C o n s ti t u ti o n a l L a w I I S e c .
1 4 a n d 1 6 P a g e | 1
[No. L-5371. March 26, 1953]
The People of the Philippines, plaintiff and appellee, vs. Aquino Mingoa,
defendant and appellant.
Criminal Law; Evidence; Malversation of Public Funds; "Prima Facie" Presumption
of Guilt.—"There is no constitutional objection to the passage of a law providing
that the presumption of innocence may be overcome by a contrary presumption
founded upon the experience of human conduct, and enacting what evidence shall
be sufficient to overcome such presumption of innocence." Article 217 of the
Revised Penal Code creates a presumption of guilt once certain facts are proved. It
makes the failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming, upon proper
demand, any public funds or property with which he is chargeable, prima facie
evidence that he has put such missing funds or property to personal use. The
presumption is reasonable and valid. People vs. Mingoa, 92 Phil., 856, No. L-5371
March 26, 1953.
REYES, J.:
Found short in his accounts as officer-in-charge of the office of the municipal
treasurer of Despujols, Romblon, and unable to produce the missing fund
amounting to P3,938 upon demand by the provincial auditor, the defendant Aquino
Mingoa was prosecuted for the crime of malversation of public funds in the Court
of First Instance of Romblon, and having been found guilty as charged and
sentenced to the corresponding penalty, he appealed to the Court of Appeals. But
that court certified the case here on the ground that it involved a constitutional
question.
The evidence shows that it is not disputed that upon examination of his books and
accounts on September 1, 1949, defendants, as accountable officer, was found
short in the sum above-named and that, required to produce the missing fund, he
was not able to do so. He explained to the examining officer that some days
before he had, by mistake, put the money in a large envelope which he took with
him to show and that he forgot it on his seat and it was not there anymore when
he returned. But he did not testify in court and presented no evidence in his favor.
We agree with the trial judge that defendant's explanation is inherently
unbelievable and cannot overcome the presumption of guilt arising from his
inability to produce the fund which was found missing. As His Honor observes, if
the money was really lost without defendant's fault, the most natural thing for him
to do would be to so inform his superiors and apply for release from liability. But
this he did not do. Instead, he tried to borrow to cover the shortage. And on the
flimsy excuse that he preferred to do his own sleuthing, he even did not report the
loss to the police. Considering further as the prosecution points out in its brief, that
defendant had at first tried to avoid meeting the auditor who wanted to examine
his accounts, and that for sometime before the alleged loss many teachers and
other employees of the town had not been paid their salaries, there is good
ground to believe that defendant had really malversed the fund in question and
that his story about its loss was pure invention.
It is now contended, however, that lacking direct evidence of actual
misappropriation the trial court convicted defendant on mere presumptions, that is,
presumptions of criminal intent in losing the money under the circumstances
alleged and presumptions of guilt from the mere fact that he failed, upon demand
to produce the sum lacking. The criticism as to the first presumption is irrelevant,
for the fact is that trial court did not believe defendant's explanation that the
money was lost, considering it mere cloak to cover actual misappropriation. That is
why the court said that "whether or not he (defendant) is guilty of malversation for
negligence is of no moment . . . " And as to the other presumption, the same is
authorized by article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, which provides:
The failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds
or property with which he is chargeable, upon demand by any duly
authorized officer, shall be prima facie evidence that he has put such
missing funds or property to personal use.
The contention that this legal provision violates the constitutional right of the
accused to be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved cannot be sustained.
The question of the constitutionality of the statute not having been raised in the
court below, it may not be considered for the first time on appeal.
(Robb vs. People, 68 Phil., 320.)
In many event, the validity of statutes establishing presumptions in criminal cases
is now settled matter, Cooley, in his work on constitutional limitations, 8th ed., Vo.
I, pp. 639-641says that "there is no constitutional objection to the passage of law
providing that the presumption of innocence may be overcome by contrary
presumption founded upon the experience of human conduct, and enacting what
evidence shall be sufficient to overcome such presumption of innocence." In line
with this view, it is generally held in the United States that the legislature may
enact that when certain facts have been proven they shall be prima facie evidence
of the existence of the guilt of the accused and shift the burden of proof provided
there be rational connection between that facts proved and the ultimate fact
presumed so that the inference of the one from proof of the others is not
unreasonable and arbitrary because of lack of connection between the two in
 C o n s ti t u ti o n a l L a w I I S e c . 1 4 a n d 1 6 P a g e | 2

common experience. (See annotation on constitutionality of statutes or ordinances

making one fact presumptive or prima facie evidence of another, 162 A.L.R. 495-
535; also, State vs. Brown, 182 S.E., 838, with reference to embezzlement.) The
same view has been adopted here as may be seen from the decisions of this court
in the U.S. vs. Tria, 17 Phil., 303; U.S. vs. Luling, 34 Phil., 725; and People vs.
Merilo, G.R. No. L-3489, promulgated June 28, 1951.

The statute in the present case creates a presumption of guilt once certain facts
are proved. It makes the failure of public officer to have duly forthcoming, upon
proper demaand, any public funds or property with which he is chargeable  prima
facie evidence that he has put such missing funds or property to personal use. The
ultimate fact presumed is that officer has malversed the funds or property
entrusted to his custody, and the presumption is made to arise from proof that he
has received them and yet he has failed to have them forthcoming upon proper
demand. Clearly, the fact presumed is but a natural inference from the fact
proved, so that it cannot be said that there is no rational connection between the
two. Furthermore, the statute establishes only a prima facie presumption, thus
giving the accused an opportunity to present evidence to rebut it. The presumption
is reasonable and will stand the test of validity laid down in the above citations.

There being no reversible error in the decision appealed from, the same is hereby
affirmed, with costs.

No. L-53586. January 30, 1982.*
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. PONCIANO
LUMAGUE, JR., MARIO LUMAGUE, ROLANDO LUMAGUE and JUANITO
LUMAGUE, accused whose death sentences are under review.
Criminal Law; Plea of guilty made by Juanito Lumague, his being a fugitive from
justice and evidence adduced show that said accused is guilty of the killing of the
offended party.—With respect to Juanito Lumague, who withdrew his plea of not
guilty, who was tried separately and whose guilt was also established by means of
the evidence presented against him, we find that the counsel’s contentions are
devoid of merit. Juanito’s guilt was proven beyond reasonable doubt. His plea of
guilty and the evidence introduced by the prosecution destroyed the presumption
of innocence in his favor. There is conclusive evidence that he was the one who
stabbed Regalado. In doing so, he conspired with the other assailants of the
victim, particularly with the assailant who treacherously struck Regalado on the
back with a hoe. Even Juanito’s mother admitted that he took part in the assault
(408-9, 413-4). And, of course, the fact that Juanito was a fugitive from justice for
several months is an indication of his guilt.
Same; Plea of guilty not mitigating if made after prosecution had commence the
presentation of evidence.—The trial court correctly held that the killing was murder
qualified by treachery and abuse of superiority and aggravated by cruelty. Hence,
death is the proper penalty. Juanito’s plea of guilty is not mitigating because it was
made after the prosecution had commenced the presentation of its evidence.
Same; Constitutional Law; An accused person should be given, the opportunity to
testify in his behalf and to present additional evidence.—“Due process of law in a
criminal prosecution consists of a law creating or defining the offense, an impartial
tribunal of competent jurisdiction, accusation in due form, notice and opportunity
to defend, trial according to established procedure, and discharge unless found
guilty” (16A C.J.S. 617). The constitutional right of the accused to be heard in his
defense is inviolate. “No court of justice under our system of government has the
power to deprive him of that right.” (Abriol vs. Homeres, 84 Phil 525, 534.)
Fundamental fairness, which is the essence of due process, requires that the three
accused should be allowed to testify on their defenses and to present additional
evidence to prove their innocence.
Fernando, C.J.:
Takes no part insofar as the separate decision imposing the death sentence on
Juanito Lumague and concurs as to the setting aside of the death sentence
C o n s ti t u ti o n a l L a w I I S e c . 1 4 a n d 1 6 P a g e | 3
imposed on Ponciano, Mario and Rolando, all surnamed Lumague. He likewise
concurs with the observation of Justice Abad Santos in his brief separate opinion.
Abad Santos, J., concurs in the result
Evidence; Ducha’s sworn statement should be disregarded as he did not testify in
court.—Ducha’s sworn statements (Exhibits E and F) should be totally disregarded.
Since he did not testify and hence could not be cross-examined, they are hearsay.
They are prejudicial to the accused.
Same; Criminal Procedure; The trial court should view the social and economic
backgrounds of the accused in a different light For their poverty society must
assume its share of the blame.—I would urge the trial court when it renders
another decision in the case of Ponciano, Mario and Rolando Lumague to view
their social and economic backgrounds in a different fight. The decision appears to
indicate that because of their life-styles they have a proclivity to commit crime.
Maybe it is so. But it should be remembered that they did not choose to be poor
and for their poverty society must assume its share of the blame.
De Castro, J.:
I concur with Justice Ericta’s observations.
Ericta, J., concurs and dissents:
Criminal Law; Cruelty is not present as there was no proof that accused sadistically
augmented the wrong done by causing another not necessary for the commission
of homicide even if there were 36 stab wounds.—In the case of PP vs. Juan
Jumauan alias Juancho Jumauan, 98 Phil. 1, the lone defendant inflicted upon the
deceased 13 wounds in all. But this Court refused to appreciate the aggravating
circumstance of cruelty, because there was no showing that the defendant
“deliberately and inhumanly increased the suffering of the deceased.” The test is
whether the accused deliberately and sadistically augmented the wrong by causing
another wrong not necessary for its commission or inhumanly increased the
victim’s suffering or outraged or scoffed at his person or corpse (People vs. Lacao,
60 SCRA 89). People vs. Lumague, Jr., 111 SCRA 515, No. L-53586 January 30,
1982
PER CURIAM:
This is a murder case. Early in the morning of July 25, 1977, Antonio A. Regalado,
39, a credit investigator of the Social Security System, was maliciously killed in the
Marikit Subdivision, Marikina, Rizal.

The postmortem examination revealed that he had fourteen incised wounds, two
lacerated wounds, ten punctured wounds and ten stab wounds, or thirty-six
wounds in all, eight of which were fatal because they affected his vital organs like
his lungs, liver, heart and intestines (Exh. A). The wounds were located in different
parts of his body: front and back, head, arms, legs, abdomen, knees, chest and
shoulders (Exh. B). Obviously, he had been assaulted by more than one person.
The incised and stab wounds were caused by a bladed weapon such as a kitchen
knife. The lacerated wounds were caused by a blunt instrument such as a piece of
wood or iron bar. The punctured wounds were caused by a pointed instrument
such as an icepick.
Elma Icater Regalado, a thirty-nine-year-old business-woman, the victim’s widow,
testified that she spent P25,000 for the funeral of her husband and for
miscellaneous obligations (Exh. J to J-8). Aside from his widow, the deceased was
survived by his two children, Ian, 4 and Shiela, 6. In her letter to General Romeo
C. Espino, she said (Exh. K):
“In our own little world, my husband and I planned the future of our children.
“Ma. Shiela was to be a nurse while L. Ian, x x x was to be a doctor according to
his wish. We planned and rejoiced in our little hopes even when life was difficult,
until last July 25, 1977 at about 0030 Hrs., when a gang of hoodlums pounced
upon my husband and his companions while they were on their way home and
robbed him and brutally and mercilessly murdered him, and with him, the beautiful
dreams we had for our children.
“Even a mad dog or an abominable criminal did not deserve his manner of death!
He, who never harmed anybody nor spanked his children out of love, lay there in a
muddy street of the Marikit Subdivision, gasping for breath and calling our x x x
son even as his assailants took turns in stabbing him and pummeling him with a
garden hoe that broke at the handle as it hit my helpless husband as he lay on the
ground.
“Our house that was once a happy home when he was around is no longer the
same since he has gone. Our little girl, Ma. Shiela, eats her breakfast silently with
tears streaming down her face; our son L. Ian keeps asking me when his father
will wake up, and I, will never get used to the emptiness and the void that he has
left behind.”
The Marikina police could not solve the crime. At the request of Mrs. Regalado,
General Espino referred the case to the Constabulary criminal investigation service
(CIS) at Camp Crame.
C o n s ti t u ti o n a l L a w I I S e c . 1 4 a n d 1 6 P a g e | 4
As a result of the investigation, the four Lumague brothers, Ponciano, Jr., 27,
Rolando, 25, Mario, 23, and Juanito 21, and their brother-in-law, Rodolfo de la
Cruz, were charged with murder for the killing of Regalado. Ponciano, Rolando and
Mario were arrest on August 20, 1977. Juanito was arrested on October 10, 1977
when the prosecution had already finished the presentation of its evidence against
his three brothers. De la Cruz is at large.
The Lumague brothers came from a family of five boys and five girls. They grew
up in the slum area of Tondo, Manila. Their parents were natives of La Union. The
father, a convict, was killed by a member of the Oxo gang (p. 138, Record).
Even before the Lumague brothers were implicated in the killing of Regalado,
Rolando had been charged in the municipal court of San Fernando, La Union with
frustrated murder and slight physical injuries (Exh. L and M). In the same court,
Ponciano was charged with frustrated homicide (Exh. P). He was also charged in
the provincial fiscal’s office of La Union with direct assault of an agent of a person
in authority and robbery (Exh. R and S).
Ponciano is married with four children. He used to be a shoe repairman. He
finished grade four. Rolando is married with three children. He finished grave five.
He used to be a tricycle driver. Mario is married with three children. He finished
grade three. He was jobless.
The probation officers found the Lumague brothers to have marked criminal
tendencies and to have a propensity for anti-social behavior (p. 139, Record).
Trial of Ponciano, Rolando and Mario Lumague.—These three brothers were tried
first because the other two accused, Juanito Lumague and Rodolfo de la Cruz,
were at large. According to the prosecution, in July, 1977, the Lumague brothers,
with their mother, Emerenciana Morales, and their sister and brother-in-law,
Rodolfo de la Cruz, were renting from Walter Romero Gutierrez a shack or
“barong-barong” in the Marikit Subdivision in Marikina near the residence of Virgilio
At about eleven o’clock in the evening of July 24, 1977, Regalado, with his friends,
Roberto Asuncion, Gerardo A. Ducha, Lorenzo Gravador and Rogelio Bautista, had
a drinking spree at the Havana Pub and Beerhouse located at Barrio Concepcion,
Marikina, Metro Manila. Each of the five drank three bottles of beer. They watched
the floor show.
Shortly after midnight, the group left that place and, as it was curfew time, they
decided to walk to Bautista’s house in the subdivision about a kilometer away and
sleep there. (Regalado was a resident of 5-C Annapolis Street, Cubao, Quezon City,
a neighbor of Asuncion who resided at 5-D Annapolis Street.)

What happened while the group was walking was testified to by two eyewitnesses,
Asuncion, 30, and Pacunayen, 21, a high school graduate, who, as noted above,
was residing at a house near the shack where the Lumague family was staying and
who claimed to have been a victim of an assault perpetrated by the members of
the Lumague family in June, 1977.
Asuncion testified that he and Regalado were walking together. Gravador was
ahead of them. Bautista and Ducha followed Regalado and Asuncion. While
walking on the street in front of the shack occupied by the Lumague family and
Pacunayen’s house, Asuncion heard Ducha shouting that Bautista had been
stabbed. When Asuncion looked behind, he noticed that Ducha and Bautista were
running because they were being pursued by two persons.
Asuncion’s impulse was to follow Bautista and Ducha but after taking a few steps,
he turned around and looked at the place where he had left Regalado. He saw
Mario Lumague beating Regalado on the back with a hoe (Exh. D). Asuncion was
about two fathoms away. Regalado fell on the ground face down. Asuncion got a
stone and threw it at Mario.
Mario pulled Regalado to a dark grassy place near the lighted street. Four persons
approached Regalado. Asuncion identified three of them as the brothers Ponciano,
Mario and Rolando Lumague. Ponciano hit Regalado many times with his fist and
struck him on the back with an adobe stone.
Rolando also threw an adobe stone at the head of Regalado and boxed him many
times. Juanito repeatedly stabbed Regalado. Rodolfo de la Cruz clobbered
Regalado with a club (“pamalo”) about two feet long.
Then, Mario who was armed with a hoe, turned his attention to Asuncion, Ducha
and Bautista who fled upon his approach. Mario pursued them. He did not
overtake them. Shortly thereafter, the five assailants left the place where they had
assaulted Regalado.
Asuncion approached Regalado who was bloodied all over but was still breathing.
Asuncion directed Bautista to fetch a vehicle. Ducha went to the police station.
When a taxicab passed by, Asuncion hailed it and placed Regalado inside the
taxicab. He was brought to the E. Rodriguez Hospital but was already dead on
arrival thereat.
Asuncion’s testimony is a confirmation of his sworn statements dated August 8 and
22, 1977 before the Constabulary investigator of the CIS police intelligence section
at Camp Crame (Exh. C and C-2).
C o n s ti t u ti o n a l L a w I I S e c . 1 4 a n d 1 6 P a g e | 5
Pacunayen, the other prosecution witness, a neighbor of the Lumague family, who
was acquainted with the members thereof, testified that at past midnight on July
25, 1977 he was in the balcony of his house overlooking the lighted street.
He witnessed the assault on Regalado which was perpetrated by the four Lumague
brothers and their brother-in-law Rodolfo de la Cruz. Pacunayen, who was at a
distance of fifteen meters from the scene of the assault, corroborated the
particulars thereof as narrated by Asuncion. Pacunayen’s testimony is a
confirmation of his sworn statement dated August 9, 1977 before the Constabulary
investigator of the CIS police intelligence section at Camp Crame (Exh. G).
Ducha, who, like Gravador and Bautista, did not testify, executed sworn
statements dated August 11 and 22, 1977 before the Constabulary CIS investigator
(Exh. E and F). Ducha, 25, a high school graduate, narrated how he and Bautista
encountered a person who tried to stab Bautista. Then, Ducha saw another person
beating Regalado with a hoe. At a confrontation, Ducha identified Mario as the
wielder of the hoe, Ponciano as the one who assaulted Regalado with an adobe
stone and Rolando as the one who boxed Regalado (pp. 79-83. Record).
Another documentary evidence of the prosecution is the hardly legible sworn
statement of Mario Lumague taken by the same Constabulary investigator (Exh. H,
pp. 87-90, Record).
The investigator, before interrogating Mario, warned him that anything that he
would say regarding the death of Regalado would be used against him in court and
that he (Mario) had the rights (1) to remain silent and not to answer any question
that would be prejudicial to him, (2) to have counsel, (3) to be investigated in the
presence of his lawyer and (4) to have counsel de oficio if he could not afford to
hire his own lawyer.
Then, the investigator asked Mario whether after being apprised of his
constitutional rights he was willing to give a voluntary statement and to sign an
acknowledgment that he understood his constitutional rights. Mario answered in
the affirmative. He then signed the following certification, amounting to a waiver
of his constitutional rights, which formed part of his statement:
“Ito ay nagpapatunay na nauunawaan kong lahat ang aking mga karapatan na
napaliwanag sa akin ng inbestigador gaya ng pagbibigay ng Salaysay na kusang
loob, at hindi na rin kukuha ng abogado dahil katotohanan lamang ang aking
sasabihin.” (Exh. H-1, p. 87, Record.)
Mario’s version in his statement is that he and Juanito were in the Havana Pub and
Beer Garden from seven to ten o’clock in the evening of July 25 (should be 24),

1977. At around eleven o’clock, when Mario was already in his residence at the
Marikit Subdivision (where he lived with his brothers, mother and brother-in-law)
he heard a shout coming from the street in front of the house and the sound of an
object hitting the roof (“kalabog”) and he saw Juanito going out of the house.
Then, later, Beth, the sister of his brother-in-law, informed Mario that some
persons had ganged up against Juanito. Mario came out of the house and allegedly
saw Juanito prostrate on the street in front of their house. Mario reentered the
house, got a hoe and helped Juanito in resisting his four assailants who were
holding stones and assaulting Juanito. Mario clubbed on the head the person
holding Juanito. Juanito got a kitchen knife from the house and repeatedly stabbed
the person whom Mario had clubbed on the head and who was sitting on the
ground. The assaulted person fell on the ground. Mario and Juanito ran away.
Mario in his statement disclosed that the persons staying in the house at the
Marikit Subdivision were Rodolfo de la Cruz and his wife Hermenegilda (Mario’s
sister), Ildefonsa or Perlita Lumague, Reynaldo Lumague, Beth de la Cruz, Lita
Lumague (Mario’s wife) and Juanito (No. 32, Exh. H).
Mario said that only he himself and Juanito assaulted Regalado but he (Mario) was
not sure whether he was the only one who killed Regalado (No. 40, Exh. H).
The version of the defense is that Juanito Lumague was the sole assailant of
Regalado. Ponciano, Rolando and Mario presented as witnesses their mother
Emerenciana Morales and Angelita Ramos, Eleno Gomez and Winnie Camacho to
prove their defense of alibi.
Emerenciana, a sixty-nine-year-old widow, testified that in July, 1977 she resided
with the spouses Hermenegilda Lumague and Rodolfo de la Cruz in the house
which they had been renting for three months in the Marikit Subdivision. In the
evening of July 24, 1977 she went to bed at eleven o’clock. She was awakened
because of the noise caused by some persons who were passing near the house
and who were challenging the Ilocanos to a fight. She came out of the house and
saw five men who were very noisy.
She advised them to go home because it was already very late. They allegedly
answered that they did not observe the curfew and they cursed the President for
enforcing it. Emerenciana said that the five men pushed her towards the door of
her house and she fell on the ground. She was allegedly stoned by the five noisy
individuals. She was hit in the cheek, chest, left foot and front part of her body. A
woman named Marilou (Angelita) was also stoned and her foot was injured
(“napilay”) (412).
C o n s ti t u ti o n a l L a w I I S e c . 1 4 a n d 1 6 P a g e | 6
Emerenciana admitted that when the incident happened she, her children and son-
in-law were staying in the house but when asked to clarify her answer she said
that her daughter Hermenegilda, son-in-law Rodolfo de la Cruz and her
grandchildren were staying in the house (398). She declared that she did not know
who killed Regalado and that when Regalado was killed her four sons “were not
there” (399), meaning that Rolando, Ponciano and Juanito were in the province,
Mario was in Tondo and Rodolfo was in the house (400-3). When pressed by
counsel de oficio to clarify the whereabouts of Juanito, Emerenciana answered that
Juanito arrived in the house when Emerenciana was pushed by the five persons
(406-9).
Emerenciana categorically declared that Ponciano never resided with her in
Marikina (410-11). She testified that when Juanito was boxed by the men, a fight
ensued between them and Juanito. She admitted that Juanito had previously been
confined in the Madrigal Rehabilitation Center for having been involved in a
homicide case with his brother-in-law, Maximino Dacanay.
Angelita Ramos, 20, a helper of Emerenciana, testified that Pacunayen used to go
to Emerenciana’s house. In the afternoon of July 24, 1977, Ponciano was not in
the house in Marikina but was in Bauang, La Union, Mario was in Tondo and
Rolando was in Barrio Ambangonan, Pugo, La Union, but Juanito was in
Emerenciana’s house in the Marikit Subdivision, Marikina.
Angelita corroborated Emerenciana’s testimony that at about midnight on July 24
five persons passed by Emerenciana’s house and challenged the Ilocanos to step
out. Emerenciana came out of the house and told the five persons to go home.
She was pushed by the five persons and she fell on the ground.
At that juncture, Juanito and Pacunayen arrived. Regalado allegedly boxed Juanito.
The five persons threw stones and the witness, Angelita, was hit in the ankle.
Pacunayen assaulted Regalado with a hoe. Regalado fell on the ground face down.
Pacunayen repeatedly stabbed Regalado (461).
Because Angelita was not available for cross-examination, her testimony on direct
examination was stricken out of the record (506).
Eleno Gomez, 50, a farmer, a resident of Barrio Quinavite, Bauang, La Union, and
a first cousin of Julian Camacho, who in turn is a first cousin of the Lumague
brothers, testified that in the evening of July 24, 1977 he acted as guard at a
dance held on the occasion of a wedding in Barrio Quinavite and that Ponciano,
Rolando and Mario were present at that dance (475). Juanito and De la Cruz were

not present at that dance. A few moments later, Gomez testified that Rolando and
Mario were not present at the wedding party (489).
Winnie Camacho, a twenty-three-year-old housewife, whose husband is a first
cousin of Rolando, testified that on July 24 and 25, 1977 Rolando was at her house
in Barrio Ambangonan, Pugo. He planted rice on July 24. The next day he went
fishing in the river.
Decision in the case of Ponciano, Rolando and Mario Lumague.—At the conclusion
of Winnie’s testimony on January 31, 1978, defense counsel Galvan announced
that he would present the accused as witnesses at the next hearing scheduled on
February 24. That hearing was not held. The case was reset for March 14. No
hearing was held on that date for reasons not shown in the record.
On that date, the trial court issued an order requiring the prosecution to present
its memorandum within ten days and giving defense counsel Galvan five days
within which to file a reply memorandum. It scheduled on April 18 the
promulgation of its sentence.
The prosecution in a motion dated March 20, 1978 offered its Exhibits L to S which
were marked during the cross-examination of the defense witnesses. Galvan
objected to Exhibits L, M and N. He did not make any comment on Exhibits P to S
because copies thereof were not attached to the motion.
The prosecution filed its memorandum on April 5. Galvan was furnished with a
copy thereof. He did not submit his reply memorandum. As scheduled, the death
sentence against Ponciano, Rolando and Mario was “dictated and promulgated in
open court” on April 18, 1978.
The trial court convicted Ponciano, Rolando and Mario Lumague of murder,
sentenced each of them to death and ordered them to pay solidarily to the heirs of
Regalado an indemnity of thirty-two thousand pesos. Treachery and abuse of
superiority were considered qualifying circumstances. Cruelty was appreciated as a
generic aggravating circumstance. The trial court did not give credence to the
alibis of the accused.
The trial court in its decision explained that the defense waived its right to present
further evidence after it failed to present such evidence in spite of numerous
postponements and when defense counsel failed to appear in court despite due
notice (p. 286, Record).
C o n s ti t u ti o n a l L a w I I S e c . 1 4 a n d 1 6 P a g e | 7
Galvan filed on April 24 a motion for reconsideration. He complained that the
accused were denied due process of law because they were not given a chance to
testify in their behalf. The motion was denied. The trial court in its order of April
28, 1978 directed the clerk of court to forward the record of the case to this Court.
Separate trial and decision in Juanito Lumague’s case.—As priorly noted, Juanito
was arrested in Barrio Ambangonan, on October 10, 1977 when the prosecution
had finished the presentation of its evidence against his brothers Ponciano,
Rolando and Mario. When arraigned on October 19, Juanito pleaded not guilty. He
was given a separate trial
At the hearing on June 28, 1978, when the medico-legal officer was testifying for
the second time in the separate trial for Juanito, Benjamin Santos, Juanito’s
counsel, interrupted the testimony of the medico-legal officer and manifested that
Juanito was withdrawing his plea of not guilty and changing it to a plea of guilty.
The doctor’s testimony was suspended. Juanito was placed on the witness stand.
He took his oath and was interrogated as follows:
“Court to Juanito Lumague: Do you confirm and affirm that you are changing your
plea of not guilty to that plea of guilty?—A. Yes, sir. I was not able to talk.
“Q. by Court: You were not able to talk because you were arrested, x x x.—A. No,
your Honor. The reason at that time I was asking but I was not able to reason out
that I was the one who committed the crime.
“Court: Why did you not tell the lawyer of your brother that you (are) the only one
to be presented by the defense lawyer?—A. I stated so, your Honor.
“Court: Did anybody intimidate, coerce you or promise you of (any) leniency for
changing that plea of not guilty to that plea of guilty?—A. No, your Honor.” (550-
552)
The trial court then ordered the resumption of the presentation of evidence against
Juanito. The medico-legal officer was cross-examined by Juanito’s counsel.
Asuncion and Elma I. Regalado testified again. The prosecution formally offered in
evidence against Juanito the same Exhibits A to K which it had already presented
during the trial of Ponciano, Rolando and Mario Lumague.
Juanito’s counsel did not present any evidence. On July 5, 1978, the trial court
rendered in Juanito’s case a decision similar to its previous decision. It convicted
him of murder, sentenced him to death and ordered him to pay the same
indemnity (p. 281, Record).

Ruling.—In this automatic review of the fear death sentences, counsel de oficio
contends that the trial court erred in not giving the four accused a chance to
present other witnesses and to testify in their behalf, in admitting the extra-judicial
confession of Mario Lumague, in giving credence to the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses and in convicting the accused of murder.
With respect to Juanito Lumague, who withdrew his plea of not guilty, who was
tried separately and whose guilt was also established by means of the evidence
presented against him, we find that the counsel’s contentions are devoid of merit.
Juanito’s guilt was proven beyond reasonable doubt. His plea of guilty and the
evidence introduced by the prosecution destroyed the presumption of innocence in
his favor.
There is conclusive evidence that he was the one who stabbed Regalado. In doing
so, he conspired with the other assailants of the victim, particularly with the
assailant who treacherously struck Regalado on the back with a hoe. Even
Juanito’s mother admitted that he took part in the assault (408-9, 413-4). And, of
course, the fact that Juanito was a fugitive from justice for several months is an
indication of his guilt.
The trial court correctly held that the killing was murder qualified by treachery and
abuse of superiority and aggravated by cruelty. Hence, death is the proper
penalty. Juanito’s plea of guilty is not mitigating because it was made after the
prosecution had commenced the presentation of its evidence.
With respect to the other three accused, Ponciano, Mario and Rolando Lumague,
who pleaded not guilty and who were tried ahead of Juanito, there is merit in their
contention that they were denied due process of law because they were not given
a chance to testify in their behalf and to present additional evidence.
An accused has the constitutional right “to be heard by himself and counsel” and
the right “to testify as a witness in his own behalf”. The denial of such rights is a
denial of due process, as held in People vs. Santiago, 46 Phil. 734. See People vs.
Abuda, L-30009, February 27, 1971, 37 SCRA 789.
“Due process of law in a criminal prosecution consists of a law creating or defining
the offense, an impartial tribunal of competent jurisdiction, accusation in due form,
notice and opportunity to defend, trial according to established procedure, and
discharge unless found guilty” (16A C.J.S. 617).
The constitutional right of the accused to be heard in his defense is inviolate. “No
court of justice under our system of government has the power to deprive him of
that right.” (Abriol vs. Homeres, 84 Phil. 525, 534).
C o n s ti t u ti o n a l L a w I I S e c . 1 4 a n d 1 6 P a g e | 8
Fundamental fairness, which is the essence of due process, requires that the three
accused should be allowed to testify on their defenses and to present additional
evidence to prove their innocence.
WHEREFORE, we affirm the trial court’s separate decision dated July 5, 1978,
sentencing Juanito Lumague to death. Its prior decision of April 18, 1978,
sentencing to death Ponciano, Mario and Rolando, all surnamed Lumague, is set
aside. It is directed to receive the additional evidence of the said accused, subject
to the right of the prosecution to present rebuttal evidence and the right of the
accused to present surrebuttal evidence. The evidence already presented subsists
and should be taken into account in the rendition of another decision. Costs de
oficio.
SO ORDERED.
     Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Fernandez, Guerrero,
Melencio-Herrera, Plana and Escolin, JJ., concur.
     Fernando, C.J., takes no part insofar as the separate decision imposing the
death sentence on Juanito Lumague and concurs as to the setting aside of the
death sentence imposed on Ponciano, Mario and Rolando, all surnamed Lumague.
He likewise concurs with the observation of Justice Abad Santos in his brief
separate opinion.
     Abad Santos, J., separate opinion concurring in the result.
     De Castro, J., I concur with Justice Ericta’s observations.
     Ericta, J., separate dissenting and concurring opinion.
ABAD SANTOS, J., concurring—
I concur in the result and in doing so I wish to express some thoughts on the case.
The Marikina police could not solve the murder of Antonio A. Regalado. The
Philippine Constabulary Criminal Investigation Service (CIS) had to intervene
despite the fact that the so-called friends of the deceased, namely: Roberto
Asuncion, Gerardo A. Ducha, Lorenzo Gravador and Rogelio Bautista were present
when the incident occurred. They did come out immediately to denounce the crime
to the police and of the four only Asuncion testified in court; Ducha, Gravador and
Bautista did not. If a person has friends like them, who needs enemies?

Ducha’s sworn statements (Exhibits E and F) should be totally disregarded. Since
he did not testify and hence could not be cross-examined, they are hearsay. They
are prejudicial to the accused.
I would urge the trial court when it renders another decision in the case of
Ponciano, Mario and Rolando Lumague to view their social and economic
backgrounds in a different light. The decision appears to indicate that because of
their life-styles they have a proclivity to commit crime. Maybe it is so. But it should
be remembered that they did not choose to be poor and for their poverty society
must assume its share of the blame.
ERICTA, J., Concurring and Dissenting:
I do not agree that cruelty has been proven. There were five assailants and the
attack was concerted and almost simultaneous. If there were 36 wounds in all,
each defendant practically inflicted an average of seven wounds.
In the case of PP vs. Juan Jumauan alias Juancho Jumauan, 98 Phil. 1, the lone
defendant inflicted upon the deceased 13 wounds in all. But this Court refused to
appreciate the aggravating circumstance of cruelty, because there was no showing
that the defendant “deliberately and inhumanly increased the suffering of the
deceased.”
The test is whether the accused deliberately and sadistically augmented the wrong
by causing another wrong not necessary for its commission or inhumanly increased
the victim’s suffering or outraged or scoffed at his person or corpse (People vs.
Lacao, 60 SCRA 89).
There being no aggravating circumstance, the penalty to be imposed upon Juanito
Lumague should be reclusion perpetua.
I concur in the rest of the Decision.
Decision affirmed
Notes.—A plea of guilty when formally entered on arraignment, is sufficient to
sustain a conviction even for a capital offense without the introduction of further
evidence, the requisite proofs having been supplied by the accused themselves.
(People vs. Garcia, 106 SCRA 314.)
A second plea of guilty, after the trial court entered a plea of not guilty despite a
previous plea of guilty, automatically revives an accused judicial confession of
guilt. (People vs. Matilla, 105 SCRA 768.)
C o n s ti t u ti o n a l L a w I I S e c . 1 4 a n d 1 6 P a g e | 9
There is no improvident plea of guilty where same was confirmed by prosecution’s
evidence. (People vs. Dumdum, Jr., 92 SCRA 198.)
An unqualified plea of guilty constitutes an admission of the material facts alleged
in the information, including the aggravating circumstances. (People vs. Valera, 90
SCRA 400.)
It is now beyond dispute that due process cannot be satisfied in the absence of
that degree of objectivity on the part of a judge sufficient to reassure litigants of
his being fair and just. (Ignacio vs. Villaluz, 90 SCRA 16.)
Since what due process contemplates is freedom from arbitrariness and what it
requires is fairness or justice, the substance rather than the form being
paramount, an allegations based solely on the lack of opportunity to be heard
without notice does not per se merit unconditional approval (Superior Concrete
Products, Inc. vs. Workmen’s Compensation Commission, 82 SCRA 270.)
Due process of law implies that there must be a court or tribunal clothed with
power to bear and determined the matter before it, that jurisdiction shall have
been lawfully acquired, that the defendant shall have an opportunity to be heard,
and that judgment shall be rendered upon lawful hearing. (Luzon-Surety Co., Inc.
vs. Panaguiton, 84 SCRA 148.)
Lack of due process of law in the list of those recommended for summary dismissal
violates due process where administrative complaint was still pending
determination. (Macabuhay vs. Manuel, 87 SCRA 153.)
No denial of due process to accused as they were given by the trial court full
consideration of their rights. (People vs. Molleda, 86 SCRA 667.)
——o0o—— People vs. Lumague, Jr., 111 SCRA 515, No. L-53586 January 30,
1982

G.R. No. 137288. December 11, 2001.*
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. DANILO ABINO y
ADVINCULA, appellant.
Criminal Law; Rape; Qualified Rape; The law requires that the elements of rape be
proven first before the circumstance of relationship can be appreciated to increase
the penalty.—Insofar as it is relevant to the present case, the law states that once
the crime of rape is proven, the circumstance of father-daughter relationship
between the victim and the offender raises the penalty to death. Such relationship,
which must be both alleged in the information and proven by the evidence, does
not by itself operate to convert carnal knowledge to rape. It bears emphasizing
that the law requires that the elements of rape be proven first before the
circumstance of relationship can be appreciated to increase the penalty.
Same; Same; Rape Committed Upon an Unconscious Woman; Elements.—In the
present case, the Information alleges that the crime of rape was committed under
paragraph number two of Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code. Hence, before
appellant can be convicted thereof, two elements must concur: (1) he had carnal
knowledge of complainant, Daniela; and (2) she was unconscious when it
happened.
Same; Same; Presumption of Innocence; Settled jurisprudence requires proof
beyond reasonable doubt, not mere possibility of the presence of all the elements
of the crime charged.—The circumstantial evidence in the present case admits of
the possibility that appellant could have had carnal knowledge of complainant. But
we cannot affirm his death sentence on the basis alone of a mere possibility.
Settled jurisprudence requires proof beyond reasonable doubt, not mere possibility
of the presence of all the elements of the crime charged.
Same; Same; It is simply incredible that the pain that can reasonably be expected
from such insertion of a penis into the complainant’s young, virginal vaginal canal
would fail to wake her up. How could she have slept through the entry of her
father’s penis into her vagina and its exit therefrom, from beginning to end, and
awakened only after the alleged completion of the crime?; A case must rest on
evidence, not on mere possibility.—The prosecution claims that the painful vagina
and the lacerated hymen are circumstantial evidence of carnal knowledge that
occurred while Daniela was asleep on the night of April 6, 1996. If this were so, it
follows that the purported penile penetration must have been deep enough to
reach and lacerate her hymen at the 3 and the 9 o’clock positions. It is simply
incredible that the pain that can reasonably be expected from such insertion of a
penis into her young, virginal vaginal canal would fail to wake her up. How could
C o n s ti t u ti o n a l L a w I I S e c . 1 4 a n d 1 6 P a g e | 10
she have slept through the entry of her father’s penis into her vagina and its exit
therefrom—from beginning to end—and awakened only after the alleged
completion of the crime, as the prosecution would have us believe? It may have
been possible if she had been drugged, but a case must rest on evidence, not on
mere possibility.
Same; Same; Right to be Informed; Where the accused was charged and tried on
an Information alleging rape of a woman who was “asleep and unconscious,”
convicting him of rape done by intimidation would violate his constitutional right to
be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.—Neither can
we, in these proceedings, convict appellant of rape committed through intimidation
as a result of his moral ascendancy, even if it were proven beyond reasonable
doubt. He was charged and tried on an Information alleging rape of a woman who
was “asleep and unconscious.” Convicting him of rape done by intimidation would
violate his constitutional right “to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him.” People vs. Abino, 372 SCRA 50, G.R. No. 137288
December 11, 2001
AUTOMATIC REVIEW of a decision of the Regional Trial Court of Calamba, Laguna,
Br. 34.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
     The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
     Public Attorney’s Office for accused-appellant.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Rape, particularly incestuous rape, is reprehensible and abominable. However, to
convict the accused and to sentence him to death requires proof beyond
reasonable doubt of the elements of the crime and the qualifying circumstances
specifically alleged in the information. Conviction always rests on the strength of
the evidence of the prosecution, never on the weakness or the absence of that of
the defense.
The Case
For automatic review by this Court is the Decision1 dated January 20, 1999,
promulgated by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Calamba, Laguna (Branch 34) in
Criminal Case No. 5793-98-C, finding Danilo Abino y Advincula guilty of rape
beyond reasonable doubt. We quote the decretal portion of the Decision:

“ACCORDINGLY, this Court finds accused Danilo Abino y Advincula GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of rape as defined and penalized under Article 335
of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and hereby sentences him to suffer the
penalty of death.
“Accused is further directed to indemnify the offended party, Daniela Abino, the
sum of FIFTY THOUSAND (P50,000.00) PESOS as and for moral damages.
“With costs against the accused.”2
The Information3 against appellant reads as follows:
“That on or about April 6, 1996, in the Municipality of Los Baños, Province of
Laguna and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused did then and there have carnal knowledge of his daughter, the minor
DANIELA ABINO y MERCADO, who was then asleep and unconscious, against her
will and consent, to her damage and prejudice.”
With the assistance of his counsel,4 appellant pleaded not guilty when arraigned
on July 10, 1998.5 In due course, the latter was tried and convicted of qualified
rape.
The Facts
Version of the Prosecution
The Office of the Solicitor General summarized the evidence for the prosecution in
this wise:6
“1. Fourteen-year old Daniela Abino lived with her father, appellant Danilo Abino,
at Agua Santa, an old resort located in Bambang, Los Baños, Laguna. Appellant
was a member of the Los Baños task force on market security, assigned to night
shift duty at the market. Daniela’s mother no longer lived with them as she had
another family.
“2. On the evening of April 6, 1996, appellant came home drunk. He took a bath
and told Daniela to prepare his things for the market. Daniela obeyed him and
went to the second floor of their house to fix her father’s things. Appellant
followed Daniela clad only in his underwear with a towel wrapped around his
waist. He embraced Daniela and pressed his penis against her buttocks. Daniela
pulled herself away from appellant and went downstairs.
C o n s ti t u ti o n a l L a w I I S e c . 1 4 a n d 1 6 P a g e | 11
“3. When appellant went down, Daniela told him that she was no longer going with
him to his office. Appellant said nothing and left for work. Daniela stayed at the
first floor of their house until she decided to go to bed and went upstairs.
“4. Daniela was fast asleep in her bed when she felt somebody on top of her and
kissing her. She opened her eyes and saw appellant who was naked. Daniela
found herself naked too as she no longer had her panty and shorts on. When
Daniela woke up and moved, appellant stood up, dressed himself and then left.
Daniela felt intense pain in her vagina and cried.
“5. Daniela put on her panty and tried to sleep, but sleep escaped her and she
kept on crying. The following morning, she prepared herself for school and cooked
rice. Daniela, however, did not go to school that day and stayed at home.
“6. Daniela did not immediately tell anybody about what appellant did to her. She
stayed with him for about seventeen months more or until September 1997.
However, Daniela eventually decided to run away from home because she was
afraid that appellant might molest and hurt her again.
“7. Daniela stayed in a canteen near ‘Star City’ in Manila. After her stint at the
canteen, Daniela worked for one Mando Parr in Pasay City. She, however, left his
employ. In December of 1997, Daniela found herself in Baguio City where she met
a social worker who placed her in the custody of the Department of Social Welfare
and Development.
“8. On December 17, 1997, Daniela was brought by one Aileen Edades of the
Commission on Human Rights to the City Health Office in San Pablo City. There
she was examined by Dr. Azucena I. Bandoy, the Assistant City Health Officer of
San Pablo City.
“9. Dr. Bandoy found that Daniela’s sex organ bore a ‘3rd and 9 o’clock old healed
laceration scar’ and that the scar was caused by the insertion of a foreign body,
specifically, ‘the penis or a male organ,’ into Daniela’s vagina. According to Dr.
Bandoy, the laceration might have been inflicted ‘a year ago’.”
Version of the Defense
On the other hand, the Public Attorney’s Office presents appellant’s version of the
incident simply as follows:7
“Danilo Abiño y Advincula testified that the allegation in the complaint is not true.
The only reason why the complainant filed the rape charge against him is that he
is a very strict father, that’s the reason why the complainant is angry with him.”

