000, both as part of jueteng protection money. [Ibid, pp. 49-
50] Gov. Singson explained that "258" was his code name which he had been using even in their radio communication and that
later, FPres. Estrada would kid him with his code name when they played mahjong. [Ibid, p. 52]

In the April 2000 ledger (Exh A-4-H), the entry "4/14/00 AS/258 5.000" appeared twice, (Exh A-4-H-1) because according to Gov.
Singson he gave Five Million Pesos (P5,000,000.00) twice, one in the morning and another in the afternoon on the same day,
April 14, 2000, or a total of Ten Million Pesos (P10,000,000.00) from jueteng protection money collection, because FPres. called
him up twice on the said date as his birthday on April 19, 2000 was nearing. [Ibid, pp. 53-54]

At the ledger for May 2000 (Exh A-4-i), the first entry also at the right hand portion was "5/31 AS/258 5.000" (Exh A-4-i-1) and
next entry was "5/13 AS/258 5.000" (Exh A-4-i-2). Gov. Singson explained that the entries meant that he gave Five Million Pesos
(P5,000,000.00) on May 31, 2000 and another Five Million Pesos (P5,000,000.00) to FPres. Estrada on May 13, 2000, both part of
the jueteng protection money. Gov. Singson also mentioned that the entries sometimes were not in chronological order, but
they were for the same month. [Ibid, pp. 55-56]

The June 2000 ledger (Exh A-4-j), the entry at the right hand portion reads: "6/30 AS/258 3.300", and the next entry is "6/15
AS/258 5.000" (Exh A-4-j-2). According to Gov. Singson, these means that he gave to FPres. Estrada Three Million Three Hundred
Thousand (P3,300,000.00) from jueteng protection money collection on June 30, 2000, and Five Million Pesos (P5,000,000.00)
from the same collection, on June 15, 2000. [Ibid, pp. 56-57]

The succeeding ledgers for July 2000 (Exh A-4-k) the following entries appear: (1) "7/14 AS/258 2.650" (Exh. "A-4-k-1) and (2)
"8/12 AS/258 3.600" (Exh.A-4-k-2). Gov. Singson explained that the entries mean respectively that he gave the amount of Two
Million Six Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (P2,650,000.00) on July 14,2000 and Three Million Six Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P3,600,000.00) to FPres. Estrada as part of jueteng protection money collection. [Ibid, pp.57-58] To the question of why the
amounts were less than P5,000,000.00 on the said occasions, Gov. Singson replied that it so happened that those were the only
cash in his possession when the requests for money were made and that they stopped jueteng collection because Atong Ang
started with "Pick 2" and later "Bingo 2 Balls" which according to FPres. Estrada would have a semblance of legality. [Ibid, pp. 59-
60]

The ledger for the month of August 2000 (Exh.A-4-L) contains the entry "8/16 AS/258 3.050" (Exh. A-4-L-1). Gov. Singson
testified that he gave FPres. Estrada on August 16, 2000 the amount of Three Million Fifty Thousand Pesos (P3,050,000.00) as
part of protection money collected from jueteng. [Ibid, pp. 62-63] According to Gov. Singson the President was very strict with
money and so they had an auditor and he checked the ledger monthly so that they could not make any kickback ("Kupit") from
the jueteng collection. [Ibid, pp. 63-64]

Gov. Singson testified that the jueteng collector for Bulacan on November and December 1998 was Jessie Viceo. In January 1999
the jueteng collector for Bulacan was Jinggoy Estrada as shown by the ledger where he was identified as "Jing" who got One
Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) (Exh. W7). Viseo and Jinggoy Estrada were friends so the latter supervised the jueteng collection in
Bulacan, although he was residing in San Juan. When FPres. Estrada instructed Gov. Singson not to give money to Jinggoy
Estrada and so that the latter will not get mad at him, Gov. Singson and Jinggoy Estrada agreed to keep it a secret from the
FPres. that Jinggoy Estrada managed the jueteng collection in Bulacan and that out of the total monthly collection of Three
Million Pesos (P3,000,000.00) from Bulacan, Jinggoy Estrada gave only Two Million Pesos (P2,000,000.00) to Gov. Singson and he
retained One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00). The money was either picked-up from the office or house of Jinggoy or the latter
sent the money to Singson. The secret arrangement started in November 1999 and lasted until the end of August 2000. [Ibid, pp.
69-70] However, the arrangement did not appear in the ledger because they will be scolded by FPres. Estrada. [Ibid, p. 71] When
asked whether Jinggoy Estrada personally collected the jueteng money, Gov. Singson replied that it was Jinggoy Estrada and
Jessie Viceo who talked with each other, sometimes they got the jueteng money from the office of Jinggoy Estrada or sometimes
the latter sent it to the office of Singson, but Gov. Singson knew that Jinggoy was in charge of the jueteng collection. The secret
arrangement came about because jueteng collection in Bulacan was a problem from the start as there were delays or sometimes
the checks paid by Jessie Viceo bounced. Viceo agreed to the arrangement because he was a close friend of Jinggoy Estrada.
[Ibid, pp. 71-72] Gov. Singson knew Viceo personally because he would see Viceo in the cockpits which the latter frequented.
[Ibid, p. 74]
Gov. Singson considered the biggest among the expenses charged to the "Tax" the One Million Two Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P1,200,000.00) given to Laarni Enriquez whom Gov. Singson described as the most beloved or favorite of FPres. Estrada [Ibid, p.
75]. According to Gov. Singson, he was assessed, like other persons who attended the birthday party of Laarni, the aforesaid
P1,200,000.00 as his share in the price of the necklace birthday gift amounting to Thirteen Million Pesos (P13,000,000.00) for
Laarni. Jaime Dichaves collected the said amount from Gov. Singson after the party. Gov. Singson paid by check which was
deposited in the account of Laarni at PSBank. [Ibid, pp. 76-81] It was Congressman Mark Jimenez who pinpointed the guests who
would share (P1,200,000.00) each for the gift for Laarni after they had just finished playing mahjong with FPres. Estrada during
the party. [Ibid, p. 84] Gov. Singson charged the P1,200,000.00 as "tax" in the jueteng collection because it was "a big amount of
money". [Ibid, pp. 87-88]

In the early part of the year 2000, FPres. Estrada instructed Gov. Singson to transfer Two Hundred Million Pesos
(P200,000,000.00) of jueteng money to Serapio. The instruction was given by FPres. Estrada to Gov. Singson in Malacañang
Palace in the presence of Ricaforte and Serapio. According to Gov. Singson, Serapio said "Ako na ang bahalang magpa-ikot-ikot"
which Gov. Singson took it to mean that Serapio would see to it that the Two Huundred Million Pesos (P200,000,000.00) jueteng
money would not be traced before it reached him. FPres. Estrada checked Gov. Singson in April 2000 when FPres. Estrada’s
birthday was approaching, whether the money was so transferred. The transfer of funds was confirmed to Gov. Singson by both
Ricaforte and Serapio. The jueteng money delivered to Serapio initially amounted to One Hundred Twenty Three Million Pesos
(P123,000,000.00) but it was increased later to Two Hundred Sixteen Million Pesos (P216,000,000.00). [Ibid, pp. 88-94]

Gov. Singson testified that Serapio was the trusted lawyer of FPres. Estrada who formed fake corporations for FPres. Estrada
which Serapio would narrate to Gov. Singson when they often see each other in Malacañang Palace. Serapio was introduced to
Gov. Singson in 1999 after the birthday of FPres. Estrada.

Gov. Singson delivered jueteng money to FPresident Estrada in a black bag, like an attaché case. He delivered money at the
houses of FPres. Estrada, particularly once at P. Guevarra Street, twice or thrice or four times or five times at Polk Street. [Ibid,
pp. 95-98]

Atty. Kenneth S. Tampal of the office of the Senate Legal Counsel brought the black bag referred to by Gov. Singson which was
marked as Exhibit "MMM" at the Senate Impeachment Proceedings and the set of ledgers for the period beginning August 1999
to August 2000 (Exhibits A-4 to A-4-l). The bag was a leatherette attaché case with two (2) combination locks numbered 000.
[Ibid, pp. 103-105] According to Atty. Tampal, the exhibits are in the custody of the Office of the Senate Legal Counsel. [Ibid, p.
110]

Gov. Singson testified that the abovementioned black bag (Exh. O8) was one of the black bags which they used to deliver money
to FPres. Estrada in Malacañang Palace. [Ibid, p. 113] The said black bag can contain five or even six million pesos. [Ibid, pp. 115,
118] He would leave the bag with money and brought with him the bag without money. The bag contained two (2) combination
locks. The combination of both was "000" although he change it to "419", representing the birthdate of FPres. Estrada, April 19,
at the time he delivered money in Malacañang Palace to FPres. Estrada, but the latter asked him to revert to "000" combination
because FPres. Estrada could not open the lock. [Ibid, pp. 118-119] There were four (4) pieces of this type of bag. [Ibid, pp. 115-
116]

The bills placed in the bag were in One Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00) denomination. Many times Singson himself delivered the
jueteng money to FPres. Estrada in Malacañang Palace. To go to the Presidential Residence (PR), he passed through the main
gate where there were guards. At first, the Secretary would call to give the guards instruction not to inspect the bag. Later on,
the guards came to know Gov. Singson and allowed him to enter without inspecting the bag. Jueteng money was either
delivered to Gov. Singson’s office or picked-up by Gov. Singson, or his driver or his security or the people in his office. [Ibid, pp.
121-124]

The total amount of money Gov. Singson collected from jueteng operations for FPresident Estrada starting November 1998 to
August 2000 was Five Hundred Forty Million Pesos (P540,000,000.00) more or less, according to Gov. Singson.

Gov. Singson personally delivered about Two Hundred Million Pesos (P200,000,000.00) to FPres. Estrada. [Ibid, p. 124-125]

In the ledger for March 1999 (Exh AAAAAAAA), the entry "Bicol15 1.100" means in the Province of Bicol for fifteen (15) days the
protection money collection for FPres. Esrada was One Million One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P1,100,000.00). In the ledger for
the month of November 1998 (Exh. W7), there was an entry "1.500 Anton and 2.500 Anton". According to Gov. Singson, the
entry was made because Atong Ang told him the amounts of One Million Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P1,500,000.00) and
Two Million Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P2,500,000.00), or a total of Four Million Pesos (P4,000,000.00), collected from Bicol
were recorded / listed in the name of Presidential Assistant Anton Prieto. Atong Ang informed Gov. Singson that FPres. Estrada
knew about it and the latter so confirmed to Gov. Singson. [Ibid, pp. 125-127]
While jueteng protection money collection started in September 1998, the ledger started only in November 1998 when Gov.
Singson alone was asked to continue the jueteng collection. [Ibid, pp. 128-129]

In the July 2000 ledger (Exh. A-4-k), the total amount of jueteng collection and the total amount of expenses were the same so
the balance at the end of the month was zero because "Pick 2" replaced jueteng, as Gov. Singson, Dante Tan and FPres. Estrada
discussed in Malacañang and in his new home at New Manila called "Boracay". "Pick 2" was the brainchild of Dante Tan and
"Bingo 2 Ball" was the brainchild of Atong Ang. [Ibid, pp. 129-132] In "Boracay", Bong Pineda told Dante Tan, Gov. Singson and
FPres. Estrada that "Pick 2" may be hard to be understood by the people because there will be 75 numbers. [Ibid, p. 134]

In August 2000, "Pick 2" started and, in September 2000, before his departure for the United States, FPres. Estrada asked Gov.
Singson to hasten the start of "Bingo 2 Balls". Atong Ang called Gov. Singson when he was in Malaysia in September 6, 2000 and
told him that FPres. Estrada would like to rush the start of "Bingo 2 Balls". Gov. Singson replied that was nice and asked that
Atong Ang reserve Ilocos Sur for him. However, the following day the son of Gov. Singson informed him that the other half of the
franchise was given to his political opponent, Eric Singson, whom he defeated in the election. Eric Singson was his distant
relative. [Ibid, pp. 138-141]

According to the son of Gov. Singson, Atong Ang told him that he had the provincial commander transferred and the Chief of
Police replaced. His father could not do anything to stop "Bingo 2 Balls" as it was decided by FPres. Estrada and his political
career was finish. Gov. Singson talked with Atong Ang when he was in Malaysia and told him that they should wait for FPres.
Estrada to return. FPres. Estrada returned from the United States on September 13, 2000. Gov. Singson also arrived from
Malaysia the following day. The following day, Gov. Singson asked FPres. Estrada over the phone why the franchise was given to
his political enemy. Gov. Singson told him that all the mayors will be embarrassed. FPres. Estrada replied that he had nothing to
do with it. Gov. Singson thought that FPres. Estrada was fooling him. He told FPres. Estrada that it was a matter of pride, that all
his mayors were getting embarrassed. FPres. Estrada replied that he did not care, so Gov. Singson told him "Kung dahil lang dyan
pagkatapos ng lahat bibitawan mo ako, bibitaw na rin ako sa iyo". [Ibid, pp. 142-146]

Gov. Singson then asked his lawyers to prepare his affidavit because he knew that his life would be in danger if he would part
ways with FPres. Estrada, who was very powerful and Gov. Singson had no evidence. Gov. Singson then called Ricaforte and
asked her to fax to him the ledger. Ricaforte asked if they were going to Malacañang. Gov. Singson knew that Ricaforte did not
know yet what was happening. After she faxed the ledger from her house to Gov. Singson, the latter asked his lawyer to
continue with the preparation of his affidavit. Gov. Singson said he prepared the affidavit so that if anything happened to him it
would be known who was responsible. When asked if he was threatened, Gov. Singson replied that he knew FPres. Estrada and
the men around him so he knew that his life was in danger. [Ibid, pp. 146-150]

The first set of ledgers was faxed to Singson, while the second set (Exhs. A-4 to A-4-1) was in the possession of Ricaforte which
she produced during the impeachment proceedings. The prosecution would have the latter subpoenaed fom the Senate.
Everyone that Gov. Singson consulted gave the same comment. Nobody will believe Gov. Singson because FPres. Estrada was
the most popular President elected. Gov. Singson talked with Jinggoy Estrada. Gov. Singson told Jinggoy Estrada that his family
got One Hundred Thirty Million Pesos (P130,000,000.00) from him and that Jinggoy Estrada got part of the said money. Gov.
Singson also told Jinggoy Estrada that jueteng money all went to his father and that Jinggoy Estrada also had a part of it. Jinggoy
Estrada told Gov. Singson, they would fix it. [Ibid, pp. 147-155]

Nothing happened so Gov. Singson talked with JV Ejercito, another son of FPres. Estrada. JV Ejercito asked Gov. Singson not to
come out and that he will talk with his father. Again nothing happened so Gov. Singson approached Secretary Ronnie Zamora
and showed him the ledger. The latter reacted that the ledger was a serious matter, "Delikado ito". Zamora asked Gov. Singson
not to come out and he told Gov. Singson that he would see FPres. Estrada. Gov. Singson then went to see Former Secretary
Edgardo Angara at the latter’s GMA Farm in Batangas and showed to him the ledger. Secretary Angara asked Gov. Singson not to
come out publicly because the ledger was a serious matter and even they, the cabinet members may be affected. After that first
meeting in Batangas, Chavit Singon saw Secretary Angara at the Philippine Plaza and he latter told Gov. Singson that it was
alright as he was able to talk to FPres. Estrada. Secretary Angara, according to Gov. Singson, told FPres. Estrada that Gov.
Singson was a big help to them in politics and that he was just asking for a small favor. Secretary Angara also asked FPres.
Estrada not to embarrass Gov. Singson’s mayors. This matter might be known by the media. Secretary Angara informed Gov.
Singson that FPres. Estrada got mad and replied "Sinong tinakot nya?" Before Secretary Angara left, he told FPres. Estrada that
he saw Gov. Singson’s jueteng ledger and he found it a ground for impeachment. FPres. Estrada appeared surprised ("Nagulat")
but did not say anything. Secretary Angara assured FPres. Estrada, he will first talk with Gov. Singson and fix it. For the third
time, Gov. Singson saw Secretary Angara at New World Hotel. He asked Gov. Singson to give him until the end of September
2000 because the FPres. was a "macho" and would not easily give in. However, Gov. Singson replied that he was already decided
because his mayors kept on calling him. Incidentally according to Gov. Singson, these political enemies were operating the
"Bingo 2 Balls". [Ibid, pp. 156-164]

After Secretary Angara, Gov. Singson also approached Congressman Mark Jimenez, who said after he met with FPres. Estrada,
General Lacson and Secretary Ronnie Zamora that "Bingo 2 Balls" will not stop in Ilocos Sur but that Gov. Singson should lie low
first. Gov. Singson replied that he had decided already to come out and he informed his mayors that he will expose the
anomalies involving FPres. Estrada. Gov. Singson talked with Jimenez over the phone when he was then at Holiday Inn on
October 3, 2000. There was a conference of the Mayors League in the Philippines. Gov. Singson left Holiday Inn together with
twenty-two mayors. According to Gov. Singson, armed men followed him at about 11:30 that evening at San Marcelino Street
and that his vehicle was blocked by three cars and one motorcycle, all passengers by which were fully armed by armalite. Two of
the cars were TMG cars and the other, a civilian red car. Gov. Singson told the mayor with whom he was talking over the phone
that they should all go to San Marcelino, behind Jai-Alai because of an emergency. His driver was instructed by Gov. Singson not
to open the door of his vehicle. [TSN dated July 29, 2002, pp. 11-19]

PAOC men signaled Gov. Singson to get out of his vehicle, a bullet-proof Ford Super Van but he refused. He went out of the van
after the mayors arrived one after another. The PAOC team told Gov. Singson that they received information that he had a
blinker that, although he did not use it, mere possession was already a violation and that they wanted to bring this to Crame and
after he suggested that he be given a ticket of the volation but he instead asked that they go to the police precincts at the
United Nations Avenue. Only the two TMG Officers went to the police precinct with Gov. Singson who rode in his own van. There
were media people at the police precinct. When asked why he was being harassed although he was influencial to the FPres.
Estrada, Gov. Singson replied to the media that he will expose the anomalies of FPres. Estrada. [Ibid, pp. 20-26]

The following day the incident was published in the newspapers and shown on television. The group of FPres. Esrada tried to
settle with Singson. JV Ejercito was the first to call repeatedly (every two minutes) to ask Gov. Singson to return the call of FPres.
Estrada, Gov. Singson called the latter who asked that they talk because he was confused with the problems of the Abu Sayyaf
and the First Lady. Gov. Singson replied he had already given his word. They talked for the second time and then third time, it
was FPres. Estrada himself who called. The next person to call was Atong Ang who was pleading to Gov. Singson to fix the
matter. Gov. Singson brought up the P130 Million from the excise tax which Gov. Singson said was taken by Atong Ang and
FPres. Estrada. Atong Ang promised that the said amount will be returned to Gov. Singson and that the "Bingo 2 Balls" will be
given to Gov. Singson. Gov. Singson informed him that it was too late. Atong Ang called Gov. Singson about twenty (20) times
[Ibid, pp. 27-37]

After Atong Ang, Former Secretary Alfredo Lim called to convince Gov. Singson to settle and to see FPres. Estrada. Alfredo Lim
asked Gov. Singson to proceed with the press conference but he should put the blame on Atong Ang and that they will take care
of Atong Ang. Alfredo Lim gestured with his right fist thumb down. Gov. Singson understood this to mean that Atong Ang will be
killed. Gov. Singson did not agree because he might be implicated. He asked them to look for a good reason. [Ibid, pp. 38-42)

The next to call Gov. Singson was Jinggoy Estrada. The latter and Gov. Singson talked on October 8, 2000. Jinggoy Estrada also
sent many emissaries to talk with Gov. Singson. That evening Gov. Singson went to Cardinal Sin at his San Miguel Residence.
Gov. Singson explained to Cardinal Sin the situation and left to him the evidences so that in case anything happens to Gov.
Singson, he would know who will be responsible. Gov. Singson saw the Cardinal with his sisters. Cardinal Sin told Gov. Singson to
go ahead that he will pray for Gov. Singson and that God will be with them. [Ibid, pp. 42-26]

Gov. Singson returned to his house at 10:00 o’clock in the evening where Jinggoy Estrada called him and sent emissaries again to
Gov. Singson. At 12:00 midnight Jinggoy Estrada and some friends of his arrived at Gov. Singson’s house in Blue Ridge, Quezon
City. Jinggoy Estrada pleaded to Gov. Singson until 3:00 o’clock the following morning. Gov. Singson told Jinggoy Estrada that it
was too late because his press conference will happen in a while and all that the Estradas could do was to deny what Gov.
Singson will reveal at the press conference. He further said to Jinggoy Estrada that he will not mention the latter’s name. [Ibid,
pp. 46-51]

Gov. Singson proceeded with his press conference on October 9, 2000 at Club Filipino. He gave the two reasons: first, FPres.
Estrada insulted him and wanted him killed so he was not a true friend anymore; and second, he already had the evidence and
they will kill him even if he did not pursue his planned press conference. It was better for him to be killed with honor and to
show how corrupt the government was under the Estrada Administration. According to Gov. Singson, FPres. Estrada wanted to
replace jueteng with "Bingo-2-Balls" because he will earn more, about Fifty Million Pesos (P50,000,000.00) a day. Gov. Singson
explained how much FPres. Estrada would receive from "Bingo 2 Balls". [Ibid, pp. 51-59]

Gov. Singson also mentioned that FPres. Estrada owned the "Boracay Mansion" in New Manila. He identified this property
through a computer generated picture (Exh. P8). [Ibid, pp. 60-67] Gov. Singson also described the house of FPres. Estrada at Polk
St., Greenhills which he had visited frequently as well as the house of the FPres. in P. Guevarra Street which was just 2 to 3
kilometers away from Polk Street. [Ibid, pp. 68-72]

Gov. Singson testified as to the other properties of FPres. Estrada like Fontainbleau, Inc., a casino. A check (Exh. V6) payable the
order of Fonteinbleau, Inc. was among the checks turned over to Ricaforte. Gov. Singson helped put up the said casino for FPres.
Estrada. However, his name does not appear as an incorporator of the said company in its Articles of Incorporation (Exh. 22).
According to Gov. Singson, the shares in the company were distributed as follows: five percent (5%) to Butch Tenorio, the
President of the casino; twenty-five percent (25%) for Gov. Singson; seventy percent (70%) for FPres. Estrada which were placed
in the names of Jaime Dichaves and his classmate Susie Pineda. [Ibid, pp. 72-76]

To prove his close relationship with FPres. Estrada, Gov. Singson mentioned that Jacob, a son of the FPres. Estrada by Laarni
Enriquez, was his baptismal godson while FPres. Estrada stood as sponsor (in the wedding with his two children, Racquel and
Randy). [Ibid, pp.76-78]

On cross examination, Gov. Singson was confronted with his testimony during the Senate impeachment trial, contained in the
transcript of the stenographic notes of the proceedings held on December 13, 2000 at pages 234 and 235 (Exh. 28-Serapio and
submarkings). In the said testimony, Gov. Singson did not mention that Serapio was present when he turned over to Ricaforte
the jueteng protection money, partly in cash and partly in check. [TSN dated July 29, 2002, pp. 147-150] Gov. Singson insisted
that Serapio was present but he was being confused by the Senators sympathetic to FPres. Estrada. It appears, however, that
Singson was not asked during impeachment proceedings who were present during the aforementioned turn-over of jueteng
protection money. [Ibid, pp. 150-151] Gov. Singson also testified that he did not know if Ricaforte withdrew the amount in cash.
Gov. Singson was only told by Ricaforte that she gave the Two Hundred Million Pesos (P200,000,000.00) to Serapio. [Ibid, pp.
153-156 Gov. Singson also admitted that the P200,000,000.00 were transferred to the Muslim Youth Foundation, Inc. [Ibid, p.
156] and that he likewise testified before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee on October 17, 2000, as shown by the transcript of
Stenographic Notes of the hearing of that Committee (Exh. 29 and submarkings). Ibid, pp. 158-159]. Gov. Singson acknowledged
that he had came across the Certificate of Incorporation and By-Laws of the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation, Inc. (Exh 1-Serapio
and submarkings). The said foundation’s Certificate of Incorporation was dated November 17, 2000, and that the Articles of
Incorporation was dated February 15, 2000. [Ibid, pp. 167-168] Gov. Singson saw for the first time during his cross-examination
the certification of the Branch Manager of Equitable-PCI Bank that the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation, Inc. maintained an
account in the total amount of Two Hundred Three Million One Hundred Thirty-Six Thousand Nine Hundred Thirty-One Pesos
and Twenty Seven Centavos (P203,136,931.27) (Exh 17; 17-a-Serapio). [Ibid, p. 169]

EMMA BARBON LIM (Emma Lim) worked for Gov. Singson since July 1987 as Liaison Officer at the latter’s private office in LCS
Building, San Andres corner Diamante Street, San Andres Bukid, Metro Manila. LCS stood for Luis Chavit Singson. Emma Lim did
personal errands for Gov. Singson, like collecting jueteng money from different persons for FPres. Estrada pursuant to the
instructions of Gov. Singson.

As early as January 1999, Emma Lim was already receiving deliveries of jueteng money. Gov. Singson told her to take care of the
money that she was receiving because it was not the money of Gov. Singson but of FPres. Estrada. She started collecting jueteng
money sometime in April 1999. She personally went to the person from whom she collected the money. She knew that it was
jueteng money because Gov. Singson told her so and that it was also confirmed by Ricaforte.

She also knew that it was jueteng money because there was an instance that Ricaforte scolded her for opening an envelope.
Ricaforte told her that it was strictly confidential and it was intended for FPres. Estrada. Emma Lim also personally delivered
jueteng money to Malacañang.

According to Emma Lim, Ricaforte was the accountant-auditor of FPres. Estrada. This was how she was introduced by Gov.
Singson to her and how she introduced herself when she reported at the LCS Office. Ricaforte also held office in the same
address. Emma Lim’s other co-employee was Menchu Itchon. [TSN dated July 1, 2002, pp. 12-17]

Witness testified that she collected jueteng money from Undersecretary (USec) Anton Prieto, Jinggoy Estrada and Bong Pineda.

USec Anton Prieto was the Presidential Assistant for Bicol Affairs. He was the one in charge of jueteng collection in the Bicol
Area. Witness met Prieto personally and he introduced himself to the witness as such. Every time he called the office, he always
said that he was an Undersecretary in Malacañang.

Sometime on April 1999, Emma Lim met Prieto at the lobby of Dusit Hotel Nikko in Makati. Usec Prieto handed to her a sealed
mailing envelope which she brought to their office at LCS Building. Emma Lim called Gov. Singson who asked her to open the
envelope to know how much she received. The envelope contained a post dated check (Exh F7, F7-1 to F7-5) in the amount of
P1,190,000.00. Emma Lim deposited the check (Exh G7, G7-1 to G7-4) in the account of Gov. Singson at the Metrobank, Ayala
Center Branch on April 7, 1999.

Three days after the check was deposited, the New Accounts Department of the Metrobank Ayala branch informed Emma Lim
that the check was dishonored because the signature was different. The check was returned through Usec Prieto’s messenger.

Emma Lim usually deposited the PNB Naga Branch checks from Prieto in the Account No. 0963011682260 of Gov. Singson. The
deposit slips (Exhibits I7 to Q7 and submarkings) listed the deposits.
At one time, Ricaforte scolded her for opening the envelope because it was strictly confidential and that it was for FPres.
Estrada. Ricaforte took the check from the Emma Lim. [Ibid, pp. 17-56]

Ricaforte first reported at the LCS building on April 16, 1999. She introduced herself as the accountant-auditor of FPres. Estrada.
Gov. Singson also introduced her as such.

Emma Lim collected jueteng money twice from Bong Pineda, who was in charge of the jueteng collections in Pampanga because
Gov. Singson told her so.

Sometime on January 2000, upon instruction of Gov. Singson, Emma Lim and Gov. Singson’s driver Faustino Prudencio went to
the house of Bong Pineda at No. 2 Albany Street, Northeast Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila to pick-up money. At Pineda’s
house, Pineda’s secretary, Marty, asked her to enter an office room to wait for Bong’s brother Romy Pineda. When Romy Pineda
arrived, he placed a shopping bag on top of the table and asked Emma Lim to count the contents. The money was P5,000,000.00
in P1,000 denominations. After counting the money, they returned the money inside the shopping bag and Mr. Pineda made her
sign a half sheet of bond paper evidencing that she received the money. Emma Lim then kept the money inside the vault at the
LCS office and informed Gov. Singson that she had picked up the money.

The second time Emma Lim collected money from Bong Pineda was sometime on February 2000. They were on their way home
after collecting money from Jinggoy Estrada. Menchu Itchon called her and told her that Gov. Singson wanted her to drop by the
house of Mr. Bong Pineda to pick-up money. Emma Lim proceeded and Marty again ushered her to the office room. Romy
Pineda arrived. He opened what appeared to be a bookshelf and came out with a red Salvatore Ferragamo shopping bag (Exhibit
R7) containing P5,000,000.00. The money was in P1,000 bills and in 5 bundles containing P1,000,000.00 each. Romy Pineda asked
her to sign a paper that she received the amount. She kept the money in the vault assigned to her at the LCS office. She
informed Gov. Singson that she received the money from Bong Pineda, and Gov. Singson told her that he will pass by for it. [Ibid,
pp. 58-80]

She collected jueteng money from Jinggoy Estrada three times. These were sometime in January, February 2000 and March 17,
2000.

For the first collection, Gov. Singson called her up at the LCS office and told her to call the office of Mayor Jinggoy Estrada to
inquire if she can pick up what was to be picked up. The staff of Jinggoy Estrada who answered the phone told her to go there
after lunch. Witness left the office at 1:00 o’clock with the driver of Gov. Singson and proceeded to the office of Mayor Jinggoy
Estrada at the second floor of the Municipal Hall of San Juan, Metro Manila.

When she arrived at the office, the staff at the receiving section gave her a sheet of paper where she wrote her name and office.
The bodyguard of Jinggoy Estrada arrived and handed to her something which was wrapped in a magazine and sealed with
scotch tape. The bodyguard told her not to count the money because there were many people around. She then brought the
package back to the LCS office and kept it in the vault. She called Gov. Singson and told him that she already picked up the
money from Jinggoy Estrada. When Gov. Singson arrived, witness counted the money in his presence and it was P1,000,000.00
which she turned over to Gov. Singson.

Sometime in February 2000, she again collected jueteng money from Jinggoy Estrada. Gov. Singson called her up and instructed
her to call up the office of Jinggoy Estrada. She was able to talk to Jinggoy Estrada’s secretary Josie and was told to go to their
office after lunch.

Josie ushered her inside the office of Jinggoy Estrada. Jinggoy Estrada was there. Witness greeted him a good afternoon and he
smiled. Josie asked her to sit in front of her table which was about 4 to 5 meters away from Jinggoy Estrada. Josie took up a
paper bag from under her table and placed it on top of the table. She asked the witness to count the contents. The witness
counted that there were ten (10) bundles of P1,000.00 bills. Each bundle had 100 pieces and the total amount was
P1,000,000.00. She then asked permission to leave. After coming from the office of Jinggoy Estrada, they proceeded to the
house of Bong Pineda.

She collected jueteng money for the third time from Jinggoy Estrada on March 17, 2000. She again went to the office of Jinggoy
Estrada after lunch after contacting Josie. When she arrived there, she was ushered inside the office of Jinggoy Estrada. She can
no longer remember the number of staff inside the office. It was Josie who told her to sit down in front of the table of Jinggoy
Estrada. Jinggoy Estrada took out a check from his wallet and gave it to her saying, "Sabihin mo kay Gob tseke na lang." Emma
Lim then kept the check inside her bag. The amount was P1,000,000.00 with United Overseas Bank Philippines, San Juan Branch
as the drawee bank. The witness deposited the check to the account of Gov. Singson at Metrobank, Ayala Center. The deposit
slip (Exhibit S7) was presented.
According to the witness, the check was personalized because it bore the picture of Jinggoy Estrada at the background. Emma
Lim had seen this kind of check of Gov. Singson. [Ibid, pp. 82-111] Emma Lim maintained her testimony notwithstanding that she
was shown a certification dated December 11, 2000 issued by Isabelita M. Papa, Executive Vice President of United Overseas
Bank of the Philippines, stating that Mr. Jose P. Estrada, also known as Jinggoy Ejercito Estrada, never had a current or checking
account with the said bank. [TSN dated July 10, 2002]

She knew that the money she kept in the vault assigned to her were jueteng collections because Governor Singson and Ricaforte
told her so. [TSN dated July 1, 2002, p. 81]

On July 3, 2002, Emma B. Lim continued her direct examination and testified that she personally met FPres. Estrada when she
delivered jueteng money to Malacanang. As instructed by Gov. Singson, she was fetched by Singson’s driver, personal aide and
security guard at Singson’s office at LCS. She boarded the Ford Expedition when they passed by the LCS office.Singson called to
ask Emma Lim to double check the money inside the car if it was Five Million Pesos (P5,000,000.00). Gov. Singson’s driver
Faustino Prudencio, personal aide Jemis Singson and security guard Frederico Artates were inside the car too when she bundle
count the money. They proceeded to the residence of FPres. Estrada at Polk Street, Greenhills. However, Artates and Jamis
Singson were informed by the security guards that Malou Florendo and FPres. Estrada were not at home. They waited outside
and decided to take their lunch in a restaurant in Greenhills. They brought the black bag containing the money with them at the
restaurant. Gov. Singson’s personal aide was holding the bag. Driver Faustino Prudencio received instruction from Singson for
them to proceed to Malacanang. It was already 1:00 o’clock, after lunchtime in 1999 during the Maslog book scam in
Malacanang. She recalled it because her companion warned her not to open the bag because "Baka ma-maslog ka ". In that
incident, Maslog was caught bringing money inside Malacanang. Emma Lim was dropped-off at the circle inside Malacanang. She
carried the black bag containing P5,000,000.00. Emma Lim introduced herself to the security guard as Emma from the office of
Governor Gov. Singson and told him Malou Florendo was expecting her. The amount of P5,000,000.00 was in One thousand (P
1,000.00) peso bills. [TSN dated July 3, 2002, pp. 190-207] The security guard allowed her to enter, without passing the bag
through the x-ray. The guard was not strict and pointed to her the Presidential Residence. There was another security guard in
front of the house and Emma Lim gave the same introduction and that Malou Florendo was expecting her. Emma was allowed to
enter. She was met by Malou inside the residence, Emma Lim saw FPres. Estrada, wearing a cream polo. Emma Lim handed the
black bag to Malou Florendo. Emma Lim and FPres. Estrada were within each other’s view. Malou placed the black bag beside an
office table. Emma Lim heard Malou told Gov. Singson over the phone that she was already there. Emma Lim left for the LCS
office. [Ibid, pp. 242-261] Emma Lim described the black bag as rectangular with numbered combination lock. The width was
about 8 inches, the length, 18 inches and the height was 12 inches. It was made of canvass or synthetic material. Emma
demonstrated in court that she could carry a bag of similar size with P 5,000,000.00 inside. Five bundles of bills weighed four (4)
kilos and eight (8) grams. [Ibid, pp. 263-279,280] The bag weighed 2 kilos and 6 grams. The bag and its contents weighed 7 kilos
and 4 grams. [Ibid, p. 288]

On cross-examination, Emma Lim testified that she worked for Gov. Singson since 1987. She started living at LCS Office since
1989 until she got married in 1996. She did not pay rent just like the other employees of Singson. She was not related to Singson.
Her brother Roy Barbon worked as driver for Singson between 1990 and 1992. She did not feel beholden to Gov. Singson
because she worked for her salary. She did not owe him a debt of gratitude but it should be the other way around because she
got embroiled in this trouble because of jueteng collections. [Ibid, pp. 296-308]

Emma Lim attended a dinner at Malacañang Palace on February 16, 2001. [TSN dated July 17, 2002, pp. 75-77] She was
appointed at John Hay Development Corporation during the term of President Arroyo. She received Eight Thousand Pesos
(P8,000.00) per board meeting. Emma Lim also worked as liaison officer of Gov. Singson for overseas workers. [Ibid, pp.87-88]
She knew that she was collecting jueteng money because Gov. Singson said so and Ricaforte comfirmed. Further the money
delivered was bundled by millions and no money of that amount arrived their office when Gov. Singson was not yet a collector.
[Ibid, p. 99]

MARIA CARMENCITA ANCHETA ITCHON (Itchon), a Certified Public Accountant, testified that she was hired by Gov. Singson to
be an accountant of Fountain Bleau Incorporated (later renamed Fontain Bleau Incorporated) on February 19, 1999. According
to Itchon, the said corporation, which was set-up to build a casino in Clark Air Base, Pampanga, was owned by former President
Estrada. Witness knew that this was owned by Estrada because Gov. Singson said so and it was confirmed by Mrs. Ricaforte.
[TSN, June 17, 2002, pp. 115-118]

She allegedly knew that Fontain Bleau Incorporated got its funding from the jueteng collections of FPres. Estrada because Gov.
Singson would always tell her to wait for the jueteng collection of FPres. Estrada every time she asked for funds. [Ibid, pp. 119-
122]

As Accountant, she was the one who made the listings of the pre-operation and expenses of Fontain Bleau and during that time
she was the Accountant, she already received jueteng collections for FPres. Estrada.
Itchon further testified that she received jueteng collections, amounting to a total of around Six Million Pesos (P6,000,000.00) in
cash and check, about six (6) times. She received these jueteng  collections from the messengers of Mr. Anton Prieto and former
San Juan Mayor Jinggoy Estrada or Jingle Bells. After receiving the collections, she would inform Gov. Singson and then either
Gov. Singson took the collection from her or they turned it over to Mrs. Yolanda Ricaforte.

Itchon identified Fontain Bleu’s original Certificate of Incorporation (Exh. P6) and the Articles of Incorporation and By Laws
attached (Exh. P6-1), which were in her possession. These incorporation documents showed the date of Fontain Bleau’s
registration with the Securities and Exchange Commission (April 5, 1999), the names of its incorporators, and its office address at
the 2nd Floor, LCS Building, San Andres Bukid, Manila. Itchon’s sketch of the office was marked as Exh. Q6. [Ibid., pp. 123-124,132-
137]

Itchon averred that before she personally met Yolanda Ricaforte at the office in LCS, Ricaforte used to call their office and
introduced herself as the Accountant – Auditor for FPres. Estrada. As early as March 19, 1999, Singson told Itchon that she
would be working with Yolanda Ricaforte, the Accountant of FPres. Estrada. Ricaforte began to report for work in the same
office as Itchon on April 16, 1999. [Ibid, pp. 129-132, 138-141]

Singson and Ricaforte told Itchon that Ricaforte will be her [Itchon’s] immediate supervisor. Ricaforte checked Itchon’s entries in
her journal. Ricaforte signed the check that Itchon prepared for payment for the supplier of Fontain Bleau and Ricaforte brought
Itchon every time she went to the Pampanga office.

Itchon proceeded to narrate how in the course of their work she and Ricaforte became close and had many conversations
including among others how FPres. Estrada came to appoint Ricaforte’s husband Orestes Ricaforte as undersecretary of Tourism
and how FPres. Estrada gifted Orestes with the Black Lexus that Yolanda and Itchon usually used in traveling to the Pampanga
office. Itchon had photographs of gatherings she attended with Ricaforte (Exh. A-6-vvvvv). [Ibid, pp. 143-152]

Itchon knew Ricaforte to be the Accountant–Auditor of FPres. Estrada in Fontain Bleau Incorporated and for jueteng collections
because Ricaforte reported directly to FPres. Estrada. Itchon then narrated how on June 15, 1999, she and Mrs. Regina Lim (one
of the incorporators of Fontain Bleau) brought Ricaforte to Malacañang at around 3:30 p.m. They brought her there because
Ricaforte said she would report to FPres. Estrada. Before going to Malacañang, Ricaforte took their records of Fontain Bleau, got
Itchon’s journal and the list of expenses and then Itchon briefed her regarding their expenses. [Ibid, pp. 155-162]

Itchon also testified that Ricaforte also reported to FPres. Estrada by phone, sometimes using the landline in the office and
sometimes using her [Ricaforte’s] cell phone. Itchon knew that the calls were made to FPres. Estrada because she was around
when Ricaforte was making calls, and Ricaforte would ask her to keep quiet because she was calling the President. The calls
were made inside the LCS office.

Itchon explained that she knew that the cell phone number of Ricaforte was 0918-9021847 because the number was originally
issued in Itchon’s name. The cell phone was supposed to be hers. When they were in Fontain Bleau, they bought cell phones and
the application form for the number was under Itchon’s name. Itchon was the one who assigned it to herself. But when the cell
phones came, Itchon testified that Ricaforte took the cell phone no. 0918-9021847 and the number 0918-9021849 originally
assigned to Ricaforte went to Itchon. Itchon also testified that Ricaforte called up Estrada in her presence about five times.

Itchon prepared a summary of the calls (Exh. R6 with submarkings) made by Ricaforte. Itchon explained that these were the
summary of phone calls of Ricaforte to FPres. Estrada at the presidential residence; to Mayor Jinggoy Estrada or Jingle Bells, to
Mr. Edward Serapio, to Governor Singson and to Mr. Romy Pineda, the brother of Bong Pineda. She took the information from
the fifteen (15) Statements of Account of Ricaforte for her cell number 0918-9021847. The phone billings of Ricaforte
particularly with reference to cell phone no. 0918-9021847 were with Itchon. [Ibid, pp. 163-175]

Itchon averred that she prepared or came up with a summary of calls made by Mrs. Ricaforte upon the advice of her lawyer Atty.
Pablito Sanidad because when she and Mrs. Ricaforte testified in the Senate Blue Ribbon Hearing Committee, Mrs. Ricaforte
testified that she seldom or never called up President Joseph Estrada, Mr. Jinggoy Estrada, Atty. Edward Serapio, Governor
Singson and Mr. Romy Pineda. Itchon also testified that when she prepared the summary based on the entries on the particular
phone billings, she found out several phone calls to those persons mentioned. [TSN, June 19, 2002, pp. 8-12]

Fifteen (15) Statements of Account (Exhs. S6, S6-1 up to S6-14) issued by Smart communications were also identified by Itchon
purporting to be statements of account of Cell phone No. 0918-9021847. The Statements of Account covered the billing period
ending July 1999 and billing period ending August 31, 2000. The billing statements of account were received by Itchon from the
company for her to pay. The cell phone bills were being paid by Fontain Bleau, but when Fontain Bleau ceased to exist, the
phone bills were paid by Ricaforte with money from jueteng collections. [Ibid, pp. 15-18]
Itchon affirmed that she was present during Mrs. Ricaforte’s phone call to the presidential residence in five instances. During
these times, Mrs. Ricaforte was at the LCS office and Itchon was either beside her or in front of Mrs. Ricaforte’s office table.
Itchon pointed out in the sketch (Exh. Q6) she prepared where she was during the five times when the calls were made in her
presence.

The number or numbers Ricaforte called up were 736-8855 and 736-8858. Itchon testified that she knew that the numbers
pertain to the numbers in the Presidential Residence because they had office records and she also tried calling the number.
When she dialed the numbers she asked if it was the PMS. The answer was it was the Presidential Residence. When asked why
Itchon checked and called the numbers in the first place, she answered that when she checked Mrs. Ricaforte’s cell phone bills,
she found out that the numbers were there so she tried calling to check whether it was the Presidential Residence.

When asked what was the nature or gist of the conversation from the end of Mrs. Ricaforte when she called up the Presidential
residence, Itchon answered that Mrs. Ricaforte said: "Malou, this is Yolly. Is the President already calling for me? If he needed
me, just call me on the cell phone." According to Itchon, Malou was the secretary of FPres. Estrada and Itchon knew this because
it was Mrs. Ricaforte who told her. [Ibid., pp. 18-23]

According to Itchon, there were also calls made to former San Juan Mayor Jinggoy Estrada and, in her summary, Ricaforte called
up Mayor Jinggoy Estrada twenty-four (24) times. On at least five occasions, Itchon testified that she was present when Ricaforte
called up Jinggoy Estrada while they [Itchon and Ricaforte] were both in the LCS office. Itchon distinctly remembered two dates
of Ricaforte’s phone calls to Mayor Jinggoy Estrada – (a) August 16, 1999 when Ricaforte called up Jinggoy in his residence
because that was the first call of Ricaforte when she started concentrating as the accountant-auditor of former President
Estrada in his "jueteng" collections; and (b) November 15, 1999 because Ricaforte called up Mayor Jinggoy several times as they
were waiting for Mayor Jinggoy’s jueteng collection from which they would get their salaries.

The cell phone number of Jinggoy Estrada was 0917-526-0217 and his landline number was 724-4736. Itchon knew that these
numbers pertain to Jinggoy Estrada because she got the numbers from Gov. Singson. She got the number because she wanted to
check the cell phone bills of Ricaforte because there were times that she remembered that Ricaforte had been calling the
number of Jinggoy Estrada which Itchon was not aware of. [Ibid, pp. 23-28]

Based on Itchon’s as well as the phone billings, Ricaforte called up Atty. Edward Serapio six (6) times at cell phone No. 0918-
9012071. Itchon also got the number of Atty. Serapio from Gov. Singson. Based on the Smart Communications phone billings,
Ricaforte called up Atty. Serapio on March 23 and 24, 2000, and April 3, 12, 13, and 14, 2000. (Exh. S6 with submarkings) [Ibid.,
pp. 29-35]

According to Itchon’s summary, Mrs. Ricaforte called up Gov. Singson 209 times at cell phone nos. 0917-8387171 and 0918-
9002443. Itchon was present several times when Ricaforte called up Gov. Singson. Itchon knew that these numbers pertained to
Gov. Singson because she was familiar with these cell phone numbers. [Ibid, pp. 37-38]

Itchon also testified to calls made by Ricaforte to a certain Romy Pineda, the brother Bong Pineda, whom she knew was a
jueteng lord. Itchon testified that Ricaforte called up Romy Pineda in his landline number, 722-7366. Based on the Summary that
Itchon prepared, Ricaforte called up Romy Pineda twice. [Ibid, pp. 38-39]

Itchon further testified that Fontain Bleau, Inc. was not able to operate because Fontain Bleau could not comply with PAGCOR’s
requirement for a 200-room hotel accommodation so it was not issued a license to operate.

After the non-issuance of the license to operate, Fontain Bleau entered into a Memorandum of Agreement with RN
Development Corporation on July 19, 1999 (Exhs. T6, T6-1 to T6-2). The Memorandum of Agreement ("MOA") stipulated that RN
Development Corporation will reimburse all the pre-operations expenses of Fontain Bleau and that Fontain Bleau will have a
10% share from the casino that will be established by RN Development Corporation. Itchon was present during the signing of the
MOA. She identified the signatures of the witnesses to the MOA; namely, a certain Pax who was introduced to Itchon as Atong
Ang’s sister (Exh. T6-2-c) and Yolanda Ricaforte (Exh. T6-2-d). Itchon testified that she came to know Atong Ang during the
negotiation of the MOA and that Atong Ang was present during the signing.

As far as Itchon knew, the pre-operational expenses of Fontain Bleau was around Sixty Five Million Pesos (P65,000,000.00). This
was reimbursed by RN Development Corporation to Fontain Bleau pursuant to their Memorandum of Agreement. Itchon
brought with her a copy of RN's deposit slip and their first payment in the amount of Thirty Million Pesos (P30,000,000.00) (Exh.
U6) and testified that the depositor’s signature therein was Emma Lim’s, one of the secretaries in the LCS office. Itchon also had a
photocopies of the second check that RN paid to Fontain Bleau in the amount of Thirty Four Million Six Hundred Forty Thousand
Four Hundred and Forty Two Pesos (P34,640,442.00) (Exh. V6) and of the acknowledgement receipt (Exh. V6-1) signed by
Ricaforte and Atty. Manuel Singson, as Director and Corporate Secretary, respectively of Fontain Bleau. Itchon further testified
that Ricaforte got the originals of these documents but Itchon had them photocopied for her record before Ricaforte took the
originals.

Since Fontain Bleau was unable to operate, all the employees of Fontain Bleau in the Pampanga office were terminated. It was
only Itchon and Mrs. Ricaforte who were retained. [Ibid, pp. 39-58]

In August 1999, Ricaforte already concentrated on being the accountant-auditor of FPres. Estrada in his "jueteng" operation and
then Itchon was told by Gov. Singson to help Ricaforte. Nothing happened to Fontain Bleau anymore. Itchon allegedly knew that
in August 1999, Ricaforte concentrated in the jueteng collection because Itchon was there when Gov. Singson briefed Ricaforte
regarding the collection of the jueteng operation and she [Ricaforte] was given the code name "Madam Auring" by Gov. Singson.
[Ibid, pp. 58-60]

Itchon’s testimony then detailed how she participated in the "jueteng" collections. She was tasked to receive the "jueteng"
collections that were brought to the office. There were also times when Itchon or Emma Lim were called by Ricaforte to help
compute and count the money turned over to Ricaforte such as double checking through a calculator. Collections that Itchon
received were brought by messengers of Mr. Anton Prieto and sometimes by the messengers of Gov. Singson who picked up the
jueteng collections from Mayor Jinggoy Estrada. Itchon knew Prieto’s messenger because when the messenger came, the checks
were inside the white envelope with markings "Menchu/Emma" and then the messenger introduced himself as messenger of
Anton Prieto. Itchon was also present when Gov. Singson was giving instructions to his messengers to get jueteng collections
from Mayor Jinggoy Estrada. Gov. Singson’s messengers were Mr. Jamis Singson and Edward Iverra. Each collection was One
Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) per collection in cash. She remembers these collections from Mayor Jinggoy Estrada on two (2)
occasions because it was from there that they (Ricaforte, Lim, Itchon and Iverra) took their salary.

According to Itchon, these jueteng collections came in around 15th and 30th of the month. From the time that they started
concentrating on the jueteng collection for the former President on August 1999, Itchon received these collections about six (6)
times, covering the period August 1999 to August 2000. The total collections she received after August 1999 was around Seven
Million Pesos (P7,000,000.00). With respect to the Seven Million Peso collections that she received, there were times when Gov.
Singson took the collection directly from her and there were times when Gov. Singson instructed her to turn over the collection
to Ricaforte. As Accountant of Fontain Bleau, she also received six (6) collections, for the period February 1999 to July 1999. All
in all Itchon averred she received twelve (12) collections. [Ibid, pp. 61-66]

Itchon also testified that Emma Lim was the secretary of Governor Singson and also a co-employee at the LCS Office. Since
Emma Lim was also helping in the jueteng collections, she also received salary from Ricaforte. [Ibid, pp. 71-72]

On cross examination, Itchon explained that the name of the former President allegedly did not appear in the Articles of
Incorporation of Fontain Bleau because of his public position and because the source of its funds was illegal [TSN, June 24, 2002,
pp. 19-20]. Emma Lim, Jamis Singson, Edward Iverra and sometimes Ricaforte collected jueteng money from Jinggoy Estrada.
Jamis Singson turned over to Itchon the jueteng collection about once or twice in 2000 between January to August 2000. Itchon
testified that they helped Gov. Singson count Five Million pesos (P5,000,000.00) from the jueteng collections sent through the
messengers and some from the collections of Gov. Singson himself and placed the said amount of money in a black bag to be
brought to FPres. Estrada but she admitted she did not see the delivery to President Estrada. [Ibid, pp. 23-30, 101]

Itchon and the others at the office would allegedly wait for the call of Ricaforte to Jinggoy every pay day because their salaries
would come from Jinggoy’s jueteng collection. Itchon was only present around five (5) times that Ricaforte called Jinggoy,
although Ricaforte called Jinggoy 24 times. (Ibid, pp. 39-46) Itchon also mentioned during her cross-examination that Gov.
Singson was reimbursed for the jueteng money advanced to Fontain Bleau when the latter was acquired by RN Development
Corporation. RN Development Corporation’s partial payment in the amount of Thirty Million Pesos (P30,000,000.00) was
deposited in the account of Fontain Bleau by Ricaforte and Ricaforte thereafter returned to Singson the said amount through a
Metrobank check payable to Singson. (Exhs. X6, X6-1, X6-2) [Ibid, pp. 125-127; TSN, June 26, 2002, pp. 25-26]

According to Itchon, the use by Ricaforte of the cell phone no. 0918-9021847 in the name of Itchon was proven by the cell
phone number declared by Ricaforte in the bank where she deposited money (Ibid, p. 19). She admitted that she and Emma Lim
were appointed by President Arroyo as Director of John Hay Poro Point Development Corporation on September 2001. (Exh. 26,
26-a to 26-c-1) [TSN, June 26, 2002, pp. 51-56]

On redirect, Itchon referred to the acknowledgement receipt dated March 12, 1999 (Exh. Y-6) for the advance rental of Thirty
Million Pesos (P30,000,000) as well as the landscape plan of said company (Exhs. E7, E7-1 to E7-6) as proof that that original name
of Fontain Bleau was spelled Fountain Bleau Holding, Inc. [Ibid, p. 100]

Smart Communications billings identified by Itchon were marked as Exhs. X6, X6-1 to X6-2 [Ibid, pp.  101-105]. Itchon also brought
to court the journal (Exhs. A7-1 to A7-5) and computerized list (Exh. B7, B7-1 to B7-3) of the pre-operation expenses of Fountain
Bleau amounting to Sixty Five Million (P65,000,000.00) which were reimbursed by RN Development Corporation. She also
presented the computerized list of said expenses with specifics (Exh. C7, C7-1 to C7-4) and some of the checks of Gov. Singson
which were used to pay the expenses of Fountain Bleau from March 3, 1999 to June 20, 1999 (Exh. D7, D7-1 to D7-95) The funds
of Fountain Bleau were taken by Gov. Singson from jueteng collections. The check covering part of the reimbursement to
Fountain Bleau in the amount of Thirty Four Million Six Hundred Forty Thousand Four Hundred and Forty Two Pesos
(P34,640,442.00) was marked as Exh. V6 (with submarkings). [Ibid, pp. 106-117]

VICENTE RAGIL AMISTAD (Amistad) was a Philippine National Police (PNP) officer stationed at Vigan City Police Station, assigned
to former Gov. Singson since 1989 until the time of his testimony. On three (3) occasions in 1999 and 2000, Amistad was
instructed by Gov. Singson to go to the house of Bong Pineda at Albany Street, Northeast Greenhills and received from Romy
Pineda, Bong Pineda’s brother, the followings sums of money: Seven Million Seven Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P7,750,000.00); Five Million Pesos (P5,000,000.00) and Three Million Two Hundred Fifty Pesos (P3,250,000.00). Amistad would
bundle count, place the money in a plastic bag and bring it to Gov. Singson at LCS building, after signing a receipt prepared by
Romy Pineda. [TSN, September 16, 2002, pp. 15-56]

Amistad also testified that upons instruction of Singson, he went to the office of then Mayor Jinggoy Estrada at the second floor
of the Municipal Hall of San Juan in 1999. After Mayor Jinggoy Estrada called up someone, he [Jinggoy] asked Amistad to go
down and get what Jinggoy would give him in front of the Municipal Hall. At the ground floor, the security guard of Mayor
Jinggoy Estrada gave him a package wrapped in a newspaper with scotch tape, which he brought to Gov. Singson at LCS Building.
Amistad testified that he was was scolded by Gov. Singson because the money inside the package was short. Gov. Singson called
up Jinggoy and informed the latter about the shortage. The following day Amistad was informed by Gov. Singson that the
shortage of Jinggoy was already given to him.

JAMIS BATULAN SINGSON (Jamis) was the personal aide of Gov. Singson, who was not related to him. Jamis Singson knew FPres
Estrada and Gov. Singson to be close friends who played mahjong and drank together. Jamis Singson was constantly with Gov.
Singson when he delivered jueteng money to FPres Estrada. [TSN, September 18, 2002, pp. 25-31] Jamis Singson saw Gov.
Singson counting the jueteng money before he placed them in a black bag which he would carry.

