Evidence

Assignment No. 6.1

Go Chi Gun

vs.

Co Cho

Facts:

Paulino Gocheco died on April 24, 1943, and on January 10, 1944 his
eldest son instituted intestate proceedings for the settlement of his estate.
These were terminated on March 23, 1947.The present action was instituted by
Go Chi Gun and Go Away on July 31, 1948. Their amended complaint, among
other things, alleges (1) that plaintiffs were purposely kept in complete and
absolute ignorance of the intestate proceedings of their deceased father Go
Checo, instituted by Paulino Gocheco, and were not informed by the latter of
the existence of a guardian ad litem appointed for them to protect their
hereditary interests; (2) that Paulino Gocheco caused Joaquin a. Go Cuay to be
appointed as commissioner on claims and appraisals and the latter in
obedience to instructions from said Paulino Gocheco, appraised the real
properties of the estate at their assessed value and not at their market value;
(3) that Paulino Gocheco, caused Joaquin A. Cuay to be appointed guardian ad
litem of the plaintiffs without informing the latter of such step; (4) that Paulino
Gocheco caused the age of Go Chi Gun to appear as 14 years old, in order to
obviate the necessity of notifying her of the hearing of the project of partition;
(5) that in conspiracy with Joaquin A. Go Cuay, the latter signed his conformity
to the project of partition and kept the plaintiffs completely and totally ignorant
of everything that took place in the proceedings; (6) that subsequently Paulino
Gocheco instituted guardianship proceedings and had himself appointed as
guardian of the persons and properties of the plaintiffs without giving
information whatsoever thereof to them; (7) that gocheco caused Go Away to
come to the Philippines under the assumed name of Lim purpotedly the
daughter of a chinese merchant Lin Tui, for the purpose of making her believe
that their common father hads died without leaving any properties, as well as
to prevent her from making inquiries of her mother; (8) that notwithstanding
the fact that Go Away had reached the age of majority, Gocheco did not keep
her informed of such fact; (9) that the plaintiffs only learned of the fact that
their deceased father had left valuable properties in Manila in the month of
April, 1948, when a friend of theirs accidently found the papers connected with
the intestate proceedings for the settlement of the estate of their deceased
father. On the basis of the above facts, plaintiffs claim that Paulino Gocheco by
fraudulent means obtained the properties adjudicated to him in the project of
partition and so he acquired same in trust for their (plaintiffs' and defendants')
common benefit; and that the properties and business conducted by the said
deceased Paulino Gocheco in his lifetime were owned in common by them with
the deceased, in the proportion of 1/3 for each of the plaintiffs and 1/3 for the
deceased Paulino Gocheco. In consequence they pray that the project of
partition submitted in case No. 11588 in the proceedings for the settlement of
the estate of the deceased Gocheco and the order of the court of May 11, 1916
approving the partition, be declared null and void as a result of fraud, collusion
and connivance of Paulino Gocheco and Joaquin A. Go Cuay, and that the
properties adjudicated to Paulino Gocheco, Go Chi Gun and Go Away in the
project of partition be declared as their joint properties.

Upon being summoned, the defendants promptly filed a motion to dismiss the
amended complaint on two grounds, namely; (1) that the action is barred by
the statute of limitations, and (2) that the complaint states no cause of action
against the defendants. This motion was denied, so the defendants presented
an answer (1) denying specifically each and every one of the allegations of fraud
supposed to have been committed by Paulino gocheco; (2) alleging, by way of
special defense, that the cause or causes of action which plaintiffs may have
had are barred both by the statute of limitations of the statute on non-claims;
and (3) alleging that the properties now being claimed by the plaintiffs have
been acquired by presecription by defendants by actual and adverse
possession, and as immediate successors in interest of their father, publicly
notoriously and adversely for more than 32 years. By way of counterclaim, they
allege that they have incurred expenses consisting of counsel's fees amounting
to P50,000; in consequence they pray that the action be dismissed and that
plaintiffs be ordered to pay P50,000 and P20,000 as punitive damages. Before
the trial of the case Gocheco Brothers, and Incorporated, and Go Tecson were
allowed to intervene. In their answers these interveners’ made specific denials
of the supposed frauds committed by the deceased Paulino Gocheco and set up
the same special defenses that the defendants have put up in their answer.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner has a valid contention

Held: The Court said that, It is a general rule that actual knowledge on the
part of the plaintiff of the existence of a cause of action against the defendant,
is not necessary or essential, but that it is enough if such knowledge may be
imputed to him (plaintiff) by reason of the existence of opportunity of his part
to acquires such knowledge, or because of circumstances of which he was
cognizant. (Graham vs. Boston, H. & E. R. Co., 118 U. S. 161, 30 L. ed. 1916,
6 S. Ct. 1009, cited in 19 am. Jur. 350.) In the case at bar, the plaintiffs-
appellees, upon reaching the age of majority which took place at least 22 years
before the action was brought, could have easily obtained information and
knowledge about the properties that have been left by their deceased father Go
Checo. Constant communication between Manila and Amoy, china has always
been maintained between Chinese residents of the Philippines and their
relatives in China and f the plaintiffs-appellees had only taken the trouble to
find out if their deceased father had left properties and the nature thereof,
information would have been obtained by them very easily since the facts they
were interested in appear in public judicial records. We cannot reconcile
ourselves to the belief the plaintiffs-appellees had not received information
about the properties left by their deceased father; but assuming that they had
no such knowledge, yet their inaction or ignorance in no wise saves them from
the defense of laches. It has been said that knowledge of facts and
circumstances necessary to warrant the imputation of laches in such as might
have been acquired by the excercise of due diligence. Ignorance which is the
effect of inexcusable negligence is no excuse for laches; and therefore, where
the essential facts might be learned by due negligence, ignorance thereof will
afford no excuse (19 An. Cases, 113.) As to matters complained of its fraud,
whichare evidenced by public records, it has been held that in order to avoid
the effects of such notice, one must show something more than concealment by
mere silence — some affirmative act of deception; some misleading device or
contrivance on the part of the party charged with fraud, intended to exclude
suspicion, prevent inquiry and the institution of adequate measures of redress.
(Lant vs. Manley, 71 Fed., 7, cited in 19 Ann. Cases, 113.) Concealment could
not have been imputed to the deceased Paulino Gocheco, because the partition
of the properties of his deceased father was through judicial proceedings before
the courts of justice. Plaintiffs-appellees should have known that something
must have been done about the properties that their deceased father may have
left upon his death. They should, therefore, have made the necessary inquiries
in relation thereto, This they failed to do. And even if they were actually
ignorant of the existence of such judicial proceedings, which we doubt, such
ignorance is not a bar o the defense of laches (19 Ann. Cases, 113), because no
excuse was offered therefor and ignorance without justifiable excuse is neither
a defense. (Bausman vs. Kelley, 38 Minn., 197, 36 N. W. 333, 8 Am. St. Rep.
661, cited in 19 Ann. Cases, 112). There certainly, was no justifiable excuse, if
the plaintiffs-appellees have not received any share or any just share in the
inheritance of their deceased father, for them to have remained quiet and
silent. In the eyes of the law and under the circumstances of the case,
knowledge of the judicial proceedings is imputable to them.