Ruling of the Trial Court
The court a quo found complainant’s testimony “strong, credible and competent.”
It “could not fathom any justifiable reason why she at so young an age would
accuse her own father and portray the latter as a beast who deflowered her if the
same be not true.” Finding carnal knowledge to have taken place between them, it
sentenced appellant to death.
Hence, this automatic review before us.8
Assignment of Errors
In his Brief, appellant faults the court a quo with the following alleged errors:9
“The lower court erred in convicting the accused based on the incredible and
inconsistent testimony of Daniela Abino.
“The lower court gravely erred in convicting the accused despite failure of the
prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.”
Basically, the assigned errors boil down to the sole issue of whether the
prosecution evidence proves appellant’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime charged.
The Court’s Ruling
The appeal is meritorious.
Main Issue:
Sufficiency of Evidence
At the time of the alleged commission of the acts stated in the Information, the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 11 of RA 7659, specifies how rape
may be committed, as follows:
“Art. 335. When and how rape is committed.—Rape is committed by having carnal
knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:
1. By using force or intimidation;
2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and
3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.
“The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.
C o n s ti t u ti o n a l L a w I I S e c . 1 4 a n d 1 6 P a g e | 12
“Whenever the crime of rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by
two or more persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.
“When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has become insane,
the penalty shall be death.
“When the rape is attempted or frustrated and a homicide is committed by reason
or on the occasion thereof, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.
“When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, a homicide is committed, the
penalty shall be death.
“The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with
any of the following attendant circumstances:
1. when the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a
parent, ascendant, stepparent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity
within the third civil degree, or the common-law-spouse of the parent of the
victim.
2. when the victim is under the custody of the police or military authorities.
3. when the rape is committed in full view of the husband, parent, any of the
children of other relatives within the third degree of consanguinity.
4. when the victim is a religious or a child below seven (7) years old.
5. when the offender knows that he is afflicted with Acquired Immune Deficiency
Syndrome (AIDS) disease.
6. when committed by any member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines or the
Philippine National Police or any law enforcement agency.
7. when by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has suffered
permanent physical mutilation.”
Insofar as it is relevant to the present case, the law states that once the crime of
rape is proven, the circumstance of father-daughter relationship between the
victim and the offender raises the penalty to death. Such relationship, which must
be both alleged in the information and proven by the evidence, does not by itself
operate to convert carnal knowledge to rape. It bears emphasizing that the law
requires that the elements of rape be proven first before the circumstance of
relationship can be appreciated to increase the penalty.
 C o n s ti t u ti o n a l L a w I I S e c . 1 4 a n d 1 6 P a g e | 13

The prosecution sought to prove the element of unconsciousness through the
testimony of Daniela that on the night of April 6, In the present case, the
Information alleges that the crime of rape was committed under paragraph
number two of Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code. Hence, before appellant can
be convicted thereof, two elements must concur: (1) he had carnal knowledge of
complainant, Daniela; and (2) she was unconscious when it happened.
1996, she was asleep. As to the element of carnal knowledge, it presented only
the following circumstantial evidence:
Q What time did you go to sleep that night of April 6, 1996?
A I do not know the time sir.
Q When asked if you ha[d] any companions on that night of April 6, 1996 you said
you ha[d] no companions, tell us why were you alone on that night in your house?
A Becaus[e] my father left.
Q How about your mother, do you have any mother?

1. On the night of April 6, 1996, Daniela woke up to find her father on top of her, A Yes, sir.
but he promptly got off when she “opened her eyes.”
Q Where was she on that night of April 6, 1996?
2. Thereafter she felt pain in her vagina.
A She already has another family.
3. After seventeen months, she left home and wandered from place to place for
several more months, until she met a social worker in Baguio. Q What time did you wake up that night of April 6, 1996?

4. She was then examined and found to have old healed hymenal lacerations at A I do not know.
the 3 and the 9 o’clock positions and a yellowish white discharge, which indicated
Q Were you able to continuously sleep the whole night of April 6, 1996?
infection due to coitus several times with an infected male.10
A No, sir.
An examination of Daniela’s entire testimony compels us to reverse the RTC’s
hasty conclusion of rape based only on its circumstantial finding of carnal Q Why?
knowledge between appellant and Daniela. Contrary to the court a quo’s
pronouncement, Daniela was not convincing on very material points. A Because that night, my father who was dr[u]nk took his bath and after that he
told me to fix his things in going to the office. So I went upstairs to fix his things
Q Tell us on the night of April 6, 1996 where were you then? and he followed me.

A I was in our house at Agua Santa. ATTY. PADERAYON: Before the next question, we object to the answer, your
honor, considering that that is not responsive to the question.
Q Where is this Agua Santa where you said you were then?
FISCAL:
A In Bambang sir.
Q Where did he follow you?
FISCAL:
A To the second floor of our house.
Q: Los Baños, Laguna?
Q After your father followed you [o]n the second floor of your house, what did he
A Yes, sir.
do? if any?
Q Were you alone in your house or did you have companions at that time?
A He told me it was cold.
A None, sir.
Q After he embraced you, what happened?
 C o n s ti t u ti o n a l L a w I I S e c . 1 4 a n d 1 6 P a g e | 14

A “Yong ari niya idinikit sa puwet ko.” Q At what time did you see him and what was he doing at the time you saw him?

Q After he did that to you, what did he do next?
A “Umalis ako sa harap niya at bumaba [ako] ng hagdan.” (Witn ess is crying)
Q After you said you left and went down, what did your father do?
A He dressed up and when he was already on the first floor, I told him that I will
not go with him anymore [to] the office.
A When I saw him that night I don’t know what time was that[.] I returned to
sleep and I was awakened and felt that someone was on my top.
Q Were you able to recognize who was that somebody who was on your top?
A Yes, sir.
Q Who?

Q Why? Did he ask you to go with him [to] the office? A My father sir.

A Yes, sir, we are always together in his office and I am sleeping in his office. Q What was your father doing at the time you said he was on top of you?

Q By the way, where [is] this office where you said your father is working? A When I opened my eyes he left me.

A Near the market sir. Q Can you tell us what your father was wearing when you said he was on top of
you?
Q What is his work in the market?
A Pants and white t-shirt and [he] was wearing a vest.
A Tax collector sir.
Q And when your father you said left what did you notice on your self?
Q After you told your father that you will not go with him anymore what did he tell
you? A My private part was painful.

A Nothing, he just left. FISCAL:

Q On your part, what did you do after your father left? Q Aside from the pain that you felt what else did you [notice] from your private
part?
A I just stayed in the first floor of our house, up to x x x nigh[t] time and when x x
x night time came I went to sleep. A “Mahapdi” whenever I am urinating.

FISCAL: Q When you said you felt pain after your father left, what were you wearing?

Q Did your father come back that night? A I was wearing my uniform.

A Yes, sir. Q At the time your father left at the time you saw him, what were you wearing?

ATTY. PADERAYON: Leading, your honor. A I was wearing skirt and shorts.

FISCAL: Q So when you said you felt pain after you said your father was on top of [you]
and then you left, what did you do?
Q Why did you know that your father went back that night?
A I noticed my panty was yellowish and was hot “mainit ng konti”.
A I saw him that night.
Q And when you noticed these things, what did you do?

A I just cried.
Q Where was your father at the time you said you were crying?
A He returned to the market.
Q Finally, what time did you wake up that morning?
A I was not able to sleep then.
Q The following morning, what did you do?
A I cooked rice and prepared myself [for] school.
Q Did you go to school the following day?
ANo, sir.
FISCAL:
Q: Why?
A I felt lazy.
Q What did you do that day of April 7 when you said you did not go tschool?
A Nothing sir. I just stayed in the house.
Then, on redirect examination, she testified:
Q: Now you said that you woke up, your father was on top of you, what was he
doing at that time when he was on your top?
A: He was kissing me, sir.
Q: And aside from kissing, what else x x x did [he do] to you?
A: Nothing more, sir.”12
In attempting to clarify and consolidate its case against appellant, the prosecution
succeeded only in destroying the testimony of its star witness. In the process, it
further strengthened the premise that, other than lying on top of Daniela and
kissing her, appellant did “nothing more” on April 6, 1996.
The circumstantial evidence in the present case admits of the possibility that
appellant could have had carnal knowledge of complainant. But we cannot affirm
his death sentence on the basis alone of a mere possibility. Settled
C o n s ti t u ti o n a l L a w I I S e c . 1 4 a n d 1 6 P a g e | 15
jurisprudence13 requires proof beyond reasonable doubt, not mere possibility of
the presence of all the elements of the crime charged.
Here, the prosecution’s contention that the element of carnal knowledge concurred
with the element of unconsciousness is neither believable nor supported by
evidence. There is no evidence to show that Daniela was knocked out, drugged,
intoxicated, tired and worn out or in any similar condition that would induce such a
heavy sleep. There was therefore nothing that would account for her insensitivity
to appellant’s supposed act of inserting his penis into her vagina, if this really
happened on April 6, 1996.
The prosecution claims that the painful vagina and the lacerated hymen are
circumstantial evidence of carnal knowledge that occurred while Daniela was
asleep on the night of April 6, 1996. If this were so, it follows that the purported
penile penetration must have been deep enough to reach and lacerate her hymen
at the 3 and the 9 o’clock positions. It is simply incredible that the pain that can
reasonably be expected from such insertion of a penis into her young, virginal
vaginal canal would fail to wake her up. How could she have slept through the
entry of her father’s penis into her vagina and its exit therefrom—from beginning
to end—and awakened only after the alleged completion of the crime, as the
prosecution would have us believe? It may have been possible if she had been
drugged, but a case must rest on evidence, not on mere possibility.
“It is a legal truism that evidence, to be believed, must not only proceed from the
mouth of a credible witness, but must be credible in itself.”14 “We have no test of
the truth of human testimony, except in conformity with our knowledge,
observation, and experience and whatever is repugnant to these belongs to the
miraculous and is outside of judicial cognizance.”15 In the present case, the
circumstances surrounding the prosecution’s allegations are not in accord with
human experience. “The proof against the accused must overcome not only “the
test of reason and logic, but above all, that of experience.”16 It is more reasonable
to believe, that, as Daniela herself testified, appellant kissed her on the night of
April 6, 1996—but did nothing more; or, as can reasonably be inferred from the
records, he had carnal knowledge of her, but she was conscious and willing.
Doctrinally, where “the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or
more explanations one of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused
and the other consistent with his guilt, then the evidence does not fulfill the test of
moral certainty and is not sufficient to support a conviction.”17
It is claimed that appellant had carnal knowledge of his daughter on a day other
than on April 6, 1996, and under some circumstance other than while she was
 C o n s ti t u ti o n a l L a w I I S e c . 1 4 a n d 1 6 P a g e | 16

asleep. Aside from speculation and conjecture, this argument finds no factual No woman, especially of tender age, would concoct a story of defloration, allow an
support. And even if true, such circumstance cannot convict him of the rape examination of her private parts, and thereafter pervert herself by being subjected
charged in the Information. to a public trial if she was not motivated solely by the desire to have the culprit
apprehended and punished. (People vs. Taneo, 284 SCRA 251 [1998])
Neither can we, in these proceedings, convict appellant of rape committed through
intimidation as a result of his moral ascendancy, even if it were proven beyond ——o People vs. Abino, 372 SCRA 50, G.R. No. 137288 December 11, 2001
reasonable doubt. He was charged and tried on an Information alleging rape of a
woman who was “asleep and unconscious.” Convicting him of rape done by
intimidation would violate his constitutional right “to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him.”18

Rape, particularly incestuous rape, is reprehensible and abominable. However, to

convict the accused and to sentence him to death requires that (1) the
prosecution’s evidence for the elements of the crime and (2) the qualifying
circumstances specifically alleged in the Information must pass the test of moral
certainty. Absent the satisfaction of this stringent requirement, we must uphold
appellant’s constitutional right to be presumed innocent.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED and the assailed Decision is hereby

REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellant Danilo Abino y Advincula is ACQUITTED on
reasonable doubt. The director of the Bureau of Corrections is ordered to cause
the immediate release of appellant, unless the latter is being lawfully held for
another cause; and to inform the Court of the date of appellant’s release, or the
reasons for his continued confinement, within ten days from notice. No
pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

     Davide, Jr. (C.J.), Bellosillo, Melo, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Quisumbing,

Pardo, Ynares-Santiago, De Leon, Jr., Sandoval-Gutierrez and Carpio, JJ., concur.

     Puno and Buena, JJ., Abroad on official business.

Appeal granted, judgment reversed and set aside. Accused-appellant acquitted.

Notes.—Where there is reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused, he must

be acquitted even though his innocence may be doubted since the constitutional
right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty can be overthrown only by proof
beyond reasonable doubt. (Pecho vs. People, 262 SCRA 518 [1996])

The father-daughter relationship in rape cases has been treated by Congress in the
nature of a special circumstance which makes the imposition of the death penalty
mandatory. (People vs. Manhuyod, Jr., 290 SCRA 257 [1998])

G.R. No. 116736. July 24, 1997.*
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. BENJAMIN ORTEGA,
JR. y CONJE, MANUEL GARCIA y RIVERA and JOHN DOE, accused,
BENJAMIN ORTEGA, JR. y CONJE and MANUEL GARCIA y RIVERA,
accused-appellants.
Criminal Law; Witnesses; Unless the trial judge plainly overlooked certain facts of
substance and value which, if considered, might affect the result of the case, his
assessment of credibility must be respected.—Because the trial court had the
opportunity to observe the witnesses’ demeanor and deportment on the stand as
they rendered their testimonies, its evaluation of the credibility of witnesses is
entitled to the highest respect. Therefore, unless the trial judge plainly overlooked
certain facts of substance and value which, if considered, might affect the result of
the case, his assessment of credibility must be respected.
Same; Murder; Homicide; Aggravating Circumstances; Abuse of Superior Strength;
Abuse of superior strength requires deliberate intent on the part of the accused to
take advantage of such superiority.—Although treachery, evident premeditation
and abuse of superior strength were alleged in the information, the trial court
found the presence only of abuse of superior strength. We disagree with the trial
court’s finding. Abuse of superior strength requires deliberate intent on the part of
the accused to take advantage of such superiority. It must be shown that the
accused purposely used excessive force that was manifestly out of proportion to
the means available to the victim’s defense. In this light, it is necessary to evaluate
not only the physical condition and weapon of the protagonists but also the various
incidents of the event.
Same; Criminal Liability; The essential requisites for the application of Article 4,
par. 1 of the Revised Penal Code are that: (a) the intended act is felonious; (b) the
resulting act is likewise a felony; and (c) the unintended albeit graver wrong was
primarily caused by the actor’s wrongful acts.—Article 4, par. 1, of the Revised
Penal Code states that criminal liability shall be incurred by “any person
committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that
which he intended.” The essential requisites for the application of this provision are
that (a) the intended act is felonious; (b) the resulting act is likewise a felony; and
(c) the unintended albeit graver wrong was primarily caused by the actor’s
wrongful acts.
Same; Same; Homicide; Although an accused may have been unaware that the
victim was still alive when he assisted another in concealing the body of the victim
by throwing it into the well, he is still liable for the direct and natural consequence
C o n s ti t u ti o n a l L a w I I S e c . 1 4 a n d 1 6 P a g e | 17
of the felonious act, that of homicide, where it was shown that the victim died
subsequently of drowning.—In assisting Appellant Ortega, Jr. carry the body of
Masangkay to the well, Appellant Garcia was committing a felony. The offense was
that of concealing the body of the crime to prevent its discovery, i.e., that of being
an accessory in the crime of homicide. Although Appellant Garcia may have been
unaware that the victim was still alive when he assisted Ortega in throwing the
body into the well, he is still liable for the direct and natural consequence of his
felonious act, even if the resulting offense is worse than that intended. True,
Appellant Garcia merely assisted in concealing the body of the victim. But the
autopsy conducted by the NBI medico-legal officer showed that the victim at that
time was still alive, and that he died subsequently of drowning. That drowning was
the immediate cause of death was medically demonstrated by the muddy particles
found in the victim’s airway, lungs and stomach.
Same; Constitutional Law; Criminal Procedure; Right to be Informed; The
hornbook doctrine in our jurisdiction is that an accused cannot be convicted of an
offense, unless it is clearly charged in the complaint or information.—The
Information accused Appellant Garcia (and Appellant Ortega) of “attack[ing],
assault[ing], and stab[bing] repeatedly with a pointed weapon on the different
parts of the body one ANDRE MAR MASANGKAY y ABLOLA.” The prosecution’s
evidence itself shows that Garcia had nothing to do with the stabbing which was
solely perpetrated by Appellant Ortega. His responsibility relates only to the
attempted concealment of the crime and the resulting drowning of Victim
Masangkay. The hornbook doctrine in our jurisdiction is that an accused cannot be
convicted of an offense, unless it is clearly charged in the complaint or information.
Constitutionally, he has a right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him. To convict him of an offense other than that charged in
the complaint or information would be a violation of this constitutional right.
Same; Same; Same; Same; A person cannot be convicted of homicide through
drowning in an information that charged murder by means of stabbing.—By parity
of reasoning, Appellant Garcia cannot be convicted of homicide through drowning
in an information that charges murder by means of stabbing.
Same; Accessories; Exempting Circumstances; A person who assists a brother-in-
law in concealing the body of a crime in order to prevent its discovery can not be
convicted as an accessory.—Although the prosecution was able to prove that
Appellant Garcia assisted in “concealing x x x the body of the crime, x x x in order
to prevent its discovery,” he can neither be convicted as an accessory after the
fact defined under Article 19, par. 2, of the Revised Penal Code. The records show
that Appellant Garcia is a brother-in-law of Appellant Ortega, the latter’s sister,

Maritess, being his wife. Such relationship exempts Appellant Garcia from criminal
liability as provided by Article 20 of the Revised Penal Code: “ART. 20. Accessories
who are exempt from criminal liability.—The penalties prescribed for accessories
shall not be imposed upon those who are such with respect to their spouses,
ascendants, descendants, legitimate, natural, and adopted brothers and sisters, or
relatives by affinity within the same degrees with the single exception of
accessories falling within the provisions of paragraph 1 of the next preceding
article.”
Same; Homicide; Damages; The Court can give credence only to those expenses
that are supported by receipts and appear to have been genuinely incurred in
connection with the death of the victim; Civil indemnity requires no proof other
than the fact of death and the accused’s responsibility therefor.—The award of
actual damages should be reduced to P31,790.00 from P35,000.00. The former
amount was proven both by documentary evidence and by the testimony of Melba
Lozano, a sister of the victim. Of the expenses alleged to have been incurred, the
Court can give credence only to those that are supported by receipts and appear
to have been genuinely incurred in connection with the death of the victim.
However, in line with current jurisprudence, Appellant Ortega shall also indemnify
the heirs of the deceased in the sum of P50,000.00.
Indemnity requires no proof other than the fact of death and appellant’s
responsibility therefor. People vs. Ortega, Jr., 276 SCRA 166, G.R. No. 116736 July
24, 1997
APPEAL from a decision of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Br.
171.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
     The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
     Evaristo P. Velicaria for accused-appellant.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
A person who commits a felony is liable for the direct, natural and logical
consequences of his wrongful act even where the resulting crime is more serious
than that intended. Hence, an accused who originally intended to conceal and to
bury what he thought was the lifeless body of the victim can be held liable as a
principal, not simply as an accessory, where it is proven that the said victim was
actually alive but subsequently died as a direct result of such concealment and
burial. Nonetheless, in the present case, Appellant Garcia cannot be held liable as
C o n s ti t u ti o n a l L a w I I S e c . 1 4 a n d 1 6 P a g e | 18
a principal because the prosecution failed to allege such death through drowning in
the Information. Neither may said appellant be held liable as an accessory due to
his relationship with the principal killer, Appellant Ortega, who is his brother-in-
law.
Statement of the Case
This case springs from the joint appeal interposed by Appellants Benjamin Ortega,
Jr. and Manuel Garcia from the Decision,1 dated February 9, 1994 written by
Judge Adriano R. Osorio,2 finding them guilty of murder.
Appellants were charged by State Prosecutor Bernardo S. Razon in an
Information3 dated October 19, 1992, as follows:
“That on or about October 17, 1992 in Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring together and mutually helping one another, without any justifiable
cause, with treachery and evident premeditation and with abuse of superior
strenght (sic) and with deliberate intent to kill, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab repeatedly with a pointed
weapon on the different parts of the body one ANDRE MAR MASANGKAY y
ABLOLA, thereby inflicting upon the latter serious physical injuries which directly
caused his death.”
During arraignment, Appellants Ortega and Garcia, assisted by counsel de oficio,4
pleaded not guilty to the charge.5 Accused “John Doe” was then at large.6 After
trial in due course, the court a quo promulgated the questioned Decision. The
dispositive portion reads:7
“WHEREFORE, finding accused Benjamin Ortega, Jr. y Conje and Manuel Garcia y
Rivera [g]uilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged, the Court hereby
sentenced (sic) them to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA and to pay
the costs of suit.
Accused are hereby ordered to pay the offended party the sum of P35,000.00 for
funeral expenses of deceased Andre Mar Masangkay and death indemnity of
P50,000.00.”
The Notice of Appeal, dated March 9, 1994, was thus filed by Atty. Evaristo P.
Velicaria8 who took over from the Public Attorney’s Office as counsel for the
accused.
The Facts

Evidence for the Prosecution
The trial court summarized the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses as
follows:9
“Diosdado Quitlong substantially testified that on October 15, 1992 at about 5:30
in the afternoon, he, the victim Andre Mar Masangkay, Ariel Caranto, Romeo
Ortega, Roberto San Andres were having a drinking spree in the compound near
the house of Benjamin Ortega, Jr. at Daangbakal, Dalandanan, Valenzuela, Metro
Manila. That while they were drinking, accused Benjamin Ortega, Jr. and Manuel
Garcia who were [already] drunk arrived and joined them. That victim Andre Mar
Masangkay answered the call of nature and went to the back portion of the house.
That accused Benjamin Ortega, Jr. followed him and later they [referring to the
participants in the drinking session] heard the victim Andre Mar shouted, ‘Don’t,
help me!’ (Huwag, tulungan ninyo ako!) That he and Ariel Caranto ran towards the
back portion of the house and [they] saw accused Benjamin Ortega, Jr., on top of
Andre Mar Masangkay who was lying down in a canal with his face up and
stabbing the latter with a long bladed weapon. That Ariel Caranto ran and fetched
Benjamin Ortega, Sr., the father of accused Benjamin, Jr. That he [Quitlong] went
to Romeo Ortega in the place where they were having the drinking session [for the
latter] to pacify his brother Benjamin, Jr. That Romeo Ortega went to the place of
the stabbing and together with Benjamin Ortega, Jr. and Manuel Garcia lifted
Andre Mar Masangkay from the canal and brought Andre Mar to the well and
dropped the latter inside the well. That Romeo Ortega, Benjamin Ortega, Jr. and
Manuel Garcia then dropped stones measuring 11 to 12 inches high, 2 feet in
length and 11 to 12 inches in weight (sic) to the body of Andre Mar Masangkay
inside the well. That Romeo Ortega warned him [Quitlong] not to tell anybody of
what he saw. That he answered in the affirmative and he was allowed to go home.
That his house is about 200 meters from Romeo Ortega’s house. That upon
reaching home, his conscience bothered him and he told his mother what he
witnessed. That he went to the residence of Col. Leonardo Orig and reported the
matter. That Col. Orig accompanied him to the Valenzuela Police Station and some
police officers went with them to the crime scene. That accused Benjamin Ortega,
Jr. and Manuel Garcia were apprehended and were brought to the police station.
On cross-examination, he said that he did not talk to the lawyer before he was
presented as witness in this case. That he narrated the incident to his mother on
the night he witnessed the killing on October 15, 1992. That on October 15, 1992
at 5:30 in the afternoon when he arrived, victim Andre Mar Masangkay, Romeo
Ortega, Serafin and one Boyet were already having [a] drinking spree and he
joined them. That accused Benjamin Ortega, Jr. and Manuel Garcia were not yet in
C o n s ti t u ti o n a l L a w I I S e c . 1 4 a n d 1 6 P a g e | 19
the place. That the stabbing happened between 12:00 midnight and 12:30 a.m.
That they drank gin with finger foods such as pork and shell fish. That he met the
victim Andre Mar Masangkay only on that occasion. That accused Benjamin
Ortega, Jr. and Manuel Garcia joined them at about 11:00 p.m. That there was no
altercation between Benjamin Ortega, Jr. and Manuel Garcia in one hand and
Andre Mar Masangkay, during the drinking session. That at about 12:30 a.m.
Andre Mar Masangkay answered the call of nature and went to the back portion of
the house. That he cannot see Andre Mar Masangkay from the place they were
having the drinking session. That he did not see what happened to Andre Mar
Masangkay. That he only heard Masangkay asking for help. That accused Manuel
Garcia was still in the drinking session when he heard Masangkay was asking for
help. That Benjamin Ortega, Jr. and Manuel Garcia are his friends and neighbors.
That when he heard Andre Mar Masangkay was asking for help, he and Ariel
Caranto ran to the back portion of the house and saw Benjamin Ortega, Jr. on top
of Andre Mar Masangkay and stabbing the latter. That Andre Mar Masangkay was
lying down with his back in the canal and Benjamin Ortega, Jr. on top stabbing the
former. That he did not see any injuries on Benjamin Ortega, Jr. That he called
Romeo Ortega to pacify his brother Benjamin, Jr. That he did not do anything to
separate Benjamin Ortega, Jr. and Masangkay. That he knows that Andre Mar
Masangkay was courting Raquel Ortega. That Raquel Ortega asked permission
from Andre Mar Masangkay when she left between 8:00 and 9:00 p.m. That there
was no trouble that occurred during the drinking session.
PNP Superintendent Leonardo Orig substantially testified that Diosdado Quitlong is
his neighbor for about 9 years. That on October 16, 1992 at 5:00 in the morning,
he was summoned by Diosdado Quitlong and reported to him the stabbing incident
that occurred at Daangbakal near the subdivision he is living. That he relayed the
information to the Valenzuela Police Station and a police team under police officer
Param accompanied them to the place. That he asked the police officers to verify if
there is a body of person inside the well. That the well was covered with stones
and he asked the police officers to seek the help of theneighbors (sic) to remove
the stones inside the well. That after the stones were removed, the body of the
victim was found inside the well. That the lifeless body was pulled out from the
well. That the body has several stab wounds. That he came to know the victim as
Andre Mar Masangkay. That two men were arrested by the police officers.
On cross-examination, he said that he saw the body when taken out of the well
with several stab wounds. That Diosdado Quitlong told him that he was drinking
with the victim and the assailants at the time of the incident. That Benjamin
Ortega, Jr. stabbed the victim while the latter was answering the call of nature.

NBI Medico Legal Officer Dr. Ludivico J. Lagat substantially testified that he
conducted [an] autopsy on the cadaver of Andre Mar Masangkay on October 16,
1992 at the Valenzuela Memorial Homes located at Macarthur Highway. That he
prepared the autopsy report and the sketch of human head and body indicating
the location of the stab wounds. That the cause of death is multiple stab wounds,
contributory, [a]sphyxia by submersion in water. That there were 13 stab wounds,
8 of which were on the frontal part of the body, 2 at the back and there were
contused abrasions around the neck and on the left arm. There was stab wound at
the left side of the neck. That the contused abrasion could be produced by cord or
wire or rope. That there is (an) incised wound on the left forearm. That the stab
wounds which were backward downward of the body involved the lungs. That the
victim was in front of the assailant. That the stab wound on the upper left shoulder
was caused when the assailant was in front of the victim. That the assailant was in
front of the victim when the stab wound near the upper left armpit was inflicted as
well as the stab wound on the left chest wall. That the stab wound on the back left
side of the body and the stab wound on the back right portion of the body may be
produced when the assailant was at the back of the victim. That the assailant was
in front of the victim when the stab wound[s] on the left elbow and left arm were
inflicted. That the large airway is filled with muddy particles indicating that the
victim was alive when the victim inhaled the muddy particles. The heart is filled
with multiple hemorrhage, loss of blood or decreased of blood. The lungs is filled
with water or muddy particles. The brain is pale due to loss of blood. The stomach
is one half filled with muddy particles which could [have been] taken in when
submerged in water.
On cross-examination, he said that he found 13 stab wounds on the body of the
victim. That he cannot tell if the assailant or the victim were standing. That it is
possible that the stab wounds was (sic) inflicted when both [referring to
participants] were standing or the victim was lying down and the assailant was on
top. That he cannot tell the number of the assailants.”
Evidence for the Appellants
Appellant Manuel Garcia testified that in the early morning of October 15, 1992, he
and his wife, Maritess Garcia, brought their feverish daughter, Marjorie, to the Polo
Emergency Hospital. He left the hospital at seven o’clock in the morning, went
home, changed his clothes and went to work.10 After office hours, he and
Benjamin Ortega, Jr. passed by the canteen at their place of work. After drinking
beer, they left at eight o’clock in the evening and headed home. En route, they
chanced on Diosdado Quitlong alias Mac-mac and Andre Mar Masangkay, who
invited them to join their own drinking spree. Thereupon, Appellant Garcia’s wife
C o n s ti t u ti o n a l L a w I I S e c . 1 4 a n d 1 6 P a g e | 20
came and asked him to go home because their daughter was still sick. To alleviate
his daughter’s illness, he fetched his mother-in-law who performed a ritual called
“tawas.” After the ritual, he remained at home and attended to his sick daughter.
He then fell asleep but was awakened by police officers at six o’clock in the
morning of the following day.
Maritess Garcia substantially corroborated the testimony of her husband. She
however added two other participants in the drinking session aside from Diosdado
Quitlong alias Mac-mac and Andre Mar Masangkay, namely, a Mang Serafin and
Boyet Santos.11
Benjamin Ortega, Jr. likewise substantially corroborated the testimony of Appellant
Manuel Garcia.12 According to him, between eleven and twelve o’clock in the
evening, Masangkay left the drinking session. Thirty (30) minutes after Masangkay
left, he also left the drinking place to urinate.13 He went behind the house where
he saw Masangkay peeping through the room of his sister Raquel. He ignored
Masangkay and continued urinating.14 After he was through, Masangkay
approached him and asked where his sister was. He answered that he did not
know. Without warning, Masangkay allegedly boxed him in the mouth, an attack
that induced bleeding and caused him to fall on his back. When he was about to
stand up, Masangkay drew a knife and stabbed him, hitting him on the left arm,
thereby immobilizing him. Masangkay then gripped his neck with his left arm and
threatened to kill him. Unable to move, Ortega shouted for help. Quitlong came
and, to avoid being stabbed, grabbed Masangkay’s right hand which was holding
the knife. Quitlong was able to wrest the knife from Masangkay and, with it, he
stabbed Masangkay ten (10) times successively, in the left chest and in the middle
of the stomach. When the stabbing started, Ortega moved to the left side of
Masangkay to avoid being hit.15 Quitlong chased Masangkay who ran towards the
direction of the well. Thereafter, Ortega went home and treated his injured left
armpit and lips. Then, he slept.
When he woke up at six o’clock the following morning, he saw police officers in
front of his house. Taking him with them, the lawmen proceeded to the well. From
the railroad tracks where he was asked to sit, he saw the police officers lift the
body of a dead person from the well. He came to know the identity of the dead
person only after the body was taken to the police headquarters.16
The Trial Court’s Discussion
The trial court explained its basis for appellants’ conviction as follows:17

“The Court is convinced that the concerted acts of accused Benjamin Ortega, Jr.,
Manuel Garcia, Jr. and one Romeo Ortega in lifting, carrying and dumping the
victim Andre Mar Masangkay who was still alive and breathing inside the deep well
filled with water, head first and threw big stones/rocks inside the well to cover the
victim is a clear indication of the community of design to finish/kill victim Andre
Mar Masangkay. Wounded and unarmed victim Andre Mar Masangkay was in no
position to flee and/or defend himself against the three malefactors. Conspiracy
and the taking advantage of superior strength were in attendance. The crime
committed by the accused is Murder.
Concert of action at the moment of consummating the crime and the form and
manner in which assistance is rendered to the person inflicting the fatal wound
may determine complicity where it would not otherwise be evidence [People vs.
Yu, 80 SCRA 382 (1977)].
Every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable. Accused (m)ust
reimburse the heirs of victim Andre Mar Masangkay the amount of P35,000.00 for
the funeral expenses of the deceased.”
The Issues
In their ten-page brief, appellants fault the trial court with the following:18
“I. The trial court erred in holding that there is conspiracy on the basis of the
prosecution’s evidence that at the time both accused and one Romeo Ortega lifted
the body of Andrew Masangkay from where he succumbed due to stab wounds
and brought and drop said body of Andrew Masangkay to the well to commit
murder;
II. The trial court erred in finding and holding that Andrew Masangkay was still
alive at the time his body was dropped in the well;
III. The trial court erred in convicting Manuel Garcia and in not acquitting the latter
of the crime charged; and
IV. The trial court erred in not finding that if at all Benjamin Ortega, Jr. is guilty
only of homicide alone.”
On the basis of the records and the arguments raised by the appellants and the
People, we believe that the question to be resolved could be simplified thus: What
are the criminal liabilities, if any, of Appellants Ortega and Garcia?
The Court’s Ruling
C o n s ti t u ti o n a l L a w I I S e c . 1 4 a n d 1 6 P a g e | 21
We find the appeal partly meritorious. Appellant Ortega is guilty only of homicide.
Appellant Garcia deserves acquittal.
First Issue: Liability of Appellant Ortega
The witnesses for the prosecution and defense presented conflicting narrations.
The prosecution witnesses described the commission of the crime and positively
identified appellants as the perpetrators. The witnesses for the defense, on the
other hand, attempted to prove denial and alibi. As to which of the two contending
versions speaks the truth primarily rests on a critical evaluation of the credibility of
the witnesses and their stories. In this regard, the trial court held:19
“The Court has listened intently to the narration of the accused and their witnesses
and the prosecution witnesses and has keenly observed their behavior and
demeanor on the witness stand and is convinced that the story of the prosecution
is the more believable version. Prosecution eyewitness Diosdado Quitlong
appeared and sounded credible and his credibility is reinforced by the fact that he
has no reason to testify falsely against the accused. It was Diosdado Quitlong who
reported the stabbing incident to the police authorities. If Quitlong stabbed and
killed the victim Masangkay, he will keep away from the police authorities and will
go in hiding. x x x”
Because the trial court had the opportunity to observe the witnesses’ demeanor
and deportment on the stand as they rendered their testimonies, its evaluation of
the credibility of witnesses is entitled to the highest respect. Therefore, unless the
trial judge plainly overlooked certain facts of substance and value which, if
considered, might affect the result of the case, his assessment of credibility must
be respected.20
In the instant case, we have meticulously scoured the records and found no
reason to reverse the trial court’s assessment of the credibility of the witnesses
and their testimonies21 insofar as Appellant Ortega is concerned. The narration of
Eyewitness Diosdado Quitlong appears to be spontaneous and consistent. It is
straightforward, detailed, vivid and logical. Thus, it clearly deserves full credence.
On the other hand, in asserting alibi and denial, the defense bordered on the
unbelievable. Appellant Ortega claimed that after he was able to free himself from
Masangkay’s grip, he went home, treated his injuries and slept.22 This is not the
ordinary reaction of a person assaulted. If Ortega’s version of the assault was true,
he should have immediately reported the matter to the police authorities, if only
out of gratitude to Quitlong who came to his rescue. Likewise, it is difficult to
believe that a man would just sleep after someone was stabbed in his own

backyard. Further, we deem it incredible that Diosdado Quitlong would stab
Masangkay ten (10) times successively, completely ignoring Benjamin Ortega, Jr.
who was grappling with Masangkay. Also inconsistent with human experience is his
narration that Masangkay persisted in choking him instead of defending himself
from the alleged successive stabbing of Quitlong.23 The natural tendency of a
person under attack is to defend himself and not to persist in choking a
defenseless third person.
Murder or Homicide?
Although treachery, evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength were
alleged in the information, the trial court found the presence only of abuse of
superior strength.
We disagree with the trial court’s finding. Abuse of superior strength requires
deliberate intent on the part of the accused to take advantage of such superiority.
It must be shown that the accused purposely used excessive force that was
manifestly out of proportion to the means available to the victim’s defense.24 In
this light, it is necessary to evaluate not only the physical condition and weapon of
the protagonists but also the various incidents of the event.25
In his testimony, Witness Dominador Quitlong mentioned nothing about Appellant
Ortega’s availment of force excessively out of proportion to the means of defense
available to the victim to defend himself. Quitlong described the assault made by
Appellant Ortega as follows:26
“ATTY. ALTUNA:
Q Will you please tell me the place and date wherein you have a drinking spree
with Andrew Masangkay and where you witnessed a stabbing incident?
A It was on October 15, 1992, sir, at about 5:30 in the afternoon we were drinking
in the house of Mr. Benjamin Ortega, Sr., because the house of Benjamin Ortega,
Sr. and the house of his son Benjamin Ortega, Jr. are near each other.
x x x     x x x     x x x
Q Mr. Witness, who were the companions of said persons, Benjamin Ortega, Jr.,
Manuel Garcia, you (sic) in drinking in said place?
A The other companions in the drinking session were Ariel Caranto y Ducay,
Roberto San Andres and Romeo Ortega.
Q What about this victim, Andrew Masangkay, where was he at that time?
C o n s ti t u ti o n a l L a w I I S e c . 1 4 a n d 1 6 P a g e | 22
A Also the victim, Andrew Masangkay, he was also there.
Q You said that the two accused, Manuel Garcia and Benjamin Ortega, Jr. arrived
drunk and joined the group?
A Yes, sir.
Q What happened next?
A While we were there together and we were drinking . . .
(interrupted by Atty. Altuna)
Q Who is that ‘we’?
A Referring to Benjamin Ortega, Jr., Manuel Garcia, Ariel Caranto, Romeo Ortega,
Roberto San Andres, myself and Andrew Masangkay. Andrew Masangkay answer
to a call of nature and went to the back portion of the house, and Benjamin
Ortega, Jr. followed him where he was.
Q What happened next?
A And afterwards we heard a shout and the shout said ‘Huwag, tulungan n’yo ako.’
Q From whom did you hear this utterance?
A The shout came from Andrew Masangkay.
Q After Benjamin Ortega, Jr. followed Andrew Masangkay to answer a call of
nature and after you heard ‘huwag, tulungan n’yo ako’ coming from the mouth of
the late Andrew Masangkay, what happened next?
A Ariel Caranto and I ran towards the back portion of the house.
Q And what did you see?
A And I saw that Benjamin Ortega, Jr. was on top of Andrew Masangkay and he
was stabbing Andrew Masangkay.
Q Will you please demonstrate to the Honorable Court how the stabbing was done
telling us the particular position of the late Andrew Masangkay and how Benjamin
Ortega, Jr. proceeded with the stabbing against the late victim, Andrew
Masangkay?
INTERPRETER:

(At this juncture, the witness demonstrating.)
Andrew Masangkay was lying down on a canal with his face up, then Benjamin
Ortega, Jr. was ‘nakakabayo’ and with his right hand with closed fist holding the
weapon, he was thrusting this weapon on the body of the victim, he was making
downward and upward motion thrust.
ATTY. ALTUNA: (To the witness)
Q How many times did Benjamin Ortega, Jr. stabbed Andrew Masangkay?
A I cannot count the number of times.”
It should be noted that Victim Masangkay was a six-footer, whereas Appellant
Ortega, Jr. was only five feet and five inches tall.27 There was no testimony as to
how the attack was initiated. The accused and the victim were already grappling
when Quitlong arrived. Nothing in the foregoing testimony and circumstances can
be interpreted as abuse of superior strength. Hence, Ortega is liable only for
homicide, not murder.
Second Issue: Liability of Appellant Manuel Garcia
Appellants argue that the finding of conspiracy by the trial court “is based on mere
assumption and conjecture x x x.”28 Allegedly, the medico-legal finding that the
large airway was “filled with muddy particles indicating that the victim was alive
when the victim inhaled the muddy particles” did not necessarily mean that such
muddy particles entered the body of the victim while he was still alive. The
Sinumpaang Salaysay of Quitlong stated, “Nilubayan lang nang saksak nang
mapatay na si Andrew ni Benjamin Ortega, Jr.” Thus, the prosecution evidence
shows Masangkay was already “dead” when he was lifted and dumped into the
well. Hence, Garcia could be held liable only as an accessory.29
We do not agree with the above contention. Article 4, par. 1, of the Revised Penal
Code states that criminal liability shall be incurred by “any person committing a
felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he
intended.” The essential requisites for the application of this provision are that (a)
the intended act is felonious; (b) the resulting act is likewise a felony; and (c) the
unintended albeit graver wrong was primarily caused by the actor’s wrongful acts.
In assisting Appellant Ortega, Jr. carry the body of Masangkay to the well,
Appellant Garcia was committing a felony. The offense was that of concealing the
body of the crime to prevent its discovery, i.e., that of being an accessory in the
crime of homicide.30 Although Appellant Garcia may have been unaware that the
victim was still alive when he assisted Ortega in throwing the body into the well,
C o n s ti t u ti o n a l L a w I I S e c . 1 4 a n d 1 6 P a g e | 23
he is still liable for the direct and natural consequence of his felonious act, even if
the resulting offense is worse than that intended.
True, Appellant Garcia merely assisted in concealing the body of the victim. But
the autopsy conducted by the NBI medico-legal officer showed that the victim at
that time was still alive, and that he died subsequently of drowning.31 That
drowning was the immediate cause of death was medically demonstrated by the
muddy particles found in the victim’s airway, lungs and stomach.32 This is evident
from the expert testimony given by the medico-legal officer, quoted below:33
ATTY. ALTUNA:
“Q Will you please explain this in simple language the last portion of Exhibit N,
beginning with ‘tracheo-bronchial tree,’ that is sentence immediately after
paragraph 10, 2.5 cms. Will you please explain this?
A The trancheo-bronchial tree is filled with muddy particles.
Q I ask you a question on this. Could the victim have possibly get this particular
material?
A No, sir.
Q What do you mean by no?
A A person should be alive so that the muddy particles could be inhaled.
Q So, in short, you are telling or saying to us that if there is no inhaling or the
taking or receiving of muddy particles at that time, the person is still alive?
A Yes, sir.
Q Second point?
A The heart is pale with some multiple petechial hemorrhages at the anterior
surface.
Q And this may [be] due to stab wounds or asphyxia?
A These are the effects or due to asphyxia or decreased amount of blood going to
the heart.
Q This asphyxia are you referring to is the drowning?
A Yes, sir.