Jamis also testified that in March 1999, he, Artates and driver Prudencio went to the house of Bong Pineda. Artates went inside
the house and when he went out, he was carrying a shopping bag full of money. Jamis then transferred the money to a black bag
which Gov. Singson used to deliver money to FPres. Estrada. Jamis described the black bag’s measurements and how it was
opened from the top with a combination (lock) ( Exh. "08"). The money totalled Five Million Pesos (P 5,000,000.00 ) in five (5)
bundles of One Million Pesos ( P1,000,000.00 ) each. They proceed to LCS Building in San Andres to pick up Emma Lim as
instructed by Gov. Singson. Inside the vehicle, Emma Lim counted the money. [Ibid, pp. 68-81] They went to the Polk Street
house of FPres. Estrada but the latter was not home. While having lunch at a restaurant, Emma Lim received a call from Gov.
Singson instructing them to go to Malacañang. Emma Lim alighted from the vehicle with the black bag and entered passing
through the guard house in going to the Presidential residence. They waited outside. Emma Lim asked to be fetched later and
she was no longer holding the black bag. [TSN, ibid, pp. 83-90]

Jamis also testified to one occasion in the middle of 1999 when he himself was instructed by Gov. Singson to collect money from
the house of Bong Pineda. That time Jamis received Seven Million Pesos (P7,000,000.00) in a shopping bag from Romeo "Romy"
Pineda. Romy made Jamis sign a blue book and then Jamis brought the money to Gov. Singson in the latter’s office. [Ibid, pp. 91-
101]

Jamis also testified he collected jueteng money from Mayor Jinggoy Estrada twice on Gov. Singson’s instructions. For the first
occasion, on or about October 1999 Jamis went to the office of then Mayor Jinggoy Estrada at the second floor Municipal Hall of
San Juan at around 4pm to 5 pm. Inside the said office, Jinggoy Estrada’s bodyguard Nestor showed a sando plastic bag to
Jinggoy Estrada and after that Jamis saw Jinggoy pointing to him [Jamis]. Jamis brought the plastic bag, which Jamis
subsequently saw contained an indeterminable amount of money, to Singson at the latter’s office. [Ibid, pp. 105-121]

The second time Jamis collected jueteng money from Jinggoy Estrada was immediately after the first time, in the evening.Thus,
Gov. Singson instructed Jamis to proceeed to the house of Mayor Jinggoy Estrada in Greenhills. At Mayor Jinggoy’s house, Jamis
again received a plastic sando bag from "Nestor". Jamis brought the bag to Gov. Singson’s office and handed it to Menchu (Ma.
Carmencita) Itchon as Gov. Singson instructed. Jamis identified Menchu in Court. He said she was the companion of Ricaforte in
the office. [Ibid., pp. 121-132]

ATTY. DAVID JONATHAN YAP (Atty. Yap), the Senate Legal Counsel, testified that he acted as the Deputy Clerk of the Senate
Impeachment Court. Among others, his office was in charge of receiving all documents and pleadings relating to the
impeachment trial. He was in charge of marking the Exhs. requested by the parties and keeping them in custody. He brought to
this Court in compliance with a subpoena a fifteen (15)-paged document marked in this case as prosecution’s Exhs. "A-4" to "A-
4-L" [TSN, September 25, 2002, p. 63] He identified his signatures that he affixed on the Exhibits on December 7, 2002. He
testified that he saw Yolanda Ricaforte when she brought those documents to the Senate Impeachment Court in compliance
with a subpoena dated December 5, 2000 (Exh. E) issued by Chief Justice Davide. Atty. Yap was present when Ricaforte took her
oath on the witness stand on December 7, 2000 He identified Ricaforte from a photograph (Exh. A6-V5-1). The Original
documents were placed in a vault inside his office, where they had been kept and deposited since they were turned to him
during the impeachment trial, except only when they were sent over to the Sandiganbayan as requested. [Ibid., p. 77]

Atty. Yap was at the back of Yolanda Ricaforte at the Senate Impeachment Trial when she gave her testimony that the ledger she
brought is an ordinary "listahan." [TSN, Senate Impeachment Trial, p. 144; see also TSN of these cases,September 25, 2002, pp.
78-79]

EDELQUINN DE GUZMAN NANTES (Nantes) was the Branch Manager of Equitable-PCI Bank, Scout Tobias-Timog Branch on
September 1, 1999. Nantes knew Yolanda Ricaforte because the latter was a client of the bank. Ricaforte told Nantes that she
[Ricaforte] was in the real estate and fish pond business.

Nantes personally attended to Ricaforte when the latter opened checking and savings account with the branch on September 1,
1999. She asked Ricaforte to fill up all the required documents for opening current and savings accounts such as the signature
cards for Current Account No. 0107-00638-9 and Savings Account No. 0157-04227-0. (Exhs. A-6, A-6-a and A-6-b) [TSN, May 22,
2002, pp. 67-72]

Ricaforte opened one checking account, one savings account, seven special savings accounts and a PCI Emerald Fund. The initial
amount of deposit in the savings account was Seventeen Million Two hundred Five Thousand Pesos (P17,205,000.00) as shown
by the deposit slip for Savings Account No. 0517-042227 (Exh. A-6-aa). The Seventeen Million Two Hundred Ten Thousand Pesos
(P17,210,000.00) was in check payable to cash. The Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) was deposited in the checking account No.
0107-001638-9 (Exh. A-6-bb) and the balance of Seventeen Million Two Hundred Five Thousand Pesos (P17,205,000) was
deposited in the savings account. [Ibid, pp. 80-85]

There were deposits made on the savings account of Ricaforte after the initial deposit. Nantes presented and identified the
deposit slips and the statement of accounts of Ricaforte (Exh. A-6 and submarkings) which were: Deposit Slip dated September
1, 1999 (Exh. A-6-aa) with the amount of Seventeen Million Two Hundred Five Thousand Pesos (P17,205,000.00); Deposit Slip
dated September 7, 1999 (Exh. A-6-cc) with the amount of Three Million Seven Hundred Thousand Pesos (P3,700,000.00);
Deposit Slip dated September 29, 1999 (Exh. A-6-dd) with the amount of One Million Six Hundred Ninety Seven Thousand Pesos
(P1,697,000.00); Deposit Slip dated September 7, 1999 (Exh. A-6-ee) with the amount of Ten Million Four Hundred Thousand
Pesos (P10,400,000.00); Deposit Slip dated September 15, 1999 (Exh. A-6-ff) with the amount of Five Million Seven Hundred
Seventy Five Thousand Pesos (P5,775,000.00); Deposit Slip dated September 17, 1999 (Exh. A-6-gg) with the amount of Seven
Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (P750,000.00); Deposit Slip dated October 4, 1999 (Exh. A-6-hh) with the amount of Nine Million
Fifty Thousand Pesos (P9,050,000.00); Deposit Slip dated October 19, 1999 (Exh. A-6-ii) with the amount of Six Million Six
Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (P6,650,000.00); Deposit Slip dated November 4, 1999 (Exh. A-6-jj) with the amount of Six Million
Nine Hundred Thirty Thousand Pesos (P6,930,000.00); Deposit Slip dated November 16, 1999 (Exh. A-6-kk) with the amount of
Four Million Six Hundred Thousand Pesos (P4,600,000.00); Deposit Slip dated November 19, 1999 (Exh. A-6-ll) with the amount
of One Million Seven Hundred Eleven Thousand Pesos (P1,711,000.00); Deposit Slip dated December 7, 1999 (Exh. A-6-mm) with
the amount of Nine Hundred Eighty Nine Thousand One Hundred Fifty Pesos (P989,150.00); Deposit Slip dated January 10, 2000
(Exh. A-6-2) with the amount of Three Million Pesos (P3,000,000.00); and a deposit slip (Exh. A-6-3) with the amount of Two
Million Four Hundred Sixty Thousand Pesos (P2,460,000.00).

Bank statements reflected withdrawals (Exhs. A-6-nn to A-6-zz) from the savings account for the period September 30, 1999 to
October 31, 2000. [Ibid, pp. 87-97]

With respect to the Current Account No. 0107-00638-9, witness identified the specimen signature card (Exh. A-6-a and A-6) to
show that the initial deposit slip was Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) (Exh. A-6-bb). [Ibid, p. 98]

Ricaforte signed in the presence of Nantes the Authority to Debit and Transfer Funds (Exh. A-6-G) which allowed funds to be
automatically transferred from savings to current account to cover checks issued. [TSN dated May 27, 2002, pp. 11-16]

The initial deposit for the First Special Savings Account No. 0157-90392-6 was Seventy Million Pesos (P70,000,000.00) as shown
by the Special Savings Passbook (Exh. A-6-S3) of Ricaforte dated December 2, 1999. The account was closed on April 13, 2000. It
had a balance of Seventy One Million Three Hundred Ninety Thousand Eight Hundred Seventy Five and Eight Centavos
(P71,390,875.08) which was transferred to Ricaforte’s regular Savings Account. [Ibid, pp. 22-24, 43]

In the Second Special Savings Account covered by Special Savings Passbook No. 392093 dated February 7, 2000 (Exh. A-6-X3)
showed the initial deposit of Ten Million Pesos (P10,000,000.00) was taken from the regular savings account. A withdrawal of
the whole amount of Ten Million One Hundred Thirteen Thousand Eight Hundred Thirty Six Pesos and Fifty Seven Centavos
(P10,113,836.57) was made on April 13, 2000 reflected in the Credit Advice dated April 13, 2000 (Exh. A-6-ZZZ). [Ibid, pp. 49-60]

The Third Special Savings Account was opened on March 29, 2000 for Two Million Five Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P2,500,000.00). The money was taken from her regular Savings Account No. 0157-04427-0. The amount of Two Million Five
Hundred One Thousand Six Hundred Sixty Six Pesos and Sixty Six Centavos (P2,501,666.66) was withdrawn from the special
savings account as shown by the certified true copy of the Credit Advice dated April 13, 2000 (Exh. A-6-C4). [Ibid, pp. 84, 93-95]

The Fourth Special Savings Account No. 3157-00073-9 covered by the Special Savings Passbook No. 392178 (Exh A-6-E4) had an
initial deposit of Nine Million Seven Hundred Thousand Pesos (P9,700,000.00) as found in the deposit receipt dated April 5, 2000
(Exh A-6-D4). On April 13, 2000, the Special Savings was cancelled and preterminated. The amount of Nine Million Seven
Hundred Three Thousand (P9,703,000) was credited to Savings Account No. 0157-04227-0. [Ibid, pp. 115-124]

The Fifth Special Savings Account (Exh. A-6-G4) which was opened on May 29, 2000 under the name of Yolanda T. Ricaforte had
an initial deposit of Two Million Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P2,500,000.00). The initial deposit was withdrawn from her
regular Savings Account. The Special Savings was closed on September 4, 2000 and the amount of Two Million Five Hundred Fifty
Nine Thousand Four Hundred Eleven Pesos and Twenty Centavos (P2,559,411.20) was credited to her Regular Savings Account
0157-04227-0. [Ibid, pp. 128-129, 135, 138]

The Sixth Special Savings Account (Exh. A-6-L4), under the name of Yolanda T. Ricaforte, was opened on May 4, 2000 for One
Million Nine Hundred Thousand Pesos (P1,900,000.00). The account was closed on September 4, 2000 as per Debit Advice dated
September 4, 2000 (Exh. A-6-P4) for the matured Special Savings Account worth Two Million Twenty Two Thousand Four
Hundred Twenty Nine Pesos and Eighteen Centavos (P2,022,429.18). [Ibid, pp. 147–153]

The Seventh Special Savings Account No. 3157-00088-7 dated June 1, 2000 (Exh. A-6-Q4) was worth Two Million Pesos
(P2,000,000.00) in cash. The account was closed on September 4, 2000 and the proceeds were credited to the Regular Savings
Account No. 0157-04227-0. The balance (Exh. A-6-T4) then was Two Million Thirty Five Thousand Thirty Five Pesos and Ninety
One Centavos (P2,035,035.91). [Ibid, pp. 156, 166]

The PCI Emerald Fund was in the amount of Six Million Six Hundred Sixteen Thousand Six Hundred Seventy Six Pesos and
Nineteen Centavos (P6,616,676.19) (Exh. A-6-U4 and Exh. A-6-V4). The fund was then rolled-over monthly as evidenced by the
Confirmation letter (Exh. A-6-Z4) dated December 6, 2000. It was again rolled-over several times until it was redeemed on June 5,
2002. [Ibid, p. 168, 176 -193]

The first four Special Savings Accounts were all debited on April 13, 2000 and Ricaforte purchased a Cashier’s Check payable to
Cash for Ninety One Million Pesos (P91,000,000). The Application for Cashier’s check (Exh. "A-6- R5") was signed by Ricaforte as
purchaser. The Cashier’s check (Exh. A-6- S5 and Exh. A-6-U5) was cleared and accepted by Equitable PCI Bank, Makati Pacific Star
Branch, based on the dorsal portion of the check.

The last three Special Savings Accounts (Special Savings Account Nos. 3157-00077-1, 3157-00080-1, and 3157-00088-7) were
closed on September 4, 2000 and all the proceeds were credited to the regular savings account, and then invested in the PCI
Emerald Fund for Six Million Six Hundred Thousand Pesos (P6,600,000.00). [Ibid, pp. 168, 206-207]

Nantes met Ricaforte more than twenty times and identified the latter through a picture shown by the prosecution. (Exh. A-6-V5)
[TSN, May 29, 2002, pp. 16-20]

The current account balance is at Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) (Exh. A-6-W5) and that of the Savings Account is One Hundred
Ninety Seven Thousand Seven Hundred Thirty Six and Sixty Nine Centavos (P197,736.69) (Exh. A-6-X5). The last withdrawal from
the savings account was made on October 5, 2000 for automatic transfer to the current account in the amount of Seventy Nine
Thousand Six Hundred Sixty Four and Eighty Centavos (P79,664.80). The last deposit was on October 4, 2000, through a credit
memorandum of Thirty Seven Thousand Twenty Nine Pesos and Seventeen Centavos (P37,029.17) which represented the
interest of the PCI Emerald Fund. After October 5, 2000 there were no more counter transactions, only the entry of interest
earned and withholding tax. [Ibid, pp. 23-27]

ROSARIO SALUDO BAUTISTA (Bautista) is the Senior Branch Manager of the Equitable, PCI Bank, Diliman, Matalino Branch.
Bautista personally attended to Yolanda Ricaforte who was a walk-in client of the branch on November 19, 1999. Ricaforte
opened a savings account and used her California driver’s license and passport for identification.

The duly accomplished specimen signature card (Exh. A-7-z) was presented to show the existence of the savings account. It was
personally accomplished by Mrs. Ricaforte in the presence of Bautista. The initial deposit of Mrs. Ricaforte was Five Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) in cash. [TSN, May 29, 2000, pp. 93-96]
Ricaforte returned to the branch on November 22, 1999. She opened a combo account and closed the savings account she
opened on November 19, 1999. The combo account was Savings Account Number 0288-02037-0 and Current Account Number
0238-00853-0. As a new account, Bautista required Mrs. Ricaforte to accomplish signature cards (Exh. A-7 and A-7-a). When the
combo account was already opened, Ricaforte presented for deposit two (2) checks totaling Seventy Million Pesos
(P70,000,000.00). Each check (Exh. A-7-B and A-7-C) was payable to cash for Thirty Five Million Pesos (P35,000,000.00). The
drawer was William T. Gatchalian and the drawee bank was PCI Bank, main office in Makati City.

Ricaforte told Bautista that the money came from the proceeds of the sale of a prime property sold to Mr. Gatchalian. As
precautionary measure, the branch of Bautista checked with the drawee bank PCI Makati and they learned that Gatchalian’s
account was a good account.

There were additional deposits made to the account. One deposit made on November 23, 1999 was a check (Exh. A-7-h) issued
by Governor Luis Gov. Singson dated November 22, 1999 for One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) payable to cash. The drawee
bank was Metro Bank, Ayala. The second check deposit made was on December 16, 1999 payable to cash with PNB, Naga Branch
as drawee bank. The check (Exh. A-7-i) was dated December 9, 1999. The check was deposited and subsequently cleared.

On December 2, 1999, Ricaforte deposited Three Million Fifty Thousand Pesos (P3,050,000.00) in cash (Exh. A-7-d). The cash was
in big bills, P1,000 and P500 denominations. Ricaforte explained to Bautista that the amount came from other accounts in other
banks because she planned to transfer all her other accounts to Equitable, Diliman, Matalino Branch. Another cash deposit (Exh.
A-7-f and Exh. A-7-aa) was made on January 28, 2000 for One Million Pesos. [Ibid, pp. 100-130]

Ricaforte also opened a special saving account number 3288-00079-3 in the amount of Seventy Million Pesos (P70,000,000.00).
The initial deposit was taken from Ricaforte’s savings account (Exh. A-7-j). The account was opened with passbook number
394979 (Exh. A-7-bb) and the specimen signature card (Exh. A-7-cc). The account has already been closed. [Ibid, pp. 132-135]

On February 24, 2000, Mrs. Ricaforte again transferred Seven Million Pesos (P7,000,000) from her ordinary savings account to a
special savings account deposit (Exh. A-7-w) with Account Number 3288-00087-4. Ricaforte also accomplished a specimen
signature card (Exh. A-7-dd) for the Special Savings Account.

On April 13, 2000 Mrs. Ricaforte applied for a Sevety Seven Million Peso (P77,000,000) cashier’s check against her special savings
deposit account. She accomplished an application form (Exh. A-7-l) for the transaction. Ricaforte had to accomplish a deed of
undertaking (Exh. A-7-n) because the cashier’s check was payable to cash. The cashier’s check (Exh. A-7-ee) was deposited on
April 25, 2000 at the Pacific Star Branch of Equitable PCI Bank in Makati. The name and account number were not indicated on
the check. [Ibid, pp. 148 -159]

Mrs. Ricaforte always dealt with Bautista as the Bank Manager for her transactions. Bautista identified Ricaforte as the one
wearing red (Exh. A-6-vvvvv-1) when shown a group picture. Bautista also identified the girl beside Mrs. Ricaforte as Mrs. Itchon,
one of the witnesses in the impeachment proceedings. Aside from the personal visits of Mrs. Ricaforte, Bautista also called her
on cell phone no. 0918-9021847 or home landline 9518854 whenever there was a maturity or an updating of interest. [Ibid, pp.
162-168]

At the time of Bautista’s testimony, the balance in the account of Ricaforte was around Two Million Two Hundred Thousand
Pesos (P2,200,000.00). It is still earning interest.

SHAKIRA CASTRILLO YU (Yu) was the Manager of Equitable PCI Bank, Pedro Gil-Robinson’s Branch since it opened on August
1999. Yu knew Yolanda T. Ricaforte as she was one of their depositors. Ricaforte told Yu that she was connected with Fil-East
Travel and Tours which is located at the second floor of the Manila Midtown Hotel. Ricaforte first opened a Regular Savings
Account, participated in the Reverse Repurchase Agreement and subsequently opened a Special Savings Account.

Ricaforte opened the Regular Savings Account on January 6, 2000. It was Ms. Evelyn Ponce, the Cash Operations Officer who
attended to her as Yu was not around. Yu brought with her the specimen signature card (Exh. A-8-P) for Savings Account No.
027602029-3 and the New Accounts Record (Exh. A-8-Q) which were filled out by Ricaforte. [TSN, June 3, 2002, pp. 85-92]

The initial deposit (Exh. A-8-Q-3) of the Regular Savings Account was Six Million Pesos (P6,000,000.00) in cash (Exh. A-8-R). When
witness asked Ricaforte where the initial deposit came from, Ricaforte said it was proceeds of a sale of a property. [Ibid, pp. 97-
100]

Other deposits made to the Regular Savings Account were the following: a check deposit amounting to Two Million Nine
Hundred Sixty-Five Thousand (P2,965,000) with Governor Luis Chavit Singson as drawer; a cash deposit of One Million Five
Hundred Forty Thousand Pesos (P1,540,000) deposited on January 25, 2000 and a One Million Three Hundred Forty Thousand
Pesos (P1,340,000) check deposit (Exh. A-8-D) with Governor Singson as drawer (Exh. A-8-D-1). [Ibid, pp. 101-112]
On January 31, 2000, Ricaforte told Yu that she wanted to earn higher interest so witness advised her to participate in the
Reverse Repurchase. Ricaforte asked Yu to debit her Regular Savings Account for about Eight Million Nine Hundred Thousand
Pesos (P8,900,000.00) (Exh. "A-8-P"). On February 29, 2000 Ricaforte informed Yu that she did not want the Reverse Repurchase
and she wanted a bank product that earned a higher interest with passbook as documentation. The Certificate of Participation
without Recourse (Exh. A-8-F) was then paid on February 29, 2000 in the amount of Eight Million Nine Hundred Forty Thousand
Seven Hundred Fifty-Two Pesos and Eighty Two Centavos (P8,940,752.82).

Yu then advised Ricaforte to open a Special Savings Account. They took out her participation in the Reverse Repurchase for
P8,900,000.00 plus interest and Ricaforte asked them to debit more or less One Million Fifty-One Thousand Pesos
(P1,051,000.00) from her Regular Savings Account because she wanted her Special Savings Account to be in the amount of Ten
Million Pesos (P10,000,000.00). The specimen signature card of the Special Savings Account and the Credit Memo (Exh. A-8-G)
under the account name Yolanda Ricaforte for the Account No. 276-90238-5 dated 2/29/2000 were shown as evidence of the
existence of the account. The three signatures appearing in the card belonged to Mrs. Yolanda Ricaforte signed in front of Yu.

Subsequently, Ricaforte withdrew her Ten Million Pesos (P10,000,000.00) plus interest from the Special Savings Account and
transferred the amount to her Regular Savings Account. The Special Savings passbook of Mrs. Ricaforte (Exh. A-8-H) contained
the entry Out of Return P10,019,555,55. [Ibid, 113-120]

On April 13, 2000, Ricaforte applied for a cashier’s check in the amount of Eleven Million Pesos (P11,000,000) debited to her
Regular Savings Account. The application for Cashier’s check (Exh. A-8-I), the receiving copy of the Cashier’s check, the Letter of
Undertaking and Cashier’s check (Exh. A-8-T) were all presented. The Application for Cashier’s Check stated that the Cashier’s
Check is allowed to be payable to cash except that the bank will not be held responsible for the loss thereof or a demand for a
refund or replacement. It is no longer allowed starting around July or August 2000.

Ricaforte instructed Yu to transfer Eight Hundred Thousand Pesos (P800,000.00) from her Regular Savings Account on May 23,
2000 to her Special Savings Account to earn higher interest. A Special Savings Account Passbook (Exh. A-8-L) was issued to Mrs.
Ricaforte which credited the Eight Hundred Thousand Pesos (P800,000.00) to the Special Savings Account. [Ibid, pp.120-127]

At present, the outstanding balance of the Special Savings Account is more or less Six Hundred Thirty Four Thousand Pesos
(P634,000.00). The regular Savings Account has an outstanding balance of more or less Sixty-Nine Thousand Eight Hundred
Pesos (P69,800.00).

After being shown a photograph, Yu identified Yolanda Ricaforte as the person wearing maroon or red in the picture (Exh. A-6-
Z5). Yu was able to talk to Mrs. Ricaforte over the phone around six (6) times. She used the cell phone number indicated in the
records. [Ibid, pp. 128-132]

VERGEL LEJARDE PABILLON (Pabillon) knew a person by the name of Yolanda Ricaforte because Ricaforte opened regular
Savings Account No. 0193-61496-8 and Special Savings Account No. 02193-15050-3 with Equitable PCI Bank T.M. Kalaw Branch
on February 8, 2000 while Pabillon was still manager of the branch.

Ricaforte mentioned to Pabillon that she was connected with a certain company under the name of Phil. East Travel and Tours
located at Ramada Hotel, Mabini. She handed her California Driver’s license as identification card and signed the specimen
signature cards about one foot away from the witness.

Pabillon brought the Individual Account Record (Exh. A-9-C) and the signature cards signed by Mrs. Ricaforte as evidence of the
Account. The initial deposit made were in the form of a PNB Manager’s Check (Exh. A-9-A) in the amount of Ten Million Seven
Thousand Seven Hundred Seventy Seven Pesos and Seventy-Eight Centavos (P10,007,777.78) and One Million Four Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P1,400,000.00) in cold cash. Eleven Million Pesos (P11,000,000.00) of that amount was placed in the Special
Savings Account and Four Hundred Seven Thousand Seven Hundred Seventy Seven Pesos and Seventy Eight Centavos
(P407,777.78) was placed under the Regular Savings Account. [TSN, June 5, 2002, pp. 98-109]

On April 13, 2000, Mrs. Ricaforte went to the bank and informed the witness that she needed Eleven Million Pesos
(P11,000,000.00) in the form of manager’s check, payable to cash, to be taken out from the existing Special Savings Account No.
02193-6-15050-3. The manager’s check dated April 13, 2000 payable to cash was presented (Exh. A-9-B). Ricaforte had to sign a
Purchaser’s Undertaking bearing her name as purchaser. (Exh. A-9-F) [Ibid, pp. 113-127]

Mrs. Ricaforte opened a third account, Special Savings Accounts No. 02-193-15177-1, in the amount of Five Hundred Thousand
Pesos (P500,000.00). A debit memo (Exh. A-9-G) showed the transfer of the P500,000 from the regular Savings Account 0193-
64196-8 to the special savings account.
On August 31, 2000, Mrs. Ricaforte went to the bank and requested for another Two Hundred Fifty Thousand Peso
(P250,000.00) manager’s check payable to her to be deducted from Special Savings Account No. 02193-15177-1. A bank
document which served as a registered copy of the issuance of the manager’s check was presented. (Exh. A-9-H) [Ibid, pp. 128-
129]

Pabillon identified Ricaforte from a group photograph (Exh. A-6-B5) [Ibid, pp. 133-134]

The witness availed of the early retirement offered by Equitable PCI. He testified in the impeachment trial even if he was already
supposed to go on early retirement because he just wanted to tell the truth regarding what transpired to the opening of the
account of Mrs. Ricaforte. [TSN, June 10, 2002, pp. 54-56]

EDGARDO LIM ALCARAZ (Alcaraz) was the branch manager of Equitable PCIBank, Scout Albano branch for almost three years.
He met Yolanda Ricaforte because she was one of their clients. She opened three accounts with the bank on March 2, 2000 and
he was the one who personally attended to her. These were savings account and current account under the automatic transfer
facility and a special savings account.

Alcaraz testified on documents to show that Yolanda Ricaforte opened these three accounts, such as the individual account
record which showed information about Ricaforte, her special instructions and the summary of the accounts that she opened.
The other documents pertained to the specimen signature cards signed by Ricaforte for Checking Account No. 5732-01-975-7,
Savings Account No. 5733-15154-3 and Special Savings Account No. 5733-00721-0. Ricaforte submitted her local driver’s license
and her California driver’s license for identification. She told witness that she was engaged in the prawn business in Iloilo.
Alcaraz contacted Ricaforte two or three times using the numbers she wrote in the account record. He also had a calling card
from Ricaforte (Exh. A-10-F). [TSN, June 10, 2002, pp. 79-84]

The initial deposit in cash for the savings account opened by Ricaforte was One Million Nine Hundred Ninety Five Thousand
(P1,995,000.00). The initial deposit for Checking Account 5732-01-975-7 was Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00). The initial deposit
for Special Savings Account No. 5733-0721-0 was Two Million Pesos (P2,000,000). Copies of the deposit slips (Exhs. A-10-G, A-10-
H, A-10-I) [Ibid. pp. 97-99]

On April 12, 2000, Ricaforte pre-terminated the special savings account. This is shown by its passbook (Exh. A-10-J). A credit
memo (Exh. A-10-L) showed that Ricaforte requested that the proceeds of the special savings account be credited under the
Savings Account No. 5733-15154-3.

On the same day, Mrs. Ricaforte applied for a manager’s check in the amount of Three Million Pesos (P3,000,000.00) payable to
bearer. The application form for manager’s check (Exh. A-10-C), the proof sheet copy of the manager’s check (Exh. A-10-K) and
the copy of the check were presented (Exh. A-10-M). [Ibid, pp.102-108]

As of the time of Alcaraz’ testimony, the regular savings account still existed with an outstanding balance of One Hundred Three
Thousand Pesos (P103,000.00). The checking account was still active with an outstanding balance of Five Thousand Pesos
(P5,000.00). With respect to the checking account, Ricaforte issued a check in the amount of P500,000.00 on March 12, 2000.
Since the accounts are automatic transfer accounts, the funds from the savings account were automatically transferred to the
checking account. [Ibid, pp. 100-101]

EMMA AVILA GONZALES (Gonzales) had been the Branch Manager of Equitable Savings Bank, Isidora Hills Branch for more than
three years up to time she testified in this Court. Gonzales knew a person by the name of Yolanda Ricaforte who was one of the
clients of the bank.

She first met Ricaforte on March 15, 2000 when she opened a special savings account with the branch. She walked into the
bank, approached the witness and told her that she wanted to open an account and that she was a valued client of other
branches of Equitable Savings Bank. The specimen signature card (Exh. A-11) and deposit slip (Exh. A-11-A) were shown to prove
the opening of the special savings account. The initial deposit was Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) cash, in ten
bundles of five hundred (500) peso bills. Ricaforte said she was a businesswoman but did not specify the kind of business she
was engaged in. With respect to the initial deposit of Ricaforte, the account is still outstanding. The original copy of the Equitable
Special Savings Passbook No. 123727 (Exh. A-11-I) shows the outstanding balance to be Five Hundred Ninety Three Thousand
Four Hundred Ninety Six Pesos and Thirty Two Centavos (P593,496.32) as of June 10, 2002. The difference in the amount was
the interest earned from the time it was opened. There was no movement of the fund except for the interest. [TSN, June 10,
2002, pp. 162-169, June 17, 2002, p. 10]

Ricaforte also opened Special Savings Account No. 077090498-6 (Exh. A-11-H and Exh. A-11-D) amounting to Seven Million Pesos
(P7,000,000.00). The initial deposit was an MBTC (Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co.) Ayala Branch Check No. 1070. It was payable
in cash and the drawer was Governor Luis "Chavit" Singson. It was cleared after three days. The account was pre-terminated on
April 14, 2000. The withdrawal slip (Exh. A-11-E) showed that the amount withdrawn was Seven Million Nineteen Thousand
Seven Hundred Thirty Six Pesos and Eleven Centavos (P7,019,736.11). Ricaforte received the payment in the form of a Cashier’s
check (Exh. A-11-F) payable to cash in the amount of Seven Million Pesos (P7,000,000.00) and cash in the amount of Nineteen
Thousand Seven Hundred Thirty Six Pesos and Eleven Centavos (P19,736.11). The dorsal portion of the Cashier’s check showed
that it was deposited in Equitable Banking Corporation, Makati Pacific Star. On the other hand, the amount of Nineteen
Thousand Seven Hundred Thirty Six Pesos and Eleven Centavos (P19,736.11) cash was used to open regular Savings Account No.
0770009375 (Exh. A-11-I). The latest bank statement (Exh. A-11-J) showed that the account still existed but the balance was no
longer Nineteen Thousand Seven Hundred Thirty Six Pesos and Eleven Centavos (P19,736.11). [TSN, June 10, 2002, pp. 172-189]

Witness was able to verify the phone number given by Mrs. Ricaforte because when she called the number, Mrs. Ricaforte
answered the phone. [TSN, June 17, 2002, pp. 11-13]

ANTONIO MARTIN SAGRITALO FORTUNO (Fortuno) was the Bank Operations Officer of Equitable PCI Bank, Pacific Star Branch
since January 28, 2002. The witness averred that he handled the opening of accounts; supervised the investment section; the
foreign telegraphic transfer as well as the domestic telegraphic transfer and the safekeeping of the records of deposits; and
other transactions which transpired in their branch.

Fortuno brought with him documents relating to the deposit of six (6) cashier’s/manager’s checks in the total amount of Two
Hundred Million Pesos (P200,000,000.00) to the Pacific Star Branch and the transfer of these funds from cashier’s checks to the
account of the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation in the 100 Strata Branch of Equitable PCI Bank. [TSN dated September 27, 2002, p.
127]

He identified an Acknowledgement Letter [Exh. I9, with sub markings; Exh. 16-a (Serapio)] dated April 25, 2000 addressed to Atty.
Edward Serapio from Beatriz L. Bagsit, who was then Division Head of the Makati Area. The letter acknowledged receipt of six (6)
checks for deposit on a staggered basis and on various different dates to the account of Erap Muslim Youth Foundation
maintained at the Ortigas Strata Branch. The checks were as follows:

(1)      PCIBank Manager’s Check NO. 573-000035822 dated April 12, 2000 for P3 Million (Exh. A-10-m);

(2)      PCIBank Manager’s Check No. 019L-000061146 dated April 13, 2000 for P11 Million (Exh. A-9-b);

(3)      Equitable Bank Cashier’s Check No. 0226-00949 dated April 13, 2000 for P11 Million (Exh. A-8-t);

(4)      Equitable Bank Cashier’s Check No. 0238-000941 dated April 13, 2000 for P77 Million (Exh. A-7-ee);

(5)      Equitable Bank Cashier’s Check No.107-013064 dated April 13, 2000 for P91 Million; (Exh. A-6-r5)

(6)      Equitable Bank Cashier’s Check No.6720-00042 dated April 14, 2000 for P7 Million; (Exh. A-11-g)

Fortuno also identified the passbook for Bearer Account No. 0279-04225-5 (Exh. J9, with sub markings) which was opened on
April 25, 2000. A bearer account is an account wherein there is no name mentioned in the account. According to Fortuno, the six
(6) manager’s checks were the manager’s checks that were deposited on April 25, 2000 in the bearer account for the total
amount of Two Hundred Million (P200,000,000.00).

According the witness, the instruction in the letter was to deposit the funds on a staggered basis and they can do so if they first
deposit all the checks simultaneously for the three-day clearing.

On the basis of debit memos, manager’s check applications, detailed report transaction and deposit slips or receipts, the Two
Hundred Million Pesos (P200,000,000.00) was gradually withdrawn from the bearer account and transferred to the Erap Muslim
Youth Foundation from April 27, 2000 to May 11, 2000.

The six (6) checks were deposited in Bearer Account No. 0279-04225-5 of which fourteen (14) withdrawals in Manager’s Checks
(Exh. K9 to X9, with sub markings) were made in various amounts and these withdrawals were further divided into twenty-eight
(28) deposits into the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation. Each withdrawal was divided into two deposits, as shown by the Account
Information Slips, Deposit Receipts and Detailed Report for Transfers and Debit/Credit Memos (DRTM) (See Exhs. K9 to X9, with
sub markings) brought by the witness. [Ibid, pp. 32-96]

The bearer account was closed on November 14, 2000 as evidenced by the Fund Transfer Memo (Exh. Z9), and contained the
interest for Ninety Seven Thousand Three Hundred Ninety Two Pesos (P97,392) which was transferred to the account of the
Foundation. [Ibid, pp. 97-98]
AIDA TUAZON BASALISO (Basaliso) was the operations officer of Equitable PCIBank, Ortigas-Strata 100 Branch since July 1997.
She brought with her bank documents on the accounts of the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation maintained at the Equitable
PCIBank, Strata-Ortigas Branch including the inter-branch deposits from the Equitable PCIBank, Pacific Star Branch for the total
amount of P200 million to the Account No. 0192-85835-6 in the name of Erap Muslim Youth Foundation.

The signature card for Savings Account No. 0192-85702-3 (Exh. A10) of the Treasurer-in trust has the signature of Mr. George Go,
the former Chairman of the Board of the bank. The list of Contribution (Exh. B10) also had the signature of the treasurer, Mr.
George Go. The two documents were given to Basaliso by Catherine Mercado, someone who usually transacted business at the
branch.

Witness also identified the Signature Cards of the Savings and Checking Accounts of the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation. On the
signature cards (Exh. C10) pertaining to the Savings Account No. 0192-85835-6, the signatures of Mr. Raul De Guzman, Mr.
George Go, Mr. Edward Serapio and Mr. Danilo Reyes, Ms. Mila Reforma appear. Two signature cards were needed for the same
account because the corporation consisted of five (5) signatories.

The signature cards (Exh. D10 and Exh. D10-1) for current Account No. 0142-62890-2 showed the signatures of the same five
persons.

She identified the Secretary’s Certificate (Exh. E10) showing that the Corporate Secretary was Edward S. Serapio, the Certificate of
Incorporation with SEC Registration No. 2000002526 (Exh. F10) and the Articles of Incorporation (Exh. G10) and the by-laws (Exh.
H10).

Witness also testified on a debit memo (Exh. I10) dated April 20,2000 in Savings Account No. 019285702-3 amounting to One
Hundred Thousand Two Hundred One Pesos and Ten Centavos (P100,201.10) and credited (Exh. I10-2) to 014262890-2 the
amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) for the opening of the checking account of the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation and
a Credit Advice (Exh. I10-1) to Savings Account No. 019285835-6 amounting to Ninety Thousand Two Hundred One Pesos and Ten
Centavos (P90,201.10) to open the savings account of the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation.

Basaliso also testified on "no book cash deposits" made to the savings account of the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation. No book
meant that the deposit was made by the depositor without bringing his savings passbook. DRTM (Detailed Report of Transfer
Debit and Credit memos) (Exhs. J10 to R10) were presented to show the transactions. The following deposits were made: Ten
Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) total deposit on April 27, 2000, Six Million Seven Hundred Twenty Five Thousand Pesos
(P6,725,000.00) and Eight Million Two Hundred Seventy Five Thousand Pesos (P8,275,000.00) on April 28, 2000, Five Million One
Hundred Eight Thousand Pesos (P5,108,000.00) and Nine Million Eight Hundred Ninety Two Thousand Pesos (P9,892,000.00)
totaling Fifteen Million Pesos (P15,000,000.00) on May 2, 2000, Three Million Ninety One Thousand Four Hundred Fifty Pesos
(P3,091,450.00) and Six Million Nine Hundred Eight Thousand Five Hundred Fifty Pesos (P6,908,550.00) totaling Ten Million
Pesos (P10,000,000.00) on May 3, 2000, Six Million One Hundred Eighteen Thousand Two Hundred Twenty Five Pesos
(P6,118,225.00) and Eight Million Eight Hundred Eighty One Thousand Seven Hundred Seventy Five Pesos (P8,881,775.00)
totaling Fifteen Million Pesos (P15,000,000.00) on May 4, 2000, Five Million Nine Hundred Thirty Six Thousand Pesos
(P5,936,000.00) and Nine Million Sixty Four Thousand Pesos (P9,064,000.00) totaling Fifteen Million Pesos (P15,000,000.00) on
May 8, 2000, Seven Million Pesos (P7,000,000.00) and Eight Million Pesos (P8,000,000.00) totaling Fifteen Million Pesos on May
9, 2000, Seven Million Two Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (P7,250,000.00), Seven Million Three Hundred Ninety Nine Thousand
Eight Hundred Pesos (P7,399,800.00), Nine Million Three Hundred Seventy Five Thousand Pesos (P9,375,000.00), Nine Million
Four Hundred Forty Nine Thousand Four Hundred Pesos (P9,449,400.00), Nine Million Six Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P9,600,000.00) and Eleven Million Nine Hundred Twenty Five Thousand Eight Hundred Pesos (P11,925,800.00) totaling to Fifty
Five Million (P55,000,000.00) on May 10, 2000, Six Hundred Thirty Four Thousand Pesos (P634,000.00), Two Million Five
Hundred Thousand Pesos (P2,500,000.00), Three Million Eight Hundred Thousand Pesos (P3,800,000.00), Five Million Two
Hundred Thousand Pesos (P5,200,000.00), Nine Million One Hundred Thirty Nine Thousand Two Hundred Eighty Pesos
(P9,139,280.00), Nine Million Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P9,500,000.00), Nine Million Eight Hundred Thirty Six Thousand
Five Hundred Pesos (P9,836,500.00) and Nine Million Eight Hundred Eighty Nine Thousand Seven Hundred Twenty Pesos
(P9,889,720.00) totaling about Fifty Million Pesos (P50,000,000.00) on May 11, 2000. There was also a credit memo made on
November 14, 2000 amounting to Ninety Seven Thousand Three Hundred Ninety Two Pesos and Fifty Centavos (P97,392.50)
(Exh. S10). Bank statements pertaining to the periods April 1-28, 2000 up to December 2000, except statements for July, August
and October were presented.

At the time of Basaliso’s testimony, the current account of the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation with a balance of Eight Thousand
Six Hundred Pesos (P8,600.00) (Exh. T10) was dormant. The Savings Account No. 0192-85835-6 was inactive with a balance of
Two Hundred Seven Million One Thousand Eight Hundred Eighty Three Pesos and Fifty Three Centavos (P207,001,883.53) (Exh.
U10).
Witness also testified that any two persons out of the five signatories of the Foundation were authorized to transact regarding
the accounts. Based on record, the amount of Two Hundred Million Pesos (P200,000,000.00) was deposited into the account
without a single centavo being lost. The passbook [See Exh. U10,36(Serapio)] had a balance of Two Hundred Seven Million One
Thousand Eight Hundred Eighty Three Pesos and Fifty Three Centavos (P207,001,888.53) because it already earned interest.
There were no withdrawals from the Savings and Current Account from the time they were opened. [TSN dated October 2, 2002
and October 7, 2002]

ATTY. CECILIO ALEJANDRO VILLANUEVA (Villanueva) is the assistant Corporate Secretary of PAGCOR. Witness brought with him
the Minutes No. 36 of PAGCOR’s Regular Board Meeting dated September 5, 2000, under Agenda Item No. 002646 of the Best
World Gaming and Entertainment Corporation Cancellation of Quick Pick bingo and conduct of PAGCOR’s Two Balls Bingo Games
(Exh. S15). Witness brought with him pp. 28-30 with referred to Item Agenda No. 002646. Villanueva’s testimony was offered
corroborate the testimony of Gov. Singson that the consultancy firm of Atong Ang will receive 6% of the gross income from
Bingo Two Balls.

On cross examination, witness testified that he has no personal knowledge whether the Bingo 2 Balls was actually implemented.
[TSN dated December 2, 2002 and TSN dated December 4, 2002]

MARIANITO MANIGBAS DIMAANDAL (Dimaandal) was the Assistant Director of the Malacañang Records Department since
1993. Dimaandal identified the appointment papers of Atty. Serapio as Presidential Assistant for Political affairs, Office of the
Presidential Adviser for Political Affairs (Exh. V10) and Mr. Orestes Ricaforte as Undersecretary, Department of Tourism (Exh. W10)
and the assumption into office by Ms. Yolanda Ricaforte to the PCGG representing the San Miguel Campo Creo Group (Exh. X10).

Witness also brought a Certification (Exh. Y10) issued by the Office of the President that the phone numbers 736-8856 and 736-
8858 were in fact the telephones assigned to and connected to the presidential residence during the incumbency of FPres.
Estrada.

On December 16, 2002, Dimaandal was recalled to the witness stand. He further presented and identified the Appointment of
Edward S. Serapio as Member Ad Interim of the Judicial and Bar Council representing the Private Sector dated July 1, 2000 (Exh.
I17) issued by FPres. Estrada; a Memorandum to All Heads of Office and Units signed by Former Executive Secretary Ronaldo
Zamora (Exh. J17); and a Memorandum to All Heads of Office and Units from the Office of the President dated April 29, 1999 (Exh.
K17 with submarkings) with the subject title "Special Instructions to the Presidential Assistant for Political Affairs" and with the
contents read as follows: "Be informed that I have given special instructions to Atty. Edward S. Serapio, Presidential Assistant I
for Political Affairs, to undertake, in addition to his regular duties and responsibilities, the following functions: 1) provide prompt
objective and independent advice on any legal question, matter, or issue which may be of special concern to the President; 2)
update the President on recent developments in law or jurisprudence on such subjects, areas, or issues which the President may
so specify; 3) study and review documents, deeds, contracts, memoranda or other papers which the President may opt to refer
to him for study and review; 4) coordinate with various units of the Office of the President, Departments, and other agencies
and instrumentalities of the government on any legal matter which the President may refer to him; and 5) perform other duties
and responsibilities as may be directed by the President. Atty. Serapio will be directly reporting to the President on any of the
foregoing matters. For your information and guidance."

On March 31, 2003, witness Dimaandal was again recalled to the witness stand. He presented and identified copies of
Proclamation No. 145 dated July 17, 1999 (Exh. X19), Proclamation No. 194 dated October 11, 1999 (Exh. Y19), Proclamation No.
202 dated October 21, 1999 (Exh. Z19), Proclamation No. 205 dated October 25, 1999 (Exh. A20), Proclamation No. 225 dated
January 30, 2000 (Exh. B20), Proclamation No. 234 dated January 28, 2000 (Exh. C20), Proclamation No. 273 dated April 23, 2000
(Exh. D20), Proclamation No. 355 (Exh. E20), Administrative Order Nos. 28, 29, 32, 50, 59, 69, 73, 87, 89 (Exhs. F20 – N20),
Memorandum Order Nos. 82, 88, 89 (Exhs. O20-Q20) and memorandum Circular No. 45 (R20) . These documents were signed by
FPres. Estrada and his signatures were marked accordingly. [TSN dated October 7, 2002; December 16, 2002; and March 31,
2003]

SALVADOR ROSAL SERRANO (Serrano) was the Vice-President of Security Bank Corporation and the head of its Centralized
Operation and Control Division. [TSN dated November 25, 2002] He was responsible for the day to day operations of one
hundred nineteen (119) branches of the Security Bank Corporation; supervised the record keeping and accounting of the branch
transactions; ensured the compliance of their branches to bank policies and procedures; supervised the safekeeping of all
documents of all branch transactions; and issued certified true copies of documents in relation to the original documents kept
by the bank.

Serrano was called by the prosecution to corroborate the testimony of prosecution witness Gov. Singson that he issued a check
payable to cash from funds of jueteng protection money to accused FPres. Estrada and that the said accused, in turn, delivered
the check to Mr. Paul Bograd who subsequently deposited the check to his account at the Security Bank Corporation; and to
identify and authenticate the documents he was subpoenaed to bring.
Serrano identified a microfilm copy of Metro Bank Check No. 0000917 for the amount of Five Million Pesos (P5,000,000.00) that
was deposited through Security Bank Corporation on February 2, 1999. The maker of this check was Gov. Singson and which
check was deposited to Account No. 061-0-14636-7 whose account holder was Paul Gary Bograd as evidenced by a deposit slip
of Security Bank Corporation (Exhs. N14; N14-1; N14-2; N14-3; O14; O14-1; O14-2; and O14-3).

Also presented was a statement of account showing that an amount of Five Million Pesos (P5,000,000) was credited on February
2, 1999 to the account of Paul Gary Bograd (Exhs. P14 and P14-1). Serrano also identified the specimen signature card of Paul Gary
Bograd showing that the latter was a depositor in their bank and that he [Bograd] held the Account No. 061-0-14636-7 of
Security Bank Corporation (Exhs, Q14; Q14-1; and Q14-2).

PATRICK DEE CHENG (Cheng), an employee of CITIBANK for 12 years, became the Branch Banking Head of CITIBANK on
November 2001. [TSN dated October 7, 2002 and TSN dated October 9, 2002] As banking head, he had overall supervision and
responsibility for all the branch banking operations of CITIBANK in all of its six (6) branches.

Cheng presented and identified the following:

(1) deposit slip (Exh. Z10, with sub markings) dated October 4, 1999 for the account of Luisa P. Ejercito ("Mrs. Ejercito")
under Account No. 166820 covering the deposit of Metrobank Check No. 00138 (See Exh. M8 as original and Exh. A11 as
micro film copy) dated September 29, 1999 by Gov. Singson in the amount of Eight Million Pesos (P8,000,000) and
another check in the amount of Four Hundred Thousand Pesos (P400,000);

(2) Account Opening Form (Exh. B11) for Account No. 166820 of Mrs. Ejercito;

(3) Hold-all-Mail Agreement (Exh. C11, with sub markings) dated March 9, 2000 of Mrs. Ejercito which designated Ms.
Lucena Baby Ortaliza to be her authorized representative;

(4) deposit slip (Exh. D11, with sub markings) of William T. Gatchalian dated August 20, 1999 with Account No.
8131201377 for Forty Six Million Three Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (P46,350.000.00) which covered the deposit of
Metrobank Check No. 000132 dated August 21, 1999 of Gov. Singson in the amount of P46,350,000.00;

(5) certified copy of the microfilm of the Metrobank Ayala Center Branch Check NO. 000132 (See Exh. E11, with sub
markings) dated August 21, 1999 drawn by Gov. Singson, payable to William Gatchalian in the amount of P46,350,000;

(6) Relationship Opening Form – Personal (Exh. F11, with sub markings) of Mr. William T. Gatchalian; and

(7) Signature Card (Exh. G11, with sub markings) of Mr. William T. Gatchalian for a Peso Checking Account with Account
No. 8131201377 opened on March 13, 1996.

MELCHOR SUAREZ LATINA (Latina) is head of Remedial Management, Globe Telecommunication in charge of terminated
accounts. [TSN dated October 9, 2002]

He brought with him a certification (Exh. H11) October 4, 2002 issued by Atty. Melchor S. Latina, and subscribed before Atty.
Gilbert Escolo that Globe Cellular Phone No. 0917-5260217 was registered in the name of Jinggoy Estrada. The certification was
supported with the Service Agreement for Cellular Mobile Phone Service (See Exh. H11-1, with sub markings) executed by the
applicant Jinggoy Estrada and the supporting documents required in connection with the subscription of cell phone; specifically,
a photocopy of Jinggoy Estrada’s driver’s license (Exh. H11-2) and statement of his Philippine National Bank Visa (Exh. H11-3) as
proof of billing. The cellular phone issued to Jinggoy Estrada has already been cut-off since December 15, 2000 based on Globe
Telecom records (Exh. H11-4).

ATTY. OSWALDO CHONG SANTOS (Atty. Santos) was a partner of the De Borja Santos Law Firm during the time of the
impeachment proceedings against the accused Former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada. [TSN dated January 6, 2003 and TSN
dated January 8, 2003]

In a letter dated December 22, 2000, the De Borja Santos Law Firm was requested by the Prosecution Panel of the House of
Representatives to conduct an investigation regarding the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation, Inc. (Exhibit A-12-a)

Atty. Santos testified that the commissioned law firm of which he was a member started conducting research and investigation
on the alleged foundation on December 28, 2000. They gathered available documents pertaining to the Muslim Youth
Foundation, Inc. from the Records Division of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). On January 5, 2001, witness Santos
then went to the corporate address of the subject foundation indicated in the SEC documents (Exh. V17) that the investigating
team gathered which was at 15th Floor, Strata 100 Building, Emerald Avenue, City of Pasig. He found out from his inquiries that
the said office address was occupied by the law firm of De Borja Medialdea Bello Guevarra and Jerodias. Atty. Santos clarified
that his partner named De Borja was not the same person indicated in the aforementioned law firm and that the witness had no
idea if they were related. Thereafter, the witness contacted the phone number of the subject foundation indicated in the SEC
documents that the investigating team had but got the response that the phone number belonged to the aforesaid law firm and
not to the subject foundation.

The witness then presented and identified a copy of the Report (Exh. A12) of the investigating team on the Erap Muslim Youth
Foundation, Inc. He said that the original copy was submitted to the Prosecution Panel of the House of Representatives and he
attested as to the truth of the contents of the report. Atty. Santos mentioned that the said report stated that the law firm
occupying the supposed corporate office of the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation, Inc. "used to be the law firm of the Acting
Corporate Secretary Atty. Edward S. Serapio".

Atty. Santos also identified the SEC documents that the investigating team had gathered which were previously produced and
identified by prosecution witness Atty. David Jonathan Villegas Yap. These SEC documents were as follows: a Certificate of
Corporate Filing / Information dated December 28, 2000 pertaining to the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation, Inc.; a Certificate of
Incorporation of the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation, Inc. dated February 17, 2000 with SEC Reg. No. A20002526; a Covering
Sheet of the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation, Inc.; the Articles of Incorporation of the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation, Inc.; a
Certificate of Filing of the Amended By-Laws of the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation, Inc. dated April 3, 2000; another Covering
Sheet of the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation, Inc.; and the Amended By-Laws of the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation, Inc. (Exhs.
T17, U17 V17, W17 with submarkings, X17, Y17 and Z17 with submarkings)

The witness testified on cross examination that the Erap Muslim Foundation, Inc. was duly organized and obtained a juridical
personality in accordance to law. The Amended By-Laws of the subject corporation, which was approved by the SEC, allegedly
provided that the members of the Board of Trustees were not entitled to receive allowances or honoraria in the performance of
their duties. Atty. Santos was not, however, familiar to the Minutes of the Organizational Meeting of the Board of Trustees held
on March 22, 2000 (Exh. 4-Serapio); the Community Tax Certificate (Exh. 5-Serapio) of the foundation; and the Mayor’s Permit
(Exh. 6-Serapio) as well as the Business Permit (Exh. 9-Serapio) of the foundation. He qualified that he verified from the Office of
the Bureau of Permit of Pasig City that the foundation had registered its Business License though he did not see the Mayor’s
Permit of the foundation and mentioned the same in the report. Atty. Santos likewise admitted that he did not come across
documents relating to the operations of the foundation but testified consistently on matters pertained the report. (Exhs. 7-
Serapio, 8-Serapio, 10-Serapio to 15-Serapio, and 21-Serapio to 27-Serapio, inclusive of submarkings)

CAROLINA SANTIAGO GUERRERO (Guerrero) is the Branch Manager of PS Bank Murphy Branch, Quezon City. She brought with
her a deposit slip (Exh. A13) processed on December 23, 1999. The deposit involved a Metrobank Ayala Center Check No. 001547
(Exh. N8) issued by Luis Chavit Singson in the amount of One Million Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P1,200,000). The check was
deposited to the account of Laarni Enriquez with Account No. 0180409000-3. The account statement for the month of
December 1999 (Exh. C13, with sub markings) of Laarni Enriquez showed that the amount of One Million Two Hundred Thousand
Pesos (P1,200,000) was credited to her account on December 24, 1999.

The signature card (Exh. B13) showed that the account was opened on July 18, 1996. The card contained Enriquez’s address as 95
8th Avenue, Cubao, Quezon City and her description as Filipino, 5’5", 34 years old, brown, medium built and tiny mole on the
right cheek.

Guerrero further testified that the biggest single check deposit of Ms. Enriquez in the particular savings account was made on
August 4, 1998 for P40 Million. This was shown through a bank statement of account (Exh. D13) brought by the witness. The
subject account was already closed as shown by the December 27, 2000 bank statement. The address given in the statement
had changed to 771 Harvard Street, Wac-wac Subdivision, Mandaluyong. (TSN dated October 30, 2002, pp. 6-28)

DR. ROGELIO V. QUEVEDO (Dr. Quevedo) was, at the time of his testimony, the Head of the Legal and Carrier Business of Smart
Communications, Incorporated. The prosecution offered his testimony to corroborate the Itchon’s testimony regarding the
Smart cellular phone numbers used by Atty. Serapio and Ricaforte.

Dr. Quevedo identified a Certification signed by him that Smart Cellular Phone Nos. 0918-9012071 and 0918-9021847 were
registered in the names of Atty. Edward Serapio and Fontain Bleu, Inc., respectively. (Exh. G12) [TSN dated October 28, 2002, p.
74]

With respect to Smart Cellular Phone No. 0918-9012071, witness identified the application form accomplished by an Edward S.
Serapio of the De Borja Medialdea Bello Guevarra Serapio Law Office (Exh. H12), Certification regarding mobile phone number,
phone model, INEI and ICCID (Exh. I12), Official Receipt No. 82116771 (Exh. J12), Sales Invoice No. A0161625 (Exh. K12), Account
Summary dated March 6, 1999 (Exh. L12), photocopy of Statement for Atty. Serapio’s Philippine National Bank Visa Card (Exh.
M12), photocopy of Atty. Serapio’s Citibank card (Exh. N12), Customer Inquiry Menu (Exh. O12), Customer Address Inquiry (Exh.
P12), On Line Aging Information (Exh. Q12), Service Disconnection document showing termination of the account upon request of
the customer on December 20, 2000 (Exh. R12) and Certification Account Memo Inquiry (Exh. S12). [Ibid.,  pp. 75-90]

With respect to Smart Cellular Phone No. 0918-9021847, Dr. Quevedo presented and identified the application form of Fontain
Bleau, Inc. for two (2) cellular phones for Yolanda Ricaforte and Maria Carmencita Itchon showing that the number 0918-
9021847 was issued to Itchon while the number 0918-9021849 was issued to Ricaforte (Exh. T12), Customer Inquiry Menu (Exh.
U12), Customer Address Inquiry (Exh. V12), Account Maintenance Inquiry (Exh. W12), On Line Aging Information (Exh. X12) and
audio recording for the voice mail of 0918-9021847 by a certain "Yolly" (portion of TSN marked as Exh. Y12). [Ibid., pp. 91-115]
Dr. Quevedo further testified that the account for 0918-9021847 had already been disconnected.