The evidence for the plaintiff-appellees shows that Go Away came to the
Philippines in the month of May, 1926. Her husband was a merchant who used
to come often to the City of Manila, staying at the house of Paulino Gocheco,
who had a lumber business and had many other forms of business activity. If
she had not actually received any amount as her share in the inheritance,
which she does not state and about which is silent, the fact that her brother
had extensive business interests in Manila should have caused her to
investigate the source or origin of such properties and interests. We cannot
believe her statement that her immediately going to the provinces actually
could have prevented her from making inquires about the properties left by her
deceased father. Her husband was a frequent visitor and he could have made
the proper inquires for her. In any case, the law imputes to her actual
knowledge of the judicial proceedings, or inexcusable negligence in not making
inquires or ascertaining from judicial records the supposed illegal acts
committed by her brother.

The existence of the fourth element is apparent. Ever since Paulino Gocheco
received his properties, he, had dealt therewith in the ordinary course of
business — a portion of the parcel of land hat he had inherited had already
been assigned to the City of Manila as early as November 10, 1916. (Exh. I.)
Many of his properties have already been transferred before his death —
Chiang Kia Shek High School. (Exh. O.) The lumber business must have been
conducted for so long time it would now be impossible for the defendants to
comply with the judicial order of rendition of accounts from 1916. These
circumstances make the action unjust, unfair and inequitable and would
prejudice third persons who may have acquired rights and interests in the
properties in the ordinary course of business, as well as the decedent himself
and his heirs, who have been in continuous enjoyment of the inheritance for a
full period of 32 years without any interruption or objection on the part of the
plaintiffs-appellees. So the fourth element of laches has been fully satisfied. We
therefore, find the trial court so erred in overruling the defense of laches
opportunely presented by the defendants.
Icard

vs

Marasigan

Facts:

In this case,Joseph K. Icard filed a claim of P2,000 against the estate of

his deceased father George M. Icard. The claim having been allowed by the
commissioner on claims, the administrator appealed to the Court of First
Instance, where it was likewise allowed. The administrator's appeal to this
Court rests mainly on the theory that the probate court erred in allowing the
claimant to testify to the services rendered by him in favor of his father,
because the action being one against the administrator of a deceased person,
plaintiff cannot be allowed to testify as to any matter of fact which occurred
before the death of such deceased person, under section 383, paragraph 7, of
Act No. 190, now Rule 123, section 26, paragraph (c), of the Rules of Court.

It is undisputed that the Antamok Central Group of mining claims, situated in

the subprovince of Benguet, were originally owned in common by Fred M.
Harden, the deceased George M. Icard, and plaintiff-appellee Joseph K. Icard.
These mining claims were later sold to the Big Wedge Mining Company, the
deed of sale having been executed jointly by the common owners, Fred M.
Harden, George M. Icard, and Joseph K. Icard, the latter represented by his
attorney-in-fact, George M. Icard. A dispute having arisen as to the price still
due under the contract of sale, the Big Wedge Mining Company filed in the
Court of First Instance of Manila an action for rescission (Civil Case No. 48186)
against the vendors, Fred M. Harden, George M. Icard, and Joseph K. Icard,
the latter in his personal capacity and as executor of the deceased George M.
Icard.

Issue:

Whether or not the petitioner has a valid contention

Ruling:

The Court said that It is thus clear that Joseph K. Icard had an interest
in the mining claims aforementioned, as evidenced by the deed of sale executed
in favor of the Big Wedge Mining Company and the compromise agreement
approved by the court in civil case No. 48186 of the Court of First Instance of
Manila. The amount of this interest being undetermined, Joseph K. Icard may,
if he wishes to, properly claim one-half of P39,478.16, under the legal provision
that "the interests of the coowners shall be presumed to be equal until the
contrary is proved." (Art. 393, C.C.). Instead, he claims P2,000 only, and it is
this reduced claim which he seeks to establish by his oral testimony.

Section 383, par. 7, of the Code of Civil Procedure, which is now Rule 123,
section 26, paragraph (c), of the Rules of Court, is designed to close the lips of
the party plaintiff when death has closed the lips of the party defendant, in
order to remove from the surviving party the temptation to falsehood and the
possibility of fictitious claims against the deceased. Where, as in the instant
case, the purpose of the oral testimony is to prove a lesser claim than what
might be warranted by clear written evidence, to avoid prejudice to the estate of
the deceased, the law has certainly no reason for its application. Ratione
cessante, cessat ipsa lex.

Ong Chua vs Carr

Facts : This is an appeal by the defendants from a decision of the Court of First
Instance of Zamboanga ordering the reformation of the deed of sale executed by
the plaintiff in favor of Edward Carr for lots Nos. 135, 136 and 137 of cadastral
case No. 8695, West Extension, and for a house of strong materials
constructed on another parcel of land, lot No. 132 of the same. A copy of the
deed is attached to the record and is marked Exhibit A.

Lots Nos. 136 and 137 and the house on lot No. 132 originally belonged to one
Henry E. Teck, and lot No. 135 was the property of Teck's wife, Magdalena Lim.
Sometime prior to June 20, 1923, it seems that the spouses sold the property
in question to the plaintiff, Ong Chua, and on June 17, 1923, the latter
executed a public document granting to Magdalena Lim the right to repurchase
lot 135 for the sum of P6,500 within four years from that date, and on the 20th
of the same month, he executed another public document in which he agreed
to sell lots Nos. 136, 137, and the house on lot 132 to Henry E. Teck for the
sum of P13,500 at any time within four years from date. Neither one of the
documents was placed on record with the register of deeds.

In the month of July, 1925, Edward Carr came to Zamboanga, bringing with
him letters of introduction addressed to P. J. Moore, a practising attorney in
that town. With said letters Carr went to the office of Moore and sought the
advice and assistance of the latter in regard to purchasing coconut lands. After
various interviews, Moore called Carr's attention to the lots above-mentioned
and told him that he could buy the lots for P20,000, the amount which Ong
Chua paid for them to Henry E. Teck and Magdalena Lim. Carr entered into
negotiations with Ong Chua and Moore, and many conversation took place in
which Moore, among other things, informed Carr that Teck and his wife had
the right to repurchase the property in question from Ong Chua and that such
rights would expire in June, 1927.

On December 14, 1925, Ong Chua and Carr went to the office of Moore, to
whom they delivered copies of the documents under which Teck and Lim
acquired their rights to repurchase the property involved, and requested him to
draw the deed of sale of the property from Ong Chua to Carr. Before the
drafting of the deed, Ong Chua stated to Moore that he consented to sell the
properties to Carr on the condition that the sale should be subject to the rights
of Teck and Lim to have the property reconveyed to them and that said rights
were to be respected by the vendee. According to Moore's own testimony, Carr
was fully aware of those rights even before the execution of the deed, December
14, 1925, and that he consented to embody stipulations to the effect in said
deed.

The purchase price of the property stipulated between vendor and vendee was
P20,000. When the deed of sale was about to be drafted, Carr informed Moore
that he had only P13,500 on hand and that he desired to obtain a loan of
P6,500 from the Zamboanga Mutual Building and Loan Association of which
Moore was the secretary. Moore told him in effect that the loan could not be
made upon property the titles to which were not clear and that the right of
Teck and Lim to repurchase were not entered upon the certificates of title to
the property. Moore also told Carr that the deed of sale could be made in such
a form that Carr's title to the property purchased would appear to be absolute
but that Carr was to bear in mind that the rights of Teck and Lim still existed
and that the deed and other documents must be left in his, Moore's, possession
until the expiration of the term for the right of repurchase and that, if the deed
were made in that form, the loan of P6,500 could be obtained.