Q Next point is the lungs?
A The lungs is also filled with multiple petechial hemorrhages.
Q What could have caused this injury of the lungs?
A This is due to asphyxia or the loss of blood.
Q Are you saying that the lungs have been filled with water or muddy particles?
A Yes, sir.
Q And, precisely, you are now testifying that due to stab wounds or asphyxia, the
lungs have been damaged per your Report?
A Yes, sir.
Q Continuing this brain and other visceral organs, pale. What is this?
A The paleness of the brain and other visceral organs is due to loss of blood.
Q And, of course, loss of blood could be attributed to the stab wound which is
number 13?
A Yes, sir.
Q And the last one, under the particular point ‘hemothorax’?
A It indicates at the right side. There are around 1,400 cc of blood that accumulate
at the thoraxic cavity and this was admixed with granular materials?
Q And what cause the admixing with granular materials on said particular portion
of the body?
A Could be muddy particles.
Q Due to the taking of maddy (sic) materials as affected by asphyxia? Am I
correct?
A It’s due to stab wounds those muddy particles which set-in thru the stab
wounds.
Q So, because of the opening of the stab wounds, the mudd particles now came
in, in that particular portion of the body and caused admixing of granular
materials?
C o n s ti t u ti o n a l L a w I I S e c . 1 4 a n d 1 6 P a g e | 24
A Yes, sir.
Q Continuing with your report, particularly, the last two portions, will you please
explain the same?
A The hemoperitoneum there are 900 cc of blood that accumulated inside the
abdomen.
Q And what could have cause the same?
A [T]he stab wound of the abdomen.
Q The last one, stomach 1/2 filled with muddy particles. Please explain the same?
A The victim could have taken these when he was submerged in water.
Q What is the take in?
A Muddy particles.
Q And he was still alive at that time?
A Yes, sir.” (Italics supplied)
A Filipino authority on forensic medicine opines that any of the following medical
findings may show that drowning is the cause of death:34
“1. The presence of materials or foreign bodies in the hands of the victim. The
clenching of the hands is a manifestation of cadaveric spasm in the effort of the
victim to save himself from drowning.
2. Increase in volume (emphysema aquosum) and edema of the lungs (edema
aquosum).
3. Presence of water and fluid in the stomach contents corresponding to the
medium where the body was recovered.
4. Presence of froth, foam or foreign bodies in the air passage found in the
medium where the victim was found.
5. Presence of water in the middle ear.”
The third and fourth findings were present in the case of Victim Masangkay. It was
proven that his airpassage, or specifically his tracheo-bronchial tree, was filled with

muddy particles which were residues at the bottom of the well. Even his stomach
was half-filled with such muddy particles. The unrebutted testimony of the medico-
legal officer that all these muddy particles were ingested when the victim was still
alive proved that the victim died of drowning inside the well.
The drowning was the direct, natural and logical consequence of the felony that
Appellant Garcia had intended to commit; it exemplifies praeter intentionem
covered by Article 4, par. 1, of the Revised Penal Code. Under this paragraph, a
person may be convicted of homicide although he had no original intent to kill.35
In spite of the evidence showing that Appellant Garcia could be held liable as
principal in the crime of homicide, there are, however, two legal obstacles barring
his conviction, even as an accessory—as prayed for by appellants’ counsel himself.
First. The Information accused Appellant Garcia (and Appellant Ortega) of
“attack[ing], assault[ing], and stab[bing] repeatedly with a pointed weapon on the
different parts of the body one ANDRE MAR MASANGKAY y ABLOLA.” The
prosecution’s evidence itself shows that Garcia had nothing to do with the stabbing
which was solely perpetrated by Appellant Ortega. His responsibility relates only to
the attempted concealment of the crime and the resulting drowning of Victim
Masangkay. The hornbook doctrine in our jurisdiction is that an accused cannot be
convicted of an offense, unless it is clearly charged in the complaint or information.
Constitutionally, he has a right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him. To convict him of an offense other than that charged in
the complaint or information would be a violation of this constitutional right.36
Section 14, par. 2, of the 1987 Constitution explicitly guarantees the following:
“(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the
contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to
be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a
speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have
compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of
evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may proceed
notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been duly
notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable.” (Italics supplied)
In People vs. Pailano,37 this Court ruled that there can be no conviction for rape
on a woman “deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious” where the information
charged the accused of sexual assault “by using force or intimidation,” thus:
“The criminal complaint in this case alleged the commission of the crime through
the first method although the prosecution sought to establish at the trial that the
C o n s ti t u ti o n a l L a w I I S e c . 1 4 a n d 1 6 P a g e | 25
complainant was a mental retardate. Its purpose in doing so is not clear. But
whatever it was, it has not succeeded.
If the prosecution was seeking to convict the accused-appellant on the ground that
he violated Anita while she was deprived of reason or unconscious, such conviction
could not have been possible under the criminal complaint as worded. This
described the offense as having been committed by ‘Antonio Pailano, being then
provided with a scythe, by means of violence and intimidation, (who) did, then and
there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of the
complainant, Anita Ibañez, 15 years of age, against her will.’ No mention was
made of the second circumstance.
Conviction of the accused-appellant on the finding that he had raped Anita while
she was unconscious or otherwise deprived of reason—and not through force and
intimidation, which was the method alleged—would have violated his right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. [Article IV, Sec.
19, Constitution of 1973; now Article III, Sec. 14(2)] This right is safeguarded by
the Constitution to every accused so he can prepare an adequate defense against
the charge against him. Convicting him of a ground not alleged while he is
concentrating his defense against the ground alleged would plainly be unfair and
underhanded. This right was, of course, available to the herein accused-appellant.
In People vs. Ramirez, [fn: 69 SCRA 144] we held that a person charged with rape
could not be found guilty of qualified seduction, which had not been alleged in the
criminal complaint against him. In the case of People vs. Montes, [fn: 122 SCRA
409] the Court did not permit the conviction for homicide of a person held
responsible for the suicide of the woman he was supposed to have raped, as the
crime he was accused of—and acquitted—was not homicide but rape. More to the
point is Tubb v. People of the Philippines, [fn: 101 Phil. 114] where the accused
was charged with the misappropriation of funds held by him in trust with the
obligation to return the same under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the Revised
Penal Code, but was convicted of swindling by means of false pretenses, under
paragraph 2(b) of the said Article, which was not alleged in the information. The
Court said such conviction would violate the Bill of Rights.”
By parity of reasoning, Appellant Garcia cannot be convicted of homicide through
drowning in an information that charges murder by means of stabbing.
Second. Although the prosecution was able to prove that Appellant Garcia assisted
in “concealing x x x the body of the crime, x x x in order to prevent its discovery,”
he can neither be convicted as an accessory after the fact defined under Article 19,
par. 2, of the Revised Penal Code. The records show that Appellant Garcia is a

brother-in-law of Appellant Ortega,38 the latter’s sister, Maritess, being his wife.39
Such relationship exempts Appellant Garcia from criminal liability as provided by
Article 20 of the Revised Penal Code:
“ART. 20. Accessories who are exempt from criminal liability.—The penalties
prescribed for accessories shall not be imposed upon those who are such with
respect to their spouses, ascendants, descendants, legitimate, natural, and
adopted brothers and sisters, or relatives by affinity within the same degrees with
the single exception of accessories falling within the provisions of paragraph 1 of
the next preceding article.”
On the other hand, “the next preceding article” provides:
“ART. 19. Accessories.—Accessories are those who, having knowledge of the
commission of the crime, and without having participated therein, either as
principals or accomplices, take part subsequent to its commission in any of the
following manners:
1. By profiting themselves or assisting the offender to profit by the effects of the
crime.
2. By concealing or destroying the body of the crime, or the effects or instruments
thereof, in order to prevent its discovery.
3. By harboring, concealing, or assisting in the escape of the principal of the crime,
provided the accessory acts with abuse of his public functions or whenever the
author of the crime is guilty of treason, parricide, murder, or an attempt to take
the life of the Chief Executive, or is known to be habitually guilty of some other
crime.”
Appellant Garcia, being a covered relative by affinity of the principal accused,
Benjamin Ortega, Jr., is legally entitled to the aforequoted exempting provision of
the Revised Penal Code. This Court is thus mandated by law to acquit him.
Penalty and Damages
The award of actual damages should be reduced to P31,790.00 from P35,000.00.
The former amount was proven both by documentary evidence and by the
testimony of Melba Lozano, a sister of the victim.40 Of the expenses alleged to
have been incurred, the Court can give credence only to those that are supported
by receipts and appear to have been genuinely incurred in connection with the
death of the victim.41 However, in line with current jurisprudence,42 Appellant
Ortega shall also indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of P50,000.00.
C o n s ti t u ti o n a l L a w I I S e c . 1 4 a n d 1 6 P a g e | 26
Indemnity requires no proof other than the fact of death and appellant’s
responsibility therefor.43
The penalty for homicide is reclusion temporal under Article 249 of the Revised
Penal Code, which is imposable in its medium period, absent any aggravating or
mitigating circumstance, as in the case of Appellant Ortega. Because he is entitled
to the benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum term shall be one
degree lower, that is, prision mayor.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the joint appeal is PARTLY GRANTED.
Appellant Benjamin Ortega, Jr. is found GUILTY of homicide and sentenced to ten
(10) years of prision mayor medium, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8)
months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal medium, as maximum. Appellant
Ortega, Jr. is also ORDERED to pay the heirs of the victim P50,000.00 as indemnity
and P31,790.00 as actual damages. Appellant Manuel Garcia is ACQUITTED. His
immediate release from confinement is ORDERED unless he is detained for some
other valid cause.
SO ORDERED.
     Narvasa (C.J., Chairman), Davide, Jr., Melo and Francisco, JJ., concur.
Appeal partly granted.
Note.—The right to be informed has the following objectives—First. To furnish the
accused with such a description of the charge against him as will enable him to
make his defense; second, to avail himself of his conviction or acquittal for
protection against a further prosecution for the same cause; and third, to inform
the court of the facts alleged, so that it may decide whether they are sufficient in
law to support a conviction, if one should be had. (People vs. Pecho, 262 SCRA
518 [1996])
——o0o—— People vs. Ortega, Jr., 276 SCRA 166, G.R. No. 116736 July 24, 1997

[No. 21741. January 25, 1924]
AURELIA CONDE, petitioner, vs. PABLO RIVERA, acting provincial fiscal
of Tayabas, and FEDERICO M. UNSON, justice of the peace of Lucena,
Tayabas, respondents.
1.CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; SPEEDY TRIAL.—Phil-ippine
organic and statutory law expressly guarantee that in all criminal prosecutions the
accused shall enjoy the right to have a speedy trial.
2.ID.; ID.; ID.—The Government of the Philippine Islands should be the last to set
an example of delay and oppression in the administration of justice.
3.ID.; ID.; ID.; MANDAMUS; HABEAS CORPUS.—Where a prosecuting officer,
without good cause, secures postponements of the trial of a defendant against his
protest beyond a reasonable period of time, as in this instance for more than a
year, the accused is entitled to relief by a proceeding in mandamus to compel a
dismissal of the information, or if he be restrained of his liberty, by habeas corpus
to obtain his freedom. Conde vs. Rivera and Unson, 45 Phil. 650, No. 21741
January 25, 1924.
MALCOLM, J.:
Aurelia Conde, formerly a municipal midwife in Lucena, Tayabas, has been forced
to respond to no less than five informations for various crimes and misdemeanors,
has appeared with her witnesses and counsel at hearings no less than on eight
different occasions only to see the cause postponed, has twice been required to
come to the Supreme Court for protection, and now, after the passage of more
than one year from the time when the first information was filed, seems as far
away from a definite resolution of her troubles as she was when originally charged.
Philippine organic and statutory law expressly guarantee that in all criminal
prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to have a speedy trial. Aurelia
Conde, like all other accused persons, has a right to a speedy trial in order that if
innocent she may go free, and she has been deprived of that right in defiance of
law. Dismissed from her humble position, and compelled to dance attendance on
courts while investigations and trials are arbitrarily postponed without her consent,
is palpably and openly unjust to her and a detriment to the public. By the use of
reasonable diligence, the prosecution could have settled upon the appropriate
information, could have attended to the formal preliminary examination, and could
C o n s ti t u ti o n a l L a w I I S e c . 1 4 a n d 1 6 P a g e | 27
have prepared the case for a trial free from vexatious, capricious, and oppressive
delays.
Once before, as intimidated, the petitioner had to come to us for redress of her
grievances. We thought then we had pointed out the way for the parties. But it
seems not. Once again therefore and finally, we hope, we propose to do all in our
power to assist this poor woman to obtain justice. On the one hand has been the
petitioner, of humble station, without resources, but fortunately assisted by a
persistent lawyer, while on the other hand has been the Government of the
Philippine Islands which should be the last to set an example of delay and
oppression in the administration of justice. The Court is thus under a moral and
legal obligation to see that these proceedings come to an end and that the
accused is discharged from the custody of the law.
We lay down the legal proposition that, where a prosecuting officer, without good
cause, secures postponements of the trial of a defendant against his protest
beyond a reasonable period of time, as in this instance for more than a year, the
accused is entitled to relief by a proceeding in mandamus  to compel a dismissal of
the information, or if he be restrained of his liberty, by habeas corpus to obtain his
freedom. (16 C.J., 439 et seq.; In the matter of Ford [1911], 160 Cal., 334;
U.S. vs. Fox [1880], 3 Montana, 512. See further our previous decision in
Conde vs. Judge of First Instance, Fourteenth Judicial District, and the Provincial
Fiscal of Tayabas, No. 21236. 1
The writ prayed for shall issue and the Provincial Fiscal of Tayabas shall abstain
from further attempts to prosecute the accused pursuant to informations growing
out of the facts set forth in previous informations, and the charges now pending
before the justice of the peace of Lucena, Tayabas, are ordered dismissed, with
cost against the respondent fiscal. We append to our order the observation that,
without doubt, the Attorney-General, being fully cognizant of the facts of record,
will take such administrative action as to him seems proper to the end that
incidents of this character may not recur. So ordered.

No. L-62810. July 25, 1983.*
EULALIA MARTIN, petitioner, vs. GEN. FABIAN VER, CHIEF OF STAFF,
ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES and GEN. HAMILTON DIMAYA,
JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL, respondents.
Military Law; Jurisdiction; A court-martial retains jurisdiction in certain case even
after a soldier has been discharged from service, such as in case of malversation.
—Generally, court-martial jurisdiction over persons in the military service of the
Philippines ceases upon discharge or other separation from such service. This
however, is but a general rule. The Articles of War in terms prescribe some
exceptions designed to enhance discipline and good order within the military
organization. Thus, court-martial jurisdiction as to certain cases of fraud and
misappropriation of military hardware and other government property is not
extinguished by discharge or dismissal pursuant to the 95th Article of War.
Same; Same; Habeas Corpus; A discharged soldier charged before a court-martial
of illegal sale or disposition of military hardware may still be detained by that court
even after discharge from military service.—We conclude that despite his discharge
from the military service, the petitioner is still subject to military law for the
purpose of prosecuting him for illegal disposal of military property, and his
preventive detention thereunder—pending trial and punishment for the said
offense committed when he was in the military service—is lawful.
Constitutional Law; Habeas Corpus; Criminal Procedure; Undue delay in trial is
counted from the time the information is filed not before.—There was no such
denial. As stated by this Court in a per curiam decision: “x x x the test of violation
of the right to speedy trial has always been to begin counting the delay from the
time the information is filed, not before the filing. The delay in the filing of the
information, which in the instant case has not been without reasonable cause, is
therefore not to be reckoned with in determining whether there has been a denial
of the right to speedy trial.” (People vs. Orsal, 113 SCRA 226 at 236.)
Same; Same; Same; Denial of right to speedy trial not quantifiable.—At any rate,
whether or not one has been denied speedy trial is not susceptible to precise
quantification. At best, the constitutional right of speedy trial is relative, consistent
with reasonable delays, taking into account the circumstances of each case.
Same; Same; Same; There can be undue delay in trial where delay due to
unavailability of witnesses who died by virtue of grenade sold by petitioner.—
Returning to the case at hand, the criminal act imputed to the petitioner
C o n s ti t u ti o n a l L a w I I S e c . 1 4 a n d 1 6 P a g e | 28
unfortunately resulted in the death of three persons (including Rogelio Cruz who
allegedly bought the handgrenades from the petitioner) and very serious injuries to
three others whose testimony is vital to the preferment of charges and prosecution
of the petitioner. It is therefore not unreasonable to heed the claim of respondents
that the delay complained of was occasioned by the unavailability of witnesses, a
claim which has not at all been challenged or denied by the petitioner. Martin vs.
Ver, 123 SCRA 745, No. L-62810 July 25, 1983
Arturo V. Romero for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
PLANA, J.:
This is a petition for habeas corpus filed by Eulalia Martin on behalf of her
husband, Pvt. Francisco Martin.
Pvt. Martin was an enlisted man in the Philippine Army. On or about April 14,
1981, when he was still in the service, he allegedly sold two grenades to one
Rogelio Cruz at P50.00 each, one of which exploded during a picnic in Laoag City
on April 17, 1981 causing the death of three persons, including Rogelio Cruz, and
injuries to three others.
According to respondents, Pvt. Martin has admitted to Cpl. Lucio Tuppal, Philippine
Army, having sold the grenades to Rogelio Cruz in Laoag City, although this is
denied by Pvt. Martin.
After an initial investigation conducted by the Laoag City PC and INP authorities, a
report was submitted to the Ministry of National Defense which referred the matter
to the Chief of Staff, AFP, who in turn directed the Inspector General to conduct
another investigation.
On May 5, 1981, Pvt. Martin was arrested and confined (restricted to barracks) at
Fort Bonifacio pursuant to Article 70 of the Articles of War, infra. The following
year, he was discharged from the service effective as of May 5, 1982. On
November 17, 1982 the instant petition was filed. The following month, i.e.,
December 3, 1982, Pvt. Martin was charged for violation of the 85th and 97th
Articles of War, which read:

ART. 85. Waste or Unlawful Disposition of Military Property Issued to Soldiers.—
Any soldier who sells or wrongfully disposes of or willfully or through neglect
injures or losses any horse, arms, ammunition, accouterments, equipment,
clothing, or other property issued for use in the military service, shall be punished
as a court-martial may direct.
ART. 97. General Article.—Though not mentioned in these articles, all disorders
and neglects to the prejudice of good order and military discipline and all conduct
of a nature to bring discredit upon the military service shall be taken cognizance of
by a general or special or summary court-martial according to the nature and
degree of the offense, and punished at the discretion of such court.
The charge sheet stipulates the following charges:
CHARGE I: Violation of the 85th Article of War.
Specification: In that Private Martin assigned with the Headquarters and
Headquarters Service Battalion, First Infantry Division, Philippine Army on or about
14 April 1981 at Laoag City wrongly disposed of by sale to Rogelio Cruz two (2)
grenades.
CHARGE II: Violation of the 97th Article of War.
Specification: In that Private Francisco Martin, ... on or about the month of April
1981 at Laoag City, unlawfully and without authority had in his possession two (2)
hand grenades thus committing an act prejudicial to good order and military
discipline and of a nature that will bring discredit to the military establishment.
The petitioner contends that having been discharged from the military service, he
is no longer subject to court-martial even if the offenses of which he is charged
were committed while he was still subject to military law. He therefore, concludes
that his continued detention pursuant to Article 70 of the Articles of War (which
authorizes the arrest/confinement of any person subject to military law who is
charged with an offense under the Articles of War) is illegal and he, accordingly,
should be released. This posture has no merit.
Generally, court-martial jurisdiction over persons in the military service of the
Philippines ceases upon discharge or other separation from such service. This
however, is but a general rule. The Articles of War in terms prescribe some
exceptions designed to enhance discipline and good order within the military
organization. Thus, court-martial jurisdiction as to certain cases of fraud and
C o n s ti t u ti o n a l L a w I I S e c . 1 4 a n d 1 6 P a g e | 29
misappropriation of military hardware and other government property is not
extinguished by discharge or dismissal pursuant to the 95th Article of War.
ART. 95. Frauds Against the Government.—Any person subject to military law ...
Who steals, embezzles, knowingly and willingly misappropriates, applies to his own
use or benefit or wrongfully or knowingly sells or disposes of any ordnance, arms,
equipment, ammunition, clothing, subsistence, stores, money, or other property of
the Government furnished or intended for the military service thereof ...
Shall, on conviction thereof, be punished by fine or imprisonment, or by such other
punishment as a court-martial may adjudge, or by any or all of said penalties. And
if any person, being guilty of any of the offenses aforesaid while in the service of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines or of the Philippine Constabulary receives his
discharge or is dismissed from the service, he shall continue to be liable to be
arrested and held for trial and sentence by a court-martial in the same manner and
to the same extent as if he had not received such discharge nor been dismissed.
(Emphasis supplied.)
It was on the basis of the foregoing legal provision, among others, that this Court
sustained the court-martial of the petitioner in De la Cruz vs. Alcaraz, et al. after
his reversion to inactive status, for misappropriation of public funds committed
while he was still in the active military service. The Court, thru Mr. Justice J. B. L.
Reyes, said:
There is no question that although appellant had been reverted to inactive
(civilian) status in the reserve force of the Philippine Army, he is still amenable to
investigation and court-martial under the Artitles of War by the Philippine Navy for
alleged acts of misappropriation of government funds committed while he was still
in the active military service. As correctly held by the Court below, appellant's case
falls within the provisions of Article 95 of the Articles of War (Commonwealth Act
No. 408, as amended), which provides as follows: ...
The lower Court did not, therefore, err in refusing to enjoin appellant's
investigation by the naval authorities on charges that he had misappropriated
public property while he was still in the service of the Philippine Navy, specially
since petitioner admits that he is still a member of the Reserve Force." (99 Phil.
130 at 131-132.).
We conclude that despite his discharge from the military service, the petitioner is
still subject to military law for the purpose of prosecuting him for illegal disposal of

military property, and his preventive detention thereunder — pending trial and
punishment for the said offense committed when he was in the military service —
is lawful.
Alternatively, petitioner maintains that even assuming that the jurisdiction of the
military authorities to try and punish him was not abated by his discharge from
military service, the denial to him of his constitutional right to speedy trial (he
having been confined from the date of his arrest on May 5, 1981 up to December
3, 1982 when he was formally charged — a period of I year and 7 months) entitles
him to be released on habeas corpus.
The fundamental rights guaranteed in the Constitution apply to all persons,
including those subject to military law, (Aquino vs. Military Commission No. 2, 63
SCRA 546; Cayaga vs. Tangonan, 66 SCRA 216; Go vs. Olivas, 74 SCRA 230;
Romero vs. Ponce Enrile, 75 SCRA 429.) To quote Ex Parte Milligan, 4 Wall. 2:
The Constitution is a law for rulers and for people equally in war and in peace and
covers with the shield of its protection all classes of men at all times and under all
circumstances.
It would indeed be parodoxical if military men who are called upon in times of the
gravest national crises to lay down their lives in defense of peace and freedom
would be the very people to be singled out for denial of the fundamental rights for
which they risk their lives.
For denial of a constitutional right to the accused, the hearing tribunal may lose its
jurisdiction to conduct further proceedings. In such a case, habeas corpus would
lie to obtain the release of the accused. (Gumabon vs. Director, 37 SCRA 420;
Acevedo vs. Sarmiento, 36 SCRA 247; Aquino vs. Ponce Enrile, 59 SCRA 183;
Flores vs. People, 61 SCRA 331; Dacuyan vs. Ramos, 85 SCRA 487, Ventura vs.
People, 86 SCRA 188; Romero vs. Ponce Enrile, 75 SCRA 429; Aquino vs. Ponce
Enrile, supra; Go vs. Olivas, supra.)
In the case at bar, the petitioner claims that he has been denied his constitutional
right of speedy trial because the charges against him were filed only about 1 year
and 7 months after his arrest.
There was no such denial. As stated by this Court in a per curiam decision: "x...
the test of violation of the right to speedy trial has always been to begin counting
the delay from the time the information is filed, not before the filing. The delay in
the filing of the information, which in the instant case has not been without
C o n s ti t u ti o n a l L a w I I S e c . 1 4 a n d 1 6 P a g e | 30
reasonable cause, is therefore not to be reckoned with in determining whether
there has been a denial of the right to speedy trial." (People vs. Orsal, 113 SCRA
226 at 236.)
At any rate, whether or not one has been denied speedy trial is not susceptible to
precise quantification. At best, the constitutional right of speedy trial is relative,
consistent with reasonable delays, taking into account the circumstances of each
case. As expressed in Barker vs. Wingo, 33 L. Ed 2d 101:
... the right to a speedy trial is a more vague and generically different concept
than other constitutional rights guaranteed to accused persons and cannot be
quantified into a specified number of days or months, and it is impossible to
pinpoint a precise time in the judicial process when the right must be asserted or
considered waived ...
... a claim that a defendant has been denied his right to a speedy trial is subject to
a balancing test, in which the conduct of both the prosecution and the defendant
are weighed, and courts should consider such factors as length of the delay,
reason for the delay, the defendant's assertion or non-assertion of his right, and
prejudice to the defendant resulting from the delay, in determining whether
defendant's right to a speedy trial has been denied ...
Returning to the case at hand, the criminal act imputed to the petitioner
unfortunately resulted in the death of three persons (including Rogelio Cruz who
allegedly bought the handgrenades from the petitioner) and very serious injuries to
three others whose testimony is vital to the preferment of charges and prosecution
of the petitioner. It is therefore not unreasonable to heed the claim of respondents
that the delay complained of was occasioned by the unavailability of witnesses, a
claim which has not at all been challenged or denied by the petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the petition for habeas corpus is dismissed, without prejudice to the
petitioner seeking his provisional release on bail from the military authorities or the
Ministry of National Defense. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 159098. October 27, 2006.*
SPS. HENRY and ROSARIO UY, petitioners, vs. HON. JUDGE ARSENIO P.
ADRIANO, in his capacity as Pairing Judge of RTC, Br. 64, Tarlac City,
CITY PROSECUTOR ALIPIO C. YUMUL and PIÑAKAMASARAP CORP.,
respondents.
Speedy Trial; Constitutional Law; Words and Phrases; “Speedy trial” is a relative
term and necessarily a flexible concept—in determining whether the right of the
accused to a speedy trial was violated, the delay should be considered, in view of
the entirety of the proceedings—indeed, more mathematical reckoning of the time
involved would not suffice as the realities of everyday life must be regarded in
judicial proceedings which, after all, do not exist in a vacuum.—Under the
Constitution and Section 1(7) of Rule 115 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, the accused shall be entitled to have a speedy and impartial trial.
“Speedy trial” is a relative term and necessarily a flexible concept. In determining
whether the right of the accused to a speedy trial was violated, the delay should
be considered, in view of the entirety of the proceedings. Indeed, mere
mathematical reckoning of the time involved would not suffice as the realities of
everyday life must be regarded in judicial proceedings which, after all, do not exist
in a vacuum.
Same; Same; Different weights should be assigned to various reasons by which
the prosecution justifies the delay—a deliberate attempt to delay the trial in order
to hamper the defense should be weighed heavily against the prosecution—a more
neutral reason such as negligence or overcrowded courts should be weighed less
heavily but nevertheless should be considered since the ultimate responsibility for
such circumstances must rest with the government rather than with the defendant.
—Different weights should be assigned to various reasons by which the
prosecution justifies the delay. A deliberate attempt to delay the trial in order to
hamper the defense should be weighed heavily against the prosecution. A more
neutral reason such as negligence or overcrowded courts should be weighed less
heavily but nevertheless should be considered since the ultimate responsibility for
such circumstances must rest with the government rather than with defendant.
Same; Same; The right to speedy trial cannot be invoked where to sustain the
same would result in a clear denial of due process to the prosecution—it should
C o n s ti t u ti o n a l L a w I I S e c . 1 4 a n d 1 6 P a g e | 31
not operate in depriving the State of its inherent prerogative to prosecute criminal
cases generally in seeing to it that all of those who approach the bar of justice is
afforded fair opportunity to present their side.— Certainly, the right to speedy trial
cannot be invoked where to sustain the same would result in a clear denial of due
process to the prosecution. It should not operate in depriving the State of its
inherent prerogative to prosecute criminal cases or generally in seeing to it that all
those who approach the bar of justice is afforded fair opportunity to present their
side. For it is not only the State; more so, the offended party who is entitled to
due process in criminal cases. In essence, the right to a speedy trial does not
preclude the people’s equally important right to public justice.
Same; Same; The assertion of the right to a speedy trial is entitled to a strong
evidentiary weight in determining whether defendant is being deprived thereof—
failure to claim the right will make it difficult to prove that there was a denial of a
speedy trial.—The assertion of the right to a speedy trial is entitled to strong
evidentiary weight in determining whether defendant is being deprived thereof.
Failure to claim the right will make it difficult to prove that there was a denial of a
speedy trial.
Same; Same; The right to a speedy trial is a privilege of the accused—if he does
not claim it, he should not complain. R.A. No. 8493 (Speedy Trial Act of 1998) is a
means of enforcing Section 14(2), Article III of the Constitution—the spirit of the
law is that the accused must go on record in the attitude of demanding a trial or
resisting delay. If he does not do this, he must be held, in law, to have waived the
privilege.—In the same vein, one’s failure to timely question the delay in the trial
of a case would be an implied acceptance of such delay and a waiver of the right
to question the same. Except when otherwise expressly so provided, the speedy
trial right, like any other right conferred by the Constitution or statute, may be
waived when not positively asserted. A party’s silence may amount to laches. The
right to a speedy trial is a privilege of the accused. If he does not claim it, he
should not complain. R.A. No. 8493 (Speedy Trial Act of 1998) is a means of
enforcing Section 14(2), Article III of the Constitution. The spirit of the law is that
the accused must go on record in the attitude of demanding a trial or resisting
delay. If he does not do this, he must be held, in law, to have waived the privilege.
Same; Same; The right to a speedy trial is not primarily intended to prevent
prejudice to the defense caused by the passage of time, that interest is protected
primarily by the due process clause and the statutes of limitations.— As neither the
specific types of prejudice mentioned in Barker nor any others have been brought
to the Court’s attention, we are constrained to dismiss petitioners’ claim. The
passage of time alone, without a significant deprivation of liberty or impairment of

the ability to properly defend oneself, is not absolute evidence of prejudice. The
right to a speedy trial is not primarily intended to prevent prejudice to the defense
caused by the passage of time; that interest is protected primarily by the due
process clause and the statutes of limitations. Uy vs. Adriano, 505 SCRA 625, G.R.
No. 159098 October 27, 2006
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Challenged in this instant Petition for Review on Certiorari is the Decision1 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 62103 which affirmed the Orders of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tarlac City2 denying the motion to quash the
Information in Criminal Case Nos. 6512-94.
Based on a confidential information that petitioner Henry Uy had been engaged in
manufacturing, delivering, and selling "fake" Marca Piña soy sauce, 3 Orlando S.
Bundoc, Intelligence Officer II of the Economic Intelligence and Investigation
Bureau (EIIB), applied for a search warrant4 for unfair competition which was
granted on February 14, 1994. When the search warrant was implemented on
even date, Atty. Francisco R. Estavillo, agent of the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) in Tarlac, seized fifty-five (55) bottles of label Marca Piña soy
sauce.5
Consequently, a criminal complaint was filed in the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of
Tarlac City on March 23, 1994, charging petitioner Henry Uy with violation of
Article 189 (Unfair Competition) of the Revised Penal Code. 6
On November 8, 1994, private respondent Piñakamasarap Corporation moved to
amend the criminal charge by including Henry's spouse, petitioner Rosario Uy. 7 The
court granted the motion in its Order dated November 15, 1994 and admitted the
amended criminal complaint which reads:
The undersigned, LUIS E. GONZALES, Comptroller of PIÑAKAMASARAP
CORPORATION of 583 Sta. Veronica St., Novaliches, Quezon City, and by
authority of the said corporation, under oath accuses HENRY UY,
ROSARIO GUTIERREZ UY and a certain JOHN DOE of Violation of Article
189 of the Revised Penal Code, committed as follows:
That on or about February 14, 1994, and for sometimes (sic) prior
thereto, in Municipality of Tarlac, Tarlac, Philippines, the said Rosario G.
Uy accused, being then the owner of a business establishment with
principal address at Phase I, Northern Hills Subdivision, San Vicente,
C o n s ti t u ti o n a l L a w I I S e c . 1 4 a n d 1 6 P a g e | 32
Tarlac, Tarlac, and her co-accused, husband, HENRY UY, and a certain
John Doe, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously conspire
and confederate together and help one another engaged in unfair
competition with the intention of deceiving and defrauding the public in
general and the consuming public in general and PIÑAKAMASARAP
Corporation, the manufacturer and bottler of soy sauce under the name
"MARCA PIÑA," a [trademark] duly registered with the Philippine Patent
Office and sell or offer for sale soy sauce manufactured by them with the
brand name "Marca Piña" which is a bastard version of the trademark,
and using the bottles of Piñakamasarap Corporation and substituted the
contents thereof with those manufactured by the accused and passing to
the public that said products to be the products of Piñakamasarap
Corporation which is not true, thereby inducing the public to believe that
the above-mentioned soy sauce sold or offered for sale by said accused
are genuine "MARCA PIÑA" soy sauce manufactured by PIÑAKAMASARAP
CORPORATION, and of inferior quality to the damage and prejudice of the
Piñakamasarap Corporation.
Contrary to law.
Tarlac, Tarlac, November 8, 1994.8
After preliminary examination of the prosecution witnesses, the court found
probable cause to indict petitioners. 9 On January 30, 1995, the court issued a
warrant of arrest against petitioners.10 They were released after posting a cash
bond on February 1, 1995.11 On July 10, 1995, petitioners were arraigned, assisted
by counsel, and pleaded not guilty to the charge.12 Petitioners, through counsel,
waived the pre-trial conference on October 25, 1995. The initial trial was set on
November 27, 1995.13
However, it was only on February 26, 1996 that the first witness of the
prosecution, Atty. Estavillo of the NBI, testified. In the meantime, in October 1996,
this Court issued Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 104-96 providing, inter alia, that
the RTC shall have exclusive jurisdiction over violations of Articles 188 and 189 of
the Revised Penal Code and Republic Act (R.A.) No. 166, as amended, thus:
VIOLATIONS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS SUCH AS, BUT NOT
LIMITED TO, VIOLATIONS OF ART. 188 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE
(SUBSTITUTING AND ALTERING TRADEMARKS, TRADE NAMES, OR
SERVICE MARKS), ART. 189 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE (UNFAIR
COMPETITION, FRAUDULENT REGISTRATION OF TRADEMARKS, TRADE
NAMES, OR SERVICE MARKS, FRAUDULENT DESIGNATION OF ORIGIN,

AND FALSE DESCRIPTION), P.D. NO. 49 (PROTECTION OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS), P.D. NO. 87 (AN ACT CREATING
THE VIDEOGRAM REGULATORY BOARD), R.A. NO. 165, AS AMENDED
(THE PATENT LAW), AND R.A. NO. 166, AS AMENDED (THE TRADEMARK
LAW) SHALL BE TRIED EXCLUSIVELY BY THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS
IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE ESTABLISHED RAFFLE SCHEME EXCEPT
THOSE COVERED BY ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 113-95 DATED 2
OCTOBER 1995, IN WHICH CASE, THE DESIGNATED REGIONAL TRIAL
COURTS SHALL CONTINUE TO OBSERVE THE PROVISIONS THEREIN.
CONSIDERING THAT JURISDICTION FOR VIOLATIONS OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS HEREINBEFORE MENTIONED IS NOW
CONFINED EXCLUSIVELY TO THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS, THE
DESIGNATION OF METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURTS AND MUNICIPAL
TRIAL COURTS IN CITIES UNDER ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 113-95
IS DELETED AND WITHDRAWN.
Despite the administrative order of the Court, the MTC continued with the trial.
Gloria P. Tomboc, Analyst of the Bureau of Food and Drugs Administration (BFAD),
testified on August 25, 1997. In the meantime, Articles 188 and 189 of the Revised
Penal Code were amended by R.A. No. 8293, otherwise known as the Intellectual
Property Code. Two years thereafter, Alfredo Lomboy, supervisor of
Piñakamasarap Corporation, testified on August 30, 1999.
On December 12, 1999, the prosecution filed its formal offer of evidence.  In the
14
meantime, on October 22, 1999, Atty. Joselito L. Lim had moved to withdraw his
appearance as counsel for petitioners;15 the court had granted the motion on
October 25, 1999;16 and the new counsel of petitioners, Balbastro and Associates,
had entered its appearance on November 24, 1999.17
On February 15, 2000, the court resolved to admit the documentary evidence of
the prosecution except Exhibit "E" which was rejected by the court, and Exhibits
"I" and "J" which were withdrawn.18 The prosecution rested its case.
On March 10, 2000, petitioners, through their new counsel, filed a Motion for
Leave to File Demurrer to Evidence.19The court granted the motion. In their
demurrer,20 petitioners argued that a judgment of acquittal is proper since no
sufficient evidence was presented to prove beyond reasonable doubt that they are
guilty of the offense charged. The prosecution was not able to establish that they
gave their goods the general appearance of another manufacturer or dealer and
that they had the intent to defraud the public or Piñakamasarap Corporation.
Moreover, under both R.A. No. 166, as amended, and its repealing law, R.A. No.
C o n s ti t u ti o n a l L a w I I S e c . 1 4 a n d 1 6 P a g e | 33
8293, the RTC had jurisdiction over the crime charged; hence, the amended
complaint should be quashed.
The prosecution opposed the demurrer to evidence, contending that it had
presented proof beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt of petitioners for the crime
charged. The prosecution maintained that, under Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 129,
the MTC had jurisdiction over the crime charged in the light of the imposable
penalty for unfair competition under Article 189 of the Revised Penal Code. 21
In its Resolution dated May 16, 2000,22 the court held that there was prima facie
evidence which, if unrebutted or not contradicted, would be sufficient to warrant
the conviction of petitioners. However, the court ruled that the RTC was vested by
law with the exclusive and original jurisdiction to try and decide charges for
violation of R.A. No. 166 as amended by R.A. No. 8293. Accordingly, the court
denied the demurrer to evidence and ordered the records of the case forwarded to
the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor for appropriate action.
The City Prosecutor forwarded the case records to the Clerk of Court of RTC, Br.
63, Tarlac City.23 On June 19, 2000, the RTC ordered the City Prosecutor to
conduct the requisite preliminary investigation and to file the necessary
Information if he found probable cause against petitioners.
The City Prosecutor found probable cause based on the findings of the MTC in its
May 16, 2000 Resolution that there was a prima facie case against petitioners. 24 He
filed an Information in the RTC on July 18, 2000 for violation of Article 189 of the
Revised Penal Code.25 The Information reads:
That on or about February 14, 1994 and sometime prior thereto, at Tarlac
City, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused,
being the owner of a business establishment with principal address at
Phase I, Northern Hills Subd., San Vicente, Tarlac City, the accused,
conspiring, confederating and helping one another did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, in unfair competition with the
intention of deceiving and defrauding the public in general and the
PIÑAKAMASARAP CORPORATION, the name "MARCA PIÑA," and sell or
offer for sale soy sauce manufactured by them with the brand name
"Marca Piña," which is a version of the trademark, and using the bottles
of Piñakamasarap Corporation and substituted the contents thereof with
those manufactured by the accused and passing to the public the
products, thereby inducing the public to believe that the soy sauce sold or
offered for sale by the accused are genuine "MARCA PIÑA" soy sauce, to
the damage and prejudice of PIÑAKAMASARAP CORPORATION.