II. EVIDENCE FOR THE DEFENSE

The following are the witnesses for the defense under paragraph (a):

FORMER PRESIDENT JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA (FPres. Estrada) took the witness stand on March 22, 2006, March 29, 2006,
April 5, 2006, April 19, 2006, April 26, 2006, May 24, 2006, May 31, 2006, June 7, 2006, June 14, 2006, June 21, 2006 and June
28, 2006. At the outset, FPres. Estrada denied that Gov. Singson was his close friend because he had only one close friend, the
late actor Fernando Poe, Jr. Gov. Singson was just an ordinary friend and a political ally to him. He seldom saw Gov. Singson
when he was a Mayor of San Juan. Although he admitted that they sometimes went out, as they had common friends.

FPres. Estrada stated that all allegations in specification (a) of the Amended Information were lies, as he did not receive a single
centavo from any form of illegal gamling, even when he was still a mayor and he never conspired with jueteng lords. As mayor of
San Juan, his policy ws to make San Juan jueteng free so he directed the Chief of Police of San Juan to go all out against all forms
of gambling. He even personally raided all gamling dens and had all indulging in jueteng and other forms of gamling arrested and
jailed. However, their wives and children came to him and explained that their husbands could not find other jobs. He promised
to put up a livelihood program for them. (TSN, April 5, 2006, morning session, pp.20-26)

FPres. Estrada also cited national artist Nick Joaquin’s book "Joseph Estrada and other Sketches" (Exh. 457), particularly the
article in the said book "Erap In a New Role" (Exh. 457-a), which narrated an incident when he padlocked a gambling den when
he was still mayor. (Exhs.457-a-1; and 457-a-2) [TSN, April 5, 2006, pp.35-36]

FPres. Estrada asserted that his policy against gambling had not changed, even when he was a senator, Vice President and
President. However, he realized when he was a mayor that jueteng which was a gambling for the poor was illegal and its
collectors were harassed while the casino for the rich was legal. He delivered his first privilege speech at the senate on
November 25, 1987 (Exh. 458) where he advocated the legalization of jueteng in order that the government through PAGCOR
could earn Twelve Million Pesos (P 12, 000,000.00) everyday or Three Hundred Sixty Million Pesos (P 360, 000,000.00) a month
which could be used to provide essential services for the poor instead of the enrichment of the police and illegal operators.
Although when he was Vice-President and appointed by President Fidel V. Ramos as Chairman of the Presidential Anti-Crime
Commission, jueteng was not part of his mandate but he was to go against kidnapping, carnapping and illegal drugs. As
President, he appointed Justice Cecilia Munoz-Palma as Chairperson of the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) and
asked her to study how to legalize jueteng. She retired only after less than two (2) months to take care of her sick husband. Later
it was assigned to her successor Rosario Lopez, who begged off as she was new on the job. Chairperson Alice Reyes of PAGCOR
took over and finished the study.

Chairperson Reyes reported to former FPres. Estrada that the answer to jueteng was Bingo-2-Balls and that if jueteng was to be
legalized the government could earn no less than Five Billon Pesos (P5,000,000,000.00). The study of jueteng showed that from
Regions I to V only the collectors, cabos and runners numbering one hundred fifty thousand (150,000) benefit from jueteng
whereas if jueteng is legalized, the jueteng cobradors will became members of the SSS or GSIS, they would have decent jobs,
ceased to be harassed and victims of extortion. First Lady Loi Ejercito woud have funds to provide dialysis machines for the poor.
The legalization of jueteng will minimize if not totally eradicate corruption among police officials and local government officials
(Ibid, pp.43-48) According to Alice Reyes, the Presidential social funds could be augmented if jueteng was to be legalized.
However, FPres. Estrada told Reyes that instead the Mayors and governors social fund should be created because these local
officials are besieged with requests for medicines, funerals, bills, bills for tuition fees etc. [Ibid, pp.47-50]

FPres. Estrada instructed Chairperson Reyes to implement right away the Bingo-2-Balls. There was a dry-run in Bulacan and it
was very successful. It earned Twenty Four Million Pesos (P24, 000,000.00) in less than three (3) weeks in a few towns in
Bulacan. Unfortunately, the jueteng lords who were against it caused trouble and it was stopped. There were allegations that
FPres. Estrada was receiving jueteng money. [Ibid, pp.53-54]
FPres. Estrada denied that in August 1998 he had a meeting with Atong Ang at the kitchen of his residence at Polk Street,
Greenhills, which was allegedly witnessed by Gov. Singson who arrived later, followed by Bong Pineda. From the start, FPres.
Estrada had told Ang to distance himself from the former President, Ang never stepped into his house nor in Malacañang except
during the wedding of his daughter where he did not even see Ang. Bong Pineda too had never stepped into his house. Gov.
Singson only fabricated the alleged meeting. His testimony in the impeachment that he saw Bong Pineda when he arrived at
Estrada’s house and the testimony in this trial that Pineda arrived later were conflicting. [Ibid, pp.55-62] FPres. Estrada also
belied the testimony of Singson that he told Bong Pineda that he should not be the one to bring the jueteng money because it
would be very obvious. FPres. Estrada denied that he entered into any transaction regarding any illegal form of gambling
specially jueteng. [Ibid, pp.57-70] He admitted that Bong Pineda was his "kumpadre". The father of the wife of his son Jinggoy,
Precy, was a friend of Bong Pineda. They were from Pampanga. The family of Precy, not the Estradas, got Mrs. Pineda, the wife
of Bong, as principal sponsor at the wedding of Jinggoy and Precy. He wondered why Bong Pineda was not presented by the
prosecution as witness when Singson kept on referring to him. [Ibid, pp.70-74]

On the delivery to him of jueteng money, FPres. Estrada denied Singson delivered jueteng protection money to him at his house
at Polk Street, the Presidential Residence in Malacañang and at P. Guevara Street. He also denied that Emma Lim delivered
jueteng money to his Secretary Malou Florendo at Malcañang and that contrary to the testimony of Emma Lim, it was hard for
anybody, including his dentist, to enter the Presidential Residence in Malacañang without passing through the strict security
check. He never heard of Emma Lim except during the impeachment trial. He never asked Singson to pay his obligations, as he
did not have any debt, nor did he ask Singson to buy any appliance for him. He refused gifts like appliances which he would just
raffle off during Christmas. He had never seen Carmencita Itchon, who he learned was a relative of Singson. Emma Lim and
Carmencita Itchon were rewarded for testifying against him at the trial with their appointment as member of the Board of
Directors of Camp John Hay [Poro Point Development Corporation, now Poro Point Management Corporation] (Exh. 459-A-2,
459-A-3) He emphatetically stated that he did not receive a single centavo of jueteng money. [TSN, April 5, 2006, afternoon
session, pp.3-19]

FPres. Estrada denied any knowledge of the ledgers of jueteng money testified to by Singson. He stated he had not seen said
ledgers, he had nothing to do with them and he could not understand them. He first saw the ledgers on television during the
impeachment trial. Acording to him, Singson only fabricated the ledgers; like the documents pertaining to the excise tax. [Ibid.,
pp.24-35, 46, 49, 52-55]

FPres. Estrada also called a lie the testimony of Singson that he instructed Singson to pay Mr. Paul Bograd Five Million Pesos (P 5,
000,000.00) from the jueteng money. He did not ask Singson to keep money from him, so he could not order Singson to pay Paul
Bograd and he did not owe the latter anything. [TSN, April 19, 2006, p.14] He explained that the check for P1,200,000.00 (Exh.
N8) which Singson allegedly gave as birthday gift for Laarni Enriquez was actually intended for his son Jacob and his two siblings,
specifically, P1,000,000.00 for Jacob, the godson of Singson and P100, 000.00 each for Jacob’s two (2) siblings, as Christmas gift.
The check was dated December 22, 1999 whereas the birthday of Laarni was September 22, 1999, Former President Estrada was
surprised at the big amount and he thought that Singson was trying to ingratiate himself to him. [TSN, April 19, 2006, pp.15-16]

FPres. Estrada also belied the claim of Singson that he advanced the Eight Million Pesos (P8,000,000.00) interest from the Sixty-
Two Million Pesos (P62, 000,000.00) of jueteng money lent to Wlliam Gatchalian. He denied too that he ordered Singson to lend
the said amount of money to Gatchalian because he did not ask Singson to keep any money for him. [Ibid., pp.23-25]

Regarding Yolanda Ricaforte, former President Estrada admitted he knows Yolanda, who is the wife of the Former Tourism
Attache in Tokyo, Orestes Ricaforte. Orestes met him when he arrived at the airport for a speaking engagement for Overseas
Filipino Workers in Tokyo. He met Orestes again after four (4) or five (5) years when he, then already the Vice-President, had a
speaking engagement with the Filipino community in Los Angeles. There Orestes introduced his wife Yolanda to FPres. Estrada.
He met Yolanda again during the oath-taking of Orestes as Undersecretary of Tourism. He appointed him Undersecretary as he
promised if he would become President when they were in Los Angeles. He also appointed Yolanda as director of Campo Carne
as requested by Orestes because their income was not enough as they had two (2) children studying in Los Angeles. [Ibid., pp.27-
30]

FPres. Estrada however denied that Yolanda at any time was his employee. He seldom saw Yolanda after the oath-taking of her
husband. He did not approve her auditor for jueteng as claimed by Singson. He had nothing to do with the money deposited by
Yolanda, as he did not have in his possession any bank documents. [Ibid., pp.30-33]

Regarding the testimony of the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation, Former President Estrada testified that even before he became
mayor and when he was a mayor, he was giving scholarships to poor deserving students, since he believed that education would
give them the opportunity to rise above poverty. His number one program as mayor was to put up the first municipal high
school, which as cited by national artist Nick Joaquin in his book (Exhs. 457 and 457-A-3), was the project closest to his heart as it
will offer free education to the needy young. He said that 60% of elementary graduates could not afford to go to high school and
thereby they could become a potential trouble group. This is the root cause of criminality and he would rather spend money on
free high school than spend it to enlarge the municipal jail. [Ibid., pp.33-35]
Former President Estrada also established the Movie Workers welfare Foundation (MOWELFUND) when he was still an actor
(Exh. 460). The MOWELFUND sent to the United States to study film making seven (7) scholars who were shown in The Evening
Post, June 1, 1981 edition (Exh. 461). He also put up the ERAP Foundation in 1988 to give scholarship to poor but deserving
students. ERAP is the acronym of Education Research and Assistance Program. It was registered with the SEC as shown by its
Articles of Incorporation (Exh. 462) The incorporators of the Foundation were: former Senate President Joverto Salonga; former
President Estrada’s brother-in-law, Raul P. de Guzman, former Vice-President of the University of the Philippines and member of
its Board of Regent’s; Mr. Anthony Dee, former owner of China Banking; Mr. Dee K Chong, member of the Board of Directors of
China Banking; Mr. Manuel Zamora, a businessman and bar topnotcher; Mr. Antonio Abacan, now President of Metrobank; Mr.
Ronald Allan Poe, also known by his screen name Fernando Poe, Jr.; Mr. Iñigo Zobel of Makati; Mr. Carlos Tuason, a former
Chairman of the Philippine Sports Commission and a cousin of Mr. Jose Mike Arroyo; Mr. Danny Dolor, a businessman; Mr.
Hermogenes Tantoco, a big fishpond owner in Malolos, Bulacan; and Mdme. Maria Clara Lobregat former City Mayor of
Zamboanga (Exh. 462-B). According to the memorandum of Executive Director of the ERAP Foundation, Jing Ancheta (Exh. 463),
for school year 1988-1989 to 2005-2006, a total of 6,574 availed of the scholarship of the said Foundation, of which 2,512
graduated, 2,251 discontinued and 811 then currently enrolled. There were scholars from Cordillera Administrative Region. (Exh.
464); National Capital Region (Exh. 464-A); Regions I to XIIb (Exhs. 464-B, 464-C, 464-D, 464-E, 464-F, 464-G, 464-H, 464-I, 464-J,
464-K, 464-L, and 464-M); ARMM (Exh. 464-N); CARAGA Region (Exh. 464-O). The list of schools attended by the scholars and the
attachment to the memorandum of Mr. Ancheta which was a Report of the e-Cares Program of Fr. Larry Faraon, dated March
19, 2006 re: Students and Profile were marked as Exhs. 463-C and 465 (with submarkings) respectively. [TSN, ibid, pp.43-58].
According to Former President Estrada, the seed money for the foundations came from his salary as mayor. He said that from
the time that he was a mayor, then Senator, Vice-President and President, he never received a single centavo from his salary.
They all went to the Foundations. [Ibid, p.60]

FPres. Estrada testified that he devoted his salaries as public official to scholarship for the poor because without them, there
would be no Erap. The poor patronized his movies and supported him in his political career. He solicited donations for his
scholarship programs but donors wanted to remain anonymous. He put up the ERAP Muslim Youth Foundation because it was
his campaign promise for the people of Mindanao. In the Mindanao State Colleges, in Marawi City, he promised to send one
hundred (100) Muslim Youth yearly to Australia and America. When he was elected President, he spoke on January 25, 1999 of
his project Muslim Youth Foundation in Smokey Mountains (Exh. 466) and in Angelicum College in Sto. Domingo Church at
Quezon City during the launching of the Educational Reentry, Agenda for the President to the Poor (Exh. 467 and 467-a). To
comply with this promise, he asked his brother-in-law, Dr. Raul de Guzman to put up the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation, whose
articles of Incorporation was duly registered with the SEC (Exh. 252 [also Exhs. G10, W17 to W17-6 of Prosecution]) [TSN, April 26,
2006, pp.11-24]

Aside from Dr. de Guzman, the other incorporators of the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation were Professor Danilo Reyes of the
University of the Philippines (UP) who had a Masteral and Doctorate Degree in Pulic Administration at UP, another UP Professor,
Mila Reforma, Mr. George Go, one of the owners PCI-Equitable Bank, and Atty. Edward Serapio, a valedictorian of the Ateneo de
Manila College of Law and a bar topnotcher. The latter was introduced to him in 1999 by then Secretary Lito Banayo of the
Philippine Tourism Authority. He appointed Serapio as Presidential Assistant on Political Affairs because he was impressed by his
bio-data. Serapio is not that close to him as he dealt with Serapio on an official and professional level. He denied that Serapio
established a fictitious ("kalokohan") corporation for him. He described Serapio as an ex-seminarian, a scholar, a very
respectable person, very conservative, very professional, a family man and of unquestionable integrity [Ibid., pp.24-28]. Former
President Estrada was automatically the Chairman Emeritus of the foundations that he established. He was the number one
fund-raiser but he is not a signatory to the checks of the foundation. The seed money of the foundation came from his salary. He
sponsored an Erap Golf Tournament which raised P27,000,000.00, some part of which went to MOWELFUND and most of it to
the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation. Funds were also raised from Valentines Ball at Manila Hotel and from solicitations from his
businessman friends and classmates. [Ibid., p.29]

Regarding the meeting allegedly attended by him, Singson, Ricaforte and Serapio where he instructed Singson to give to the Erap
Muslim Youth Foundation, through Serapio, jueteng money in the amount of Two Hundred Million Pesos (P200, 000,000.00.
former President Estrada claimed that no such meeting took place. He only learned from Atty. Serapio that Singson gave
P200,000,000.00 to the foundation which he said came from an anonymous donor. He ordered Atty. Serapio to return the
money to Singson because his immediate reaction was that it was jueteng money. The Former President Estrada emphatically
stated: "I’m sure it’s from jueteng." [Ibid., p.34] He knew because Singson had been offering this to him a long time ago.
According to Serapio he did not know it was jueteng money and that he received the money in good faith. When the former
President told Serapio to take all possible means to return the money, Serapio replied that he would consult the Board of
Trustees first. Former President Estrada did not know what happened after that because rallies and the impeachment started.
(Ibid, pp.34-36). He learned later that the money was intact at the Equiatble-PCI Bank and that it earned interest, per bank
certification (Exh. 257-C) and passbook (Exh. 257, 257-A and 257-B). At the time of the testimony, the money based on the
aforesaid documents amounted to P 213, 000,000.00. (Exh. 257-B) [TSN, ibid, pp.41-45] Dr. Raul d Guzman informed him that
the scholarship was continuing but the foundation could not send scholars to the US but only to the universities in the
Philippines. One of the scholars, Janice Halim Negrosa was in the courtroom, at the time of this testimony of the former
President [Ibid., p.46]. He was happy with the continuation of the scholarship because it was his vow to help the poor who
supported him in his election as Mayor, Senator, Vice-President and President. [Ibid, pp.47-48] He established two (2)
foundations, the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation and the Erap Para sa Mahirap Foundation to emphasize the assistance to our
Muslim brothers, the true pure-blooded Filipinos who defended us from foreign invaders. It was impossible to use the Erap
Muslim Youth Foundation for money laundering because he was not a signatory to the checks of the foundation. Its treasurer
was the Chairman of the bank who would not allow his name to be used in money laundering. If the Foundation would be
dissolved, all its assets would go to the government. [Ibid., pp.50-55; and Exh. 252-C]

In support of his policy to go after illegal gambling, former President Estrada cited the memorandum and verbal directives that
he issued to the PNP to implement this policy. In a memorandum dated August 3, 1998 (Exh. 132) of Acting PNP Chief Roberto
Lastimoso pertaining to the aforesaid directives, he reported that he conducted 1,600 operations resulting in the arrest of 807
suspects, confiscation of P320,039.70 in cash and jueteng paraphernalia, the filing of 253 cases in court with 13 cases still under
investigation. The report gave the statistics of illegal gambling for the semester 1998 and informed the former President that he
[Lastimoso] gave an ultimatum to all PRO Directors to pursue the anti-illegal gambling campaign without end, until finally
stopped and eradicated. Another report of the PNP Acting chief stated in part:

"Dear President Estrada: This pertains to our compliance with the presidential directive dated August 14, 1998,
regarding the resurgence of illegal gambling operations in the country. Please be informed that the directive was sent
to all PNP Regional Directors to identify, find, arrest and file charges appropriate in Court against individuals who are
using the name of President Estrada, or supposed connection with his office to promote these illegal activities, and to
come up with rigid measures and tangible results and immediately stop all forms of illegal gambling,
particularly jueteng and masiao." (Exh. 134) [TSN, April 26, 2006]

On October 7, 2000, Former President Estrada issued a Memorandum to the Secretary of Inetrior and Local Government, the
Director General of PNP that pending review of PAGCOR’s Bingo-Two-Ball which was in the meantime suspended, they were
directed to intensify anti-jueteng operations to prevent unscrupulous individuals from taking advantage of the situation. (Exh.
468) He also issued another memorandum to the incoming Director General Panfilo Lacson reiterating his directive against illegal
gambling and requiring periodic and timely reports on all actions relative thereto. (Exh. 469) [TSN, ibid., pp.56-64]

On the testimony of Gov. Singson that he was used and humiliated by the former President and ordered killed by the latter, the
former President testified that on the contrary, it was Singson who used his name specifically in jueteng collections and Singson
made it appear that he could influence him, that Singson was close to him, and that Singson joined his state visits even if he was
not invited. Singson was accosted by the Traffic Management Group (TMG) because he was illegally using sirens and blinkers, as
testified to by TMG’s General Paredes. [Ibid, pp.65-66]

According to Former President Estrada, Singson leveled the serious accusations against him because of his mounting problems.
Singson had only two (2) sources of income, the tobacco excise tax under R.A. No. 7171 and jueteng. Singson could not liquidate
his cash advance from the tobacco excise tax share of Ilocos Sur. He told Singson that he could not help him because COA was an
independent constitutional body. Singson was also against Bingo-2-Ball which was already conceptualized because he would lose
his source of income. [TSN, April 26, 2006, pp.64-69] Former President Estrada was informed that Singson talked to then
Secretary Alfredo Lim seeking his intercession to seek a meeting with Former President Estrada so that jueteng would not be
legalized or that if legalized (through Bingo-2-Ball) the franchise be given to him, otherwise it would mean his [Singson’s]
political death. Former President Estrada refused to talk with Singson and told Secretary Lim to talk to Chairperson Alice Reyes.
Singson approached also other persons aside from Secretary Lim and Senator Edgardo Angara. Senator Angara told FPRes.
Estrada that Singson went to see him on a Sunday asking help about jueteng and Bingo-2-Ball. He told Senator Angara to tell
Singson not to talk to him but to Chairperson Alice Reyes. Angara mentioned that Singson threatened to expose him but he said
he had nothing to hide and if Singson wanted so, to let him do it. Former President Estrada then immediately had the
accusations investigated as he had confirmed that for a long time, Singson had already been using his name, specifically in
jueteng collection. He was hurt by the accusations of Singson as he was turned from being a President, with the biggest mandate
in a clean election, into a prisoner because of a big lie started by one person, Governor Singson. Moreover his son Jinggoy and
Atty. Serapio were also detained for two (2) years when they knew nothing about jueteng [TSN, April 26, 2006, pp.69-77.]

JOSE "JINGGOY" ESTRADA was elected Vice Mayor of San Juan in 1988 and Mayor of San Juan in 1992. [ TSN, November 17,
2004, pp. 15-16.]

Mayor Jinggoy stated that he first got to know Gov. Singson, whom he considered as an acquaintance, during the presidential
campaign of his father, FPres. Estrada, in the 1998 elections. At that time, Gov. Singson supported FPres. Estrada and hosted a
lunch for FPres. Estrada’s entourage when they campaigned in Ilocos Sur. After the presidential campaign, he said he met Gov.
Singson only occasionally. [Ibid., pp. 16-17]

Mayor Jinggoy denied the testimony of Gov. Singson that he was the collector for jueteng protection money in the province of
Bulacan starting January 1999 to August 2000. Witness also stated that he has never been called "Jingle Bell" nor had he
received or heard communication where he was called "Jingle Bell". Witness also denied the statement of Gov. Singson that a
certain Jessie Viceo was the collector of jueteng protection money in the province of Bulacan from January 1999 to August 2000,
because witness had never been a collector or protector of jueteng. However, Mayor Jinggoy admitted that he came to know
Jessie Viceo when the latter was running for congressman since Viceo was also aligned with their political party during the time
witness was assigned to campaign for his father in the province of Bulacan. After that, witness stated that he met Viceo three
times in social functions. Again, witness considered Viceo as an acquaintance. [Ibid., 18-22]

Mayor Jinggoy also denounced for being untrue the allegation that as collector of jueteng protection money in Bulacan, he
collected Three Million Pesos (P3,000,000.00) monthly of which One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) was retained by him and the
other Two Million Pesos (P2,000,000.00) was sent to Gov. Singson’s office or was picked up by Gov. Singson’s aides from
witness’ office in the municipal hall of San Juan or from witness’ residence. [Ibid., p. 22]

He further added that he had never used a personalized check with his picture printed on the check as testified to by Emma Lim
who allegedly deposited such check drawn against the United Overseas Bank of the Philippines, San Juan Branch to Gov.
Singson’s account with Metro Bank Ayala Branch. Mayor Jinggoy presented a certification to prove that he does not maintain a
current account with the said bank. [Ibid., pp. 25-26]

Witness also denied the testimony of prosecution witnesses Vicente Amistad and Jamis Singson who both claimed to have
collected/received jueteng protection money from the witness. With respect to the statements of Jamis Singson, Mayor Jinggoy
asserted they were untrue since he did not have a security aide named Nestor. Further, the testimony of Jamie Singson that on
other occasion, the latter got protection money from witness’ residence at Polk St., Greenhills is also not true because he does
not live in Polk St. but in 97 Kennedy St., North Greenhills. [Ibid., pp. 26-28]

As regards the rest of the testimony of Gov. Singson, Mayor Jinggoy also stated that following were totally untrue: that in his
conversation with Gov. Singson, witness confirmed that he received a part (or Fifteen Million Pesos) of the One Hundred Thirty
Million Pesos that came from the tobacco excise funds because witness was never involved nor did he know anything about it;
that before the press conference held on October 9, 2000 at the Club Filipino, witness tried to dissuade Singson from making the
expose because at that time witness was in Australia watching the Sydney Olympics. [Ibid., pp. 29-32] Witness, however,
admitted that three weeks before he left for Australia, Singson called him up before meeting him at the Kamayan, EDSA where
witness was having dinner with his basketball team to ask if witness can convince his father or Atong Ang to give Singson the
franchise of Bingo 2 Ball and not to his (Singson) political enemies, to which Mayor Jingoy replied that he will try to talk to Atong
Ang. Witness also denied the allegation that he called up Gov. Singson at midnight of October 8, 2000, on the eve of the press
conference where according to Gov. Singson, witness told Gov. Singson that "baka naman isama mo pa ako dito, Governor",
because witness was then shooting a movie with Judy Ann Santos. [Ibid., pp. 34-39, 102]

Bong Pineda was an acquaintance of Jinggoy Estrada. He denied having known Orestes Rusty Ricaforte and Yolly Ricaforte, while
he admitted having known Bonito Singson whom he met once or twice. [Ibid., 65-68]

Jinggoy Estrada testified that the Municipality of San Juan maintained a current account with the Philippine National bank and
Land Bank and not with the United Overseas Bank. He, himself maintained a personal account with United Coconut Planters
Bank. [Ibid., pp. 86-88]

Mayor Jinngoy knew Atong Ang personally, whose real name was Charlie and he first come to know him even before the 1998
presidential elections. He testified that he did not know Alma Alfaro, Eleuterio Tan, Victor Tan Uy, or a Jojo Uy, and a yatch by
the name of Escalera. [Ibid., 99-104]

ALICIA PEREZ LLAMADO REYES (Reyes) was the Chairperson and Chief Executive Officer of PAGCOR since January 2, 1987. She
was appointed by Former President Corazon C. Aquino, reappointed by Former President Fidel V. Ramos, and again reappointed
by Former President Joseph E. Estrada. [TSN, March 7, 2005]

The witness testified that Atong Ang proposed to her the operation of Bingo Two Balls sometime in the year of 2000. She
welcomed the idea since Atong Ang successfully handled the Jai-Alai operations of PAGCOR. Witness Reyes then suggested for a
written proposal from Atong Ang. In a Letter dated September 1, 2000 addressed to the Director of PAGCOR Jose Rodriguez III
(Exh. 286), Atong Ang proposed the feasibility of the Bingo Two Balls. The proposal was duly approved for negotiation by the
Board of Directors of PAGCOR in a Memorandum dated September 5, 2000 (Exh. 287 with submarkings). Witness Reyes added
that the proposal had the confirmation of FPres. Estrada who even told her to "study the proposal and if it will displace Jueteng
then he [was] all for it". For the purpose of implementing the initial operation of Bingo Two Balls, the officers of PAGCOR called a
meeting in Parañaque Casino and invited several personalities knowledgeable in number gaming operations in the Philippines.
Gov. Singson did not attend the meeting since the latter was not interested according to Atong Ang. The operation of Bingo Two
Balls in Ilocos Sur was nonetheless offered to three relatives of Gov. Singson.
Among the conditions for the operation of Bingo Two Balls was the drawing of winning numbers in public and that no payments
will be made "under the table". It was agreed that 23% of the total revenue will be remitted to PAGCOR and 77% of the total
revenue will inure to the benefit of the operators. The Bingo Two Balls nationwide operation was estimated to gain P50 to 65
Million of sales a day. Atong Ang was supposed to be given a management fee of 8% but was reduced to 7% and then to 5%. The
management fee was finally recommended to be reduced at 2% by the head of the Bingo Department of PAGCOR in a
Recommendation Letter dated November 30, 2000 (Exh. 290).

The dry-run operation of Bingo Two Balls lasted for 20 days particularly in the Province of Bulacan. According to witness Reyes,
PAGCOR got P24 Million from the initial operation of Bingo Two Balls from the Province of Bulacan alone. FPres. Estrada then
ordered for the suspension of the operation of Bingo Two Balls allegedly because of adverse publicity and criticisms from the
press.

On cross examination, witness Reyes clarified that there was no written agreement for the dry-run operation of the Bingo Two
Balls and that the conditions set forth in the initial operation was not final. She also stated that the P24 Million that was remitted
to PAGCOR represented the 23% share that was agreed upon and that part of this share was remitted to the Social Fund of the
Office of the President. The 77% share of the income was returned to the operators.

On re-direct examination, the witness testified that the Social Fund of the Office of the President was created during the term of
Former President Aquino. During her administration, this fund was utilized mostly for building school houses which policy was
also adopted during the administration of Former Presidents Ramos and Estrada.

ATTY. EMILIA SAMONTE PADUA (Padua) was the Managing Head of the Entertainment and Bingo Department of PAGCOR since
July of 1996 to June of 2001. She managed, supervised, and controlled the nationwide commercial bingo operations and bingo
derivatives, such as Quick-Pick Games and Bingo Two Balls. [TSN, March 9, 2005]

The witness testified that her department reviewed and evaluated the Bingo Two Ball Project Proposal of Atong Ang to PAGCOR.
The said project proposal was approved for an initial operation and that the Officer-In Charge for the project was Jose Rodriguez
III while the Consultant of the project was the Prominent Marketing Consultancy Group, Inc. of which Atong Ang was the
General Manager. Atong Ang also served as the Marketing Agent of PAGCOR for the project and, as such, he identified the
operational areas and the pre-qualified applicants. The Bingo Two Ball Project was partially implemented from September 18,
2000 to October 7, 2000 in the provinces of Bataan, Bulacan, CAR, Cordillera Administrative Region, Albay, Bicol, Cavite,
Marinduque, Lucena, Batangas, Northern and Southern Luzon, and in Visayas. PAGCOR allegedly attained its financial goals and
objectives in the organizational stage of the project. Witness Padua presented and identified PAGCOR’s Share Based on
Reported Sales Quota (Exh. 288) prepared by the consultancy group of Atong Ang to corroborate the success of the initial
operation of the Bingo Two Balls Project.

Based on a Memorandum dated November 14, 2000 (Exh. 290) approved by the Board of Directors of PAGCOR, the 20-day
operation of the Bingo Two Ball Project aggregated a gross sale of P106,206,661.00 and that P24,427,532.00 was collected by
PAGCOR which represented its 23% share. The consultancy group of Atong Ang gained 2% from the 23% share of PAGCOR.
Though there was no written agreement between PAGCOR and the consultancy group of Atong Ang as regards the payment of
the latter’s 2% share, the Board of Directors of PAGCOR decided that the consultancy group of Atong Ang was entitled to such
share.

Witness Padua also testified that among the objectives of the Bingo Two Ball Project were to eradicate the illegal number games
such as Jueteng and to create employment opportunities. However, the said project was ordered suspended by the Office of the
President because of adverse criticisms and questions of legality from the public.

On cross examination, witness Padua admitted that there was no bidding conducted by PAGCOR in awarding the operation of
the Bingo Two Ball Project to Prominent Marketing Consultancy Group, Inc. She explained that since Atong Ang also headed the
Power Management Corporation which successfully handled the Jai-Alai Operations of PAGCOR, the Board of Directors of
PAGCOR decided to engage the services of the Prominent Marketing Consultancy Group, Inc. of Atong Ang to handle the Bingo
Two Ball Project. The witness further testified that some of the appointed operators of the Bingo Two Ball Project were reputed
as Jueteng Operators but qualified that she only knew them as such after the initial operation of the said project.

On re-direct examination, witness Padua testified that assuming the Bingo Two Ball Project was not suspended and a contract
was perfected between PAGCOR and the operator the contract would nonetheless pass the review and approval of the Office of
the Government Corporate Council (OGCC) and the Office of the President.

SENATOR ALFREDO SIOJO LIM (Sen. Lim) was appointed as the Secretary of the Department of Interior and Local Government
(DILG) on January 8, 2000. [TSN, March 14, 2005]
On October 7, 2000, Sen. Lim read in the newspaper the alleged attempted ambush on the life of Gov. Singson and discussed the
issue with Congressman Luis "Baby" Asistio during their breakfast meeting at the Manila Yacht Club. Thereafter, Sen. Lim and
Baby Asistio visited Gov. Singson at his residence in Blue Ridge, Quezon City. Governor Casimiro Ynares, Jr. later arrived and
joined their conversation. According to Lim, Gov. Singson related to them the details of the attempted plot against the life of
Gov. Singson on the late evening of October 3, 2000. On said date, members of the Traffic Management Group (TMG) armed
with long rilfes and not wearing proper uniforms, accosted the vehicle occupied by Gov. Singson along San Marcelino Street, for
beating a red light and having a blinker on top of his vehicle. Gov. Singson initially refused to alight from his vehicle and got
down only when the mayors that he just had a meeting with arrived on the scene. Singson argued with the TMG Officers and
refused to be brought to Camp Crame. The dispute ended when the TMG Officers finally agreed that they will no longer force
Gov. Singson to be brought to Camp Crame since the blinker of the vehicle of Gov. Singson was surrendered to them.

Gov. Singson allegedly said that Atong Ang and Ping Lacson were the persons responsible for the attempted ambush on his life,
and that both conspired to have him killed because Gov. Singson was against the Bingo Two Balls gaming proposal of Atong Ang
and that there was an arrangement for the raising of campaign funds for the presidential candidacy of Ping Lacson. Sen. Lim
further related that Gov. Singson also implicated FPres. Estrada on the alleged attempted ambush on his life on the theory that
Atong Ang and Ping Lacson will not have the courage to have him killed without the approval of FPres. Estrada. Gov. Singson also
grumbled about the awarded franchises for the operation of the Bingo Two Balls in Ilocos by Atong Ang to the political
opponents of Gov. Singson. Gov. Singson also mentioned that FPres. Estrada did not help him sort out his problems with the
Commission on Audit (COA).

Sen. Lim further testified that on the following day, October 8, 2000, he and Congressman Baby Asistio went to the Malacañang
Palace and met FPres. Estrada. The witness relayed to FPres. Estrada the sentiments and allegations of Gov. Singson. FPres.
Estrada denied Gov. Singson’s accusations that he had something to do with the attempted ambush and that he would initiate
an investigation on the matter. FPres. Estrada said that Gov. Singson was his good friend and that he was with Lim in Cebu City
and Cagayon de Oro during the alleged incident. As to the issue regarding the Bingo Two Ball Project of Atong Ang, FPres.
Estrada said that he was convinced by PAGCOR that it could triple its proceeds as compared to the operations of Jai-Alai. FPres.
Estrada would also trigger an investigation regarding Gov. Singson’s allegation that Atong Ang had planned to divert the
proceeds of the Bingo Two Ball Project of PAGCOR. Witness Lim added that FPres. Estrada admitted that he left Gov. Singson to
explain to COA because he had no control and supervision over the said constitutional body.

The witness also refuted the testimony of Gov. Singson that he conveyed the impression to Gov. Singson that FPres. Estrada
gave the signal to kill Atong Ang. Witness Lim claimed that his thumbs down gesture to Gov. Singson meant that FPres. Estrada
would have Atong Ang ordered investigated and not to have the latter killed.

On cross examination, witness Lim testified that he had no personal knowledge as to the purchase of shares from Bell
Corporation by GSIS and SSS; as to the matters regarding the Ilocos Sur Excise Taxes; and as to the Jueteng collection ledger of
Yolanda Ricaforte.

VIOLETA SUAREZ DAMITAN (Damitan) was the Executive Assistant of the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation employed by Raul P.
De Guzman on January 1, 2004 (Exh. 278). [TSN, March 16, 2005] She was responsible, among others, for the safekeeping of the
records of the said corporation such as the Articles of Incorporation and By-Laws, and the records of applicants to the
scholarship program of the foundation.

Damitan testified that the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation provided scholarship education programs to the less privileged Muslim
youth Filipinos. The applications and recommendations filed were reviewed by the Screening Committee and approved by the
Board of Trustees of the foundation.

Damitan presented and identified the credentials and pertinent records of Sittie Shahani Laminero who was one of the
applicants granted a scholarship program by the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation (Exhs. 295, 296, 297 and submarkings). She
likewise presented and identified several documents enumerating and showing other grantees of the said scholarship program,
namely, Salvador Ongay Domona, Sohayle Hadji Abdul Rachman, Janice Halim Negrosa, Roque Santos Morales, and Ahmad
Robert (Exhs. 279, 280, 298, 299 and submarkings). The witness further presented and identified a Minutes of the Meeting of
the Board of Trustees of the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation on July 21, 2000 to show the appointment of the other employees
of the foundation and the accounts of the scholarship program (Exh. 274 and submarkings).

SALVADOR ONGAY DOMONA [TSN, March 16, 2005], JANICE HALIM NEGROSA [TSN, March 30, 2005], ROQUE SANTOS
MORALES [TSN, March 30, 2005] and H. SOLAYHE A.A. MARANGIT [TSN, March 28, 2007], all similarly testified that they were
granted scholarships by the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation. Witness Domona applied and was admitted for the scholarship
program on the year 2003; witness Negrosa applied and was admitted to the said program on the year 2004; witness Morales
applied and was admitted to the same program on the year 2004 and witness Marangit applied and was admitted to the same
program in 2004. These witnesses also presented and identified their respective credentials and pertinent documentary
evidence. (see also Exhs. 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310, and submarkings)

ATTY. CARINA JAVIER DEMAISIP (Demaisip) was appointed Assistant Corporate Secretary of the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation,
Inc. on January 1, 2004 (Exh. 277). She assisted the release of funds and prepared the minutes of the meetings of the Board of
Trustees of the foundation. [TSN dated March 30, 2005 and TSN dated April 4, 2005]

Demaisip testified that Raul P. De Guzman solicited her services for the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation sometime on July of 2003
which was after the incarceration of Atty. Edward S. Serapio, the Corporate Secretary. The foundation was located at the
4th Floor of VAG Building in Greenhills, Ortigas Avenue. The witness then identified several minutes of the meetings approved by
the Board of Trustees of the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation (Exhs. 279, 281, 312, and submarkings) and corroborated the
testimony of witness Violeta S. Damitan regarding the approved and awarded scholarship programs by the foundation (Exh. 313
and submarkings). She also testified that among the reasons why the foundation had no scholars for the years 2000, 2001, 2002,
and 2003, except for Salvador O. Domona, were because of (a) the ineffectiveness of the Board of Trustees brought by the
charges against FPres. Estrada, (b) the lack of funds to operate the foundation due to the freeze orders, and (c) the failure of the
institutions to comply with the requirements of the scholarship program. The funds of the foundation became available on
November 11, 2003. Hence, the foundation started releasing checks only thereafter although some of the applications for the
scholarship program were already reviewed and approved before the availability of the funds.

MARIA LOURDES LOVERO FLORENDO (Florendo) was an Executive Assistant in the Office of the Vice President and the
Confidential Secretary of accused FPres. Estrada. [TSN, April 20, 2005 and April 25, 2005]

Florendo testified that she did not know and had never met on any occasion Emma Lim. The witness said that she was shocked
when she read from the newspaper that Emma Lim allegedly gave her a black bag containing P5,000,000.00 at the Presidential
Residence. She refuted the statements that Emma Lim gave during the Impeachment Trial on December 11, 2000 that the latter
went straight to her and handed a black bag which contained P5,000,000.00; that Emma Lim was not required at the guardhouse
of the Presidential Residence to have her black bag examined in the X-Ray Machine; that there were no furniture or sala sets at
the right side of the entrance of the Presidential Residence; that witness Florendo received the black bag and placed it near a
table and that she talked to Gov. Singson and told him that "they already arrived"; and that Emma Lim went out running towards
her vehicle after giving the black bag to witness Florendo (Exh. 320-C and submarkings).

NORMAN DELOS SANTOS BORDADORA (Bordadora) was a reporter of the Philippine Daily Inquirer since July of 1996. He
testified that he was the author of an article in the Philippine Daily Inquirer Newspaper entitled "Chavit, I Have Never Been Into
Jueteng" which was published on May 21, 2005 (Exh. 335). The source of the contents of his article was allegedly Governor Luis
"Chavit" Singson whom witness Bordadora had interviewed through a cellular phone which was not recorded. The witness
clarified that he interviewed Gov. Singson on the alleged jueteng involvement of Archbishop Cruz and not on the jueteng expose
in the year 2000. [TSN, June 22, 2005]

ATTY. JOSEPH QUION ORSOS (Orsos), P/SUPT. ARTURO LACSINA PAGLINAWAN (Paglinawan), P/SUPT. RODOLFO SANTOS

AZURIN, JR. (Azurin), POLICE CHIEF INSPECTOR NOEL BIACA VALLO (Vallo), P/SUPT. ELISEO DECENA DE LA PAZ (Dela
Paz), JONIRO FORMILLEZA FRADEJAS (Fradejas) and RENATO MENDOZA PAREDES (Paredes), all testified to matters related to
the October 3, 2000 traffic incident involving Gov. Singson and the Traffic Management Group ("TMG").

Orsos, a Police Officer and the Chief of the Legal Services of the TMG, presented and identified a Roster of Troops dated October
3, 2000; a Disposition of Personnel as of August 28, 2000 dated October 31, 2000; a Memorandum dated October 4, 2000
regarding the apprehended motor vehicle of Gov. Singson; and another Memorandum dated October 4, 2000 (Exh. 360)
regarding the traffic violation of the driver of Gov. Singson. He admitted he had no personal knowledge of the incident. [TSN,
July 13, 2005, Exhs. 358-61 with submarkings] Paredes, Director of the TMG, identified a Memorandum dated October 4, 2000
signed by him and previously marked as Exh. 360. [TSN dated August 17, 2003] Paglinawan, Chief of the General Assignment
Section of the Western Police District, testified that there were no records in the WPD that Gov. Singson filed a case in relation
to the October 3, 2000 incident. [TSN, July 18, 2005] Azurin, Chief of the Special Operations Division of the TMG, testified that,
on October 3, 2000, he was called by Vallo for assistance in some misunderstanding with Gov. Singson. He also testified to what
happened after they proceeded to the WPD headquarters in UN Avenue and related that the agents of the TMG Group were
wearing proper uniform but admitted that he himself was not in proper uniform. Azurin testified that the blinker and siren found
in the vehicle of Gov. Singson were confiscated for violation of a Memorandum dated July 14, 1998 issued by the Office of the
President. [TSN, July 18, 2005, and Exh. 362 with submarkings] Vallo, Chief of the Operation Task Force Limbas of the TMG,
testified to the TMG’s spotting of an accelerating vehicle (Gov. Singson’s), the chase and the accosting of the vehicle for a traffic
violation. Dela Paz, Police Chief Superintendent of the Philippine National Police, identified his signature in a Memorandum sent
to relevant offices pertaining to the use of blinkers [TSN, August 8, 2005, Exh. 364] Fradejas, Executive Assistant II of the Traffic
Engineering Center of the Metro Manila Development Authority, identified a Certification pertaining to the DPWH Phase I
installation of traffic lights in Metro Manila. [TSN dated August 8, 2005, Exh. 384]
DR. GEMMA BAULA DAVID (David) had been the dentist of FPres. Estrada since the latter was still a Senator. David testified that
she provided dental treatments to FPres. Estrada at the latter’s residence in No. 1 Polk Street, Greenhills, and at the Presidential
Residence in Malacañang. The witness related that, every time she visited FPres. Estrada at his residence in Greenhills as well as
in the Presidential Residence in Malacañang for the scheduled dental appointment, she had to pass the strict security protocols
conducted at the entrance of both locations. She further related that at there was a walk-through metal detector at the
Presidential Residence in Malacañang. [TSN, May 30, 2005]

MARICHU ANDUEZA VILLANUEVA (Villanueva) was a Journalist of the Philippine Star Newspaper and a member of the
Malacanang Press Group. She authored the article entitled "Palace Backs Ping on Anti-Jueteng Drive" in the June 17, 2000 issue
of the said newspaper which was based on a press conference she attended in Malacañang Palace on June 16, 2000. [TSN,
September 26, 2005; Exh. 415 and submarkings]

ATTY. RICARDO VILLANUEVA PUNO, JR., a practicing lawyer, testified that he joined the government as Press Secretary and
Presidential Spokesperson on or about March 16, 2000 and stayed in that position until January 20, 2001. In such position, he
would only speak of information that he was authorized to disseminate to the public or the media at that particular time. His
position gave him the privilege of being present at discussions on policies, which included Presidential meetings. [TSN, October
3, 2005]

To the best of his recollection, the policy of the FPres. Estrada then was always to fight illegal gambling. That has been the
declared policy even during the tenure of the witness as Press Secretary and Presidential Spokesperson. He had a general
recollection of this policy, but he had no specific recollection of the times it was actually mentioned.

He could not recall specifically a press conference held on June 16, 2000, although he saw the June 17, 2000 issue of the
Philippine Star attached to the subpoena [Exh. 415], but there was a time when he held a series of briefings for media at 2:00
p.m., and it was probably during one of those briefings that the points in the article were raised. The article referred to a drive
by the then Director General of the Philippine National Police against jueteng. The question asked of the witness at the time was
probably, whether FPres. Estrada in fact prescribed jueteng  reduction. It was very clear that it was in fact the policy at that time,
based on their previous conversations. The article, however, referred to the drive allegedly initiated by then PNP Director Panfilo
Lacson. Up to the time that the witness left in January 2001, he could not remember any reversal of that policy. He would not
know, however, if jueteng continued despite the campaign against it, because his office as Press Secretary was not monitoring
the situation.

ATTY. HILARIO PAUL HAVOC RAGUNJAN, JR. was a commissioned Notary Public who notarized the Letter dated May 28, 2005 of
Rodolfo Q. Pineda (Exh. 331) addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Games and Amusements of the House of the
House of Representatives, Hon. Mario Z. Almario. Witness Ragunjan, Jr. testified that he personally knew the affiant of the letter
but had no personal knowledge as to the contents of the said letter. [TSN, June 6, 2005]

MARIBETH ANG ESCOBAR, Officer-in-Charge of the United Overseas Bank (UOB) San Juan Branch, testified on a Certification
dated June 28, 2002 addressed to Atty, Irene Jurado issued by Ms. Elma Gutierrez, who was no longer connected with UOB.
Witness had been the OIC of UOB San Juan since Ms. Gutierrez’ resignation. (TSN, November 22, 2004, p. 48)

The said Certification stated: "This is to certify that based on our records from 1999 up to the present, we have no current
account listed under the name of the client Mayor Jose "Jinggoy" Estrada." She verified the facts stated in the Certification by
personally checking the records on file in their system and there was no reading of an account under the name of Senator Jose
"Jinggoy" Estrada, upon receipt of the subpoena. (Ibid., p. 54)

Escobar also testified that she was not aware and has not seen any check with photo of the client on the face of the check. She
has never processed a customized check but has seen one with the logo of a company like Sunlife. Witness stated that the
Certification was issued based on the letter dated June 28, 2002 of Atty. Irene D. Jurado to the Manager of UOB San Juan.
(Ibid., pp. 54-58)

Witness testified that although the certification stated only that Jose Jinggoy Estrada had no current account, her verification of
their their records showed that there was no Jose Jinggoy Estrada on the list of active accounts of UOB San Juan, as well as in the
dormant accounts. Similarly, the Municipality of San Juan had no account with the UOB San Juan, more so the Municipality of
Marikina. (Ibid., pp. 94-98)

ROSEMARIE J. SAN GREGORIO, Community Affairs Officer II of the Municipal Government of San Juan, testified that she didn’t
know personally a lady by the name of Emma Lim, but has seen her testify before the Impeachment Court on television. She
remembered particularly the testimony of Emma Lim because Emma Lim mentioned the name of her officemate, Josie, who was
with the witness when they were watching the proceedings in the television along with Lauro Quirino, who was their
receptionist in the Mayor’s Office. Witness remembered that among the testimony of Emma Lim was that she went to the
Municipal Office to collect money. Witness stated that she and Josie Ramos were surprised and amazed with Emma Lim’s
testimony since she [Emma Lim] did not go to the Mayor’s Office. Josie Ramos was the one handling papers for the signature of
the Mayor. [TSN, November 24, 2004, pp. 26-42]

JOSEFINA QUIAZON RAMOS worked as one of the secretaries in the Office of the Mayor, Municipality of San Juan for 1998 to
2001, preparing documents for signature of then Mayor Jinggoy Estrada. Witness Ramos corroborated the testimony of
Rosemarie San Gregorio that Emma Lim did not go to the Office of then Mayor Jose "Jinggoy" Estrada in January, February and
March 2000 to pick up allegedly jueteng money from the Office of the Mayor.

Ramos described as untrue the testimony of Emma Lim that Emma Lim talked to Ramos and was asked to sit in front of Ramos’
table in the Office of the Mayor on February and March 2000. Witness stated that Emma Lim never went to the Office of the
Mayor in San Juan. Witness was surprised when Emma Lim mentioned her name during the impeachment trial, and that she told
this to Mayor Estrada who called her up after Emma Lim testified. Mayor Estrada was also surprised and told her that "what is
that woman saying, that woman is a liar". [TSN, December 6, 2004]

SUSAN MACALLA AVILES was the Social Secretary of Ms. Guia Gomez and a resident of No. 1 Ibuna Street corner P. Guevarra
Street, San Juan, Metro Manila. She testified that, as social secretary, she was the one who received guests, entertained them
and was the one who would call to serve the visitors coffee or juice at the house of Guia Gomez at No. 1 Ibuna Street corner P.
Guevarra Street, San Juan. Aviles asserted that Gov. Singson never went to the house at P. Guevarra. [TSN, December 1, 2004,
p.16-17] She clarified that the house on P. Guevarra and Ibuna were one and the same because their address was No. 1 Ibuna
Street corner P. Guevarra Street, San Juan. (Ibid.,  p.44)

NOEL ISRAEL BUENDIA was previously a security guard assigned at the residence of Guia Gomez at No. 1 Ibuna corner P.
Guevarra Streets, San Juan, from February 26, 1998 up to 2002, and as such, was stationed at the gate along Ibuna St. from 6:00
a.m. to 6:00 p.m. and the one assigned in the front and in-charge of asking visitors. During his assignment at Guia Gomez’s
residence, Buendia testified that he did not see Gov. Singson go there. [TSN, December 1, 2004]

CONGRESSMAN LUIS A. ASISTIO (Cong. Asistio) testified that he was at San Francisco, California on July 24, 2000 as part of the
official Philippine Delegation accompanying then President Joseph E. Estrada in his state visit to the United States of America,
and that it was there that he saw Gov. Singson, at the lobby of the Fairmont Hotel where they stayed, telling him of the latter’s
problem that FPres. Estrada did not want to see him. Cong. Asistio, together with Gov. Singson, went to the room of FPres.
Estrada, and Gov. Singson asked FPres. Estrada to call the Chairman of the COA for the relief of the Auditor assigned in his
province to which FPres. Estrada replied that he might get into trouble as the Chairman of the COA is a constitutional appointee
and suggested that Gov. Singson instead talk to then Executive Sectary Ronaldo Zamora to resolve his problem.

Witness also testified that after returning from the U.S. and prior to the expose or press conference made by Gov. Singson in
October 2000, he received a call from the latter asking him if they could meet it Manila Peninsula, and, at the same time, Gov.
Singson told him of his problem and his grievances (sama ng loob) against FPres. Estrada, including placing his political
opponents in positions of power in his province, such as, the relief of the Provincial Commander and conferring on his brother,
Bonito, who is his mortal enemy, a position regarding jueteng.

Cong. Asistio clarified that in the many meetings he had with Gov. Singson during the period late August to September 2000,
they mainly talked about the state of the Ilocos Sur provincial leadership and occasionally Gov. Singson’s suspicions regarding
Atong Ang’s designs to corner bingo two balls and ease him out. According to Cong. Asistio, Gov. Singson is worried that his
continued provincial leadership will be affected by the developments. Cong. Asistio also testified they never talked about
jueteng, or receipt of jueteng monies or the alleged receipt of money from R.A. 7171 since according to him, he knew of these
issues only during the Impeachment Trial and he thinks that these are mere figments of Gov. Singson’s imagination.

Cong. Asistio also testified that he, together with Mayor Lim, went to the house of Gov. Singson to persuade the latter not to
push through with the press conference.

Cong. Asistio also testified that in his visits to Malacañang during the time of FPres. Estrada, at least three times a week, he
never saw Atong Ang there because Atong Ang was banned by the FPres. Estrada from entering Malacañang. [TSN, October 11,
2004 and October 13, 2004]

ATTY. ESTELITA D. CORDERO (Cordero) testified that she was a close friend Mrs. Lydia "Honey Girl" Singson, sister of Gov.
Singson, and worked as a legal consultant for Mrs. Honey Girl Singson when the latter was appointed as Director General of the
Technology and Livelihood Resource Center (TLRC) until October 12, 2000. [TSN, November 8, 2004, pp. 9, 11-12, 14]

Cordero testified that in October 2001, members of the Save Ilocos Sur Alliance (SISA) visited her in her office and requested her
to go over several audit reports (1999 to 2000, SAO Special Report 1999) of the province and to find out if there is any basis for
filing any action against responsible public officials of the province. [Ibid., p. 38] After going through the documents, witness
Cordero, together with members of SISA and other concerned citizens, decided to file criminal complaints against Gov. Singson
and other responsible officers of the province who did some anomalous transactions to the detriment of the province. [Ibid., pp.
44-45]

Witness thought that the testimony of Emma Lim in the impeachment trial were all lies because from the statement of Gov.
Singson, he did not have anything to do with jueteng and the delivery of the money. Thus, witness claimed that all of these were
fabricated statements on the part of Emma Lim. [TSN, November 10, 2004, pp. 26-28]

Witness Cordero also testified that Gov. Singson was the jueteng lord in their province and neighboring provinces, and all
matters relating to jueteng, such as, employment, people, operations were under the control of Gov. Singson. [Ibid., pp. 29-30]

BRIG. GEN. RODOLFO DOCTOR DIAZ, a retired military officer, was assigned as the Commanding Officer of the Presidential
escorts, one of the major units of the Presidential Security Group, in 1998 when FPres. Estrada assumed office. He testified that
he was familiar with the private residence of FPres. Estrada in No. 1 Polk Street. Quezon City. According to Gen. Diaz, only the
First Family’s vehicles were allowed to park in the garage. Only five vehicles could be accommodated there and usually the cars
parked there were the President’s primary and secondary car, as well as an SUV and two more cars. Witness also detailed the
security measures followed in Polk Street. In Polk Street, visitors were never allowed to park their cars inside the garage. [TSN,
June 1, 2005, pp. 50-56]

The witness did not see Atong Ang either at No. 1 Polk Street or in Malacanang since the President has been elected. He had
seen Mr. Jaime Dichaves twice; Mr. Baby Asistio, once or twice. He did not see Governor Singson in No. 1 Polk Street [Ibid., pp.
81-83]

RICARDO GREY GOLPEO, General Manager of the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) from February 2000 to February
2001, testified that he and then PSCO Chairman Rosario Lopez were summoned by FPres. Estrada to Malacañang in March 2000.
On that occasion, FPres. Estrada informed them that jueteng had become a big problem to him and wanted to know if the PCSO
can do something to fight jueteng. The witness replied that they will study the instruction of the President. Chairman Lopez
instructed witness to personally handle the matter. At the time the witness left PCSO, he testified that the PCSO had not come
up with a suggestion to the President on how to eradicate jueteng. [TSN, April 11, 2005, pp. 11-17, 19, 30)]

DANILO DELA ROSA REYES was a Member of the Board of Trustees of the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation, Inc. and the Acting
Treasurer of the said foundation. He was also an Associate Professor at the National College of Public Administration and
Governance in the University of the Philippines (UP) Diliman and the Vice President for Educational Services for the "Erap Para sa
Mahirap" Foundation

Reyes testified that the "Erap Para sa Mahirap" Foundation was duly established in 1988 and had 14,000 recipients of
scholarships as of the year 2000. Among the Incorporators of the said foundation was FPres. Estrada. The "Erap Para sa
Mahirap" Foundation, however, encountered financial constraints so the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation, Inc. came into
existence.

Reyes related that Raul P. De Guzman, a brother-in-law of FPres. Estrada, invited him to join in establishing a foundation for the
poor and deserving Muslim students in line with the vision of FPres. Estrada of developing a new generation of Muslim leaders.
He then identified the documents related to the registration of the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation, Inc. (Exhs. 251 to 255, 262 to
271, inclusive of submarkings) with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). The Erap Muslim Youth Foundation, Inc. was
duly organized in accordance with law and had conducted its business upon incorporation for bona fide purposes as stated in its
Articles of Incorporation (Exh. 252) and Amended By-Laws (Exh. 255). The original Members of the Board of Trustees were: Prof.
Mila Reformina, Dr. Raul P. De Guzman, Atty. Edward S. Serapio, Dr. Danilo Reyes, and Mr. George L. Go, who later resigned.