Moore thereupon instructed his clerk, C. E. Darlucio, to prepare and typewrite

the deed of sale without including therein the condition that sale was subject
to Teck's and Lim's rights to repurchase. The deed was signed by Ong Chua in
the presence of Darlucio and duly acknowledged before Moore as notary public.
It may be noted that Ong Chua did not understand English and was therefore
ignorant of the arrangement arrived at between Moore and Carr in connection
with the loan, but he asked Moore if the document contained the conditions in
reference to Teck's right to repurchase the property and was told that the
document was sufficient.
After deed was prepared and signed, Ong Chua told Carr and Moore that lot
No. 137 was mortgaged by him to the Bank of the Philippine Islands for
P6,500, the rate of interest being 10 per cent per annum. Moore stated that the
Zamboanga Building and Loan Association could not lend money at less than
13 per cent per annum. Ong Chua then stated that he was willing to let the
mortgage on the lot given to the bank stand until the expiration of the term for
the repurchase. As this arrangement would save Carr a considerable sum of
money, he agreed to the proposition and paid only P13,500 in cash and
promised, in writing, to pay to the vendor the balance of the purchase price,
P6,500, with interest at 10 per cent per annum. On or before July 1, 1927. The
loan from the Building and Loan Association thus became unnecessary, but
instead of redrafting the deed, it was agreed that Moore would keep the deed
and the other documents in his custody and would not deliver them to any one
until the expiration of the period, for repurchase.

In July, 1926, Teck offered to repurchase the property in question from Ong
Chua who thereupon demanded of Carr the reconveyance of the property to the
spouses, Teck and Lim, but Carr refused to do so, claiming that he had an
absolute title to said property, and Ong Chua then learned, for the first time,
that the deed in question contained no reference to the rights of Teck and Lim
to repurchase the property. On July 23, 1926, this action was brought, the
plaintiff alleging in substance the principal facts hereinbefore stated and
demanding that the deed in question be reformed in accordance therewith. The
defendant demurred, but the demurrer was overruled. The defendant
thereupon filed an answer pleading the general issue and setting up as special
defenses that the deed in question contained no stipulation as to rights of
repurchase and that if there was any agreement or promise on the part of the
defendant to convey the property to Henry E. Teck and Magdalena Lim or to
the plaintiff, as alleged in the complaint, such agreement and promise was for
the sale of real property, or an interest therein, and that neither said
agreement or promise, nor any note or memorandum was made in writing or
subscribed by the defendant or by any authorized person for him. Subsequent
to the filling of the answer, Carr died, and the administrator of his estate,
Manuel Igual, was substituted as defendant.

At the trial of the case, no evidence was offered by the defendant, and,
consequently, the facts hereinbefore stated stand uncontradicted. Upon such
facts the court below ordered the reformation of the deed, Exhibit A, in
accordance with the plaintiff's demand.

Issue: Whether or not the Court erred in permitting the plaintiff, Ong Chua, to
testify, over the defendant's objections
Held : The Court said that that the evidence is conclusive that the plaintiff had
no clear conception of the contents of the deed. That he was anxious to protect
the rights of redemption held by the parties who sold the land to him, is very
obvious; indeed, if he had failed to do so, he would have laid himself open to an
action for damages. But the deed was written in the English language, with
which the plaintiff was unfamiliar, and he had to rely on the statements of
Moore as to the contents and effect of the deed and was told that the document
was sufficient. He had confidence in Moore, with whom he had previous
business relations, and it was but natural for him to believe Moore's statement.

Carr, on the other hand, knew the contents of the deed and fully agreed to
Moore's plan to place it in escrow until the expiration of the term for the
repurchase or redemption of the land. He, nevertheless, in violation of his own
agreement, harassed Moore, then a very sick man, into giving him possession
of the deed prematurely. He took immediate advantage of that circumstances
and hastened to have the document presented to the register of deeds for the
issuance of certificates of title. It is elementary that such conduct constitutes
fraud and was calculated to obtain an unfair advantage over the plaintiff.

Reformation will be given "where there is a mistake on one side and fraud or
unfair dealing on the other" (Devlin on Real Estate, 3d ed., par. 1238). That is
this case, and it follows that the suit for reformation may be maintained.

Certain minor points raised by appellant's counsel are so obviously without

merit as to require no discussion; the sale of the property by the plaintiff to the
defendant was subject to Teck's and Lim's right of redemption, and it was
perfectly proper for the court below, in its judgment, to define the extent of
these rights. Neither was it error on the part of the court to hold that the
pendency of the action tolled the term for the right of redemption; that is an old
and well established rule.
LILIBETH SUNGA-CHAN and CECILIA SUNGA vs. LAMBERTO T. CHUA,

FACTS:
Respondent alleged that, he verbally entered into a business partnership with
Jacinto. Respondentand Jacinto allegedly agreed to register the business name
of their partnership, under the name of Jacinto as a sole proprietorship. The
partnership allegedly had Jacinto as manager, assisted byJosephine Sy, a
sister of the wife respondent, Erlinda Sy.Upon Jacinto's death, his surviving
wife, petitioner Cecilia and particularly his
daughter, petitioner Lilibeth, took over the operations, control, custody, dispos
ition and management of Shellite without respondent's consent. Despite
respondent's repeated demands upon petitionersfor accounting, inventory,
appraisal, winding up and restitution of his net shares in the partnership,
petitioners failed to comply.Petitioners filed their Answer with Compulsory
Counter-claims, contending that they are notliable for partnership shares,
unreceived income/profits, interests, damages and attorney's fees,that
respondent does not have a cause of action against them, and that the trial
court has
no jurisdiction over the nature of the action, the SEC being the agency that ha
s original andexclusive jurisdiction over the case. As counterclaim, petitioner
sought attorney's fees andexpenses of litigation.The trial court rendered its
Decision ruling for respondent. Petitioners filed a Notice of Appealwith the trial
court, the CA dismissed the appeal. Hence, this petition.Petitioners question
the correctness of the finding of the trial court and the Court of Appeals thata
partnership existed between respondent and Jacinto from 1977 until Jacinto's
death. In theabsence of any written document to show such partnership
between respondent and
Jacinto, petitioners argues that these courts were proscribes from hearing the 
testimonies of respondentand his witness, Josephine, to prove the alleged
partnership three years after Jacinto's death. Tosupport this argument,
petitioners invoke the "Dead Man's Statute' or "Survivorship Rule"
under Section 23, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.Petitioners thus implore this
Court to rule that the testimonies of respondent and his alter ego,Josephine,
should not have been admitted to prove certain claims against a deceased
person(Jacinto), now represented by petitioners.
ISSUE: Whether or not the "Dead Man's Statute" applies to this case so as to
render respondent'stestimony and that of Josephine inadmissible.

RULING: The "Dead Man's Statute" provides that if one party to the alleged
transaction is precluded fromtestifying by death, insanity, or other mental
disabilities, the surviving party is not entitled to theundue advantage of giving
his own uncontradicted and unexplained account of thetransaction. But
before this rule can be successfully invoked to bar the introduction
of testimonial evidence, it is necessary that:"1. The witness is a party or
assignor of a party to case or persons in whose behalf a casein prosecuted.