CONTRARY TO LAW.26
Petitioners filed a Motion to Quash the Information,27 alleging that their rights to
due process and speedy trial had been violated. Other than the notice of hearing
sent by the court, they never received a subpoena which required them to submit
their evidence during a preliminary investigation. Petitioners further averred that
certain delays in the trial are permissible, especially when such delays are due to
uncontrollable circumstances or by accident. In this case, the inordinate delay was
obviously brought by the lackadaisical attitude taken by the prosecutor in
prosecuting the case. Petitioners pointed out that there was already a delay of six
(6) long years from the time the initial complaint was filed, and that they had
already been prejudiced. Their life, liberty and property, not to mention their
reputation, have been at risk as there has been no determination of the issue of
whether or not to indict them. Thus, the case should be dismissed in order to free
them from further capricious and oppressive dilatory tactics of the prosecution.
Indeed, their right to a speedy trial is part of due process, both of which are
guaranteed by no less than the fundamental law itself. They insisted that they
should not be made to unjustly await the prosecution of the charges against them.
In opposition, the City Prosecutor clarified that subpoenas were sent to the parties
during the preliminary investigation. In fact, petitioner Henry Uy appeared and
submitted the case for resolution without submitting additional evidence. Also, the
proceedings in the MTC were not part of preliminary investigation but the trial on
the merits.28
On September 8, 2000, the court issued an Order denying the motion to
quash.29 The court ruled that:
While there must have been a protracted trial since the case was
originally filed before the Municipal Trial Court, a period of about six (6)
years, as the accused contends, nevertheless the delay if any, is partly
attributable to the accused. [They] allowed the prosecution to rest the
evidence in chief before raising the issue of lack of jurisdiction. Had the
accused immediately raised the issue of lack of jurisdiction, this case
could have been filed anew before the RTC. The accused allowed
themselves to be arraigned without raising the issue of jurisdiction. In
fact, the prosecution [had] rested its evidence in chief.
The parties may[,] however[,] stipulate in the pre-trial that all the
proceedings taken before the Municipal Trial Court are automatically
reproduced and are considered part of the prosecution's evidence, so that
the trial will now be with respect to the reception of defense evidence. 30
C o n s ti t u ti o n a l L a w I I S e c . 1 4 a n d 1 6 P a g e | 34
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order 31 which the trial court
denied.32 At the same time, the court granted the oral motion of the prosecution to
amend the Information to reflect in its caption that the law violated by the accused
is R.A. No. 8293 and not Article 189 of the Revised Penal Code. On October 12,
2000, the City Prosecutor filed an amended Information. The inculpatory portion
reads:
That on or about February 14, 1994 and sometimes prior thereto, at
Tarlac City, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
accused, being the owner of a business establishment with principal
address at Phase I, Northern Hills Subd., San Vicente, Tarlac City, the
accused, conspiring, confederating and helping one another did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, in Violation of Sec. 168 of R.A.
No. 8293with the intention of deceiving and defrauding the public in
general and the PIÑAKAMASARAP CORPORATION, the name "MARCA
PIÑA," and sell or offer for sale soy sauce manufactured by them with the
brand name "Marca Piña," which is a version of the trademark, and using
the bottles of Piñakamasarap Corporation and substituted the contents
thereof with those manufactured by the accused and passing to the
public the products, thereby inducing the public to believe that the soy
sauce sold or offered for sale by the accused are genuine "MARCA PIÑA"
soy sauce, to the damage and prejudice of PIÑAKAMASARAP
CORPORATION.
CONTRARY TO LAW.33
Petitioners then filed before the CA a petition for certiorari with prayer for
temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction,34 on the sole ground that
respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in denying their motion to
quash based on violation of their right to a speedy trial. They claimed that there
was no active effort on their part to delay the case as they merely attended the
scheduled hearings and participated in the preliminary investigation. On the
contrary, it is the prosecution that has the unmitigated obligation to immediately
file the Information with the proper court. The public prosecutor is supposedly
knowledgeable of the existing laws and jurisprudence since his office has the
delicate task of prosecuting cases in behalf of the State. Under the Rules on
Criminal Procedure, he is the officer responsible for the direction and control of
criminal prosecutions. In the case at bar, the public prosecutor failed in his
bounden duty by neglecting to file the case in the court of competent jurisdiction.
The prosecution could not advance a single reason to justify the procedural error
and instead pointed its accusing finger to petitioners who are just ordinary citizens.
Their failure to call the attention of the prosecution is neither acquiescence nor
consent on their part. While their former lawyer was obviously lackluster in their

defense, the act of the counsel should not deprive them of their constitutional right
to a speedy trial. For petitioners, the prosecution's blunder in procedure and
ignorance of existing laws and jurisprudence far outweigh whatever minimal
participation, if any, they had in the protracted proceedings.
On March 21, 2003, the CA dismissed the petition. 35 The fallo of the decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is
hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Orders dated September 8,
2000 and October 9, 2000 of the public respondent are
hereby DISMISSED.36
In dismissing the petition, the appellate court ratiocinated that:
[T]he right to a speedy disposition of a case, like the right to speedy trial,
is deemed violated only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious,
capricious and oppressive delays" (Castillo v. Sandiganbayan, 328 SCRA
69, 76); "or when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and
secured, or when without cause or justifiable motive a long period of time
is allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried." ( Binay v.
Sandiganbayan, 316 SCRA 65, 93)
In the instant case, aside from the fact that it took almost six years for
the prosecution to complete the presentation of its evidence, petitioners
failed to show that the delay, if ever there is any, was caused solely by
the prosecution. Neither did the petitioners show that the proceedings
before the Municipal Trial Court was attended by vexatious, capricious
and oppressive delays attributable to the prosecution or that unjustified
postponements of the trial were asked for and secured by the prosecution
to the prejudice of the petitioners. The fact alone that the prosecution
had consumed six (6) years to complete its presentation of evidence,
without any allegation or proof that the prosecution has caused
unreasonable delays or that the proceeding was attended by vexatious,
capricious and oppressive delays, to Our minds is not sufficient for the
application upon the petitioners of their Constitutional right to speedy
trial. "A mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved, therefore,
would not be sufficient. In the application of the Constitutional guarantee
of the right to speedy disposition of cases, particular regard must also be
taken of the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case." ( Binay v.
Sandiganbayan, supra, p. 93). In the case at bar, petitioners failed to
C o n s ti t u ti o n a l L a w I I S e c . 1 4 a n d 1 6 P a g e | 35
present, for Our perusal, the circumstances attending the trial of their
case before the Municipal Trial Court.
The only controversy of the instant case lies in the fact that the Municipal
Trial Court which heard the case has no jurisdiction over the said case.
While it may be conceded that the prosecution erred in not filing the
information against the petitioners to a proper court, still, petitioners are
not blameless in this regard. Petitioners, through their counsel, had
actively participated in the proceedings before the Municipal Trial Court.
Petitioners had to wait for almost six (6) years to elapse before they
brought to the attention of the Municipal Trial Court that it had no
jurisdiction to hear the case against the petitioners. Petitioners have, by
reason of their participation in the proceedings before the Municipal Trial
Court and also by reason of their silence and inaction, allowed the
Municipal Trial Court to proceed with a case for six (6) years despite
absence of jurisdiction of such court to hear the case. We cannot allow
the petitioners to reap from their acts or omissions. "A litigation is not a
game of technicalities in which one, more deeply schooled and skilled in
the subtle art of movement and position, entraps and destroys the other."
(Fortune Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 229 SCRA 355, 364)
"The constitutional privilege was never intended as furnishing a technical
means for escaping trial." (Esguerra v. Court of First Instance of Manila,
et al., 95 Phil. 609, 611-612) "The right of an accused to a speedy trial is
guaranteed to him by the Constitution, but the same shall not be utilized
to deprive the State of a reasonable opportunity of fairly indicting
criminals. It secures rights to an accused, but it does not preclude the
rights of public justice. (Domingo v. Sandiganbayan, 322 SCRA 655,
667)37
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, which the appellate court denied. 38
Petitioners sought relief from this Court on a petition for review, alleging that:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION
WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE COURT A QUO'S DENIAL OF PETITIONERS'
MOTION TO QUASH, BASED ON VIOLATION OF THEIR RIGHT TO
SPEEDY TRIAL (SEC. 16, ART. 3, 1987 CONSTITUTION).39
Petitioners reiterate their arguments in the CA to support the present petition.
They aver that:

In this case, the prosecution took six (6) long and grueling years before it
filed an Information with a competent court, despite the fact that
jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts over trademark cases remained
unchanged since the birth of the Trademark Law. Surely, this inordinate
delay can be considered a "vexatious, capricious and oppressive delay"
which is constitutionally impermissible in this jurisdiction pursuant to the
right of the accused to speedy trial.
Indeed, petitioners have been prejudiced. Their lives, liberty and
property, not to mention their reputation have all been put at risk for so
long.
The public prosecutor failed to explain the reason for the delay. Truth to
tell, even at this last stage, the public prosecutor chooses to remain silent
why it had unjustifiably taken him too long to file this case before a
competent court. Unfortunately, the Court of Appeals deliberately ignored
this glaring flaw committed by the public prosecutor and instead focused
on petitioners' alleged negligence in not raising the issue of jurisdiction
earlier. It further ruled that due to this fact, petitioners are thus not
entirely blameless for the delay of the trial.
Truth to tell, these findings of the Court of Appeals are palpably
erroneous.
Firstly, it is elementary that jurisdiction over the subject matter may be
raised at any stage of the proceedings. This is because no amount of
waiver can confer jurisdiction on a court over an offense for which such
jurisdiction has not been conferred by law in the first place.
Secondly, even assuming that petitioners failed to raise the issue of
jurisdiction earlier, still, they could not be estopped from invoking their
right to speedy trial. The delay to be considered "partly attributable" to
the accused (which could work against him in invoking the right to speedy
trial) presupposes an active effort of the defendant to delay the case
(Manabat v. Timbang, 74 Phil. 295). There is no violation of the right to
speedy trial where the delay is imputable to the accused ( Solis v. Agloro,
63 SCRA 370). Here, it was the prosecution that had the unmitigated
obligation to file the Information with the correct court, within a
reasonable time. It did not. Such blunder was fatal to its cause.
C o n s ti t u ti o n a l L a w I I S e c . 1 4 a n d 1 6 P a g e | 36
To emphasize, petitioners need not even call the attention of the
prosecution that it had failed to file the case with the proper court,
contrary to the opinion of the Court of Appeals. x x x40
xxxx
Although petitioners agree with the Court of Appeals that mere
mathematical reckoning of time would not be sufficient for the application
of the right to speedy trial, still, the public prosecutor's blunder should
already be considered "vexatious, capricious and oppressive" warranting
the dismissal of the case.
Indeed, to condone the public prosecutor's manner of having directed this
case, just like what the Court of Appeals did, might give rise to a
disturbing precedent where the constitutional right of the accused could
very well be set aside to justify the mishandling of the prosecution by
officers of the State.41
Section 1(h), Rule 115 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that
the accused is entitled to a speedy, impartial and public trial. Section 2, Rule 119
of the said Rules provides that trial, once commenced, shall be continuous until
terminated:
Sec. 2. Continuous trial until terminated; postponements. – Trial, once
commenced, shall continue from day to day as far as practicable until
terminated. It may be postponed for a reasonable period of time for good
cause.
The court shall, after consultation with the prosecutor and defense
counsel, set the case for continuous trial on a weekly or other short-term
trial calendar at the earliest possible time so as to ensure speedy trial. In
no case shall the entire trial period exceed one hundred eighty (180) days
from the first day of trial, except as otherwise authorized by the Supreme
Court.
The time limitations provided under this section and the preceding section
shall not apply where special laws or circulars of the Supreme Court
provide for a shorter period of trial.
However, any period of delay resulting from a continuance granted by the
court motu proprio, or on motion of either the accused or his counsel, or the

prosecution, if the court granted the continuance on the basis of its findings set
forth in the order that the ends of justice is served by taking such action outweigh
the best interest of the public and the accused on a speedy trial, shall be
deducted.
The trial court may grant continuance, taking into account the following factors:
(a) Whether or not the failure to grant a continuance in the proceeding
would likely make a continuation of such proceeding impossible or result
in a miscarriage of justice; and
(b) Whether or not the case taken as a whole is so novel, unusual and
complex, due to the number of accused or the nature of the prosecution,
or that it is unreasonable to expect adequate preparation within the
periods of time established therein.
In addition, no continuance under section 3(f) of this Rule shall be
granted because of congestion of the court's calendar or lack of diligent
preparation or failure to obtain available witnesses on the part of the
prosecutor.42
Under the Constitution and Section 1(7) of Rule 115 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, the accused shall be entitled to have a speedy and impartial
trial. "Speedy trial" is a relative term and necessarily a flexible concept. 43In
determining whether the right of the accused to a speedy trial was violated, the
delay should be considered, in view of the entirety of the proceedings. 44 Indeed,
mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved would not suffice 45 as the
realities of everyday life must be regarded in judicial proceedings which, after all,
do not exist in a vacuum.46
Apart from the constitutional provision and Section 115, Section 1(i) of the Rules of
Criminal Procedure, A.O. No. 113-95 of the Court provides that:
The trial of cases for violation of Intellectual Property Rights covered by
this Administrative Order shall be immediately commenced and shall
continue from day to day to be terminated as far as practicable within
sixty (60) days from initial trial. Judgment thereon shall be rendered
within thirty (30) days from date of submission for decision.
More than a decade after the 1972 leading U.S. case of Barker v. Wingo47 was
promulgated, this Court, in Martin v. Ver,48 began adopting the "balancing test" to
C o n s ti t u ti o n a l L a w I I S e c . 1 4 a n d 1 6 P a g e | 37
determine whether a defendant's right to a speedy trial has been violated. As this
test necessarily compels the courts to approach speedy trial cases on an ad
hoc basis, the conduct of both the prosecution and defendant are
weighed apropos the four-fold factors, to wit: (1) length of the delay; (2) reason
for the delay; (3) defendant's assertion or non-assertion of his right; and (4)
prejudice to defendant resulting from the delay.49 None of these elements,
however, is either a necessary or sufficient condition; they are related and must be
considered together with other relevant circumstances. These factors have no
talismanic qualities as courts must still engage in a difficult and sensitive balancing
process.50
A. Length of the Delay
The length of delay is to some extent a "triggering mechanism." Until there is
some delay, which is presumptively prejudicial, there is no necessity to inquire into
the other three factors. Nevertheless, due to the imprecision of the right to a
speedy trial, the length of delay that will provoke such an inquiry is necessarily
dependent upon the peculiar circumstances of the case.51
B. Reason for the Delay
Under Section 9, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the accused
have the burden to prove the factual basis of the motion to quash the Information
on the ground of denial of their right to a speedy trial.52 They must demonstrate
that the delay in the proceedings is vexatious, capricious, and oppressive; or is
caused by unjustified postponements that were asked for and secured; or that
without cause or justifiable motive, a long period of time is allowed to elapse
without the case being tried.53 On the other hand, the prosecution is required to
present evidence establishing that the delay was reasonably attributed to the
ordinary processes of justice, and that petitioners suffered no serious prejudice
beyond that which ensued after an inevitable and ordinary delay. 54
The records bear out the contention of petitioners that there had been a
considerable delay in the trial in the MTC. Upon motion/agreement of petitioners
and the prosecution, or because of the joint absences, the trial of the case was
delayed for more than 11 months.55 In its own instance, the MTC also reset some
of the trial dates in order to correct mistakes in scheduling or because the
witnesses were not duly notified,56 thus, delaying the trial of the case for an
additional seven months. Even petitioners contributed to the delay of more than
five months – they or their former counsel were either absent or moved for
postponements to attend another pending case or due to health concerns. 57 The
delay of about 21 months, covering 15 re-settings, can be attributed to the

prosecution. However, except in five instances, when the trial was reset because
the private prosecutor had to attend to some professional 58 and personal
matters,59 the delays were brought about because of the recent engagement of
legal service,60 absence of the public prosecutor,61 and unavailability of
documents62 and witnesses.63
Not only the petitioners but the State as well were prejudiced by the inordinate
delay in the trial of the case. It took the prosecution more than four years to rest
its case after presenting only three witnesses. Had the prosecution, petitioner and
the trial court been assiduous in avoiding any inordinate delay in the trial, the
prosecution could have rested its case much earlier. The court even failed to order
the absent counsel/prosecutor/witnesses to explain/justify their absences or cite
them for contempt. The speedy trial mandated by the Constitution and the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure is as much the responsibility of the prosecution, the
trial court and petitioners to the extent that the trial is inordinately delayed, and to
that extent the interest of justice is prejudiced.
The case before the RTC should not be dismissed simply because the public
prosecution did not move for the dismissal of the case in the MTC based on A.O.
No. 104-96 declaring that the RTC has exclusive jurisdiction over cases under
Articles 188 and 189 of the Revised Penal Code; or for failure of the MTC to motu
proprio dismiss the case on that ground. The City Prosecutor then believed in good
faith, albeit erroneously, that under R.A. No. 7691 which amended B.P. Blg. 129,
the MTC had jurisdiction over the crime charged.
The mistake of the City Prosecutor and the failure of the MTC to dismiss the case
motu proprio should not prejudice the interest of the State to prosecute criminal
offenses and, more importantly, defeat the right of the offended party to redress
for its grievance. Significantly, petitioners do not attribute to the prosecution or to
the MTC any malice aforethought or conscious disregard of their right to a speedy
trial; nor have substantially proven the same by clear and convincing evidence.
Hence, absent showing of bad faith or gross negligence, delay caused by the lapse
of the prosecution is not in itself violative of the right to a speedy trial.
Different weights should be assigned to various reasons by which the prosecution
justifies the delay. A deliberate attempt to delay the trial in order to hamper the
defense should be weighed heavily against the prosecution. A more neutral reason
such as negligence or overcrowded courts should be weighed less heavily but
nevertheless should be considered since the ultimate responsibility for such
circumstances must rest with the government rather than with defendant. 64
C o n s ti t u ti o n a l L a w I I S e c . 1 4 a n d 1 6 P a g e | 38
In Corpuz v. Sandiganbayan,65 the Court had carefully balanced the societal
interest in the case, which involved the so-called "tax credit certificates scam," and
the need to give substance to the defendants' constitutional rights. In said suit, we
upheld the decision of the Sandiganbayan (Special Fourth Division) that the
dismissal of the cases was too drastic, precipitate and unwarranted. While the
Court recognized that defendants were prejudiced by the delay in the
reinvestigation of the cases and the submission of a complete report by the
Ombudsman/Special Prosecutor to the Sandiganbayan, we underscored that the
State should not be prejudiced and deprived of its right to prosecute cases simply
because of the ineptitude or nonchalance of the Ombudsman/Special Prosecutor.
"An overzealous or precipitate dismissal of a case may enable defendant, who may
be guilty, to go free without having been tried, thereby infringing the societal
interest in trying people accused of crimes by granting them immunization because
of legal error."66
The same observation was made in Valencia v. Sandiganbayan.67 Here, the Court
noted the haphazard manner by which the prosecutor handled the litigation for the
State when he rested the case without adducing evidence for the prosecution and
simply relying on the Joint Stipulation of Facts, which the accused did not even
sign before its submission to the Sandiganbayan. In allowing the prosecution to
present additional evidence and in dismissing the claim of the accused that his
constitutional right to a speedy trial had been violated, we ruled:
As significant as the right of an accused to a speedy trial is the right of
the State to prosecute people who violate its penal laws. The right to a
speedy trial is deemed violated only when the proceeding is attended by
vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays x x x [T]o erroneously put
premium on the right to speedy trial in the instant case and deny the
prosecution's prayer to adduce additional evidence would logically result
in the dismissal of the case for the State. There is no difference between
an order outrightly dismissing the case and an order allowing the eventual
dismissal thereof. Both would set a dangerous precedent which enables
the accused, who may be guilty, to go free without having been validly
tried, thereby infringing the interest of the society. 68
Certainly, the right to speedy trial cannot be invoked where to sustain the same
would result in a clear denial of due process to the prosecution. It should not
operate in depriving the State of its inherent prerogative to prosecute criminal
cases or generally in seeing to it that all those who approach the bar of justice is
afforded fair opportunity to present their side. 69 For it is not only the State; more
so, the offended party who is entitled to due process in criminal cases. 70 In
essence, the right to a speedy trial does not preclude the people's equally

important right to public justice.71 Thus, as succinctly decreed in State v.
McTague:72
The constitutional and statutory provisions for a speedy trial are for the
protection of the defendant, but that does not mean that the state is the
only one that may initiate action. There is really no reason for the courts
to free an accused simply because a dilatory prosecutor has 'gone to
sleep at the switch' while the defendant and his counsel rest in silence.
These solicitous provisions are not to be used as offensive weapons, but
are for the benefit of defendants who claim their protection. They are a
shield, and they 'must not be left hanging on the wall of the armory.' It is
for the protection of personal rights, not to embarrass the administration
of the criminal law nor to defeat public justice.
Be that as it may, the conduct of the City Prosecutor and the MTC must not pass
without admonition. This Court must emphasize that the State, through the court
and the public prosecutor, has the absolute duty to insure that the criminal justice
system is consistent with due process and the constitutional rights of the accused.
Society has a particular interest in bringing swift prosecutions, and the society's
representatives are the ones who should protect that interest. The trial court and
the prosecution are not without responsibility for the expeditious trial of criminal
cases. The burden for trial promptness is not solely upon the defense. The right to
a speedy trial is constitutionally guaranteed and, as such, is not to be honored only
for the vigilant and the knowledgeable.73
C. Petitioners' Assertion of the Right
The assertion of the right to a speedy trial is entitled to strong evidentiary weight
in determining whether defendant is being deprived thereof. Failure to claim the
right will make it difficult to prove that there was a denial of a speedy trial. 74
Except in only one instance in this case,75 the records are bereft of any evidence
that petitioners, through counsel, have bothered to raise their objection to the
several re-setting of the trial dates. This is not unexpected since, as already
shown, the reasons for the delay are not in themselves totally inexcusable or
unreasonable. Moreover, petitioners actively participated in the trial when the
prosecution presented its evidence, as they scrutinized the documentary evidence
and cross-examined the witnesses. Until the filing of the motion to quash in the
RTC, they never contested the prosecutorial proceedings nor timely challenged the
pendency of the case in the MTC.
C o n s ti t u ti o n a l L a w I I S e c . 1 4 a n d 1 6 P a g e | 39
While it is true that lack of jurisdiction may be assailed at any stage of the
proceedings, such defense must be seasonably raised at the earliest possible
opportunity. Otherwise, active participation in the trial would estop a party from
later challenging such want of jurisdiction.76
In the same vein, one's failure to timely question the delay in the trial of a case
would be an implied acceptance of such delay and a waiver of the right to question
the same. Except when otherwise expressly so provided, the speedy trial right, like
any other right conferred by the Constitution or statute, may be waived when not
positively asserted.77 A party's silence may amount to laches.78 The right to a
speedy trial is a privilege of the accused. If he does not claim it, he should not
complain. R.A. No. 8493 (Speedy Trial Act of 1998) is a means of enforcing Section
14(2), Article III of the Constitution.79 The spirit of the law is that the accused
must go on record in the attitude of demanding a trial or resisting delay. If he does
not do this, he must be held, in law, to have waived the privilege.
This Court cannot subscribe to petitioners' untiring argument that, being "ordinary
citizens," they should not be made to suffer from the "lackluster" performance of
their former counsel who failed to recognize the MTC's want of jurisdiction. Too
often we have held that a client is bound by the acts, mistakes or negligence of his
counsel.80 This is, as it should be, since a counsel has the implied authority to do
all acts which are necessary or, at least, incidental to the prosecution and
management of the suit in behalf of his client. Any act performed within the scope
of his general and implied authority is, in the eyes of the law, regarded as the act
of the client.81 If the rule were otherwise, there would be no end to litigation so
long as a new counsel could be employed who would allege and show that the
prior counsel had not been sufficiently diligent, experienced, or learned. 82 It would
enable every party to render inutile an adverse order or decision through the
simple expedient of alleging gross negligence on the part of the counsel. 83 Every
shortcoming of a counsel could be the subject of challenge by his client through
another counsel who, if he is also found wanting, would likewise be disowned by
the same client through another counsel, and so on ad infinitum.84 Proceedings
would then be indefinite, tentative and at times, subject to reopening by the
simple subterfuge of replacing counsel.85
While the rule admits of certain exceptions,86 we find none present in this case.
Other than his obvious failure to assert lack of jurisdiction, Atty. Lim undeniably
represented the cause of his clients in the MTC proceedings. Interestingly, their
new counsel, wittingly or unwittingly, raised the issue of jurisdiction only four
months after it entered its appearance, 87 thus, adding to the delay.
D. Prejudice to the Petitioners
 C o n s ti t u ti o n a l L a w I I S e c . 1 4 a n d 1 6 P a g e | 40

In the Barker case,88 the different interests of a defendant which may be affected
by the violation of the right to a speedy trial were identified. It was held that
prejudice should be assessed in the light of the interests of a defendant which the
speedy trial right was designed to protect, namely: (1) to prevent oppressive
pretrial incarceration; (2) to minimize anxiety and concern of the accused; and (3)
to limit the possibility that the defense will be impaired. Of these, the most serious
is the last, because the inability of a defendant to adequately prepare his case
skews the fairness of the entire system. If witnesses die or disappear during a
delay, the prejudice is obvious. There is also prejudice if defense witnesses are
unable to recall accurately events of the distant past. Loss of memory, however, is
not always reflected in the record because what has been forgotten can rarely be
shown. Even if an accused is not incarcerated prior to trial, he is still
disadvantaged by restraints on his liberty and by living under a cloud of anxiety,
suspicion, and often hostility.89 After all, arrest is a public act that may seriously
interfere with the defendant's liberty, whether he is free on bail or not, and that
may disrupt his employment, drain his financial resources, curtail his associations,
subject him to public obloquy, and create anxiety in him, his family and friends. 90
Again, a perusal of the records failed to reveal that the delay in bringing
petitioners to trial in a court of competent jurisdiction caused them any prejudice
tantamount to deprivation of their right to a speedy trial. Petitioners in this case
were not subjected to pretrial incarceration, oppressive or otherwise, thus
eliminating the first Barker consideration bearing on prejudice.
As to the minimization of anxiety and concern of the accused, there is no showing
that petitioners suffered undue pressures in this respect. Mere reference to a
general asseveration that their "life, liberty and property, not to mention
reputation" have been prejudiced is not enough. There must be conclusive factual
basis, as this Court cannot rely on pure speculation or guesswork. Surely, a
pending criminal case may cause trepidation but, as stressed in Barker, the
standard here is minimization, not necessarily elimination of the natural
consequences of an indictment. While this is not to be brushed off lightly, it is not
by itself sufficient to support a claim of denial of the right to a speedy trial.
As neither the specific types of prejudice mentioned in Barker nor any others have
been brought to the Court's attention, we are constrained to dismiss petitioners'
claim. The passage of time alone, without a significant deprivation of liberty or
impairment of the ability to properly defend oneself, is not absolute evidence of
prejudice. The right to a speedy trial is not primarily intended to prevent prejudice
to the defense caused by the passage of time; that interest is protected primarily
by the due process clause and the statutes of limitations.91
In several cases where it is manifest that due process of law or other rights
guaranteed by the Constitution or statutes has been denied, this Court has not
faltered to accord the so-called "radical relief" to keep accused from enduring the
rigors and expense of a full-blown trial.92 In this case, however, there appears no
persuasive, much less compelling, ground to allow the same relief for absence of
clear and convincing showing that the delay was unreasonable or arbitrary and
was seasonably objected to by petitioners.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of
merit. The March 21, 2003 Decision and July 17, 2003 Resolution of the Court of
Appeals are AFFIRMED. The Regional Trial Court, Branch 64, Tarlac City, is
directed to proceed with the trial on the merits of the criminal case with all
reasonable and judicious dispatch consistent with the right of petitioners to a
speedy trial. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

There is no factual basis for the claim of petitioners that we are not supplied with
any specific allegation in the record, nor witnesses or evidence may become
unavailable because of the delays in this case. To repeat, the claim of impairment
of defense because of delay must be specific and not by mere conjecture. Vague
assertions of faded memory will not suffice. Failure to claim that particular
evidence had been lost or had disappeared defeats speedy trial claim.

G.R. No. 109271. March 14, 2000.*
RICARDO CASTILLO, DEMETRIO CABISON, JR., and RODOLFO AGDEPPA,
petitioners, vs. HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN (SECOND DIVISION), and
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by HONORABLE CONRADO
VASQUEZ, OMBUDSMAN, respondents.
Criminal Procedure; Ombudsman; Sandiganbayan; There was no need for the
Ombudsman to conduct another preliminary investigation as the one conducted by
the former Tanodbayan was valid and legal.—Petitioners’ contention is misleading.
In the aforecited case, this Court clearly held that the authority of the Tanodbayan
to conduct preliminary investigations and to direct the filing of criminal cases was
lost effective February 2, 1987. The inference, therefore, of such holding is that
the Tanodbayan had such authority prior to February 2, 1987. In this case, the
Tanodbayan issued petitioners a subpoena on September 22, 1986 directing them
to file their counter-affidavits, which the latter complied with on September 30,
1986. In short, the preliminary investigation was conducted by the Tanodbayan
before he lost his authority to do so. Hence, there was no need for the
Ombudsman to conduct another preliminary investigation as the one conducted by
the former Tanodbayan was valid and legal. Presumably, the new Ombudsman
recognized the results of the preliminary investigation conducted by the then
Tanodbayan and adopted the conclusions reached therein when he ordered the
filing of an Information against petitioners.
Same; Constitutional Law; The right to a speedy disposition of a case, like the right
to speedy trial, is deemed violated only when the proceeding is attended by
vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays.—In Cojuangco, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan,
this Court has held that the constitutional guarantee set forth in Section 16, Article
III of the 1987 Constitution, of “(t)he right to a speedy disposition of a case, like
the right to speedy trial, is deemed violated only when the proceeding is attended
by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays.” “x x x (T)he concept of speedy
disposition of cases is a relative term and must necessarily be a flexible concept.
Hence, the doctrinal rule is that in the determination of whether that right has
been violated, he factors that may be considered and balanced are the length of
delay, the reason for such delay and the assertion or failure to assert such right by
the accused, and the prejudice caused by the delay.”
Same; Same; Court has taken judicial cognizance of the fact that the ever
increasing caseload of courts has affected the speedy disposition of cases pending
before the Sandiganbayan.—In addition, it is clearly apparent from the figures
cited by petitioners that the Sandiganbayan was burdened with a heavy caseload.
Parenthetically, this Court has taken judicial cognizance of the fact that the ever
C o n s ti t u ti o n a l L a w I I S e c . 1 4 a n d 1 6 P a g e | 41
increasing caseload of courts has affected the speedy disposition of cases pending
before the Sandiganbayan. Castillo vs. Sandiganbayan, 328 SCRA 69, G.R. No.
109271 March 14, 2000
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari and Prohibition.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
     Leonardo G. Padilla for petitioner R. Castillo.
     Santiago D.R. Agdeppa for petitioner R. Agdeppa.
     Domingo and D.R. Agdeppa for petitioner.
     The Solicitor General for respondents.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Certiorari assailing two Orders dated February 18,
19931 and March 8, 19932 of the Sandiganbayan’s Second Division denying
petitioners’ Motion to Dismiss and Motion for Reconsideration.
On August 25, 1986, concerned employees of the Commission on Audit (COA) filed
a Complaint before the Tanodbayan,3 against petitioners Ricardo Castillo, Rodolfo
Agdeppa and Demetrio Cabison, Jr., COA Auditor VIII, COA Auditor II, and COA
Auditor III, respectively, all assigned at the National Housing Authority (NHA), for
alleged “submittal of initial very derogatory reports which became the basis for the
filing of cases with the Tanodbayan and the reversals of their initial
recommendations for selected contractors.” Petitioners were notified of the
Complaint on September 22, 1986 when they were directed by the Tanodbayan to
file their counter-affidavits, which they did on September 30, 1986.
In a resolution dated October 30, 1987, the Tanodbayan found a prima facie case
against petitioners and accordingly recommended the filing of an Information
against them for violation of Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act (RA 3019).4
On November 27, 1987, petitioners promptly filed a Motion for Reinvestigation.5
On March 21, 1988, they filed a Motion to Resolve their Motion for
Reinvestigation.6
Without acting upon the Motion for Reinvestigation and Motion to Resolve Motion
for Reinvestigation, an Information was filed on November 5, 1990, before the
Sandiganbayan, which reads:

“That on or about August 5, 1986 or prior and subsequent thereto, in Quezon City,
Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
accused namely, Ricardo R. Castillo, Rodolfo M. Agdeppa and Demetrio M.
Cabison, Jr., all public officers being then COA Auditor VIII, COA Auditor II and
COA Auditor III, respectively, taking advantage of their official positions, while in
the performance or discharge of their administrative official functions, with evident
bad faith and manifest partiality, conspiring, confederating and confabulating with
each other, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and fraudulently cause undue
injury, damage and prejudice to the Government of the Republic of the Philippines,
to wit: that two contracts were entered into by the NHA management with two
private contractors relative to the complete development of Phase V-A Packages 3
& 4 which is being constructed by Sarmiento Construction Co., and likewise Phase
IX Packages 7 & 7-A which is being constructed by the Supra Construction Co.,
both constructions are located at the Tala Estate Sites & Services, by causing to
prepare, submit, issue and sign in the different inventory reports/recommendation
on various occasions that Sarmiento Construction had an overpayment in the
amount of P362,591.98 for Phase V-A Packages 3 & 4 but later on said accused
changed their inventory reports/recommendation and subsequently readjusted this
as overpayment on physical work thereby prejudicing the government on account
of accused’s constant changes/reversals in the inventory reports prepared, signed
and submitted by them; whereas in the second contract with Supra Construction,
accused issued an inventory report by stating thereon that said contractor had a
work deficiency in the amount of P788,806.94 but refraining from taking
appropriate action on account of P1,873,091.40 withheld on Tala to pay a refund
order on a Tondo contract issued by the COA main office. The said accused raised
the deficiency in the amount of P855,281.50. Later on, another inventory report
was issued and prepared by a Tri-Partite Team Committee composed of COA, NHA
and the contractors stating a work deficiency in the amount of P352,121.40 only.
Despite previous inventory reports/recommendation by the accused citing different
amounts and another amount by the Tri-Partite Team Committee said accused
later stated that the final deficiencies of Supra Construction is no longer
P855,281.58 but was reduced only to P70,596.37, which reductions in the
contractors’ final deficiencies were not justified thereby giving unwarranted
benefits, preference and advantage to the above-mentioned contractor to the
damage and prejudice of the government in the amount of P231,523.00 and to the
Sarmiento Construction for inventoried accomplishment were not duly credited by
the said accused.”7
Trial on the merits thereafter ensued. After the prosecution rested its case,
petitioners filed a Demurrer to Evidence but the same was denied by the
C o n s ti t u ti o n a l L a w I I S e c . 1 4 a n d 1 6 P a g e | 42
Sandiganbayan in a Resolution dated December 11, 1992.8 Petitioners’ Motion for
Reconsideration was likewise denied in a Resolution dated January 20, 1993.9
Thereafter, petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss10 dated February 15, 1993 citing
lack of jurisdiction and violation of due process, but the same was denied by the
Sandiganbayan. Petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration11 was also denied.
Hence, this petition for certiorari and prohibition, raising the following grounds:
The Honorable Respondent Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in
not dismissing the Information notwithstanding that there was a violation of
petitioners’ constitutional rights of “due process” and “speedy disposition of cases”
and there was use of the strong arm of the law in an oppressive and vindictive
manner against the petitioners.
1. Unexplained and unjustified delay of three (3) years before an Information is
filed before the Honorable Respondent Sandiganbayan counting from the date of
the resolution of the Ombudsman recommending the prosecution of the petitioners
for violation of Rep. Act No. 3019 (or a total of four [4] years from initial
investigation up to filing of information);
2. Motion for Reinvestigation and Motion to Resolve the Motion for Reinvestigation
filed by the petitioners before the Office of the Honorable Respondent Ombudsman
were not acted upon;
3. No reason or explanation was made by the prosecution on the delay in the filing
of Information;
4. With no plausible explanation on hand, the petitioners are thus inclined to
reason out, or even suspect, that there is connection between such delay and their
past and contemporaneous official acts;
5. The lapse of three (3) years or a total of four (4) years from start of
investigation up to filing of Information may result in the destruction of affirmative
evidence tending to establish the innocence of the petitioners and that the passage
of time may have produced an unfavorable effect on their defense;
6. Violation of constitutional rights divests the court of jurisdiction;
7. Lack of jurisdiction of the court may be raised at any time;
8. Criminal prosecution may be enjoined in order to afford adequate protection to
constitutional rights and to prevent the use of the strong arm of the law in an
oppressive and vindictive manner;

9. Subject of instant petition are the Orders of the Honorable Respondent
Sandiganbayan denying the Motion to Dismiss of petitioners for violation of their
constitutional rights and the use against them of the strong arm of the law in an
oppressive and vindictive manner.
Petitioners submit that the Ombudsman oppressed and discriminated against them
by not issuing any notice, reply or order denying their Motion for Reinvestigation
as well as their Motion to Resolve their Motion for Reconsideration. They argue
that the Ombudsman should have granted outright their Motion for Reinvestigation
in view of the ruling in Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan12 wherein this Court held, thus:
Under the 1987 Constitution, the Ombudsman (as distinguished from the
incumbent Tanodbayan) is charged with the duty to:
“Investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any
public official, employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to
be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient.” (citation omitted)
x x x      x x x      x x x
Now then, inasmuch as the aforementioned duty is given to the Ombudsman, the
incumbent Tanodbayan (called Special Prosecutor under the 1987 Constitution and
who is supposed to retain the powers and duties NOT GIVEN to the Ombudsman)
is clearly without authority to conduct preliminary investigations and to direct the
filing of criminal cases with the Sandiganbayan, except upon orders of the
Ombudsman. This right to do so was lost effective February 2, 1987. From that
time, he has been divested of such authority.
Petitioners’ contention is misleading. In the aforecited case, this Court clearly held
that the authority of the Tanodbayan to conduct preliminary investigations and to
direct the filing of criminal cases was lost effective February 2, 1987. The
inference, therefore, of such holding is that the Tanodbayan had such authority
prior to February 2, 1987. In this case, the Tanodbayan issued petitioners a
subpoena on September 22, 1986 directing them to file their counter-affidavits
which the latter complied with on September 30, 1986. In short, the preliminary
investigation was conducted by the Tanodbayan before he lost his authority to do
so.
Hence, there was no need for the Ombudsman to conduct another preliminary
investigation as the one conducted by the former Tanodbayan was valid and legal.
Presumably, the new Ombudsman recognized the results of the preliminary
investigation conducted by the then Tanodbayan and adopted the conclusions
reached therein when he ordered the filing of an Information against petitioners.
C o n s ti t u ti o n a l L a w I I S e c . 1 4 a n d 1 6 P a g e | 43
Consequently, there was no need for the Ombudsman to act on the petitioners’
Motion for Reinvestigation. As stated, there was no need for the Ombudsman to
conduct another preliminary investigation.
Petitioners also submit that they were deprived of their constitutional right to a
speedy trial by reason of the delay in the filing of the Information by the
Ombudsman. They contend that the Sandiganbayan abused its discretion in not
dismissing the Information filed against them on the ground that “there was
unexplained and unjustified delay of more than three (3) years before an
information was filed against them from the filing of the complaint on August 25,
1986 up to the filing of the Information on November 5, 1990.” In fine, they point
out that considering that the preliminary investigation was concluded as early as
October 30, 1987, the first Ombudsman constituted under the 1987 Constitution
should have filed the Information as soon as he was appointed on June 6, 1988.
Instead, it took more than two years and 3,386 cases before Criminal Case No.
16240 was filed against them on November 5, 1990. In other words, petitioners
argue that since the Resolution of the Ombudsman recommending the filing of the
Information was issued on October 30, 1987, then the Information should have
been filed immediately thereafter, considering that even before the promulgation
of the Zaldivar case on April 27, 1988, thousands of Informations had been filed.13
Petitioners’ contention is without merit.
In Cojuangco, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan,14 this Court has held that the constitutional
guarantee set forth in Section 16, Article III of the 1987 Constitution,15 of “(t)he
right to a speedy disposition of a case, like the right to speedy trial, is deemed
violated only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious, and
oppressive delays.” “x x x (T)he concept of speedy disposition of cases is a relative
term and must necessarily be a flexible concept. Hence, the doctrinal rule is that in
the determination of whether that right has been violated, the factors that may be
considered and balanced are the length of delay, the reason for such delay and the
assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused, and the prejudice caused
by the delay.”16
As pointed out by petitioners, the complaint was filed before the Tanodbayan on
August 25, 1986. On October 30, 1987, a Resolution was issued finding a prima
facie case against petitioners and recommending the filing of an Information with
the Sandiganbayan. However, it was only on November 5, 1990 when the
Information was filed. Admittedly, it took three (3) years for the Ombudsman to
file the Information against petitioners from the date of the Resolution
recommending the filing thereof.
 C o n s ti t u ti o n a l L a w I I S e c . 1 4 a n d 1 6 P a g e | 44

In explaining the delay in the filing of the Information, however, the Office of the
Solicitor General averred, as follows:
It will be noted that the normal operations of the Office of the Special Prosecutor
was affected by the Decision of this Honorable Court in Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan
and Zaldivar v. Gonzalez, 160 SCRA 843 dated April 27, 1988, where it was ruled
that the incumbent Tanodbayan lost his right to conduct preliminary investigation
and to direct the filing of criminal cases with the Sandiganbayan effective February
2, 1987. As a result, complaints (including that involved in the present petition),
resolutions and other legal papers awaiting action during that period remained
pending the appointment of an Ombudsman.
In addition, it is clearly apparent from the figures cited by petitioners that the
Sandiganbayan was burdened with a heavy caseload. Parenthetically, this Court
has taken judicial cognizance of the fact that the ever increasing caseload of courts
has affected the speedy disposition of cases pending before the Sandiganbayan.19
While petitioners certainly have the right to a speedy disposition of their case, the
structural reorganization of the prosecutorial agencies, the procedural changes
brought about by the Zaldivar case as well as the Sandiganbayan’s heavy caseload
certainly are valid reasons for the delay in the disposition of petitioners’ case. For
those reasons, the delay certainly cannot be considered as vexatious, capricious
and oppressive. Neither is it unreasonable nor inordinate.