The word ERAP affixed to the name "Muslim Youth Foundation" was allegedly an acronym for "Education, Research, and
Assistance Program". The funding of the said foundation was provided by the Erap Golf Cup, which donated the amount of Ten
Million Pesos (P10,000,000.00); the contributions of the Board of Trustees in the amount of P20,000.00 each; and a Two
Hundred Million Peso (P200,000,000.00) donation from a donor which, according to Serapio, would like to remain anonymous.
The amount of Ten Million One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P10,100,000.00) was deposited with the UCPB and eventually
transferred to Metrobank while the Two Hundred Million Pesos (P200,000,000.00) was deposited with Equitable PCI Bank. The
Ten Million Pesos (P10,000,000.00) was the source of the foundation’s operating expenses and for minimal scholarship program
during the time material in this case.

According to Reyes, the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation, Inc. had (four (4) scholars for MA in Islamic Studies in the University of
the Philippines for school year 2004-2005. For the second semester of that school year, the foundation added four (4) more
scholars for Masters Degree, two in the University of the Philippines and the other two in the Philippine Normal University. The
scholars were only given Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) per semester. Reyes explained that the foundation was in hiatus for
three (3) years because its funds were frozen by a court order and that they conducted meetings after the recuperation of Dr. De
Guzman who got sick, and after the release on bail of Atty. Serapio.

Reyes also testified as to the appointment papers of the employer of the foundation, such as the Executive Assistant, the
Assistant Corporate Secretary and the Utility Messenger. The office address of the foundation was transferred from Pasig to the
VAG Building in San Juan. [TSN, February 21, 2005; February 23, 2005; and March 2, 2005]

EUGENE MACAMASBAD, a Police Senior Inspector with the Philippine National Police, brought with him the documents required
in the subpoena addressed to Gen. Arturo Lomibao of the PNP or his authorized representative. He produced a certified true
copy of a Memorandum Circular 2000-003, certified by Celia Redison (Exh. 365). As to the memorandum dated July 19, 2000
which was subpoenaed, the same could not be located as shown by a certification dated 29 July 2005 issued by the Deputy Chief
of the PACER. (Exh. 380) [TSN, August 1, 2005, pp. 60-69] The witness came to Court and produced the above documents only
upon verbal instruction from his officers. He was not the records custodian and he did not have any knowledge about records
being maintained by their office. [Ibid.,  pp. 70-72, id.]

SEN. EDGARDO ANGARA, a lawyer and a senator when he testified in Court, knew Gov. Singson. They were compadres, being
godfathers at the wedding of Singson’s niece. In September 2000, Gov. Singson made an unexpected visit at Senator Angara’s
farm to request that the witness talk to President Estrada about the 2-balls game. Gov. Singson told the witness that the
franchise for the said game in Ilocos Sur was given to his political opponent and he was losing face with his supporters. Gov.
Singson wanted the franchise to go to him or if it cannot be granted, that the game of 2-balls not be allowed altogether in Ilocos.
The witness replied that he would go down to Manila and call the President to relay Gov. Singson’s message. [TSN, June 1, 2005,
pp. 13-15]

Sen. Angara remembered Gov. Singson saying that the franchise was given to Eric Singson. Gov. Singson even mentioned a list of
of jueteng  payoffs and that one of the beneficiaries was the President. When Sen. Angara mentioned to FPres. Estrada Gov.
Singson’s request regarding 2-balls and statements regarding jueteng, the President denied that he was a recipient of any
payoff, saying he had nothing to do with it [2-balls] but that it was Atong Ang’s jurisdiction [Ibid.,  pp.16 and 24]

After Sen. Angara relayed the answer of the President, Gov. Singson asked the witness to talk to Atong Ang and the witness said
he will try. When the witness was able to talk to Atong Ang and repeated Gov. Singson’s request, Atong Ang replied he will study
it or that he will have to consult PAGCOR. The witness denied having told Gov. Singson "Grabe ‘to. Huwag kang lumabas at
akong bahala kay Presidente dahil baka pati kaming mga  Cabinet members maaapektuhan nito." [Ibid., pp. 17-18, 24-25]
Witness saw the list of payoffs shown by Singson, but he did not read it. [Ibid., pp. 30, 43]

FINDINGS OF FACT

Re: Sub-paragraph (a) of the Amended Information

With respect to the alleged acts of receiving or collection of sums of money from illegal gambling, commonly known as
"jueteng", in the form of share or percentage, the Court finds credible material portions of Gov. Chavit Singson’s testimony
insofar as they are corroborated by independent and competent evidence.

The Court concedes that Gov. Chavit Singson did not have the purest of motives in exposing the jueteng collections which he
testified were done for the benefit of FPres. Estrada. Undoubtedly and by his own admission, he resented not being given the
franchise for the Bingo Two Balls, the government sanctioned numbers game, in his home province of Ilocos Sur. He feared the
demise of his political career as the said franchise was given to his political opponents, Eric Singson and his brother Bonito
Singson, to the embarrassment of the mayors who were affiliated to him. Gov. Chavit Singson was disappointed to say the least
that Mayor Jinggoy Estrada, JV Ejercito, the other son of FPres. Estrada, Secretary Edgardo Angara, Secretary Alfredo Lim, friends
like Luis Asistio and Mark Jimenez, whom Gov. Chavit Singson approached to intercede to FPres. Estrada to help him secure the
franchise, were unsuccessful. Gov. Chavit Singson was also displeased that FPres. Estrada would not use the Office of the
Presidency to help him with his trouble with the Commission on Audit which was demanding his liquidation of the Two Hundred
Million Pesos (P200,000,000.00) share of Ilocos Sur in the excise taxes collected under RA No. 7171. The Court will not cite the
alleged attempt on the life of Gov. Chavit Singson in the evening of October 3, 2000 considering the contradictory evidence on
this matter consisting of the testimony of the enforcement officers on the incident.

The acts of collection of jueteng protection money for FPres. Estrada from various provinces nationwide per month as well as
the payments to him and to various persons from such sums of money with his approval or acquiescence were methodically
detailed in two sets of ledgers: the first set covering the period beginning November 1998 to July 1999 (Exh. W7 to E8), and the
second set for the period starting August 1999 to August 2000 (Exh. A-4 to A-4-l). The first set of ledgers were personally
prepared by Gov. Chavit Singson, aided by Emma Lim and Carmencita Itchon, while the second set of ledgers were prepared by
Yolanda Ricaforte, under the supervision of Gov. Chavit Singson and also with the help of Lim and Itchon. Insofar as the
collection of jueteng money is concerned, Emma Lim and Carmencita Itchon, by their own admission performed similar roles as
Yolanda Ricaforte except that the latter received double the amount of the monthly salary of Lim and Itchon by virtue of her
"supervisory" status.

The accused would have this Court dismiss the ledgers as hearsay and/or mere fabrications. However, there are circumstances
which lend credibility to the said ledgers. The first set of ledgers (Exh. W7 to E8) was faxed by Ricaforte to Singson just before
Gov. Chavit Singson made his expose while the second set of ledgers (Exh. A-4 to A-4-l) was in the possession of Ricaforte, which
she produced during the Senate Impeachment proceedings, as testified to by Atty. David Jonathan Yap, the Senate Legal
Counsel.

Yolanda Ricaforte was closely associated to FPres. Estrada, being the wife of Orestes Ricaforte, who was appointed by FPres.
Estrada as Undersecretary of Tourism. Ricaforte opened several accounts in the different branches of Equitable PCI Bank with
unusually huge deposits and investments in multiple of millions of pesos during the period covered by the second set of ledgers.

Per testimony of Nantes, in Scout Tobias-Timog Branch, Ricaforte opened a savings account, a current account, seven special
savings account and a PCI Emerald account. In the Savings Account No. 0157-04227-0 alone, after the initial deposit of
P17,205,000.00 on September 1, 1999, she deposited from September 7, 1999 to January 10, 2000, a staggering total amount of
P57,712,150.00. The initial deposits for each of the seven (7) Special Savings Accounts were: P70,000,000.00 (December 2,
1999); P10,000,000.00 (February 7, 2000); P2,500,000.00 (March 29, 2000); P9,700,000.00 (April 5, 2000); 2,500,000.00 (May 29,
2000) P1,900,000.00 (May 4, 2000); and P2,000,000.00 (June 1, 2000). The deposit in the PCI Emerald Fund was P6,616,676.19
(December 6, 2000).

According to Rosario S. Bautista, in Diliman-Matalino Branch, Ricaforte opened on November 19, 1999 a combo account: Savings
Account No. 0288-02037-0 and Current Account No. 0238-00853-0 with an initial deposit of P70,000,000.00 covered by two (2)
PCI Bank Checks payable to cash each in the amount of P35,000,000.00, drawn by William T. Gatchalian. Additional deposits
were: a check (Exh. A-7-h) issued by Gov. Chavit Singson on November 22, 1999 for P1,000,000.00; another check dated
December 9, 1999 with PNB Naga as drawee bank (Exh. A-7-j); cash deposit of P3,050,000.00 (Exh. A-7-d) on December 2, 1999;
and cash deposit of P1,000,000.00 on January 28, 2000.

In the Pedro Gil-Robinsons Branch, according to Shakira C. Yu, Ricaforte opened on January 6, 2000, a Regular Savings Account
with an initial deposit of P6,000,000.00. Other deposits consisted of: (1) check drawn by Gov. Chavit Singson for P2,965,000.00;
(2) cash deposit of P1,540,000.00 on January 25, 2000; and check drawn by Gov. Chavit Singson in the amount of P1,340,000.00.

In the T.M. Kalaw Branch, Pabillon testified that Ricaforte opened Regular Savings Account No. 0193-61496-8 and Special Savings
Account No. 02193-15050-3 on February 8, 2000, with the initial deposits in PNB Managers Check (Exh. A-9-A) in the amount of
P10,007,777.78 and cash of P1,400,000.00.

In the Scout Albano Branch, Alcaraz testified that Ricaforte opened on March 2, 2000 three accounts with initial deposits as
follows: Savings Account No. 5733-15154-3, P1,995,000.00; Special Savings Account No. 5733-0721-0, P2,000,000.00; and
Checking Account No. 5732-01-975-7, P5,000.00.

In Isidora Hills Branch, Gonzales testified that Ricaforte opened on March 15, 2000, among others, Special Savings Account No.
077090498-6 with the initial deposit of P7,000,000.00 in the form of Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co. Check drawn by Gov.
Chavit Singson payable to cash.

Bank officials, such as Salvador R. Serrano, Patrick Dee Cheng, and Carolina S. Guerrero, testified to the existence of checks paid
by Chavit Singson which landed in the accounts of persons associated with FPres. Estrada: (1) Metrobank Check No. 0000917 of
Gov. Chavit Singson for P5,000,000.00 which was deposited on February 2, 1999 in Account No. 061-0-14636-7 of Paul Gary
Bogard at Security Bank; (2) Metrobank Check No. 00138 drawn by Chavit Singson on September 29, 1999 in the amount of
P8,000,000.00 deposited in the account of Mrs. Luisa P. Ejercito; (3) Metrobank Ayala Center Check No. 000132 drawn by Gov.
Chavit Singson payable to William Gatchalian in the amount of P46,350,000.00; (4) Metrobank Check No. 001547 issued by Gov.
Chavit Singson in the amount of P1,200,000.00 which was deposited in the Account No. 0180409000-3 of Laarni Enriquez on
December 23, 1999.

The Erap Muslim Youth Foundation

The paper trail of the P200,000,000.00 deposited for the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation, Inc. incontrovertibly established that
the said sum of money came from jueteng collections through the cashier’s / managers checks purchased by Ricaforte using the
deposits in the accounts that she opened in the different branches of Equitable PCI Bank described above, as follows: Cashier’s
Check for P91,000,000.00, Scout Tobias-Timog Branch, April 13, 2000 (Exh. A-6-S); Cashier’s Check for P77,000,000.00, Diliman-
Matalino Branch, April 13, 2000 (Exh. A-7-ee); Cashier’s Check for P11,000,000.00, Pedro Gil-Robinsons Branch, April 13, 2000
(Exh. A-9-B); Manager’s Check for P3,000,000.00, Scout Albano Branch, April 12, 2000 (Exh. A-10-K); and Cashier’s Check for
P7,000,000.00, Isidora Hills Branch, April 14, 2000.

Antonio Fortuno, Bank Operations Officer of Equitable PCI Bank Pacific Star Branch, testified that the aforementioned six (6)
checks were deposited in Bearer Account No. 0279-04225-5. From the said bearer account, fourteen (14) withdrawals in
Manager’s Checks (Exh. K9 to X9 with submarkings) were made in various amounts. Each withdrawal was divided into two
deposits or a total of twenty eight (28) deposits of various amounts into the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation, as shown by the
Account Information Slips, Deposit Receipts, and Detailed Report for Transfers and Debit / Credit Memos (DRTM) (Exh. K9 to
X9 with submarkings).

Fortuno identified the Acknowledgement Letter (Exh. I9) dated April 25, 2000 addressed to Atty. Serapio from Beatriz Bagsit,
Division Head of Makati Area, acknowledging receipt of the said six (6) checks for deposit on staggered basis and on different
dates to the account of Erap Muslim Youth Foundation, Inc. at Ortigas-Strata Branch.

Aida T. Basaliso corroborated the testimony of bank officer Fortuno as to the inter-branch deposits at Equitable PCI Bank Strata
Ortigas Branch in Savings Account No. 0192-85835-6 of the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation, Inc. from the Pacific Star Branch of
the same bank in the amount of P200,000,000.00 on staggered basis.

The slew of bank documents, involving mind-boggling amounts of money and authenticated by competent and credible bank
officers, convinces the Court that collection of jueteng money for FPres. Estrada indeed took place and the entries in the ledger
were not manufactured by Gov. Chavit Singson.

Payments or disbursements of the jueteng protection money to persons related to or closely associated with FPres. Estrada belie
his denial that the funds accounted for in the ledgers belong to him. Indeed, the Court cannot see why Gov. Chavit Singson
would make such large and substantial payments in the form of checks drawn from his Metrobank account, to personalities such
as William Gatchalian, Laarni Enriquez, Loi Estrada, or other intimate associates of FPres. Estrada unless the money belonged to
FPres. Estrada and the funds were being disbursed according to his instructions. The evidence does not show why Gov. Chavit
Singson would choose Ricaforte to take over the supervision of the jueteng collection and let her deposit millions of pesos into
Ricaforte’s accounts in the different branches of the Equitable PCI Bank when Ricaforte had no prior association nor relation to
Gov. Singson and that the latter had his own trusted associates. As admitted by the accused, it was FPres. Estrada who had a
long standing and close relationship with Ricaforte and her husband. This fact would explain Ricaforte’s vital participation in the
preparation of the second set of ledgers. The said ledgers were prepared and later produced before the Senate by Ricaforte and
not by Gov. Singson.

The first set of ledgers show that P72,500,000.00 of jueteng money were handed to FPres. Estrada, alias "Asiong Salonga" from
November 1998 to July 1999. Based on the second set of ledgers, the total amount of jueteng money that FPres. Estrada
received was P112,800,000.00 from August 1999 to August 2000. For the entire duration or period covered by the 2 sets of
ledgers of the total amount of P185,300,000.00. was handed by Gov. Chavit Singson to FPres. Estrada bi-monthly. The balance,
after these amounts were given to FPres. Estrada and the deduction of expenses, were deposited by Ricaforte in her bank
accounts. Based on the two (2) sets of ledgers the total jueteng collections for FPres. Estrada from November 1998 to August
2000 amounted to P545,291,000.00. The P200,000,000.00 of these sums of money found their way into the account of the Erap
Muslim Youth Foundation.

With respect to Jinggoy Estrada, according to Gov. Singson, he was the "Jing" listed as an expense in the ledger for
P1,000,000.00. It was Gov. Singson’s testimony that FPres. Estrada (after discovering that entry) forbade Gov. Chavit Singson
from giving any further share in the jueteng protection money to Jinggoy Estrada and that it will be up to FPres. Estrada to give
Jinggoy Estrada a share. For this reason, Gov. Chavit Singson and Jinggoy Estrada hid the fact that Jinggoy Estrada was the
collector for the Province of Bulacan and that the latter was receiving P1,000,000.00. To begin with, the prosecution’s theory
that Jinggoy Estrada had to keep his participation in the jueteng collection a secret from his own father belied the allegation that
Jinggoy Estrada’s participation in the jueteng scheme was that of a principal or a conspirator. The grant of bail to Jinggoy Estrada
was anchored on this fact advanced by Gov. Singson in his very own testimony. Although prosecution witness Gov. Singson, and
the other witnesses who were under his employ, testified that there were instances that they collected or received money from
Jinggoy Estrada, there was no testimony to the effect that they saw Jinggoy Estrada subtracted his share from jueteng
collections or in any other way received a share from the jueteng collections. This Court further found it difficult to believe that
Jinggoy Estrada, who was not even a resident of Bulacan, was the collector for Bulacan. Gov. Singson associates Jinggoy Estrada
with Viceo allegedly from Bulacan. Who is Viceo? Why was Viceo not charged if it was true that jueteng collections from Bulacan
came from him before they passed the hands of Jinggoy? There was no evidence at all that the money Jinggoy Estrada turned
over to Gov. Singson or the latter’s representatives was part of the jueteng protection money collected from Bulacan or that he
received funds from a certain Viceo.
The prosecution did not also rebut the bank certification presented by the defense that Jinggoy Estrada did not have an account
with the United Overseas Bank. The certification disproved the testimony of Emma Lim that the deposit slip in the amount of
P1,000,000.00 said to be part of jueteng money was turned over to her by Jinggoy Estrada in the form of a personalized check
with his photograph, from his account at the United Overseas Bank. The gaps in the prosecution’s evidence as to Jinggoy Estrada
create uncertainty in the mind of the Court as to the participation of Jinggoy Estrada in the collection and receipt of jueteng
money. This Court had already brushed aside prosecution’s reliance on the telephone calls and billing statements for such calls
between Ricaforte and Jinggoy Estrada to prove that he was a jueteng collector for Bulacan, for being highly speculative. The
Court’s ruling remains firm to this day.

With respect to Serapio, neither Gov. Chavit Singson’s testimony nor the ledger entries proved that Serapio was involved in any
way in the collection or disbursement of jueteng protection money. Certainly, Serapio’s involvement appears to have begun and
was limited to the funds of the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation. Serapio is being charged with "laundering" or concealing a
portion of the jueteng protection money in the amount of approximately P200,000,000.00 which was deposited in the account
of the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation.

To this Court’s mind, while the P200,000,000.00 was clearly illegally amassed wealth, the evidence on record is insufficient to
prove beyond reasonable doubt that Serapio was aware that the questioned funds were in fact amassed from jueteng
protection money collections and that the fact of the unusually large amount of the deposits into the foundation’s account was
with criminal intent on the part of Serapio to "launder" or conceal the illegal nature of the funds to serve the purpose of the
acquisition or amassing of ill-gotten wealth by FPres. Estrada. The only evidence presented on this point is the uncorroborated
testimony of Gov. Chavit Singson that Serapio was present during the meeting wherein FPres. Estrada instructed the transfer of
the amount of P200,000,000.00 to the foundation. The Court has reservations as to the credibility of Gov. Singson’s assertion in
this regard because Gov. Singson failed to mention Serapio’s presence on that occasion during his testimony at the Senate
Impeachment trial. Neither can the Court consider from the single fact alone that he arranged the staggered deposit of the said
sum of money to the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation that he had a criminal intent to conceal ill-gotten wealth in furtherance of
the accumulation of such wealth by the principal accused. More so, this Court is not prepared to conclusively rule that the Erap
Muslim Youth Foundation is not a legitimate foundation or that it was set up purely to hide his illegally amassed wealth. The
incorporation papers and business permits of the Foundation are authentic and regular. The personalities behind the said
foundation appear to be well-respected academicians. Fortunately or unfortunately, the public revelation of the nature of the
P200,000,000.00 as part of jueteng protection money collected for FPres. Estrada came too soon after the organization of the
Foundation. The Court is not in a position to ascertain with moral certainty if this controversy preempted any legitimate
charitable activities it could have undertaken soon after its incorporation as it was explained by defense witnesses or whether it
was as the prosecution asserted a money laundering entity. Premises considered, it is difficult to presume any criminal intent on
the part of Serapio to conceal or launder jueteng protection money in order to contribute to the amassing and accumulation of
ill-gotten wealth by FPres. Estrada in connection with the transfer of the P200,000,000.00 to the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation,
notwithstanding that the evidence on record demonstrate indisputably that the said sum of money form part of ill-gotten wealth
obtained though the predicate acts charged in sub-paragraph (a) of the Amended Information.

RE: SUB-PARAGRAPH B OF THE

AMENDED INFORMATION
_____________________________

(b) by DIVERTING, RECEIVING, misappropriating, converting OR misusing DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, for HIS OR

THEIR PERSONAL gain and benefit, public funds in the amount of ONE HUNDRED THIRTY MILLION PESOS
[P130,000,000.00], more or less, representing a portion of the TWO HUNDRED MILLION PESOS
[P200,000,000.00] tobacco excise tax share allocated for the Province of Ilocos Sur under R.A. No. 7171, BY
HIMSELF AND/OR in CONNIVANCE with co-accused Charlie ‘Atong’ Ang, Alma Alfaro, JOHN DOE a.k.a. Eleuterio
Tan OR Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, and Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas, AND OTHER JOHN DOES AND JANE
DOES;

I. EVIDENCE FOR THE PROSECUTION

GOVERNOR LUIS "CHAVIT" CRISOLOGO SINGSON also testified to prove the second charge in the amended Information
involving the diversion of excise taxes under Republic Act (RA) No. 7171. [TSN dated July 29, 2002, pp. 78-80] According to Gov.
Singson, Ilocos Sur was not getting its rightful share as a beneficiary of the excise tax. He reminded FPres. Estrada of his
campaign promise that he would release all the funds to Ilocos Sur in advance, amounting more or less to Four Million Pesos
(P4,000,000.00) including interest. FPres. Estrada promised to comply but he said that because of the huge election expenses he
hoped that Gov. Singson would help. Since, Gov. Singson was afraid not to get the funds, he said: "Why not?" when FPres.
Estrada asked: "How much?" Gov. Singson replied "Maybe Ten Percent (10%) of what you can release." FPres. Estrada instructed
Gov. Singson to prepare his request and he will approve it. Gov. Singson brought the request addressed to Secretary Diokno of
the Department of Budget and Management (DBM). FPres. Estrada wrote a marginal note on the request addressed to the DBM
with instruction to approve it. The original of the letter was submitted to Secretary Diokno. Gov. Singson produced in court a
Xerox copy with the original stamp mark of receipt dated 8/7. The marginal note reads: "Aug. 3, ’98. To Secretary Ben Diokno,
Please see if you can accommodate the request of Governor Singson" (Exh. Q8 and submarkings). [Ibid, pp. 81-96]

According to Gov. Singson, Jinggoy Estrada and Atong Ang kept on following up the release of the money from DBM. A notice of
funding check issued (Fund 103 dated August 25, 1998) (Exh. R8) was received by Gov. Singson. Gov. Singson immediately
informed Jinggoy Estrada and Atong Ang. The latter told Gov. Singson that the President needed One Hundred Thirty Million
Pesos (P130,000,000.00). Gov. Singson was surprised because their agreement was only ten percent (10%). Atong told him there
will be billions of pesos, so they should be the first one to deliver to FPres. Estrada and thus be the strongest and more
influential (to the Former President). Gov. Singson then caused the preparation of a Provincial Board resolution appropriating
the sum of Two Hundred Million Pesos (P200,000,000.00). The Board approved the appropriation of One Hundred Seventy
Million Pesos (P170 Million) for the flue curing barn and Thirty Million Pesos (P30,000,000.00) for infrastructure. Atong Ang gave
Gov. Singson three (3) names to whom the money would be sent, which they did. Landbank Vigan transferred One Hundred
Thirty Million Pesos (P130,000,000.00) to Landbank Mandaluyong which credited the accounts of the three (3) persons named
by Atong Ang as follows: Account No. 0561043-38, Alma Alfaro, August 27, 1998, P40,000,000.00; Account No. 0561-0445-97,
Delia Rojas, August 28, 1998, P50,000,000.00; and Account No. 0561-0446-00, Eleuterio Tan, August 28, 1998, P40,000,000.00.
The total amounted to P130,000,000.00.

The above data were contained in a certification of Landbank Branch Head Ma. Elizabeth Balagot (Exh. S8). [Ibid, pp. 96-108]
Gov. Singson did not personally know Delia Rajas, Alma Alfaro or Eleuterio Tan. In a photograph (Exh. V8), Gov. Singson identified
Jojo Uy as the Eleuterio Tan who showed up at the bank to withdraw the money. Jojo Uy, according to Gov. Singson was very
close to FPres. Estrada. [Ibid, pp. 109-110]

Gov. Singson narrated that Atong Ang called him up from his mother’s house and asked Gov. Singson to go there where they will
wait for the money. Gov. Singson went to the house of Atong Ang’s mother at 10:00 o’clock in the morning and waited there
until 3:00 to 4:00 o’clock in the afternoon. When the money arrived, Gov. Singson noticed that Atong Ang left some money in
the house. Atong Ang and Gov. Singson boarded Atong Ang’s vehicle, and Gov. Singson’s vehicle with the security and driver
followed them. At the corner near the house of FPres. Estrada at Polk St., Atong Ang asked Gov. Singson to alight from his
vehicle so that it would not be obvious to the people in the vicinity. Gov. Singson alighted from the vehicle and saw Atong Ang’s
car entered inside the house of FPres. Estrada. Atong Ang was the one driving the car. After 15 to 20 minutes, Gov. Singson
followed Atong Ang to the house of FPres. Estrada. Gov. Singson then met the First Lady, Dr. Loi Estrada who thanked Gov.
Singson, saying "Chavit, thank you very much we really needed it." Gov. Singson took the money which he and Atong Ang
brought. [Ibid, pp. 111-114] When FPres. Estrada came out, Gov. Singson asked him how much Atong Ang gave him. FPres.
Estrada answered Seventy Million Pesos (P70,000,000.00). Gov. Singson informed him that the total amount was One Hundred
Thirty Million Pesos (P130,000,000.00). FPres Estrada got mad at Atong Ang who explained that he gave Twenty Million Pesos
(P20,000,000.00) to Dr. Loi Estrada, and Fifteen Million Pesos (P15,000,000.00) to Jinggoy Estrada. Atong Ang found it hard to
explain the remaining Twenty Five Million Pesos (P25,000,000.00). [Ibid, pp. 114-116]

Gov. Singson frequented the house of FPres. Estrada. At one time, the latter asked him again to make a request for the excise tax
allocation which he will approve. Gov. Singson explained that the release of the money must be continued in big amount so that
they could cover up the One Hundred Thirty Million Pesos (P130,000,000.00). FPres. Estrada agreed but he did not give the
billions promised. Hence, Gov. Singson could not cover up the (P130,000,000.00). When told by Gov. Singson that the
Commission on Audit (COA) was "pestering" them, FPres. Estrada asked Gov. Singson to cover it up in the meanwhile. The
amount of Forty Million Pesos (P40,000,000.00) out of the One Hundred Thirty Million Pesos (P130,000,000.00) was paid to the
supplier of the flue curing barn which were delivered by the supplier and inaugurated by FPres. Estrada as shown by the pictures
taken on that occasion (Exhs.T8 and U8). The flue curing barn was needed by the tobacco farmers to save time and money.
[Ibid, pp. 116-121]

Gov. Singson referred to the inaugural speech of FPres. Estrada where the latter stated "walang kama-kamaganak, walang kai-
kaibigan, walang kumpa-kumpadre". Gov. Singson said after what happened that it would mean even friends should pay to
FPres. Estrada. [Ibid, pp. 122-124]

Gov. Singson demonstrated in Court, from the witness stand up to the door of the courtroom and back in more or less twenty
(20) seconds, that he, who had smaller built than Atong Ang, could carry a box containing Twenty Million Pesos (P20,000,000.00)
in demonetized bills from the Central Bank in One Thousand Pesos (P1, 000.00) denomination each. There were twenty bundles
of One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) per bundle inside the box. The distance between the witness stand and the door of the
courtroom was thirteen (13) meters. [Ibid, pp. 124-135] The box carried by Gov. Singson weighed more than ten (10) kilos and
five bundles of cash amounting to P5,000,000.00 weighed 4.8 kilos. [Ibid, pp. 172-173]

JAMIS BATULAN SINGSON (Jamis) further testified that he, Gov. Singson, his escort Federico Artates, and Driver Faustino
Prudence, left the office of Gov. Singson on August 31, 1998 to fetch Atong Ang in his office at Pinaglabanan. They all proceeded
to the house of the mother of Atong Ang. Gov. Singson and Atong Ang went inside the house while the rest waited outside.
Later, Atong Ang, Gov. Singson and William Ang, the brother of Atong Ang, went out. Gov. Singson instructed them to
accompany William to Westmont Bank, Shaw Boulevard. Jamis, Artates, William Ang and the driver of Atong Ang rode the
Mitsubishi Van owned by Atong Ang. William Ang went inside the bank and after 3 hours came out with Jojo Uy and two security
guards carrying two boxes each or a total of four (4) boxes. Jojo Uy was a family friend of Atong Ang, whom Jamis often saw in
the office of Atong Ang. Jamis identified Jojo Uy in a photograph (Exh. V8). Each of the boxes were brown in color, with a length
of more than ten (10) inches, height of twelve (12) inches and thickness of eight (8) to ten (10) inches. [TSN dated September 18,
2002, pp. 38-55] Jamis and Artates each brought two (2) boxes inside the vehicle and went back to the house of the mother of
Atong Ang, with an armored van following them. The four boxes were brought inside the house where Gov. Singson and Atong
Ang were seated on a sofa. After lunch, Jamis saw the men of Atong Ang loading something in the vehicle of Atong Ang.

Gov. Singson boarded the car of Atong Ang and instructed Jamis to just follow them to FPres. Estrada’s house at Polk Street in
Greenhills, but they were instructed by Gov. Singson to wait at the corner. William Ang earlier informed them that the boxes
contained money for FPres. Estrada. Jamis did not actually see the money. After an hour, Gov. Singson asked to be fetched from
FPres. Estrada’s house. [Ibid, pp. 59-68]

MARIA ELIZABETH GOZO BALAGOT testified that she was the Manager of Land Bank Vigan Branch from August 3, 1998 to
December 31, 2000 and had over-all supervision and control of the accounts of said Branch.

According to witness Balagot, on August 27, 1998, Land Bank Vigan Branch received a Facsimile of Inter-Office Debit Advice (Exh.
L18 and submarkings) dated August 27, 1998 from Land Bank Malacañang Branch with instruction to credit Current Account No.
04021045-70 of the Provincial Government of Ilocos Sur the amount of Two Hundred Million Pesos (P200,000,000.00). Land
Bank Vigan Branch complied with the instruction and correspondingly sent an Inter-Office Credit Advice (Exh. M18 and
submarkings). Later in the afternoon of August 27, 1998, authorized (Exh. N18) representatives from the Office of the Provincial
Governor of Ilocos Sur, namely, Maricar Paz and Marina Atendido, presented Check No. 0000097650 (Exhs. O18 and P18 and
submarkings) dated August 27, 1998 in the amount of One Hundred Seventy Million Pesos (P170,000,000.00) issued to the order
of Luis "Chavit" Singson accompanied by an Accountant’s Advice for Local Check Disbursement (Exh. Q18 and submarkings) dated
August 27, 1998.

Witness Balagot confirmed that on August 27, 1998, the Provincial Administrator of Ilocos Sur called up Land Bank Vigan Branch
requesting for encashment of the One Hundred Seventy Million Pesos (P170,000,000.00) that had been credited to the account
of the province. She asked for three (3) days for encashment as a matter of bank policy but since the Provincial Administrator
told her the money is immediately needed, she suggested for them to apply for a demand draft payable and encashable in Land
Bank Makati Branch. Maricar Paz advised witness Balagot that the demand drafts should be payable to Delia Rajas, Alma Alfaro,
Nuccio Saverio, and Eleuterio Tan, although she was not given the reason why the drafts had to be issued in their names. She
never received any call from FPres. Estrada instructing her as to the said names.

On August 28, 1998, witness Balagot called up Gov. Singson to inform him that Delia Rajas and Eleuterio Tan were trying to
deposit their demand drafts in Westmont Bank and the governor responded that it was okay with him. She made a second call
to the governor in the afternoon to inform him of the presence of Delia Rajas and Eleuterio Tan in Land Bank Shaw Branch and
they were insisting that the checks be encashed there. Witness Balagot informed the governor that she could not accept the
encashment at the said branch, but Gov. Singson told her to do what they wanted. She testified that she called the governor
instead of Maricar Paz because she knew for a fact that the one giving instructions to Maricar Paz was the governor himself.

Witness Balagot then advised Land Bank Shaw Branch to cancel the demand drafts and the amounts covered will just be coursed
through the individual accounts by inter-branch transaction. Witness Balagot then prepared an Inter-Branch Transaction Advice
for Eleuterio Tan (Exh. Z18) and Delia Rajas (Exh. Y18) and credited the amount of Forty Million Pesos (P40,000,000,00) and Fifty
Million Pesos (P50,000,000.00) to their respective accounts. The cancelled demand drafts were returned to Land Bank Vigan
Branch with a Memorandum (Exh. A19) dated August 31, 1998. The demand draft issued to Nuccio Saverio, on the other hand,
was encashed in Land Bank Makati Branch.

Witness Balagot also identified and affirmed her Sworn Affidavit (Exhibit B19 and submarkings) dated November 6, 2000 relative
to the foregoing facts. [TSN dated January 20, 2003 and TSN dated January 22, 2003]

MARIA CARIDAD MANAHAN RODENAS was the cashier at Land Bank Shaw Branch. She testified that she knew a person by the
name of Alma Alfaro as the authorized representative of valued clients, Mrs. Catalina Ang and Yolanda Uy, and as an account
holder of the branch. [TSN, November 4, 2002, pp. 13-16] According to witness Rodenas, Alfaro claimed to be an employee of
Power Express and that Power Express was owned by Catalina Ang. [TSN, November 11, 2002, pp. 21-25]

Witness Rodenas testified that on August 27, 1998, she assisted Alma Alfaro open her own savings account with the branch with
an initial deposit of One Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00) (Exh. H13). Alfaro presented her school ID (Exh. F13-2) and SSS card (Exh. F13-
1) as valid IDs and personally accomplished the signature card (Exh. G13). Alfaro indicated her business address to be c/o Power
Express and residence address as Capt. Savy Street, Zone IV-A, Talisay, Negros Occidental. After complying with requirements,
Alfaro told witness Rodenas that Forty Million Pesos (P40,000,000.00) coming from Land Bank Vigan Branch will soon be
credited to her account. [TSN, November 4, 2002, pp. 16-27] True enough, Forty Million Pesos (P40,000,000.00) from Land Bank
Vigan Branch was credited online to Alfaro’s newly created account. When Alfaro told witness Rodenas that she wanted to
withdraw the money right away, the latter told Alfaro to just come back the following day as she will still have to prepare the
money. Witness Rodenas then requested from Land Bank’s Greenhills Cash Center the amount of Forty Six Million Pesos
(P46,000,000.00) to cover the amount needed by Alfaro as well as to cover other withdrawals for the day as shown by the Fund
Transfer Request (Exh. I13).

When Alma Alfaro returned to the bank on the following day, she proceeded to withdraw Forty Million Pesos (P40,000,000.00)
(Exh. J13) in cash from her account. [TSN, November 4, 2002, pp. 27- 43] In that same afternoon, Alma Alfaro asked witness
Rodenas to help her two friends, whom she introduced as Eleuterio Tan and Delia Rajas, with their demand drafts. Delia Rajas
brought two demand drafts, Demand Draft No. 099435 in the amount of Thirty Million Pesos (P30,000,000.00) (Exh. L13) and
Demand Draft No. 09936 in the amount of Twenty Million Pesos (P20,000,000.00) (Exh. K13). Eleuterio Tan’s Demand Draft, on
the other hand, was in the amount of Forty Million Pesos (P40,000,000.00) (Exh. M13).

Witness Rodenas testified that Tan and Rajas asked that they be accommodated in Land Bank Shaw Branch because they
considered it too risky to encash their demand drafts in the cash department in Buendia, Makati and thereafter to bring it back
to Mandaluyong since they were from Mandaluyong. [TSN, November 11, 2002, p. 136] After examining the demand drafts
presented, witness Rodenas advised Rajas and Tan that she could not accommodate their request because Land Bank Shaw
Branch was not the paying unit of the drafts and that she did not have the amount with her at that time. Due to their insistence,
however, witness Rodenas conferred with Elizabeth Balagot and Lawrence Lopez, the Branch Manager and Branch Accountant
of Land Bank Vigan Branch, who told her to just cancel the demand drafts and let Rajas and Tan open accounts with their branch
so that they could credit the amounts online. [TSN, November 4, 2002, pp. 44-51]

Eleuterio Tan presented two IDs (Exh. N13) and accomplished a specimen signature card (Exh. O13) and cash deposit slip (Exh. P13)
for One Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00). Witness Rodenas identified Eleuterio Tan in a picture (Exh. F9). Delia Rajas also presented
two IDs (Exh. Q13) and accomplished a specimen signature card (Exh. R13) and deposit slip (Exh. S13) for One Thousand Pesos
(P1,000.00).

Witness Rodenas sent the cancelled demand drafts by facsimile to Land Bank Vigan Branch and after sometime the Vigan Branch
credited online the proceeds of the demand drafts to the newly created accounts of Tan and Rajas. The original of the demand
drafts were later returned to the Vigan Branch. [TSN, November 11, 2002, p. 133] Tan and Rajas then accomplished withdrawal
slips (Exh. T13 & Exh. U13) to withdraw Forty Million Pesos (P40,000,000.00) and Fifty Million Pesos (P50,000,000.00), respectively.
Thereafter, Eleuterio Tan filed three (3) applications for cashier’s check (Exhs. W13, V13 & X13) causing Land Bank Shaw Branch to
issue THREE (3) cashier’s checks (Exhs. W13-1, V13-1 & X13-1) in his name in the amount of Thirty Million Pesos (P30,000,000.00)
each. The three (3) cashier’s checks were later deposited at Westmont Bank, Mandaluyong Branch to Savings Account No. 2011-
00772-7. [TSN, November 4, 2002, pp. 52-91]

SPO2 FREDERICO APENES ARTATES was a policeman since 1988. At the time of his testimony, he was assigned at the Vigan City
Police Station but detailed to Gov. Singson as security escort.

Witness Artates testified that on August 31, 1998, he was in the office of Gov. Singson at the LCS Building in San Andres Bukid,
Manila, together with Gov. Singson, Jamis Singson and driver Faustino Prudencio. According to him, Gov. Singson instructed
them to go to the apartment of Atong Ang’s mother and while there they accompanied William Ang, Atong’s brother to
Westmont Bank at Shaw Boulevard, Mandaluyong City where they got four (4) boxes of cash from the said bank and returned
back to the house of Atong Ang’s mother and later on proceeded to FPres. Estrada’s house at Polk Street. He described each of
the boxes to be 10 inches in length, 12 inches in height 15 inches in width [TSN, September 25, 2002, pp.90-107]. [TSN dated
September 25, 2002]

ILONOR ANDRES MADRID testified that she was the Chief of License Section, Operations Division, Land Transportation Office.
Madrid presented and identified certifications dated January 2, 2001 (Exh. I11) and December 6, 2000 (Exh. D9) pertaining to the
data in the driver’s license of Victor Jose Tan Uy, and identified computer generated photographs of Victor Jose Tan Uy (Exhs.
J11 & D9-1). [TSN, October 9, 2002, pp. 127-148]

GWEN MARIE JUDY DUMOL SAMONTINA was the Assistant Vice-President and Head of Records and Information Management
Center of the Social Security System (SSS) since January 1998. She was the official records custodian of the SSS and in-charge of
ensuring that all records received by the branches were archived.

Witness Samontina brought with her the Social Security Form E-1 (Exh. V11-1 and sub markings) filed by Delia Ilan Rajas. This
form showed that her address was No. 48 Calbayog Street, Mandaluyong, Metro Manila and SSS number was 33-2365508-7.
Witness also brought several SSS Form R-1 and R1-A filed by the employers of Rajas with SSS namely (1) Admate Company, Inc.,
(2) Energetic Security and Specialists, Inc. (3) Jetro Construction and Development Inc., (4) Power Management and Consultancy
Inc. The forms (Exhs. W11, X11, & Y11, and sub markings) filed by Admate Company, Inc. showed the company address to be No. 46
Calbayog Street, Mandaluyong, Metro Manila. The first R1-A Form filed on December 8, 1994 showed Rajas as the only
employee. The R1-A Form filed on May 6, 1998 showed that Rajas as listed as one of the employees. The forms were
accomplished by the employer’s representative and treasurer, Yolanda A. Uy. The forms submitted by Energetic Security and
Specialists, Inc. (Exhs. Z11 and A12, with sub markings) showed the business address to be No. 46 Calbayog Street, Mandaluyong,
Metro Manila. The forms showed that Charlie T. Ang and Delia Rajas appeared as employees. The forms were accomplished by
Ma. Rosanie U. Ang. The Form R-1 (Exh. B12, with sub markings) of Jetro Construction and Development, Inc. filed on October 9,
1990 showed that it had two employees. This document was accomplished by Yolanda Ang. Its Form R1-A (Exh. C12, with sub
markings) filed on March 15, 1995 showed that it had 18 employees, including Delia Rajas. The address is still No. 46 Calbayog
Street, Mandaluyong, Metro Manila and it was prepared by Yolanda A. Uy. The forms (Exhs. D12, E12 & F12, with sub markings) of
Power Management and Consultancy Incorporation were received by SSS on June 8, 2000. It had an office address at 188
Captain Manzano Street, Corner N. Domingo, San Juan, Metro Manila. Among the officers listed were Charlie T. Ang, Nerissa S.
Ang, and William T. Ang. Delia Rajas appeared as one of its employees. [TSN, October 23, 2002, pp. 25-60]

II. EVIDENCE FOR THE DEFENSE

During his testimony, accused FORMER PRESIDENT JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA vehemently denied that he asked Gov. Singson
to give him part of Ilocos Sur’s share on the tobacco excise tax imposed by Republic Act No. 7171; that when he was approached
by Gov. Singson regarding the said share of his province, he told Singson to make a formal request, and that Singson already had
a prepared request (Exh. Q) to which FPres. Estrada wrote his marginal note addressed to then Budget Secretary Diokno, stating:
"Please see if you can accommodate".

FPres. Estrada explained that he could not have alluded to his election expenses because contributions to his 1998 Presidential
Campaign were overflowing; that he rejected many contributions which kept pouring in as it was the case with a very popular
candidate like him; that he even asked his party treasurers to distribute campaign funds to their candidates for Mayor,
Congressman and Governor, that Gov. Singson got a big share of the campaign funds, that Gov. Singson’s testimony on the
percentage he allegedly asked for was a lie as he would not take away funds intended for farmers and that in fact during his
term as President he rejected an offer of Fourteen Million Dollars (US $14,000,000) for him to sign a sovereign guaranty; that he
did not know Alma Alfaro, Eleuterio Tan or Mr. Uy, and Delia Rajas, that being the President, he could not have conspired with
Delia Rajas whom he heard was a cook; that he met Charlie "Atong" Ang sometime in 1993 or 1994, when the latter was
introduced to him by his friend, Jojo Antonio; that he was not that close to Ang; that Atong Ang never went to his house at Polk
Street, Greenhills, San Juan to deliver money from the excise tax as testified to by Gov. Singson; that the garage in his house
could not accommodate Atong Ang’s vehicle since the Presidential Car was parked there and there were security arrangements
if he was at home and that Gov. Singson was merely passing the blame to him because he would not help Gov. Singson with his
problem with the Commission on Audit. [TSN, March 22, 2006, pp. 63-113]

On March 29, 2006, FPres. Estrada testified that Atong Ang did not go to his residence at Polk Street, Greenhills nor at
Malacañang except when Atong Ang attended the wedding of his daughter; that in the reenactment at the Bangko Sentral, it
was shown that One Thirty Million Pesos (P130,000,000.00) in bills could not fit into four (4) boxes contrary to the testimony of
Gov. Singson, and that the weight of the said sum of money was equivalent to two and one half sacks of rice which could not be
carried by one person.

FPres. Estrada disclaimed any knowledge of Prosecution’s Exhibits "A19", "X18" and "Y18" and also Landbank check dated August 27,
1998 for Forty Million Pesos (P40,000,000.00) and Gov. Singson’s September 3, 1998 letter to Elizabeth Balagot, Landbank
Manager of Vigan Branch in Ilocos Sur. He also testified that the Notice of Funding Check Issued, Fund 103 dated August 25,
1998 signed by DBM Secretary Benjamin Diokno addressed to the Provincial Governor of Ilocos Sur, [Exh. R8] did not reach the
Office of the President.

According to FPres. Estrada, he did not know, nor have seen, Alma Alfaro, the person mentioned in the certification that inter-
branch deposits made by the provincial government of Ilocos Sur from August 27 to 28, 1998, particularly on August 27, 1998 to
Account No. 0561-0445-38 in the name of said Alma Alfaro in the amount of Forty Million Pesos (P40,000,000.00). He said that
he saw her for the first time only during the Impeachment Trial. [TSN, March 29, 2006, pp.42-49] He also did not know, nor have
seen, Delia Rajas and Eleuterio Tan, the owners of the bank accounts at Land Bank Shaw Branch who were recipients of the
online credit from Land Bank Vigan Branch on August 28, 1998 in the amounts of Fifty Million Pesos (P50,000,000.00) and Forty
MiIlion Pesos (P40,000,000.00) respectively [TSN, ibid, pp.50-51]. The persons shown in the photographs marked as
prosecutions Exhibits "F", "G9", and "T8" were not known to him. He was able to identify the photograph marked as Exhibit "U8"
which was the inauguration of the flue-curing plant in Ilocos Sur, which he later on learned was a mere show-off ("pakitang tao")
because the project did not push through.
FPres. Estrada likewise denied any knowledge of prosecution’s exhibits presented to identify Victor Jose Uy (a.k.a. Eleuterio Tan)
(Exhs. "N9", "N13", "T11" & "J"); Delia Rajas (Exhs. "V", "W", "H", "H13", "Y", "Y-3", "Z11", "A12", "B12-4", "C12", "D12" & "Q13") and Alma
Alfaro (Exhs. "F12" & "F13"). [TSN, March 29, 2006, pp.59-68,79,80]

FPres. Estrada likewise disclaimed any knowledge of prosecution’s exhibits regarding the P130,000,000.00 excise tax share of
Ilocos Sur [Exhs. H13, I13, J13, K13, M13, L13, O13, P13-1, R13, S13, E13, U13, V13, V13-1, W13, W13-1, X13, X13-1, Y13, Z13, M17, N17, O17, P17, Q17,
R17, S17, L18, M18, N18, O18, P18, Q18, R18, S18, T18, B19, Z18. [TSN, March 29, 2006, pp.76-95]

FPres. Estrada also belied Gov. Singson’s testimony of that he ordered Gov. Singson to cover up his unliquidated cash advances
by countering that Gov. Singson tried to cover up his own cash advances as the Commission on Audit was already going after
him and he wanted to pass the blame to FPres. Estrada. [TSN, March 29, 2006, pp. 98-100] When he learned about the Two
Hundred Million Pesos (P200,000,000.00) excise tax share of Ilocos Sur, he instructed then Justice Secretary Artemio G. Toquero
to investigate the matter. Secretary Toquero, in turn, referred the matter to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). After one
week, NBI Regional Director Carlos Saunar submitted a report through a Memorandum dated October 20, 2000 (Exh. 199) to
Secretary Toquero. Director Saunar also submitted to FPres. Estrada a December 12, 2000 letter (Exh. 201); another document
(Exh. 204) addressed to Secretary Toquero on the subject – Governor Luis Chavit Singson, et al. for malversation of public funds
– Twenty Million Pesos (P20, 000,000.00) and for violation of Section 3 (a) of Republic Act No. 3019; an affidavit of Agustin D.
Chan, Jr. (Exh. 202) and to which is an attached letter dated December 3, 2000 of Agustin T. Chan, Jr. (Exh. 202-D) with attached
certification (Exh. 206-C) demanding that Gov. Singson settle his outstanding cash advance in the amount of One Hundred
Million Pesos (P100,000,000.00) and Twenty Million Pesos (P20,000,000.00) under Check Nos. 98397 and 42364 dated
December 29, 1999 and March 19, 1999, pursuant to paragraph 9.1 and 9.3.3.3 of COA Circular No. 97-002 and Section 89 of
P.D. No. 1445; an affidavit of Elizabeth Arabello dated January 12, 2001 (Exh. 205); a document entitled "WP, item Singson cash
advances" (Exh. 208), which details the unliquidated cash advances of Gov. Singson at year end 1999 amounting to One Hundred
Thirty Five Million Five Hundred Eighty Four Thousand Eight Hundred Eighteen Pesos and Seventeen Centavos
(P135,584,818.17); and NBI Disposition Form, Subject Results of Evaluation and Evidence in Support of COA Reports on the
provincial government of Ilocos Sur for the years 1997 and 1998 (Exh. 198), stating that the amount of Four Hundred Thirty Five
Million One Hundred Ninety Thousand Two Hundred Ninety Eight Pesos (P435,190,298.00) was spent by Gov. Singson on the
Tomato Paste Plant which COA found to be a non-functioning and non-operational project and to have incurred the loss of more
than Twenty Million Six Hundred Fifty-five Thousand and Seventy-four Pesos (P20, 655, 074.00) as of June 30, 1998 [TSN, March
29, pp.106-131] and that there were ELEVEN (11) other cases of unsettled, unliquidated or dissolved cash advances of Gov.
Singson which included the One Hundred Seventy Million (P170,000,000) unliquidated cash advances for the purchase of
equipment for the Tobacco Flue Curing Plant involved in this case. [TSN, ibid, pp.143-144]

FPres. Estrada narrated that Director Saunar informed him that the case against Gov. Singson was clear and should be filed right
away with the Office of the Ombudsman. Director Saunar gave him a copy of the complaint–affidavit of the NBI (Exh. 200, 200-N,
200-0, 200-P, 200-Q) recommending the filing of the appropriate charges against Gov. Singson and other Ilocos Sur provincial
officials among others for the non-delivery of the supplier NS International, Inc. of the equipment for the flue curing barn and re-
drying plant in the amount of One Hundred Seventy Million Pesos (P170,000,000.00) (Exh. 200-R). [TSN, March 29, 2006, pp. 7-
18] However, Gov. Singson was granted immunity from criminal prosecution and Gov. Singson was able to pass on the case
against FPres. Estrada by implicating the latter as the one who ordered him and testifying against him. [TSN, ibid, pp.19-25]

The last time FPres. Estrada talked to Gov. Singson was when he stopped over at San Francisco USA for a speaking engagement
on his way to an official visit to Washington he was surprised that Gov. Singson who was not a member of his delegation fetched
him at the airport. After his speaking engagement, he went up to his room where Congressman Asistio and Gov. Singson had a
big problem with the COA in Ilocos Sur because the provincial auditor did not want to cooperate with him. Gov. Singson asked
FPres. Estrada to help transfer the said auditor, which request he refused because COA is an independent constitutional body.
Gov. Singson insisted that FPres. Estrada call the COA Chairman to interfere in his behalf. He reminded Gov. Singson that he
should not look after himself but he should protect the name of the Office of the President. Gov. Singson then abruptly stood up
and grudgingly left. FPres. Estrada came to know of the name of the COA provincial auditor during the Senate Blue Ribbon
Committee hearing and he was Atty. Agustin Chan who testified at the hearing and demanded that Gov. Singson liquidate his
cash advances. Later, FPres. Estrada read from the newspaper that Chan was ambushed and killed in a town in Ilocos Sur.
[TSN, ibid, pp.31-44]

ATTY. AGATON S. DACAYANAN was the State Auditor of the Commission on Audit (COA) assigned at the Province of Ilocos Sur
for the years 1995 to 1999. He examined, audited and settled all accounts of the Province of Ilocos Sur based on the documents
submitted by, and gathered from the Provincial Accountant, Provincial Treasurer, Budget Officer and other officials who have
access to the financial transactions of the provincial government. He submitted Annual Audit Reports at the end of every year.

Witness Dacayanan then presented and identified the Annual Audit Reports for the years ended December 31, 1995 (Exh. 187
and submarkings); December 31, 1996 (Exh. 188 and submarkings); December 31, 1997 (Exh. 189 and submarkings); and,
December 31, 1998 (Exh. 190 and submarkings). [TSN dated September 20, 2004, TSN dated Septebmer 22, 2004 and TSN dated
September 29, 2004]
BONIFACIO M. ONA was Director III of COA and the Officer-In-Charge of its Special Audit Office. Witness Ona testified that one
of his duties as OIC of the Special Audit Office was to transmit the Report prepared by their audit teams to the different auditing
units and as such he had the chance to review as to its form the Special Audit Report for the Province of Ilocos Sur for the period
1999 (SAO Report No. 99-31) (Exh. 191 and submarkings), which he presented to the Court by virtue of a subpoena duces tecum,
and after which he transmitted the same to the Governor of Ilocos Sur. [TSN dated October 4, 2004]

ELVIRA JAVIER FELIX was State Auditor IV of the COA. Witness testified that she was the Officer-in-Charge of the Provincial
Auditor’s Office from October 5, 2001 to July 31, 2002, and she presented and identified Annual Audit Reports for the Province
of Ilocos Sur for the years ended December 31, 2001 (Exh. 192 and submarkings), and December 31, 2002 (Exh. 193 and
submarkings).

Witness Felix also presented and identified copies of the Annual Audit Reports of the Province of Ilocos Sur for the years ended
December 31, 1999 (Exh. 194 and submarkings) and December 31, 2000 (Exh. 195 and submarkings) which she secured from the
Provincial Auditor’s Office, and which were prepared during the term of then Provincial Auditor Atty. Agustin Chan who was
killed in an ambush on October 4, 2001. [TSN dated October 4, 2004 and TSN dated October 6, 2004]

ELIZABETH M. SAVELLA was an Auditor of the Corporate Government Sector of the COA. Savella testified that she was assigned
previously with the Special Audit Office of the Commission of Audit and was designated in 1999 as the Team Leader of a Special
Audit Team that conducted a special audit of the Province of Ilocos Sur for the period from 1996 to 1999. Being the Team
Leader, witness Savella was the one assigned to consolidate all the audit findings submitted by the team members to come up
with the audit report. The said audit report was SOA Report No. 99-31 (Exh. 191 and submarkings).

Witness stated that the scope of the audit was the financial transaction and operation of the Province of Ilocos Sur for the
period 1996 to 1999. They looked, particularly, into the utilization of R.A. 7171 funds and the utilization of the PNB loan
specifically the implementation of the Tomato Flue Curing Plant Project, stating that the audit aims to evaluate the regularity of
the implementation of the province’s projects. [TSN dated October 6, 2004 and TSN dated October 11, 2004]

CONGRESSMAN LUIS A. ASISTIO testified that he knows Gov. Singson and met him several times. He said that on July 24, 2000,
he accompanied Gov. Singson to see FPres. Estrada at his room at the Fairmont Hotel at San Francisco, California where Gov.
Singson requested FPres. Estrada to call the Chairman of the Commission on Audit to ask for the relief of the Auditor assigned to
his province to which FPres. Estrada declined.

Asistio clarified that in the many meetings he had with Gov. Singson during the period late August to September 2000, they
never talked about alleged receipt of monies from R.A. 7171 and he knew of these issues only during the Impeachment Trial. He
thinks that these are mere figments of Gov. Singson’s imagination since they never talked of anything except the provincial
leadership.

Gov. Singson also did not mention the name of accused Mayor Jinggoy Estrada. He added that Gov. Singson at one time went to
his house when there was an ongoing rally at Makati prior to the press conference and told him that he (Gov. Singson) does not
consider FPres. Estrada as his friend anymore.

Asistio added that he watched the Impeachment Trial against FPres. Estrada and thinks that it is a farce because in all their
conversations, Gov. Singson never mentioned about R.A. 7171 nor talked about jueteng, except probably when he said "kunin
na nilang lahat huwag lang yung liderato".