People vs carlos

Facts : On August, 1944, about two or three o'clock in the morning, a truck
pulled up to the curb in front of a house on Constancia Street, Sampaloc,
Manila, where one Martin Mateo lived. From the truck the accused, a Japanese
spy, alighted together with members of the Japanese military police and
pointed Martin Mateo's house and Fermin Javier's house to his Japanese
companions, whereupon the Japanese soldiers broke into Martin Mateo's
dwelling first and Fermin Javier's afterwards. In those houses they seized
Martin Mateo, Ladislao Mateo and Fermin Javier, bound their hands, and put
them in the truck. Along with other persons who had been rounded up in the
other places and who had been kept in the truck while it was parked, they were
taken to Fort Santiago where the two Mateos and Fermin Javier were tortured
and from which they were released six days later. The reason for the arrest and
maltreatment of Martin and Ladislao Mateo was that they had refused to
divulge the whereabouts of their brother, Marcelino Mateo, who was a guerrilla
and who had escaped from the Japanese. And Fermin Javier was arrested and
tortured because he himself was a guerrilla, a fact which Carlos knew or at
least suspected.
Issue: Whether or not the lower court erred in not holding that the accused
cannot be convicted of the offense of treason committed against the
government of the United States and of the Philippines, because it is a settled
principle in international law that in a territory actually under the authority of
the enemy, all laws of political complexion of the previous government are
suspended

Held: The Court said that The People's Court is a court of special and
restricted jurisdiction created under the stress of an emergency and national
security. It was devised to operate for a limited period only, a limitation
imposed by economic necessity and other factors of public policy. Obviously,
the main concerning the creation of a special court was the trial and and
disposition of the cases, numbering over 6,000, of accused who were being held
by the United States military authorities and who were to be turned over to the
Commonwealth Government. It was presumed that there were other cases of
treason not included in this number — cases which might not be discovered
until years afterward — , and the possibility was not overlooked that even some
of the cases which the United States Army was on the eve of placing under the
jurisdiction of the Philippine Government could not be filed and submitted for
trial within a foreseeable future owing to lack of readily available evidence,
absence of witnesses, or other causes. On the other hand, considerations of
economy and public interests forbade maintenance of the People's Court for an
indefinite period. Under the circumstances, it was necessary that a provision
be made requiring that only cases which could be brought to court within six
months and which were deemed enough to occupy the attention of the People's
Court within the limited time of its life, should be cognizable by it, and the rest
should be instituted in the proper Courts of First Instance. Such provision is
not an arbitrary and international discrimination, and does not work as a
deprivation of the right to equal protection of the laws. Both in privileges or
advantages conferred, if any, and in liabilities imposed, if any, person under
equal circumstances are treated alike. It does not deprive appellant of the
protection enjoyed by others failing within his class. The equal protection of the
laws guaranteed by the Constitution "does not prevent a state or municipality
from adjusting its legislation to differences in situations and making a
discrimination or distinction in its legislation in respect of things that are
different, provided that the discrimination or distinction has a reasonable
foundation or rational basis and is not palpably, purely, and entirely arbitrary
in the legislative sense, that is, outside of the wide discretion which the
legislative body may exercise." (16 C.J.S., 997.) Moreover, with its associate
feature the People's Court is designed to extend greater protection to persons
charged with collaboration with the enemy. If others are prosecuted before a
Court of First Instance, they and not the appellant should have cause to
complain of discrimination.
Us vs antipolo

Facts: At about noon of the 21st of October, 1915, Andres Pablo, a policeman
of the municipality of Balanga, went by order of his chief to the barrio of Tuyo
to raid a jueteng game which, according to the information lodged, was being
conducted in that place; but before the said officer arrived there the players,
perhaps advised of his approach by a spy, left and ran away; however, on his
arrival at a vacant lot the defendant there found Francisco Dato and, at a short
distance away, a low table. After a search of the premises he also found
thereon a tambiolo(receptacle) and 37 bolas (balls). Notwithstanding that the
officer had seen the men Maximo Malicsi and Antonio Rodrigo leave the said
lot, yet, as at first he had seen no material proof that the game was being
played, he refrained from arresting them, and on leaving the place only
arrested Francisco Daro, who had remained there.

In reporting to his chief what had occurred, the policeman presented a

memorandum containing the following statement: "In the barrio of Tuyo I
raided a jueteng na bilat game, seized a tambiolo and bolas, and saw
thecabecillas Maximo MAlicsi and Antonio Rodrigo and the gambler Francisco
Dato. I saw the two cabecillasescape."

In consequence, chief of police Jose D. Reyes, on October 22, 1915, filed a

complaint in the court of justice of the peace charging the said Rodrigo,
Malicsi, and Dato with having gambled at jueteng, in violation of municipal
ordinance No. 5. As a result of this complaint the accused were arrested, but
were afterwards admitted to bail.

At the hearing of the case Francisco Dato pleaded guilty. The other two
accused, Maximo Malicsi and Antonio Rodrigo, pleaded not guilty; therefore,
during the trial the chief of police presented the memorandum exhibited by the
policeman Andres Pablo, who testified under oath that on the date mentioned
he and Tomas de Leon went to the said barrio to raid a jueteng game, but that
before they arrived there they saw from afar that some persons started to run
toward the hills; that when witness and his companion arrived at a vacant lot
they saw Francisco Dato and a low table there, and the table caused them to
suspect that a jueteng game was being carried on; that in fact they did find on
one side of the lot a tambiolo and 37 bolas, but that they did not see the
accused Rodrigo and Malicsi on the said lot, nor did they see them run; and
that only afterwards did the witness learn that these latter were
the cabecillas or ringleaders in the jueteng game, from information given him
by an unknown person. In view of this testimony by the police officer who made
the arrest and of the other evidence adduced at the trial the court acquitted the
defendants Antonio Rodrigo and Maximo Malicsi and sentenced only Francisco
Dato, as a gambler.
Before the case came to trial in the justice of the peace court the policeman
Andres Pablo had an interview and conference with the accused Malicsi and
ROdrigo in the house of Valentin Sioson. On this occasion he was instructed
not to testify against Malicsi and Rodrigo, and in fact received through Gregorio
Ganzon the sum of P5.

Issue : Whether or not the petitioner has a valid contention

Held: The Court said that The right of prosecution and punishment for a
crime is one of the attributes that by a natural law belongs to the sovereign
power instinctively charged by the common will of the members of society to
look after, guard and defend the interests of the community, the individual and
social rights and the liberties of every citizen and the guaranty of the exercise
of his rights.

The power to punish evildoers has never been attacked or challenged, as the
necessity for its existence has been recognized even by the most backward
peoples. At times the criticism has been made that certain penalties are cruel,
barbarous, and atrocious; at other, that they are light and inadequate to the
nature and gravity of the offense, but the imposition of punishment is admitted
to be just by the whole human race, and even barbarians and savages
themselves, who are ignorant of all civilization, are no exception.lawphil.net

Notwithstanding that the said Act No. 1697 (which, as interpreted by this court
in its decisions, was deemed to have repealed the aforementioned article of the
Penal Code relating to false testimony, comprised within the term of perjury)
did not expressly repeal the said articles of the Penal Code; and as the said
final article of the Administrative Code, in totally repealing Act No. 1697, does
not explicitly provide that the mentioned articles of the Penal Code are also
repealed, the will of the legislation not being expressly and clearly stated with
respect to the complete or partial repeal of the said articles of the Penal Code,
in the manner that it has totally repealed the said Act No. 1697 relating its
perjury; and, furthermore, as it is imperative that society punish those of its
members who are guilty of perjury or false testimony, and it cannot be
conceived that these crimes should go unpunished or be freely committed
without punishment of any kind, it must be conceded that there must be in
this country some prior, preexistent law that punishes perjury or false
testimony.