When the Ombudsman was appointed in 1988, it took some time still before his WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is DENIED and the two
Office could become fully constituted and operational. Because of the unavoidable Orders dated February 18, 1993 and March 8, 1993 of the Sandiganbayan’s
delay caused by the aforementioned circumstances, the corresponding Information Second Division in Criminal Case No. 16240 are AFFIRMED. The Sandiganbayan is
in the criminal case involved was filed and approved only in 1990. DIRECTED to proceed with dispatch in the disposition of this case.

Prescinding from the foregoing, this Court finds no violation of petitioners’ right to No costs.
a speedy disposition of their case. The delay was not vexatious, capricious, nor
oppressive, considering the factual milieu of this case, namely the structural SO ORDERED.
reorganizations and procedural changes brought about by frequent amendments of      Davide, Jr. (C.J., Chairman), Puno and Kapunan, JJ., concur.
procedural laws in the initial stages of this case. The complaint was filed on August
25, 1986. On October 30, 1987, the Ombudsman issued a Resolution finding a      Pardo, J., On official business abroad.
prima facie case and recommending the filing of an Information. Meanwhile, on
April 27, 1988, the Zaldivar case was promulgated holding that the Tanodbayan Petition denied, orders affirmed.
lost his authority to conduct preliminary investigations and to direct the filing of
Note.—The Constitution guarantees the right of persons against unreasonable
Informations with the Sandiganbayan effective February 2, 1987. Then on
delay in the disposition of cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative
November 5, 1990, the Information against petitioners was filed.
bodies. (Matias vs. Plan, 293 SCRA 532 [1998])
In the case Binay v. Sandiganbayan and Magsaysay v. Sandiganbayan,17 this
Court has held that:

A mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved, therefore, would not be

sufficient. In the application of the constitutional guarantee of the right to speedy
disposition of cases, particular regard must also be taken of the facts and
circumstances peculiar to each case.

In Alvizo v. Sandiganbayan,18 this Court has reiterated that it has taken judicial
cognizance of the frequent amendments of procedural laws by presidential
decrees, the structural reorganizations in existing prosecutorial agencies and the
creation of new ones by executive fiat, resulting in changes of personnel,
preliminary jurisdiction, functions and powers of prosecuting agencies.

No. L-30104. July 25, 1973.
HON. GREGORIO N. GARCIA, Judge of the City Court of Manila, and
FRANCISCO LORENZANA, petitioners, vs. HON. FELIX DOMINGO, Judge
of the Court of First Instance of Manila, EDGARDO CALO and SIMEON
CARBONNEL, respondents.
Constitutional law; Legal history of right to a public trial.—The 1935 Constitution
which was in force at the time of the antecedents of this petition explicitly
enumerated the right to a public trial to which an accused was entitled. So it is, as
likewise made clear, under the present dispensation. As a matter of fact, that was
one constitutional provision that needed only a single, terse summation from the
Chairman of the Committee on the Bill of Rights, Delegate, later Justice, Jose P.
Laurel, to gain acceptance. x x x It would have been surprising if its proposed
inclusion in the Bill of Rights had provoked any discussion, much less a debate. It
was merely a reiteration of what appeared in the Philippine Autonomy Act of 1916,
popularly known as the Jones Law. Earlier, such a right found expression in the
Philippine Bill of 1902, likewise an organic act of the then government of this
country as an unincorporated territory of the United States. Historically, as was
pointed out by Justice Black, in the leading case of In re Oliver: "This nation's
accepted practice of guaranteeing a public trial to an accused has its roots in (the)
English common law heritage." He then observed that the exact date of its origin is
obscure,"but it likely evolved long before the settlement of (the United States) as
an accompaniment of the ancient institution of jury trial." It was then noted by him
that "there. "the guarantee to an accused of the right to a public trial first
appeared in a state constitution in 1776" Later it was embodied in the Sixth
Amendment of the Federal Constitution ratified in 1791. He then conclude his
historical survey thus: "Today almost without exception every state by constitution,
statute, or judicial decision, that all requires criminal trials be open to the public."
Same; What public trial means.—The trial must be public. It possesses that
character when anyone interested in observing the manner a judge conducts the
proceedings in his courtroom may do so. There is to be no ban on such
attendance. His being a stranger to the litigants is of no moment. No relationship
to the parties need be shown. The thought lies behind this safeguard is the belief
that thereby the accused is afforded further protection, that his trial is likely to be
conducted with regularity and not tainted with any impropriety. x x x There is the
well recognized exception though that warrants the exclusion of the public where
the evidence may be characterized as "offensive to decency or public morals."
C o n s ti t u ti o n a l L a w I I S e c . 1 4 a n d 1 6 P a g e | 45
Same; When hearings held inside judge's chambers not violative of right to public
trial.—What did occasion difficulty in this suit was that for the convenience of the
parties, and of the.city court Judge, it was in the latter's air-conditioned chambers
that the trial was held. Did that suffice to vitiate the proceedings as violative of this
right?
The answer must be in the negative. There is now showing that the public was
thereby excluded. It is to be admitted that the size of the room allotted the Judge
would reduce the number of those who could be present. Such a fact though is not
indicative of any transgression of this right. Courtrooms are not of uniform
dimensions. Some are smaller than others. Moreover, as admitted by Justice Black
in his masterly in In re Oliver opinion, it suffices to satisfy the requirement of a
trial being public if the accused could "have his friends, relatives and counsel
present, no matter with what offense he may be charged." Then, too, reference
may also be made to the undisputed fact that at least fourteen hearings had been
held in chambers of the city court Judge, without objection on the part of
respondent policemen.
Same; Criminal procedure; Lack of intervention by fiscal in trial of criminal case,
effect of.—No jurisdictional error was incurred by the city court judge where an
assistant fiscal abdicated control over the prosecution. As was so emphatically
declared by Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Cariaga v. Justo-Guerrero: "The case below was
commenced and prosecuted without the intervention, mediation or participation of
the fiscal or any of his deputies. This, notwithstanding, the jurisdiction of the court
was not affected x x x but the court should have cited the public prosecutor to
intervene x x x". Garcia vs. Domingo, 52 SCRA 143, No. L-30104 July 25, 1973
FERNANDO, J.:
The pivotal question in this petition for certiorari and prohibition, one
which thus far has remained unresolved, is the meaning to be accorded
the constitutional right to public trial.1 More specifically, did respondent
Judge commit a grave abuse of discretion in stigmatizing as violative of
such a guarantee the holding of the trial of the other respondents 2 inside
the chambers of city court Judge Gregorio Garcia named as the
petitioner.3 That was done in the order now impugned in this suit,
although such a procedure had been agreed to beforehand by the other
respondents as defendants, the hearings have been thus conducted on

fourteen separate occasions without objection on their part, and without
an iota of evidence to substantiate any claim as to any other person so
minded being excluded from the premises. It is thus evident that what
took place in the chambers of the city court judge was devoid of haste or
intentional secrecy. For reasons to be more fully explained in the light of
the facts ascertained — the unique aspect of this case having arisen from
what turned out to be an unseemly altercation, force likewise being
employed, due to the mode in which the arrest of private petitioner for a
traffic violation was sought to be effected by the two respondent
policemen thus resulting in charges and counter-charges with eight
criminal cases being tried jointly by city court Judge in the above manner
— we rule that there was no transgression of the right to a public trial,
and grant the petition.
It was alleged and admitted in the petition: "In Branch I the City Court of
Manila presided over by petitioner Judge, there were commenced, by
appropriate informations all dated January 16, 1968, eight (8) criminal
actions against respondent Edgardo Calo, and Simeon Carbonnel and
Petitioner Francisco Lorenzana, as follows: a. Against Edgardo Calo  (on
complaint of Francisco Lorenzana) (1) Criminal Case No. F-109192, also
for slight physical injuries; (2) Criminal Case No. F-109192, alsofor slight
physical injuries; and (3) Criminal Case No. F-109193, for maltreatment;
b. Against Simeon Carbonnel (id.) (1)Criminal Case No. F-109197, for
maltreatment; (2) Criminal Case No. F-109196, for slight physical injuries;
and (3) Criminal Case No. F-109198, for light threats; (c) Against
Francisco Lorenzana (on complaint of Calo and Carbonnel) (1) Criminal
Case No. F-109201, for violation of Sec. 887 of the Revised Ordinances of
Manila (resisting an officer); and (2) Criminal Case No. F-109200, for
slander."4The above was followed by this recital: "The trial of the
aforementioned cases was jointly held on March 4, 1968, March 18, 1968,
March 23, 1968, March 30, 1968, April 17, 1968, April 20, 1968, May
4,1968, May 11, 1968, June 1, 1968, June 15, 1968, June 22, 1968, June
29, 1968, August 3, 1968 and August 10, 1968. All the fourteen (14) trial
dates — except March 4 and 18, and April 17, 1968 — fell on a Saturday.
This was arranged by the parties and the Court upon the insistence of
respondents Calo and Carbonnel who, as police officers under suspension
because of the cases, desired the same to be terminated as soon as
possible and as there were many cases scheduled for trial on the usual
criminal trial days (Monday, Wednesday and Friday), Saturday was agreed
C o n s ti t u ti o n a l L a w I I S e c . 1 4 a n d 1 6 P a g e | 46
upon as the invariable trial day for said eight (8) criminal cases." 5 Also
this: "The trial of the cases in question was held, with the conformity of
the accused and their counsel, in the chambers of Judge Garcia." 6 Then
came these allegations in the petition: "During all the fourteen (14) days
of trial, spanning a period of several months (from March to August,
1968), the accused were at all times represented by their respective
counsel, who acted not only in defense of their clients, but as
prosecutors of the accusations filed at their clients' instance. There was
only one (1) day when Atty. Consengco, representing respondent Calo and
Carbonnel, was absent. This was on April 20, 1968. But at the insistence
of Pat. Carbonnel, the trial proceeded, and said respondent cross-
examined one of the witnesses presented by the adverse party. In any
case, no pretense has been made by the respondents that this constituted
an irregularity correctible on certiorari. At the conclusion of the hearings
the accused, thru counsel, asked for and were granted time to submit
memoranda. Respondents Calo and Carbonnel, thru counsel, Atty. Rafael
Consengco, submitted a 14-page memorandum with not less than 35
citations of relevant portions of the transcript of stenographic notes in
support of their prayer for exoneration, and conviction of petitioner
Lorenzana in respect of their countercharges against the latter. It is
worthy of note that up to this late date, said respondents Calo and
Carbonnel had not objected to — or pointed out — any supposed
irregularity in the proceedings thus far; the memorandum submitted in
their behalf is confined to a discussion of the evidence adduced in, and the
merits of the cases."7 It was stated in the next petition:
"The promulgation of judgment was first scheduled on September 23,
1968. This was postponed to September 28, 1968 at the instance of Atty.
Rafael Consengco, as counsel respondents Calo and Carbonnel, and again
to October 1, 1968 at 11 o'clock in the morning, this time at the instance
of Atty. Consengco and Atty. Francisco Koh who had, in the meantime,
also entered his appearance as counsel for respondents Calo and
Carbonnel. The applications for postponement were not grounded upon
any supposed defect or irregularity of the proceedings."8
Mention was then made of when a petition for certiorari was filed with
respondent Judge: "Early in the morning of October 1, 1968, Edgardo Calo
and Simeon Carbonnel, thru their counsel, Atty. Rafael S. Consengco, filed
with the Court of First Instance a petition for certiorari and prohibition,

with application for preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunction ...
[alleging jurisdictional defects]." 9 Respondent Judge acting on such
petition forthwith issued a restraining order thus causing the deferment of
the promulgation of the judgment. After proceedings duly had, there was
an order from him "declaring that 'the constitutional and statutory rights of
the accused' had been violated, adversely affecting their 'right to a free
and impartial trial' [noting] 'that the trial of these cases lasting several
weeks held exclusively in chambers and not in the court room open the
public';" and ordering the city court Judge, now petitioner, "to desist from
reading or causing to be read or promulgated the decisions he may have
rendered already in the criminal cases (in question) ... pending in his
Court, until further orders of this Court.'" 10
A motion for reconsideration proving unavailing, petition on January 28,
1969, elevated the matter to this Tribunal by means of the present suit
for certiorari and prohibition. In its resolution of February 3, 1969,
respondents were required to answer, with a preliminary injunction
likewise being issued. As was to be expected the answer filed by
respondent Judge on March 11, 1969 and that by the other respondents
on March 19, 1969 did attempt to justify the validity of the finding that
there was a failure to respect the right to a public trial of accused persons.
Neither in such pleadings nor in the memorandum filed, although the
diligence displayed by counsel was quite evident, was there any
persuasive showing of a violation of constitutional guarantee of a public
trial, the basic issue to be resolved. Rather it was the mode of approach
followed by counsel Andres R. Narvasa for petitioners that did manifest a
deeper understanding of its implications and ramifications. Accordingly, as
previously stated, it is for us to grant the merits prayed for.
1. The 1935 Constitution which was in force at the time of the antecedents
of this petition, as set forth at the outset, explicitly enumerated the right
to a public trial to which an accused was entitled. So it is, as likewise
made clear, under present dispensation. As a matter of fact, that was one
constitutional provision that needed only a single, terse summation from
the Chairman of the Committee on the Bill of Rights, Delegate, later
Justice, Jose P. Laurel, to gain acceptance. As was stressed by him: "Trial
should also be public in order to offset any danger of conducting it in an
illegal and unjust manner." 11 It would have been surprising if its proposed
inclusion in the Bill of Rights had provoked any discussion, much less a
C o n s ti t u ti o n a l L a w I I S e c . 1 4 a n d 1 6 P a g e | 47
debate. It was merely a reiteration what appeared in the Philippine
Autonomy Act of 1916, popularly known as the Jones Law. 12 Earlier, such
a right found expression in the Philippine Bill of 1902, likewise an organic
act of the then government of this country as an unincorporated territory
of the United States. 13 Historically as was pointed out by Justice Black,
speaking for the United States Supreme Court in the leading case of In re
Oliver: 14 "This nation's accepted practice of guaranteeing a public trial to
an accused has its roots in [the] English common law heritage. 15 He then
observed that the exact date of its origin is obscure, "but it likely evolved
long before the settlement of the [United States] as an accompaniment of
the ancient institution of jury trial." 16 It was then noted by him that there,
"the guarantee to an accused of the right to a public trial appeared in a
state constitution in 1776." 17 Later it was embodied in the Sixth
Amendment of the Federal Constitution ratified in 1791. 18 He could
conclude his historical survey "Today almost without exception every state
by constitution, statute, or judicial decision, requires that all criminal trials
be open to the public." 19 Such is the venerable, historical lineage of the
right to a public trial.
2. The crucial question of the meaning to be attached this provision
remains. The Constitution guarantees an accused the right to a public trial.
What does it signify? Offhand it does seem fairly obvious that here is an
instance where language is to be given a literal application. There is no
ambiguity in the words employed. The trial must be public. It possesses
that character when anyone interested in observing the manner a judge
conducts the proceedings in his courtroom may do so. There is to be no
ban on such attendance. His being a stranger to the litigants is of no
moment. No relationship to the parties need be shown. The thought that
lies behind this safeguard is the belief that thereby the accused is afforded
further protection, that his trial is likely to be conducted with regularity
and not tainted with any impropriety. It is not amiss to recall that Delegate
Laurel in his terse summation the importance of this right singled out its
being a deterrence to arbitrariness. It is thus understandable why such a
right is deemed embraced in procedural due process. 20 Where a trial takes
place, as is quite usual, in the courtroom and a calendar of what cases are
to be heard is posted, no problem arises. It the usual course of events
that individuals desirous of being present are free to do so. There is the
well recognized exception though that warrants the exclusion of the public

where the evidence may be characterized as "offensive to decency or
public morals." 21
What did occasion difficulty in this suit was that for the convenience of the
parties, and of the city court Judge, it was in the latter's air-conditioned
chambers that the trial was held. Did that suffice to investigate the
proceedings as violative of this right? The answer must be in the negative.
There is no showing that the public was thereby excluded. It is to be
admitted that the size of the room allotted the Judge would reduce the
number of those who could be our present. Such a fact though is not
indicative of any transgression of this right. Courtrooms are not of uniform
dimensions. Some are smaller than others. Moreover, as admitted by
Justice Black in his masterly In re Oliver opinion, it suffices to satisfy the
requirement of a trial being public if the accused could "have his friends,
relatives and counsel present, no matter with what offense he may be
charged." 22
Then, too, reference may also be made to the undisputed fact at least
fourteen hearings had been held in chambers of the city court Judge,
without objection on the part of respondent policemen. What was said by
former Chief Justice Moran should erase any doubt as to the weight to be
accorded, more appropriately the lack of weight, to any such objection
raised. Thus: "In one case, the trial of the accused was held in Bilibid
prison. The accused, invoking his right to a public trial, assigned the
procedure thus taken as error. The Supreme Court held that as it
affirmatively appears on the record that the accused offered no objection
to the trial of his case in the place where it was held, his right is deemed
waived." 23 The decision referred to, United States v. Mercado, 24 was
handed down sixty-eight years ago in 1905.
It does seem that the challenged order of respondent is far from being
invulnerable.
3. That is all that need be said as to the obvious merit of this petition. One
other objection to the conduct of the proceedings by the city court Judge
may be briefly disposed of. Respondent Judge would seek to lend support
to an order at war with obvious meaning of a constitutional provision by
harping on the alleged abdication by an assistant fiscal of his control over
C o n s ti t u ti o n a l L a w I I S e c . 1 4 a n d 1 6 P a g e | 48
the prosecution. Again here there was a failure to abide by settled law. If
any party could complain at all, it is the People of the Philippines for whom
the fiscal speaks and acts. The accused cannot in law be termed an
offended party for such an alleged failure to comply with official duty.
Moreover, even assuming that respondent policemen could be heard to
raise such a grievance, respondent Judge ought to have been aware that
thereby no jurisdictional defect was incurred by the city court Judge. As
was so emphatically declared by Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Cariaga v. Justo-
Guerrero: 25 "The case below was commenced and prosecuted without the
intervention, mediation or participation of the fiscal or any of his deputies.
This, notwithstanding, the jurisdiction of the court was not affected ... but
the court should have cited the public prosecutor to intervene ... ." 26
4. There is much to be said of course for the concern displayed by
respondent Judge to assure the reality as against the mere possibility of a
trial being truly public. If it were otherwise, such a right could be reduced
to a barren form of words. To the extent then that the conclusion reached
by him was motivated by an apprehension that there was an evasion of a
constitutional command, he certainly lived up to what is expected of a
man of the robe. Further reflection ought to have convinced him though
that such a fear was unjustified. An objective appraisal of conditions in
municipal or city courts would have gone far in dispelling such misgivings.
The crowded daily calendar, the nature of the cases handled, civil as well
as criminal, the relaxed attitude on procedural rules not being strictly
adhered to all make for a less tense atmosphere. As a result the
attendance of the general public is much more in evidence; nor is its
presence unwelcome. When it is remembered further that the occupants
of such courts are not chosen primarily for their legal acumen, but taken
from that portion of the bar more considerably attuned to the pulse of
public life, it is not to be rationally expected that an accused would be
denied whatever solace and comfort may come from the knowledge that a
judge, with the eyes of the alert court alert to his demeanor and his
rulings, would run the risk of being unjust, unfair, or arbitrary. Nor does it
change matters, just because, as did happen here, it was in the air-
conditioned chambers of a city court judge rather than in the usual place
that the trial took place.
WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari prayed for is granted nullifying, setting
aside, and declaring bereft of any legal force or effect the order of
 C o n s ti t u ti o n a l L a w I I S e c . 1 4 a n d 1 6 P a g e | 49

respondent Judge Felix Domingo November 29, 1968 for being issued with
grave abuse of discretion. The writ of prohibition sought by petitioner is
likewise granted, commanding respondent Judge or any one acting in his
place to desist from any further action in Criminal Case No. 74830 of the
Court of First Instance of Manila other than that of dismissing the same.
The preliminary writ of injunction issued by this Court in its resolution of
February 3, 1969 against the actuation of respondent Judge is made
permanent. With costs against respondent policemen Edgardo Calo and
Simeon Carbonnel.

No. L-45667. June 20, 1977.*
MANUEL BORJA, petitioner, vs. HON. RAFAEL T. MENDOZA, Judge of the
Court of First Instance of Cebu (Branch VI) and HON. ROMULO R.
SENINING, Judge of the City Court of Cebu (Branch I), respondents.
Constitutional law; Procedural due process; Arraignment; Arraignment an
indispensable means for bringing accused into court and informing him of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him.—The procedural due process
mandate of the Constitution requires that the accused be arraigned so that he may
be informed as to why he was indicted and what penal offense he has to face, to
be convicted only on a showing that his guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt
with full opportunity to disprove the evidence against him. Moreover, the sentence
to be imposed in such a case is to be in accordance with a valid law. x x x An
arraignment thus becomes indispensable as the means “for bringing the accused
into court and notifying him of the cause he is required to meet * * *.”
Same; Same; Same; Definition and purposes of arraignment.—It is at that stage
where in the mode and manner required by the Rules, an accused, for the first
time, is granted the opportunity to know the precise charge that confronts him. It
is imperative that he is thus made fully aware of possible loss of freedom, even of
his life, depending on the nature of the crime imputed to him. At the very least
then, he must be fully informed of why the prosecuting arm of the state is
mobilized against him. An arraignment serves that purpose.
Same: Same; Right of accused to be heard by himself and counsel.—“In criminal
cases there can be no fair hearing unless the accused be given an opportunity to
be heard by counsel. The right to be heard would be of little avail if it does not
include the right to be heard by counsel. Even the most intelligent or educated
man may have no skill in the science of the law, particularly in the rules of
procedure, and, without counsel, he may be convicted not because he is guilty but
because he does not know how to establish his innocence.”
Same; Same; Trial of accused in absentia only after arraignment.—The provision in
the present Constitution allowing trial to be held in absentia is unavailing. x x x Its
language is clear and explicit. What is more, it is mandatory. Thus: “However,
after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused
provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustified.” x x
x The indispensable requisite for trial in absentia is that it should come “after
arraignment.” The express mention in the present Constitution of the need for
such, a step emphasizes its importance in the procedural scheme to accord an
accused due process.
C o n s ti t u ti o n a l L a w I I S e c . 1 4 a n d 1 6 P a g e | 50
Same; Same; Where appeal not considered as waiver of procedural defect;
Absence of arraignment may be involved at anytime.—The appeal itself is
tantamount to questioning those defects. In fact, the memorandum in support of
the appeal unmistakably raised as error the absence of petitioner at the
arraignment and cited jurisprudence, commentaries and the rules to bolster his
position. Specifically, the absence of an arraignment can be invoked at anytime in
view of the requirements of due process to ensure a fair and impartial trial.
Borja vs. Mendoza, 77 SCRA 422, No. L-45667 June 20, 1977
FERNANDO, J.:
The jurisdictional infirmity imputer to respondent Judge Romulo R. Senining of the
City of Cebu which was not remedied by respondent Judge Rafael T. Mendoza of
the Court of First Instance of Cebu in this certionrari proceeding was the absence
of an arraignment of petitioner Manuel Borja, who was accused of slight physical
injuries. This notwithstanding respondent Judge Senining proceeded with the trial
in abssentia and thereafter, in a decision promulgated on August 18, 1976, found
him guilty of such offense and sentenced him to suffer imprisonment for a period
of twenty days of arresto menor. 1 Thereafter, an appeal was duly elevated to the
Court of First Instance of Cebu presided by respondent Judge Mendoza. 2 It was
then alleged that without any notice to petitioner and without requiring him to
submit his memorandum, a decision on the appealed case was rendered on
November 16, 1976 petitioner that the failure to arraign him is violative of his
constitutional right to procedural due process, 3 more specifically of his right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him and of his right to
be heard by himself and counsel. 4 Ther was thus, at the very least, a graveabuse
of discretion. The Solicitor General, 5 when asked to comment, agreed that the
procedural defect was of such gravity as to render void the decision of the City
Court affirmed by the Court of First Instance. The comment was considered as
answer, with the case being submitted for decision.
Respect for the constitutional rights of an accused as authoritatively construed by
this Court, duly taken note of in the comment of the Solicitor General, thus calls
for the grant of the writ of certiorari prayed for.
1. The plea of petitioner to nullify the proceedings had in the criminal case
against him finds support in the procedural due process mandate of the
Constitution. It requires that the accused be arraigned so that he may be informed
as to why he was indicted and what penal offense he has to face, to be convicted
only on a showing that his guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt with full
opportunity to disprove the evidence against him. Moreover, the sentence to be

imposed in such a case is to be in accordance with a valid law. 6 This Court, in
People v. Castillo, 7 speaking through Justice De Joya and following the language
of the American Supreme Court, Identified due process with the accused having
"been heard in a court of competent jurisdiction, and proceeded against under the
orderly processes of law, and only punished after inquiry and investigation, upon
notice to him, with an opportunity to be heard, and a judgment awarded with the
authority of a constitutional law, ..." 8 An arraignment thus becomes indispensable
as the means "for bringing the accused into court and notifying him of the cause
he is required to meet ... " 9 Its importance was stressed by Justice Moreland as
early as 1916 in the leading case of United States v. Binayoh. 10 He pointed out
that upon the accused being arraigned, "there is a duty laid by the Code [now the
Rules of Court] upon the court to inform [him] of certain rights and to extend to
him, on his demand, certain others. This duty is an affirmative one which the
court, on its own motion, must perform, unless waived." 11 To emphasize its
importance, he added: "No such duty, however, is laid on the court with regard to
the rights of the accused which he may be entitled to exercise during the trial.
Those are rights which he must assert himself and the benefits of which he himself
must demand. In other words, in the arraignment the court must act of its own
volition, ..." 12 In the terse and apt language of the Solicitor General:
"Arraignment is an indispensable requirement in any criminal prosecution." 13
Procedural due process demands no less.
2. Nor is it only the due process guarantee that calls for the accused being
duly arraigned. As noted, it is at that stage where in the mode and manner
required by the Rules, an accused, for the first time, is granted the opportunity to
know the precise charge that confronts him. It is imperative that he is thus made
fully aware of Possible loss of freedom, even of his life, depending on the nature of
the crime imputed to him. At the very least then, he must be fully informed of why
the prosecuting arm of the state is mobilized against him. An arraignment serves
that purpose. Thereafter he is no longer in the dark. It is true, the complaint or
information may not be worded with sufficient clarity. He would be in a much
worse position though if he does not even have such an opportunity to plead to
the charge. With his counsel by his side, he is thus in a position to enter his plea
with full knowledge of the consequences. He is not even required to do so
immediately. He may move to quash. What is thus evident is that an arraignment
assures that he be fully acquainted with the nature of the crime imputed to him
and the circumstances under which it is allegedly committed. It is thus a vital
aspect of the constitutional rights guaranteed him. It is not useless formality, much
less an Idle ceremony.
3. An equally fatal defect in the proceeding had before respondent Judge
Senining was that notwithstanding its being conducted in the absence of
petitioner, he was convicted. It was shown that after one postponement due to his
C o n s ti t u ti o n a l L a w I I S e c . 1 4 a n d 1 6 P a g e | 51
failure to appear, the case was reset for hearing. When that date came, December
14, 1973, without petitioner being present, although his bondsmen were notified,
respondent Judge, as set forth in the comment of the Solicitor General, "allowed
the prosecution to present its evidence invoking Letter of Instruction No. 40. Only
one witness testified, the offended party herself, and three documents were
offered in evidence after which the prosecution rested its case. Thereupon,
respondent City Court set the promulgation of the decision on December 28,
1973." 14 It could then conclude: :Verily the records clearly show that petitioner
was not arraigned at all and was not represented by counsel throughout the whole
proceedings in the respondent City Court." 15 It is indisputable then that there was
a denial of petitioner's constitutional right to be heard by himself and counsel. As
categorically affirmed by Justice Ozaeta for this Court in the leading case of Abriol
v. Homeres: 16 "It is the constitutional right of the accused to be heard in his
defense before sentence is pronounced on him." 17 He added further that such
"constitutional right is inviolate." 18 There is no doubt that it could be waived, but
here there was no such waiver, whether express or implied. It suffices to refer to
another leading case, People v. Holgado, 19 where the then Chief Justice Moran
emphatically took note of the importance of the right to counsel: "In criminal cases
there can be no fair hearing unless the accused be given an opportunity to be
heard by counsel. The right to be heard would be of little avail if it does not
include the right to be heard by counsel. Even the most intelligent or educated
man may have no skill in the science of the law, particularly in the rules of
procedure, and, without counsel, he may be convicted not because he is guilty but
because he does not know how to establish his innocence." 20 With the violation
of the constitutional right to be heard by himself and counsel being thus manifest,
it is easily understandable why the Solicitor General agreed with petitioner that the
sentence imposed on him should be set aside for being null.
4. The provision in the present Constitution allowing trial to be held in
absentia is unavailing. It cannot justify the actuation of respondent Judge
Senining. Its language is clear and explicit. What is more, it is mandatory. Thus:
"However, after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of
the accused provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is
unjustified." 21 As pointed out then by the Solicitor General, the indispensable
requisite for trial in absentia is that it should come "after arraignment." The
express mention in the present Constitution of the need for such a step
emphasizes its importance in the procedural scheme to accord an accused due
process. Without the accused having been arraigned, it becomes academic to
discuss the applicability of this exception to the basic constitutional right that the
accused should be heard by himself and counsel.
5. Nor did the appeal to the Court of First Instance presided by respondent
Judge Mendoza possess any curative aspect. To quote anew from the comment of
 C o n s ti t u ti o n a l L a w I I S e c . 1 4 a n d 1 6 P a g e | 52

the Solicitor General: "Respondent Court of First Instance ... considered the appeal
taken by the petitioner as waiver of the defects in the proceedings in the
respondent City Court. Precisely, the appeal itself is tantamount to questioning
those defects. In fact, the Memorandum in support of the appeal unmistakably
raised as error the absence of petitioner at the arraignment and cited
jurisprudence, commentaries and the rules to bolster his position. Specifically, the
absence of an arraignment can be invoked at anytime in view of the requirements
of due process to ensure a fair and impartial trial." 22

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is granted. The decision of respondent

Judge Romulo R. Senining dated December 28, 1973, finding the accused guilty of
the crime of slight physical injuries, is nullified and set aside. Likewise, the decision
of respondent Judge Rafael T. Mendoza dated November 16, 1976, affirming the
aforesaid decision of Judge Senining, is nullified and set aside. The case is
remanded to the City Court of Cebu for the prosecution of the offense of slight
physical injuries, with due respect and observance of the provisions of the Rules of
Court, starting with the arraignment of petitioner.

Barredo, Antonio, Aquino and Fernandez, JJ, concur.

Concepcion Jr., J, is on leave.


THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. ALBERTO V.
SENERIS, As District Judge, Court of First Instance, Branch II, Sixteenth
Judicial District, Zamboanga City and PILAR ANGELES DE PIMENTEL,
respondents.
Constitutional Law; Criminal Procedure; Evidence; The right to cross-examine a
prosecution witness is a guaranteed right in the Constitution.—The constitutional
right of confrontation, which guarantees to the accused the right to cross-examine
the witnesses for the prosecution, is one of the most basic rights of an accused
person under our system of justice. It is a fundamental right which is part of due
process not only in criminal proceedings but also in civil proceedings as well as in
proceedings in administrative tribunals with quasi-judicial powers (Savory
Luncheonette vs. Lakas Manggagawang Pilipino, et al., 62 SCRA 258 [1957].
Same; Same; Same; Right to cross-examine a witness may be waived expressly or
impliedly.—But while the right to confrontation and cross-examination is a
fundamental right, WE have ruled that the same can be waived expressly or
impliedly by conduct amounting to a renunciation of the right of cross-examination
(Savor Luncheonette vs. Lakas ng Manggagawang Pilipino et al., supra, p. 259,
citing U.S. v. Atanacio, 6 Phil. 413 [1906], People vs. De la Cruz, 56 SCRA 84, 91
[1974]). The conduct of a party which may be construed as an implied waiver of
the right to cross-examire may take various forms. But the common basic
principles underlying the application of the rule on implied waiver is that the party
was given opportunity to confront and cross-examine an opposing witness but
failed to take advantage of it for reasons attributable to himself alone. Thus, where
a party has had the opportunity to cross-examine a witness but failed to avail
himself of it, he necessarily forfeits the right to cross-examine and the testimony
given on direct examination of the witness will be received or allowed to remain in
the record.
Same; Same; Same; The right to cross-examine may be lost thru the fault of the
cross-examiner.—However, WE likewise therein (64 SCRA 610) emphasized that
where the right to cross-examine is lost wholly or in part through the fault of the
cross-examiner, then the testimony on direct examination is not and cannot be
done or completed due to cause attributable to the party offering the witness, the
uncompleted testimony is thereby rendered incompetent (p. 636).
Same; Same; Same; Where the prosecution witness was already partly cross-
examined, but prior to the next hearing he was shot dead while trying to escape
from jail, his testimony cannot be striken off the record.—As clear as day the
Lufthansa ruling therefore applies only if there is a finding that the cause for non-
completion of the cross-examination of a witness was attributable to the very party
C o n s ti t u ti o n a l L a w I I S e c . 1 4 a n d 1 6 P a g e | 53
offering the said witness. Consequently, the same is inapplicable to the instant
action as the cause for the non-completion of the cross-examination of petitioner’s
witness was a fortuitous event as he was killed, as per the pleadings submitted in
this action, by the law enforcers (Integrated National Police Patrols) after his
escape from prison. As a matter of fact, respondent judge, in his questioned order,
did not lay any basis for the application of the Lufthansa ruling as he failed to
make any finding that the non-completion was due to petitioner, the party offering
the witness, whose testimony he declared as inadmissible in evidence.
Same; Same; Same; Same.—It may be true that the escape of the said witness
and his consequent death may be attributable to the negligence of petitioner’s
agents; but such negligence may not bind the petitioner as to prejudicially affect
its cause and interest—the prosecution of criminal offense—by reason of the
generally accepted principle that the State is not bound by the negligence or
tortious acts of its agents. As the cause of non-completion was, as aforesaid,
beyond the control of the prosecution, respondent judge’s questioned order cannot
be sustained on the basis of the Lufthansa ruling which, as aforestated, was
principally anchored on the finding that the cause of the non-completion of the
cross-examination of the therein witness was attributable to the very party offering
him as a witness.
Criminal Procedure; Evidence; Where the cross-examination of a government
witness was deferred on motion of the accused and was approved by the judge
without objection by the fiscal, it is not correct to say that the accused was at fault
if the cross-testimony cannot be made further because the witness died.—While it
is true that her counsel did not immediately start with his cross-examination of the
deceased witness on March 22, 1978, he did avail, however, of such right on the
same day by initially obtaining an opportunity to make preparations for an
effective exercise thereof considering the nature of the case—a capital one—and
the length of the direct examination; three sittings on three different dates or on
February 28, 1978, March 6, 1978 and March 22, 1978. Hence, there was no
waiver of her right of cross-examination. Moreover, the deferment of the cross-
examination of the witness requested by private respondent on March 22, 1978
was approved by respondent judge without any objection on the part of petition
(pp. 45, 46, 64, rec.). And on the date for the cross-examination of the witness
Mario Nemenio or on April 19, 1978, counsel for private respondent failed to cross-
examine the said witness not of his own design but because said witness failed to
appear on that date for the reason that due to the oversight of the court’s
personnel the subpoena for said witness was not served on him at the San Ramon
Prison and Penal Farm (pp. 90, 108, rec.) And respondent judge had to re-set the
hearing for the cross-examination of the witness by the private respondent only to

June 7, 1978 because of the fact that respondent judge took, with the approval of
the Supreme Court, his summer vacation the whole month of May, 1978.
Same; Same; Where a witness was already rigorously cross-examined on the
essential elements of the crime and what remained for further cross-examination
when the witness died was on the alleged remand received, which is a mere
aggravating circumstance in parricide the witness’ testimony is admissible in
evidence, except that relative to the alleged reward.—There is merit in the
contention of the petitioner that the questioned testimony of its deceased witness
is admissible in evidence because private respondent’s counsel had already “x x x
rigorously and extensively cross-examined witness Mario Nemenio on all essential
elements of the crime charged (parricide), all of which have been testified upon by
said witness in his direct examination-in-chief and consequently, the cross-
examination-in-chief, has already been concluded.” The cross-examination was
completed insofar as the essential elements of the crime charge—parricide, fact of
killing—is concerned. What remained was merely the cross-examination regarding
the price or reward, which is not an element of parricide, but only an aggravating
circumstance (par. 11, Art. 14, Revised Penal Code).
Same; Same; Same.—Because the cross-examination made by the counsel of
private respondent of the deceased witness was extensive and already covered the
subject matter of his direct testimony as state witness relating to the essential
elements of the crime of parricide, and what remained for further cross-
examination is the matter of price or reward alleged paid by private respondent for
the commission of the crime, which is merely an aggravating circumstance and
does not affect the existence of the offense charged, the respondent judge gravely
abused his discretion in declaring as entirely inadmissible the testimony of the
state witness who died through no fault of any of the parties before his cross-
examination could be finished. People vs. Seneris, 99 SCRA 92, No. L-48883
August 6, 1980
MAKASIAR, J.:
The legal issue posed in this special civil action for certiorari, with prayer for a writ
of preliminary injunction, spawned by the August 4, 1978 order of respondent
judge in Criminal Case No. 750 for parricide against therein accused Pilar Angeles
de Pimentel, hereinafter referred to as private respondent, is the admissibility in
evidence of the testimony of a prosecution witness in the said criminal case who
dies before completion of his cross-examination. That issue is crucial to the fate of
private respondent, considering that the deceased prosecution witness "... is the
most vital and the only eyewitness available to the prosecution against respondent
C o n s ti t u ti o n a l L a w I I S e c . 1 4 a n d 1 6 P a g e | 54
Pilar Angeles de Pimentel for the commission of the gruesome crime of
parricide ..." (p. 10, rec.).
The factual background of the action is undisputed.
On February 8, 1978, Assistant Provincial Fiscal Camilo E. Tamin, who was then on
official detail with the office of the City Fiscal, Zamboanga City, filed with the Court
of First Instance, Sixteenth Judicial District, Zamboanga City, an amended
information for parricide in Criminal Case No. 1742, charging herein private
respondent as principal by inducement, Mario Nemenio y delos Santos and Salim
Doe as principals by direct participation and Moises Andaya y Julkanain, as
accomplice, in the fatal stabbing on September 6, 1977 in Zamboanga City of
Eduardo Pimentel y Orario, the lawful husband of private respondent. The
amended information reads:
That on or about September 6, 1977, in the City of Zamboanga, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Court, the above-named accused Pilar Angeles de
Pimentel, with deliberate intent to kill her husband, Eduardo Pimentel y Orario,
with whom she was united in lawful wedlock, did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, induce and offer a sum of money as consideration or
prize to said accused Mario Nemenio y delos Santos and Salim Doe to kill her said
lawfully wedded husband Eduardo Pimentel y Orario, and because and on account
of said promised consideration or prize which was accepted, the said accused
Mario Nemenio y delos Santos and Salim Doe, did then and there, willfully and
feloniously assault, attack and stab with a knife with which they were conveniently
provided, the person of said Eduardo Pimentel y Orario, thereby inflicting upon the
latter mortal wound which directly caused his death; that the above-named
accused Moises Andaya y Julkanain although without having participated directly in
the commission of the offense above- described, took part prior to its commission
by then and there acting as the contact man in the execution of their plot to kill
said Eduardo Pimentel y Orario.
Contrary to law (p. 13, rec.)
On January 17, 1978, private respondent, assisted by her counsel, moved and was
granted a separate trial (p. 16, rec.).
On February 22, 1978, the accused Mario Nemenio y delos Santos, assisted by his
counsel de oficio, entered on arraignment a plea of guilty. Respondent judge
thereafter rendered judgment convicting accused Mario Nemenio y delos Santos of
murder — qualified by the circumstance of prize and reward-and not of parricide
as charged in the information; because he "... had no relation whatsoever to the

deceased Eduardo Pimentel ..." and appreciating the mitigating circumstances of
voluntary plea of guilty and lack of instruction and education, imposed on him the
indeterminate penalty of eight (8) years of prision mayor as the minimum, to
fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months of reclusion temporal as the maximum;
to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Eduardo Pimentel the amount of
P12,000.00 and to pay one-fourth (¼) of the costs of the proceedings (pp. 15-19,
rec.).
Immediately after promulgation of judgment, accused Mario Nemenio y delos
Santos offered to testify against his co-accused, herein private respondent, in her
separate trial earlier granted by the respondent judge in the same criminal case,
now numbered 750. Allowed, he testified as prosecution witness on February 28,
March 6, and March 22, 1978 and as summarized by the petitioner, his testimony
on direct examination contained in seventy-six (76) pages of transcripts of
stenographic notes (pp. 21-44, 57-64, rec.), is to the effect "...that he and Salim
Doe were hired by respondent Pilar Angeles de Pimentel, for the consideration of
P3,000.00 to kill Eduardo Pimentel, husband of respondent Pilar Angeles de
Pimentel, in the evening of September 6, 1977, in the latter's residence in
Zamboanga City, and that it was respondent Pilar Angeles de Pimentel herself who
actually pointed out the victim Eduardo Pimentel to the witness, who then stabbed
the said victim to death...That he did not know the Identity of the victim Eduardo
Pimentel at the time of the stabbing in the evening of September 6, 1977. He was
guided solely by respondent Pilar Angeles de Pimentel, who pointed out her victim
spouse to him ..." (allegation No. 4, petition, pp. 4-5, rec.).
After the prosecution had terminated on March 22, 1978 the direct examination of
its witness Mario Nemenio y delos Santos, counsel for private respondent moved
for the holding in abeyance of the cross-examination of the said prosecution
witness until after he (counsel) shall have been furnished with the transcripts of
the stenographic notes of the direct examination of said prosecution witness (p.
47, TSN, March 22, 1978, p. 64, rec.); allegation No. 5, petition, p. 5, rec.). The
same was granted by the respondent judge who ordered the resumption of the
hearing on April 19, 1978 (pp. 64, 94, 108, rec.).
But on April 19, 1978, aforesaid prosecution witness failed to appear because he
was not served with a subpoena (p. 108, rec.). Consequently, the hearing was
reset for June 7, 1978 (ibid.)
On June 7, 1978, counsel for private respondent commenced his cross-
examination of prosecution witness Mario Nemenio y delos Santos, which cross-
examination however was not completed on that session for lack of material time,
thus:
C o n s ti t u ti o n a l L a w I I S e c . 1 4 a n d 1 6 P a g e | 55
ATTY. CALVENTO:
I reserve my right to cross-examine the witness further.
COURT Reservation to continue the cross-examination is granted.
ORDER: For lack of material time, as prayed for and upon agreement of the parties
today's hearing is hereby adjourned and to be resumed on July 3, 1978 at 8:30
o'clock in the morning (p. 84, rec.).
According to the petition, the uncompleted cross-examination reduced in fifty-three
(53) pages of transcripts of stenographic notes (pp. 65-84, rec.) had already "...
touched on the conspiracy existing among Salim Doe, witness Mario Nemenio and
respondent Pilar Angeles de Pimentel to kill Eduardo Pimentel, in the latter's
residence in Zamboanga City in the evening of September 6, 1977, and also on the
actual stabbing by witness Mario Nemenio of the victim Eduardo Pimentel who was
pointed out to the witness-killer by his wife, respondent Pilar Angeles de
Pimentel ..." (p. 7, rec.). This is not disputed by private respondent.
Continuation of the cross-examination was, as aforestated, set for July 3, 1978 at
8:30 o'clock in the morning.
However, prosecution witness Mario Nemenio y delos Santos was shot dead by the
Integrated National Police patrols on June 21, 1978 while allegedly escaping from
the San Ramon Prison and Penal Farm, Zamboanga City, where he was then
serving his sentence. Consequently, the completion of his cross-examination
became an impossibility.
On July 20, 1978, petitioner, without any motion on the part of the defense for the
striking out of the deceased witness's testimony, filed with the respondent court a
motion praying for a ruling on the admissibility of the testimony of deceased
witness Mario Nemenio y delos Santos.
On August 4, 1978, respondent judge issued an order declaring as inadmissible the
entire testimony of the deceased witness Mario Nemenio y delos Santos on the
principal ground "... that the defense was not able to complete its cross-
examination of said witness ...", relying on the case of Ortigas, Jr. vs. Lufthansa,
etc., L-28773, June 30, 1975, 64 SCRA, pp. 610,636-37).
Hence, this action, to which WE gave due course on December 4, 1978, after
considering private respondent's comment as well as those of the Solicitor General

and of the respondent judge who was required to file one. On even date, WE
likewise issued a temporary restraining order "... effective immediately and until
further orders from this Court enjoining respondent District Judge from continuing
with the trial of Criminal Case No. 750 (1742) entitled People of the Philippines,
plaintiff, versus Pilar Angeles de Pimentel, accused, in the Court of First Instance
of Zamboanga City, Branch II."
Petitioner contends that respondent judge gravely abused his discretion in ruling
as inadmissible the testimony of prosecution witness Mario Nemenio y delos
Santos.
WE agree.
I 293; see alo 29 Am. Jur. 2d 749).
1. The constitutional right of confrontation, which guarantees to the accused
the right to cross-examine the witnesses for the prosecution, is one of the most
basic rights of an accused person under our system of justice. It is a fundamental
right which is part of due process not only in criminal proceedings but also in civil
proceedings as well as in proceedings in administrative tribunals with quasi-judicial
powers (Savory Luncheonette vs. Lakas Manggagawang Pilipino, et al., 62 SCRA
258 [1975]).
In almost exactly the same language, both the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions
secured it, thus: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused ... shall enjoy the
right ... to meet the witnesses face to face ..." (Section 19, Art. IV, Bill of Rights,
1973 Constitution; Section 17, Art. III, 1935 Constitution). Echoing the same
guarantee, Section I (f) of Rule 115 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that in
all criminal proceedings the defendant shall have the right to be confronted at the
trial by, and to cross- examine the witnesses against him. Constitutional
confrontation requirements apply specifically to criminal proceedings and have
been held to have two purposes; first and primarily, to secure the opportunity of
cross-examination, and secondarily, to obtain the benefit of the moral impact of
the courtroom atmosphere as it affects the witnesses demeanor (21 Am Jur 2d
360). Stated otherwise, it insures that the witness will give his testimony under
oath, thus deterring lying by the threat of perjury charge; it forces the witness to
submit to cross-examination, a valuable instrument in exposing falsehood and
bringing out the truth; and it enables the court to observe the demeanor of the
witness and assess his credibility (California v. Green, 339 U.S. 157 [1970]).
2. But while the right to confrontation and cross-examination is a
fundamental right, WE have ruled that the same can be waived expressly or
C o n s ti t u ti o n a l L a w I I S e c . 1 4 a n d 1 6 P a g e | 56
implied by conduct amounting to a renunciation of the right of cross-examination
(Savory Luncheonettee vs. Lakas ng Manggagawang Pilipino, et al., supra, p. 259,
citing U.S. v. Atanacio, 6 Phil. 413 [1906]; People vs. dela Cruz, 56 SCRA 84, 91
[19741). The conduct of a party which may be construed as a implied waiver of
the right to cross-examine may take various forms. But the common basic
principles underlying the application of the rule on implied waiver is that the party
was given the opportunity to confront and cross-examination an opposing witness
but failed to take advantage of it for reasons attributable to himself alone. Thus,
where a party has had the opportunity to cross-examine an opposing witness but
failed to avail himself of it, he necessarily forfeits the right to cross-examine and
the testimony given on direct examination of the witness will be received or
allowed to remain in the record (Savory Luncheonette vs. Lakas ng Maggagawang
Pilipino, et al., supra, citing Francisco, Revised Rules of Court, Vol. on Evidence, p.
853, in turn citing People vs. Cole, 43 N.Y. 508-512 and Bradley vs. Mirick, 91 N.Y.
On the other hand, when the cross-examination is not and cannot be done or
completed due to causes attributable to the party offering the witness, as was the
situation in the Lufthansa German Airlines case (64 SCRA 610 [1975]) relied upon
by respondent judge, the uncompleted testimony is thereby rendered incompetent
and inadmissible in evidence. WE emphasized in the said case that "[T]he right of
a party to cross-examine the witness of his adversary is invaluable as it is
inviolable in civil cases, no less than the right of the accused in criminal cases. The
express recognition of such right of the accused in the Constitution does not
render the right of parties in civil cases less constitutionally based, for it is an
indispensable part of the due process guaranteed by the fundamental law. Subject
to appropriate supervision by the judge in order to avoid unnecessary delays on
account of its being unduly protracted and to needed injunctions protective of the
right of the witness against self-incrimination and oppressive and unwarranted
harassment and embarrassment, a party is absolutely entitled to a full cross-
examination as prescribed in Section 8 of Rule 132 ... Until such cross-examination
has been finished, the testimony of the witness cannot be considered as complete
and may not, therefore be allowed to form part of the evidence to be considered
by the court in deciding the case" (p. 637). However, WE likewise therein
emphasized that where the right to cross examine is lost wholly or in part through
the fault of the cross-examiner, then the testimony on direct examination may be
taken into account; but when cross-examination is not and cannot be done or
completed due to causes attributable to the party offering the witness, the
uncompleted testimony is thereby rendered incompetent (p. 636)
3. The effects of absence of and incomplete cross-examination of witness on
the admissibility in evidence of his testimony on direct examination has been
extensively discussed thus: "As a general rule, the testimony of a witness, given on

direct examination, should be stricken where there is not an adequate opportunity
for cross-examination, as where the witness by reason of his death, illness, or
absence cannot be subjected to cross-examination. Although the contrary has
been held (Scott v. McCann, 24 A. 536, 76 Md. 47), the testimony of a witness,
given on direct examination, should be stricken where there is not an adequate
opportunity for cross-examination (Nehring v. Smith, 49 N.W. 2d 831, 243 Iowa
225), as where the party against whom he testified is, through no fault of his own,
deprived of the right to cross-examine him by reason of his death (Henderson v.
Twin Falls County 80 P. 2d 801, 59 Idaho 97; Twin Falls County, State of Idaho v.
Henderson, 59 S. Ct. 149, 305 U.S. 568, 83 L. Ed. 358), or as a result of the illness
of the witness or absence, or a mistrial ordered. The direct testimony of a witness
who dies before conclusion of the cross-examination can be stricken only insofar
as not covered by the cross-examination (Curtice v. West, 2 NYS 507, 50 Hun 47,
affirmed 24 N.E. 1099, 121 N.Y. 696), and absence of a witness is not enough to
warrant striking his testimony for failure to appear for further cross-examination
where the witness has already been sufficiently cross-examined (Lew Choy v. Lim
Sing 216 P. 888, 125 Wash 631), or the matter on which further cross-examination
is sought is not in controversy (supra). It has been held that a referee has no
power to strike the examination of a witness on his failure to appear for cross-
examination where a good excuse is given (In re Crooks, 23 Hun 696)" [98 CJS
126-127, Emphasis supplied].
Moreover, "[I]f one is deprived of the opportunity of a cross-examination without
fault upon his part, as in the case of the illness or death of a witness after direct
examination, it is generally held that he is entitled to have the direct testimony
stricken from the record. This doctrine rests on the common law rule that no
evidence should be admitted but what was or might be under the examination of
both parties, and that exparte statements are too uncertain and unreliable to be
considered in the investigation of controverted facts (Wray vs. State, 154 Ala 36,
45 So 697; People vs. Manchetti, 29 Cal. 2d 452,175 P2d 533; A. H. Angerstein,
Inc. vs. Jankowski, 55 Del 304, 187 A2d 81; Nehring vs. Smith, 243 Iowa 225, 49
NW2d 831; Citizens Bank & Trust Co. vs. Reid Motor Co. 216 NC 432, 5 SE 2d
318). It has been held, however, that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
refusing to discharge the jury where the state witness collapsed before cross-
examination was completed, it being shown that no motion to strike the testimony
was made, that it was not indicated what further information was sought to be
produced by further cross-examination, and that the witness' testimony was
largely cumulative (Banks vs, Commonwealth, 312 Ky 297, 227 SW 2d 426)" [81
Am Jur 2d 474].
4. Wigmore, eminent authority on evidence, opined that:
xxx xxx xxx
C o n s ti t u ti o n a l L a w I I S e c . 1 4 a n d 1 6 P a g e | 57
... where the death or illness prevents cross-examination under such circumstances
that no responsibility of any sort can be attributed to either the witness of his
party, it seems harsh measure to strike out all that has been obtained on the direct
examination. Principle requires in strictness nothing less. But the true solution
would be to avoid any inflexible rule, and to leave it to the trial judge to admit the
direct examination so far as the loss of cross-examination can be shown to him to
be not in that instance a material loss. Courts differ in their treatment of this
difficult situation; except that by general concession a cross-examination begun
but unfinished sufices if its purposes have been substantially accomplished
xxx xxx xxx
(Vol. II, P. 108, Emphasis supplied).
II
1. Respondent judge's full reliance on the Lufthansa German Airlines case
cannot be sustained. To be sure, while the cross-examination of the witness in the
aforesaid Lufthansa case and that of the witness in the present action were both
uncompleted, the causes thereof were different in that while in the present case it
was the death of the witness, in the Lufthansa case, it was the unjustified and
unexplained failure of Lufthansa to present its witness on the scheduled date for
his cross-examination which had already been preceded by several postponements
initiated by Lufthansa itself, thus depriving the other party the opportunity to
complete the cross-examination of said witness. Consequently, this Court therein
correctly ruled as inadmissible the testimony of the said witness on the principle
that "... when cross-examination is not and cannot be done or completed due to
causes attributable to the party offering the witness, the uncompleted testimony is
thereby rendered incompetent ..." (supra, at p. 636). As clear as day, the
Lufthansa ruling therefore applies only if there is a finding that the cause for non-
completion of the cross-examination of a witness was attributable to the very party
offering the said witness. Consequently, the same is inapplicable to the instant
action as the cause for the non-completion of the cross-examination of petitioner's
witness was a fortuitous event as he was killed, as per the pleadings submitted in
this action, by the law enforcers (Integrated National Police Patrols) after his
escape from prison. As a matter of fact, respondent judge, in his questioned order,
did not lay any basis for the application of the Lufthansa ruling as he failed to
make any finding that the non-completion was due to petitioner, the party offering
the witness, whose testimony he declared as inadmissible in evidence. A reading of
the questioned order reveals that respondent judge ruled as inadmissible said
questioned testimony mainly because private respondent can no longer finish her
cross-examination; hence incomplete. However, private respondent advanced in

this action the cavalier theory that the failure of her counsel to complete his cross-
examination of petitioner's witness was due to the fault of or was attributable to
the petitioner, People of the Philippines, because it was the very agents of State
who killed its own witness; hence, making the questioned testimony of petitioner's
witness inadmissible, per the Lufthansa ruling.
The contention does not deserve serious consideration. There was no finding nor
any showing as the same is farfetched or inconceivable that the killing of the
witness of petitioner by its own agents was ill-motivated. The prosecution did not
order the shooting of the government witness. He was shot while escaping from
prison. It is petitioner's cause which will possibly suffer from said death; not the
cause of private respondent. It may be true that the escape of the said witness
and his consequent death may be attributable to the negligence of petitioner's
agents; but such negligence may not bind the petitioner as to pre-judicially affect
its cause and interest — the prosecution of criminal offenses — by reason of the
generally accepted principle that the State is not bound by the negligence or
tortious acts of its agents. As the cause of non-completion was, as aforesaid,
beyond the control of the prosecution, respondent judge's questioned order cannot
be sustained on the basis of the Lufthansa ruling which, as aforestated, was
principally anchored on the finding that the cause of the non-completion of the
cross-examination of the therein witness was attributable to the very party offering
him as a witness.
2. On the other hand, WE find no merit in petitioner's contention that the
testimony of its deceased witness is admissible on the ground that private
respondent had waived her right to cross-examine the witness and that the cause
of non-completion was attributable to said private respondent. As correctly pointed
out by private respondent and sustained by respondent judge, petitioner is not
justified in attributing fault to her (private respondent) and in contending that she
is deemed to have partly lost already the right of cross-examination by not availing
of the right to cross-examine the witness Mario Nemenio on March 22, 1978 or
right after his direct examination was closed and delaying until the lapse of two
and a half (2½) months thereafter before making such cross-examination;
because while it is true that her counsel did not immediately start with his cross-
examination of the deceased witness on March 22, 1978, he did avail, however, of
such right on the same day by initially obtaining an opportunity to make
preparations for an effective exercise thereof considering the nature of the case —
a capital one — and the length of the direct examination; three sittings on three
different dates or on February 28, 1978, March 6, 1978 and March 22, 1978.
Hence, there was no waiver of her right of cross-examination. Moreover, the
deferment of the cross-examination of the witness requested by private
respondent on March 22, 1978 was approved by respondent judge without any
objection on the part of petitioner (pp. 45, 46, 64, rec.). And on the date for the
C o n s ti t u ti o n a l L a w I I S e c . 1 4 a n d 1 6 P a g e | 58
cross-examination of the witness Mario Nemenio or on April 19, 1978, counsel for
private respondent failed to cross-examine the said witness not of his own design
but because said witness failed to appear on that date for the reason that due to
the oversight of the court's personnel the subpoena for said witness was not
served on him at the San Ramon Prison and Penal Farm (pp. 90, 108, rec.). And
respondent judge had to re-set the hearing for the cross-examination of the
witness by the private respondent only to June 7, 1978 because of the fact that
respondent judge took, with the approval of the Supreme Court, his summer
vacation the whole month of May, 1978.
It is thus apparent that no fault can be imputed to the private respondent for the
length of time that elapsed before her counsel was able to commence his cross-
examination of the witness. And private respondent's counsel was not able to
complete his cross-examination of the witness on June 7, 1978 for lack of material
time by reason of which and upon agreement of the parties the hearing was
adjourned and ordered resumed on July 3, 1978 (p. 84, rec.).
It appears, therefore, that the situation is one whereby the cause of non-
completion of the cross-examination of the deceased witness was attributed
neither to the fault of petitioner nor the private respondent. Consequently, the
admissibility or inadmissibility of the testimony of the said witness cannot be
resolved on the basis of the rule enunciated in the Lufthansa case.
III
There is merit in the contention of the petitioner that the questioned testimony of
its deceased witness is admissible in evidence because private respondent's
counsel had already "... rigorously and extensively cross-examined witness Mario
Nemenio on all essential elements of the crime charged (parricide), all of which
have been testified upon by said witness in his direct examination-in-chief, and
consequently, the cross-examination-in- chief, has already been concluded."
The cross-examination was completed insofar as the essential elements of the
crime charged — parricide, fact of killing-is concerned. What remained was merely
the cross-examination regarding the price or reward, which is not an element of
parricide, but only an aggravating circumstance (par. 11, Art. 14, Revised Penal
Code).
As elaborated by petitioner in its memorandum:
 C o n s ti t u ti o n a l L a w I I S e c . 1 4 a n d 1 6 P a g e | 59

The crime charged in the case at bar is Parricide under Article 246 of the Revised
Penal Code.
The elements of the crime of Parricide are that a person was killed; that the killing
was intentionally caused by the accused; and that the victim is a parent or child,
whether legitimate or illegitimate, or the lawful spouse, or legitimate ascendant or
descendant of the accused. Once these facts are established beyond reasonable
doubt, conviction is warranted (See Aquino, The Revised Penal Code, 1961 Ed.,
Vol. II, p. 1171).
The deceased Eduardo Pimentel has been sufficiently shown to be the lawful
husband of private respondent Pilar Pimentel by means of the marriage contract
executed between them on May 18, 1971 ... marked as Exhibit 'R' for the
prosecution ...
The cross-examination of witness Mario Nemenio by the counsel for private
respondent on June 7, 1978 touched on the conspiracy, and agreement, existing
among Salim Doe, witness Mario Nemenio and private respondent Pilar Pimentel to
kill Eduardo Pimentel, in the latter's residence in Zamboanga City in the evening of
September 6, 1977, and also on the actual stabbing by witness Mario Nemenio of
the victim Eduardo Pimentel who was pointed out to the witness-killer by his wife,
the private respondent Pilar Pimentel herself... The matter of consideration or price
of P3,000.00, which both the public and private respondents maintain was not
touched in the cross-examination of witness Mario Nemenio, is not an essential
element of the crime of parricide. Price or consideration is merely an aggravating
circumstance of the crime charged, not an essential element thereof. The failure to
touch the same in the cross-examination would not at all affect the existence of
the crime of parricide. Furthermore, there is no showing or even the slightest
indication that the witness or his testimony would be discredited if he was cross-
examined on the promised consideration. The probability is rather very great that
the witness would only have confirmed the existence of the promised consideration
were he cross-examined on the same.
Because the cross-examination made by the counsel of private respondent of the
deceased witness was extensive and already covered the subject matter of his
direct testimony as state witness relating to the essential elements of the crime of
parricide, and what remained for further cross-examination is the matter of price
or reward allegedly paid by private respondent for the commission of the crime,
which is merely an aggravating circumstance and does not affect the existence of
the offense charged, the respondent judge gravely abused his discretion in
declaring as entirely inadmissible the testimony of the state witness who died
through no fault of any of the parties before his cross-examination could be
finished.
WHEREFORE, THE AUGUST 4,1978 ORDER OF THE RESPONDENT JUDGE IS
HEREBY SET ASIDE; THE RESTRAINING ORDER OF DECEMBER 4, 1978 ISSUED
BY THIS COURT IS HEREBY LIFTED; AND RESPONDENT JUDGE OR HIS
SUCCESSOR IS ACCORDINGLY ORDERED TO PROCEED WITH THE TRIAL OF
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 750 (1742) AND TO ADMIT AND CONSIDER IN DECIDING
THE CASE THE TESTIMONY OF THE DECEASED WITNESS MARIO NEMENIO y
DELOS SANTOS EXCLUDING ONLY THE PORTION THEREOF CONCERNING THE
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF PRICE OR REWARD WHICH WAS NOT
COVERED BY THE CROSS-EXAMINATION. NO COSTS.
Teehankee (Chairman), Guerrero, De Castro and Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concur.
Fernandez, J., is on leave.

From the foregoing discussion, it is submitted that the rigorous and searching
cross-examination of witness Mario Nemenio on June 7, 1978, practically
concluded already the cross-examination-in-chief, or has already substantially
accomplished the purpose of the cross-examination, and therefore, the failure to
pursue the privilege of further cross-examination, would not adversely affect the
admissibility of the direct testimony of said witness anymore (pp. 159162, rec.).
No. L-51513. May 15, 1984.*
Private respondent did not dwell on the aforesaid points in her memorandum.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. FELICIANO
GOROSPE and RUFINO BULANADI, accused-appellants.
Criminal Procedure; Abduction, a continuing offense.—The above questions are
easily answered. Abduction is a persistent and continuing offense. (U.S. vs.
Bernabe, 23 Phil. 154 [1912].) Hence it may be “tried in the court of the
municipality or province wherein the offense was committed or any one of the
essential ingredients thereof took place.” (Rules of Court, Rule 110, Sec. 14[a].)
The Municipal Court of Pulilan had jurisdiction because the abductors and their
captive passed Pulilan on their way from Plaridel to Talavera. And the CFI of
Bulacan (as well as the CFI of Nueva Ecija) had jurisdiction because essential
elements of the offense took place in Bulacan (and also in Nueva Ecija).
Same; Jurisdiction; Jurisdiction vests in the court, not in a particular judge of a
multi-sala court.—We hold that Judge de Vega had the power to decide the case.
“Where a court of first instance is divided into several branches each of the
branches is not a court distinct and separate from the others. Jurisdiction is vested
in the court, not in the judges, so that when a complaint or information is filed
before one branch or judge, jurisdiction does not attach to said branch of judge
alone, to the exclusion of the others. Trial may be had or proceedings may
continue by and before another branch or judge.” (Lumpay, et al. vs. Moscoso,
105 Phil. 968 [1959].)
Evidence; Testimony of fourteen-year old victim of abduction with rape
corroborated by a key eyewitness whose name was dropped from amended
information.—Fajardo testified, among other things, that he was given a lift from
the monument in Caloocan City to Nueva Ecija by Gorospe and Bulanadi; that in
Plaridel, between the market and the bridge, the two forced Anastacia to go with
them; that Anastacia was brought to his house and later transferred to a nipa hut
near an irrigation pump; that in the nipa hut Anastacia was undressed by Gorospe;
that Gorospe, Bulanadi and Alvaran took turns in spending 20 to 30 minutes inside
the hut with Anastacia; and that he did not have sex with her. It can thus be seen
that Fajardo was a key witness. His testimony corroborated that of Anastacia in
material matters.
Criminal Procedure; Evidence; Judgment; Judgment is validly rendered even if
defense not yet through with cross-examination of key witness.—The trial court
committed no error in admitting the testimony of Fajardo although the defense
had not finished its cross-examination. An examination of the transcript of
Fajardo’s testimony shows that he was subjected to detailed cross-examination on
material points. In fact, the cross-examination was lengthier than the direct
examination.
C o n s ti t u ti o n a l L a w I I S e c . 1 4 a n d 1 6 P a g e | 60
Criminal Law; Evidence; Defense theory that complainant is a prostitute not
credible, as the latter is only 14 years old and still studying in school.—The version
of the appellants does not inspire belief because it appears to have been contrived.
The appellants portray Anastacia as wanton and unchaste woman—a prostitute.
But one’s credulity has to be unduly stretched in order to buy the line that a girl of
14 years who was still going to school was a prostitute who went far away from
her home in order to peddle her body. The appellant’s version is simply too crude
to be convincing.
Same; Criminal Procedure; Penalty; Even if conspiracy exists, and victim was raped
by three men, the appellants cannot be found guilty of three rapes where one of
the three was dropped from the information.—The Solicitor General states that
Gerardo Fajardo, the discharged state witness, also committed rape hence the
appellants should each be found guilty of three (3) rapes because in a conspiracy
the act of one is the act of all. We cannot agree in respect of the participation of
Fajardo. Since Fajardo was dropped from the complaint his guilt had not been
established. However, We agree with the Solicitor General’s observation “that a
motor vehicle was used to bring her [Anastacia de Jesus] from Plaridel, Bulacan,
where she was first deceived and drugged, and then taken to an isolated
uninhabited place at a nipa hut, near an irrigation pump at Calipahan, Talavera,
Nueva Ecija, where she was abused, two (2) aggravating circumstances are
present, namely use of motor vehicle and uninhabited place (Art. 14, R.P.C.),” so
that death is the proper penalty. (Brief, pp. 14-15.) However, for lack of the
necessary number of votes the death penalty cannot be imposed. People vs.
Gorospe, 129 SCRA 233, No.
APPEAL from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan. Br. 11. De
Vega, J.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
     The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
     Francisco S. Pagaduan, Sr. for accused-appellants.
ABAD SANTOS, J.:
In a verified complaint filed on October 8, 1974, with the Municipal Court of
Pulilan, Bulacan, ANASTACIA DE JESUS accused GERARDO FAJARDO, RUFINO
BULANADI and FELICIANO GOROSPE of the crime of forcible abduction with rape.
(Expediente p. 1.) The crime was said to have been committed on September 30,
1974, starting in Plaridel, Bulacan, thru Pulilan, and thence to Talavera, Nueva
Ecija.

Municipal Judge Alfredo V. Granados of the Municipal Court of Pulilan received the
complaint and conducted a preliminary investigation, first stage.
On October 25, 1974, the Complaint was amended. Rufino Bulanadi and Feliciano
Gorospe were again named but Gerardo Fajardo was dropped and OSCAR
ALVARAN was named instead. The date when the crime was said to have been
committed was changed from September 30, 1974, to September 25, 1974. (Id.,
p. 41.)
Again Judge Granados conducted a preliminary investigation and on November 18,
1974, he issued an order for the arrest of Bulanadi, Gorospe and Alvaran and fixed
their bail at P15,000.00 each. (Id., p. 70.)
Bulanadi and Gorospe posted the requisite bail. Alvaran remained at large.
The second stage of the preliminary investigation was set on February 5, 1975, but
on that day neither Bulanadi or Gorospe appeared for which reason Judge
Granados declared that they had waived their right thereto and elevated the case
to the Court of First Instance of Bulacan. (Id., p. 87.
On March 19, 1975, Provincial Fiscal Pascual C. Kliatchko filed with the CFI of
Bulacan an information for forcible abduction with rape against Gorospe and
Bulanadi. It was docketed as Criminal Case No. 1293-M. (Id., p. 88.) But on July
25, 1975, Fiscal Kliatchko filed an amended information which reads:
“That on or about the 25th day of September, 1974, in the municipality of Plaridel,
province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the said accused Feliciano Gorospe and Rufino Bulanadi, together with one
Oscar Alvaran who is still at large, conspiring and confederating together and
helping one another, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously, by
means of force, violence and intimidation, and with lewd design abduct the
complaining witness Anastacia de Jesus, an unmarried woman, 14 years of age, by
then and there taking and carrying her to Talavera, Nueva Ecija, against her will
and without her consent, and upon arrival there, the said accused by means of
violence, force and intimidation have carnal knowledge of the said Anastacia de
Jesus against her will and consent.” (Id., p. 100.)
Judge Nelly L. Romero Valdellon started the trial of the case on October 15, 1975.
The accused and their counsel de parte had long been notified that the case was
to be tried on that day but they did not appear so the former were tried in
absentia. After hearing part of the testimony of Anastacia de Jesus, the
complainant, Judge Valdellon was transferred to Metro Manila and she was
replaced by Judge Fidel P. Purisima who finished the trial. But Judge Purisima
C o n s ti t u ti o n a l L a w I I S e c . 1 4 a n d 1 6 P a g e | 61
issued an order on March 10, 1976, wherein he inhibited himself from deciding the
case. He said, “Considering that Judge Alfredo V. Granados is a first cousin by
affinity of the undersigned Presiding Judge and if only to make sure that the
decision to be rendered in this case shall be above suspicion and considering
further the gravity of the offense charged, the undersigned Presiding Judge hereby
inhibits himself from deciding this case.” (Id., pp. 386-387.) So it was Judge Jesus
R. de Vega who decided the case and rendered the following judgment:
“PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Court finds both the herein accused Gorospe and
Bulanadi guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape committed against Anastacia de
Jesus as charged in the information. Considering the legal principle that each of
the herein accused is responsible not only for the act of rape committed personally
by him but also for the rape committed by his other co-accused on account of the
finding of conspiracy or cooperation in the commission of the said crime charged
against them, the Court accordingly sentences each of the herein accused Gorospe
and Bulanadi to suffer two (2) perpetual penalties of reclusion perpetua to be
served in accordance with Art. 70 of the Revised Penal Code, with all the accessory
penalty of the law.
“Both accused are further ordered to indemnify Anastacia de Jesus in the amount
of P40,000.00 for actual, exemplary and morel damages; and to pay the costs.”
(Id., p. 419.)
The case is now before Us on appeal.
The People’s version of the facts is as follows:
“Complainant Anastacia de Jesus, a 14 year-old girl at the time of the incident,
single, student at the Calumpit Institute, Bulacan, and resident of Puñgo, Calumpit,
Bulacan, was, at about 10:00 a.m., of September 25, 1974, at Plaridel, Bulacan, in
front of the Caltex Station, intending to cross the street to buy a book. She was
looking for a book, entitled “Diwang Guinto” (pp. 2-5, t.s.n., Dec. 15, 1975; pp.
17-18, t.s.n., March 10, 1976; p. 4, t.s.n., March 11, 1976). Two persons passed
by, one of whom was appellant Rufino Bulanadi, who waived a handkerchief
across her face, which affected her consciousness and she felt dizzy but felt that
she was being held and boarded into a motor vehicle (pp. 5-11, t.s.n., Dec. 15,
1975; p. 18, t.s.n., March 10, 1976).
“Complainant regained her full consciousness at about 8:00 o’clock in the evening
of September 25, 1974, in a nipa hut near the irrigation pump, of Gerardo Fajardo,
at Calipahan, Talavera, Nueva Ecija. Inside she saw appellants, Feliciano Gorospe,
Rufino Bulanadi, and Gerardo Fajardo (pp. 11-14, 17, 21, t.s.n., Dec. 15, 1975).

They were arguing why she (complainant) had to be taken by appellants Rufino
Bulanadi and Feliciano Gorospe (p. 16, t.s.n., Dec. 15, 1975).
“That evening, at the said nipa hut, complainant was forced to drink a strange
tasting royal soft drink by appellant Feliciano Gorospe and appellant Rufino
Bulanadi, who held her hands (pp. 21-23, t.s.n., Dec. 15, 1975). After drinking the
soft drink complainant lost consciousness. She woke up only the next morning with
aches and pains all over her body especially her private part. She found herself
naked. Appellants, Rufino Bulanadi and Feliciano Gorospe, were there by her side
standing when she woke up (pp. 23-26, t.s.n., Dec. 15, 1975; p. 22, t.s.n., Jan.
12, 1976). Gerardo Fajardo was also there. All the three of them were naked.
Evidently, appellants and Gerardo Fajardo sexually abused her (p. 27, t.s.n., Dec.
15, 1975; p. 15, t.s.n., March 10, 1976).
“Appellants and Gerardo Fajardo forcibly kept Anastacia de Jesus for nine (9) days
in the hut, with appellants, and Gerardo Fajardo taking turns in sexually abusing
her during the night. During the day she was guarded by Oscar Alvaran.
“After her nine-day ordeal, Gerardo Fajardo brought her to the house of Cirilo
Balanagay at Bancal, Talavera, Nueva Ecija (pp. 20-23, t.s.n., March 12, 1976).
When Gerardo Fajardo left the house, Anastacia de Jesus related to Cirilo
Balanagay what the appellants and Fajardo did to her. Cirilo Balanagay, therefore,
wired Anastacia’s parents and then brought her to the Talavera Municipal Building
where she executed an affidavit about her ordeal. She also told the PC of her
harrowing experience (pp. 23-25, t.s.n., March 12, 1976).
“When complainant was brought home, her friends readily noticed that she was
not her usual self anymore as ‘she cannot answer and she just kept on shouting
and crying and trembling’, saying ‘keep away from me, have pity on me.’ (pp. 14-
15, t.s.n., Oct. 14, 1975).
“Complainant Anastacia de Jesus was physically examined on October 6, 1974, by
Dra. Norma V. Gungon who issued a medical certificate on her findings, as follows:
‘Patient examined with the presence of a ward Nurse. She is conscious, coherent
answers to questions intelligently. Physical Examination:
Breast—symetrical, conical in shape, areola pigmented.
Mons pubis—pubic hair scanty in amount.
Internal Examination:
C o n s ti t u ti o n a l L a w I I S e c . 1 4 a n d 1 6 P a g e | 62
Hymen—presence of healed lacerations, at 11, 5, 3 o’clock.
Vaginal introctus—admits 2 fingers w/ difficulty. Cervix—small, closed
SMEAR FOR SPERMATOZOA-NEGATIVE’ (Exh, G-1, p. 6, rec.)” (Brief, pp. 3-6.)
The appellants make the following assignment of errors:
“I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED GUILTY OF THE CRIME
OF RAPE WHICH THE PROSECUTION ALLEGES TO HAVE BEEN COMMITTED IN
TALAVERA, PROVINCE OF NUEVA ECIJA AND NOT IN THE PROVINCE OF
BULACAN.
“II. THE HONORABLE JUDGE JESUS R. DE VEGA, PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF BULACAN, BRANCH II ERRED IN RENDERING THE
DECISION APPEALED FROM WHEN HE HAS NO AUTHORITY TO DO SO BECAUSE
THIS CASE WAS ENTIRELY TRIED IN THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF
BULACAN, BRANCH I, PRESIDED OVER BY HONORABLE JUDGE FIDEL P.
PURISIMA.
“III. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING THE TESTIMONY OF GERARDO
FAJARDO WHOSE CROSS-EXAMINATION WAS NOT FINISHED DUE TO HIS
FAILURE TO APPEAR INSPITE OF A WARRANT FOR HIS ARREST.
“IV. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED FELICIANO GOROSPE
AND RUFINO BULANADI GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF
RAPE.” (Brief, pp. 21-22.)
The first assignment of error raises the following questions: (1) Why was the
complaint not filed in Plaridel, Bulacan or Talavera, Nueva Ecija but in Pulilan,
Bulacan? (2) Since the rape was committed in Talavera, why was the case tried by
the CFI of Bulacan and not by the CFI of Nueva Ecija?
The above questions are easily answered. Abduction is a persistent and continuing
offense. (U.S. vs. Bernabe, 23 Phil. 154 [1912].) Hence it may be “tried in the
court of the municipality or province wherein the offense was committed or any
one of the essential ingredients thereof took place.” (Rules of Court, Rule 110, Sec.
14[a].) The Municipal Court of Pulilan had jurisdiction because the abductors and
their captive passed Pulilan on their way from Plaridel to Talavera. And the CFI of
Bulacan (as well as the CFI of Nueva Ecija) had jurisdiction because essential
elements of the offense took place in Bulacan (and also in Nueva Ecija).
The second assignment of error asserts that Judge de Vega had no authority to
render the decision in the case.