Asistio stated that in his visits to Malacañang during the time of FPres. Estrada, at least three times a week, he never saw Atong
Ang there because Atong Ang was banned by FPres. Estrada from entering Malacañang. [TSN dated October 11, 2004 and TSN
dated October 13, 2004]

CARLOS P. SAUNAR was Regional Director of the National Bureau of Investigation. In October 2000, he was the Chief of the Anti-
Graft Division of the NBI, assuming the position from 1997 or 1998 up to July 2001, and as such was tasked to investigate the
public disclosures made by then Gov. Singson as per instructions of then NBI Director Federico Opinion, who was, in turn,
directed by then Justice Secretary Artemio G. Tuquero in a Memorandum dated October 10, 2000 (Exh. 199 and submarkings).

In the conduct of their investigation, Saunar and his team of investigators secured documents from the COA, such as, the Audit
Reports of the Provincial Government of Ilocos Sur and the Schedule of Unliquidated Cash Advances, and subpoenaed the
concerned public officials and employees of the Province of Ilocos Sur. [TSN, October 13, 2004, pp. 67-69]

After evaluating the reports and evidence, witness submitted an Evaluation Disposition Form (Exh. 198 and submarkings) dated
16 October 2000 which made mention of 11 cases (Annex A of Disposition Form) (Exh. 198-B) of irregularities that were assigned
to different teams for investigation. [TSN, October 13, 2004, pp. 80, 84]
The result of Saunar’s investigation on the P170,000,000.00 alleged unliquidated cash advances of Governor Singson and some
other cash advances was contained in a Revised Report of Investigation which became the subject of a Complaint-Affidavit (Exh.
200 and submarkings) dated 10 January 2001 signed by Carlos S. Caabay, then acting Director, NBI, filed with the Office of the
Ombudsman. Witness explained that the Revised Report of Investigation traced the P170,000,000.00 from its source up to its
liquidation. [TSN, October 13, 2004, p. 96]

Saunar testified that they made a record check and searched, as requested by the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, for the
whereabouts of accused Alma Alfaro, accused Eleuterio Tan and accused Delia Rajas but failed to locate them. [TSN, October 13,
2004, pp. 107-110] The NBI filed two (2) other cases involving cash advances of the Gov. Singson with the Office of the Secretary
of Justice, one of which is contained in a case transmittal (Exh. 201 and submarkings) dated 12 December 2000 addressed to
Honorable Artemio G. Tuquero relating to the P100,000,000.00 cash advance of Gov. Singson and supported by a Report of
Investigation dated 12 December 2000 (Exh. 201-B). The other case transmittal (Exh. 204 and submarkings) they filed with the
Department of Justice on December 14, 2000 was in connection with the cash advance of Gov. Singson in the amount of
P20,000,000.00, and supported by another Report of Investigation dated 14 December 2000 (Exh. 204-B). In all the
investigations conducted by the NBI on the cash advances of Gov. Singson, Saunar said that they prepared an analysis, "WP-
Singson Cash Advance" (Exh. 208 and submarkings) (WP stands for working paper), and that based on the working paper, Gov.
Singson had accumulated cash advances of Three Hundred Five Million Six Hundred Thousand Pesos (P305,600,000.00) between
the period January 1997 to January 2000. From this total, the amount of P170,015,181.83 appears to have been settled, leaving
a balance of unliquidated cash advances of Gov. Singson of P135,584,818.70 as of January 2000. [TSN, October 25, 2004, pp. 53-
54]

The amount of P163,663,636.27 as appearing in the working paper, which was also the subject matter of the complaint-affidavit
filed with the Ombudsman (Exh. 200), is supposed to be the amount that was the settlement of the cash advance of
P170,000,000.00 less 30% withholding tax supposed to be remitted to the BIR. The P170,000,000.00 pesos came from the
P200,000,000.00 representing the share of the Province of Ilocos Sur from the excise taxes collected pursuant to R.A. 7171 that
was released by the DBM. The P170,000,000.00 was then cash advanced by Gov. Singson from the account of the Province of
Ilocos Sur in LBP Vigan Branch, wherein a certain Marina Atendido deposited the amount of P40,000,000.00 in favor of the
account of Alma Alfaro at the LBP Shaw Boulevard Branch through an inter-branch accommodation. The same was withdrawn in
cash by Alma Alfaro. [TSN, October 25, 2004, pp. 57-63]

As to the remaining P130,000,000.00, four (4) demand drafts were applied for by Maricar Paz, one of which was issued in favor
of Luccio Saberrio in the amount of P40,000,000.00 which was withdrawn in LBP Makati, where the amount of P35,000,000.00
was deposited to another savings account (the account number is indicated in the demand draft) in the same LBP Makati while
the P5,000,000.00 was cashed. The second demand draft pertains to another P40,000,000.00 pesos in favor of Eleuterio Tan
which was negotiated at the LBP Shaw Boulevard Branch but was cancelled, and in lieu of this, the corresponding amount was
wire transferred from LBP Vigan to LBP Shaw Boulevard. The two remaining demand drafts pertain to Delia Rajas, one in the
amount of P20,000,000.00 and the other in the amount of P30,000,000.00, and were negotiated in LBP Shaw Boulevard but
were also cancelled, the corresponding total amount of P50,000,000.00 was then wire transferred and deposited to the account
of Delia Rajas in LBP Shaw Boulevard. [TSN, October 25, 2004,, pp. 64-70]

Saunar reiterated that they conducted an in-depth investigation of the expose’ made by Gov. Singson, which includes alleged
violations on the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices, malversation of public funds and violation of R.A. 4200, pursuant to the
memorandum issued by the Secretary of Justice. However, their investigation so far has not reached the point of illegal jueteng
or illegal gambling. They did not conduct an in-depth investigation on the activities of Mr. Atong Ang and FPres. Estrada because
they have not reached that point where the evidence would show that they have participated. [TSN, October 25, 2004, pp. 102-
104]

However, they already filed a complaint-affidavit dated January 10, 2007 which referred to the One Hundred Seventy Million
Pesos (P170,000,000.00) that was cash advanced by Gov. Singson based on the evidence they gathered so far in their
investigation.

Saunar further testified that on November 2000, Director Opinion directed him to accommodate interviews on the result of their
investigation in connection with the P170,000,000.00 alleged cash advance of Gov. Singson which was done in his office when he
was still the Chief of the NBI Anti-Graft Division, and the result of which appeared in a VCD. [TSN, November 3, 2004, pp. 18, 26-
27]

[TSN dated October 13, 2004, TSN dated October 25, 2004, TSN dated October 27, 2004 and TSN dated November 3, 2004]

BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS (BSP) OCULAR INSPECTION

On May 25, 2005, the Court conducted another ocular inspection at the Money Museum of the BSP upon the request of the
accused Estradas. The Court observed that if the P130,000,000.00 were all in P1000.00 denominations and divided into 130
bundles with each bundle consisting of 1000 pieces of P1000.00 peso bills amounting to P1 Million pesos, only a maximum of 20
bundles amounting to P20 Million pesos would fit in a box (Exh. X-Ocular Inspection), with an inner or interior dimensions of 12
inches width, 10 inches height and 15 inches length which measurement was given by prosecution witnesses Artatez and a
certain OJ Singson during their testimony. Thus, the P130 Million pesos would fit in 6 and ½ boxes.

If the P130,000,000.00 were in P500.00 denominations and divided into 260 bundles with each bundle consisting of 1000 pieces
of P500.00 bills amounting to P500,000.00, the P130,000,000.00 pesos would fit in 13 boxes.

A Certification issued by the BSP that the P1,000,000.00 pesos in P1000.00 bills would weigh about just under a kilo has already
been submitted by the accused in the previous hearing. [TSN dated May 25, 2002, pp. 10-11]

FINDINGS OF FACT

Re: Sub-paragraph (b) of the Amended Information

With respect to the predicate act of divesting, receiving or misappropriating a portion of the tobacco excise tax share allocated
for the Province of Ilocos Sur, this Court finds that indeed an amount of P130,000,000.00 out of the P200,000,000.00 share in
tobacco excise taxes of the Province of Ilocos Sur was withdrawn from the provincial coffers and misappropriated and misused
to the damage and prejudice of the said province.

The evidence presented before this Court establish beyond doubt that Gov. Singson initiated the process that eventually led to
the allocation and release of funds by the national government to the Province of Ilocos Sur of the amount of P200,000,000.00
from the excise tax imposed pursuant to Republic Act No. 7171. As chief executive of the Province of Ilocos Sur, Gov. Singson
personally handed a letter to FPres. Estrada requesting the release of Ilocos Sur’s share in the tobacco excise taxes [Exh. Q8] to
pin him on his campaign promise to the people of Ilocos Sur during the 1998 Presidential Elections. FPres. Estrada, through a
marginal note on Gov. Singson’s letter, endorsed the request to then Sec. Benjamin Diokno of the Department of Budget and
Management (DBM) [Exh. Q8-1]. The DBM released the amount of P200,000,000 to the Province of Ilocos Sur as its share in
tobacco excise taxes as shown in the Notice of Funding Check Issued, Fund 103 dated August 25, 1998 signed by DBM Sec.
Benjamin Diokno and addressed to the Provincial Governor of Ilocos Sur [Exh. R8]. Gov. Singson forthwith caused the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Ilocos Sur to enact a Resolution appropriating the sum of P200,000,000.00, of which
P170,000,000.00 was intended for flue-curing barns and P30,000,000.00 for infrastructure. Gov. Singson caused the release of
P170,000,000.00 from the said fund as shown by the Authorization he issued to Maricar Paz and Marina Atendido, employees of
his office to officially transact with Land Bank Vigan Branch, in behalf of the Provincial Government of Ilocos Sur dated August
27, 1998 [Exh "N18"], Check No. 0000097650 dated August 27, 1998 issued to the order of Luis "Chavit" Singson in the amount of
P170,000,000.00 [Exhs. O18 and P18], and an Accountant’s Advice for Local Check Disbursement dated August 27, 1998 [Exh. Q18].
This amount, however, was broken down into smaller amounts and deposited/transferred to the accounts of individuals
identified with or known associates of Atong Ang, namely Alma Alfaro, Delia Rajas and Eleuterio Tan, as shown by a certification
of Land Bank Vigan Branch Manager Ma. Elizabeth Balagot [Exh. S8], Demand Draft Application Nos. 656 and 712 in the name of
Delia Rajas [Exhs. R18 and S18], Demand Draft Application No. 734 in the name of Eleuterio Tan [Exh. T18], and Demand Draft
Application No. 722 in the name of Nuccio Saverio [Exh. U18], and the four demand drafts issued pursuant thereto [Exhs. V18, K13,
L13 and M13]. A fifth demand draft in the name of Gov. Singson was inexplicably cancelled albeit the amount covered by it was
deposited in the account of Alma Alfaro through an Inter-Branch Deposit Accomodation Slip [Exh. X18] as instructed by Maricar
Paz to Land Bank. The demand drafts issued to Delia Rajas and Eleuterio Tan were similarly cancelled and the amounts of
P40,000,000.00 and P50,000,000.00 covered by the demand drafts were deposited in the accounts of Eleuterio Tan and Delia
Rajas, respectively, at Land Bank Shaw Branch. Alma Alfaro’s P40,000,000.00 was withdrawn by her in cash a day after it was
deposited in her account at Land Bank Shaw Branch on August 27, 1998 [TSN, November 4, 2003, pp. 27-43]. On the other hand,
Tan and Rajas withdrew on the same day P40,000,000 and P50,000,000, respectively, from their accounts and Tan used the
proceeds to buy Three (3) cashier’s check in the amount of P30,000,000 each or a total of P90,000,000 [Exhs. W13-1, V13-1 & X13-
1]. The Three (3) cashier’s check were deposited in Savings Account No. 2011-00772-7 at Westmont Bank, Mandaluyong Branch
[Ibid, pp. 52-91]. The P40,000,000.00 originally covered by the demand draft in the name of Gov. Singson which was cancelled
and subsequently withdrawn by Alma Alfaro was not shown to have been deposited at Westmont Bank. Who profited from this
sum of money? The Court can only surmise given the dearth of even the prosecution’s evidence on what happened to the
money after it was received by Alma Alfaro. Significantly, it appears that of the P170,000,000.00 appropriated by the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Ilocos Sur for flue-curing barns only the amount of P40,000,000.0 went to the supplier of the flue-
curing barn, Nuccio Saverio who encashed his demand draft at Land Bank Makati Branch. Saverio could collect only the said
amount in view of the testimony of Gov. Singson that he delivered only one module of flue curing barns costing P40,000,000.00.

According to Jamis Singson and Artates, they accompanied William Ang, the brother of Atong Ang, to Westmont Bank to
withdraw money but they just waited outside the bank. They helped carry the four (4) boxes to the vehicle when William and
the security guards brought the said boxes outside the bank. Thereafter, they joined William transport the boxes to the home of
Catalina Ang, and later to the residence of FPres. Estrada at Polk Street. Jamis and Artates were told by William Ang that the
boxes contained money for FPres. Estrada.

The prosecution’s evidence that only the amount of P90,000,000.00 was deposited in Westmont Bank created a loophole in the
impression given by the testimony of Gov. Singson that he and Atong Ang were supposed to bring the P130,000,000.00
withdrawn from Westmontbank to the residence of FPres. Estrada. The Court can only speculate that this could have been the
reason why during the Ocular Inspection at the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) the amount of P130,000,000.00 could not fit
the four (4) boxes described by Gov. Singson and the other prosecution witnesses.

There are also gaps in the prosecution’s evidence on the alleged delivery to FPres. Estrada of the diverted funds or a portion
thereof. It was not established how much cash was allegedly stashed in the boxes that came from Westmont Bank and which
were unloaded/reloaded at the house of Catalina Ang or how much cash was in the boxes allegedly brought to FPres. Estrada’s
house. No one testified that he saw cash being handed to FPres. Estrada, Sen. Loi Estrada or Jinggoy Estrada. Serious doubts are
engendered by the bare testimony of Gov. Singson, the prosecution’s star witness, who, by his own account, did not even touch
the boxes of money, nor count the money inside the boxes that arrived at the home of Catalina Ang and allegedly reloaded for
delivery to Polk Street. Gov. Singson did not also see the alleged turnover of the money by Ang to FPres. Estrada, Dr. Loi Estrada
or Mayor Jinggoy as he stayed at the corner of Polk Street, so many meters away from the highly fenced and gated house of
FPres. Estrada. The Court finds it queer that Gov. Singson would stay only at the corner of the street where FPres. Estrada’s
residence is located instead of accompanying Ang to witness the delivery of money that, according to him, was important to him
and his constituents in Ilocos Sur. Only Atong Ang could have credibly testified on the alleged delivery of money but the
prosecution did not present him as a witness, despite his plea of guilt to a lower offense and his admission that he partook of
P25,000,000.00 of the P130,000,000.00 of the excise tax share of Ilocos Sur. This Court could not admit without corroborating
evidence Gov. Singson’s bare testimony that FPres. Estrada purportedly got mad that Atong Ang gave him only P70,000,000.00
and that Atong Ang had given P20,000,000.00 and P15,000,000.00 to Dr. Loi Estrada and Mayor Jinggoy respectively. In this
Court’s view, certain details of Gov. Singson’s testimony on this point are rather incredible and far-fetched. Gov. Singson had not
offered any explanation why and how Atong Ang had the temerity or the guts to divide the money among FPres. Estrada and the
members of the First Family and decide by himself the amount of their respective shares without prior clearance of FPres.
Estrada, then the highest executive official of the land.

Furthermore, the record is bereft of evidence to confirm Gov. Singson’s testimony that FPres. Estrada was interested in the
diversion of tobacco excise taxes or that there was an agreement between Gov. Singson and FPres. Estrada that 10% of any
amount released to the Province of Ilocos Sur would be turned over by Gov. Singson to FPres. Estrada. Gov. Singson’s
statements that Atong Ang and Mayor Jinggoy kept following up the release of the money and that Atong Ang informed Gov.
Singson that FPres. Estrada wanted not just 10% but P130,000,000.00 of the P200,000,000.00 are likewise uncorroborated.
Regarding the testimony of Gov. Singson implicating Jinggoy Estrada in the commission of the predicate act mentioned in sub-
paragraph (b), the Honorable Supreme Court early enough had clarified the import of the charge against accused Jinggoy Estrada
under the Amended Information in this manner:

xxx       xxx       xxx Sub-paragraph (b) alleged the predicate act of diverting, receiving or misappropriating a portion of
the tobacco excise tax share allocated for the Province of Ilocos Sur, which Act is the offense described in item [1] in the
enumeration in Section 1 (d) of the law. This sub-paragraph does not mention petitioner (Jinggoy Estrada) but instead
names other conspirators of the Former President. [Jose "Jinggoy" Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 148965, supra,
p. 553]

The recent decision in People of the Philippines vs. Sandiganbayan (Special Division) and Jose "Jinggoy" Estrada (G.R. No.
158754, promulgated August 10, 2007) which upheld this Court’s Resolution granting bail to Jinggoy Estrada, has explained the
essence and import of the above-quoted ruling:

Obviously hoping to maneuver around the above ruling so as to implicate individual respondent for predicate acts
described in sub-paragraphs (b), (c) and (d) of the Amended Information, petitioner now argues:

It should be emphasized that in the course of the proceedings in the instant case, respondent Jinggoy Estrada
waived the benefit of the said ruling and opted, instead, to participate, as he did participate and later
proceeded to cross examine witnesses whose testimonies were clearly offered to prove the other constitutive
acts of Plunder alleged in the Amended Information under sub-paragraphs "b", "c", and "d".

We disagree.

At bottom, the petitioner assumes that the ruling accorded "benefits" to respondent Jinggoy that were inexistent at the
start of that case. But no such benefits were extended, as the Court did not read into the Amended Information, as
couched, something not there in the first place. Respondent Jinggoy’s participation, if that be the case, in the
 proceedings involving sub-paragraphs "b", "c", and "d", did not change the legal situation set forth in the aforequoted
portion of the Court’s ruling in G.R. No. 148965. For when it passed, in G.R. NO. 148965, upon the inculpatory acts
envisaged and ascribed in the Amended Information against Jinggoy, the Court merely defined what he was indicted
and can be penalized for. In legal jargon, the Court informed him of the nature and cause of the accusation against him,
right guaranteed an accused under the Constitution. In fine, all that the Court contextually did in G.R. No. 148965 was
no more than to implement his right to be informed of the nature of the accusation in the light of the filing of the
Amended Information as worded. If at all, the Court’s holding in G.R. No. 148965 freed individual respondent from the
ill effects of a wrong interpretation that might be given to the Amended Information.

The mere fact that FPres. Estrada endorsed Gov. Singson’s request for release of funds to the then DBM Secretary for review
does not indicate any undue interest on the part of FPres. Estrada in the grant of Gov. Singson’s request. The tenor of the
marginal note itself was simply for the DBM Secretary to "see if [he] can accommodate the request of Governor Singson."
Finally, not a scintilla of evidence links FPres. Estrada to any of the obscure personalities who withdrew the P130,000,000.00,
namely, Delia Rajas, Alma Alfaro, and Eleuterio Tan and to any of the official bank documents that made possible the diversion
and misappropriation of the aforesaid public funds.

In sum, the paper trail in relation to the P130,000,000.00 diverted tobacco excise taxes began with Gov. Singson and ended with
Atong Ang. This Court does not find the evidence sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt that FPres. Estrada or any
member of his family had instigated and/or benefited from the diversion of said funds.

RE: SUB-PARAGRAPH C OF THE

AMENDED INFORMATION
_____________________________

(c) by directing, ordering and compelling, FOR HIS PERSONAL GAIN AND BENEFIT, the Government Service
Insurance System (GSIS) TO PURCHASE, 351,878,000 SHARES OF STOCKS, MORE OR LESS, and the Social
Security System (SSS), 329,855,000 SHARES OF STOCK, MORE OR LESS, OF THE BELLE CORPORATION IN THE
AMOUNT OF MORE OR LESS ONE BILLION ONE HUNDRED TWO MILLION NINE HUNDRED SIXTY FIVE
THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED SEVEN PESOS AND FIFTY CENTAVOS [P1,102,965,607.50] AND MORE OR LESS SEVEN
HUNDRED FORTY FOUR MILLION SIX HUNDRED TWELVE THOUSAND AND FOUR HUNDRED FIFTY PESOS
[P744,612,450.00], RESPECTIVELY, OR A TOTAL OF MORE OR LESS ONE BILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FORTY SEVEN
MILLION FIVE HUNDRED SEVENTY EIGHT THOUSAND FIFTY SEVEN PESOS AND FIFTY CENTAVOS
[P1,847,578,057.50]; AND BY COLLECTING OR RECEIVING, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, BY HIMSELF AND/OR IN
CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, COMMISSIONS OR PERCENTAGES BY REASON OF SAID
PURCHASES OF SHARES OF STOCK IN THE AMOUNT OF ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY NINE MILLION SEVEN HUNDRED
THOUSAND PESOS [P189,700,000.00], MORE OR LESS, FROM THE BELLE CORPORATION WHICH BECAME PART
OF THE DEPOSIT IN THE EQUITABLE-PCI BANK UNDER THE ACCOUNT NAME "JOSE VELARDE

Under paragraph (c) of the Amended Information, accused FPres. Estrada was charged with the crime of plunder, for having
willfully, unlawfully and criminally acquired, amassed or accumulated and acquired ill-gotten wealth in the amount of
P189,700,000.00 representing commissions or percentages by reason of the purchase of shares of stock of Belle Corporation by
SSS and GSIS.

The gravamen of this specific charge is whether FPres. Estrada, unjustly enriched himself at the expense and to the damage and
prejudice of the Filipino people and the Republic by receiving a commission of P187 Million as consideration for the purchase by
SSS and GSIS of Belle Shares. Even if the Prosecution is able to establish that FPres. Estrada used his official position, authority,
relationship and influence and directed, ordered and compelled Carlos A. Arellano (then President of the SSS) and Federico C.
Pascual (then President of GSIS) for SSS and GSIS to buy Belle shares with money of the GSIS and SSS which are held in trust by
the said institutions for the millions of employees of the government and the private sector, such fact alone does not constitute
an overt or criminal act, the commission of which would warrant a conviction for plunder. Prosecution must establish that, in
consideration of the purchase by GSIS and SSS of the Belle Shares, FPres. Estrada received the amount of P189,700,000.00 as
commission.

In discharging its burden of proof that FPres. Estrada directed, ordered and compelled, for his personal gain and benefit, the
GSIS to purchase 351,878,000 shares of stock more or less, and the SSS to purchase 329,855,000 shares of stock more or less, of
the Belle Corporation in the amount of more or less One Billion One Hundred Two Million Nine Hundred Sixty Five Thousand Six
Hundred Seven Pesos And Fifty Centavos (P1,102,965,607.50) and more or less Seven Hundred Forty Four Million Six Hundred
Twelve Thousand And Four Hundred Fifty Pesos (P744,612,450.00), respectively, or a total of more or less One Billion Eight
Hundred Forty Seven Million Five Hundred Seventy Eight Thousand Fifty Seven Pesos And Fifty Centavos (P1,847,578,057.50),
the prosecution presented its principal witnesses in the persons of Arellano, Pascual, Ocier and Capulong.
EVIDENCE FOR THE PROSECUTION

WILLY NG OCIER (Ocier) was the Vice Chairman and Director of Belle Corporation on June 24, 1999. He testified that SSI
Management, a company created by Roberto Ongpin was the Selling stockholder of Belle shares totaling 650,000,000. [TSN
January 9, 2002, p.94] Roberto Ongpin, in his personal capacity, originally gave an option to Mark Jimenez to purchase these
650,000,000 shares of Belle [Ibid., pp. 67- 68] because Roberto Ongpin at that time granted (sic) to transform Belle Corporation
into the foremost gaming company in the Philippines, and he wanted somebody to help him "acquiring (sic) licenses to do Jai-
Alai and to do Super Sabong, Bingo, Casino, etc., etc." [Ibid. pp. 71 and 72] and Mr. Roberto Ongpin whom he held in high
regard, told him that Mark Jimenez was a very close friend of FPres. Estrada. [Ibid. p. 84] The option was given as an incentive
for Mark Jimenez as a favor to Roberto Ongpin. [Ibid. p. 88] Mark Jimenez was not able to exercise the option because Ongpin
was ousted from the Board of Belle on June 15, 1999. [Ibid. p. 90]

After a meeting of the Board of Directors of Belle Corporation on July 20, 1999 (Exh. P), when Dichaves asked Ocier about the
option given by Ongpin to Mark Jimenez and if the option can be given to him, Ocier told Dichaves that the option cannot be
given anymore because of the fact that the shares are intended to be sold in light of a recent call for unpaid subscription. [TSN,
January 7, 2002, p. 17] The Board of Director of Belle Corporation decided to make a call for payment of unpaid subscriptions to
raise money to address the debt problem of the Corporation. [TSN, October 1, 2001, p. 79] When asked what can be done in
relation to the Belle shares, Ocier explained to Dichaves that he needs the latter’s help in selling the Belle shares to cover for the
75 per cent unpaid subscription and the two of them basically agreed to divide the work wherein Ocier would contact his foreign
brokers to sell the shares and Dichaves will contact his local counterparts or contacts if he can sell the shares locally. [TSN,
January 7, 2002, p.18]

Ocier further testified that overtime (sic) the market was not very strong, so the foreign brokers took quite a while to make
decisions about their action of buying Belle shares. [Id.] In a subsequent meeting with Dichaves, Ocier testified that Dichaves
confirmed to him that there was a good chance that GSIS and SSS may be willing to buy the Belle shares and when he asked
when the shares can be transacted he was assured by Dichaves that the latter had taken up the matter already with FPres.
Estrada and that Dichaves told him that the Former President had already spoken to Carlos Arellano of SSS and Ding Pascual of
GSIS about the said matter. [Ibid. p. 19]

After a few weeks, Dichaves called Ocier and told the latter that the transaction may be pushing through but that Dichaves
wanted to take up a matter of condition that was proposed for the transaction to push through which was to the effect that
Ocier will have to give a commission for the transaction to push through. [Ibid .pp. 20-21] Ocier testified that since the shares
involved was approximately 600,000,000 to 650,000,000 and the price of Belle at that time at about P3.00 per share, the total
expected proceeds of the sale was almost Two Billion Pesos (P2,000,000,000.00) and the commission that Jaime was asking for
amounted to Two Hundred Million Pesos (P200,000,000.00). [Ibid. p. 23]

When asked to whom the commission should be given, Ocier answered that according to Dichaves, the condition was being
imposed by FPres. Estrada. [Ibid. p. 26] When asked for his reaction to the information conveyed by Dichaves that it was FPres.
Estrada that imposed the condition, Ocier testified that his reaction was that he felt that it was quite a big amount of
commission to be paid and that normally, in real estate and stock transactions, commissions range between three (3) to five (5)
percent only and he told Dichaves that he finds that quite high [Ibid. p. 34], to which Dichaves answered that "that was the
condition." [Ibid. p. 36] When asked what his answer was to the answer of Dichaves that that was the condition, Ocier answered
that he was constrained to agree because Dichaves told him that "that was the only way for the transaction to push through."
[Id.] Ocier further testified that on October 21, 1999, Belle shares totaling 447,650,000 were sold by SSI Management to GSIS
and SSS through Eastern Securities Development Corporation [Ibid. p. 39; Exh. Q; Q-1; Exh. T] while other Belle Shares were sold
through other brokers. [TSN dated January 14, 2002, p. 20]

CARLOS ALMARIO ARELLANO (Arellano) was appointed Chairman and President of SSS on July 1, 1998 by FPres. Estrada. [TSN,
November 7, 2001, p. 49] The transaction with Belle was initiated on October 6, 1999. He got a call from FPres. Estrada and was
told: "Gusto ko kayo ni Ding Pascual ay tignan ninyo ang pagbili ng Belle Corporation sa stock market. [Ibid. pp. 75- 77] He
thought that the words "tignan ninyo" was an instruction for him. [Ibid. p. 80] After the instruction, he asked the people in the
Investment Department of SSS to take a look and review the shares of Belle as an investment item in the portfolio of SSS and
also to find out to what extent the SSS can further increase the SSS position in the said stock. [Ibid. p. 82]

As far as the Investment Committee was concerned, they agreed that Belle is still possible investment for the SSS. [Ibid. p. 94] In
answer to the instruction of the President he said "Opo, opo." [Id.] He got a call from FPres. Estrada the week after and he was
asked to see the President at Malacanang. [Ibid. p. 95] At Malacañang, he saw FPres. Estrada with Jaime Dichaves. While he was
there he approached the FPres. who stood up and took him aside and asked whether this time, he had followed FPres.
instructions to buy Belle shares. He replied: "Tinitignan pa po ng Investment committee namin." [Ibid. pp. 97, 104] He did not
immediately buy the Belle shares because he felt that it was not the proper timing and the volume that was being considered
was too much and not yet the proper time. [Ibid. p. 102] When he answered this to the Former President, he recalled that the
reaction of the Former President was to tell him "Bilisan ninyo na, bilisan." [Ibid. p. 107] Upon receiving these instructions, he
still did not do anything for a few days after. [Ibid. p. 115] After several days, he received another call from FPres. Estrada and he
repeated "Bilisan mo, bilisan ninyo na. [Ibid. p. 124] As far as he was concerned, it was more serious than previous orders given
to him. [Id.] On October 21, the SSS implemented the transaction. [TSN dated November 7, 2001, p. 110]

FEDERICO CALIMBAS PASCUAL (Pascual) was the President of GSIS in 1999, testified that he had a meeting with FPres. Estrada
on September 6, 1999 and in that meeting, he was instructed by the FPres. Estrada to buy Belle Shares. It was only in October 9,
1999 when he ordered his people to buy Belle Shares because First: he was hoping that the President was not serious in his
September 6, 1999 instruction and he was hoping the President would forget his instruction. [TSN, November 22, 2001, p. 20]
Second, because he was not very comfortable with Belle because some people are of the opinion that Belle Shares, because the
corporation is involved in jai-alai and gambling, is "speculative flavor." [Id.]

In another telephone conversation with FPres. Estrada on October 9, 1999, he felt that the President was more serious in his
instructions in the sense that, he was away and there was this telephone call and he felt that FPres. Estrada was already
agitated. [Ibid. p. 24] In the telephone call, he was asked by FPres. Estrada "bakit hindi ka pa bumibili ng Belle" to which he
replied "tatawag ho ako sa head office at papa-aralan ko." [Ibid. pp. 56-57]

When he returned to the Philippines on October 21, 1999, he learned that GSIS had purchased 351,000,000 Belle Share worth
P1,100,000,000.00 as shown by the investment committee confirmation report.

On cross-examination, he testified that his purpose in executing his affidavit was to remove from the minds of the doubting
public that he benefited from the Belle Shares. [Ibid. p. 48; Exh. O to O-4] The alleged money making that intervened or
supervened in the purchase of Belle Shares was not included in his affidavit because the purpose was to show how GSIS
purchased shares of Belle on the instruction of the Former President. [Ibid. p. 54] The purchases of Belle Shares were made
when he was abroad. FPres. Estrada gave him the instructions to buy and he also made instructions to his people to buy, that
was the chain of events. [Ibid. pp. 68; 74] He authorized the purchase of Belle Shares only if Belle was a qualified share. [Ibid. p.
69] If he did not make that call to the people in GSIS about the Former President’s instruction, there was probably no possibility
of GSIS acquiring Belle Shares during that period of time beginning October 13 to October 21. [Ibid. p. 77] Except for the
instruction, there was nothing irregular, illegal or anomalous about the transaction and he does not know whether somebody
benefited from the purchase of Belle Shares that took place between October 13 to 21. [Ibid, p. 83]

RIZALDY TADEO CAPULONG (Capulong) was the Deputy Chief Actuary and Assistant Vice-President of the Securities Trading and
Management Department of the Social Security System (SSS). He headed the Actuary Department which was responsible in
making long term and short term projections of the revenues and expenditures of SSS. As AVP of the Securities Trading and
Management Department, Capulong was in charge of providing research and operational support to top SSS offices with regard
to equities and investment.

Capulong testified that he made the recommendation which cost the SSS P1,300,000,000.00 because per his research,
evaluation and verification, it was a profitable transaction. He had gone into the validity and legality of the acquisition of the
Belle Shares and he was convinced that they were all proper, legal and beyond reproach. He signed the recommendation and
submitted it for approval of the Executive Management Committee and then for the approval of the Social Security Commission.
Capulong clarified that it was an approval for allocation not for funding. For SSS to be able to acquire shares of their corporation,
it was necessary that there was an approval for an allocation. SSS had the amount of money but it was not reserved for Belle
transactions even with the approval of the recommendation. The money will only be identified and allocated at the time of
transaction. [TSN dated February 6, 11, 13, and 18, 2002]

EVIDENCE FOR THE DEFENSE

REYNALDO PASTORFIDE PALMIERY (Palmiery) was the Senior Executive Vice-President and the Chief Operating Officer and
Member of the Board of Trustees of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS). Palmiery was the Chairman of the
Investment Committee of the GSIS in 1998 to 2000. The Investment Committee discusses the new proposals for investment
which were elevated by the Corporate Finance Group of the GSIS. The process is that the Finance Corporate Group first studies
and evaluates stocks which are not yet qualified and accredited to be purchased and elevates this to the Investment Committee
for discussion, and if it is approved by the Investment Committee then it is elevated to the board for approval.

Palmiery testified that the GSIS had been trading all Belle Shares in 1993. The first acquisition of GSIS then was about 18 million
shares, or 5% of the outstanding stocks of Belle Corporation, and that the GSIS booked an aggregate trading gain of
P145,859,195.95 on the purchase of Belle Shares alone (Exh. 236 and submarkings).

Palmiery then presented and identified a Joint Counter-Affidavit which the members of the Investment Committee filed with the
Office of the Ombudsman. He confirmed the statement contained in the last paragraph of the joint affidavit that the Investment
in Belle Shares was made solely on the basis of the compliance with the law and GSIS internal guidelines. Palmiery was not
aware of any phone call made by FPres. Estrada to Pascual. He further explained that the acquisition of the Belles Shares was
pursuant to the directive of General Manager Pascual. Palmiery related that he received a call from Pascual and instructed him
to review and study the prospects of Belle Corporation with the end objective to purchase shares of stock of the said
corporation up to the limit allowed under the existing guidelines of GSIS. The evaluation was pursued and approved.

On cross-examination, Palmiery admitted that under GSIS Resolution No. 284 series of 1992, General Manager Pascual was given
the sole authority to trade in stocks listed or traded in the two (2) major stocks exchange, and under GSIS Resolution No. 273, he
was granted the continuing authority to buy Belle Shares. Resolution No. 273 was then amended in 1998 by the GSIS providing
for the continuing authority for the President and General Manager as well as the Executive Vice President and the Senior Vice
President for Corporate Finance to purchase and sell stocks traded in the Stocks Exchange at prevailing prices.

On re-direct examination, Palmiery testified that when General Manager Pascual called and instructed him to purchase Belle
Shares the number of shares to be purchased was specified to be within the limits of the GSIS Guidelines which was the number
of shares equivalent to one board seat or 10% of the outstanding shares whichever is higher. [TSN dated December 13, 2004 and
TSN dated January 24, 2005]

HON. HERMOGENES DIAZ CONCEPCION (Conception) was a Retired Associate Justice of the Supreme Court and Chairman of the
Board of Trustees of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS).

Concepcion testified that he was familiar with the Belle Resources and Shares of Stocks, and confirmed the veracity and accuracy
of the statement in paragraph 10 of his Affidavit. With respect to the acquisition that took place on October 13 to 21, 1999,
witness Concepcion explained that the President/General Manager of the GSIS has full authority to buy and sell shares listed in
the stock exchange of the amounts within the boundary set forth by the Board of Trustees. So, the President buys and sells
these securities without the Board knowing what he did because decisions have to be made sometimes on the spot in order to
get a better margin. Paragraph 16 (2) of the Counter-Affidavit was checked with the records of the GSIS, the Committee in
charge of the investment, and the amounts made by the GSIS on these shares, P145,859,195.94, was furnished to them. Witness
Concepcion explained that during the period from 1993 to 2000, the GSIS would buy shares then sell them, buy shares then sell
them, and by that process, the GSIS made P145 Million as profit or actual gain. Witness also stated that paragraph 16 (9) which
refers to the purchase of 351,878,000 shares was based on the records of the GSIS.

Concepcion also testified that then President and General Manager Federico Pascual never told them that FPres. talked to him
nor discussed to the witness the alleged directive or pressure brought upon him by FPres. Estrada. There was no need to ask
Federico Pascual why he bought shares because there is the presumption that our functions are regularly performed. [TSN dated
December 8, 2004]

MERCEDITAS GARCIA GACULITAN (Gaculitan) was the Corporate Secretary of the Social Security Commission (SSS). Gaculitan
testified that before these investments in Belle Resources Corporation were made prior approval of the investment by the
Commission en banc were obtained since all purchases and all investments are required to be approved or passed upon by the
Social Security Commission. [TSN dated December 13, 2004]

Accused FORMER PRESIDENT JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA testified on his own defense. The relevant portions of his testimony
are set forth below.

The purchase of Belle Shares according to accused FPres. Estrada

In the Memorandum for FPres. Estrada, the defense stated that under this indictment, the Prosecution incur the bounden duty
to prove:

1. accused Estrada’s acts constitutive of directing, ordering and compelling the GSIS and SSS to buy Belle Shares;
2. the purchase were made solely due to the said acts of compulsion by accused Estrada;
3. the extent and parameter of Estrada’s acts relative to the questioned purchases;
4. the alleged profit commission is government fund or money; and
5. damages to the government or People of the Philippines.

The Defense claims that the prosecution’s evidence itself shows that (1) the transaction complained of was perfectly valid, since
accused FPres. Estrada did not direct, order or compel SSS and GSIS to buy Belle Shares and (2) there is no proof that any
commission was paid to the accused. [Defense Memorandum, p. 192]

To bolster its claim that the purchase of Belle Shares was a perfectly valid transaction, the Defense pointed to the following
portions of Arellano’s testimony:
 1. That the purchase of Belle Shares was a routine transaction in the regular course of business, for SSS had
previously purchased Belle Shares at profit;
2. What was told by FPres. Estrada to Arellano was simply to initiate the acquisition of Belle Shares. How many
shares he was ordered to buy and at how much price per share, was never dealt with in the phone
conversation;
3. The above notwithstanding, Arellano proceeded on his own volition with the acquisition of the 249 Million
Belle Shares.
4. The Decision to purchase was exclusively his and the policy making body of SSS.
[Ibid. pp. 193-194, citing TSN, November 8, 2001, pp. 63, 73-74, 75-76]

The Defense argues that the reason why Arellano testified in the manner he did and executed an affidavit implicating FPres.
Estrada in the instant plunder case notwithstanding that there was nothing irregular, illegal or anomalous in the October 21,
1999 acquisition of Belle Shares was because his testimonies and affidavit are his last ditch effort to exculpate himself from
possible plunder charges where he may be detained without bail considering that plunder is a capital offense. [Ibid. p. 197]

Likewise, the Defense cited the testimony of Capulong who testified that he examined and audited all the acquisition papers and
the various confirmation slips and official receipts covering the acquisition and found them to be in order. Hence he had no
objection to, but on the contrary, approved the payment of the said acquisition. Said witness also testified that as far as he was
concerned, there was nothing illegal or irregular or anomalous in the SSS purchase of Belle Shares in October 21, 1999 and that
it was a legal investment and a valid investment that is in the list of investment of SSS. That it is not an irregular investment and
it is said that it might be somewhat not ordinary in the sense that in this case there was a call. [Ibid. p. 198, citing TSN,
November 14, 2001, p. 53]

Insofar as the acquisition by GSIS of Belle Shares, the Defense argued that the purchase by GSIS was in accordance with
investment policy and rules.

The Defense sought to establish that the Belle Shares were qualified under GSIS policy and charter and GSIS may by itself and in
accordance with its rules, purchase Belle Shares without the need of any order or compulsion from anybody as shown by the
testimony of Pascual, the President of GSIS when he admitted that even way back in 1993, GSIS had been purchasing or dealing
with Belle Shares and had already made profits at the extent of around P145,000,000.00 since 1993 up to the present prior to
his coming in as the new General Manager of GSIS. [TSN, November 22, 2001, pp. 61 to 62] That the purchase was in accordance
with the GSIS policy was established by Pascual’s testimony that the trading department under the Corporate Finance Group
investigated and made further inquiries in connection with the shares and concluded that there would be no violation that could
have been committed by GSIS in the purchase of the shares. [TSN, December 3, 2001, pp. 14 and 15] Pascual further testified
that the price of P3.13 per share was the worth of the shares around the time it was purchased and it was reported to him by his
people that the reason why they bought so much was because there was a history of profitability and that they already had a
P1,000,000,000.00 turnover plus and he felt that it was "a good buying afterwards." (sic) [Defense Memorandum, p. 204]
Pascual also testified that he had no information if anybody benefited from the purchase of Belle Shares that took place on
October 13 to 21 and admitted that GSIS was suffering a paper loss because of the purchase. [Ibid. p. 204-205, citing TSN,
November 22, 2001, pp. 83-84]

Defense argued that assuming arguendo that there was an instruction from FPres. Estrada for such purchase, such instruction
was not too compelling or irresistible to directly cause the execution of the purchase suggestion and that such instruction was
immaterial because the GSIS Board which approved the transaction did not receive the alleged instruction of the Former
President and that in the same vein, the GSIS decided on the purchase independently, free from any compulsion by an outsider
as the instruction given by Pascual was to the effect that a study be conducted and if the Belle Shares are qualified, to buy within
the range of their authority. [Defense Memorandum, pp. 205-206, citing TSN, December 3, 2001, p. 93]

As to Pascual’s testimony that it was unusual for FPres. Estrada to call him for the purchase of a (sic) particular shares, the
Defense pointed out that as per admission of Pascual, what he meant by unusual was that FPres. Estrada called him when he
was out of the country. Defense pointed out however, that as testified by FPres. Estrada, the latter did not know that Pascual
was out of the country when he called. [Ibid. p. 209] Defense pointed out that, by Pascual’s admission, the GSIS Board was not
pressured into finding that the Belle Shares were okay, above board, and that they were not pressured by anybody into
concluding the purchase. [Ibid. p. 214, citing TSN, December 3, 2001, p. 93]

FPres. Estrada testified that he appointed Arellano and Pascual and he knows that Belle Resources is the developer of Tagaytay
Highlands because sometimes, he spends his weekend in Tagaytay Highlands. [TSN, April 26, 2006 (pm), p. 10-11] He denied that
he instructed or ordered Pascual to buy Belle Shares on September 6, 1999 during a meeting with him. What he told Pascual was
to study and make due diligence if Belle Shares will be beneficial to the GSIS. To which Pascual answered "Yes" and that he has
this Corporate Finance Group to make the study. As to the testimony of Pascual regarding his telephone conversation with
FPres. Estrada, the latter testified that he did not know that Pacual was abroad and he talked to him not about Belle Shares but
about delayed benefits of GSIS members. [Ibid. pp. 17, 24] He denied ordering Pascual to buy Belle Shares. [Ibid. pp. 15-17] He
claimed there was nothing irregular about his instruction to Pascual when he only told him to make a serious study and due
diligence. [Ibid. p. 22]

As regards Arellano’s testimony, FPres. Estrada denied that he ever called Arellano nor did he order him to buy Belle Shares. He
remembers that Mr. Jaime Dichaves told him, that being one of the members of the Board of Directors, the latter informed him
that Belle Resources are offering their stocks to GSIS and SSS and that Dichaves was looking for investors, local and foreign and
he told Dichaves that it will be upon the study of SSS and GSIS who will decide whether they are buying or not. [Ibid. p. 25] As
regards the telephone conversation with Arellano, FPres. Estrada testified that they talked in Tagalog and he said to Arellano to
study the offer of Belle Resources and if it will be beneficial to the government then why not. To which Arellano answered "Yes,
sir," that he would refer the matter to the Investment Committeee to give due diligence. [Ibid. pp. 26-27] FPres. Estrada denied
that he pressured Arellano and said that he noticed that the testimony of Pascual and Arellano are the same as if they are of the
same script. [Ibid. p. 29] FPres. Estrada stated that Pascual or Arellano, admitted buying Belle Shares and they were the ones
who decided the amount and how much to buy and they did not inform him anymore. [Ibid. p. 32] As regards the testimonies of
Pascual and Arellano, FPres. Estrada testified that it seems they have only one lawyer. He learned that Pascual and Arellano
were called by then DOJ Secretary Perez and it was the latter who pressured them to testify against him and they were
threatened to be charged with plunder. He also learned that Secretary Perez gave them a lady lawyer but he does not know the
relation of Perez to that lady lawyer. [Ibid. p. 37] FPres. Estrada testified that after Arellano testified in Court, the latter called
him and apologized because according to him, he could not do anything since he was threatened by Secretary Perez with the
words that if they can send the President to jail, what more of him? [Ibid. p. 41]

FPres. Estrada also denied knowledge of the alleged conversation and transaction between Ocier and Dichaves. He testified that
Mr. Dichaves was, at that time, one of the members of the Board of Directors of Belle Resources and a business man. [Ibid. p.
42] FPres. Estrada cited instances when he was offered commissions but he rejected them such as the IMPSA and SGS deals.
[Ibid. pp. 45-48] His reaction to Arellano’s statement to him that the latter was threatened was to say that he understood
because the same thing happened to him when he was offered by Secretary Nani Perez that he could go to any country of his
choice but he refused. [Ibid. pp. 49-50]

FINDINGS OF FACT

Re: Sub-paragraph (c) of the Amended Information

We find that the prosecution has established beyond reasonable doubt that FPres. Estrada directed and instructed Arellano and
Pascual for SSS and GSIS respectively to buy Belle Shares.

As can be culled from the testimonial and documentary evidence of the Prosecution, the following circumstances surround the
purchase of the Belle Shares by GSIS and SSS.

On July 20, 1999, Ocier and Dichaves discussed the matter of the sale of the 650,000,000 shares of Belle, in the light of a recent
call for payment of unpaid subscription which the Board of Directors of Belle Corporation decided to address its debt problems.
Ocier explained to Dichaves that he needs the latter’s help in selling the Belle Shares to cover for the 75 per cent unpaid
subscription. They agreed to divide the task of looking for buyers of these Belle Shares with Ocier looking for foreign buyers and
Dichaves to look for local buyers. [ TSN, January 7, 2002, p.18]

In a subsequent meeting with Dichaves, the latter confirmed to Ocier that there was a good chance that GSIS and SSS may be
willing to buy the Belle shares as Dichaves had taken up the matter already with FPres. Estrada and that Dichaves told him that
the Former President had already spoken to Carlos Arellano of SSS and Ding Pascual of GSIS about the said matter. [Ibid, p. 19]

After a few weeks, Dichaves called Ocier and told the latter that the transaction may be pushing through but that a commission
will have to be paid as a condition for the purchase to push through. [Ibid. p. 21] As per Ocier’s testimony, Dichaves told him that
it was FPres. Estrada who imposed the condition. [Ibid. p. 26] Since the shares involved was approximately 600,000,000 to
650,000,000 and the price of Belle at that time was about P3.00 per share, the total expected proceeds of the sale was almost
Two Billion Pesos and the commission involved would amount to Two Hundred Million Pesos. [Ibid. p. 23]

Since the payment of the commission was the only way for the transaction to push through, he was constrained to agree to the
payment of the commission. [Ibid. p. 36]

On September 6, 1999, at a meeting with FPres. Estrada, Federico Pascual, President of GSIS was instructed by the President to
buy Belle Shares. [TSN, November 22, 2001, p. 20]

On October 6 1999, Carlos Arellano got a call from FPres. Estrada and was told: "Gusto ko kayo ni Ding Pascual ay tignan ninyo
ang pagbili ng Belle Corporation sa stock market. [TSN, November 7, 2001, p. 77] He thought that the words "tignan ninyo" was
an instruction for him. [Ibid. p. 80] After the instruction he asked the people in the Investment Department of SSS to take a look
and review the shares of Belle as an investment item in the portfolio of SSS and also to find out to what extent the SSS can
further increase the SSS position in the said stock. [Ibid. p. 82]

He got a call from FPres. Estrada the week after and he was asked to see the President at Malacanang. [Ibid. p. 95] At
Malacañang he saw FPres. Estrada with Jaime Dichaves. While he was there he approached the President who stood up and
took him aside and asked whether this time, he had followed FPres. Estrada’s instructions to buy Belle shares. He replied:
"Tinitignan pa po ng Investment committee namin"; [Ibid. p. 97-104] When he answered this to the President, he recalled that
the reaction of the President was to tell him "Bilisan ninyo na, bilisan." [Ibid. p. 107] Upon receiving these instructions, he still
did not do anything for a few days after. [Ibid. p. 115]

After several days, he received another call from FPres. Estrada and the latter repeated "Bilisan mo, bilisan ninyo na." As far as
he was concerned, it was more serious than previous orders given to him. [Ibid. p. 124]

October 9, 1999 while Pascual was abroad, he talked by phone to FPres. Estrada who asked him "bakit hindi ka pa bumibili ng
Belle" to which he replied "tatawag ho ako sa head office at papa-aralan ko." [TSN, November 22, 2001, pp. 56-57] He felt that
the President was more serious in his instructions in the sense that, he was away and there was this telephone call and he felt
that FPres. Estrada was already agitated. [Ibid. p. 24] He ordered the purchase of the Belle Shares on the same day. The
President gave him the instructions to buy and he also made instructions to his people to buy, that was the chain of events.
[Ibid. pp. 68; 74]

For the period October 13-21, 1999, GSIS bought 351,878,000 Belle Shares and paid P1,102,965,607.50 (Exh. N), and the Social
Security System (SSS) bought 329,855,000 Belle Shares for P744,612,450.00 on October 21, 1999. [TSN, February 14, 2005, p.78]

That the purchase of Belle Shares by GSIS and SSS was the result of the instructions of the FPres. Estrada is borne out by the
following circumstances:

1. The sequence of events beginning from the time Ocier agreed to the payment of commission, to the
instructions transmitted personally and by telephone calls from FPres. Estrada to Pascual and Arellano, to the
actual purchase of Belle Shares by GSIS and SSS.
2. The haste with which GSIS and SSS bought Belle Shares. In the case of GSIS, from October 9, 1999 (when the
"agitated instructions" were given) to October 13, 1999 (the date when the first purchases were made) or a
period of 4 days. In the case of SSS, a few days after October 13, 1999, ( the date when the "more serious"
order was given by FPres. Estrada to Arellano) to October 21, 1999 (the date when the purchases were made)
or a period of no more than 8 days. The instructions to buy originated from FPres. Estrada and cascaded to
Pascual and Arellano then to GSIS and SSS respectively.
3. The obedience to FPres. Estrada’s instructions despite Arellano’s reluctance to do so because he believed that
it was not the proper timing and the volume that was being considered was too much and not yet the proper
time. [TSN, November 7, 2001, p. 102] And in the case of Pascual, his reluctance to buy because he was not
very comfortable with Belle because some people are of the opinion that Belle Shares, because the
corporation is involved in jai-alai and gambling, has speculative flavor. [TSN, November 22, 2001, Ibid. p. 20]
4. The relationship of Pascual and Arellano to FPres. Estrada, who, being the appointees and subordinates of
FPres. Estrada, cannot refuse the instruction of their superior.
5. The manner in which the instructions were given. In the case of Arellano, he felt that the third order was more
serious than previous orders given to him. [TSN, November 7, 2001, p. 124] And, in the case of Pascual,
because he felt that FPres. Estrada was already agitated. [TSN, November 22, 2001, p. 24]

We find no merit to the claim of the Defense that the prosecution’s evidence itself shows that: (1) The transaction complained of
was perfectly valid, since accused FPres. Estrada did not direct, order or compel SSS and GSIS to buy Belle Shares and (2) There is
no proof that any commission was paid to the accused. [Defense Memorandum, p. 192]

The denial of FPres. Estrada that he instructed Pascual and Arellano to buy Belle Shares cannot overcome the straightforward
and direct testimony of Pascual and Arellano attesting to the persistent instructions given by FPres. Estrada which is replete with
details. Mere denial by an accused, particularly when not properly corroborated or substantiated by clear and convincing
evidence, cannot prevail over the testimony of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters. Denial, being in the nature
of negative and self-serving evidence, is seldom given weight in law. Positive and forthright declarations of witnesses are often
held to be worthier of credence than the self-serving denial of the accused. [People v. Quilang, 312 SCRA, 328, 329]

Neither can We give more weight to the claim of the Defense that the purchase of Belle Shares was a perfectly valid transaction
even as it pointed to the following portions of Arellano’s testimony:
 1. That the purchase of Belle Shares was a routine transaction in the regular course of business, for SSS had
previously purchased Belle Shares at profit;
2. What was told by FPres. Estrada to Arellano was simply to initiate the acquisition of Belle Shares. How many
shares he was ordered to buy and at how much price per share, was never dealt with in the phone
conversation;
3. The above notwithstanding, Arellano proceeded on his own volition with the acquisition of the 249 Million
Belle Shares.
4. The Decision to purchase was exclusively his and the policy making body of SSS. [Ibid. 193-194, citing TSN,
November 8, 2001, pp. 63, 73-74, 75-76]

for prefatory to these actions of the SSS were the instructions given by FPres. Estrada to Arellano and the compliance with said
instructions by Arellano. While it is true that the SSS had previously granted authority for additional investment by SSS in Belle
Shares prior to and up to 1999, it was only in the 1999 purchases that there was an instruction coming from FPres. Estrada
through Arellano to purchase Belle Shares.

The evidence of the Defense show that the 1st Indorsement dated September 29, 1999 re: proposal to increase by
P450,000,000.00 the investment allocation for Belle to total P1,300,000,000.00 was not signed by Arellano (Exh. 242), contrary
to the assertion of the Defense. [In its formal offer of Evidence on p. 45, Defense claimed that Exh. 247 was executed by
Arellano. Exh. 247 is the same as Exh. 242]

Neither was there any documentary evidence submitted showing the approval by the Commission of the proposal increasing by
450,000,000 the investment allocation for Belle to total P1,300,000,000.00.

Likewise, the testimony of Capulong - that he examined and audited all the acquisition papers and the various confirmation slips
and official receipts covering the acquisition and found them to be in order and hence, he had no objection to, but on the
contrary approved the payment of the said acquisition; that as far as he was concerned, there was nothing illegal or irregular or
anomalous in the SSS purchase of Belle Shares in October 21, 1999 and that it was a legal investment and a valid investment that
is in the list of investment of SSS; that it is not an irregular investment and it is said that it might be somewhat not ordinary in
the sense that in this case there was a call [Defense Memorandum, p.198, citing TSN, November 14, 2001, p. 53], in fact
corroborates Arellano’s statement that indeed there was a call from FPres. Estrada instructing the purchase of Belle Shares.

Moreover, Capulong, in his testimony, stated that Belle Corporation Shares were no longer qualified stocks since Belle had not
declared dividends whether in cash or stock in 1997, 1998 and 1999. [TSN, February 14, 2005, p. 75]

He likewise testified that it was former President and Chairman Carlos A. Arellano who directly gave the orders to the brokers to
purchase Belle Shares in behalf of the SSS and he (Capulong) had nothing to do directly insofar as the acquisition was concerned
since his participation is merely limited to recommend the increase of the funding for the acquisition of the shares. [TSN,
February 11, 2002, p. 11]

Capulong further testified that for the month of October, 1999, the SSS bought 389,855,000 shares with a value of
P1,031,126,400.00. [Ibid. p. 38] In his subsequent testimony, Capulong testified that on October 21, 1999, the SSS bought
249,679,000 shares at the value of P784,551,150.00 at an average price of P3.14/share. [TSN, February 14, 2005, p. 78] After
October 21, 1999, Belle Shares was on a downward trend going down to the P1.00 level by the year 2000. By October 23, 2001,
it went below P1.00, then it went down to 70 centavos by February 15, 2001. As of February 11, 2002, it was being traded at 40
to 50 cents. [Ibid. pp. 92-93]

Capulong further testified that out of the 249,679,000 shares which SSS bought on October 21, 1999 for P784,551,150.00, a total
of 96,366,000 shares were sold at an average selling price of P1.7736/share resulting in a loss amounting to P127,464,710.00.
[TSN, February 18, 2002, pp. 94-95]

The Defense argues that the reason why Arellano testified in the manner he did and executed an affidavit implicating FPres.
Estrada in the instant plunder case notwithstanding that there was nothing irregular, illegal or anomalous in the October 21,
1999 acquisition of Belle Shares was because his testimonies and affidavit are his last ditch effort to exculpate himself from
possible plunder charges where he may be detained without bail considering that plunder is a capital offense. [Defense
Memorandum, p. 197]

This argument of the Defense are mere allegations and extracted from FPres. Estrada’s testimony that Arellano called him up
and explained the circumstances behind Arellano’s execution of his Affidavit which are however, uncorroborated.