It is, then, assumed that the said articles of the Penal Code are in force and are
properly applicable to crimes of false testimony. Therefore, in consideration of
the fact that in the case at bar the evidence shows it to have been duly proven
that the defendant, Andres Pablo, in testifying in the cause prosecuted for
gambling at jueteng, perverted the truth, for the purpose of favoring the alleged
gamblers, Maximo Malicsi and Antonio Rodrigo, with the aggravating
circumstance of the crime being committed through bribery, for it was also
proved that the defendant Pablo received P15 in order that he should make no
mention of the said two gamblers in his sworn testimony, whereby he
knowingly perverted the truth, we hold that, in the commission of the crime of
false testimony, there concurred the aggravating circumstance of price or
reward, No. 3 of article 10 of the Code, with no mitigating circumstance to
offset the effects of the said aggravating one; wherefore the defendant has
incurred the maximum period of the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum
degree to prision correccional in its medium degree, and a fine
People vs Francisco

Facts : On or about the 24th day of December, 1943, in the municipality and
province aforesaid, Francisco Abad (alias Paquito) the accused herein, serving
as an informer and spy of the Japanese Army, did then and there, join
participate in a raid conducted by about fifteen Japanese soldiers of the
Military Police at the house of Magno Ibarra, and did then and there
apprehended the said Magno Ibarra, charging him of possession of a revolver
which had been previously surrendered by Magno Ibarra to the Japanese that
Magno Ibarra still had the revolver, the latter was confined in the Japanese
garrison.

That on or about March 11, 1944, in the same municipality and province
aforesaid, the said Francisco Abad (alias Paquito), as such informer of the
Japanese Army, wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably, for more than
two months, of one Mr. Francisco, whose first name is still unknown, for
having remarked that the Americans would soon return many places in the
Philippines had already been retaken.

That on or about September 28, 1944, in the municipality of Camiling,

Province of Tarlac, the herein accused, as such informer of the Japanese Army,
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably force,
coerce, and compel Osias Salvador and his two brothers Epifanio Salvador and
Liberto Salvador to go, as they did to go to the Japanese garrison where the
said Osias Salvador and his two brothers, at the instance of the herein accused
in his presence, were tortured as guerrilla suspects, and although Epifanio and
Liberto Salvador managed later to escape from imprisonment, the said Osias
Salvador was unable to do so and died from the tortures and injuries inflicted
upon him.

That on or about November 12, 1844 and on the occasion of a stage show held
in the said municipality of Camiling, Province of Tarlac, the herein accused,
taking advantage of his connection and influence as informer and spy of the
Japanese Army, did then and there unlawfully, wilfully and feloniously hand
over one Francisco Donato to the Japanese soldiers who slapped and kicked
the said Francisco Donato, for an incident in which the accused was entirely to
blame in that the said accused annoyed Flora Esteban, wife of Francisco
Donato, by throwing sugar cane butts at her.

Issue: Whether or not the lower court erred in finding the accused guilty on the
first count, notwithstanding the fact only one witness testified to the overt act
alleged therein
Held: The Court said that they hold appellant as one of those responsible for
the arrest of the Salvador brothers, we do not agree with the lower court in
finding him responsible also for the death of Osias Salvador, as according to
the evidence, it was the escape of Epifanio, and later the escape of Liberato,
which must have enraged the Japanese to the extent of killing Osias Salvador,
who, were not so weak, had the same chance as his brothers to escape. If his
brothers did not escape, there is no ground to presume that Osias would have
been killed by the Japanese if we take into consideration that, after almost two
and a half months of confinement, the Japanese allowed Fausto Francisco to
be released. There is absolutely no evidence that appellant was present or had
anything to do with the killing of Osias Salvador.

Upon the conclusion we arrived at, it is not necessary to deal with the ninth
assignment of error in appellant's brief.

Finding the accused guilty of the crime of treason as punished by article 114 of
the Revised Penal Code with the attendance of one mitigating circumstance, as
provided in number 2 of article 64 of the Revised Penal Code, with the
modification of the lower court's decision, we sentence him to 14 years, 8
months, and 1 day of reclusion temporal and to pay a fine of P5,000 and the
costs.

Ordono vs daguigan

Facts: Avelino Ordoño was charged with rape having raped his daughter,
Leonora. In support of that complaint, Catalina Balanon Ordoño, the mother of
Leonora, executed a sworn statement wherein she disclosed that on that same
date, Leonora had apprised her of the outrage but no denunciation was filed
because Avelino Ordoño threatened to kill Leonora and Catalina if they
reported the crime to the police. Catalina Ordoño in her sworn statement
further revealed that her husband had also raped their other daughter, Rosa.
Avelino Ordoño, invoked the marital disqualification rule found in Rule 130 of
the Rules of Court. Counsel claimed that Avelino Ordoño had not consented
expressly or impliedly to his wife's testifying against him. The trial court
overruled the objection.
Issue: Whether or not the marital disqualification applies.

Ruling: No. Should the phrase "in a criminal case for a crime committed by
one against the other" be restricted to crimes committed by one spouse against
the other, such as physical injuries, bigamy, adultery or concubinage, or
should it be given a latitudinarian interpretation as referring to any offense
causing marital discord? There is a dictum that "where the marital and
domestic relations are so strained that there is no more harmony to be
preserved nor peace and tranquility which may be disturbed, the reason based
upon such harmony and tranquility fails. In such a case identity of interests
disappears and the consequent danger of perjury based on that identity is non-
existent. Likewise, in such a situation, the security and confidences of private
life which the law aims at protecting will be nothing but ideals which, through
their absence, merely leave a void in the unhappy home. That the rape of the
daughter by the father, an undeniably abominable and revolting
crime with incestuous implications, positively undermines the
connubial relationship, is a proposition too obvious to require much
elucidation.

Uy chico vs union life

Facts:
In 1897, petitioner’s father died. He continued the business still in the name of
his father after buying the share of his brother in the said business. Petitioner filed a case
seeking the recovery of the proceeds of 2 insurance policies on stock of dry goods
that was destroyed in a fire. These policies were surrendered by the petitioner’s lawyer
to the administrator of his father’s estate, who had compromised with
the defendant for ½ of the face value of the insurance that was paid to the court. He
alleged that said policies belong to him and that he was not bound by the
compromised agreement made by the administrator. The company introduced
evidence showing that the petitioner had agreed to the settlement of the policies when
his lawyer surrendered the same to the estate’s administrator.
Petitioner, on the witness stand had been asked if he had any objection as to his
lawyer testifying concerning the surrender of the policies to which he negatively
replied. Whereupon, the lawyer of
the petitioner formally withdraw the waiver given by the petitioner and objecte
d to thetestimony on the ground of privileged communication

Issue: Whether or not instruction of the client to be delivered to a third

person is considered privilege

Held:  No. A similar provision is inserted in section 383, No. 4, of the same Act.
It will be noted that the evidence in question concerned the dealings of the
plaintiff's attorney with a third person. Of the very essence of the veil of secrecy
which surrounds communications
made between attorney and client, is that such communications are not intend
ed for theinformation of third persons or to be acted upon by them, put of the purpose of
advising the client as to his rights. It is evident that a communication made by a client to
his attorney for the express purpose of its being communicated to a third person is
essentially inconsistent with the confidential relation. When the attorney has
faithfully carried out his instructions be delivering the communication to the
third person for whom it was intended and the latter acts upon it, it cannot,
by any reasoning whatever, be classified in a legal sense as
a privileged communication between the attorney and his client. It is plain that 
such ac o m m u n i c a t i o n ,   a f t e r   r e a c h i n g   t h e   p a r t y   f o r   w h o m   i t  
w a s   i n t e n d e d   a t   l e a s t ,   i s   a communication between the client and a third
person, and that the attorney simply occupies the role of intermediary or agent