Judge Purisima in the order wherein he inhibited himself from deciding the case
also “ordered to have the same reraffled off and assigned to another branch.” The
case was presumably re-raffled to Judge de Vega who issued an order on June 23,
1978, which states, inter alia:
“Considering the foregoing, and in order to be properly guided in the further
disposition of this case, and to obviate possible objections and criticisms which
may come from any or both parties in the final disposition thereof, the Court
resolves to require the parties to submit their respective written comments within
fifteen (15) days from receipt hereof on the propriety and advisability of the
decision in this case to be rendered by the Presiding Judge of this Court; and to
call a conference to hear further the views and arguments of the parties on this
question, which is hereby set on July 18, 1978, at 1:30 p.m. Let notices be sent
accordingly to all parties concerned.” (Expediente p. 390.)
Neither the comments nor the memorial of the conference are in the expediente
but on March 28, 1979, counsel for the accused filed a motion stating:
“2. That the above promulgation was held in abeyance, and then the accused
received the order dated June 13, 1978 where the Court called the parties to a
conference on July 18, 1978;
3. That the parties appeared before this Court on July 18, 1978;
4. That up to the present a Decision in the above entitled case has not yet been
promulgated.
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court that the above
entitled case be resolved.” (Id., p. 401.) And on June 4, 1979, Judge de Vega
promulgated the decision. (Id., p. 410.)
We hold that Judge de Vega had the power to decide the case. “Where a court of
first instance is divided into several branches each of the branches is not a court
distinct and separate from the others. Jurisdiction is vested in the court, not in the
judges, so that when a complaint or information is filed before one branch or
judge, jurisdiction does not attach to said branch of judge alone, to the exclusion
of the others. Trial may be had or proceedings may continue by and before
another branch or judge.” (Lumpay, et al. vs. Moscoso, 105 Phil. 968 [1959].)
It is to be recalled that in the original complaint filed by Anastacia de Jesus before
the Municipal Court of Pulilan, Gerardo Fajardo was one of the accused. In the
C o n s ti t u ti o n a l L a w I I S e c . 1 4 a n d 1 6 P a g e | 63
amended complaint, Fajardo’s name was dropped and Oscar Alvaran was named
instead. Nonetheless, when Anastacia testified she said that she was brought to
the house of Gerardo Fajardo in Talavera, Nueva Ecija; that when she woke up
after she was forced to drink something, Fajardo was there with Gorospe and
Bulanadi, and all three were naked; that Fajardo was one of those who raped her;
and that it was Fajardo who brought her to Cirilo Balanagay.
Why was Fajardo dropped from the complaint? The record does not yield an
answer but perhaps he decided to cooperate with the complainant because soon
after she finished her testimony the prosecution presented Fajardo as its next
witness. Fajardo testified, among other things, that he was given a lift from the
monument in Caloocan City to Nueva Ecija by Gorospe and Bulanadi; that in
Plaridel, between the market and the bridge, the two forced Anastacia to go with
them; that Anastacia was brought to his house and later transferred to a nipa hut
near an irrigation pump; that in the nipa hut Anastacia was undressed by Gorospe;
that Gorospe, Bulanadi and Alvaran took turns in spending 20 to 30 minutes inside
the hut with Anastacia; and that he did not have sex with her.
It can thus be seen that Fajardo was a key witness. His testimony corroborated
that of Anastacia in material matters. His direct examination took place on June 23
and 24, 1976.
His cross-examination commenced on August 4, 1976 (whole day), and was
continued on August 9, 1976. The cross-examination is recorded on pages 112 to
230 of the transcript. But the defense did not indicate that it was through with
Fajardo.
On August 9, 1976, the trial court continued the hearing to August 11, 1976.
(Expediente, p. 204.) On the latter date, Fajardo failed to appear and the case was
re-scheduled to be heard on September 13, 1976. (Id., p. 208.) On September 13,
1976, Fajardo again failed to appear and the case was re-set to September 29,
1976. (Id., p. 222.) Fajardo did not appear on September 29, 1976, so he was
ordered arrested. (Id., p. 223-226.) Fajardo was not arrested but despite such fact
the prosecution rested its case.
In their third assignment of error the appellants bewail the fact that the trial court
decided the case even though they had not finished cross-examining Fajardo.
The trial court committed no error in admitting the testimony of Fajardo although
the defense had not finished its cross-examination. An examination of the
transcript of Fajardo’s testimony shows that he was subjected to detailed cross-
examination on material points. In fact, the cross-examination was lengthier than

the direct examination. We adopt with approval the statement of the court a quo
on this point:
“The records show that the counsel for the accused has extensively cross
examined Fajardo. The Court could not help but wonder what other matters not
yet touched during the cross-examination of Fajardo could still be elicited from him
that would probably destroy or affect his testimony-in-chief. If the counsel for the
accused expected Fajardo to testify further on material matters favorable to the
cause of the defense, he should have proffered such further testimony and entered
into the records how the absent witness would have testified if he were available
for further cross-examination. The failure of the said counsel to do so indicates
that every material point has been asked from Fajardo during the time he was
under examination.
“While cross-examination is a right available to the adverse party, it is not absolute
in the sense that a cross-examiner could determine for himself the length and
scope of his cross-examination of a witness. The court has always the discretion to
limit the cross examination and to consider it terminated if it would serve the ends
of justice.
“The Court, therefore, hereby resolves to admit the testimony of Fajardo. This
resolution finds support, though indirectly, from Section 6, Rule 133 of the Rules of
Court, which empowers the court to stop the introduction of further testimony
upon a particular point when the evidence upon it is already so full that more to
the same point cannot reasonably be expected to be additionally persuasive. The
position herein taken by the Court in brushing aside technicalities is in accordance
with a fundamental rule that the provisions of the Rules of Court shall be liberally
construed in order to promote their object and assist the parties in obtaining a
just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action or proceeding. (Section
2, Rule 1, Rules of Court).” (Id., p. 418.)
Moreover, even if Fajardo’s testimony be disregarded the accused may
nonetheless be convicted in the light of other evidence.
The fourth assignment of error raises the issue of credibility of witnesses—those of
the prosecution versus those of the defense.
The prosecution’s version has already been stated above. We now have to
consider the version of the appellants which is as follows:
“On September 30, 1974 at 4:00 o’clock in the afternoon, accused Feliciano
Gorospe, Barangay Captain of Andal Alinio district, Talavera, Nueva Ecija, since
1972 up to the present and at the same time a member of the Sangguniang Bayan
C o n s ti t u ti o n a l L a w I I S e c . 1 4 a n d 1 6 P a g e | 64
of Talavera, Nueva Ecija, representing the Barangay Group, went to the house of
his friend, Reynaldo Matias at Calipahan, Talavera, Nueva Ecija, to attend a
birthday party (pp. 36 & 37, T.s.n., February 7, 1977, CFI). Accused Rufino
Bulanadi, who was a former councilman of Calipahan, Talavera, Nueva Ecija, also
attended said party as he was also invited (p. 12, T.s.n., February 28, 1977, CFI).
At about 7:00 o’clock in the evening, several teenagers were shouting in front of
the house of Gerardo Fajardo which is ONE HUNDRED (100) METERS away from
the house where the birthday party was being held (p. 38, T.s.n., February 7, 1977
CFI). The house of Fajardo being within his jurisdiction (pp. 39 & 40, ibid),
accused Barangay Captain Gorospe proceeded to the place where the shouts were
coming from, followed by other guests in the birthday party, among whom was
Councilman Rufino Bulanadi (p. 39, ibid). There were 2 groups of teenagers who
were at odds with each other. One was the group of Gil Nocum and the other, the
group of Isagani Castro. Barrio Captain Gorospe talked with the two (2) groups of
teenagers and he was informed that Fajardo who promised to give a woman to
one group made the same commitment with respect to the same woman to the
other group (pp. 41 & 42, ibid). That woman was complainant Anastacia de Jesus,
as there were previous occasions that Gerardo Fajardo brought women of ill-
repute to his house, Gorospe called him and asked him why he brought again
another woman of ill-repute to that place. He even asked Gerardo’s wife, Della
Fajardo, why she tolerated Gerardo to bring that kind of woman in their house
when they are already married. She answered that she could not stop him because
he would cause her bodily harm. Gorospe also called Anastacia and asked her why
she went with Gerardo who is a married man (pp. 44 to 47, ibid). Thereafter he
told her to leave the place. Gerardo pleaded that Anastacia be allowed to stay only
for that night and he would take her out of the place the next day.
The following morning, October 1, 1974 while accused Rufino Bulanadi was tying
the rope of his carabao to graze in the subdivision at Calipahan, Talavera, Nueva
Ecija, Gerardo approached him and said, ‘Konsehal maaari bang itira ko ang
babaing dala-dala ko sa bahay sa balong-balong ng kalabaw mo’ (Councilman,
may I be allowed to let the girl who is with me in my house to live or stay in the
shade of your carabao). He pleaded with Bulanadi because according to him his
wife was quarrelling with him because of that woman (pp.
21-23, T.s.n., February 28, 1977, CFI). Bulanadi vehemently refused and reminded
Gerardo about the warning of Barrio Captain Gorospe to get that woman out of the
place. Gerardo left, angry and was murmuring (p. 23, ibid). Bulanadi left his
carabao to graze and proceeded to his field to see the laborers who were pulling
grasses there. The farmers in Talavera are organized into groups of Twenty (20)
for the systematic distribution of irrigation water, each with a chairman. Bulanadi

was the chairman of his group. Because there was shortage of water, he started
the engine of his irrigation pump. He had his lunch in the field. At 3:00 o’clock in
the afternoon, a son of an owner of a neighboring field informed him that water
was already being released from the Sapang Baca Dam. Upon verifying that water
was really coming, he stopped the motor of his irrigation pump. (pp. 22-26, ibid).
He cleaned the passage of water to his field for two (2) hours. At 5:00 o’clock in
the afternoon, he went home to eat because he was hungry. He left the pump
house open because he intended to go back after supper. When he came back, he
saw that there was light inside his pump house. As he was approaching, Gerardo
met him and pleaded that he and the woman be allowed to sleep there. Bulanadi
refused saying, I just bought this pump recently, ‘Sasalahulain mo ba ito? Hindi
pwede yon Gerardo, kamalasan yon.’ (Are you going to tarnish this? That cannot
be Gerardo, that will bring me bad luck) (pp. 26-29, ibid). Bulanadi saw Anastacia
playing with the water. He told her not to make the water dirty as it is being used
as drinking water and Anastacia said, ‘suya naman kayo kay selan-selan mong
matanda.’ (You are very touchy old man). When Bulanadi told them that he would
report them to the Barrio Captain, they pleaded to him not to do so, but just the
same, he went to the Barrio Captain to report.
When Bulanadi arrived in the house of Barrio Captain Feliciano Gorospe, the latter
was conversing with Oscar Alvaran (p. 31, ibid & p. 49, t.s.n., February 7, 1977).
Upon receiving the report, the 3, Rufino Bulanadi, Feliciano Gorospe and Oscar
Alvaran, went to the pump house. Barrio Captain Gorospe talked to Gerardo
Fajardo and Anastacia de Jesus saying, ‘Talaga palang matitigas ang ulo ninyo,
pinaalalahanan ko na kayo, ayaw pa ninyong lumayo dito!. (You are really hard
headed, I have already warned you but still you did not leave this place). Bulanadi
and Gorospe were very angry and Anastacia got angry too and said that it is none
of their business what she and Gerardo do. She rushed towards the two as if to
strike them but Gerardo stopped her and pleaded with the two to allow them to
stay there just for that night because he said, ‘aabutan na kami ng curfew’ (we will
be curfewed). Gorospe and Bulanadi relented and left warning them that if they
would still be there the next morning they will report the matter to the P.C. (pp.
31-35, ibid & pp. 2-6, February 24, 1977, CFI).
The next morning, October 2, 1977, Wednesday, Gerardo Fajardo and Anastacia
de Jesus left the pump house of Bulanadi. Gerardo brought Anastacia to the house
of his cousin Floring at Munoz, Nueva Ecija, where they stayed that night. The
following morning, October 3, 1977 he brought her to the house of his uncle Cirilo
Balanagay at Bakal I, Talavera, Nueva Ecija (Exhibit I). He told his uncle that
Anastacia is a student, and he requested Balanagay to devise ways and means to
C o n s ti t u ti o n a l L a w I I S e c . 1 4 a n d 1 6 P a g e | 65
return her to her parents because he might be placed in trouble (p. 7, T.s.n.,
October 12, 1974, Municipal Court of Pulilan).
After Gerardo left, Balanagay went to the room where Anastacia was and
volunteered to take her to her parents, but she said she would think it over. That
night, October 3, 1974, Balanagay brought her to the house of Barrio Captain
Andres Nazar of Bakal I, Talavera, Nueva Ecija, to inform him of Anastacia’s
presence in that house, and also so that she could relate everything to the Barrio
Captain (p. 10, T.s.n., October 12, 1974, Municipal Court of Pulilan). There was a
regulation in Bakal I, Talavera, Nueva Ecija, that a stranger who arrives there
should submit a statement as to the reason of his presence in the barrio. Barrio
Captain Andres Nazar took the statement of Anastacia de Jesus (p 4, T.s.n.,
February 7, 1977, CFI) which was in the form of question and answer. This was
reduced in writing by Councilman Aniceto Damian who was summoned for that
occasion, in the presence of the barrio captain himself, Cirilo Balanagay, and his
wife. The statement of Anastacia de Jesus marked as Exhibit “1” was signed by
Councilman Aniceto Damian and Cirilo Balanagay as witnesses (pp. 7 to 14, T.s.n.,
February 7, 1977 CFI). To protect the interest of Anastacia, Barrio Captain Nazar
asked Balanagay to notify her parents (p. 13, ibid).
On October 4, 1974, Cirilo Balanagay accompanied Anastacia to the Police
Department of Talavera, Nueva Ecija, where she made a report (Exhibit 13). Then
he wired the family of Anastacia at Pungo, Calumpit, Bulacan. On October 6, 1974
Anastacia’s relatives arrived, composed of her uncle, Enrique de Jesus, brother of
Victoriano de Jesus, sister Lolita de Jesus and brother-in-law Adriano Nicolas. They
accompanied her to the Police Department of Talavera, where she made a
statement, Exhibit 5 which is also Exhibit C (p. 3, T.s.n., June 16, 1976, CFI). That
same date, October 6, 1974 she was examined by Dr. Norma Gongon at the Dr.
Paulino J. Garcia Memorial Research and Medical Center upon request of the Police
Department of Talavera, Nueva Ecija and a Medical Certificate was issued to her
(Exhs, “G”, “G-1”, “G-2”, “H” and “H-1”).
In the meantime, on October 4, 1974, accused Barrio Captain Feliciano Gorospe
and his wife, with Mayor and Mrs. Bonifacio de Jesus of Talavera, Nueva Ecija,
Engineer and Mrs. Bacani and 3 other couples went to Baguio City to attend the
convention of the Luzon Area Community Christian Family Movement at St. Louise
University. They rented a house and stayed there for THREE (3) days, October 4,
1974 to October 6, 1974. At 5:00 o’clock in the afternoon on October 6, 1974,
when the convention ended, they went home to Talavera, Nueva Ecija (pp. 10-12,
T.s.n., February 24, 1977, CFI).

On October 6, 1974, at about 8:00 o’clock in the morning, accused Rufino Bulanadi
on his way to the field to cut grasses for his carabao, passed by a store to buy
cigarette. To his surprise he saw Gerardo there and he asked him where his ‘alaga’
was (the girl he is taking care of) and Gerardo answered, ‘Pinagpapahinga ko siya
sa Bakal at pinakawalan ko na’ (I let her rest in Bakal and I have already let her
go). Gerardo further said that the girl was intending to file a case against him, and
Bulanadi told him, ‘Mabuti nga sa iyo, ayaw mo kasing tumigil sa masamang
negosyo mo’. (That’s good for you because you don’t want to stop your bad
business). When Bulanadi proceeded on his way to the field, a jeep suddenly
stopped beside him. On the jeep were PC Sgt. Jimenez, several policemen and
Anastacia de Jesus. Sgt. Jimenez immediately got off the jeep, tied Rufino’s hand
with his own rope that he brought with him to be used in tying the grasses that he
would cut, and brought him to the Municipal Building of Talavera, Nueva Ecija,
where he was locked in jail. When asked about Gerardo, he informed the P.C. that
he saw him in the store. Gerardo was likewise arrested. Bulanadi was asked about
the case and he said he did not know anything about it (pp. 37 to 40, T.s.n.,
February 28, 1977, CFI).
When accused Barrio Captain Gorospe arrived with his wife from Baguio in the
evening of October 6, 1974, his mother informed him that a policeman was looking
for him. He told his mother that he would just go to the Municipal Building the
following day because he was tired. The next day, October 7, 1974 at 8:30 o’clock
in the morning, he went to the Municipal Building. Upon his arrival, Gerardo met
him, put his arms on his shoulders and said that the case can be settled in the
amount of P200.00. Gorospe said ‘tarantado ka pala’ (You son of a bitch). ‘I will
not give even a single centavo because you are the one responsible for this. I have
nothing to do with this case.’ Gorospe proceeded to see Sgt. Jimenez who told him
that the case was transferred to Cabanatuan City. The 3 of them, Bulanadi,
Gorospe and Fajardo were brought to the PC headquarters where they were
interviewed one after the other, after which Gorospe and Bulanadi were sent
home.
The complainant filed the case in the Municipal Court of Pulilan, Bulacan, on
October 8, 1974, two (2) days after she had gone home in Pungo, Calumpit,
Bulacan (Exhibit 8). Gerardo Fajardo who was in the custody of the Police
Department of Talavera, Nueva Ecija was taken by the Policemen of Pulilan,
Bulacan.
On October 22, 1974 while the case was being investigated by Municipal Judge
Alfredo Granados where Anastacia had already testified on October 9, 1974,
Anastacia again executed another affidavit because that was what her lawyer,
C o n s ti t u ti o n a l L a w I I S e c . 1 4 a n d 1 6 P a g e | 66
Atty. Santos wanted (p. 26, t.s.n., March 12, 1976, CFI). On the same date
Gerardo Fajardo executed another statement in the Police Department of Pulilan,
Bulacan. Thereafter, complainant filed an Amended Complaint wherein Gerardo,
against whom she was originally complaining against, was excluded as one of the
accused to be utilized as her witness, and Oscar Alvaran was included for the first
time. The alleged date of the incident was changed from September 30, 1974 to
September 25, 1974. Subsequently the case was elevated to the Court of First
Instance of Bulacan, Branch I.” (Brief, pp. 12-21.)
The version of the appellants does not inspire belief because it appears to have
been contrived. The appellants portray Anastacia as wanton and unchaste woman
—a prostitute. But one’s credulity has to be unduly stretched in order to buy the
line that a girl of 14 years who was still going to school was a prostitute who went
far away from her home in order to peddle her body. The appellant’s version is
simply too crude to be convincing.
Opposed to the appellants’ version is the affirmative narration of events made by
Anastacia which were corroborated by Gerardo Fajardo. The story which she
unfolded could have been inspired only by her thirst for justice. In her quest she
had to live her ordeal all over again for a lengthy period because she was on the
witness stand on December 15, 1975; January 12, March 10, March 11, May 3 and
June 16, 1976. During all those days she had to bare in public her shame and
humiliation.
To be sure there were inconsistencies in the testimony of Anastacia but they were
in details rather than in the highlights of her terrible experience and could very
well be attributed to her tender age and confused state of mind caused by her
private hell.
The Solicitor General states that Gerardo Fajardo, the discharged state witness,
also committed rape hence the appellants should each be found guilty of three (3)
rapes because in a conspiracy the act of one is the act of all. We cannot agree in
respect of the participation of Fajardo. Since Fajardo was dropped from the
complaint his guilt had not been established. However, We agree with the Solicitor
General’s observation “that a motor vehicle was used to bring her [Anastacia de
Jesus] from Plaridel, Bulacan, where she was first deceived and drugged, and then
taken to an isolated uninhabited place at a nipa hut, near an irrigation pump at
Calipahan, Talavera, Nueva Ecija, where she was abused, two (2) aggravating
circumstances are present, namely use of motor vehicle and uninhabited place
(Art. 14, R.P.C.),” so that death is the proper penalty. (Brief, pp. 14-15.) However,
for lack of the necessary number of votes the death penalty cannot be imposed.
 C o n s ti t u ti o n a l L a w I I S e c . 1 4 a n d 1 6 P a g e | 67

WHEREFORE, the judgment of the court a quo is hereby affirmed in all respects.
Costs against the appellants.

SO ORDERED.

     Teehankee, Makasiar, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, De Castro, Melencio-

Herrera, Plana, Escolin, Relova, Gutierrez, Jr. and De la Fuente, JJ., concur.

     Fernando, C.J., in the result.

Judgment affirmed.

Notes.—In case of rape, the law in testimony of complainant must be corroborated

by physical evidence showing use of force. (People vs. Relacion, 95 SCRA 369.)

Facts that complainant was taken in an open jeep in broad daylight and passed
through various towns of Rizal and she was not allegedly raped till 7:00 o’clock
p.m. create doubt on the guilt of the accused. (People vs. Arciaga, 98 SCRA 1.)

Simple and natural testimony of the rape victim is credible. (People vs. Lat, 99
SCRA 297.)

——o0o——

© Copyright 2019 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights rese People vs. Gorospe,
129 SCRA 233, No. L-51513 May 15, 1984

L-51513 May 15, 1984

G.R. Nos. 115338-39. September 16, 1997.*

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. LANIE ORTIZ-

MIYAKE, accused-appellant.

Labor Law; Criminal Law; Illegal Recruitment; Words and Phrases; “Recruitment
and Placement,” Defined.—The Labor Code defines recruitment and placement as

“x x x any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or
procuring workers and includes referrals, contract services, promising or
advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not x x x.”
Same; Same; Same; Republic Act No. 8042 (Migrant Workers and Overseas
Filipinos Act of 1995); Ex Post Facto Laws; R.A. No. 8042 does not apply to an
offense committed before its effectivity.—During the pendency of this case,
Republic Act No. 8042, otherwise known as the “Migrant Workers and Overseas
Filipinos Act of 1995,” was passed increasing the penalty for illegal recruitment.
This new law, however, does not apply to the instant case because the offense
charged herein was committed in 1992, before the effectivity of said Republic Act
No. 8042. Hence, what are applicable are the aforecited Labor Code provisions.
Same; Same; Same; In illegal recruitment cases, the number of persons victimized
is determinative.—It is evident that in illegal recruitment cases, the number of
persons victimized is determinative. Where illegal recruitment is committed against
a lone victim, the accused may be convicted of simple illegal recruitment which is
punishable with a lower penalty under Article 39(c) of the Labor Code. Corollarily,
where the offense is committed against three or more persons, it is qualified to
illegal recruitment in large scale which provides a higher penalty under Article
39(a) of the same Code.
Same; Same; Same; Right of Confrontation; The right of confrontation has two
purposes: first, to secure the opportunity of cross-examination; and, second, to
allow the judge to observe the deportment and appearance of the witness while
testifying.—Under the aforecited rules, the accused in a criminal case is
guaranteed the right of confrontation. Such right has two purposes: first, to secure
the opportunity of cross-examination; and, second, to allow the judge to observe
the deportment and appearance of the witness while testifying.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Hearsay Rule; The right of confrontation is not
absolute as it is recognized that it is sometimes impossible to recall or produce a
witness who has already testified in a previous proceeding, in which event his
previous testimony is made admissible as a distinct piece of evidence, by way of
exception to the hearsay rule.—This right, however, is not absolute as it is
recognized that it is sometimes impossible to recall or produce a witness who has
already testified in a previous proceeding, in which event his previous testimony is
made admissible as a distinct piece of evidence, by way of exception to the
hearsay rule. The previous testimony is made admissible because it makes the
administration of justice orderly and expeditious.
C o n s ti t u ti o n a l L a w I I S e c . 1 4 a n d 1 6 P a g e | 68
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Judgments; The exception to the right of
confrontation contemplated by law covers only the utilization of testimonies of
absent witnesses made in previous proceedings, and does not include utilization of
previous decisions or judgments.—Under these rules, the adoption by the Makati
trial court of the facts stated in the decision of the Parañaque trial court does not
fall under the exception to the right of confrontation as the exception
contemplated by law covers only the utilization of testimonies of absent witnesses
made in previous proceedings, and does not include utilization of previous
decisions or judgments.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; A previous decision or judgment, while
admissible in evidence, may only prove that an accused was previously convicted
of a crime—it may not be used to prove that the accused is guilty of a crime
charged in a subsequent case.—A previous decision or judgment, while admissible
in evidence, may only prove that an accused was previously convicted of a crime.
It may not be used to prove that the accused is guilty of a crime charged in a
subsequent case, in lieu of the requisite evidence proving the commission of the
crime, as said previous decision is hearsay. To sanction its being used as a basis
for conviction in a subsequent case would constitute a violation of the right of the
accused to confront the witnesses against him.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Every conviction must be based on the findings
of fact made by a trial court according to its appreciation of the evidence before it
—a conviction may not be based merely on the findings of fact of another court.—
As earlier stated, the Makati court’s utilization of and reliance on the previous
decision of the Parañaque court must be rejected. Every conviction must be based
on the findings of fact made by a trial court according to its appreciation of the
evidence before it. A conviction may not be based merely on the findings of fact of
another court, especially where what is presented is only its decision sans the
transcript of the testimony of the witnesses who testified therein and upon which
the decision is based.
Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; “Simple Illegal Recruitment” and “Illegal
Recruitment in Large Scale,” Distinguished.—The distinction between simple illegal
recruitment and illegal recruitment in large scale are emphasized by jurisprudence.
Simple illegal recruitment is committed where a person: (a) undertakes any
recruitment activity defined under Article 13(b) or any prohibited practice
enumerated under Articles 34 and 38 of the Labor Code; and (b) does not have a
license or authority to lawfully engage in the recruitment and placement of
workers. On the other hand, illegal recruitment in large scale further requires a

third element, that is, the offense is committed against three or more persons,
individually or as a group.
Same; Same; Same; Evidence; In illegal recruitment in large scale, while the law
does not require that at least three victims testify at the trial, it is necessary that
there is sufficient evidence proving that the offense was committed against three
or more persons.—In illegal recruitment in large scale, while the law does not
require that at least three victims testify at the trial, it is necessary that there is
sufficient evidence proving that the offense was committed against three or more
persons. This Court agrees with the trial court that the evidence presented
sufficiently proves that illegal recruitment was committed by appellant against
Marasigan, but the same conclusion cannot be made as regards Generillo and Del
Rosario as well.
Same; Same; Same; Estafa; Double Jeopardy; Conviction under the Labor Code for
illegal recruitment does not preclude punishment under the Revised Penal Code for
the felony of estafa.—The Court likewise affirms the conviction of appellant for
estafa which was committed against Marasigan. Conviction under the Labor Code
for illegal recruitment does not preclude punishment under the Revised Penal Code
for the felony of estafa. This Court is convinced that the prosecution proved
beyond reasonable doubt that appellant violated Article 315(2)(a) of the Revised
Penal Code. People vs. Ortiz-Miyake, 279 SCRA 180, G.R. Nos. 115338-39
September 16, 1997
REGALADO, J.:
Accused-appellant Lanie Ortiz-Miyake was charged with illegal recruitment in large
scale in the Regional Trial Court of Makati on a complaint initiated by Elenita
Marasigan, Imelda Generillo and Rosamar del Rosario. In addition, she was
indicted for estafa by means of false pretenses in the same court, the offended
party being Elenita Marasigan alone.
The information in the charge of illegal recruitment in large scale in Criminal Case
No. 92-6153 reads as follows:
That in or about the period comprised from June 1992 to August 1992, in the
Municipality of Paraaque, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, falsely representing herself to
have the capacity and power to contract, enlist and recruit workers for
employment abroad did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously collect
for a fee, recruit and promise employment/job placement abroad to the following
C o n s ti t u ti o n a l L a w I I S e c . 1 4 a n d 1 6 P a g e | 69
persons, to wit: 1) Rosamar del Rosario; 2) Elenita Marasigan; 3) Imelda Generillo,
without first securing the required license or authority from the Department of
Labor and Employment, thus amounting to illegal recruitment in large scale, in
violation of the aforecited law. 1chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The information in the charge for estafa in Criminal Case No. 92-6154 alleges:
That in or about or sometime in the month of August, 1992, in the Municipality of
Paraaque, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, by means of false pretenses executed prior to or
simultaneously with the commission of the fraud, falsely pretending to have the
capacity and power to send complainant Elenita Marasigan to work abroad,
succeeded in inducing the latter to give and deliver to her the total sum
of P23,000.00, the accused knowing fully well that the said manifestations and
representation are false and fraudulent and calculated only to deceive the said
complainant to part with her money, and, once in possession thereof, the said
accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously appropriate, apply
and convert the same to her own personal use and benefit, to the damage and
prejudice of the said Elenita Marasigan, in the aforementioned amount
of P23,000.00. 2chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Upon arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty to the charges and the cases were
tried jointly in Branch 145 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati.
Of the three complainants in the case for illegal recruitment in large scale,
Marasigan was the only one who testified at the trial. The two other complainants,
Generillo and Del Rosario, were unable to testify as they were then abroad.
Marasigan testified that she was a 32 year-old unmarried sales representative in
1992 when she was introduced to appellant by her co-complainants. 3 Appellant
promised Marasigan a job as a factory worker in Taiwan for a P5,000.00 fee. At
that time, Marasigan had a pending application for overseas employment pending
in a recruitment agency. Realizing that the fee charged by appellant was much
lower than that of the agency, Marasigan withdrew her money from the agency
and gave it to appellant. 4chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Marasigan paid appellant P5,000.00, but she was later required to make additional
payments. By the middle of the year, she had paid a total of P23,000.00 on
installment basis. 5 Save for two receipts, 6 Marasigan was not issued receipts for
the foregoing payments despite her persistence in requesting for the same.

Marasigan was assured by appellant that obtaining a Taiwanese visa would not be
a problem. 7 She was also shown a plane ticket to Taiwan, allegedly issued in her
name. 8Appellant issued Marasigan a photocopy of her plane ticket, 9 the original of
which was promised to be given to her before her
departure. 10chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Marasigan was never issued a visa. 11 Neither was she given the promised plane
ticket. Unable to depart for Taiwan, she went to the travel agency which issued
the ticket and was informed that not only was she not booked by appellant for the
alleged flight, but that the staff in the agency did not even know appellant.
Later, Marasigan proceeded to the supposed residence of appellant and was
informed that appellant did not live there. 12 Upon verification with the Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration (POEA), it was revealed that appellant was
not authorized to recruit workers for overseas employment. 13 Marasigan wanted to
recover her money but, by then, appellant could no longer be located.
The prosecution sought to prove that Generillo and Del Rosario, the two other
complainants in the illegal recruitment case, were also victimized by appellant. In
lieu of their testimonies, the prosecution presented as witnesses Lilia Generillo, the
mother of Imelda Generillo, and Victoria Amin, the sister of Del Rosario.
Lilia Generillo claimed that she gave her daughter P8,000.00 to cover her
application for placement abroad which was made through appellant. 14 Twice, she
accompanied her daughter to the residence of appellant so that she could meet
her; however, she was not involved in the transactions between her daughter and
appellant. 15 Neither was she around when payments were made to appellant.
Imelda Generillo was unable to leave for abroad and Lilia Generillo concluded that
she had become a victim of illegal recruitment.
The prosecution presented Victoria Amin, the sister of Rosamar Del Rosario, to
show that the latter was also a victim of illegal recruitment. Victoria Amin testified
that appellant was supposed to provide her sister a job abroad. She claimed that
she gave her sister a total of P10,000.00 which was intended to cover the latters
processing fee. 16chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Victoria Amin never met appellant and was not around when her sister made
payments. She assumed that the money was paid to appellant based on receipts,
allegedly issued by appellant, which her sister showed her. 17 Del Rosario was
unable to leave for abroad despite the representations of appellant. Victoria Amin
claimed that her sister, like Marasigan and Generillo, was a victim of illegal
recruitment.
C o n s ti t u ti o n a l L a w I I S e c . 1 4 a n d 1 6 P a g e | 70
The final witness for the prosecution was Riza Balberte, 18 a representative of the
POEA, who testified that appellant was neither licensed nor authorized to recruit
workers for overseas employment, POEA certificate
certification. 19chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Upon the foregoing evidence, the prosecution sought to prove that although two of
the three complainants in the illegal recruitment case were unable to testify,
appellant was guilty of committing the offense against all three complainants and,
therefore, should be convicted as charged.
On the other hand, appellant, who was the sole witness for the defense, denied
that she recruited the complainants for overseas employment and claimed that the
payments made to her were solely for purchasing plane tickets at a discounted
rate as she had connections with a travel agency. 20chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
She denied that she was paid by Marasigan the amount of P23,000.00, claiming
that she was paid only P8,000.00, as shown by a receipt. She further insisted that,
through the travel agency, 21 she was able to purchase discounted plane tickets for
the complainants upon partial payment of the ticket prices, the balance of which
she guaranteed. According to her, the complainants were supposed to pay her the
balance but because they failed to do so, she was obliged to pay the entire cost of
each ticket.
The evidence presented by the parties were thus contradictory but the trial court
found the prosecutions evidence more credible. On December 17, 1993, judgment
was rendered by said court convicting appellant of both crimes as
charged. 22chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In convicting appellant of illegal recruitment in large scale, the lower court adopted
a previous decision of Branch 78 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Paraaque as a
basis for the judgment. Said previous decision was a conviction for estafa
promulgated on July 26, 1993, 23rendered in Criminal Cases Nos. 74852-53,
involving the same circumstances in the instant case, wherein complainants
Generillo and Del Rosario charged appellant with two counts of estafa. This
decision was not appealed and had become final and executory.
In thus convicting appellant in the illegal recruitment case, the decision therein of
the Regional Trial Court stated that the facts in the foregoing estafa cases were
the same as those in the illegal recruitment case before it. It, therefore, adopted
the facts and conclusions established in the earlier decision as its own findings of
facts and as its rationale for the conviction in the case before
it. 24chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

In Criminal Case No. 92-6153, the Makati court sentenced appellant to serve the
penalty of life imprisonment for illegal recruitment in large scale, as well as to pay
a fine of P100,000.00. Appellant was also ordered to reimburse the complainants
the following payments made to her, viz.: (a) Marasigan, P23,000.00; (b)
Generillo, P2,500.00; and (c) Del Rosario, P2,500.00.
In the same judgment and for the estafa charged in Criminal Case No. 92-6154,
the Makati court sentenced appellant to suffer imprisonment of four (4) years and
two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years of prision
mayor, as maximum, and to pay the costs.
In the instant petition, appellant seeks the reversal of the foregoing judgment of
the Regional Trial Court of Makati convicting her of illegal recruitment in large
scale and estafa. Specifically, she insists that the trial court erred in convicting her
of illegal recruitment in large scale as the evidence presented was insufficient.
Moreover, appellant claims that she is not guilty of acts constituting illegal
recruitment, in large scale or otherwise, because contrary to the findings of the
trial court, she did not recruit the complainants but merely purchased plane tickets
for them. Finally, she contends that in convicting her of estafa, the lower court
erred as she did not misappropriate the money paid to her by Marasigan, hence
there was no damage to the complainants which would substantiate the
conviction.
We uphold the finding that appellant is guilty but we are, compelled to modify the
judgment for the offenses she should be convicted of and the corresponding
penalties therefor.
Appellant maintains that her conviction for illegal recruitment in large scale is
erroneous. It is her view that in the prosecution of a case for such offense, at least
three complainants are required to appear as witnesses in the trial and, since
Marasigan was the only complainant presented as a witness, the conviction was
groundless.
The Solicitor General also advocates the conviction of appellant for simple illegal
recruitment which provides a lower penalty. The Court finds the arguments of the
Solicitor General meritorious and adopts his position.
The Labor Code defines recruitment and placement as x x x any act of canvassing,
enlisting, contracting transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring workers and
C o n s ti t u ti o n a l L a w I I S e c . 1 4 a n d 1 6 P a g e | 71
includes referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for employment,
locally or abroad, whether for profit or not x x x. 25chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Illegal recruitment is likewise defined and made punishable under the Labor Code,
thus:
Art. 38. Illegal Recruitment. -
(a) Any recruitment activities, including the prohibited practices enumerated under
Article 34 of this Code, to be undertaken by non-licensees or non-holders of
authority shall be deemed illegal and punishable under Article 39 of this Code. x x
x.
(b) Illegal recruitment when committed by a syndicate or in large scale shall be
considered an offense involving economic sabotage and shall be penalized in
accordance with Article 39 hereof.
x x x Illegal recruitment is deemed committed in large scale if committed against
three (3) or more persons individually or as a group.
Art. 39. Penalties. -
(a) The penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of One Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P100,000.00) shall be imposed if Illegal Recruitment constitutes economic
sabotage as defined herein;
xxx
(c) Any person who is neither a licensee nor a holder of authority under this Title
found violating any provision thereof or its implementing rules and regulations
shall, upon conviction thereof, suffer the penalty of imprisonment of not less than
four (4) years nor more than eight (8) years or a fine of not less than P20,000.00
nor more than P100,000.00, or both such imprisonment and fine, at the discretion
of the court. x x x 26chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
During the pendency of this case, Republic Act No. 8042, otherwise known as the
Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995, was passed increasing the
penalty for illegal recruitment. This new law, however, does not apply to the
instant case because the offense charged herein was committed in 1992, before
the effectivity of said Republic Act No. 8042. Hence, what are applicable are the
aforecited Labor Code provisions.