Neither do we find that the presence of the instruction from FPres. Estrada is negated by the argument of the Defense that the
acquisition by GSIS of Belle Shares, was in accordance with investment policy and rules.
The Defense sought to establish that the Belle Shares were qualified under GSIS policy and charter and GSIS may by itself and in
accordance with its rules, purchase Belle Shares without the need of any order or compulsion from anybody as shown by the
testimony of Pascual, the President of GSIS when he admitted that even way back in 1993, GSIS had been purchasing or dealing
with Belle Shares and had already made profits at the extent of around P145,000,000.00 since 1993 up to the present prior to
his coming in as the new General Manager of GSIS. [TSN, November 22, 2001, pp. 61 to 62] That the purchase was in accordance
with the GSIS policy was established by Pascual’s testimony that the trading department under the Corporate Finance Group
investigated and made further inquiries in connection with the shares and concluded that there would be no violation that could
have been committed by GSIS in the purchase of the shares. [TSN, December 3, 2001, pp. 14 and 15] Pascual further testified
that the average price of P3.14 per share was the worth of the shares around the time it was purchased [TSN, November 22,
2001, pp. 89-90] and it was reported to him by his people that the reason why they bought so much was because there was a
history of profitability and that they already had a P1,000,000,000.00 turnover plus and he felt that it was "a good buying
afterwards." (sic) [TSN, November 28, 2001, p. 55]

Nowhere in the argument of the Defense does it establish the absence of the instruction of FPres. Estrada to Pascual, other than
the self-serving denial of FPres. Estrada.

Moreover, as Pascual testified, the GSIS profits in 1999 did not come from Belle Shares. Furthermore, the fact that GSIS made
profits to the extent of around P145,000,000.00 since 1993 did not mean that it made profits from the Belle Shares purchased in
1999. As testified by Pascual, the actual profit of the GSIS in 1999 did not come from Belle Shares but from other stocks and
there was no contribution to the profit of GSIS from the Belle Shares acquisition because up to the present they are still holding
on to the Belle Shares. [TSN, November 22, 2001, p. 81] Even the evidence of the Defense shows that as of December 29, 2000,
the value of Belle Shares had gone down to P0.69/share from the average purchase price of P3.14/share and an allowance for
probable loss of P374,052,750.00 had been set up (Exh. 250, J-12).

FPres. Estrada’s testimony that he called Pascual to inquire about delayed GSIS benefits is negated by the fact that after the call
to Pascual, the latter gave instructions to buy Belle Shares. If benefits were being delayed, why would GSIS spend billions of
pesos to buy Belle Shares instead of setting aside these monies to avoid delay in GSIS benefits?

Defense argued that assuming arguendo that there was an instruction from FPres. Estrada for such purchase, such instruction
was not too compelling or irresistible to directly cause the execution of the purchase suggestion and that such instruction was
immaterial because the GSIS Board which approved the transaction did not receive the alleged instruction of the President and
that in the same vein, the GSIS decided on the purchase independently, free from any compulsion by an outsider as the
instruction given by Pascual was to the effect that a study be conducted and if the Belle Shares are qualified, to buy within the
range of their authority. [Defense Memorandum, pp. 205-206]

Pascual’s testimony that when he talked to FPres. Estrada and the latter asked him why he had not bought Belle Shares in an
agitated tone; that he did not mention the instruction of FPres. Estrada to others because the instruction was specific to him;
that on October 9, 1999 after his telephone conversation with FPres. Estrada, he gave the instruction to GSIS to buy Belle Shares
should be afforded stronger weight and more probative value than the arguments of the Defense. As stated earlier, the
Prosecution has established that it was the instructions of FPres. Estrada that triggered the instructions of Pascual and Arellano
to GSIS and SSS respectively which caused these agencies, in turn to follow the usual procedures established for the purchase of
the shares which finally culminated in the purchase of the Belle Shares by GSIS and SSS.

As to Pascual’s testimony that it was unusual for FPres. Estrada to call him for the purchase of a (sic) particular shares, the
Defense pointed out that as per admission of Pascual, what he meant by unusual was that FPres. Estrada called him when he
was out of the country. Defense pointed out however, that as testified by FPres. Estrada, the latter did not know that Pascual
was out of the country when he called. [Ibid. p. 209] Defense pointed out that, by Pascual’s admission, the GSIS Board was not
pressured into finding that the Belle Shares were okay, above board, and that they were not pressured by anybody into
concluding the purchase. [Ibid. p. 214, citing TSN, December 3, 2001, p. 93]

We fail to see how the admission of Pascual that it was unusual for FPres. Estrada to call him to inquire about why GSIS had not
purchased Belle Shares in an agitated tone and the statement of FPres. Estrada that he did not know that Pascual was out of the
country at the time he called Pascual could lead to the conclusion that the GSIS Board was not pressured into finding that the
Belle Shares were "okay," "above board" and that they were not pressured by anybody into concluding the purchase. The issue
was not whether the GSIS Board was pressured into finding that the Belle Shares purchase was "okay" or "above board," but
whether FPres. Estrada pressured Pascual into ordering GSIS to buy Belle Shares.

The testimonies of defense witnesses, Justice Hermogenes D. Concepcion, Jr., the former Chairman of GSIS, and Reynaldo
Palmiery, Executive Vice-President of GSIS, did not disprove that FPres. Estrada gave instructions to Pascual for GSIS to buy Belle
Shares since, as admitted by them, they were not aware of such instructions. Nowhere in the testimony of Pascual did he state
that he informed these people of the instructions of FPres. Estrada because, as stated by Pascual, the instructions were specific
to him so he didn’t want to involve his management anymore. [TSN, November 28, 2001, pp. 9- 10]

The P189,700,000.00 Check No. 6000159271 payable to cash, drawn on International Exchange Bank with Eastern
Securities Corporation as drawer [Exh. R-R-4]

After the purchase by GSIS and SSS of the Belle Shares, Ocier caused the preparation of a check by Eastern Securities
Development Corporation in the amount of P189,700,000.00 representing the profit commission to be paid from the sale. [TSN,
January 14, 2002, p. 33-36]

Ocier identified International Exchange Bank Check No. 6000159271 dated November 5, 1999, payable to cash in the amount
of P189,700,000.00 with Eastern Securities Corporation as Drawer. Ocier testified that the check was prepared so that he can
hand carry and deliver it to Dichaves as per their agreement when he agreed to pay P 200,000,000.00 commission. [TSN, January
7, 2002, p. 49] When asked who was supposed to get the commission, Ocier answered that according to Jaime Dichaves,
President Estrada was supposed to get the commission. [Ibid. p. 55]

Ocier testified that he delivered the check to the residence of Dichaves in No. 19 Corinthian Gardens, Quezon City [TSN, January
9, 2002, p. 13] and he delivered the check because he had a pre-arranged appointment with Dichaves wherein he was supposed
to hand the check to Dichaves. [Ibid. p. 15] Mr. Dichaves arranged the appointment because he wanted Ocier to explain in
person why the check amount is P189,700,000.00 when the pre-agreed amount was P200,000,000.00. [Ibid. p. 18] Ocier
explained that he deducted transaction taxes and brokers’ commissions from the amount of P200,000,000.00 and rounded the
figure to P189,700,000 of (sic) which Dichaves agreed. Ocier learned later on that the check he delivered to Dichaves was
deposited at Far East Bank to the account which he believes belonged to Dichaves. [Ibid. p. 60]

On cross-examination, Ocier admitted that FPres. Estrada was not present when he had his conversation with Dichaves on the
Belle shares on July 20, 1999. [TSN, January 14, 2002, pp. 20-29] Neither did he talk to FPres. Estrada after the check for
P189,700,000.00 (Exh. R) was issued and cleared nor did he inquire from FPres. Estrada whether he received or was credited in
any of his account with the amount stated in the check. [Ibid. pp. 39-40] Ocier likewise testified that he did not have the
opportunity to discuss the profit commission, nor the receipt of the profit commission nor the Velarde account with FPres.
Estrada despite the fact that he had constant meetings with FPres. Estrada. [Ibid. p. 60-61]

When Ocier was asked if he could say that Dichaves was instructed by FPres. Estrada regarding the profit commission, Ocier
answered that he trusts his cousin Dichaves and whatever the latter tells him he would normally believe. Ocier also testified that
the totality of what he stated in his affidavit about the instruction, or the representation made by Dichaves was not
corroborated or confirmed by FPres. Estrada or anybody else representing him because it was just between him and Dichaves.
[Ibid. pp. 39-45]

Citing Ocier’s testimony, Defense argues that such testimony on the subject sales and commission are purely hearsay and does
not bind FPres. Estrada. What is clear on the record is that the commission went to Dichaves as gleaned from Ocier’s testimony.
[Defense Memorandum, p. 221-222]

In an attempt to establish that there was no evidence that FPres. Estrada received any percentage or commission from the sale
of Belle Shares, the Defense pointed out that Capulong’s testimony indicated that while there was a broker’s commission, which
was paid to brokers like Abacus Securities Corporation. [Defense Memorandum, pp. 215-216, citing TSN, February 11, 2002, pp.
13-16] In the case of the 389,855,000 Belle Shares bought by SSS for P1,031,126,400.00, the payments went from SSS to the
brokers, the buying brokers. [TSN, February 11, 2002, p. 38[

The Court finds that International Exchange Bank Check No. 6000159271 dated November 5, 1999, payable to cash in the
amount of P189,700,000.00 with Eastern Securities Corporation as Drawer (Exh. R), was paid as commission in consideration of
the purchase of Belle Shares by SSS and GSIS. While the testimony of Ocier to the effect that Dichaves told him that it was FPres.
Estrada who imposed the condition for the payment of commission is hearsay insofar as FPres. Estrada is concerned, the said
testimony is admissible as proof that such statement was made by Dichaves to Ocier. Testimony of what one heard a party say is
not necessarily hearsay.  It is admissible in evidence, not to show that the statement was true, but that it was in fact made.  If
credible, it may form part of the circumstantial evidence necessary to convict the accused. [Bon vs. People, 419 SCRA 103]

As regards the argument that Capulong’s testimony indicated that while there was a broker’s commission, this was paid to
brokers such as Abacus Securities Corporation and that the purchase price of P 1,031,126,400.00 for 389,855,000 Belle Shares
went from SSS to the buying brokers, again, we find this argument of the Defense to be unavailing. The issue is not whether
FPres. Estrada received Broker’s commission or received the payment from SSS, but whether he received the commission
mentioned by Dichaves to Ocier as consideration for the purchase of Belle Shares by GSIS and SSS.
Having found that a commission was paid in consideration of the purchase of Belle Shares by SSS and GSIS, the next issue that
this Court must determine is whether the commission went to FPres. Estrada or Dichaves.

The paper trail for International Exchange Bank Check No. 6000159271

First: Far East Bank and Trust Co. (Cubao-Araneta Branch)

In tracking the check (Exh. R), Prosecution presented Ms. Yolanda de Leon, (De Leon), Senior Manager of BPI (Cubao-Araneta
Branch) formerly Far East Bank and Trust Co. [BPI merged with Far East Bank sometime in 2000] De Leon testified that Dichaves
was one of the valued clients of the Bank and that Jaime Dichaves and Abby Dichavez had joint current and savings accounts
with then Far East Bank and Trust Company in 1999. The Current Account had the No. 0007-05558-7 and the Savings Account
had the No. 0107-38639-9 (C/A No. 0007-05558-7 and S/A No. 0107-38639-9). [TSN, February 4, 2002, pp. 23-24; (Exhs. BB and
Z)] She identified the microfilm copy of International Exchange Bank Check No. 6000159271 [Ibid. p. 39-41; Exh. DD] dated
November 5, 1999 in the amount of P189,700,000.00 as the check that was deposited to the savings account of Dichaves on
November 5, 1999 as evidenced by the microfilm of the deposit slip [Ibid. pp. 42-44; Exh. EE] and the bank statement of account
for S/A No. 0107-38639-9 dated November 30, 1999. [Ibid. pp. 48-49; Exh. FF, FF-1]

She testified that on November 9, 1999, the amount of P189,700,000.00 was auto- transferred from S/A No.0107-38639-9 to
C/A No.0007-05558-7 as appearing in the Statement of Accounts for S/A No. 0107-38639-9 and C/A No. 0007-05558-7. [Id.; Exh.
FF-2; Exh. GG, GG-1] She also testified that Jaime Dichaves drew a check against C/A No. 0007-05558-7 in the amount of
P189,700,000.00 as evidenced by Far East Bank and Trust Co. Check No. 3165579, a microfilm copy of which she identified.
[Ibid. p. 52-53; Exh. HH] She testified that at the dorsal portion of the microfilm copy of Check No. 3165579, there appears an
account number 160-625015 [Ibid. p. 56; Exh. HH-4] but she could not identify the bank that the account belongs because the
bank indorsement of the other bank was not clearly visible. She further testified that both C/A No. 0007-05558-7 and S/A No.
0107-38639-9 were closed as of February 29, 2000 and March 31, 2000 respectively. [Ibid. p. 57; Exhs. II and JJ]

On cross-examination, De Leon testified that she had no hand in the preparation of the Statement of Accounts marked as Exhs.
FF, ZZ, II and JJ. [Ibid. p. 84]

The Court finds that International Exchange Bank Check No. 6000159271 dated November 5, 1999 was deposited to Far East
Bank and Trust Co. S/A No. 0107-38639-9 of Jaime Dichaves and auto-transferred to C/A No.0007-05558-7 of Jaime Dichaves
who drew from the latter account, Far East Bank and Trust Co. Check No. 3165579 for P189,700,000.00.

Second: EPCIB Greenhills-Ortigas Branch to EPCIB Binondo Branch S/A 0160-62501-5 with the Account Name Jose
Velarde

The prosecution’s evidence on the deposit of Far East Bank Araneta Check No. 3165579 which was the subject of an inter-bank
deposit from EPCIB Greenhills Ortigas Branch to EPCIB Binondo Branch Account No. 0160-62501-5 in the name of Jose Velarde
consisted in the testimony of Ms. Glyzelyn Bejec, the Teller who processed the Deposit Receipt marked as Exhibit I5. She testified
that as of November 8, 1999, she was assigned to the EPCI Bank Greenhills Ortigas Branch as Customer Service Assistant Teller
with Teller Identification No. 8. Her basis for indicating the number "0160-62501-5" in the Deposit Receipt was the Account
Information Slip which is filled in by the depositor or the representative of the depositor. [TSN, May 6, 2002, pp. 46-47; 61]

After she was given the Account Information Slip together with the four checks, she first verified the face of the check as to the
date, the amount in words and figures, after which she stamped the non-negotiable endorsement at the back of each check, and
also, she wrote down the account number indicated on the Account Information Slip given to her. She wrote down the account
no. 0160-62501-5 at the dorsal portion of the check after which she deposited the checks to the Account No. indicated in the
Account Information Slip. [Ibid. p. 65; 68]

She explained that the deposit process involved first, encoding the account number given in the Account Information Slip, after
which she swiped each check on the check reader and encoded the amount on each check and after that a deposit receipt was
generated. After she had encoded the account number and the amounts of the four (4) checks that she processed for deposit
the account name that reflected in the computer was "Jose Velarde." [Ibid. p. 69-70]

The checks that she processed for deposit were forwarded to their distributing for safekeeping and microfilming the next day.
When she was shown the certified copy of Far East Bank Check No. 3165579 in the amount of P189,700,000.00 from the
Philippine Clearing House Corporation, she testified that this was the same check she processed and she identified the dorsal
portion where she wrote Account No. 160-625-015 (sic). Her other means of identifying the check was her Teller ID no.8 which
appears at the check (Exh U4-1) and she identified the account holder of the check as Jaime C. Dichaves or Abe (sic) C. Dichaves
and she attested that the check is payable to cash. She testified that the Bank accepts checks even if not endorsed by the
depositor she accepted the check even without endorsement because it was given to her by the Branch Manger for deposit.
[Ibid. p. 72-84]

On cross-examination she testified that she threw away the Account Information Slip because the deposit receipt had been
generated or the transaction has been validated in the deposit receipt. [Ibid, p. 89]

To corroborate the testimony of Ms. Bejec, the prosecution presented Ms. Teresa Barcelona, the Branch Manager of the EPCIB
Greenhills-Ortigas Branch during the period November, 1999. She identified inter-bank deposit receipt dated 8 November 1999
which was previously marked as Exh. I5 issued by the EPCIB Greenhills-Ortigas Branch for deposit to account number 0160-
62501-5 with the account name Jose Velarde. The transaction is an inter-bank deposit of four (4) checks to the account of Jose
Velarde maintained at the Binondo Branch. [TSN, May 15, 2002, p. 80] The total amount of the four (4) checks is
P263,292,303.65 of which one check is issued by Far East Bank and Trust Co. Araneta Branch with Check No.
3165579 amounting to P189,700,000.00. [Ibid. p. 81; Exh. U4-1]

The person who transacted the inter-bank deposit with the EPCIB Greenhills Ortigas Branch was Ms. Baby Ortaliza who
transacted personally with the witness and it was Ms. Baby Ortaliza who received the third copy of the deposit receipt for the
account holder. [Ibid. p. 82] This transaction was processed by Teller Glezelyn Bejec as her Teller ID appears in the deposit
receipt. [Id.]

The Defense argued that Bejec stated that the checks were handed to her by the Branch Manager, Teresa Barcelona and not by
the person who made the deposit, and that the depositor did not appear before her. Not one of the bank personnel or any other
witness presented by the prosecution testified that FPres. Estrada had any participation in the opening of Current Account
No.000110-525495-4 (sic) and Savings Account No. 0160-62501-5 in the name of Jose Velarde, nor its closing. Not one of the
prosecution witnesses testified as to the source of the funds deposited in the said accounts. Nor was there any witness who
could identify any of the persons who issued the checks deposited under the said account and under what circumstances the
same were issued. In short, there is no proof that FPres. Estrada "willfully, unlawfully and criminally amassed, accumulated and
acquired ill-gotten wealth in the amount of P 3.2 Million (sic)." Neither is there proof that this money came from "commissions,
gifts, percentages, kickbacks or any form of pecuniary benefits given to him" as the source of said money have not been
identified or traced. There is no evidence to show that he had enriched himself at the expense of the Filipino people. [Defense
Memorandum, pp. 242-243]

At any rate, Defense argues that the documents submitted as exhibits by the prosecution only tend to prove what checks were
deposited to the said Account No.0160-62501-5 of Equitable PCI Bank in the name of Jose Velarde. [Ibid. p. 242]

The Court finds that the Far East Bank and Trust Co. Araneta Branch Check No. 3165579 amounting to P189,700,000.00 drawn
by Dichaves was deposited to EPCIB S/A No. 0160-62501-5 account of Jose Velarde as part of the deposit to said account totaling
P263,292,303.65 (Exh. I5; U4-1; 127-L).

The link between FPres. Estrada and the Jose Velarde Account

In discharging its burden of proof to establish that the Jose Velarde Account belong to FPres. Estrada, the prosecution relied on
the following:

1. The testimony of Clarissa Ocampo that she saw Fpres. Estrada signed "Jose Velarde" on the Debit-
Credit instruction for S/A 0160-62501-5 (Exh. E5);
2. The admission of FPres. Estrada [TSN, May 24, 2006, p. 23] that he signed "Jose Velarde" on Exh. E5;
3. The many bank transactions of Baby Ortaliza involving the personal accounts of FPres. Estrada and his
family, the personal account of Loi Estrada and the Jose Velarde Account;
4. The use of the Jose Velarde Current Account for the purchase of the Boracay Mansion;
5. The funding that the Jose Velarde Account received from the Urban Bank Special Trust Account of
FPres. Estrada’s son, Jose Victor Ejercito; and
6. The customary signing of FPres. Estrada as "Jose."

The signatures of FPres. Estrada as "Jose Velarde" in the Investment Management Agreement (IMA), Signature
Cards, Investment Guidelines, Directional Letters, and Debit-Credit Authority for EPCIB CA/SA 0160-62501-5 of Jose
Velarde

Clarissa Ocampo testified that after explaining the documents being presented for his signature, she and Atty. Curato saw FPres.
Estrada signed as "Jose Velarde" on the three (3) copies of the Investment Management Agreement (IMA) [Exh. W4 to Y4 ; TSN
November 13, 2002, pp. 70 -73], two (2) signature cards (Exh. Z4; A5) which he signed three (3) times [TSN, November 13, 2002,
pp. 78-80], one (1) copy of the Investment Guidelines (Exh. B5; Ibid. pp. 82-84), two (2) copies of the Directional Letters (Exh.
C5 to D5; Ibid. pp. 87-89), and one (1) copy of the Debit-Credit Authority (Exh. E5). [Ibid. pp. 92-93] Her testimony regarding the
Debit-Credit Authority in particular was as follows:

OMB. MARCELO

Q       After these two exhibits marked as Exhibit C to the 5th power and D to the 5th power were signed by the former
President and handed by you to Atty. Curato what happened next?

A       I was preparing to go and then I recalled that there was an envelope that was given to me by the banking side
which contained the funding medium and so I looked at it, I pulled out the document inside the envelope, I read it and
then I gave it to the President for signing.

Q       After giving it to the President what happened next?

A       Actually, I explained to him that the letter of instruction which is a debit/credit authority, I told him that the
banking side gave it to me which authorizes the bank to actually debit or draw 500 Million from his account so I was
pointing at the account number in the debit/credit authority so debit his account draw 500 Million and credit the same
amount to trust for funding of his loan to Wellex sir.

Q       What was his reaction to your explanation?

A       He was nodding his head sir.

Q       After he nodded his head what happened?

A       He signed the document and I saw him signed.

OMB. MARCELO

Q       What was the signature affixed by the former President?

A       He signed as Jose Velarde.

Q       After the former President signed this document as Jose Velarde what happened, if any?

A       I got the document and then I looked at it and I passed it on to Atty. Curato." [TSN, November 13, 2002, pp. 92-93]

On May 24, 2006, FPres. Estrada testified as follows:

Q       Ms. Ocampo and Atty. Curato testified before this court that you signed as Jose Velarde in the documents that
you have just identified awhile ago and you signed as Jose Velarde, what can you say as to that testimony?

A       THAT IS TRUE. "PINIRMAHAN KO PO IYAN DAHIL PO SA PAKIUSAP NI MR. JAIME DE CHAVES (SIC) NA OKAY NA
RAW PO YONG INTERNAL ARRANGEMENT SA BANGKO AT PARA PALABASIN NA AKO ANG MAY ARI NG JOSE
VELARDE ACCOUNT PARA MASIGURO PO NA YONG KANILANG PINAUTANG, IPAUUTANG SA WELLEX GROUP OF
COMPANIES NI MR. WILLIAM GATCHALIAN AY SIGURADONG BABAYARAN. AYAW PO NILA SANANG PAUTANGIN SI
MR.GATCHALIAN BAKA HINDI DAW PO MAKABAYAD SA TAKDANG PANAHON. [TSN, May 24, 2006, p. 23; Emphasis
Supplied]

William Gatchalian is a big businessman. isang malaking negosyante at siya po ay may ari ng Wellex group of companies
at siya rin po ay isa sa tumulong sa aming partido noong nakaraang 1998 presidential election. [Ibid, p. 25]

Q       Now, you were requested by Mr. Jaime de Chaves (sic) to make it appear that you own the Jose Velarde account
and that there was an internal arrangement between you and Mr. de Chaves (sic) I ask you now Mr. President, when
did you agree to such request and arrangement?

A       Hindi lang po dahil doon sa internal arrangement. Hindi lang po dahil gusto kong tulungan si Mr. William
Gatchalian kundi higit po sa lahat ay nakita ko ang kapakanan noong mahigit na tatlong libong (3000) empleyado na
kung sakaling hindi mapapautang si Mr. William Gatchalian, maaring magsara ang kanyang mga kumpanya at yong mga
taong, mahigit tatlong libong (3,000) empleyado kasama na yong kanilang mga pamilya ay mawawalan ng trabaho. AT
 INISIP KO RING NA WALA NAMING (SIC) GOVERNMENT FUNDS NA INVOLVE KAYA HINDI NA PO AKO NAGDALAWANG
ISIP NA PIRMAHAN KO." [Ibid. p. 26-27; Emphasis Supplied]

In the Debit-Credit Authority signed by FPres. Estrada as Jose Velarde for EPCIB S/A No. 0160-62501-5, the following words
expressly appear:

. . . my SA/CA No.0160-62501-5 maintained with your branch in the amount of P500,000,000.00 and credit my Trust
Account No. 101-78056-1 representing my initial contribution (Exh. E5-3). [Emphasis Supplied]

Lucena "Baby" Ortaliza and the bank accounts of FPres. Estrada and the Jose Velarde Account

To establish the close relationship and trust of FPres. Estrada and his family on Lucena "Baby" Ortaliza, the prosecution
presented REMEDIOS AXALAN AGUILA, Personnel officer of the Office of the Vice- President (OVP).

She testified that Ortaliza was appointed VP Staff Officer II from January 2, 1996 to June 30, 1998 by FPres. Estrada. Being in the
immediate staff of the Vice-President, she has the trust and confidence of the Vice-President and she can report anywhere,
anytime as may be directed by the Vice-President. [TSN, May 22, 2002, pp. 21-24]

Likewise, the Prosecution presented Linda P. Sison, Presidential Officer VI, Chief Personnel Data Bank, Office of the President.
She testified that Ortaliza was employed in the office of the President on July 1, 1998 and appointed Presidential Staff Officer VI
by FPres. Estrada. She was assigned to the internal house affairs office which normally attends to the needs of the President and
members of the family. She resigned effective September 30, 2000 as "Private Secretary VI" in a letter of resignation dated
October 4, 2000. [Ibid. pp. 47-48]

To establish that Baby Ortaliza transacted for the bank accounts of FPres. Estrada and his family the Prosecution presented
Salvador Serrano, Vice-President, Centralized Operations and Control Division of Security Banking Corporation. He identified the
Investment Savings Account Agreement of FPres. Estrada [Exh. C14-C14-8] in the amount of P10,000,000.00 with Security Bank
San Juan Branch where, above the typewritten name "Joseph E. Estrada" under the word "Conforme" appears the signature of
Baby Ortaliza and he was told by the New Accounts Clerk of the San Juan Branch that Baby Ortaliza is the representative of
FPres. Estrada. [TSN, May 8, 2002, pp. 79-81; 87-90; 128-129]

The witness also identified the purchase of T-Bills by FPres. Estrada evidenced by Confirmation Sale No. 81046 (Exh. C14-9 to C14-
16) value date April 10, 1997 where there appears the signature of Baby Ortaliza above TS No. 96848. [TSN, May 8, 2002, p. 114]

The Prosecution also presented Ms. Pamela Moran who testified that Ms. Ortaliza was the only one person transacting the
accounts of FPres. Estrada when she was in charge of the New Accounts Section of the Security Bank San Juan Branch. [TSN, May
15, 2002, p. 146; pp.149-152]

The Prosecution further presented Patrick Dee Cheng of Citibank who testified that in the Hold-All-Mail Agreement signed by
Ms. Luisa P. Ejercito, her designated representative was Ms. Lucena "Baby" Ortaliza. [TSN, October 7, 2002; pp. 80-83; Exhs. B11;
C11 and sub-markings]

The Prosecution presented Ms. Marie Rose Ancheta Claudio who was Branch Manager of Urban Bank Greenhills Branch from
1998. [TSN, March 26, 2003, p. 92] She identified the Letter of Authority dated November 23, 1999 addressed to Urban Bank
Greenhills Branch (Exh. I19) for issuance of three (3) Managers’ Checks in the amounts of P42,716,554.22, P10,875,749.43 and P
54,161,496.52, where the words "Received By: Baby Ortaliza" appeared. As per the witness, however, it was not Baby Ortaliza
who received the check as she herself gave the Manager’s Checks directly to the client, Joseph Victor G. Ejercito. [TSN, March
26, 2003, p. 168]

Having presented evidence that Baby Ortaliza transacted for FPres. Estrada and family with the Banks where FPres. Estrada and
Family had accounts, the prosecution then presented evidence of the transactions by Ortaliza in relation to the Jose Velarde
Account to establish that FPres. Estrada owns the Jose Velarde accounts.

Thus, the prosecution presented Teresa A. Barcelona who testified that Baby Ortaliza transacted with her personally for the
deposit of P 143,000,000.00 (Exh. M5 and submarkings) into the Jose Velarde S/A No. 0160- 62501-5 account and it was Baby
Ortaliza who received the copy of the deposit receipt for the account holder. [TSN, May 15, 2002, pp. 76-80]

Likewise, Baby Ortaliza transacted with her personally for the deposit of the amount of P263,292,303.65 [Exh. I5 and
submarkings] to the Jose Velarde S/A 0160-62501-5 account and it was Baby Ortaliza who received the copy of the deposit
receipt for the account holder. [TSN, May 15, 2002, pp. 80-82] Baby Ortaliza also transacted with her for the deposit of the
amount of P40,000,000.00 (Exh. N5 and submarkings) to the Jose Velarde S/A 0160-62501-5 account and it was Baby Ortaliza
who received the copy of the deposit receipt for the account holder. [TSN, May 15, 2002, pp. 83-85] Baby Ortaliza transacted
with her for the deposit of P163,500,000.00 (Exh.Q5 and submarkings) to the Jose Velarde S/A 0160-62501-5 account and it was
Baby Ortaliza who received the copy intended for the account holder. [TSN, May 15, 2002, pp. 89-92]

The prosecution further presented Melissa P. Pascual former bank Teller of EPCIB Virra Mall Branch who testified that she
personally processed various checks (Exhs. V15; W15; X15; Y15; A16, inclusive of submarkings) deposited by Ms. Ortaliza to the Jose
Velarde S/A 0160-62501-5.

She was sure it was Baby Ortaliza who deposited these checks because their branch is so small that everytime she comes to their
branch, her voice is too loud so she would catch her attention. She would see Ortaliza give the checks to her officer which the
officer would give to her for validation, for processing. [TSN, December 9, 2002, pp. 21-23; 35; 37-39]

The purchase of the "Boracay Mansion" for P142 Million from money which came from the EPCIB C/A-0110- 25495-4
of Jose Velarde

The prosecution presented evidence to show that the purchase of the Boracay Mansion was initiated by a check No. 0110-
714951 dated October 5, 1999 issued by Jose Velarde from his EPCIB C/A No. 0110-25495-4 in the amount of P 142,000,000.00
payable to Jose Luis J. Yulo (hereafter Yulo) (Exh. G16) who deposited the same to his BPI C/A No. 0383-0748-27 which was a joint
account with Ma. Carmen L. Yulo. [TSN, December 9, 2002, p. 114-125; Exh. F16] Subsequently, on October 8, 1999, Yulo issued
BPI Check No. 0002129 (Exh. U16; T16) from his BPI Current Account which was deposited to the account of St. Peter Holdings
Corporation which, in turn, the latter used to buy three Managers’ Checks, one for P86,766,960.00 payable to Vicente AS
Madrigal and/or Gerardo Madrigal as sellers of the Boracay Property (Exh. V16; W16); another for P53,931,535.60 payable to
Mercedes A. Reyes (broker) (Exh. X16) and the third for P1,301,504.40 payable to Vicente AS Madrigal and/or Gerardo AS
Madrigal for payment of documentary stamps (Exh. Y16). [TSN December 16, 2002, pp. 29-51] To establish that the Boracay
Property was, in reality, owned by FPres. Estrada, Prosecution presented a tag in the carpet indicating the name: "Pres. J.
Estrada" (Exh. H19-H-2) [TSN, March 19, 2003]; a "Locator Slip" which bears the words "Approved By; MS.LAARNI N. ENRIQUEZ,"
(Exh. H19) a school correspondence for FPres. Estrada’s child with Laarni Enriquez, namely: Ejercito, Ma. Jerika Larize (Exh. H19-a),
and portion of the testimony of Chavit Singson where he mentioned that FPres. Estrada’s new house in New Manila was called
Boracay. [TSN, July 24, 2002, pp. 129-134] However, Jose Luis Yulo, whom the prosecution portrayed as the dummy of FPres.
Estrada in the purchase of the Boracay Mansion was not charged as an accused in this case which presented a legal issue as to
the propriety of attachment covering the said property during the pendency of this criminal case.

The funding of the Jose Velarde Account from the Urban Bank Account of Jose Victor Ejercito

The prosecution presented Marie Rose Ancheta Claudio who testified that JV Ejercito was the owner of Special Account No.
(SPAN) 858 with Urban Bank pursuant to a Trust Agreement executed between JV Ejercito and Urban Bank Trust Dept. [TSN,
March 26, 2003, pp. 98-99] Ma. Aileen C. Tiongson testified that Urban Bank Manager’s Check No. 43222 (Exh. W19) for P75,
000,000.00 came from a pre-terminated placement of SPAN 858. [TSN, April 2, 2003, pp. 20-21] This Urban Bank Manager’s
Check No. 43222 was subsequently replaced by four (4) Manager’s Checks Nos. 39975, 39976, 39977 and 39978 (Exhs. B 15-2,
B15-4, B15-6 and B15-8) in the respective amounts of P70,000,000, P2,000,000.00, P2,000,000.00 and P1,000,000.00 (Exhs. B15-2-9).

Subsequently, on January 24, 2000, these four (4) checks were deposited to EPCIB S/A No. 0160-62501-5 of Jose Velarde (Exh.
B 15; Exh. 127-N).

Likewise, as mentioned earlier, three (3) Urban Bank Manager’s Checks for the amounts of P10,875,749.43, P42,716,554.22 and
P54,161,496.52 (Exh. I5-17, I5-18 and O5-2), received by JV Ejercito were deposited to EPCIB S/A No. 0160-62501-5 of Jose
Velarde (Exh. I5).

Prosecution’s Evidence to show that it was customary for FPres. Estrada to sign as "Jose"

Prosecution presented Marianito M. Dimaandal who identified various official documents which showed the signature of FPres.
Estrada as reading "Jose" instead of "Joseph" (Exhs. X19 to R20 ). [TSN March 31, 2003, pp.40-47]

Based on the forgoing testimonial and documentary evidence, it is the contention of the Prosecution that it has established that
FPres. Estrada is the real and beneficial owner of EPCIB Savings Account No. 0160-62501-5 and Current Account No. 0110-
25495-4 in the name of Jose Velarde.

The theory of the defense on the Jose Velarde Account

In attempting to prove that the Jose Velarde account was owned by Jaime Dichaves and not by FPres. Estrada, the defense
presented Romuald Dy Tang and Beatriz Bagsit as their witnesses in addition to FPres. Estrada.
Romuald Dy Tang testified that in 1999, he was connected with EPCI Bank as its SVP and Treasurer. The Chairman, Mr. George L.
Go referred Mr. Dichaves to him because Go told him that Dichaves wanted to open a current account under an alias instead of
his name. Mr. Dichaves also called him up and told him the same. He knows Mr. Dichaves because the wife of Jaime Dichaves is
the sister of his sister-in-law. In effect, the wife of his brother and Jaime’s wife are sisters. What he knows is Dichaves has a lot of
business, substantial business and one of his major businesses is plaster glass. [TSN, May 4, 2005, pp.11,15, 17, 18]

When he was called by Dichaves over the phone, the latter told him that Mr. Go referred him to Dy Tang to open an alias
account for him. Based on that, Dy Tang told Dichaves to prepare a letter for records indicating his intention and Dichaves sent
him a letter saying that he is opening an account under the name Jose Velarde and everything should be so…for safekeeping.
[Ibid. p. 20] Dy Tang identified the letter dated August 25, 1999(Exh. 127 to 127 B-1). [Ibid. pp. 20-21] The letter was given to him
on the day Dichaves went to his office to get the signature cards. [Id.] He gave the signature card personally to Dichaves and he
did not see Dichaves sign the signature card because he was late for an appointment and both of them had prepared for such
appointment and so Dy Tang gave the signature card to Dichaves and told him to return the same. [Ibid, p.22] He opened two
accounts one savings and one current. It was a combo account. The signature card was returned after about a month or so, after
a follow up with him and after he followed several procedures. [Id.] Both he and Betty Bagsit were jointly assisting Mr. Dichaves.
Ms. Bagsit had to assist because if he will be the only one and he travels quite often, Mr. Dichaves will not have anybody to
attend to his account. At that time Betty Bagsit was based in the Pacific Star branch in Makati and the Jose Velarde Account was
a Binondo Account where the ledgers of the Velarde Account were kept. [Ibid., pp. 26-28] He testified that all the fixed (time)
deposits of Dichaves were moved in the branch of Bagsit in Pacific Star. [Id.]

In his sworn statement with the Ombudsman on March 23, 2001 (Exh. 327-327-C), Dy Tang stated that he received a letter from
Dichaves advising them that all transaction for the Jose Velarde account should be coursed through him. He instructed Mr.
Ceferino Ang, Vice President and Manager of Binondo Branch to cause the opening of the account. He knows Mr. Dichaves
personally because he was referred by Mr. George Go to him and because he is the brother-in-law of Dy Tang’s brother. He went
to the office to pick up the forms for the opening of the account sometime in late August 1999. Mr. Jaime Dichaves opened the
account but Dy Tang does not know if he opened it for himself or another person. He gave the signature cards for Dichaves to
fill up. The accomplished signature cards were given to him by Mr. Go. He was not present when the depositor affixed his
specimen signature in the said signature card as it was given to him accomplished by Mr. Go.

Beatriz L. Bagsit came into Equitable Bank as head of Pacific Star branch with rank of AVP and when they acquired PCI Bank in
1999, she was promoted to 1st VP and the division head who handled the Makati area. [TSN, April 13, 2005, p. 63]

She retired from the bank because of politics in the bank and the Jose Velarde case was coming up. She was the one handling
the Jose Velarde account which was being handled also by Mr. Jaime Dichaves. [Ibid. p. 65] The Jose Velarde account started at
Binondo Branch. It was opened there and when her superiors transferred to Makati, they called her to handle the account of
Jose Velarde and she was introduced to Mr. Dichaves by their Executive Vice-President, Romy Dy Tang for her to handle the
account personally. [Ibid. p. 66]

There is no Jose Velarde who owns an account with their bank. Her basis for saying that Jose Velarde account belongs to Mr.
Jaime Dichaves is that there was a letter that was given to her that came from Mr. Dichaves when the account was opened in
Binondo. When the account was opened in Binondo, she was not handling the management of the same. The Jose Velarde
account was never transferred to Makati. It was just the handling that was transferred sometime in November, 1999. [Ibid, pp.
68-70]

Based on the letter (Exh. 127) it would appear that the Jose Velarde account belonged to Jaime Dichaves because it was Mr.
Jaime Dichaves who issued the letter stating that all banking transaction of Jose Velarde should be coursed to him. The letter
was shown to her by Mr. Dy Tang in November, 1999. She does not remember the exact date when she was told by Dy Tang to
handle the account of Mr. Dichaves in the name Jose Velarde. She was first informed about it in Dy Tang’s office and after that
there was a time when Dichaves went to Dy Tang’s office and that was the time she was introduced to Dichaves. She first met
Mr. Dichaves in January, 2000. After she was introduced to Dichaves, there were times when he would call her for a transaction
and there were times he went to her office. Sometimes Dichaves will tell her that he will be sending somebody to get the MC
which he wants her to prepare and sometimes he would ask for the balance. [Ibid, pp. 72-96] Mr. Dichaves came to her office
twice or thrice only. One is when he visited Mr. Dy Tang, the other one is when he just passed by, just to check the account of
Jose Velarde and he gave her instruction that he will be sending representative to prepare an MC for him that was after the
February 4, 2000 transaction. [TSN, April 18, 2005, p. 59]

She does not know if Dichaves has an account in her area, she thinks there is none but she does not know with other branches.
The records she had access to regarding the Jose Velarde Account were the signature card and the copy of the letter. The name
"Dichaves" does not appear in the signature card. [TSN, April 13, 2005, p. 76-84]
She saw the debit-credit authorization on her table and she kept it and did not give it to anybody. [Ibid. p. 116] After Clarissa
Ocampo was presented at the impeachment proceedings, Clarissa called her and she told Clarissa "Kissa, hindi sa akin galing
yong debit/credit" because Clarissa was asking her if she was at the bank working and she told Clarissa that the bank was really
bleeding and she took the opportunity to tell her "Kissa, hindi sa akin galing yon. Saan ba galing yon?". [Ibid. p. 118] She testified
that Clarissa was just surprised and asked her "saan ba galing yon?". Where did it come from? She answered she didn’t know but
it didn’t come from her. That’s all she told Clarissa. After that there was a follow-up from Atty. Curato asking her if she did not
really issue the authorization and she told him "No talaga eh. Sabi ko, hanapin natin kung saan talaga galing." She testified that
later on, it was confirmed that it came from the Trust Department. [Ibid. p. 118-119] She testified that the Prefix Number for a
Binondo Account was 0110 but she could not remember the Prefix Number for the Pacific Star Branch. [Ibid. p. 93] In her
computation, the credits to the EPCIB Jose Velarde S/A No.0160-62501-5 totaled P2,168,523,085.00 excluding centavos and
credit memos. [TSN, April 18, 2005, p. 98]

The Court finds that the FPres. Estrada is the real and beneficial owner of EPCIB combo account C/A No. 0110-25495-4 and S/A
No. 0160-62501-5 in the name of Jose Velarde.

The eyewitness account of Prosecution witness Clarissa Ocampo that she saw FPres. Estrada signed the name Jose Velarde in the
various documents presented to him and explained to him was undisputed by FPres. Estrada and constitutes direct evidence
that FPres. Estrada signed as Jose Velarde.

Another direct evidence that FPres. Estrada is Jose Velarde is the admission of FPres. Estrada that he signed as Jose Velarde in
the documents presented to him by Clarissa Ocampo. One of such documents was the Debit-Credit Authority (Exh. E5) which
read: "...my SA/CA No.0160-62501-5 maintained with your branch in the amount of P500,000,000.00 and credit my Trust
Account No. 101-78056-1 representing my initial contribution." Such admission constitutes an admission that he and Jose
Velarde are one and the same person. Being a judicial admission, no proof is required and may be given in evidence against him
(Rule 129, SEC.4; Rule 130, SEC. 26). Being an admission against interest, it is the best evidence which affords the greatest
certainty of the facts in dispute. The rationale for the rule is based on the presumption that no man would declare anything
against himself unless such declaration was true. Thus, it is fair to presume that the declaration corresponds with the truth, and
it is his fault if it does not. [Rufina Patis Factory vs Alusitain, 434 SCRA 429]

The evidence of the Prosecution which showed that Baby Ortaliza - a trusted person of FPres. Estrada and who enjoyed the
confidence of FPres. Estrada and Loi Ejercito - transacted the various personal bank accounts of FPres. Estrada and Loi Ejercito as
well as the Jose Velarde accounts, also constitutes corroborative evidence that the Jose Velarde Accounts are owned by FPres.
Estrada and not by Dichaves, since Baby Ortaliza has been entrusted by FPres. Estrada to handle his own personal bank accounts
and there is no evidence that Dichaves and Baby Ortaliza are related in any way to each other.

The evidence of the Prosecution that the Boracay Mansion was purchased from funds coming from the Jose Velarde accounts is
yet another corroborative evidence that proved that the Jose Velarde accounts are owned by FPres. Estrada. The documents
found in the Boracay Mansion show that the beneficial owner of the Boracay Mansion is FPres. Estrada and is used by Laarni
Enriquez whose relation to FPres. Estrada was never denied.

Likewise, the evidence of the Prosecution which showed that three (3) Urban Bank Manager’s Checks for the amounts of
P10,875,749.43, P42,716,554.22 and P54,161,496.52 (Exh. I5-17, I5-18 and O5-2), received by JV Ejercito as well as the four (4)
Urban Bank Manager’s Checks totaling P75,000,000.00 (Exhs. B 15-2, B15-4, B15-6 and B-15-8) were deposited to EPCIB S/A No.
0160-62501-5 of Jose Velarde constitutes corroborative evidence that, as between FPres. Estrada and Dichaves, it can be
inferred that JV Ejercito, being the son of FPres. Estrada, would contribute to the account of his father but not if the account
were owned by Dichaves in the absence of proof that JV Ejercito was under obligation to deposit to the said account if the same
was owned by Dichaves.

The evidence of the Prosecution that it was customary for FPres. Estrada to sign as "Jose" shows that FPres. Estrada would sign
as "Jose" and further shows that, to the naked eye, the signature of FPres. Estrada as "Jose" appearing in the various official
documents signed by FPres. Estrada is similar to the signature of "Jose" appearing in "Jose Velarde."

As to the reliance of the Defense on the testimonies of Dy Tang and Bagsit to prove that the Jose Velarde accounts belong to
Jaime Dichaves, We find that such reliance is misplaced.

Dy Tang testified that after Mr. George Go referred Dichaves to him, he told Dichaves to prepare a letter for records indicating
his intention and Dichaves sent him a letter saying that he is opening an account under the name Jose Velarde and everything
should be so…for safekeeping. [TSN, May 4, 2005, p. 20] Dy Tang identified the letter dated August 25, 1999. [Ibid. pp. 20-21;
Exh. 127 to 127 B-1]

The Letter of Dichaves dated August 25, 1999 reads as follows:

 Dear Romy,

May I request that a savings account and a current account be opened with your Juan Luna branch for Jose Velarde c/o
the undersigned.

All other banking transactions of Jose Velarde shall be coursed through the undersigned.

Very truly yours,

(sgd)

Jaime Dichaves

The Letter of Dichaves does not prove that he is the owner of the Jose Velarde Account. Assuming ex gratia argumenti that the
Jose Velarde Account is owned by Dichaves, why did he not deposit the International Exchange Bank Check No. 6000159271
dated November 5, 1999, payable to cash in the amount of P189,700,000.00 drawn by Eastern Securities Corporation directly to
the Jose Velarde Account? If Dichaves owned the Jose Velarde Account, why did he take the circuitous route of depositing the
International Exchange Bank into his Far East Bank Savings Account, then auto transfer the amount to his Current Account, then
issue his personal check payable to cash for P189,700,000.00 which was ultimately deposited to the Jose Velarde Account?

It could not be because he did not want evidence to prove that the International Exchange Bank check was deposited to his
account because he, in fact, deposited that check to his personal account.

The only logical conclusion is that Dichaves did not want evidence to show that the International Exchange Bank check of
Eastern Securities Corporation was deposited to the Jose Velarde Account because such deposit would confirm that FPres.
Estrada, once proven to own the Jose Velarde Account, received the P189,700,000.00 commission arising from the purchase by
SSS and GSIS of Belle Shares.

Dichaves’ act of covering the paper trail of the International Exchange Bank check of Eastern Securities Corporation, albeit
unsuccessfully, militates against the claim of the Defense that Dichaves owns the Jose Velarde Account.

In his Sworn Statement dated March 23, 2001 (Exh. 327), Dy Tang stated that Jaime Dichaves opened the account but Dy Tang
does not know if he opened it for himself or another person. He gave the signature card for Dichaves to fill up. The signature
card was returned after about a month or so, after a follow up with him and after he followed several procedures. [TSN dated
May 4, 2005, p. 22] The signature card was given to him by George L. Go already accomplished. He was not present when the
depositor affixed his specimen signature in the said signature card as it was given to him accomplished by George L. Go.

In the signature card, it appears that it was opened on August 26, 1999 but it was received only on October 7, 1999. Likewise,
the signature card bore the signature "Jose Velarde" three times (Exh. G19, G19-6).

In his testimony, Dy Tang testified that he doesn’t think that it would be Dichaves signing as Jose Velarde because when Mr.
Dichaves called him about his discussion with Mr. Go to open an account, Dichaves told him that he was going to open an
account under an alias account. [TSN, May 4, 2005, p. 44] Nowhere did Dy Tang testify that Dichaves is the owner of the Jose
Velarde account.

As appears in the signature card, the signature of Jose Velarde is almost identical to the signature of Jose Velarde appearing on
the three (3) copies of the Investment Management Agreement [Exh. W4 to Y4; TSN November 13, 2002, pp. 70-73], two (2)
signature cards (Exh. Z4 to A5) which he signed three (3) times [TSN, November 13, 2002, pp. 78-80] one (1) copy of the
Investment Guidelines [Exh. B5; Ibid. pp. 82-84]; two (2) copies of the Directional Letters [Exh. C5 to D5; Ibid. pp. 87-89], and one
(1) copy of the debit-credit authority [Exh. E5; Ibid. pp. 92-93], which FPres. Estrada signed as Jose Velarde as testified by Clarissa
Ocampo and as admitted by him. Under Section 22, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, the court is authorized, by itself, to make a
comparison of the disputed handwriting with writings admitted or treated as genuine by the party against whom the evidence is
offered or proved to be genuine to the satisfaction of the judge. [Cogtong vs. Kyoritsu International Et. Al., GR No. 160729, July
27, 2007]

As regards the testimony of Beatriz Bagsit, her basis for saying that Jose Velarde accounts belongs to Mr. Jaime Dichaves is that
there was a letter that was given to her that came from Mr. Dichaves when the accounts were opened in Binondo. When the
accounts were opened in Binondo, she was not handling the management of the same. Based on the letter, she testified that it
would appear that the Jose Velarde accounts belonged to Jaime Dichaves because it was Mr. Jaime Dichaves who issued the
letter stating that all banking transaction of Jose Velarde should be coursed to him. [TSN, April 13, 2005, p. 68-72]
The testimony of Bagsit does not establish that it is Dichaves who owns the Jose Velarde accounts as her opinion was based
simply on the letter issued by Dichaves. As against the inference that Dichaves owned the Jose Velarde accounts based on the
letter of Dichaves, the Prosecution’s evidence showing that FPres. Estrada signed as Jose Velarde in the various documents given
to him for signature must be given more weight to establish the fact that the Jose Velarde accounts belong to FPres. Estrada.

Moreover, there was a glaring inconsistency in the testimonies of Defense witness Dy Tang and Bagsit when Dy Tang testified
that all the fixed (time) deposits of Dichaves were moved in the branch of Bagsit in Pacific Star, while Bagsit testified that she
does not know if Dichaves has an account in her area, she thinks there is none but she does not know with other branches. [TSN,
May 4, 2005. pp. 26-28; TSN, April 13, 2005, p. 76]

As regards the statement of Bagsit that the Debit-Credit authority did not come form her and that later, it was found to have
come from the Trust Department, We find the testimony of Clarissa Ocampo that the Debit-Credit Authority came from Bagsit as
being more credible. First, because the debit-credit authority deals with S/A 0160-62501-5 which is under the Banking
Department and not the Trust Department; and Second, because as testified by Bagsit, she found the Debit- Credit Authority on
her table after it was signed but she kept it and did not give it to anybody. The Court likewise notes that Bagsit was not involved
with the EPCIB Binondo Branch but she remembers the prefix for Binondo accounts as No. 0110, yet, she could not remember
the prefix for accounts with the Pacific Star Branch of EPCIB which she headed since 1999.

In the attempt to downplay the effect of FPres. Estrada signing as Jose Velarde in the Debit-Credit Authority, the defense argued
that the said debit-credit authority was not implemented "precisely because the signature of accused Estrada did not match
with that of the real Jose Velarde (who turned out to be Jaime Dichaves) [Defense Memorandum, p. 251] and "probably because
the bank officers got to realize that accused President Estrada was not really the owner of the account." [Ibid., p. 263]

Besides being speculative, the arguments of the Defense are mere allegations which are not supported by its own evidence.

The evidence of the Defense shows that prior to February 4, 2000, the account balance of S/A 0160-62501-5 of Jose Velarde was
P142,763,773.67. (Exh. 127-O) There was therefore not enough funds in the account to transfer to the Trust Account. Thus, the
Debit-Credit Authority could not be implemented.

Subsequently, a credit memo for P506,416,666.66 was issued in favor of the said Jose Velarde S/A 0160-62501-5 account. As per
the testimony of defense witness, Beatriz Bagsit, the amount of P 506,416,666.66 represented the principal and interest of a
preterminated placement of S/A 0160-62501-5. The placement was not in the name of Dichaves but in the name of an account
number, i.e. Account No. 0160-62501-5 and behind that account is Jose Velarde. [TSN, April 18, 2005, p. 37] Eventually the
P500,000,000.00 was withdrawn from the savings account in exchange for an MC payable to trust. [Ibid. pp. 30, 31]

Consequently, while the funding for the P500,000,000.00 did not come via the debit-credit authority, nonetheless, the funding
of the P500,000,000.00 came from S/A 0160-62501-5 of Jose Velarde.

Moreover, the debit-credit authority was not implemented because Bagsit kept the debit-credit authority and did not give it to
anybody. [TSN, April 13, 2005, p. 116]

Neither does the non-implementation of the Debit-Credit Authority which FPres. Estrada signed as Jose Velarde disprove the
fact that FPres. Estrada admitted that S/A 0160-62501-5 in the name of Jose Velarde is his account when he admitted affixing his
signature on the Debit-Credit Authority as Jose Velarde.

The so-called "internal arrangements" with the bank, involved the use of S/A 0160-62501-5 which had been in existence since
August 26, 1999 as the funding source of the P500,000,000.00 to be placed in the Trust account for lending to Gatchalian. The
fact that the P500,000,000.00 funding was not effected by a debit-credit transaction but by a withdrawal of P500,000,000.00
from the said S/A 0160-62501-5 proves that the money lent to Gatchalian was the personal money of FPres. Estrada through the
Jose Velarde account of which he is the owner. As explained by FPres. Estrada, "William Gatchalian is a big businessman. Isang
malaking negosyante at siya po ay may ari ng Wellex group of companies at siya rin po ay isa sa tumulong sa aming partido
noong nakaraang 1998 presidential election." [TSN, May 24, 2006, p. 23]

FPres. Estrada further testified: "Hindi lang po dahil doon sa internal arrangement. Hindi lang po dahil gusto kong tulungan si Mr.
William Gatchalian kundi higit po sa lahat ay nakita ko ang kapakanan noong mahigit na tatlong libong (3000) empleyado na
kung sakaling hindi mapapautang si Mr. William Gatchalian, maaring magsara ang kanyang mga kumpanya at yong mga taong,
mahigit tatlong libong (3,000) empleyado kasama na yong kanilang mga pamilya ay mawawalan ng trabaho. AT INISIP KO RING
NA WALA NAMING (SIC) GOVERNMENT FUNDS NA INVOLVE KAYA HINDI NA PO AKO NAGDALAWANG ISIP NA PIRMAHAN KO."
[Ibid. p. 26-27; Emphasis Supplied]
Moreover, as pointed out by the Prosecution, there was no need for the internal arrangement since the loan to Gatchalian could
have been extended by EPCIB directly considering that Gatchalian had put up sufficient collateral for the loan.

From the foregoing, the ineluctable conclusion is that the so-called internal arrangement which allegedly prompted FPres.
Estrada to sign the various documents presented to him by Clarissa Ocampo is a futile attempt to escape the consequence of his
admission that he signed as Jose Velarde which leads to the legal and indisputable conclusion that FPres. Estrada is the owner of
the Jose Velarde Accounts.