Regala vs sandiganbayan

Facts : The matters raised in the present case are an offshoot of the institution of the
PCGG against Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr., as one of the principal defendants, for the
recovery of alleged ill-gotten wealth, which includes shares of stocks in the several
corporations in PCGG Case No. 33, entitled “Republic of the Philippines vs Eduardo
Cojuangco, et al.”  Petitioners in this case are all partners in ACCRA Regala, Angara, Cruz,
Concepcion, Vinluan, Lazatin, Escueta and Hayudini (hereinafter ACCRA LAWYERS).
Likewise, private respondent ROCO is also a partner in ACCRA.ACCRA Law Firm
performed legal services for its clients, which included, among others, the organization and
acquisition of business associations and/or organizations, with the correlative and
incidental services where its members acted as incorporators, or simply, as
stockholders.The complaint in PCGG Case No. 0033 alleged that the ACCRA LAWYERS
and Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr. conspired with each other in setting up through the use
ofcoconut levy funds the financial and corporate framework and structures that led to the
establishment of UCPB, UNICOM and others and that through insidious means and
machinations, ACCRA, using its wholly-owned investment arm, ACCRA Investments
Corporation, became the holder of approximately fifteen million shares representing
roughly 3.3% of the total capital stock of UCPB as of 31 March 1987.The PCGG wanted to
establish through the ACCRA lawyers that Mr. Cojuangco is their client and it was
Cojuangco who furnished all the monies to the subscription payment; hence, ACCRA
LAWYERS acted as dummies, nominees and/or agents by allowing themselves, among
others, to be used as instrument in accumulating ill-gotten wealth through government
concessions, etc., which acts constitute gross abuse of official position and authority,
flagrant breach of public trust, unjust enrichment, violation of the Constitution and laws of
the Republic of the Philippines. On August 20, 1991,

PCGG filed a “Motion to Admit Third Amended Complaint” which EXCLUDED private
respondent ROCO
from the complaint in PCGG Case No. 33 as party-defendant, whereas ACCRA LAWYERS
still were included still as defendants. ACCRA LAWYERS subsequently filed their
Comment/Opposition with Counter-Motion that respondent PCGG similarly grant the
same treatment to them(exclusion as parties-defendants) as accorded private respondent
ROCO.PCGG in its comment agreed to exclude the ACCRA LAWYERS on the conditions
: (a) the disclosure of the identity of its clients; (b) submission of documents substantiating
the lawyer-client relationship; and (c) the submission of the deeds of assignments ACCRA
LAWYERS executed in favor of its clients covering their respective shareholdings.

ISSUE: Whether or not the lawyer’s fiduciary duty may be asserted in refusing to disclose
the identity of clients (name of ACCRA LAWYERS' clients)under the facts and
circumstances obtaining in the instant case? YES, may refuse on the basis of fiduciary
duty!

HELD: DENIED the exclusion of ACCRA LAWYERS in PCGG Case No. 33 for their
refusal to comply with the conditions required by respondent PCGG.ACCRA LAWYERS
argue they are prohibited from revealing the identity of their principal under their sworn
mandate and fiduciary duty as lawyers to uphold at all times the confidentiality of
information obtained during such lawyer-client relationship.

The GENERAL RULE  in our jurisdiction (as well as in the US) is that a lawyer may NOT
invoke the privilege and refuse to divulge the name or identity of his client.
 
EXCEPTIONS TO THE RULE :
(1)Client identity is privileged where a strong probability exists that revealing the client’s
name would implicate that client in the very activity for which he sought the lawyer’s
advice.
(2) Where disclosure would open the client to civil liability, his identity is privileged.
(3)Where the government’s lawyers have no case against an attorney’s client unless, by
revealing the client’s name, the said name would furnish the only link that would form the
chain of testimony necessary to convict an individual of a crime, the client’s name is
privileged. Other situations which could qualify as exceptions to the general rule:
a)Content of any client communication to a lawyer relevant to the subject matter of the
legal problem on which the client seeks legal assistance.

b) Where the nature of the attorney-client relationship has been previously disclosed and
it is the identity which is intended to be confidential, since such revelation would otherwise
result in disclosure of the entire transaction.
 Summarizing these exceptions, information relating to the identity of a client may fall
within the ambit of the privilege when the client’s name itself has an independent
significance, such that disclosure would then reveal client confidences. In the case at bar,
the instant case falls under at least two exceptions to the general rule.
Barton

vs

Leyte Asphalt and Mineral Oil Co.

Facts:

This action was instituted in the Court of First Instance of the City of
Manila by James D. Barton, to recover of the Leyte Asphalt & Mineral Oil Co.,
Ltd., as damages for breach of contract, the sum of $318,563.30, United States
currency, and further to secure a judicial pronouncement to the effect that the
plaintiff is entitled to an extension of the terms of the sales agencies specified
in the contract Exhibit A. The defendant answered with a general denial, and
the cause was heard upon the proof, both documentary and oral, after which
the trial judge entered a judgment absolving the defendant corporation from
four of the six causes of action set forth in the complaint and giving judgment
for the plaintiff to recover of said defendant, upon the first and fourth causes of
action, the sum of $202,500, United States currency, equivalent to $405,000,
Philippine currency, with legal interest from June 2, 1921, and with costs.
From this judgment the defendant company appealed.

The plaintiff is a citizen of the United States, resident in the City of Manila,
while the defendant is a corporation organized under the law of the Philippine
Islands with its principal office in the City of Cebu, Province of Cebu, Philippine
Islands. Said company appears to be the owner by a valuable deposit of
bituminous limestone and other asphalt products, located on the Island of
Leyte and known as the Lucio mine. On April 21, 1920, one William Anderson,
as president and general manager of the defendant company, addressed a
letter Exhibit B, to the plaintiff Barton, authorizing the latter to sell the
products of the Lucio mine in the Commonwealth of Australia and New Zealand
upon a scale of prices indicated in said letter.

On February 5, 1921, Ludvigsen & McCurdy, of San Francisco, addressed a

letter to the plaintiff, then in San Francisco, advising hi that he might enter an
order for six thousand tons of bituminous limestone to be loaded at Leyte not
later than May 5, 1921, upon terms stated in the letter Exhibit G. Upon this
letter the plaintiff immediately indorsed his acceptance.

The plaintiff then returned to Manila; and on March 2, 1921, Anderson wrote
to him from Cebu, to the effect that the company was behind with construction
and was not then able to handle big contracts. (Exhibit FF.) On March 12,
Anderson was in Manila and the two had an interview in the Manila Hotel, in
the course of which the plaintiff informed Anderson of the San Francisco order.
Anderson thereupon said that, owing to lack of capital, adequate facilities had
not been provided by the company for filling large orders and suggested that
the plaintiff had better hold up in the matter of taking orders. The plaintiff
expressed surprise at this and told Anderson that he had not only the San
Francisco order (which he says he exhibited to Anderson) but other orders for
large quantities of bituminous limestone to be shipped to Australia and
Shanghai. In another interview on the same Anderson definitely informed the
plaintiff that the contracts which be claimed to have procured would not be
filled.

Three days later the plaintiff addressed a letter (Exhibit Y) to the defendant
company in Cebu, in which he notified the company to be prepared to ship five
thousand tons of bituminous limestone to John Chapman Co., San Francisco,
loading to commence on May 1, and to proceed at the rate of one thousand
tons per day of each twenty-four hours, weather permitting.