It is evident that in illegal recruitment cases, the number of persons victimized is
determinative. Where illegal recruitment is committed against a lone victim, the
accused may be convicted of simple illegal recruitment which is punishable with a
lower penalty under Article 39(c) of the Labor Code. Corollarily, where the offense
is committed against three or more persons, it is qualified to illegal recruitment in
large scale which provides a higher penalty under Article 39(a) of the same Code.
The position of the Solicitor General is that the conviction of appellant should be
merely for the lesser offense of simple illegal recruitment. He submits that the
Regional Trial Court of Makati erred in convicting appellant of illegal recruitment in
large scale because the conviction was based on an earlier decision of the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Paraaque where appellant was found guilty of estafa
committed against Generillo and Del Rosario.
It is argued that the Makati court could not validly adopt the facts embodied in the
decision of the Paraaque court to show that illegal recruitment was committed
against Generillo and Del Rosario as well. Illegal recruitment was allegedly proven
to have been committed against only one person, particularly, Elenita Marasigan.
Appellant, therefore, may only be held guilty of simple illegal recruitment and not
of such offense in large scale.
He further submits that the adoption by the Makati court of the facts in the
decision of the Paraaque court for estafa to constitute the basis of the subsequent
conviction for illegal recruitment is erroneous as it is a violation of the right of
appellant to confront the witnesses, that is, complainants Generillo and Del
Rosario, during trial before it. He cites the pertinent provision of Rule 115 of the
Rules of Court, to wit:
Section 1. Rights of accused at the trial. In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall be entitled:
xxx
(f) To confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him at the trial. Either
party may utilize as part of its evidence the testimony of a witness who is
deceased, out of or cannot, with due diligence be found in the Philippines,
unavailable or otherwise unable to testify, given in another case or proceeding,
judicial or administrative, involving the same parties and subject matter, the
adverse party having had the opportunity to cross-examine him.
xxx
C o n s ti t u ti o n a l L a w I I S e c . 1 4 a n d 1 6 P a g e | 72
It will be noted that the principle embodied in the foregoing rule is likewise found
in the following provision of Rule 130:
Section 47. Testimony or deposition at a former proceeding. - The testimony or
deposition of a witness deceased or unable to testify, given in a former case or
proceeding, judicial or administrative, involving the same parties and subject
matter, may be given in evidence against the adverse party who had the
opportunity to cross-examine him.
Under the aforecited rules, the accused in a criminal case is guaranteed the right
of confrontation. Such right has two purposes: first, to secure the opportunity of
cross-examination; and, second, to allow the judge to observe the deportment and
appearance of the witness while testifying. 27chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
This right, however, is not absolute as it is recognized that it is sometimes
impossible to recall or produce a witness who has already testified in a previous
proceeding, in which event his previous testimony is made admissible as a distinct
piece of evidence, by way of exception to the hearsay rule. 28 The previous
testimony is made admissible because it makes the administration of justice
orderly and expeditious. 29chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Under these rules, the adoption by the Makati trial court of the facts stated in
the decision of the Paraaque trial court does not fall under the exception to the
right of confrontation as the exception contemplated by law covers only the
utilization of testimonies of absent witnesses made in previous proceedings, and
does not include utilization of previous decisions or judgments.
In the instant case, the prosecution did not offer the testimonies made by
complainants Generillo and Del Rosario in the previous estafa case. Instead, what
was offered, admitted in evidence, and utilized as a basis for the conviction in the
case for illegal recruitment in large scale was the previous decision in the estafa
case.
A previous decision or judgment, while admissible in evidence, may only prove that
an accused was previously convicted of a crime. 30It may not be used to prove that
the accused is guilty of a crime charged in a subsequent case, in lieu of the
requisite evidence proving the commission of the crime, as said previous decision
is hearsay. To sanction its being used as a basis for conviction in a subsequent
case would constitute a violation of the right of the accused to confront the
witnesses against him.

As earlier stated, the Makati courts utilization of and reliance on the previous
decision of the Paraaque court must be rejected. Every conviction must be based
on the findings of fact made by a trial court according to its appreciation of the
evidence before it. A conviction may not be based merely on the findings of fact of
another court, especially where what is presented is only its decision sansthe
transcript of the testimony of the witnesses who testified therein and upon which
the decision is based.
Furthermore, this is not the only reason why appellant may not be held liable for
illegal recruitment in large scale. An evaluation of the evidence presented before
the trial court shows us that, apart from the adopted decision in the previous
estafa case, there was no other basis for said trial courts conclusion that illegal
recruitment in large scale was committed against all three complainants.
The distinction between simple illegal recruitment and illegal recruitment in large
scale are emphasized by jurisprudence. Simple illegal recruitment is committed
where a person: (a) undertakes any recruitment activity defined under Article
13(b) or any prohibited practice enumerated under Articles 34 and 38 of the Labor
Code; and (b) does not have a license or authority to lawfully engage in the
recruitment and placement of workers. 31 On the other hand, illegal recruitment in
large scale further requires a third element, that is, the offense is committed
against three or more persons, individually or as a
group. 32chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In illegal recruitment in large scale, while the law does not require that at least
three victims testify at the trial, it is necessary that there is sufficient evidence
proving that the offense was committed against three or more persons. This Court
agrees with the trial court that the evidence presented sufficiently proves that
illegal recruitment was committed by appellant against Marasigan, but the same
conclusion cannot be made as regards Generillo and Del Rosario as well.
The testimonies of Generillos mother, Lilia Generillo, and Del Rosarios sister,
Victoria Amin, reveal that these witnesses had no personal knowledge of the actual
circumstances surrounding the charges filed by Generillo and Del Rosario for illegal
recruitment in large scale. Neither of these witnesses was privy to the transactions
between appellant and each of the two complainants. The witnesses claimed that
appellant illegally recruited Generillo and Del Rosario. Nonetheless, we find their
averments to be unfounded as they were not even present when Generillo and Del
Rosario negotiated with and made payments to appellant.
For insufficiency of evidence and in the absence of the third element of illegal
recruitment in large scale, particularly, that the offense is committed against three
C o n s ti t u ti o n a l L a w I I S e c . 1 4 a n d 1 6 P a g e | 73
or more persons, we cannot affirm the conviction for illegal recruitment in large
scale. Nonetheless, we agree with the finding of the trial court that appellant
illegally recruited Marasigan, for which she must be held liable for the lesser
offense of simple illegal recruitment.
Appellants defense that she did not recruit Marasigan but merely purchased a
plane ticket for her is belied by the evidence as it is undeniable that she
represented to Marasigan that she had the ability to send people to work as
factory workers in Taiwan. Her pretext that the fees paid to her were merely
payments for a plane ticket is a desperate attempt to exonerate herself from the
charges and cannot be sustained.
Furthermore, no improper motive may be attributed to Marasigan in charging
appellant. The fact that Marasigan was poor does not make her so heartless as to
contrive a criminal charge against appellant. She was a simple woman with big
dreams and it was appellants duplicity which reduced those dreams to naught.
Marasigan had no motive to testify falsely against appellant except to tell the
truth. 33chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Besides, if there was anyone whose testimony needed corroboration, it was
appellant as there was nothing in her testimony except the bare denial of the
accusations. 34 If appellant really intended to purchase a plane ticket and not to
recruit Marasigan, she should have presented evidence to support this claim. Also,
in her testimony, appellant named an employee in the travel agency who was
allegedly her contact person for the purchase of the ticket. She could have
presented that person, or some other employee of the agency, to show that the
transaction was merely for buying a ticket. Her failure to do the foregoing acts
belies her pretensions.
The Court likewise affirms the conviction of appellant for estafa which was
committed against Marasigan. Conviction under the Labor Code for illegal
recruitment does not preclude punishment under the Revised Penal Code for the
felony of estafa. 35 This Court is convinced that the prosecution proved beyond
reasonable doubt that appellant violated Article 315(2)(a) of the Revised Penal
Code which provides that estafa is committed:
2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed
prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud:
(a) By using fictitious name or falsely pretending to possess power, influence,
qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions, or by
means of other similar deceits.
 C o n s ti t u ti o n a l L a w I I S e c . 1 4 a n d 1 6 P a g e | 74

The evidence is clear that in falsely pretending to possess power to deploy persons
for overseas placement, appellant deceived the complainant into believing that she
would provide her a job in Taiwan. Her assurances made Marasigan exhaust
whatever resources she had to pay the placement fee required in exchange for the
promised job. The elements of deceit and damage for this form of estafa are
indisputably present, hence the conviction for estafa in Criminal Case No. 92-6154
should be affirmed.
Under the Revised Penal Code, an accused found guilty of estafa shall be
sentenced to:
x x x The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in
its minimum period, if the amount of the fraud is over 12,000 but does not exceed
22,000 pesos, and if such amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in
this paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each
additional 10,000 pesos x x x. 36chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
1) Accused-appellant is declared guilty beyond reasonable doubt of simple illegal
recruitment, as defined in Article 38(a) of the Labor Code, as amended. She is
hereby ordered to serve an indeterminate sentence of four (4) years, as minimum,
to eight (8) years, as maximum, and to pay a fine of P100,000.00.
2) In Criminal Case No. 92-6154 for estafa, herein accused-appellant is ordered to
serve an indeterminate sentence of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years of prision mayor, as maximum, and to
reimburse Elenita Marasigan the sum of P23,000.00.
In all other respects, the aforestated judgment is AFFIRMED, with costs against
accused-appellant in both instances.
SO ORDERED.

The amount involved in the estafa case is P23,000.00. Applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, the maximum penalty shall be taken from the maximum period of
the foregoing basic penalty, specifically, within the range of imprisonment from six
(6) years, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days to eight (8) years.

On the other hand, the minimum penalty of the indeterminate sentence shall be
within the range of the penalty next lower in degree to that provided by law,
without considering the incremental penalty for the amount in excess
of P22,000.00. 37 That penalty immediately lower in degree is prison correccional in
its minimum and medium periods, with a duration of six (6) months and one (1)
day to four (4) years and two (2) months. On these considerations, the trial court
correctly fixed the minimum and maximum terms of the indeterminate sentence in
the estafa case.

While we must be vigilant and should punish, to the fullest extent of the law, those
who prey upon the desperate with empty promises of better lives, only to feed on G.R. No. L-29271 August 29, 1980
their aspirations, we must not be heedless of the basic rule that a conviction may
be sustained only where it is for the correct offense and the burden of proof of the THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ADELINO
guilt of the accused has been met by the prosecution. BARDAJE, defendant-appellant.

Criminal Law; Evidence; Rape; In crimes against chastity conviction or acquittal

WHEREFORE, the judgment of the court a quofinding accused-appellant Lanie
Ortiz-Miyake guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of illegal recruitment in
large scale (Criminal Case No. 92-6153) and estafa (Criminal Case No. 92-6154) is
hereby MODIFIED, as follows:
depends almost entirely on the credibility of complaining witness.—In crimes
against chastity, the conviction or acquittal of an accused depends almost entirely
on the credibility of a complainant’s testimony since by the intrinsic nature of those
crimes they usually involve only two persons—the complainant and the accused.

The offended party’s testimony, therefore, must be subjected to thorough scrutiny
for a determination of its veracity beyond reasonable doubt. In the instant case,
we find MARCELINA’s charge that she was forcibly abducted and afterwards raped
by ADELINO in conspiracy with FIVE OTHERS highly dubious and inherently
improbable.
Same; Same; Same; Physical evidence is of the highest order. The medical
findings showed no evidence of external injuries, disproving what complainant
testified to that she was dragged from the house thus rendering her credibility in
doubt.—To start with according to the medical findings, “no evidence of external
injuries was found around the vulva or any part of the body” of Complainant, a
fact which is strange, indeed, considering that Complainant was allegedly
“dragged”, “slapped” into unconsciousness, “wrestled” with, and criminally abused.
Physical evidence is of the highest order and speaks more eloquently than all
witnesses put together. We are also faced with the medical finding of “old healed
lacerations” in the hymen which, according to the testimony of the examimng
physician would have occurred two weeks or even one month before if said
lacerations had been caused by sexual intercourse. This expert opinion bolsters the
defense that MARCELINA and ADELINO had previous amorous relations at the
same time that it casts serious doubts on the charge of intercourse by force and
intimidation.
Same; Same; Same; It is impossible that complainant could have been raped by
the accused inside a small room occupied by a woman and two children and in a
small hut where the owner, his wife and seven children are all particularly where
allegedly the appellant was with five other persons residing therein.—Secondly, by
Complainant’s own admission the first hut she was taken to was a small one-room
affair occupied by a woman and two small children. Her charge, therefore, that she
was ravished in that same room is highly improbable and contrary to human
experience. Thirdly, from her own lips Complainant testified that the second hut
where she was taken, that of Ceferino Armada, consisted of a small room
separated from the sala by a wall of split bamboos. Further that Ceferino with his
wife and seven children all lived therein. It challenges human credulity that she
could have been sexually abused with so many within hearing and seeing distance.
It is unbelievable, too, that under those circumstances the FIVE OTHERS could
have stood guard outside, armed with bolos and drinking, while ADELINO allegedly
took advantage of her. If rape were, indeed, their malevolent intent, they would,
in all probability, have taken turns in abusing her. That they did not, indicates that
there was, indeed some special relationship between MARCELINA and ADELINO.
Furthermore, with people around, and the hut constructed as it was, it would have
been an easy matter for MARCELINA to have shouted and cried for help. Surely,
C o n s ti t u ti o n a l L a w I I S e c . 1 4 a n d 1 6 P a g e | 75
the old man Ceferino, his wife and/or his children could not have been insensible
to her outcries notwithstanding their relationship to ADELINO. The aphorism still
rings true that evidence to be believed must not only come from the mouth of a
credible witness but must be credible in itself.
Same; Same; Same; A girl of tender age may be confronted with a situation
wherein she could not admit to her parents that she actually eloped with appellant.
—This case also constitutes an exception to the general belief that a young girl
would not expose herself to the ordeal of public trial if she were not motivated
solely by a desire to have the culprit who had ravished and shamed her placed
behind bars. As we view it, MARCELINA was confronted with a paradoxical
situation as a daughter of relatively tender age, who could not shamefacedly admit
to her parents that she had eloped and voluntarily submitted to sexual intercourse,
since that elopement must have met with righteous indignation on the part of her
parents. As a result, MARCELINA was faced with no other choice but to charge
ADELINO with rape or incur the ire of her parents and social disrepute from a
small community.
Same; Same; Same; Extrajudicial confession is not enough to convict unless
accompanied by evidence of corpus delicti.—In respect of the alleged confession of
ADELINO, suffice it to re-state that “an extrajudicial confession made by an
accused shall not be sufficient ground for conviction unless corroborated by
evidence of corpus delicti”. Corpus delicti is proved when the evidence on record
shows that the crime prosecuted had been committed. That proof has not been
met in the case at bar, the evidence establishing more of an elopement rather than
kidnapping or illegal detention or forcible abduction, and much less rape.
Moreover, ADELINO, age 18, was by himself when being investigated by soldiers,
without benefit of counsel nor of anyone to advise him of his rights. Aside from his
declaration that his confession was obtained through maltreatment and violence, it
was also vitiated by a procedural irregularity testified to by no less than
prosecution witness Sgt. Pedro Gacelos to the effect that he and ADELINO were
ordered to get out from the Clerk of Court’s room after he presented the statement
to the Clerk of Court, Mr. Rojas. There is reason to believe, therefore, that the so-
called confession was attested without ADELINO’s presence so that the latter
cannot be said to have duly subscribed and sworn to it.
Criminal Procedure; In capital offenses, the trial court should call the attention of
the accused to the discrepancy between the designation of the crime in the
preamble to the information and the facts pleaded in the body thereof. In the case
at bar the preamble denominated the offense as rape with illegal detention, but
the body of the information alleged facts constitutive of forcible abduction with

rape.—It should also be noted that throughout the hearings before the trial court,
it was assumed that ADELINO was being held responsible for the complex crime of
Rape with Illegal Detention-While it is true that an accused can be punished for a
crime described by the facts alleged in the Information despite a wrong
designation of the crime in the preamble of the Information, yet, in capital cases, it
should be desirable that, whenever a discrepancy is noted between the
designation of the crime made by the Fiscal and the crime described by the facts
pleaded in his Information, the lower Court should call attention of the accused to
the discrepancy, so that the accused may be fully apprised of the nature and cause
of the accusation against him. This was not done in regards to ADELINO who all
the time was under the impression that he was being tried for Rape with Illegal
Detention, and not for Forcible Abduction with Rape. If ADELINO had known that
he was being tried for Forcible Abduction with Rape, he may have changed the
strategy or tactics of his defense. Not that it could be said he would have done so;
but he should have been advised he had the right, and given the opportunity, to
do so.
Same; Constitutional Law; The trial court should not delegate to the accused the
responsibility of getting his witnesses. The court should subpoena a defense
witness if accused asks for it.—Again, one of the rights of an accused is “to have
compulsory process issued to secure the attendance of witnesses on his behalf.”
ADELINO had stated that, while MARCELINA was in the house of Ceferino Armada,
she curled the hair of Narita, one of the latter’s children, as well as the hair of
other girls in the vicinity. ADELINO wanted to have Narita testify on his behalf, and
a subpoena had been issued to her. But instead of taking effective steps to have
Narita brought to Court, the lower court gave responsibility for Narita’s attendance
to the defense, expressly stating that, if the defense was not able to bring her to
the Court, her testimony will be dispensed with.
Same; Evidence; Judges; A trial judge should take a more active role in asking
searching questions to witnesses.—It may not be amiss to state then that just as
in pleas of guilty where a grave offense is charged trial Judges have been enjoined
to refrain from accepting them with alacrity but to be extra solicitous in seeing to it
that an accused fully understands the import of his plea, so also, in prosecutions
for capital offenses, it behooves the trial courts to exercise greater care in
safeguarding the rights of an accused. The trial Judge should also take a more
active role by means of searching questions in the examination of witnesses for
the ascertainment of the truth and credibility of their testimonies so that any
judgment of conviction imposing the supreme penalty may rest on firm and
unequivocal grounds. The life and liberty of an individual demand no less.
C o n s ti t u ti o n a l L a w I I S e c . 1 4 a n d 1 6 P a g e | 76
Aquino, J., dissenting:
Criminal Law; The accused may not be guilty of rape beyond reasonable doubt,
but he is guilty of serious illegal detention of a minor.—But there is no doubt that
Bardaje and his companions committed kidnapping and serious illegal detention of
a minor as well as of a “female”, an offense penalized in article 267(4) of the
Revised Penal Code with reclusion perpetua to death. Republic Act No. 18
specifically made kidnapping of a minor and a woman a capital offense in order to
deter the kidnapping of minors and women, a crime which was very rampant after
liberation. The victim might have been a girl, who, like many teenagers of today
does not safeguard her virtue or chastity and easily succumbs to the temptation of
the flesh. Time Magazine reports that at the Puerta del Sol in Madrid, Spain, there
is a billboard on which is emblazoned Oscar Wilde’s witticism: “Puedo resistir todo
excepto la tentacion.”) People vs. Bardaje, 99 SCRA 388, No. L-29271 August 29,
1980
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
The accused ADELINO Bardaje in this case, after trial, has been convicted of
Forcible Abduction with Rape, and sentenced to death. The case is before us on
automatic review.
On December 20, 1965, MARCELINA Cuizon lodged the following complaint with
the Court of First Instance of Samar against ADELINO and five (5) others 'namely,
Lucio Malate, Pedro Odal, Adriano Odal, Silvino Odal and Fidel Ansuas (hereinafter
called the FIVE OTHERS):
The undersigned complainant, after having been duly sworn to according to
law, accuses Adelino Bardaje, Lucio Malate, Pedro Odal, Adriano Odal, Silvino Odal
and Fidel Ansuas of the crime of Rape, committed as follows:
That on or about the period from the 14th day to 17th day of
December, 1965, in Bo. Lopig, Sta. Rita, Province of Samar,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court
the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating together
and helping one another, with lewd design, by means of force
and intimidation, and at nighttime, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously drag one Marcelina Cuizon from the
house of one Norma Fernandez and brought her to a far away
place and once there, accused Adelino Bardaje, by means of

force and intimidation forcibly had sexual intercourse with her
several times while his co-accused were on guard.
Contrary to law. (Emphasis supplied).
ADELINO was arrested on December 17th, and it was on December 20th, when he
signed the alleged confession, Exhibit "C", admitting having kidnapped and
molested MARCELINA, 1 which was probably the basis for MARCELINA's complaint,
presumably prepared with the help of the Fiscal. What has been noticed is that, in
Exhibit "C", ADELINO had mentioned that, besides the FIVE OTHERS, a sixth,
Domingo Odal, was with the group when MARCELINA was "kidnapped". There is
no indication in the record as to why Domingo Odal was not included in
MARCELINA's complaint as one of the accused.
The following day, December 21st, the Fiscal's office filed the following
Information with the Court:
The undersigned Assistant Provincial Fiscal accuses Adelino
Bardaje, Lucio Malate, Pedro Odal, Adriano Odal, Silvino Odal
and Fidel Ansuas of the crime of Rape with Illegal
Detention  committed as follows:
That on or about the period from the 14th day to 17th day of December, 1965, in
Bo. Crossing, Municipality of Sta. Rita, Province of Samar, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable court the above-named accused, conspiring,
confederating together and helping one another, with Lucio Malate, Pedro Odal,
Adriano Odal, Silvino Odal and Fidel Ansuas, with lewd design, by means of force
and intimidation, armed with bolos and at nighttime, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously drag one Marcelina Cuizon, a minor of 14 years old,
from the house of one Norma Fernandez and brought her to a far away place and
once there, accused Adelino Bardaje, by means of force and intimidation forcibly
had sexual intercourse with her for several times while his co-accused were on
guard.
That the commission of the crime the aggravating circumstances that it was
committed in an uninhabited place and with the aid of armed men, were present.
(Emphasis supplied).
It will be noted that the complaint filed directly by MARCELINA with the Court was
amended by the Fiscal in the Information. While MARCELINA charged ADELINO
only with Rape, the Fiscal charged him with "Rape with Illegal Detention".
C o n s ti t u ti o n a l L a w I I S e c . 1 4 a n d 1 6 P a g e | 77
MARCELINA merely alleged that she was dragged from the house of Norma
Fernandez by means of force and intimidation and at nighttime. On the other
hand, the Information added that the accused were "armed with bolos". The name
of the barrio was also changed from Lopig to Crossing. Lastly, the Information
included the allegation that the crime of Rape with Illegal Detention was
committed with the "aggravating circumstances that it was committed in an
uninhabited place and with the aid of armed men".
Of the six (6) persons accused, the FIVE OTHERS were never arrested, and only
ADELINO stood trial. The period of the offense was from December 14th to 17th,
with the complaint having been filed on December 20th, or barely three (3) days
thereafter. With that time frame in mind, an analysis of the Information will show
the assumption that only ADELINO was the principal  culprit while the FIVE
OTHERS were either principals by cooperation or accomplices. Thus, the clause
"with" Lucio Malate, Pedro Odal, Mariano Odal, Silvino Odal and Fidel Ansuas"
indicates that it was ADELINO who had dragged MARCELINA "with" the help of the
FIVE OTHERS. Both the complaint and Information also indicated that ADELINO
was the only one who committed the rape, while the FIVE OTHERS were merely
accomplices.
On June 2, 1966, before the arraignment of ADELINO, the Information was
amended to include the allegation that MARCELINA was detained and deprived of
liberty for a period of th0ree (3) days, which allegation could be taken into account
in connection with Illegal Detention 2 but not in connection with Forcible
Abduction. 3 Since according to Exhibit "C", MARCELINA was "kidnapped" at
midnight of December 14th, and ADELINO was arrested in the morning of
December 17th, or an interval of less than 72 Hours, it could not be correctly
pleaded that MARCELINA was deprived of liberty for three (3) days. 4
After the trial was concluded, ADELINO's lawyer submitted his Memorandum on
July 26, 1967, in which he specifically argued that "the prosecution did not
establish the elements of Rape and Illegal Detention as prescribed by Articles 335
and 267 of the Revised Penal Code." It was only in the Memorandum of the Fiscal,
dated July 27, 1967, when the position was taken that the crime which should be
imputed to ADELINO is Rape with Forcible Abduction. The prosecution's
Memorandum stated:
Although the information is for Rape with Illegal Detention
instead of Rape with Forcible Abduction, yet from the body of
the information it could be clearly gleaned that the elements of
abduction are sufficiently alleged therein and hence the accused

can be convicted thereunder (People vs. Emiliano Javete, CA
01956-57-CR April 7, 1964 (82-1965).
The following day, July 28, 1967, the trial Court found ADELINO guilty of Forcible
Abduction with Rape with the aggravating circumstances of dwelling and aid of
armed men, and sentenced him to death.
The version of complainant MARCELINA Cuizon, 14 years of age, is that in
December, 1965, she and her mother were living in the house of her aunt, Sofia
Fernandez, at Barrio Crossing, Sta. Rita, Samar, where she worked as a beautician.
At 7:00 o'clock in the evening of December 14, 1965 while she was then eating
supper, ADELINO, whom she knew when they were "still small", and who was her
classmate in Grade II (1960), accompanied by the FIVE OTHERS, entered the
house and began drinking "sho hoc tong" which they brought along. After the
liquor had been fully consumed, Silvino Odal broke the kerosene lamp causing
complete darkness. She then ran to the room where her mother was. ADELINO,
Pedro Odal, Fidel Ansuas, and Adriano Odal, followed her, tried to extricate her
from her mother's embrace and dragged the two of them to the sala. Pedro Odal
choked the mother's neck thereby loosening her hold on the daughter and the four
males, two of whom were armed with bolos, forced her downstairs and by holding
and dragging her, brought her to the mountain about two kilometers from Barrio
Crossing. That was about 12 midnight. On the way, ADELINO slapped her
rendering her unconscious. She regained consciousness in a hut, with ADELINO
holding her hands, and removing her panty. She bit and kicked him. Despite her
struggle, ADELINO succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her while his other
companions stayed outside on guard.
Under cross-examination, MARCELINA declared that she did not know who owned
the hut and that it was just a one-room affair where a woman and two small
children lived; that she and Appellant slept in that same room as the woman, while
the FIVE OTHERS slept near the kitchen. 5
At about 8:00 o'clock the following morning, December 15, ADELINO and the FIVE
OTHERS brought her to another mountain, 6 kilometers farther, arriving there past
twelve o'clock noon at the house of one called Ceferino (also called Cipriano) who
lived there with his family. She was kept in one room. Outside the room were
Pedro Odal, Adriano Odal and Fidel Ansuas, still armed with bolos, drinking and
guarding her. In the evening, ADELINO had another sexual intercourse with her
even though she bit and kicked him and shouted for help which was to no avail as
all present were relatives of ADELINO, with the latter Ceferino "Tatay" She curled
the hair of Narita (daughter of Ceferino) the next day, because ADELINO
threatened to kill her if she did not. Her curling paraphernalia was taken by
C o n s ti t u ti o n a l L a w I I S e c . 1 4 a n d 1 6 P a g e | 78
Adriano Odal, upon ADELINO's instructions, from Norma Fernandez (her cousin)
who gave the equipment as she (Norma) was also threatened. MARCELINA and
her "captors" stayed in Ceferino's house for two days. In the morning of December
17, two soldiers with her father, Alejo Cuizon, arrived. The soldiers apprehended
ADELINO while the FIVE OTHERS jumped down the window and fled. Upon her
father, she embraced him and cried. They all returned to Barrio Crossing. She and
her mother, Maria Fernandez, then went to Catbalogan, where she filed a
complaint at the Fiscal's Office on December 20, 1965 and submitted to a medical
examination at the Samar Provincial Hospital.
When cross-examined, Complainant admitted that Ceferino, his wife. and seven
children were living in the same hut where she was taken the second time, which
hut was about waist high from the ground, consisted of one room, 3 x 2 meters, a
sala, 6 x 3 meters, and a kitchen. Between the room and the sala was a wall of
split bamboos so that noise inside the room could be heard clearly from the other
side. 6
Dr. Vitus Hobayan, Jr., Resident Physician at the Samar Provincial Hospital,
declared that he examined MARCELINA on December 20, 1965 and issued a
Medical Certificate with the following findings:
1. No evidence of external injuries around the vulva or any part
of the body.
2. Hymen no intact, presence of old healed laceration at 4, 7, 12
o'clock.
3. Vagina easily admits two fingers.
4. Vaginal smear negative for spermatozoa 7
Explaining the "old healed laceration", the doctor stated that laceration may have
been caused by possible sexual intercourse or other factors, and if it were
intercourse, he estimated that it could have occured " say, two weeks or one
month" or possibly more. 8
For his part, ADELINO, aged 18, admitted having had carnal knowledge of
MARCELINA but denied having raped her. He claims that they eloped on December
14 to 17, 1965 as previously planned, they having been sweethearts since
November 12, 1964. As such, they used to date in Tacloban and "anything goes".
MARCELINA's family used to have a house in Barrio Crossing but now MARCELINA

just stays in the house of her aunt, Sofia, which is about five houses away from
theirs. In the evening of December 14, 1965, while Sofia, MARCELINA's mother
and others were eating, MARCELINA handed him a bag and beauty culture
equipment through the window, went downstairs, after which the two of them
walked to the mountains, to Ceferino Armada's house. Ceferino was a cousin of
ADELINO's mother. He and MARCELINA slept in the bedroom with 18-year old
Narita, Ceferino's daughter. While in that hut, food was brought to them by his
sister, Nenita. MARCELINA curled Narita's hair the next day.
In the morning of December 17, 1965, Sets. Terado and Gacelos, accompanied by
MARCELINA's father, Alejo Cuizon, apprehended him for having kidnapped
MARCELINA. The latter ran to him and embraced him and said she was to blame.
notwithstanding, he was boxed by the soldiers as instructed by MARCELINA's
father and taken to Maulong PC Headquarters for questioning. During the
investigation, he was boxed and kicked and was forced to sign a statement
implicating the FIVE OTHERS as his companions even if untrue. He did not know
who attested to his statement as one Sgt. Gacelos took the document elsewhere.
Ceferino Armada, 60 years of age, the owner of the hut where MARCELINA was
allegedly forcibly brought the second time, corroborated that portion of ADELINO's
testimony regarding their stay in his house adding that MARCELINA and ADELINO
had told him that they had eloped; that MARCELINA even offered to curl his
daughter's hair (Narita's and Concepcion's), and helped in house chores and in the
threshing of palay, while ADELINO helped in carrying palay because it was rainy.
The trial Court found the prosecutors version of the incident more worthy of
credence stating that Complainant had no improper motive to implicate ADELINO
in such a detestable crime as Rape.
On the basis of the evidence, testimonial and documentary, we find that the guilt
of ADELINO has not been established beyond reasonable doubt.
In crimes against chastity, the conviction or acquittal of an accused depends
almost entirely on the credibility of a complainant's testimony since by the intrinsic
nature of those crimes they usually involve only two persons — the complainant
and the accused. The offended party's testimony, therefore, must be subjected to
thorough scrutiny for a determination of its veracity beyond reasonable doubt.
In the instant case, we find MARCELINA's charge that she was forcibly abducted
and afterwards raped by ADELINO in conspiracy with FIVE OTHERS highly dubious
and inherently improbable.
C o n s ti t u ti o n a l L a w I I S e c . 1 4 a n d 1 6 P a g e | 79
To start with, according to the medical findings, "no evidence of external injuries
was found around the vulva or any part of the body" of Complainant, a fact which
is strange, indeed, considering that Complainant was allegedly "dragged" slapped"
into unconsciousness, "wrestled" with, and criminally abused. Physical evidence is
of the highest order and speaks more eloquently than an witnesses put together.
We are also faced with the medical finding of "old healed lacerations" in the hymen
which, according to the testimony of the examining physician would have occurred
two weeks or even one month before if said lacerations had been caused by sexual
intercourse. This expert opinion bolsters the defense that MARCELINA and
ADELINO had previous amorous relations at the same time that it casts serious
doubts on the charge of intercourse by force and intimidation.
Secondly, by Complainant's own admission, the first hut she was taken to was a
small one-room affair occupied by a woman and two small children. Her charge,
therefore, that she was ravished in that same room is highly improbable and
contrary to human experience.
Thirdly, from her own lips, Complainant testified that the second hut where she
was taken, that of Ceferino Armada, consisted of a small room separated from the
sala by a wall of split bamboos. Further, that Ceferino with his wife and seven
children all lived therein. It challenges human credulity that she could have been
sexually abused with so many within hearing and distance. It is unbelievable, too,
that under those circumstances the FIVE OTHERS could have stood guard outside,
armed with bolos and drinking, while ADELINO allegedly took advantage of her. If
rape were, indeed, their malevolent intent, they would, in all probability, have
taken turns in abusing her. That they did not, indicates that there was, indeed,
some special relationship between MARCELINA and ADELINO. Furthermore, with
people around, and the hut constructed as it was, it would have been an easy
matter for MARCELINA to have shouted and cried for help. Surely, the old man
Ceferino, his wife and/or his children could not have been insensible to her
outcries notwithstanding their relationship to ADELINO. The aphorism still rings
true that evidence to be believed must not only come from the mouth of a credible
witness but must be credible in itself.
Additionally, Complainant admits that she even curled the hair of Narita, one of
Ceferino's daughters, a fact inconsistent with her allegation of "captivity". That she
was threatened with death if she did not accede to such an inconsequential
request defies credulity. The livelihood is that, as the defense maintains,
MARCELINA was not forcibly abducted but that she and ADELINO had, in fact,
eloped and that she had brought her beauty culture paraphernalia with her, or,
that she herself had sent for them from her cousin Norma Fernandez voluntarily
and not under threat from ADELINO.

The totality of the foregoing circumstances count with such great weight and
significance that they lend an aura of improbability and reasonable doubt to the
allegation that MARCELINA had been "kidnapped" or "illegally detained" and that
when she and ADELINO engaged in sexual intercourse, it was because of force or
intimidation exercised upon her. They are circumstances that were overlooked by
the trial Court and justify a reversal of its finding of guilt as an exception to the
established rule that the findings of fact of a trial Judge based on the relative
credibility of witnesses are entitled to great respect and will not be disturbed by
appellate Courts.
This case also constitutes an exception to the general belief that a young girl
would not expose herself to the ordeal of public trial if she were not motivated
solely by a desire to have the culprit who had ravished and shamed her placed
behind bars. As we view it, MARCELINA was confronted with a paradoxical
situation as a daughter of relative tender age who could not shamefacedly admit
to her parents that she had eloped and voluntarily submitted to sexual intercourse,
since that elopement must have met with righteous indignation on the part of her
parents. As a result, MARCELINA was faced with no other choice but to charge
ADELINO with rape or incur the ire of her parents and social disrepute from a
small community.
In respect of the alleged confession of ADELINO, suffice it to re-state that "an
extrajudicial confession made by an accused shag not be sufficient ground for
conviction unless corroborated by evidence of corpus delicti. 9 Corpus delicti  is
proved when the evidence on record shows that the crime prosecuted had been
committed. That proof has not been met in the case at bar, the evidence
establishing more of an elopement rather than kidnapping or illegal detention or
forcible abduction, and much less rape. Moreover, ADELINO, aged 18, was by
himself when being investigated by soldiers, 10 without benefit of counsel nor of
anyone to advise him of his rights. Aside from his declaration that Ws confession
was obtained through maltreatment and violence, 11 it was also vitiated by a
procedural irregularity testified to by no less than prosecution witness Sgt. Pedro
Gacelos to the effect that he and room after he presented the statement to the
Clerk of Court, Mr. Rojas. 12 There is reason to believe, therefore that the so called
confession was attested without ADELINO's presence so that the latter cannot be
said to have duly subscribed and sworn to it.
It should also be noted that throughout the hearings before the trial Court, it was
assumed that ADELINO was being held responsible for the complex crime of Rape
with Illegal Detention. While it is true that an accused can be punished for a crime
described by the facts alleged in tile Information despite a wrong designation of
the crime in the preamble of the Information, 13 yet, in capital cases, it should be
desirable that, whenever a discrepancy is noted between the designation of the
C o n s ti t u ti o n a l L a w I I S e c . 1 4 a n d 1 6 P a g e | 80
crime made by the Fiscal and the crime described by the facts pleaded in his
Information. The lower Court should call attention of the accused to the
discrepancy, so that the accused may be fully apprised of the nature and cause of
the accusation against him. This was not done in regards to ADELINO who all the
time was under the impression that he was being tried for Rape with Illegal
Detention, and not for Forcible Abduction with Rape. If ADELINO had known that
he was being tried for Forcible Abduction with Rape, he may have changed the
strategy or tactics of his defense. Not that it could be said he would have done so;
but he should have been advised he had the right, and given the opportunity, to
do so.
Again, one of the rights of an accused is "to have compulsory process issued to
secure the attendance of witnesses on his behalf. 14 ADELINO had stated that,
while MARCELINA was in the house of Ceferino Armada, she curled the hair of
Narita. one of the latter's children, as well as the hair of other girls in the vicinity.
ADELINO wanted to have Narita testify on his behalf, and a subpoena had been
issued to her. But instead of taking effective steps to have Narita brought to Court,
the lower court gave responsibility for Narita's attendance to the defense,
expressly stating that, if the defense was not able to bring her to the Court, her
testimony will be dispensed with. The record shows:
ATTY. BOHOL
I appear as counsel for the accused. Up to
now, Your Honor, the witnesses we have been
expecting have not yet arrived. This
representation, with the consent of the Clerk
of Court have wired the Chief of Police of Sta.
Rita, Samar to bring Ceferino Armada and
Narita Armada tomorrow for the hearing,
continuation of this case for those persons
mentioned to testify, your Honor, for the
accused. We pray, Your Honor, that we be
given time to hear from the Chief of Police to
bring those persons tomorrow, Your Honor.
COURT
What will be the nature of the testimonies of
those witnesses.

xxx xxx xxx
COURT
How about the other girl?
ATTY. BOHOL
Narita Armada will substantially be
corroborative, Your Honor.
COURT
Suppose the two witnesses do not arrive
tomorrow, for which this case is set also?
ATTY. BOHOL
If we receive information and find that those
witnesses could really not come for this case,
Your Honor, I will be constrained to submit the
case for decision based on the testimony of
the accused. However, Your Honor, if it will be
all right with the Honorable Court and we find
that there is hope that within this week
Ceferino Armada could come here, in view of
the distance, I pray before the Honorable
Court that we be given time within this week
to present Ceferino Armada, and upon his
failure, submit the case for decision
COURT
The Court will not allow that anymore, anyway
this case is set for tomorrow. The Court wail
grant the postponement today on condition
that any witness not presented tomorrow will
be considered waived Afterall as you have
manifest, 4 their testimonies will be
corroborative.
C o n s ti t u ti o n a l L a w I I S e c . 1 4 a n d 1 6 P a g e | 81
xxx xxx xxx
COURT
What I mean is that you should have taken
the necessary precaution for the attendance of
your witness today considering that there is a
subpoena for the witnesses.-
ORDER - for the reason that accused have no
more witnesses to present today, the trial of
this case is hereby Postponed for tomorrow,
July 26, 1967 at 8:30 A.M., with the warning
that witnesses not presented during that day
shall be considered waived. 15
Considering that this case involved a prosecution for a capital offense, the lower
Court acted precipitously in not having Narita brought to Court, by ordering her
arrest if necessary ADELINO was deprived of his right "to have compulsory process
issued to secure the attendance of witnesses on his behalf."
Crucial questions should also have been asked by the trial Court of witnesses.
MARCELINA testified before the lower Court on December 1, 1966. On December
12, 1966, P Gacelos, the PC Sgt. who investigated the complaint against ADELINO,
testified:
Q. Was that investigation of M Cuizon reduced
to writing?
A. Yes, Sir. 16
It would have been advisable if the lower Court had right then and there asked for
the production of the written statement of MARCELINA.
The medical report, Exhibit "B", implied that MARCELINA could have had sexual
intercourse previous to December 14th. On the other hand, ADELINO had testified
that he and MARCELINA used to go together to Tacloban, and while there several
times, "we had sexual intercourse because she likes it." 17 Considering the possible
infliction of the death penalty on ADELINO, the lower Court could have asked
MARCELINA if she had had sexual intercourse prior to December 14th and, if so, if
it was with ADELINO.
 C o n s ti t u ti o n a l L a w I I S e c . 1 4 a n d 1 6 P a g e | 82

Further, there was possibility that ADELINO and MARCELINA had really been
sweethearts. The lower Court could have asked MARCELINA if she realized that,
charging ADELINO with Rape with Illegal Detention, the latter could be sentenced
to death. If that had been explained to her clearly by the lower Court, she might
then have admitted that she was neither raped nor "kidnapped" nor illegally
detained.

MARCELINA could had been examined on the two matters mentioned above, with
the Court excluding the public from the hearing under the provisions of Rule 119,
Section 14. MARCELINA might have testified without feeling the pressure of her
relatives or other persons, if such pressure had in fact existed.

It may not be amiss to state then that just as in pleas of guilty where a grave
offense is charged trial Judges have been enjoined to refrain from accepting them
with alacrity but to be extra solicitous in seeing to it that an accused fully
understands the import of his plea, so also, in prosecutions for capital offenses, it
behooves the trial Courts to exercise greater care in safeguarding the rights of an
accused. The trial Judge should also take a more active role by means of searching
questions in the examination of witnesses for the ascertaintment of the truth and
credibility of their testimonies so that any judgment of conviction imposing the
supreme penalty may rest on firm and unequivocal grounds. The life and liberty of
an individual demand no less.

WHEREFORE, upon reasonable doubt, the judgment appealed from imposing the
death penalty, is reversed and the appellant, Adelino Bardaje, acquitted of the
crime with which he is charged. His immediate release is ordered unless lie is held
on other charges.

Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.