THE DAMAGE AND PREJUDICE TO THE FILIPINO PEOPLE

As stated earlier, SSS and GSIS used the funds belonging to its millions of members to buy Belle Shares upon instruction of FPres.
Estrada who benefited for his personal gain from the P189,700,000.00 commission paid in consideration of the purchase of the
Belle shares by SSS and GSIS . The money paid by GSIS and SSS for the Belle Shares are public funds which belong to the millions
of GSIS and SSS members. The amount of P189,700,000.00 deposited to the Jose Velarde account of FPres. Estrada are public
funds which came from the proceeds of the sale received by SSI Management through Eastern Securities from GSIS and SSS. The
Billions of Pesos that could have otherwise been used to pay benefits to SSS and GSIS members were diverted to buying Belle
Shares to comply with FPres. Estrada’s instructions in order that FPres. Estrada could receive his P187,900,000.00 commission to
the damage and prejudice of the millions of GSIS and SSS members who were deprived of the use of such funds and worse, who
now stand to suffer the loss amounting to millions of pesos since the Belle shares are presently priced less than their acquisition
cost. [From an average price of P3.14 per share to P0.69 per share as of December 29, 2000 (Exh. 250-J-2) and between P0.40 to
P 0.50 per share as of February 11, 2002]

The Court finds that FPres. Estrada took advantage of his official position, authority, relationship, connection and influence to
unjustly enrich himself at the expense and to the damage and prejudice of the Filipino people and the Republic of the
Philippines: a)  by instructing, directing and ordering, for his personal gain and benefit, by way of receiving commission, the
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) through its President Mr. Federico Pascual and the Social Security System (SSS)
through its President, Mr. Carlos Arellano, to purchase shares of stock Belle Corporation, as a consequence of which, during the
period October 13 to 21, 1999 GSIS bought 351,878,000 shares of Belle Corporation and paid One Billion One Hundred Two
Million Nine Hundred Sixty Five Thousand Six Hundred Seven Pesos And Fifty Centavos (P1,102,965,607.50) while SSS, on
October 21, 1999, bought 249,679,000 shares at the value of P784,551,150.00 at an average price of P3.14/share [TSN, February
14, 2005, p.78] or a combined total of at least One Billion Eight Hundred Eight Seven Million Five Hundred Sixteen Thousand
Seven Hundred Fifty Seven Pesos And Fifty Centavos (P1,887,516,757.50); b) by accepting and receiving, a commission in the
amount of One Hundred Eighty Nine Million Seven Hundred Thousand Pesos [P189,700,000.00] as consideration for the
purchase by GSIS and SSS of the shares of stock of Belle Corporation pursuant to his instructions which amount was deposited in
the Equitable-PCI Bank S/A 0160-62501-5 under the account name "Jose Velarde" of which FPres. Estrada is the real and
beneficial owner; c) by depriving the millions of members of GSIS and SSS of the use of public funds in the amount of at least
One Billion Eight Hundred Eight Seven Million Five Hundred Sixteen Thousand Seven Hundred Fifty Seven Pesos And Fifty
Centavos (P1,887,516,757.50) for payment of their benefits in order that he can receive his commission of One Hundred Eighty
Nine Million Seven Hundred Thousand Pesos (P189,700,000.00) which likewise constitute public funds for his personal benefit
and enrichment thus causing damage and prejudice to the Filipino people and the Government.

RE: SUB-PARAGRAPH D OF THE

AMENDED INFORMATION
_____________________________

(d) by unjustly enriching himself FROM COMMISSIONS, GIFTS, SHARES, PERCENTAGES, KICKBACKS, OR ANY
FORM OF PECUNIARY BENEFITS, IN CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, in the amount of MORE
OR LESS THREE BILLION TWO HNDRED THIRTY THREE MILLION ONE HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND AND ONE
HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE PESOS AND SEVENTEEN CENTAVOS [P3,233,104,173.17] AND DEPOSITING THE
SAME UNDER HIS ACCOUNT NAME "JOSE VELARDE" AT THE EQUITABLE-PCI BANK.

The prosecution presented the following witnesses to prove the enormous amounts of deposits to the Jose Velarde Account and
the person who transacted with the bank in relation thereto.

TERESA ARRASTIA BARCELONA was the Manager of Equitable PCI Bank in Greenhills-Ortigas Branch specifically located at the
Ground Floor of the Equitable Building along Ortigas Avenue corner Roosevelt, San Juan, Metro Manila, which was within the
vicinity of the business and commercial areas of Greenhills.

Witness Barcelona then related and identified twelve (12) Equitable PCI Bank Deposit Receipts (Exhs. I5 and M5 to W5) dated as
follows:
 1.       October 20, 1999;

2.       November 8, 1999;

3.       November 22, 1999;

4.       November 24, 1999;

5.       November 25, 1999;

6.       December 20, 1999;

7.       December 21, 1999;

8.       December 29, 1999;

9.       January 4, 2000;

10.     May 10, 2000;

11.     June 6, 2000; and

12.     July 25, 2000.

These deposit receipts allegedly show various deposits made to Account No. 0160-62501-5 under the Account Name Jose
Velarde maintained at the Equitable PCI Bank Binondo Branch. The transactions to the said account were allegedly inter-branch
deposits or deposits made from one branch of Equitable PCI Bank for an account maintained at another branch of the said bank.
The aforementioned deposit receipts show that the deposits to the adverted account were transacted at the Equitable PCI Bank
Greenhills-Ortigas Branch.

In the Equitable PCI Bank Deposit Receipt dated October 20, 1999, there were allegedly nine (9) checks deposited to the Jose
Velarde Account. The total amount of the checks deposited was P143,000,000.00. The teller who processed the checks was
Glyzelyn Bejec.

In the Equitable PCI Bank Deposit Receipt dated November 8, 1999, four (4) checks were deposited to the Jose Velarde Account
in the total amount of P263,292,303.65. The checks deposited were as follows: a Far East Bank and Trust Co. Araneta Branch
Check with Check No. 3165579 amounting to P189,700,000.00; an HSBC Head Office Check with Check No. 0022012 amounting
to P20,000,000.00; a Union Bank Head Office Check with Check No. 034181 amounting to P10,875,749.43; and another Union
Bank Head Office Check with Check No. 034182 amounting to P42,716,554.22. These checks were likewise processed by Glyzelyn
Bejec on November 8, 1999 at 4:01 p.m.

In the Equitable PCI Bank Deposit Receipt dated November 22, 1999, three (3) checks for the total amount of P40 Million were
deposited to the Jose Velarde Account. These checks were processed by the bank’s teller Joan Mok.

In the Equitable PCI Bank Deposit Receipt dated November 24, 1999, a check of P54,161,496.52 was deposited to the Jose
Velarde Account. The check was processed by the bank’s teller Leonora Royo on November 24, 1999 at 9:26 a.m.

In the Equitable PCI Bank Deposit Receipt dated November 25, 1999, three (3) checks for the total amount of P20,000,000.00
were deposited to the Jose Velarde Account. These checks were processed by the bank’s teller Glyzelyn Bejec.

In the Equitable PCI Bank Deposit Receipt dated December 20, 1999, three (3) checks for the total amount of P163,500,000.00
were deposited to the Jose Velarde Account. These checks were processed by the bank’s teller Lagrimas Claveria on December
20, 1999 at 4:12 p.m.

In the Equitable PCI Bank Deposit Receipt dated December 21, 1999, a check of P5,000,000.00 was deposited to the Jose Velarde
Account. The check was processed by the bank’s teller Glyzelyn Bejec.

In the Equitable PCI Bank Deposit Receipt dated December 29, 1999, two (2) checks for the total amount of P2,500,000.00 were
deposited to the Jose Velarde Account. These checks were processed by the bank’s teller Glyzelyn Bejec.
In the Equitable PCI Bank Deposit Receipt dated January 4, 2000, seven (7) checks for the total amount of P70,500,000.00 were
deposited to the Jose Velarde Account. These checks were processed by the bank’s teller Joan Mok on January 4, 2000 at 2:31
p.m.

In the Equitable PCI Bank Deposit Receipt dated May 10, 2000, four (4) checks for the total amount of P23,000,000.00 were
deposited to the Jose Velarde Account. These checks were processed by the bank’s teller Joan Mok on May 10, 2000 at 4:30
p.m.

In the Equitable PCI Bank Deposit Receipt dated June 6, 2000, two (2) checks for the total amount of P42,945,000.00 were
deposited to the Jose Velarde Account. These checks were processed by the bank’s teller Joan Mok on June 6, 2000 at 3:39 p.m.

Lastly, in the Equitable PCI Bank Deposit Receipt dated July 25, 2000, a check of P40,000,000.00 was deposited to the Jose
Velarde Account. This check was processed by the bank’s teller Glyzelyn Bejec on July 25, 2000 at 11:43 a.m.

It was Baby Ortaliza who personally transacted the above-mentioned checks with Barcelona whom she identified in a
photograph (Exh. X5). Barcelona related that Baby Ortaliza would hand over the checks to be deposited together with the
account information slip or passbook of Jose Velarde to her and that, after the validation, Barcelona would hand over a copy of
the deposit receipt to Baby Ortaliza. [TSN dated May 13, 2002 and TSN dated May 15, 2002]

JOANNE GENEVIE RANIAGA MOK was a Customer Service Assistant Teller of Equitable PCI Bank Greenhills-Ortigas Branch since
July 1997. She received deposits and processed withdrawals made with the bank.

Mok related and identified four (4) Equitable PCI Bank deposit receipts which pertained to various checks deposited to the Jose
Velarde Account with Account No. 0160-62501-5: Deposit Receipt dated November 22, 1999 (Exh. N5); Deposit Receipt dated
January 4, 2000 (Exh. T5); Deposit Receipt (Exhibit U5) dated May 10, 2000; and Deposit Receipt (Exhibit V5) dated June 6, 2000.
Mok testified that she personally processed the checks deposited to the said account.

In the Deposit Receipt dated November 22, 1999, there were three (3) checks deposited with the total amount of P40 Million. In
the Deposit Receipt dated January 4, 2000, there were seven (7) checks deposited with the total amount of P70,500,000.00. In
the Deposit Receipt dated May 10, 2000, there were four (4) checks deposited with the total amount of P23,000,000.00. Lastly,
in the Deposit Receipt dated June 6, 2000, there were two (2) checks deposited with the total amount of P44,945,000.00

Mok further related that she prepared 3 copies of the deposit receipts and that after processing the deposit receipts she threw
away the Account Information slip. [TSN dated May 20, 2002 and TSN dated October 28, 2002]

GLYZELYN HERMOZURA BEJEC was a Customer Service Assistant Teller of Equitable PCI Bank Greenhills-Ortigas Branch. She
processed deposit and withdrawal transactions of the bank.

Bejec related and identified the deposit receipts of Equitable PCI Bank (Exhs. I5, M5, P5, R5, S5 and W5) which pertained to various
checks she personally processed and credited to the Jose Velarde Account with Account No. 0160-62501-5. In the Deposit
Receipt dated November 8, 1999, the total amount of deposit was P263,292,303.65. In the Deposit Receipt dated October 20,
1999, there were nine (9) checks deposited in the total amount of P163,000,000.00. In the Deposit Receipt dated November 25,
1999, there were three (3) checks deposited in the total amount of P20,000,000.00. In the Deposit Receipt dated December 21,
1999, the total amount of deposit was P5,000,000.00. In the Deposit Receipt dated December 29, 1999, there were two (2)
checks deposited in the total amount of P2,500,000.00. Lastly, in the Deposit Receipt dated July 25, 2000, a check was deposited
in the amount of P40,000,000.00.

On cross examination, Bejec testified that there were Account Information Slips when the checks were presented but she
already threw away the said slips. It was the policy of the bank to throw away the Account Information Slips when the deposit
receipt had been generated. [TSN dated May 6, 13, and 20, 2002]

LEONORA BACSAFRA ROYO was the Customer Service Assistant for new accounts of Equitable PCI Bank Greenhills-Ortigas
Branch since March of 1993. She testified that she was the teller who processed the Deposit Receipt (Exh. O5) dated November
24, 1999 and that she prepared three (3) copies of the same since it was an inter-branch check deposit transaction. The deposit
receipt shows that an Urban Bank Head Office Branch Manager’s Check No. 0000037661 dated November 23, 1999 amounting
to P54,161,496.52 was deposited to the Jose Velarde Account No. 0160-62501-5 maintained at the Equitable PCI Bank Binondo
Branch. Teresa Barcelona, the branch manager, handed to Royo for processing the Urban Bank Manager’s Check as well as the
accomplished account information slip. [TSN dated October 30, 2002]

ANTONIO MARTIN SAGRITALO FORTUNO was the Bank Operations Officer of Equitable PCI Bank, Pacific Star Branch since
January 28, 2002. The witness averred that he handled the opening of accounts; supervised the investment section; the foreign
telegraphic transfer as well as the domestic telegraphic transfer and the safekeeping of the records of deposits; and the
transactions which transpired in their branch. Witness Fortuno brought with him to Court the documents contained in the
subpoena which he requested from the PCHC. These documents were the seventeen (17) microfilm copies of the checks that
were deposited to the Jose Velarde account from the PCHC; the nine (9) deposit slips or deposit receipts that were deposited to
the account of Jose Velarde together with the five (5) cash deposits; and the detailed report of transfers and debit, credit
memos or the DRTM from October 19, 1999 to January 24, 2000.

Fortuno related and identified the seventeen (17) microfilm copies of checks that were deposited to the Jose Velarde account
from various banks as well as the deposit receipts and the DRTMs.

The original of the checks were allegedly returned to the issuing bank after having been negotiated. The first check deposited to
the Jose Velarde account was a cashier’s check from PS Bank Head Office with Check No. 000031436 amounting to
P20,000,000.00 and dated October 18, 1999 (Exhs. R14; R14-1; and R14-2). Fortuno narrated that this check was presented to the
teller of the bank and then the teller validated the deposit slip which was attached to the check. The amount of the check was
consequently credited to the Jose Velarde account with an Account No. 0160-62501-5. The witness, however, cannot tell who
purchased this cashier’s check. The second check deposited to the Jose Velarde account was also a cashier’s check from PS Bank
Head Office with Check No. 000031437 amounting to P20 Million and dated October 18, 1999 (Exhs. S14; S14-1; S14-2; S14-3; and
S14-4). This check allegedly passed the same procedure as the first check before the amount of the check was credited to the
Jose Velarde account. The witness further related that the Jose Velarde account was maintained at the Binondo Juan Luna
branch and that the deposits were made in the Pacific Star.

The first deposit receipt (Exhs. T14; T14-1; T14-2; T14-3; and T14-4) was dated October 19, 1999. This deposit receipt allegedly shows
that there were two (2) checks deposited to the Jose Velarde Account for the total amount of P30,000,000.00, one for P20
Million and the other for P10 Million. The witness specified that this deposit receipt indicated the account name Jose Velarde;
the branch name as Pacific Star branch; the account number 0160-62501-5; the date and time of deposit which was on October
19, 1999 at 12:55 in the afternoon; and the checks deposited which were from the Security Bank Corporation Main Office with
Check No. 000363859 for P20,000,000.00 and Check No. 000363858 for P10,000,000.00. He added that the checks were dated
October 18, 1999.

The second deposit receipt (Exhs. U14; U14-1; U14-2; U14-3; and U14-4) was also dated October 19, 1999. This deposit receipt
allegedly shows that there were two (2) checks deposited to the Jose Velarde Account for the total amount of P30,000,000.00,
one for P20,000,000.00 and the other for P10,000,000.00. The witness specified that this deposit receipt contained the account
name Jose Velarde; the branch name as Pacific Star branch; the account number 0160-62501-5; the date and time of deposit
which was on October 19, 1999 at 12:53 in the afternoon; and the checks deposited, the first check was from the Security Bank
Corporation Main Office with Check No. 000363857 for P20,000,000.00, and the other check was from PSB Head Office with
Check No. 0000031438 for P10,000,000.00. These checks were dated October 18, 1999.

The third deposit receipt (Exhibits V14; V14-1; V14-2; V14-3; and V14-4) was likewise dated October 19, 1999. This deposit receipt
allegedly shows that there were two (2) checks deposited to the Jose Velarde Account for the total amount of P50,000,000.00,
one for P20,000,000.00 and the other for P30,000,000.00. Witness Fortuno identified the account name as Jose Velarde; the
branch name as Pacific Star branch; the account number 0160-62501-5; the date and time of deposit which was on October 19,
1999 at 12:49 in the afternoon; and the checks deposited, the first check was from the Global Bank Head Office with Check No.
0000107383 for P30,000,000.00, and the other check was also from the Global Bank Head Office with Check No. 00017385 for
P20,000,000.00. These checks were both dated October 18, 1999.

The fourth deposit receipt (Exhibits W14; W14-1; and W14-2) was dated November 3, 1999. This deposit receipt allegedly shows
that a check deposit was made to the Jose Velarde Account for P5,000,000.00. Witness Fortuno identified the account name as
Jose Velarde; the branch name as Pacific Star branch; the account number 0160-62501-5; the date and time of deposit which
was on November 3, 1999 at 11:03 in the morning; and the check deposited which was from Westmont Bank in Ayala Avenue
with Check No. 000187472 for P5,000,000.00. The said check was dated October 26, 1999.

The fifth deposit receipt (Exhibits X14; X14-1; and X14-2) was also dated November 3, 1999. This deposit receipt allegedly shows
that a check deposit was made to the Jose Velarde Account for P5,000,000.00. The particulars of this deposit receipt were the
same as the fourth deposit receipt except for the time of deposit, which was at 11:04 in the morning, and the check deposited
which was from Westmont Bank in Ayala Avenue with Check No. 000187471 for P5,000,000.00. The said check was likewise
dated October 26, 1999.

The sixth deposit receipt (Exhs. Y14; Y14-1; and Y14-2) was dated December 17, 1999. This deposit receipt allegedly shows that a
check deposit was made to the Jose Velarde Account for P50,000,000.00. The check deposited was allegedly from Equitable PCI
Bank in Divisoria - M. De Santos branch with Check No. 0783236 for P50,000,000.00.
The seventh deposit receipt (Exhs. Z14; Z14-1; Z14-2; Z14-3; and Z14-4) was dated January 11, 2000. This deposit receipt allegedly
shows that there were two (2) checks deposited to the Jose Velarde Account for the total amount of P26,325,055.65, one for
P20,000,000.00 and the other for P6,325,055.65. Witness Fortuno identified the account name as Jose Velarde; the branch
name as Pacific Star branch; the account number 0160-62501-5; the date and time of deposit which was on January 11, 2000 at
12:39 in the afternoon; and the checks deposited, the first check was from Equitable PCI Bank in Divisoria – M. De Santos branch
with Check No. 0111-795-117 for P20 Million, and the other check was from Bank of Commerce in Port Area with Check No.
0030474 for P6,325,055.65. The Equitable PCI Bank check was dated January 6, 2000 while the Bank of Commerce check was
dated January 11, 2000.

The eight deposit receipt (Exh. A15) was dated January 19, 2000. This deposit receipt with an account information slip (Exh. A15-1)
allegedly shows that a cash deposit of P25,000,000.00 was made to the Jose Velarde Account. Witness Fortuno testified that the
account name Jose Velarde as well as the account number were specified in the account information slip.

Last for the deposit receipt (Exh. B15) was dated January 24, 2000. This deposit receipt allegedly shows that there were four (4)
checks deposited to the Jose Velarde Account for the total amount of P75,000,000.00. The account name Jose Velarde as well as
the account number were specified in an account information slip (Exh. B15-1) for this deposit receipt. The four (4) checks
deposited (Exhs. B15-2; B15-3; B15-4; B15-5; B15-6; B15-7; B15-8; and B15-9) were allegedly manager’s checks from the head office of
Urban Bank and all dated January 18, 2000. Witness Fortuno testified that the first check with Check No. 00039976 was for
P2,000,000.00; the second check with Check No. 00039975 was for P70,000,000.00; the third check with Check No. 00039978
was for P1,000,000.00; and the fourth check with Check No. 00039977 was for P2,000,000.00.

Fortuno continued on his direct-examination and testified as to the Detailed Report of Transfers and Credit Memorandums
(DRTM) dated October 19, 1999; DRTM dated November 3, 1999; DRTM dated December 15, 1999; DRTM dated December 17,
1999; DRTM dated January 11, 2000; DRTM dated January 19, 2000; and DRTM dated January 24, 2000. The witness explained
that these DRTM reflects the inter-branch transactions which were done at the Equitable PCI Bank Pacific Star branch. These
DRTM allegedly show the summary of the transactions made particularly to the Jose Velarde Account with Account No. 0160-
62501-5.

The witness testified that the DRTM dated December 15, 1999 (Exhs. C15 and C15-1) reflects the summary of four (4) cash
deposits to the Jose Velarde Account. The first cash deposit was for P25,900,000.00; the second cash deposit was for
P37,126,467.83; the third cash deposit was for P38,325,629.67; and the fourth cash deposit was for P43,647,902.50. The DRTM
dated October 19, 1999 (Exhs. D15 and D15-1) reflects the summary of four (4) deposits to the Jose Velarde Account. The first
deposit was for P30,000,000.00; the second deposit was for P30,000,000.00; the third deposit was for P40,000,000.00; and the
fourth deposit was for P50,000,000.00. The total amount of deposits for October 19, 1999 was P150,000,000.00. The DRTM
dated November 3, 1999 (Exhs. E15 and E15-1) reflects the summary of two (2) check deposits to the Jose Velarde Account. Each
of these check deposits was for P5,000,000.00 for the total amount of P10,000,000.00. The DRTM dated December 17, 1999
(Exhs. F15 and F15-1) reflects a deposit to the Jose Verlarde Account for P50,000,000.00. The DRTM dated January 11, 2000 (Exhs.
G15 and G15-1) reflects the summary of two (2) deposits to the Jose Velarde account for the total amount of P26,325,055.65. The
first deposit was for P20,000,000.00 and the second deposit was for P6,325,055.65. The DRTM dated January 19, 2000 (Exhs.
H15 and H15-1) shows a cash deposit to the Jose Velarde Account for P25,000,000.00. Lastly, the DRTM dated January 24, 2000
(Exhs. I15 and I15-1) reflects a check deposit to the Jose Velarde Account for P75,000,000.00.

Fortuno claimed that the head of the branch of the bank at the time the foregoing deposits were made was Beatriz Bagsit. He
added that the total amount of cash and check deposits for the period of October 19, 1999 to January 24, 2000 aggregated to
P481,325,055.65.

On cross examination, Fortuno clarified that the Equitable PCI Bank Pacific Star branch had no specimen signatures of Jose
Velarde. He also admitted that he had no personal knowledge on any matter relating to the Jose Verlade Account nor does he
know the persons who made the cash and check deposits. He testified that none of the names of FPres. Estrada and Jinggoy
Estrada appear in the deposit slips or checks he exhibited and identified. [TSN dated November 25, 2002 and TSN dated
November 27, 2002]

MICHELLETTE SOLIDUM LEGASPI was the Branch Head of Equitable PCI Bank Greenhills-Virra Mall Branch on December 19, 1997
until July 26, 2002. The branch was near North Greenhills Subdivision, San Juan. It was less than 100 meters away from the
Buchanan gate or perpendicular to Eisenhower Street of the subdivision. Polk Street was one of the streets of North Greenhills
where the residence of former President Estrada was located. [TSN dated December 2, 2002, pp. 39-48]

The Virra Mall Branch was merged with the Greenhills Shopping Center Branch on July 26, 2002. All the bank records and
documents of the branch were forwarded to the warehouse of the head office.
Legaspi brought a Certification (Exhibit T15) dated November 27, 2002, accomplished and executed by Judy L. Go, Vice-President
and Branch Head, Juan Luna Binondo Center, Equitable PCI Bank which certified that Savings Account No. 016062501-5 and
Current Account No. 011025495-4 were both under the name of Jose Velarde. [Ibid, pp. 49-56]

Legaspi then identified seven (7) Electronic Clearing Systems Reports with attached documents which were microfilm copies of
certain checks. She explained that the Electronic Clearing systems Report was the summary of all checks received and processed
at Greenhills-Virra Mall Branch and then sent to PCHC for clearing. The microfilm copies of the checks supported the summary of
the Electronic Clearing systems Report. The documents were handed over to Legaspi by their Legal Department.

The Electronic Clearing Systems Report showed the batch sent by the branch to PCHC for clearing. The report bore the routing
number of the branch and the identification of the checks that were sent to the Philippine Clearing House Corporation (PCHC).

For the September 10, 1999 Report (Exhibit U15, with sub markings), ten (10) checks were processed by the branch. The
microfilm copies of the checks bore the Account No. 016062501-5 which meant that the checks were deposited to the said
account. Legaspi explained that the account number was found at the back of the checks. The back of the microfilm checks also
bore a certification from the PCHC that the item was a photocopy of the original clearing document processed by PCHC.

The following microfilm copies were presented: Allied Bank Check No. 00080546 for P10,000,000.00; Check No. 0080566 for
P10,000,000.00; Check No. 0080548 for P10,000,000.00; Check No. 0080542 for P10,000,000.00; Check No. 0080543 for
P10,000,000.00; Check No 0084547 for P5,000,000.00; Check No. 0080544 for P5,000,000.00; Westmont bank Ayala Branch
Check No. 000181135 for P5,000,000.00; Metrobank Check No. 0091780568 for P5,000,000.00; Far East Bank Check No.
3165562 for P20,000,000.00 with Jaime Dichavez or Abbie Dichavez as account holder.

Attached to the report was a document entitled Detailed Report of Transfer and/or Credit and Debit memo (U15-12) of
Greenhills, Virra Mall Branch as of September 10, 1999. On the report, an inter-branch transaction on September 10, 1999 was
made for Account No 016062501-5 for P90,000,000.00. The report was secured by the bank’s Legal Department pursuant to the
subpoena.

For the September 30, 1999 Electronic Clearing Systems Report (Exhibit V15, with submarkings), two checks were deposited to
Account No 016062501-1. These were Equitable Bank Binondo Branch Check No. 0811277 for P8,300,000.00 and Allied Bank
Check No. 0080550 for P20,000,000.00. The dorsal side of the Equitable check bore the account name Jose Velarde and Account
No. 016062501-1.

Another attached document was the transaction journal log report (Exhibit V15-4) which showed the two deposits. Reflected on
the journal log was the amount P995,371.66 indicating the last balance of the Account as of September 29, 1999. A late Deposit
Transactions Report of the Branch as of September 30, 1999 reflected that the two checks deposited were late deposit
transactions so that they were considered the following day transactions. A Detailed Report of Transfer and/or Memo of
Greenhills, Virra Mall dated September 30, 1999 also reflected the two checks.

The third Electronic Clearing Systems Report (Exhibit W15, with sub markings) presented was dated October 6, 1999. The details
contained the following: Equitable Bank Manager’s check in the amount of P300,000,000.00 deposited to Account No.
016062501-5. The journal log reported the P300,000,000.00 deposit on October 5, 1999. A detailed report of Transfer Memo
(Exhibit W15-4) of the branch dated October 6, 1999 showed that a P300,000,000.00 check deposit to Account No. 016062501-
5.

The next Electronic Clearing Systems Report (Exhibit X15, with sub markings) was dated November 26, 1999 and showed that
three checks were processed by the branch. These checks were: Equitable Bank Check No. 0811579 for P20,000,000.00, Check
No. 0811580 for P20,000,000.00 and Check No. 0811582 for P60,000,000.00. The dorsal portions of the checks bore the account
number 01602501-5 where the checks were deposited. The Detailed Report of Transaction Memo (Exhibit X15-5) dated
November 26, 1999 also showed these three transactions. Since the checks were deposited beyond the clearing cut-off time, the
late deposit transactions report ( Exhibit X15-6) was also presented.

The Electronic Clearing Systems Report (Exhibit Y15, with sub markings) dated November 29, 1999 showed a Westmont Bank
check No. 0000187474 deposit for P25 Million which against bore the account No. 016062501-5. A detailed Report Transfer
Memo (Exhibit Y15-3) was presented to show this interbranch transaction. The late transaction report dated November 29 for the
P25,000,000.00 check deposit was also presented. [Ibid, pp. 51-137]

Electronic Clearing System Report (Exhibit Z15, with sub markings) dated December 1, 1999 showed a Metrobank Magdalena
Center Check No. 035400 for P53,000,000.00. The detailed report transfer (Exhibit Z15-3) reflected that the P53,000,000.00 check
was deposited to Account No. 016062501-5.
The last Electronic Clearing Systems Report (Exhibit A16, with sub markings) dated December 2, 1999 showed that Equitable PCI
Binondo Branch Check No. 0811596 for P50,000,000.00, Check No. 0811597 for P50,000,000.00 and Allied bank Check No.
0176625 for P20,000,000.00 were processed. Attached were two transaction journals (Exhibit A16-5) dated December 1, 1999
showing these inter-branch transactions.

Legaspi explained that they were unable to produce the deposit slips representing the inter-branch deposits made to the
account of Jose Velarde because all the documents pertaining to the Virra Mall branch were forwarded to the warehouse. They
were still in the process of retrieving the other documents pertaining to the deposit slips. [TSN dated December 4, 2000, pp. 11-
23]

Legaspi testified that the transactions were made by Baby Ortaliza whom she identified in a photograph (Exht X5). [Ibid, pp. 24-
30]

On cross examination, Legaspi testified that she was certain that the deposit receipts were actually accomplished and saw Baby
Ortaliza several times transacting at the branch. [Ibid, pp. 31-34]

MELISSA PORTO PASCUAL was a bank teller of Equitable PCI Bank Greenhills Virra Mall Branch from April 1, 1999 to January of
2002. She processed cash deposits, check deposit deposits, withdrawals and encashment during that time.

The witness then related and identified microfilm copies of checks which she claimed that she personally processed for inter-
branch deposits. These checks were: Equitable PCI Bank Check (Exh. V15-2 and submarkings) No. 0811277 dated September 26,
1999 with the amount of P80,300,000.00; Allied Bank Check (Exh. V15-3 and submarkings) No. 0080550 dated September 15,
1999 with the amount of P20,000,000.00; Equitable PCI Bank Check (Exh. W15-2 and submarkings) No. 0241001331 dated
September 13, 1999 with the amount of P300,000,000.00; Equitable PCI Bank Check (Exh. X15-2 and submarkings) No. 0811579
dated November 23, 1999 with the amount of P20,000,000.00; Equitable PCI Bank Check (Exh. X15-3 and submarkings) No.
0811580 dated November 23, 1999 with the amount of P20,000,000.00; Equitable PCI Bank Check (Exh. X15-4 and submarkings)
No. 0811582 dated November 23, 1999 with the amount of P60,000,000.00; Westmont Bank Check (Exh. Y15-2 and submarkings)
No. 0000187474 dated November 27, 1999 with the amount of P25,000,000.00; and Allied Bank Check (Exh. A16-4 and
submarkings) No. 0176625 dated December 1, 1999 with the amount of P20,000,000.00.

The foregoing checks were deposited by Baby Ortaliza to the Jose Velarde Account with Account No. 0160-62501-5 which was
maintained at Equitable PCI Bank Binondo Branch. Pascual described the physical appearance of Baby Ortaliza and identified her
in a photograph (Exh. X5).

To corroborate her claim that she personally processed the aforementioned checks, witness Pascual further related and
identified the Electronic Clearing System Report (Exhs. U15 to Z15-3) dated November 26, 1999; the Electronic Clearing System
Report dated October 6, 1999; the Journal Report dated October 5, 1999; the Electronic Clearing System Report dated
September 30, 1999; the Electronic Clearing System Report dated November 29, 1999; the Electronic Clearing System Report
dated December 2, 1999; and the Journal Report dated December 1, 1999. [TSN dated December 9, 2002]

LAMBERTO BAJACAN DEL FONSO (Del Fonso) was the Assistant Vice President and Department Head of the Branch Monitoring
and Administration Department of Equitable PCI Bank since 1997.

Del Fonso identified the bank statements relative to the Jose Velarde Savings Account No. 0160-62501-5 for the period
beginning August 1, 1999 to November 30, 2000 (Exhs. D19 to D19-13, inclusive of submarkings) and to Current Account No. 0110-
25495-4 for the period beginning August 1, 1999 to October 31, 2000 (Exhs. E19 to E19-14). As to Savings Account No. 0160-
62501-5, he testified that the account was closed on November 13, 2000 (Exh. D19-13). As to Current Account No. 0110-25495-4,
witness Del Fonso identified a transaction for October 6, 1999 (Exh. E19-2) for an automatic transfer of the amount of
P29,304,219.69 from the savings account. On the same day, there was an Inward Check deposit amounting to P142 million. For
the other months, there were either minimal transactions or none at all.

With respect to the account holder – Jose Velarde, Del Fonso testified that he had no address indicated in the accounts as the
same were simply "c/o EBC" or "care of Equitable Banking Corporation" through its Head Office in Binondo, Manila. He clarified
that this was allowed as a special arrangement, although he did not know and neither had he met Jose Velarde. [TSN dated
January 22, 2003]

RENE COLIN DACIO GRAY was head of the Cash Department of Urban Bank sometime on January 2000. He presented and
identified a Manager’s Check No. 43222 dated January 17, 2000 (Exh. W19) issued by Urban Bank Greenhills Branch which
totalled Seventy Five Million Pesos (P75,000,000.00). Gray related that the Chairman of Urban Bank, Arsenio Bartolome, asked
him to divide this check into four (4) checks - Urban Bank Check Nos. 39975, 39976, 39977 and 39978 (Exhs. B15-2, B15-4 B15-6 B15-
8) all dated January 18, 2000. [TSN, March 31, 2003, pp. 8-31]
AURORA CHUMACERA BALDOZ (Baldoz) was the Vice-President of the Receivership and Liquidation Group 2 of the Philippine
Deposit Insurance Corporation (PDIC) since March 24, 1994. As such, she actually administered the receivership, take-over and
liquidation of banks that the Monetary Board orders for closure. She testified that she became familiar with Urban Bank because
it was her group that implemented the take-over of the said bank on April 26, 2000.

Baldoz presented and identified documents relative to Account No. 858 (Exh. M19) of the Urban Bank, particularly, the Letter of
Authority dated November 23, 1999 (Exh. I19); Letter of Authority dated January 29, 2000 (Exh. J19); Letter of Authority dated
April 24, 2000 (Exh. K19); as well as Urban Bank Check No. 052093 dated April 24, 2000 in the amount of P107,191,780.85, and a
Signature Card of Savings Account No. 0116-17345-9 (Exh. L19). Baldoz further identified a Certification (Exh. N19) that she issued
to the fact that as receiver of Urban Bank, PDIC found no bank records showing any account under the name of Jose Velarde,
Joseph E. Estrada, Laarni Enriquez, Guia Gomez, Rowena Lopez, Peachy Osorio, Joy Melendrez, Kevin or Kelvin Garcia, 727, 737,
747, 757, and 777. She further certified (Exh. N19–2) that Accounts "A/C 858" and "T/A 858" did not appear in the Registry of
Deposits of Urban Bank and were not part of the deposit liabilities of the said bank. [TSN dated March 24, 2003]

MARIE ROSE ANCHETA CLAUDIO (Claudio) was the Vice-President of Urban Bank and the Manager of Urban Bank San Juan
Branch. She was part of the senior management of Urban Bank, particularly its business development committee which handled
the business aspect of the bank. As area manager, she was in-charge of supervising four (4) branches of Urban Bank. On the
other hand, as branch manager, she handled the accounts of the Greenhills branch clients in terms of deposits, loans and other
products and it was in the course of her duties as such that she became familiar with Trust Account No. 858 or Special Private
Account No. (SPAN) 858.

Claudio testified that it was Arsenio Bartolome, then the Chairman of Urban Bank, who asked her to open Trust Account No. 858
and to accept a deposit of Ten Million Pesos (P10,000,000.00). The deposit was accordingly processed based on Trading Order
No. 776313 (Exh. Q19) dated January 6, 1999. She came to know that the owner of the account was Joseph Victor Ejercito when
she was asked to take hold of a Trust Agreement (Exh. R19) from the Head Office about two (2) to three (3) weeks after she
accepted the cash. Claudio further testified that the Head Office gave it to her to be given in turn to the client for signature. She
added that she personally delivered the document along with a signature card to the office of Joseph Victor Ejercito. A few
weeks after she left the documents it in his office, she came back and picked them up and gave them back tot her Head Office.
She also testified that she was familiar with the signature of Joseph Victor Ejercito because he was a client of the bank.

Also in connection with Trust Account No. 858, Claudio handled the acceptance of all deposits to the said account through
Trading Orders. Thus, she became familiar with Trading Order No. 035006-A (Exh. S19) dated January 27, 1999 in the amount of
Fifty Million Pesos (P50,000,000.00). For effecting withdrawals from the said account, Claudio explained that trading orders,
manager’s checks and letters of authorities were required. She added that she was familiar with some withdrawals, particularly
those covered by Trading Order No. 060851 (Exh. T19) dated September 30, 1999 in the amount of Forty Two Million Pesos Three
Hundred Sixty Thousand Eight Hundred Ninety Nine Pesos and Seventeen Centavos (P42,360,899.17) and with maturity value of
Forty Million Seven Hundred Sixteen Thousand Five Hundred Fifty Four Pesos and Twenty Two Centavos (P42,716,554.22) (Exh.
T19-2), which she approved and which was covered by Manager’s Check No. 0000034182 dated November 8, 1999 (Exh. I5-18).

Claudio also identified a withdrawal from the account through Trading Order No. 804490 (Exh. U19) with deal date November 5,
1999 with a maturity value of Ten Million Eight Hundred Seventy Five Thousand Seven Hundred Forty Nine Pesos and Forty
Three Centavos (P10,875,749.43) covered by Urban Bank Manager’s Check No. 34181 (Exh. I5-17) that was processed by branch
accountant Aileen Tiongson and which she approved. Lastly, Claudio identified Trading Order No. 808554 (Exh. V19) with a net
maturity value of Fifty Four Million One Hundred Sixty One Thousand Four Hundred Ninety Six Pesos and Fifty Two Centavos
covered by Urban Bank Manager’s Check No. 0000037661 (Exh. O5 with submarkings). Witness Claudio verified that she gave the
three (3) manager’s checks for withdrawals to Joseph Victor Ejercito. [TSN dated March 26, 2003]

MA. AILEEN CANDELARIA TIONGSON (Tiongson) was the Branch Accountant of Urban Bank San Juan Branch from December 18,
1999 to March, 2000. Among her duties was to ensure that all transactions of the bank and all policies in the branch were
properly implemented. Her duties also included checking trading orders prepared by the account officer for traditional and non-
traditional products, facilitating the issuance of certificates of deposits, and processing the issuance of manager’s checks for
withdrawal transactions. Tiongson clarified that non-traditional products included trust products or investment placements
under trust agreements.

Tiongson testified that she was familiar with Account No. 858 because she processed some of the transactions of the client like
the issuance of manager’s check. She added that she was familiar with Manager’s Check Bearing No. 43222 (Exh. W19) dated
January 17, 2000 in the amount of P75 Million payable to cash. She added that the source of the manager’s check was the pre-
terminated placement of Account No. 858. With respect to the said check, Tiongson testified that the placing of "payable to
cash" in a manager’s check is not a regular procedure in the bank because a manager’s check should be payable to a specified
person. [TSN dated April 2, 2003]
GUILLERMO ARAZA BRIONES (Briones) was the Deputy Receiver / Liquidator of the Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation
(PDIC) assigned to Urban Bank at the time it was under receivership.

Briones testified that as Deputy Receiver, he took charge of all the assets and affairs of the bank and also acted as custodian of
the said records. In such capacity, he came across Account No. 858 as he was instructed by PDIC Vice President Aurora Baldoz to
look for documents pertaining thereto. He collated the documents and consequently prepared an inventory list (Exh. V20 – V20-4).
Briones identified and verified the following entries therein: (1) entry A-2 as referring to Trading Order No. 020385 (Exh. T19)
dated January 29, 1999; (2) entry A-21 referring to Manager’s Check No. 43222 dated January 17, 2000 in the amount of
seventy-five million pesos (P75,000,000.00) (Exh. W19); (3) entry B-3 referring to Trading Order No. 035006 dated January 27,
1999 (Exh. S19); (4) entry B-25 referring to Trading Order No. 808554 dated November 22, 1999 (Exh. V19); (5) entry C-22 and C-23
referring to Trading Order No. 060851 dated September 30, 1991 (Exh. P19); (6) entry D-34 referring to Trading Order No. 804490
dated November 5, 1999 (Exh. B20-3); and entries E-3, E-4, and E-5 referring to letters of authority dated November 23, 1999
(Exh. I19), January 17, 2000 (Exh. J19), and April 24, 2000 (Exh. K19). After collating the documents, he submitted them to Aurora
Baldoz. [TSN dated April 9, 2003]

EMMANUEL ENRIQUEZ BARCENA was the Assistant Vice President for Operations of the PCHC during the time material in these
cases. He assisted the Vice President for Operations, Arturo M. De Castro, in supervising the check processing operations of the
corporation; he made sure that the checks delivered by the banks were credited to the clearing account with the Bangko Sentral
ng Pilipinas (BSP) and correspondingly debited to the accounts of the drawee banks; and he was also responsible for the
accuracy of the reports generated and furnished to the "clearing participants" and BSP to the delivery of checks by the banks.
The witness related that the clearing participants are the commercial and thrift bank members of the corporation with authority
from the BSP to accept demand deposits and participate in the clearing operations. These banks send local checks to the clearing
house by batches and the clearing house receive these checks and feed the same in a reader sorter which capture the drawee
bank’s information. Thereafter, the checks are "sprayed with a tracer bond" and "microfilmed" to identify the source of the
check. The checks are then tallied against the batch control ticket and the net results, known as the "clearing summary report",
are reported to the BSP to serve as basis "for debiting or crediting the clearing account" of the bank concerned.

The witness then related and identified several checks which were sent to PCHC and undergone the clearing process. He was
particular with the signatures of Arturo De Castro, the Vice President of PCHC, Francisco Gementiza, the Microfilm Custodian of
PCHC, and Edgar Gamboa, the Assistant of the Microfilm Custodian of PCHC. These checks were Allied Bank Check No. 0176610
with the amount of P5 Million; Allied Bank Check No. 0176611 with the amount of P10 Million; Westmont Bank Check No.
0187473 with the amount of P25 Million; Urban Bank Check No. 037661 dated November 23, 1999 with the amount of
P54,161,496.52; Far East Bank Gift Check with the amount of P500,000.00; Allied Bank Check No. 0176621 with the amount of
P10 Million; Allied Bank Check No. 0176620 dated December 20, 1999 with the amount of P10 Million; Allied Bank Check No.
0176622 dated December 20, 1999 with the amount of P5 Million; Allied Bank Check No. 0176619 dated December 20, 1999
with the amount of P5 Million; UCPB Check No. 018706 dated December 28, 1999 with the amount of P20 Million; UCPB Check
No. 018707 dated December 28, 1999 with the amount of P20 Million; FEBTC Check No. 0580312 dated May 8, 2000 with the
amount of P3 Million; Allied Bank Check No. 0209702 dated May 2, 2000 with the amount of P10 Million; Allied Bank Check No.
0209706 dated May 2, 2000 with the amount of P5 Million; Allied Bank Check No. 0209703 dated May 2, 2000 with the amount
of P5 Million; Metrobank Check No. 0830000304 dated June 3, 2000 with the amount of P22,945,000.00; Metrobank Check No.
3010003358 dated June 6, 2000 with the amount of P20 Million; Asian Bank Check No. 0022012 dated November 5, 1999 with
the amount of 20 Million; Urban Bank Check No. 034181 dated November 8, 1999 with the amount of P10,875,749.43; Urban
Bank Check No. 034182 dated November 8, 1999 with the amount of P42,716,554.22; Allied Bank Check No. 0176604 dated
September 30, 1999 with the amount of P10 Million; Allied Bank Check No. 0176601 dated September 30, 1999 with the amount
of P10 Million; Allied Bank Check No. 0176602 dated September 30, 1999 with the amount of P10 Million; Allied Bank Check No.
0176605 dated September 30, 1999 with the amount of P10 Million; Metrobank Check No. 0660139670 dated October 18, 1999
with the amount of P30 Million; Metrobank Check No. 0660139681 dated October 18, 1999 with the amount of P13 Million;
Metrobank Check No. 0732114979 dated October 15, 1999 with the amount of P10 Million; Global Bank Check No. 0107387
dated October 18, 1999 with the amount of P25 Million; Global Bank Check No. 0107388 dated October 18, 1999 with the
amount of P25 Million; Metrobank Check No. 0385384 dated November 24, 1999 with the amount of P10 Million; Metrobank
Check No. 0385385 dated November 24, 1999 with the amount of P5 Million; Allied Bank Check No. 0176615 dated November
24, 1999 with the amount of P5 Million; Equitable PCI Bank Check No. 0783278 dated December 17, 1999 with the amount of
P160 Million; Equitable PCI Bank Check No. 0783284 dated December 20, 1999 with the amount of P2 Million; Equitable PCI
Bank Check No. 0783282 dated December 20, 1999 with the amount of P1.5 Million; Allied Bank Check No. 080519 dated
December 20, 1999 with the amount of P5 Million; Equitable PCI Bank Check No. 006975 dated December 24, 1999 with the
amount of P1.5 Million; Westmont Bank Check No. 0189619 dated December 23, 1999; PS Bank Check No. 031436 dated
October 18, 1999 with the amount of P20 Million; PS Bank Check No. 031437 dated October 18, 1999 with the amount of P20
Million; Security Bank Check No. 0363859 dated October 18, 1999 with the amount of P20 Million; Security Bank Check No.
0363858 dated October 18, 1999 with the amount of P10 Million; Security Bank Check No. 0363857 dated October 18, 1999 with
the amount of P20 Million; PS Bank Check No. 031438 dated October 18, 1999 with the amount of P10 Million; Global Bank
Check No. 0107385 dated October 18, 1999 with the amount of P20 Million; Global Bank Check No. 0107383 dated October 18,
1999 with the amount of P30 Million; Westmont Bank Check No. 0187472 dated October 26, 1999 with the amount of P5
Million; Westmont Bank Check No. 0187471 dated October 26, 1999 with the amount of P5 Million.

Witness Barcena then related and identified in the foregoing manner Equitable PCI Bank Check No. 0783236 dated December
17, 1999 with the amount of P50 Million; Equitable PCI Bank Check No. 0111-795117 dated January 6, 2000 with the amount of
P20 Million; Bank of Commerce Check No. 0030474 dated January 10, 2000 with the amount of P6,925,055.65; Urban Bank
Check No. 039975 dated January 18, 2000 with the amount of P70 Million; Urban Bank Check No. 039976 dated January 18,
2000 with the amount of P2 Million; Urban Bank Check No. 039977 dated January 18, 2000 with the amount of P2 Million; Urban
Bank Check No. 039978 dated January 18, 2000 with the amount of P1 Million; Allied Bank Check No. 0080566 dated August 31,
1999 with the amount of P10 Million; Allied Bank Check No. 0080454 dated August 31, 1999 with the amount of P10 Million;
Allied Bank Check No. 0080548 dated August 31, 1999 with the amount of P10 Million; Allied Bank Check No. 0080542 dated
August 31, 1999 with the amount of P10 Million; Allied Bank Check No. 0080543 dated August 31, 1999 with the amount of P10
Million; Allied Bank Check No. 0080547 dated August 31, 1999 with the amount of P5 Million; Allied Bank Check No. 0080544
dated August 31, 1999 with the amount of P5 Million; Westmont Bank Check No. 00181135 dated August 31, 1999 with the
amount of P5 Million; Metrobank Check No. 0091780568 dated September 1, 1999 with the amount of P5 Million; and FBTC
Check No. 3165582 dated September 8, 1999 with the amount of P20 Million.

In another set of documentary evidence for the prosecution, the witness similarly related and identified Equitable PCI Bank
Check No. 0811277 dated September 26, 1999 with the amount of P8,300,000.00; Allied Bank Check No. 0080550 dated
September 15, 1999 with the amount of P20 Million; Equitable PCI Bank Check No. 001331 dated September 30, 1999 with the
amount of P300 Million; Equitable PCI Bank Check No. 0811579 dated November 23, 1999 with the amount of P20 Million;
Equitable Bank Check No. 0811580 dated November 23, 1999 with the amount of P20 Million; Equitable PCI Bank Check No.
0811582 dated November 23, 1999 with the amount of P60 Million; Westmont Bank Check No. 0187474 dated November 27,
1999 with the amount of P25 Million; Metrobank Check No. 0385400 dated November 29, 1999 with the amount of P53 Million;
Equitable PCI Bank Check No. 0811596 dated December 15, 1999 with the amount of P50 Million; Equitable PCI Bank Check No.
0811597 dated December 1, 1999 with the amount of P50 Million; and Allied Bank Check No. 0176625 dated December 1, 1999
with the amount of P20 Million.

Witness Barcena continued on his direct examination and related and identified FEBTC Check No. 3165579 dated November 8,
1999 with the amount of P189,700,000.00; BPI Family Bank Check No. 0006623 dated July 25, 2000 with the amount of P40
Million; Equitable PCI Bank Check No. 0742099 dated August 15, 1999 with the amount of P10 Million; Metrobank Check No.
0091780523 dated August 15, 1999 with the amount of P31 Million; Metrobank Check No. 0385379 dated August 19, 1999 with
the amount of P20 Million; Metrobank Check No. 0830416015 dated July 29, 2000 with the amount of P22 Million; and Allied
Bank Check No. 0080549 dated August 25, 1999 with the amount of P20 Million.

Lastly, the witness then presented and identified a Detail List dated November 9, 1999 of PCHC which contained a listing of
incoming checks of the participating bank in Greater Manila Area.

On cross examination, witness Barcena clarified that the checks forwarded to PCHC pertained to checks that were not yet acted
by the drawee bank as to whether the same were honored or dishonored. [TSN dated January 13, 2003; TSN dated January 15,
2003; and TSN dated January 20, 2003]

EVIDENCE FOR THE DEFENSE

The defense presented BEATRIZ LEGASPI BAGSIT, the Vice President and Division Head in the Makati Area of Equitable PCI Bank,
and ROMUALD DY TANG, Treasurer and Executive Vice President of Equitable PCI Bank. The gists of their testimonies were
already discussed in relation to sub-paragraph (c) above. FPres. Estrada also denied on the witness stand that he owned the Jose
Velarde account.

FINDINGS OF FACT

Re: Sub-paragraph (d) of the Amended Information

To reiterate, the crime of plunder is committed through a combination or series of overt or criminal acts [or "predicate acts"]
described in Section 1 (d) of R.A. No. 7080 as amended. The prosecution presented overwhelming evidence that there were
numerous deposits of astoundingly large sums of money into the Jose Velarde account. However, the prosecution failed to
prove the predicate act/s as defined under Section 1(d) of R.A. No. 7080 through which the said deposits could have been
acquired or amassed, except for the amount of P189,700,000.00, representing illegal commissions from the sales of Belle shares
and the money collected from illegal gambling. It is not per se the accumulation of wealth which is proscribed by the Anti-
Plunder Law. The acquisition of wealth of not less than P50,000,000.00 must be linked to the commission of overt or criminal
acts falling within the ambit of the said law. All that the prosecution has succeeded in showing is that the Jose Velarde account is
the repository or receptacle of vast wealth belonging to FPres. Estrada.

RULING OF THE COURT

ON THE CHARGE OF PLUNDER

Elements of the Offense of Plunder

Having reached the foregoing Findings of Fact after a meticulous and laborious study of the voluminous testimonial and
documentary evidence of both the prosecution and the defense on the four (4) sub-paragraphs of the Amended Information,
the Court is now called upon to apply the Anti-Plunder Law to the facts of this case. The accused are charged with plunder as
defined and penalized under Republic Act No. 7080, as amended, entitled "An Act Defining And Penalizing The Crime Of Plunder,
As Amended" (July 12, 1991). Particularly, Section 2 of the said law provides as follows:

Section 2. Definition of the Crime of Plunder; Penalties.- Any public officer who, by himself or in connivance with
members of his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons,
amasses, accumulates or acquires ill gotten-wealth through a combination or series of overt criminal acts as described
in Section 1 (d) hereof in the aggregate amount or total value of at least Fifty Million Pesos (P50,000,000.00) shall be
guilty of the crime of plunder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to death. Any person who participated with
the said public officer in the commission of an offense contributing to the crime of plunder shall likewise be punished
for such offense. In the imposition of penalties, the degree of participation and the attendance of mitigating and
extenuating circumstances, as provided by the Revised Penal Code, shall be considered by the court. The Court shall
declare any and ill-gotten wealth and their interests and other incomes and assets including the properties and share of
stocks derived from the deposit or investment thereof forfeited in the favor of the State. (As to the penalty, this section
is amended by Republic Act No. 9346 prohibiting the imposition of the death penalty in the Philippines. RA 9346 was
signed into law on June 24, 2006. In view of its provisions, the penalty for the crime of plunder is now reclusion
perpetua  pursuant to Section 2 (a) of RA 9346. In addition, the convicted person shall be eligible for parole under Act.
No. 4103, otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended.)

Section 1 (d) of the same statute cited in Section 2 above reads:

d) Ill-gotten wealth means any asset, property, business enterprise or material possession of any person within the
purview of Section Two (2) hereof, acquired by him directly or in directly through dummies, nominees, agents,
subordinates and/or business associates by any combination or series of the following means or similar schemes:

1) Through misappropriation, conversation, mis-use, or malversation of public funds or raids on the public
treasury;

2) By receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share, percentage, kickbacks or any other form of
pecuniary benefit from any person and/ or entity in connection with any government contract or project or by
reason of the office or position of the public officer concerned;

3) By the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of asset belonging to the National Government or any
of its subdivision, agencies or instrumentalities or government-owned or –controlled corporations and their
subsidiaries;

4) By obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares of stock, equity or any other form of
interest or participation including promises of future employment in any business enterprise or undertaking;

5) By establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or other combinations and/or

implementation of decrees and orders intended to benefit particular persons or special interests; or

6) By taking undue advantage of official position, authority, relationship, connection or influence to unjustly
enrich himself or themselves at the expense and to the damage and prejudice of the Filipino people and the
Republic of the Philippines.

RA No. 7080, as amended, enunciates a rule of evidence in Section 4 thereof which is quoted hereunder:

Section 4. Rule of Evidence. – For purpose of establishing the crime of plunder, it shall not be necessary to
prove each and every criminal act done by the accused in furtherance of the scheme or conspiracy to amass,
 accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth, it being sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of
overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy.

The case of Joseph Ejercito Estrada v. Sandiganbayan (G.R. No. 148560, promulgated November 19, 2001), which upheld this
Court’s Resolution dated July 9, 2001 denying accused Former President Estrada’s Motion to Quash the information in this case,
enumerates the elements of the crime of plunder, as follows:

(1) That the offender is a public officer who acts by himself or in connivance with members of his family, relatives by
affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons;

(2) That he amassed, accumulated or acquired ill-gotten wealth through a combination or series of the following overt
or criminal acts described in Section 1 (d) of R.A. No. 7080 as amended; and

(3) That the aggregate amount or total value of the ill-gotten wealth amassed, accumulated or acquired is at least
P50,000,000.00.

The terms "Combination" and "Series" were likewise defined in the above-cited case as follows:

Thus when the Plunder Law speaks of "combination," it is referring to at least two (2) acts falling under
different categories of enumeration provided in Sec. 1, par. (d), e.g., raids on the public treasury in Sec.1, par.
(d), subpar. (1), and fraudulent conveyance of assets belongings to the National Government under Sec.1, par.
(d), subpar. (3).

On the other hand, to constitute a "series", there must be two (2) or more overt or criminal acts falling under
the same category of enumeration found in Sec. 1, par. (d), say, misappropriation , malversation and raids on
the public treasury, all of which fall under Sec. 1, par. (d), subpar. (1). Verily, had the legislature intended a
technical or distinctive meaning for "combination" and "series," it would have taken greater pains in
specifically providing for it in the law. (emphasis supplied)

The Charges in the Amended Information

in Relation to Accused

The import of the charges in the Amended Information was carefully discussed by the Honorable Supreme Court in the case
of Jose "Jinggoy" Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan [G.R. No. 148965, February 26, 2003, 377 SCRA 538, 553-556], as penned by now
the Honorable Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, in this wise:

For better focus, there is a need to examine again the allegations of the Amended Information vis-à-vis the provisions
of R.A. No. 7080.