On March 5, 1921, Frank B. Smith, of Sydney, had cabled the plaintiff an order
for five thousand tons of bituminous limestone; and in his letter of March 15 to
the defendant, the plaintiff advised the defendant company to be prepared to
ship another five thousand tons of bituminous limestone, on or about May 6,
1921, in addition to the intended consignment for San Francisco. The name
Henry E. White was indicated as the name of the person through whom this
contract had been made, and it was stated that the consignee would be named
later, no destination for the shipment being given. The plaintiff explains that
the name White, as used in this letter, was based on an inference which he had
erroneously drawn from the cable sent by Frank B. Smith, and his intention
was to have the second shipment consigned to Australia in response to Smith's
order.

Issue:

Whether or not the petitioner has a valid contention

Held:

The Court said that the majority decision incidentally takes up for
consideration assignments of error 1 and 2 having to do with either the
admission or the rejection by the trial court of certain exhibits. Having in mind
that the Court reverses the courta quo on the facts, what is said relative to
these two assignments is absolutely unnecessary for a judgment, and even
as obiter dicta, contains unfortunate expressions. Exhibit 14, for example, is a
letter addressed by the plaintiff to his lawyer and probably merely shown to the
counsel of the defendant during negotiations to seek a compromise. Whether
that exhibit be considered improperly rejected or not would not change the
result one iota.

The rule now announced by the Court that it makes no difference how the
adversary acquired possession of the document, and that a court will take no
notice of how it was obtained, is destructive of the attorney's privilege and
constitutes and obstacle to attempts at friendly compromise. In the case of Uy
Chico vs. Union Life Assurance Society ([1915], 29 Phil., 163), it was held that
communications made by a client to his attorney for the purpose of being
communicated to others are not privileged if they have been so communicated.
But here, there is no intimation that Exhibit 14 was sent by the client to the
lawyer for the purpose of being communicated to others. The Supreme Court of
Georgia in the case of Southern Railway Co. vs. White ([1899], 108 Ga., 201),
held that statements in a letter to a party's attorney handed by the latter to the
opponent's attorney, are confidential communications and must be excluded.

Briefly, the decision of the majority appears to me to be defective in the

following particulars: (1) It sets aside without good reason the fair findings of
fact as made by the trial court and substitutes therefore other findings not
warranted by the proof; (2) it fails to stress plaintiff's main argument, and (3) it
lay downs uncalled for rules which undermine the inviolability of a client's
communications to his attorney.
Orient insurance vs Revilla

Facts: The respondent Teal Motor Co., Inc. is plaintiff in a civil action
instituted in the Court of First Instance of Manila (civil case No. 35825) for the
purpose of recovering upon two fire insurance policies issued by the Orient
Insurance Company, aggregating P60,000, upon a stock of merchandise alleged
to be of the value of P414,513.56, which, with the exception of salvage valued
at about P50,000, was destroyed by a fire on or about January 6, 1929. In one
of the clauses of the policies sued upon is a stipulation to the effect that all
benefit under the policy would be forfeited if, in case of loss, the claim should
be rejected by the insurer and action or suit should not be commenced within
three months after such rejection. In the answer of the Orient Insurance
Company, interposed in the civil case mentioned, it is alleged, by way of
defense, that the company rejected the claim on April 15, 1929, that notice of
such rejection was given to the plaintiff by letter on the same day, and that suit
was not instituted on the policy until August 3, 1929, which was more than
three months after the rejection of the claim.

In a replication to the answer of the defendant, containing the foregoing and

other defenses, the plaintiff admitted that the adjusters of the defendant
company had, on April 15, 1929, notified the plaintiff that the Orient Insurance
Company would not pay the claim, basing refusal upon alleged incendiarism
and fraud on the part of the plaintiff; and by way of avoidance, it was alleged in
the replication that, after notification of denial of liability by the insurance
company, one E. E. Elser, as representative of the company, expressly
requested the plaintiff to defer judicial action until after the following July 31,
stating that three were great possibilities that an extrajudicial compromise
might be arranged in the matter; and it was further asserted, in the replication,
that the plaintiff had deferred action, relying upon this request.

It will thus be seen that the reason for the admitted delay in the institution of
the action is an important issue in the case, or case, now in course of trial.

It further appears that while case No. 35825 was in course of trial, as it still is,
before the respondent judge, in the Court of First Instance of Manila, the
witness E. M. Bachrach, president of the Teal Motor Co., Inc., while being
examined in chief by the attorneys for the plaintiff, and speaking of the
circumstances surrounding the institution of the action, said that he had
reported certain conversations to plaintiff's attorneys, and he added: "I waited
for about a week longer and not having heard anything about it, in the
meantime, on the 13th of July, I received a letter from our attorneys, Guevara,
Francisco & Recto, urging me to file these cases." The attorney for the
defendant, Orient Insurance Company, thereupon interposed, saying: "I ask
that the witness be required to produce the letter referred to from Mr. Guevara,
or else his answer be stricken out. (To the witness) Have you got the letter
there?" The witness replied that he had the letter with him and that he had no
objection to show that part of the letter in which Guevara urged him to proceed
with the cases. Upon being asked about the other part of the letter, the witness
said that the other part contained private matter, "between the attorney and
ourselves," meaning between the Teal Motor Co., Inc., and its attorneys.
Thereupon the attorney for the defendant, Orient Insurance Company, said he
would like to see the letter, inquiring as to its date. The witness replied that it
bore date of July 13, 1929; and upon the court inquiring whether the witness
had any objection to the reading of the letter by the attorney for the defendant,
the witness replied that he wished to consult with his attorney. Upon this the
attorney for the adversary party, the Orient Insurance Company, suggested
that he would like to have the letter marked without his reading it, and it was
accordingly marked as Exhibit 49. The attorney then said: "In view of the
production of the letter, I withdraw the objection to the statement of the
witness as to its contents," and he added: "I now ask the permission of the
court to read the letter for my information." The court thereupon inquired of
the attorney for the Teal Motor Co., Inc., whether he had any objection, and the
attorney observed that he would have no objection to the disclosing of that part
of the letter which referred exactly to the point of the urging of the filing of the
complaints, and he added: "Unfortunately, the other part of the letter being a
communication between a client and attorney, I don't think, if your Honor
please, it can be disclosed without the consent of both."

In the course of the colloquy which thereupon unsued between the attorney for
the plaintiff and the attorney for the defendant, it was stated by the attorney
for the plaintiff that only a part of the letter had anything to do with the urging
of the presentation of the complaints in the cases to which the witness had
testified, and that the other part of the letter referred to the contract of fees, or
retaining of the services of plaintiff's attorneys in connection with said cases, a
matter, so the attorney suggested, entirely distinct from the urging of the
presentation of the cases. The attorney for the defendant thereupon insisted
before the court that, inasmuch as all the letter refers to the case then in court,
the entire document should be exhibited, in conformity with the rule that when
part of a document is offered in evidence, the entire document must be
presented

Issue : Whether or not the petitioner has a valid contention

Held: The Court said that It is suggested in the argument for the respondents
that the question of the admissibility in evidence of the parts of the letter not
already read into the record was prematurely raised, and that the attorney for
the defendant should have waited until it became his turn to present evidence
in chief, when, as is supposed, the question could have been properly raised.
We are of the opinion, however, that if the attorney for the defendant had a
right to examine the letter, it should have been produced when he asked for it
on the cross-examination of the witness who had the letter in his possession.
Besides, in the lengthy discussions between court and attorneys, occuring at
different times, there was not the slightest suggestion from the court that the
parts of the letter which were held inadmissible would be admitted at any time.
Furthermore, the action of the court in quashing the subpoena duces tecum for
the production of the letter shows that the court meant to rule that the letter
could not be inspected at all by the attorney for the defendant.