The Amended Information, in its first two paragraphs, charges petitioner and his other co-accused with the crime of
plunder. The first paragraph names all the accused, while the second paragraph describes in general how plunder was
committed and lays down most of the elements of the crime itself. Sub-paragraphs (a) to (d) describe in detail the
predicate acts that constitute the crime and name in particular the co-conspirators of former President Estrada in
each predicate act. The predicate acts alleged in the said four sub-paragraphs correspond to the items enumerated in
Section 1 (d) of R.A. No. 7080. Sub-paragraph (a) alleged the predicate act of receiving, on several instances, money
from illegal gambling, in consideration of toleration or protection of illegal gambling, and expressly names petitioner as
one of those who conspired with former President Estrada in committing the offense. This predicate act corresponds
with the offense described in item [2] of the enumeration in Section 1 (d) of R.A. No. 7080. Sub-paragraph (b) alleged
the predicate act of diverting, receiving or misappropriating a portion of the tobacco excise tax share allocated for the
province of Ilocos Sur, which act is the offense described in item [1] in the enumeration in Section 1 (d) of the law. This
sub-paragraph does not mention petitioner but instead names other conspirators of the former President. Sub-
paragraph (c) alleged two predicate acts - that of ordering the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) and the
Social Security System (SSS) to purchase shares of stock of Belle Corporation, and collecting or receiving commissions
from such purchase from the Belle Corporation which became part of the deposit in the "Jose Velarde" account at the
Equitable-PCI Bank. These two predicate acts fall under items [2] and [3] in the enumeration of R.A. No. 7080, and was
allegedly committed by the former President in connivance with John Does and Jane Does. Finally, sub-paragraph (d)
alleged the predicate act that the former President unjustly enriched himself from commissions, gifts, kickbacks, in
connivance with John Does and Jane Does, and deposited the same under his account name "Jose Velarde" at the
Equitable-PCI Bank. This act corresponds to the offense under item [6] in the enumeration of Section 1 (d) of R.A. No.
7080.
 From the foregoing allegations of the Amended Information, it is clear that all the accused named in sub-paragraphs (a)
to (d), thru their individual acts, conspired with former President Estrada to enable the latter to amass, accumulate or
acquire ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate amount of P4,097,804,173.17. As the Amended Information is
worded, however, it is not certain whether the accused in sub-paragraphs (a) to (d) conspired with each other to
enable the former President to amass the subject ill-gotten wealth. In light of this lack of clarity, petitioner cannot be
penalized for the conspiracy entered into by the other accused with the former President as related in the second
paragraph of the Amended Information in relation to its sub-paragraphs (b) to (d). We hold that petitioner can be held
accountable only for the predicate acts he allegedly committed as related in sub-paragraph (a) of the Amended
Information which were allegedly done in conspiracy with the former President whose design was to amass ill-gotten
wealth amounting to more than P4 billion.

We hasten to add, however, that the respondent Ombudsman cannot be faulted for including the predicate acts
alleged in sub-paragraphs (a) to (d) of the Amended Information in one, and not in four, separate Informations. A study
of the history of R.A. No. 7080 will show that the law was crafted to avoid the mischief and folly of filing multiple
informations. The Anti-Plunder Law wasenacted in the aftermath of the Marcos regimewhere charges of ill-gotten
wealth were filed against former President Marcos and his alleged cronies. Government prosecutors found no
appropriate law to deal with he multitude and magnitude of the acts allegedly committed by the former President to
acquire illegal wealth.They also found out that under the then existing laws such as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act, the Revised Penal Code and other special laws, the acts involved different transactions, different time and different
personalities.Every transaction constituted a separate crime and required a separate case and the over-all
conspiracyhad to be broken down into several criminal and graft charges. The preparation of multiple Informations was
a legl nightmarebut eventually, thirty-nine (39) separate and independent cases were filed against practically the same
accused before the Sandiganbayan. R.A. No. 7080 or the Anti Plunder Law was enacted precisely to address this
procedural problem. This is pellucid in the Explanatory Note to Senate Bill No. 733…

xxx       xxx       xxx

. . . In the case at bar, the different accused and their different criminal acts have a commonality—to help the former
President amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth. Sub-paragraphs (a) to (d) in the Amended Information alleged
the different participation of each accused in the conspiracy. The gravamen of the conspiracy charge, therefore,
is not that each accused agreed to receive protection money from illegal gambling, that each misappropriated a portion
of the tobacco excise tax, that each accused ordered the GSIS and SSS to purchase shares of Belle Corporation and
receive commissions from such sale, nor that each unjustly enriched himself from commissions, gifts and
kickbacks; rather, it is that each of them, by their individual acts, agreed to participate, directly or indirectly, in the
amassing, accumulation and acquisition of ill-gotten wealth of and/or for former President Estrada.

In the American jurisdiction, the presence of several accused in multiple conspiracies commonly involves two
structures: (1) the so-called "wheel" or "circle" conspiracy, in which there is a single person or group (the "hub") dealing
individually with two or more other persons or groups (the "spokes"); and (2) the "chain" conspiracy, usually involving
the distribution of narcotics or other contraband, in which there is successive communication and cooperation in much
the same way as with legitimate business operations between manufacturer and wholesaler, then wholesaler and
retailer, and then retailer and consumer.

From a reading of the Amended Information, the case at bar appears similar to a "wheel" conspiracy. The hub is former
President Estrada while the spokes are all the accused, and the rim that encloses the spokes is the common goal in the
overall conspiracy, i.e., the amassing, accumulation and acquisition of ill-gotten wealth.

Throughout the trial before this Court, the prosecution’s task was to establish, with the required burden of proof, the
commission of the crime of plunder by the principal accused former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada in conspiracy with his co-
accused "during the period from June, 1998 to January, 2001" by " willfully, unlawfully and criminally" amassing, accumulating
and acquiring by himself directly or indirectly ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate amount of Four Billion Ninety Seven Million Eight
Hundred Four Thousand One Hundred Seventy-Three Pesos and Seventeen Centavos ( P4,097,804,173.17), more or less and
thereby unjustly enriching himself or themselves at the expense and to the damage of the Filipino people and the Republic of
the Philippines, through "ANY OR A COMBINATION OR A SERIES OF OVERT CRIMINAL ACTS, OR SIMILAR SCHEMES OR MEANS"
described in paragraphs (a) to (d) in the Amended Information.

After a thorough evaluation of the established facts, we hold that the prosecution has proven beyond reasonable doubt the
elements of plunder as follows:

(a) The principal accused Joseph Ejercito Estrada, at the time of the commission of the acts charged in the Amended
Information was the President of the Republic of the Philippines;
 (b) He acted in connivance with then Governor Luis "Chavit" Singson, who was granted immunity from suit by the Office
of the Ombudsman, and with the participation of other persons named by prosecution witnesses in the course of the
trial of this case, in amassing, accumulating and acquiring ill-gotten wealth as follows:

(i) by a series of acts of receiving bi-monthly collections from "jueteng", a form of illegal gambling, during the
period beginning November 1998 to August 2000 in the aggregate amount of Five Hundred Forty Five Millionh
Two Hundred Ninety One Thousand Pesos (P545,291,000.00), Two Hundred Million Pesos (P200,000,000.00) of
which was deposited in the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation; and

(ii) by a series consisting of two (2) acts of ordering the GSIS and the SSS to purchase shares of stock of Belle
Corporation and collecting or receiving commission from the sales of Belle Shares in the amount of One
Hundred Eighty Nine Million Seven Hundred Thousand Pesos (P189,700,000.00) which was deposited in the
Jose Velarde account.

In Jose "Jinggoy" E. Estrada v. Sandiganbayan (G.R. No. 148965, February 26, 2002, 377 SCRA 538, 549) the Supreme Court ruled
as follows:

Contrary to petitioner’s posture, the allegation is that he received or collected money from illegal gambling "on several
instances." The phrase "on several instances" means the petitioner committed the predicate act in series. To insist that
the Amended Information charged the petitioner with the commission of only one act or offense despite the phrase
"several instances" is to indulge in a twisted, nay, "pretzel" interpretation.

In the same case (Jose "Jinggoy" E. Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, supra.), it was held:

…Sub-paragraph (c) alleged two predicate acts—that of ordering the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) and
the Social Security System (SSS) to purchase shares of stock of Belle Corporation, and collecting or receiving
commissions from such purchase from Belle Corporation which became part of the deposit in the "Jose Velarde"
account at the Equitable PCI Bank. These two predicate acts fall under items [2] and [3] in the enumeration of R.A.
No. 7080, and was allegedly committed by the former President in connivance with John Does and Jane
Does. (emphasis supplied)

This Court finds that the prosecution failed to prove, beyond reasonable doubt, who among the accused benefited from the
misappropriation of the excise tax share of Ilocos Sur and in what amounts, as charged sub-paragraph b. The prosecution
likewise failed to offer evidence on the alleged illegal sources of the numerous deposits in the Jose Velarde account which
belongs to FPres. Estrada, except for the commission received from the sale of Belle shares to GSIS and SSS and the money
collected from illegal gambling. The Anti-Plunder Law requires the prosecution to prove the series or combination of overt or
criminal acts through which ill-gotten wealth deposited in the Jose Velarde account was amassed, accumulated or acquired. The
prosecution failed to discharge this burden of proof.

However, the two different series of predicate acts outlined above (particularly, first, the regular and methodical acquisition of
ill-gotten wealth through collections from illegal gambling and second, the receipt of unlawful commissions from the sales of
Belle shares twice), whether taken separately or independently of the other or in combination with each other, unquestionably
constitute the crime of plunder as defined by Section 2, in relation to Section 1(d) of RA 7080 as amended.

The case of Estrada v. Sandiganbayan (G.R. No. 148560, November 19, 2001) ruled:

xxx As Senate President Salonga explained, of there are 150 constitutive crimes charged, it is not necessary to prove
beyond reasonable doubt all of them. If a pattern can be shown by proving for example, 10 criminal acts, then that
would be sufficient to secure conviction.

The State is thereby enabled by this device to deal with several acts constituting separate crimes as just one crime of
plunder by allowing their prosecution by means of a single information because there is a common purpose for
committing them, namely, that of "amassing, accumulating or acquiring wealth through such overt or criminal acts."
The pattern is the organizing principle that defines what otherwise would be discreet criminal acts into the single crime
of plunder. (369 SCRA 394, 475-476)

A pattern was established by the carefully planned system of jueteng money collection on a regular bi-monthly basis from the
dfferent provinces nationwide to enrich FPres. Estrada with the connivance and/or participation of Gov. Singson, Yolanda
Ricaforte, Emma Lim, Carmencita Itchon, SPO2 Artates, Jamis Singson and other jueteng collectors referred to in the Amended
Information as "John Does" and "Jane Does." The Court notes that Gov. Singson in the course of his testimony mentioned certain
persons who collected jueteng money aside from himself and his employees; namely, Anton Prieto, Bonito Singson, Bong
Pineda, Charing Magbuhos, Celso de los Angeles, Jesse Viceo, Romy Pamatmat and a certain Sanchez of Batangas. As proven, the
collections in "several instances" from illegal gambling money went way beyond the minimum of P50,000,000.00 set by the Anti-
Plunder Law. These repeated collections of jueteng money from November 1998 to August 2000 would fall within the purview of
a "series" of illegal acts constituting plunder. The said series of acts, on its own, would have been sufficient to convict the
principal accused, FPres. Estrada. However, this Court also finds that FPres. Estrada is criminally liable for plunder for receiving
commissions from the purchase of Belle Shares by the GSIS and by the SSS in grave abuse of his power on two (2) separate
occasions as charged in sub-paragraph (b) of the Amended Information. Clearly, the receipt of these commissions on two (2)
occasions likewise meets the definition of a series of two (2) similar unlawful acts employing the same scheme to accumulate ill-
gotten wealth.

It is unnecessary to indulge in an exposition of whether the two series of acts falling under sub-paragraphs (a) and (c) of the
Amended Information, proven in the course of the trial could have amounted to two (2) counts of plunder. It would be a purely
academic exercise, as the accused cannot be convicted of two offenses or two counts of plunder on the basis of a single
Information, clearly charging him of only one count of plunder, because that would violate his constitutional rights to due
process, given the severity of the crime charged in this case.

The predicate acts alleged in sub-paragraphs (a) and (c) of the Amended Information, which formed two (2) separate series of
acts of a different nature, were linked by the fact that they were plainly geared towards a common goal which was the
accumulation of ill-gotten wealth for FPres. Estrada and that they shared a pattern or a common method of commission which
was the abuse or misuse of the high authority or power of the Presidency. (U.S. v. Hiverly, 437 F3d 752)

In sum, the Court finds that prosecution has proven beyond reasonable doubt the commission by the principal accused former
President Joseph Ejercito Estrada of the crime of plunder but not so in the case of former Mayor Jose Jinggoy Estrada and Atty.
Edward Serapio.

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered in Criminal Case No. 26558 finding the accused, Former
President Joseph Ejercito Estrada, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of PLUNDER defined in and penalized by
Republic Act No. 7080, as amended. On the other hand, for failure of the prosecution to prove and establish their guilt beyond
reasonable doubt, the Court finds the accused Jose "Jinggoy" Estrada and Atty. Edward S. Serapio NOT GUILTY of the crime of
plunder, and accordingly, the Court hereby orders their ACQUITTAL.

The penalty imposable for the crime of plunder under Republic Act No. 7080, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, is Reclusion
Perpetua to Death. There being no aggravating or mitigating circumstances, however, the lesser penalty shall be applied in
accordance with Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code. Accordingly, accused Former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and the accessory penalties of civil interdiction during the period of
sentence and perpetual absolute disqualification.

The period within which accused Former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada has been under detention shall be credited to him in
full as long as he agrees voluntarily in writing to abide by the same disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted prisoners.

Moreover, in accordance with Section 2 of Republic Act No. 7080, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, the Court hereby
declares the forfeiture in favor of the government of the following:

(1) The total amount of Five Hundred Forty Two Million Seven Hundred Ninety One Thousand Pesos (P545,291,000.00),
with interest and income earned, inclusive of the amount of Two Hundred Million Pesos (P200,000,000.00), deposited
in the name and account of the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation.

(2) The amount of One Hundred Eighty Nine Million Pesos (P189,000,000.00), inclusive of interests and income earned,
deposited in the Jose Velarde account.

(3) The real property consisting of a house and lot dubbed as "Boracay Mansion" located at #100 11th Street, New
Manila, Quezon City.

The cash bonds posted by accused Jose "Jinggoy" Estrada and Atty. Edward S. Serapio are hereby ordered cancelled and released
to the said accused or their duly authorized representatives upon presentation of the original receipt evidencing payment
thereof and subject to the usual accounting and auditing procedures. Likewise, the hold-departure orders issued against the said
accused are hereby recalled and declared functus oficio.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 229288

SHERWIN T. GATCHALIAN, Petitioner
vs.
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN and FIELD INVESTIGATION OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, Respondents

DECISION

CAGUIOA, J.:

Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 assailing the Resolutions dated September 13, 20162 and
January 13, 20173 issued by the Special Thirteenth Division of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 145852.

The Facts

Six different criminal complaints were filed by the Field Investigation Office (FIO) of the Office of the Ombudsman
(Ombudsman),4 Cesar V. Purisima,5 and Rustico Tutol6 against several individuals, including petitioner Sherwin T. Gatchalian
(Gatchalian). Specifically, Gatchalian was one of the respondents in OMB-C-C-13-0212, a complaint accusing the respondents
therein of (a) violation of Section 3(e) and (g) of Republic Act No. 3019 (R.A. 3019); (b) Malversation under Article 217 of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC); and (c) violation of Section X126.2 (c) (1), (2) and (3) of the Manual of Regulations for Banks (MORB)
in relation to Sections 36 and 37 of Republic Act No. 7653 (R.A. 7653). The said complaint arose from the sale of shares in
Express Savings Bank, Inc. (ESBI), in which Gatchalian was a stockholder, in 2009, to Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA),
a government-owned and controlled corporation (GOCC).7

In a Joint Resolution dated March 16, 2015 (Joint Resolution),8 the Ombudsman found probable cause to indict Gatchalian of the
following: (a) one count of violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019, (b) one count of malversation of public funds, and (c) one count
of violation of Section Xl26.2(C) (1) and (2) of MORB in relation to Sections 36 and 37 of R.A. 7653. While it was the other
respondents - members of the Board of Trustees of LWUA (LWUA Board) - who were directly responsible for the damage caused
to the government by the acquisition by L WUA of ESBI's shares, the Ombudsman found that the latter's stockholders who sold
their shares, including Gatchalian, profited from the transaction. The Ombudsman held that in view of ESBI's precarious financial
standing at the time of the transaction, the windfall received by Gatchalian and the other stockholders must be deemed an
unwarranted benefit, advantage, or preference within the ambit of R.A. 3019.

The Ombudsman also found that there was conspiracy among the officers of LWUA and ESBI, and the stockholders of ESBI, for
the latter authorized the former to push through with the transaction. The Ombudsman found that the officers and the
stockholders acted in concert towards attaining a common goal, and that is to ensure that L WUA acquires 60% stake in ESBI in
clear contravention of requirements and procedures prescribed by then existing banking laws and regulations.9 With regard to
the violation of Section X126.2(C) (1) and (2) of MORB in relation to Sections 36 and 37 of R.A. 7653, the Ombudsman held that
the stockholders of ESBI were likewise liable because the MORB specifically requires both the transferors and the transferees to
secure the prior approval of the Monetary Board before consummating the sale.

The respondents in the Ombudsman cases, including Gatchalian, filed separate motions for reconsideration of the Joint
Resolution. However, on April 4, 2016, the Ombudsman issued a Joint Order10 denying the motions for reconsideration.

Aggrieved, Gatchalian filed with the CA a Petition for Certiorari11 under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, and sought to annul the
Joint Resolution and the Joint Order of the Ombudsman for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion. He argued that
the Ombudsman made a general conclusion without specifying a "series of acts" done by him that would "clearly manifest a
concurrence of wills, a common intent or design to commit a crime."12 Furthermore, he argued that he was neither a director
nor an officer of ESBI, such that he never negotiated nor was he personally involved with the t.ransaction in question. Ultimately,
Gatchalian claimed that there was no probable cause to indict him of the crimes charged. Procedurally, he explained that he
filed the Petition for Certiorari with the CA,13 and not with this Court, because of the ruling in Morales v. Court of Appeals.14

On September 19, 2016, the Ombudsman, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a Comment15 on the Petition
for Certiorari. The OSG argued that the CA had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case, as the decisions of the
Ombudsman in criminal cases were unappealable and may thus be assailed only through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65
filed with the Supreme Court. On the merits, it maintained that the Joint Resolution and the Joint Order were based on
evidence, and were thus issued without grave abuse of discretion.

Before the filing of the OSG's Comment, however, the CA had already issued a Resolution16 dated September 13, 2016 wherein it
held that it had no jurisdiction over the case. The CA opined that the Morales ruling should be understood in its proper
context, i.e., that what was assailed therein was the preventive suspension order arising from an administrative case filed
against a public official.17
On October 7, 2016, Gatchalian sought reconsideration of the CA's Resolution dismissing the Petition for Certiorari.18 He
reiterated his arguments in the petition, and maintained that the CA has jurisdiction over the case by virtue of the ruling
in Morales. The OSG filed its Comment on Gatchalian's motion for reconsideration and argued that there was no cogent reason
for the CA to reconsider its decision. On December 7, 2016, Gatchalian filed a Reply.19

On January 13, 2017, the CA issued another Resolution20 where it upheld its earlier Resolution. It held that the points raised in
Gatchalian's motion for reconsideration were a mere rehash of the arguments which had already been passed upon by the CA in
the earlier decision.

Gatchalian thus appealed to this Court.21 He maintains that the import of the decision in Morales is that the remedy for parties
aggrieved by decisions of the Ombudsman is to file with the CA a petition for review under Rule 43 for administrative cases, and
a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 for criminal cases.

On December 19, 2017, the OSG filed its Comment.22 According to the OSG, jurisprudence is well-settled that the CA has no
jurisdiction to review the decisions of the Ombudsman in criminal cases. It reiterated that the Morales decision should be
understood to apply only in administrative cases. Gatchalian thereafter filed a Reply on April 4, 2018.23

Issue

The sole issue to be resolved in this case is whether the CA erred in dismissing Gatchalian's Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65
for its alleged lack of jurisdiction over the said case.

The Court's Ruling

The petition is unmeritorious.

The first case on the matter was the 1998 case of Fabian vs. Desierto,24 where the Court held that Section 27 of Republic Act No.
6770 (R.A. 6770), which provides that all "orders, directives, or decisions [in administrative cases] of the Office of the
Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court by filing a petition for certiorari within ten (10) days from receipt of the
written notice of the order, directive or decision or denial of the motion for reconsideration in accordance with Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court," was unconstitutional for it increased the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court without its advice and
concurrence. The Court thus held that "appeals from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary
cases should be taken to the Court of Appeals under the provisions of Rule 43."25

Subsequently, in Kuizon v. Desierto,26 the Court stressed that the ruling in Fabian was limited only to administrative cases, and
added that it is the Supreme Court which has jurisdiction when the assailed decision, resolution, or order was an incident of a
criminal action. Thus:

In dismissing petitioners' petition for lack of jurisdiction, the Court of Appeals cited .the case of Fabian vs. Desierto. The
appellate court correctly ruled that its jurisdiction extends only to decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative
cases. In the Fabian case, we ruled that appeals from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary
cases should be taken to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. It bears stressing that when
we declared Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 as unconstitutional, we categorically stated that said provision is involved only
whenever an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 is taken from a decision in an administrative disciplinary action. It cannot be
taken into account where an original action for certiorari under Rule 65 is resorted to as a remedy for judicial review, such as
from an incident in a criminal action. In fine, we hold that the present petition should have been filed with this
Court.27 (Emphasis supplied)

In Golangco vs. Fung,28 the Court voided a decision of the CA which directed the Ombudsman to withdraw an Information
already filed by it with a Regional Trial Court (RTC). The Court in Golangco reasoned that "[t]he Court of Appeals has jurisdiction
over orders, directives and decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases only. It cannot,
therefore, review the orders, directives or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in criminal or non-administrative cases."29

With regard to orders, directives, or decisions of the Ombudsman in criminal or non-administrative cases, the Court, in Tirol, Jr.
v. Del Rosario,30 held that the remedy for the same is to file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. The
Court explained:

True, the law is silent on the remedy of an aggrieved party in case the Ombudsman found sufficient cause to indict him in
criminal or non-administrative cases. We cannot supply such deficiency if none has been provided in the law. We have held that
the right to appeal is a mere statutory privilege and may be exercised only in the manner prescribed by, and in accordance with,
the provisions of law. Hence, there must be a law expressly granting such privilege. The Ombudsman Act specifically deals with
the remedy of an aggrieved party from orders, directives and decisions of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases.
As we ruled in Fabian, the aggrieved party is given the right to appeal to the Court of Appeals. Such right of appeal is not granted
to parties aggrieved by orders and decisions of the Ombudsman in criminal cases, like finding probable cause to indict accused
persons.

However, an aggrieved party is not without recourse where the finding of the Ombudsman as to the existence of probable
cause is tainted with grave abuse of discretion, amounting. to lack or excess of jurisdiction. An aggrieved party may file a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.[[31]] (Emphasis supplied)

The Court in Tirol, Jr., however, was unable to specify the court - whether it be the RTC, the CA, or the Supreme Court - to which
the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 should be filed given the concurrent jurisdictions of the aforementioned courts over
petitions for certiorari.

Five years after, the Court clarified in Estrada v. Desierto32 that a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
questioning the finding of the existence of probable cause - or the lack thereof - by the Ombudsman should be filed with the
Supreme Court. The Court elucidated:

But in which court should this special civil action be filed?

Petitioner contends that  certiorari  under Rule 65 should first be flied with the Court of Appeals as the doctrine of hierarchy of
courts precludes the immediate invocation of this Court's jurisdiction. Unfortunately for petitioner, he is flogging a dead horse
as this argument has already been shot down in Kuizon v. Ombudsman where we decreed -

In dismissing petitioners' petition for lack of jurisdiction, the Court of Appeals cited the case of Fabian vs. Desierto. The appellate
court correctly ruled that its jurisdiction extends only to decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative
cases.1a\^/phi1 In the Fabian case, we ruled that appeals from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative
disciplinary cases should be taken to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. It bears· stressing
that when we declared Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 as unconstitutional, we categorically stated that said provision is
involved only whenever an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 is taken from a decision in an administrative disciplinary action. It
cannot be taken into account where an original action for certiorari under Rule 65 is resorted to as a remedy for judicial review,
such as from an incident in a criminal action. In fine, we hold that the present petition should have been filed with this Court.

Kuizon and the subsequent case of Mendoza-Arce v. Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas)  drove home the point that the
remedy of aggrieved parties from resolutions of the Office of the Ombudsman finding probable cause in criminal cases or non-
administrative cases, when tainted with grave abuse of discretion, is to file an original action for  certiorari with this Court and
not with the Court of Appeals. In cases when the aggrieved party is questioning the Office of the Ombudsman's finding of lack of
probable cause, as in this case, there is likewise the remedy of certiorari under Rule 65 to be filed with this Court and not with
the Court of Appeals following our ruling in Perez v. Office of the Ombudsman. 33 (Emphasis supplied)

In the 2009 case of Ombudsman v. Heirs of Margarita Vda. De Ventura, 34 the Court reiterated Kuizon,
Golangco, and Estrada, and ruled that the CA did not have jurisdiction over orders and decisions of the Ombudsman in non-
administrative cases, and that the remedy of aggrieved parties was to file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with this Court.
The foregoing principles were repeatedly upheld in other cases, such as in Soriano v. Cabais35 and Duyon v. Court of Appeals.36

In this petition, Gatchalian argues that the decision of the Court En Banc in Morales v. Court of Appeals37 abandoned the
principles enunciated in the aforementioned line of cases.

The Court disagrees.

In the Morales case, what was involved was the preventive suspension order issued by the Ombudsman against Jejomar Binay,
Jr. (Binay) in an administrative case filed against the latter. The preventive suspension order was questioned by Binay in the CA
via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with a prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO). The CA then
granted Binay's prayer for a TRO, which the Ombudsman thereafter questioned in this Court for being in violation of Section 14
of R.A. 6770, which provides:

SECTION 14. Restrictions. -No writ of injunction shall be issued by any court to delay an investigation being conducted by the
Ombudsman under this Act, unless there is a prima facie evidence that the subject matter of the investigation is outside the
jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman.

No court shall hear any appeal or application for remedy against the decision or findings of the Ombudsman, except the
Supreme Court, on pure question of law.
Relying on the second paragraph of the abovequoted provision, the Ombudsman also questioned the CA's subject matter
jurisdiction over the petition for certiorari filed by Binay.

The Court in Morales applied the same rationale used in Fabian, and held that the second paragraph of Section 14 is
unconstitutional:

Since the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 limits the remedy against "decision or findings" of the Ombudsman to a Rule
45 appeal and thus - similar to the fourth paragraph of Section 27, RA 6770 - attempts to effectively increase the Supreme
Court's appellate jurisdiction without its advice and concurrence, it is therefore concluded that the former provision is also
unconstitutional and perforce, invalid. Contrary to the Ombudsman's posturing, Fabian should squarely apply since the above-
stated Ombudsman Act provisions are in pari materia in that they "cover the same specific or particular subject matter," that is,
the manner of judicial review over issuances of the Ombudsman.

xxxx

Thus, with the unconstitutionality of the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770, the Court, consistent with existing
jurisprudence, concludes that the CA has subject matter jurisdiction over the main CAG. R. SP No. 139453 petition.38

Gatchalian argues that the consequence of the foregoing is that all orders, directives, and decisions of the Ombudsman -
whether it be an incident of an administrative or criminal case - are now reviewable by the CA.

The contention is untenable.

The Court agrees with the CA that the Morales decision should be read and viewed in its proper context. The Court
in Morales held that the CA had subject matter jurisdiction over the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 filed therein because
what was assailed in the said petition was a preventive suspension order, which was an interlocutory order and thus
unappealable, issued by the Ombudsman. Consistent with the rationale of Estrada, the Court held that a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 was proper as R.A. 6770 did not provide for an appeal procedure for interlocutory orders issued by
the Ombudsman. The Court also held that it was correctly filed with the CA because the preventive suspension order was an
incident of an administrative case. The Court in Morales was thus applying only what was already well-established in
jurisprudence.

It must likewise be pointed out that the Court, in arriving at the decision in Morales, cited and was guided by the case of Office
of the Ombudsman v. Capulong.39 In Capulong, a preventive suspension order issued by the Ombudsman was questioned
through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 filed with the CA. The Court in Capulong held that:

[t]he preventive suspension order is interlocutory in character and not a final order on the merits of the case. The aggrieved
party may then seek redress from the courts through a petition for certiorari under Section 1, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Court.
x x x There being a finding of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Ombudsman, it was certainly imperative for the CA to
grant incidental reliefs, as sanctioned by Section 1 of Rule 65.40

Also, as aptly pointed out by the CA in its assailed Resolution, "the Supreme Court never mentioned the proper remedy to be
taken from the Ombudsman's orders in non-administrative cases or criminal cases, such as the finding of probable cause. In fact,
this matter was not even alluded to in the Morales decision."41

A thorough reading of the Morales decision, therefore, would reveal that it was limited in its application - that it was meant to
cover only decisions or orders of the Ombudsman in administrative cases. The Court never intimated, much less categorically
stated, that it was abandoning its rulings in Kuizon and Estrada and the distinction made therein between the appellate recourse
for decisions or orders of the Ombudsman in administrative and non-administrative cases. Bearing in mind that Morales dealt
with an interlocutory order in an administrative case, it cannot thus be read to apply to decisions or orders of the Ombudsman
in non-administrative or criminal cases.

As a final point, it must be pointed out that subsequent to the Morales decision, the Court - likewise sitting En Banc -- decided
the case of Information Technology Foundation of the Philippines, et al. v. Commission on Elections, 42 where it again upheld the
difference of appellate procedure between orders or decisions of the Ombudsman in administrative and non-administrative
cases. Thus:

As a preliminary procedural matter, we observe that while the petition asks this Court to set aside the Supplemental Resolution,
which dismissed both administrative and criminal complaints, it is clear from the allegations therein that what petitioners are
questioning is the criminal aspect of the assailed resolution, i.e., the Ombudsman's finding that there is no probable cause to
indict. the respondents in the Ombudsman cases. Movants in G.R. No. 159139 similarly question this conclusion by the
Ombudsman and accordingly pray that the Ombudsman be directed to file an information with the Sandiganbayan against the
responsible COMELEC officials and conspiring private individuals.

In Kuizon v. Desierto and Mendoza-Arce v. Office of the Ombudsman, we held that this Court has jurisdiction over petitions
for certiorari questioning resolutions or orders of the Ombudsman in criminal cases. For administrative cases, however, we
declared in the case of Dagan v. Office of the Ombudsman(Visayas) that the petition should be filed with the Court of Appeals
in observance of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. The Dagan ruling homogenized the procedural rule with respect to
administrative cases falling within the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman - first enunciated in Fabian v. Desierto - that is, all
remedies involving the orders, directives, or decisions of the Ombudsman in administrative cases, whether by an appeal
under Rule 43 or a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, must be filed with the Court of Appeals.

xxxx

The Ombudsman's determination of probable cause may only be assailed through  certiorari proceedings before this Court on
the ground that such determination is tainted with grave abuse of discretion. Not every error in the proceedings or every
erroneous conclusion of law or fact, however, constitutes grave abuse of discretion. It has been stated that the Ombudsman
may err or even abuse the discretion lodged in her by law, but such error or abuse alone does not render her act amenable to
correction and annulment by the extraordinary remedy of certiorari. To justify judicial intrusion into what is fundamentally the
domain of another constitutional body, the petitioner must clearly show that the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in making her determination and in arriving at the conclusion she reached.
For there to be a finding of grave abuse of discretion, it must be shown that the discretionary power was exercised in an
arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and the abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross
as to amount to ·an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of
law.43 (Emphasis supplied)

It is thus clear that the Morales decision never intended to disturb the well-established distinction between the appellate
remedies for orders, directives, and decisions arising from administrative cases and those arising from non-administrative or
criminal cases.1âwphi1

Gatchalian's contention that the unconstitutionality of Section 14 of R.A. 6770 declared in Morales equally applies to both
administrative and criminal cases - and thus the CA from then on had jurisdiction to entertain petitions for certiorari under Rule
65 to question orders and decisions arising from criminal cases - is simply misplaced. Section 14 of R.A. 6770 was declared
unconstitutional because it trampled on the rule-making powers of the Court by 1) prescribing the mode of appeal, which was
by Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, for all cases whether final or not; and 2) rendering nugatory the certiorari jurisdiction of the CA
over incidents arising from administrative cases.

The unconstitutionality of Section 14 of R.A. 6770, therefore, did not necessarily have an effect over the appellate procedure for
orders and decisions arising from criminal cases precisely because the ·said procedure was not prescribed by the
aforementioned section. To recall, the rule that decisions or orders of the Ombudsman finding the existence of probable cause
(or the lack thereof) should be questioned through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 filed with the Supreme Court was laid
down by the Court itself in the cases of Kuizon, Tirol Jr., Mendoza-Arce v. Ombudsman,44 Estrada, and subsequent cases affirming
the said rule. The rule was, therefore, not anchored on Section 14 of R.A. 6770, but was instead a rule prescribed by the Court in
the exercise of its rule-making powers. The declaration of unconstitutionality of Section 14 of R.A. 6770 was therefore
immaterial insofar as the appellate procedure for orders and decisions by the Ombudsman in criminal cases is concerned.

The argument therefore that the promulgation of the Morales decision - a case which involved an interlocutory order arising
from an administrative case, and which did not categorically abandon the cases of Kuizon, Tirol, Jr., Mendoza-Arce, and Estrada -
gave the CA certiorari jurisdiction over final orders and decisions arising from non-administrative or criminal cases is clearly
untenable.

To stress, it is the better practice that when a court has laid down a principle of law as applicable to a certain state of facts, it will
adhere to that principle and apply it to all future cases where the facts are substantially the same.45 Following the principle
of stare decisis et non quieta movere - or follow past precedents and do not disturb what has been settled - the Court therefore
upholds the abovementioned established rules on appellate procedure, and so holds that the CA did not err in dismissing the
case filed by petitioner Gatchalian for lack of jurisdiction.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is hereby DENIED. The Resolutions dated September 13,
2016 and January 13, 2017 issued by the Special Thirteenth Division of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 145852
are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
UY VS. SANDIGANBAYAN
Good Law

EN BANC G.R. Nos. 105965-70, March 20, 2001 GEORGE UY, PETITIONER, VS. THE HON. SANDIGANBAYAN, THE HON.
OMBUDSMAN AND THE HON. ROGER C. BERBANO, SR., SPECIAL PROSECUTION OFFICER III, OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL
PROSECUTOR, RESPONDENTS.

RESOLUTION

PUNO, J.:

Before the Court is the Motion for Further Clarification filed by Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto of the Court's ruling in its
decision dated August 9, 1999 and resolution dated February 22, 2000 that the prosecutory power of the Ombudsman extends
only to cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and that the Ombudsman has no authority to prosecute cases falling within the
jurisdiction of regular courts.

The Court stated in its decision dated August 9, 1999:

"In this connection, it is the prosecutor, not the Ombudsman, who has the authority to file the corresponding information/s
against petitioner in the regional trial court. The Ombudsman exercises prosecutorial powers only in cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan."

It explained in the resolution of February 22, 2000 that:

"(t)he clear import of such pronouncement is to recognize the authority of the State and regular provincial and city prosecutors
under the Department of Justice to have control over prosecution of cases falling within the jurisdiction of the regular courts. The
investigation and prosecutorial powers of the Ombudsman relate to cases rightfully falling within the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan under Section 15 (1) of R.A. 6770 ("An Act Providing for the Functional and Structural Organization of the Office
of the Ombudsman, and for other purposes") which vests upon the Ombudsman "primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by
the Sandiganbayan..." And this is further buttressed by Section 11 (4a) of R.A. 6770 which emphasizes that the Office of the
Special Prosecutor shall have the power to "conduct preliminary investigation and prosecute criminal cases within the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan." Thus, repeated references to the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction clearly serve to limit the
Ombudsman's and Special Prosecutor's authority to cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan."

Seeking clarification of the foregoing ruling, respondent Ombudsman raises the following points:

(1)"The jurisdiction of the Honorable Sandiganbayan is not parallel to or equated with the broader jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombuds

(2)The phrase "primary jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan" is not a delimitation of i

(3)The authority of the Office of the Special Prosecutor to prosecute cases before the Sandiganbayan cannot be confused with the broade
Office of the Ombudsman."

Thus, the matter that needs to be discussed herein is the scope of the power of the Ombudsman to conduct preliminary
investigation and the subsequent prosecution of criminal offenses in the light of the provisions of the Ombudsman Act of 1989
(Republic Act [RA] 6770).

We held that the Ombudsman is clothed with authority to conduct preliminary investigation and to prosecute all criminal cases
involving public officers and employees, not only those within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, but those within the
jurisdiction of the regular courts as well.

The authority of the Ombudsman to investigate and prosecute offenses committed by public officers and employees is founded
in Section 15 and Section 11 of RA 6770. Section 15 vests the Ombudsman with the power to investigate and prosecute any act
or omission of any public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper
or inefficient, thus:

"Sec. 15.  Powers, Functions and Duties.--The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions and duties:

(1) Investigate and prosecute  on its own or on complaint by any person,  any act or omission of any public officer or employee,
office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. It has primary jurisdiction over
cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of this primary jurisdiction, it may take over, at any stage, from any
investigatory agency of Government, the investigation of such cases;

x x x"
Section 11 grants the Office of the Special Prosecutor, an organic component of the Office of the Ombudsman under the latter's
supervision and control, the power to conduct preliminary investigation and prosecute criminal cases within the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan. It states:

"Sec. 11.  Structural Organization.-- x x x

xxx
(3) The Office of the Special Prosecutor shall be composed of the Special Prosecutor and his prosecution staff. The Office of the
Special Prosecutor shall be an organic component of the Office of the Ombudsman and shall be under the supervision and control
of the Ombudsman.

(4) The Office of the Special Prosecutor shall, under the supervision and control and upon authority of the Ombudsman, have the
following powers:

(a) To conduct preliminary investigation and prosecute criminal cases within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan;

(b) To enter into plea bargaining agreements; and

(c) To perform such other duties assigned to it by the Ombudsman."

The power to investigate and to prosecute granted by law to the Ombudsman is plenary and unqualified. It pertains to any act
or omission of any public officer or employee when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient.
The law does not make a distinction between cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and those cognizable by regular courts. It
has been held that the clause "any illegal act or omission of any public official" is broad enough to embrace any crime committed
by a public officer or employee.[1]

The reference made by RA 6770 to cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, particularly in Section 15 (1) giving the Ombudsman
primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, and Section 11 (4) granting the Special Prosecutor the power to
conduct preliminary investigation and prosecute criminal cases within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, should not be
construed as confining the scope of the investigatory and prosecutory power of the Ombudsman to such cases.

Section 15 of RA 6770 gives the Ombudsman primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan. The law defines
such primary jurisdiction as authorizing the Ombudsman "to take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of the
government, the investigation of such cases." The grant of this authority does not necessarily imply the exclusion from its
jurisdiction of cases involving public officers and employees cognizable by other courts. The exercise by the Ombudsman of his
primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan is not incompatible with the discharge of his duty to investigate
and prosecute other offenses committed by public officers and employees. Indeed, it must be stressed that the powers granted
by the legislature to the Ombudsman are very broad and encompass all kinds of malfeasance, misfeasance and non-feasance
committed by public officers and employees during their tenure of office.[2]

Moreover, the jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman should not be equated with the limited authority of the Special
Prosecutor under Section 11 of RA 6770. The Office of the Special Prosecutor is merely a component of the Office of the
Ombudsman and may only act under the supervision and control and upon authority of the Ombudsman.[3] Its power to conduct
preliminary investigation and to prosecute is limited to criminal cases within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Certainly,
the lawmakers did not intend to confine the investigatory and prosecutory power of the Ombudsman to these types of cases.
The Ombudsman is mandated by law to act on all complaints against officers and employees of the government and to enforce
their administrative, civil and criminal liability in every case where the evidence warrants.[4] To carry out this duty, the law allows
him to utilize the personnel of his office and/or designate any fiscal, state prosecutor or lawyer in the government service to act
as special investigator or prosecutor to assist in the investigation and prosecution of certain cases. Those designated or
deputized to assist him work under his supervision and control.[5] The law likewise allows him to direct the Special Prosecutor to
prosecute cases outside the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction in accordance with Section 11 (4c) of RA 6770.

The prosecution of offenses committed by public officers and employees is one of the most important functions of the
Ombudsman. In passing RA 6770, the Congress deliberately endowed the Ombudsman with such power to make him a more
active and effective agent of the people in ensuring accountability in public office.[6] A review of the development of our
Ombudsman laws reveals this intent.

The concept of Ombudsman originated in Sweden in the early 19th century, referring to an officer appointed by the legislature to
handle the people's grievances against administrative and judicial actions. He was primarily tasked with receiving complaints
from persons aggrieved by administrative action or inaction, conducting investigation thereon, and making recommendations to
the appropriate administrative agency based on his findings. He relied mainly on the power of persuasion and the high prestige
of the office to effect his recommendations.[7]

In this jurisdiction, several Ombudsman-like agencies were established by past Presidents to serve as the people's medium for
airing grievances and seeking redress against abuses and misconduct in the government. These offices were conceived with the
view of raising the standard in public service and ensuring integrity and efficiency in the government. In May 1950, President
Elpidio Quirino created the Integrity Board charged with receiving complaints against public officials for acts of corruption,
dereliction of duty and irregularity in office, and conducting a thorough investigation of these complaints. The Integrity Board
was succeeded by several other agencies which performed basically the same functions of complaints-handling and
investigation. These were the Presidential Complaints and Action Commission under President Ramon Magsaysay, the
Presidential Committee on Administration Performance Efficiency under President Carlos Garcia, the Presidential Anti-Graft
Committee under President Diosdado Macapagal, and the Presidential Agency on Reform and Government Operations and the
Office of the Citizens Counselor, both under President Ferdinand Marcos. It was observed, however, that these agencies failed to
realize their objective for they did not enjoy the political independence necessary for the effective performance of their function
as government critic. Furthermore, their powers extended to no more than fact-finding and recommending.[8]

Thus, in the advent of the 1973 Constitution, the members of the Constitutional Convention saw the need to constitutionalize
the office of an Ombudsman, to give it political independence and adequate powers to enforce its recommendations.[9] The 1973
Constitution mandated the legislature to create an office of the Ombudsman to be known as Tanodbayan. Its powers shall not
be limited to receiving complaints and making recommendations, but shall also include the filing and prosecution of criminal,
civil or administrative case before the appropriate body in case of failure of justice. Section 6, Article XIII of the 1973 Constitution
read:

"Sec. 6. The Batasang Pambansa shall create an office of the Ombudsman, to be known as Tanodbayan, which shall receive and
investigate complaints relative to public office, including those in government-owned or controlled corporations, make
appropriate recommendations, and  in case of failure of justice as defined by law, file and prosecute the corresponding
criminal, civil or administrative case before the proper court or body."

Implementing this constitutional provision, President Marcos, on June 11, 1978, exercising his power under Proclamation 1081,
enacted Presidential Decree (PD) 1487 creating the Office of the Ombudsman to be known as Tanodbayan. Its principal task was
to "investigate, on complaint, any administrative act[10] of any administrative agency[11] including any government-owned or
controlled corporation."[12] The Tanodbayan also had the duty to file and prosecute the corresponding criminal, civil, or
administrative case before the Sandiganbayan or the proper court or body if he has reason to believe that any public official,
employee, or other person has acted in a manner resulting in a failure of justice.[13] It should be noted, however, that the
prosecution of cases falling within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan was to be done by the Tanodbayan through the Special
Prosecutor who, according to PD 1486,[14] had the exclusive authority to conduct preliminary investigation, file information for
and prosecute cases within the jurisdiction of said court. The Special Prosecutor was then under the control and supervision of
the Secretary of Justice.[15]

Shortly after its enactment, PD 1487 was amended by PD 1607 which took effect on December 10, 1978. The amendatory law
broadened the authority of the Tanodbayan to investigate administrative acts of administrative agencies by authorizing it to
conduct an investigation on its own motion or initiative, even without a complaint from any person.[16] The new law also
expanded the prosecutory function of the Tanodbayan by creating the Office of the Chief Special Prosecutor in the Office of the
Tanodbayan and placing under his direction and control the Special Prosecutor who had the "exclusive authority to conduct
preliminary investigation of all cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan; to file informations therefor and to direct and control the
prosecution of said cases therein."[17] Thus, the law provided that if the Tanodbayan has reason to believe that any public official,
employee, or other person has acted in a manner warranting criminal or disciplinary action or proceedings, he shall cause him to
be investigated by the Office of the Chief Special Prosecutor who shall file and prosecute the corresponding criminal or
administrative case before the Sandiganbayan or the proper court or before the proper administrative agency.[18]

On July 18, 1979, PD 1630 was enacted further amending PD 1487 and PD 1607. PD 1630 reorganized the Office of the
Tanodbayan and transferred the powers previously vested in the Special Prosecutor to the Tanodbayan himself. Thus, the
Tanodbayan was empowered to directly conduct preliminary investigation, file information and prosecute cases within the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan and other courts. The amendment gave the Tanodbayan the exclusive authority to conduct
preliminary investigation of all cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan; to file information therefor and to direct and control the
prosecution of said cases.[19] Section 10 of PD 1630 provided:

"Sec. 10.  Powers.--The Tanodbayan shall have the following powers:

(a) He may investigate, on complaint by any person or on his own motion or initiative, any administrative act whether amounting to any c
including any government-owned or controlled corporation;

xx
x

(e) If after preliminary investigation he finds a prima facie case, he may file the necessary information or complaint with the Sandiganbaya
prosecute the same."

Section 18 further stated:

"Sec. 18.  Prosecution of Public Personnel or Other Person.--If the Tanodbayan has reason to believe that any public official,
employee or other person has acted in a manner warranting criminal or disciplinary action or proceedings, he shall conduct the
necessary investigation and shall file and prosecute the corresponding criminal or administrative case before the Sandiganbayan
or the proper court or before the proper administrative agency."

With the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, a new Office of the Ombudsman was created. The present Ombudsman, as
protector of the people, is mandated to act promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against public officials or
employees of the government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled
corporations, and to notify the complainants of the action taken and the result thereof.[20] He possesses the following powers,
functions and duties:

"1.Investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public official, employee, office or agency, when such
improper, or inefficient;

2. Direct, upon complaint or at its own instance, any public official or employee of the Government, or any subdivision, agency or instrum
owned or controlled corporation with original charter, to perform and expedite any act or duty required by law, or to stop, prevent and
performance of duties.

3. Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action against a public official or employee at fault, and recommend his removal, suspe
and ensure compliance therewith.
4. Direct the officer concerned, in any appropriate case, and subject to such limitations as may be provided by law, to furnish it with copie
transactions entered into by his office involving the disbursement or use of public funds or properties, and report any irregularity to the

5. Request any government agency for assistance and information necessary in the discharge of its responsibilities, and to examine, if nec

6. Publicize matters covered by its investigation when circumstances so warrant and with due prudence.

7. Determine the causes of inefficiency, red tape, mismanagement, fraud, and corruption in the Government and make recommendations
standards of ethics and efficiency.

8. Promulgate its rules of procedure and exercise such other powers or perform such functions or duties as may be provided by law."[21]

As a new Office of the Ombudsman was established, the then existing Tanodbayan became the Office of the Special Prosecutor
which continued to function and exercise its powers as provided by law, except those conferred on the Office of the
Ombudsman created under the 1987 Constitution.[22]

The frameworks for the Office of the Ombudsman and the Office of the Special Prosecutor were laid down by President Corazon
Aquino in Executive Order (EO) 243 and EO 244, both passed on July 24, 1987.

In September 1989, Congress passed RA 6770 providing for the functional and structural organization of the Office of the
Ombudsman. As in the previous laws on the Ombudsman, RA 6770 gave the present Ombudsman not only the duty to receive
and relay the people's grievances, but also the duty to investigate and prosecute for and in their behalf, civil, criminal and
administrative offenses committed by government officers and employees as embodied in Sections 15 and 11 of the law.

Clearly, the Philippine Ombudsman departs from the classical Ombudsman model whose function is merely to receive and
process the people's complaints against corrupt and abusive government personnel. The Philippine Ombudsman, as protector of
the people, is armed with the power to prosecute erring public officers and employees, giving him an active role in the
enforcement of laws on anti-graft and corrupt practices and such other offenses that may be committed by such officers and
employees. The legislature has vested him with broad powers to enable him to implement his own actions. Recognizing the
importance of this power, the Court cannot derogate the same by limiting it only to cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan. It is
apparent from the history and the language of the present law that the legislature intended such power to apply not only to
cases within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan but also those within the jurisdiction of regular courts. The Court observed in
the case of Republic vs. Sandiganbayan:[23]

"A perusal of the law originally creating the Office of the Ombudsman then (to be known as the Tanodbayan), and the
amendatory laws issued subsequent thereto will show that, at its inception, the Office of the Ombudsman was already vested
with the power to investigate and prosecute civil and criminal cases before the Sandiganbayan and even the regular courts.

xxx
Presidential Decree No. 1630 was the existing law governing the then Tanodbayan when Republic Act No. 6770 was enacted
providing for the functional and structural organization of the present Office of the Ombudsman. This later law retained in the
Ombudsman the power of the former Tanodbayan to investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any
act or omission of any public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust,
improper or inefficient. x x x."

Finally, it must be clarified that the authority of the Ombudsman to prosecute cases involving public officers and employees
before the regular courts does not conflict with the power of the regular prosecutors under the Department of Justice to control
and direct the prosecution of all criminal actions under Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. The Rules of Court
must be read in conjunction with RA 6770 which charged the Ombudsman with the duty to investigate and prosecute all illegal
acts and omissions of public officers and employees. The Court held in the case of Sanchez vs. Demetriou[24] that the power of
the Ombudsman under Section 15 (1) of RA 6770 is not an exclusive authority but rather a shared or concurrent authority in
respect of the offense charged. Thus, Administrative Order No. 8 issued by the Office of the Ombudsman provides:

"The prosecution of case cognizable by the Sandiganbayan shall be under the direct exclusive control and supervision of the
Office of the Ombudsman. In cases cognizable by regular Courts, the control and supervision by the Office of the Ombudsman is
only in Ombudsman cases in the sense defined (therein). [25] The law recognizes a concurrence of jurisdiction between the Office of
the Ombudsman and other investigative agencies of government in the prosecution of cases cognizable by regular courts."

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court's ruling in its decision dated August 9, 1999 and its resolution dated February 20, 2000 that the
Ombudsman exercises prosecutorial powers only in cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan is SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.

[REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8249]

AN ACT FURTHER DEFINING THE JURISDICTION OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE PRESIDENTIAL
DECREE NO. 1606, AS AMENDED, PROVIDING FUNDS THEREFOR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled:

SECTION 1. The first paragraph of Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1606, as amended, is hereby further amended to read as
follows:

“SECTION. 1. Sandiganbayan; Composition, Qualifications; Tenure; Removal and Compensation. – A special court, of the same
level as the Court of Appeals and possessing all the inherent powers of a court of justice, to be known as the Sandiganbayan is
hereby created composed of a presiding  justice and fourteen associate justices who shall be appointed by the President.”

SEC. 2. Section 2 of the same decree is hereby further amended to read as follows:

“SEC. 2. Official Station; Place of Holding Sessions. – The Sandiganbayan shall have its principal office in the Metro Manila area
and shall hold sessions thereat for the trial and determination of cases filed with it: Provided, however, That cases originating
from the principal geographical regions of the country, that is, from Luzon, Visayas or Mindanao, shall be heard in their
respective regions of origin except only when the greater convenience of the accused and of the witnesses, or other compelling
considerations require the contrary, in which instance a case originating from one geographical region may be heard in another
geographical region: Provided, further, That for this purpose the presiding justice shall authorize any divisions of the court to
hold sessions at any time and place outside Metro  Manila and, where the interest of justice so requires, outside the territorial
boundaries of the Philippines. The Sandiganbayan may require the services of the personnel and the use of facilities of the
courts or other government offices where any of the divisions is holding sessions and the personnel of such courts or offices shall
be subject to the orders of the Sandiganbayan.”

SEC. 3. The second paragraph of Section 3 of the same decree is hereby deleted.

SEC. 4. Section 4 of the same decree is hereby further amended to read as follows:

“a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act
No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials
occupying the following positions in the government whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the
commission of the offense:

“(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade ’27’
and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:

“(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan and provincial treasurers, assessors,
engineers and other provincial department heads;

“(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors engineers and other city
department heads;

“(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher;

“(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank;

“(e) Officers of the Philippine National Police while occupying the position of provincial director and those holding the rank of
senior superintendent or higher;
“(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and
special prosecutor;

“(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or -controlled corporations, state universities or
educational institutions or foundations;

“(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade ’27’ and up under the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989;

“(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;

“(4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution; and

“(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade’27’and higher under the Compensation and Position Classification Act
of 1989.

“b. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the public officials and employees
mentioned in subsection a of this section in relation to their office.

“c. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986.

“In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to salary grade ’27’ or higher, as prescribed in the
said Republic Act No. 6758, or military or PNP officers mentioned above, exclusive original jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in
the proper regional trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court and municipal circuit trial court as the case may be,
pursuant to their respective jurisdiction as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended.

“The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction over final judgments, resolutions or orders or regional trial
courts whether in the exercise of their own original jurisdiction or of their appellate jurisdiction as herein provided.

“The Sandiganbayan shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over petitions for the issuance of the writs of mandamus,
prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, injunctions, and other ancillary writs and processes in aid of its appellate jurisdiction and
over petitions of similar nature, including quo warranto, arising or that may arise in cases filed or which may be filed under
Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986: Provided, That the jurisdiction over these petitions shall not be  exclusive
of the Supreme Court.

“The procedure prescribed in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as well as the implementing rules that the Supreme Court has
promulgated and may hereafter promulgate, relative to appeals/petitions for review to the Court of Appeals, shall apply to
appeals and petitions for review filed with the Sandiganbayan. In all cases elevated to the Sandiganbayan and from
the Sandiganbayan to the Supreme Court, the Office of the Ombudsman, through its special prosecutor, shall represent the
People of the Philippines, except in cases filed pursuant to Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986.

“In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories with the public officers or employees,
including those employed in government-owned or controlled corporations, they shall be tried jointly with said public officers
and employees in the proper courts which shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction over them.

“Any provisions of law or Rules of Court to the contrary notwithstanding, the criminal action and the corresponding civil action
for the recovery of civil liability shall at all times be simultaneously instituted with, and jointly determined in, the same
proceeding by the Sandiganbayan  or the appropriate courts, the filing of the criminal action being deemed to necessarily carry
with it the filing of the civil action, and no right to reserve the filing of such civil action separately from the criminal action shall
be recognized: Provided, however, That where the civil action had therefore been filed separately but judgment therein has not
yet been rendered, and the criminal case is hereafter filed with the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate court, said civil action
shall be transferred to the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate court, as the case may be, for consolidation and joint
determination with the criminal action, otherwise the separate civil action shall be deemed abandoned.”

SEC. 5. Section 7 of the same decree is hereby further amended to read as follows:

“SEC. 7. Form, Finality and Enforcement of Decisions. – All decisions and final orders determining the merits of a case or finally
disposing of the action or proceedings of the Sandiganbayan shall contain complete findings of the facts and the law on which
they are based, on all issues properly raised before it and necessary in deciding the case.
“A petition for reconsideration of any final order or decision may be filed within fifteen (15) days from promulgation or notice of
the final order on judgment, and such motion for reconsideration shall be decided within thirty (30) days from submission
thereon.

“Decisions and final orders of the Sandiganbyan shall be appealable to the Supreme Court by petition for review
on certiorari raising pure questions of law in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Whenever, in any case decided by
the Sandiganbayan, the penalty of reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment or death is imposed, the decision shall be appealable to
the Supreme Court in the manner prescribed in the Rules of Court.

“Judgments and orders of the Sandiganbayan shall be executed and enforced in the manner provided by law.

“Decisions and final orders of other courts in cases cognizable by said courts under this decree as well as those rendered by
them in the exercise of their appellate jurisdiction shall be appealable to, or be reviewable by, the Sandiganbayan in the manner
provided by Rule 122 of the Rules of the Court.

“In case, however, the imposed penalty by the Sandiganbayan  or the regional trial court in the proper exercise of their
respective jurisdictions, is death, review by the Supreme Court shall be automatic, whether or not accused files an appeal.”

SEC. 6. Appropriations. – The amount necessary to carry out the initial implementation of this Act shall be charged against the
current fiscal year appropriations of the Sandiganbayan. Thereafter, such sums as may be needed for its continued
implementation shall be included in the annual General Appropriations Act.

SEC. 7. Transitory Provision. – This Act shall apply to all cases pending in any court over which trial has not begun as of the
approval hereof.

SEC. 8. Separability of Provisions. – If for any reason any provision of this Act is declared unconstitutional or invalid, such parts or
portions not affected thereby shall remain in full force and effect.

SEC. 9. Repealing Clause. – All acts, decrees, general orders and circulars, or parts thereof inconsistent with the provisions of this
Act are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.

SEC. 10. Effectivity. – This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days after its complete publication in at least two (2) newspapers of
general circulation.

Approved,