Objection is also here made by the attorney for the respondents to the use of
the writ of mandamus for the purpose of correcting the error which is supposed
to have been committed. The situation presented is, however, one where the
herein petitioner has no other remedy. The letter which the petitioner seeks to
examine has been ruled inadmissible, as to the parts not introduced in
evidence by the defendant in the court below, and the respondent judge had
not permitted the document to become a part of the record in such a way that
the petitioner could take advantage of the error upon appeal to this court. It is
idle to discuss whether other remedy would be speedy or adequate when there
is no remedy at all. This court is loath, of course, to interfere in course of the
trial of a case in a Court of First Instance, as such interference might
frequently prolong unduly the litigation in that court. But this case has been
pending before the respondent judge for a considerable period of time, and
undoubtedly the probatory period will be necessarily extended much longer.
Under these circumstances, the action of this court in entertaining the present
application will either be conductive to the speedy determination of case, or at
least will not appreciably extend the proceedings.

It goes without saying that the subject matter of the contention is of a nature
which makes the use of the writ of mandamus appropriate, since the right from
the exercise of which the petitioner is excluded is one to which it is entitled
under the law and the duty to be performed is one pertaining to the respondent
judge in his official capacity.

From what has been said it follows that the writ of mandamus prayed for will
be granted, and the respondent judge is directed to permit the attorney for the
defendant (petitioner here) to inspect the letter (Exhibit 49 and 49-A) with a
view to the introduction in evidence of such parts thereof as may be relevant to
the issues made by the pleadings in civil case No. 35825 and other cases which
have been consolidated with it for trial. So ordered, with costs against the
respondent Teal Motor Co., Inc.
Hichman vs Taylor

Facts: In 1943 a tug, the “J.M. Taylor” sank while engaged in helping to tow a
car float of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad across the Delaware River at
Philadelphia. The accident, in which five of the nine crew members drowned
was unusual in nature and the cause was unknown. Three days later
Defendants employed a law firm to defend them against potential suits by
representatives of the deceased crew members and to sue the railroad for
damages to the tug. The following month, the attorney for Defendants privately
interviewed the four survivors and took statements from them with an eye
toward anticipated litigation. Hickman (Plaintiff), a representative of one of the
five victims, brought suit in federal court naming as defendants the two tug
owners. One year later, Plaintiff filed 39 interrogatories directed to the tug
owners. The 38th interrogatory requested that the tug owners disclose whether
any statements of the surviving crew members were taken following the
accident, and if so, to include copies of such statements in writing, and if oral,
to set forth in detail the exact provisions of such statements. The tug owners
answered all of the interrogatories in full, except number 38. They admitted
that statements were taken, but declined to summarize them or provide their
contents. They based their refusal on the ground that such requests called for
“privileged matter obtained in preparation for litigation. The district court held
that the requested matters were not privileged. Upon their refusal, the tug
owners were held in contempt. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the
judgment of the district court. The Supreme Court of the United States then
granted certiorari.

Issue: Whether, without a showing of prejudice by the moving party,

statements made to discoverable, if they were taken in anticipation of litigation
and contained among them the personal recollections and thoughts of
opposing counsel.

Held: No. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Circuit Court of
Appeals overturning the order for discovery. Discovery has ultimate and
necessary boundaries. Limitations come into existence when the inquiry
encroaches upon the recognized domains of privilege. The protective cloak of
this privilege does not extend to information that an attorney secures from a
witness while acting for his client in anticipation of litigation. However, an
attempt, without necessity or justification, to secure written statements,
private memoranda and personal recollections prepared or formed by an
adverse party’s counsel, falls outside the arena of discovery. The policy
underlying the work product immunity is the necessity for the lawyer to
investigate all facets of the case and develop his theories without fear of having
to disclose his strategies or information that is unfavorable to his client. A
lawyer is protected against disclosure in discovery of information generated by
the litigation process itself but not against disclosure of underlying historical
facts. Concurrence. Justice Robert H. Jackson concurred. Justice Jackson’s
concurrence focused on the demoralizing effect on law practice if lawyers were
required to write out and deliver to their adversaries an account of what
witnesses have told them.
Upjhon Company vs United States

Facts. Petitioner, an international pharmaceutical company discovered

through an independent audit that one of its foreign subsidiaries might have
made payments to foreign government officials in order to secure government
business. Gerard Thomas, Petitioner’s General Counsel, was notified and he
consulted with outside counsel as well as Petitioner’s Chairman, all of whom
decided an internal investigation as to “questionable payments” was necessary.
As a result, questionnaires were sent to all foreign and area managers
inquiring as to information regarding any such payments. This procedure of
collecting information had been deemed “highly confidential.” Petitioner
voluntarily sent a preliminary report to the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) and the IRS. The IRS began an investigation and was given
lists by Petitioner of all those who were interviewed and all whom had
responded to the questionnaire. The IRS then sought production of all files
relative to the investigation conducted under Gerard Thomas’ supervision. The
requested production included, but was not limited to the written
questionnaires and memoranda or notes of interviews conducted in the US and
abroad of officers and employees of Petitioner and its subsidiaries. Petitioner
refused, citing attorney-client privilege and attorney work product in
anticipation of trial. The Respondent, the United States (Respondent), filed a
petition seeking enforcement of the summons in the United States District
Court for the Western District of Michigan, which was granted. Petitioner then
appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit which rejected the
District Court’s finding of waiver of the attorney-client privilege, but agreed that
the privilege did not apply to the communications made by officers and agents
not responsible for directing Upjohn’s actions in response to legal advice. The
Appellate Court remanded to the District Court to determine who was within
the control group.

Issue. Whether the attorney-client privilege in the corporate context extends to

employees not within the “control group” of the corporation. Whether the IRS
had shown sufficient necessity and justification to overcome the work- product
doctrine.

Held. Judgment of the Court of Appeals reversed and remanded. The attorney-

client privilege protects the communications in this case from compelled
disclosure. The work-product doctrine applies in tax summons enforcement
proceedings where a strong showing of necessity must be shown to compel
discovery of work product.

United States vs Nobles

Facts: Nobles (defendant) was tried in federal court and convicted for robbing
a bank. The only evidence linking Nobles to the crime was the identification
testimony of a bank teller and salesman who were present at the time of the
robbery. The defense tried to impeach these eyewitnesses and hired an
investigator. This investigator interviewed both eyewitnesses and preserved
some written notes. When testifying at trial, defense counsel used these notes
to attempt to impeach the witnesses during cross-examination. With the bank
teller, the defense asked if he remembered telling the investigator that he had
seen only the back of the head of the person identified as the perpetrator.
When he replied that he did not remember making that statement, he was
allowed, despite the defense’s objections, to refresh his recollection by looking
at a part of the investigator’s notes. The prosecution too was allowed to
examine the relevant part of the notes. The witness then testified that although
the report says that he saw only the back of the head, he still had seen more
than that and insisted that Nobles was the robber. With the salesman, defense
asked whether he remembered making the statement that “all blacks look alike
to me.” After denying making this statement, the prosecution asked to see the
document, defense objected, and the court refused the prosecution’s request.

Issue: Whether or not the Court erred in its Decision

Held: The court said that it would order disclosure of the document if the
investigator testified concerning the witnesses’ alleged statements. Nobles
called the investigator to the stand. The court said that a copy of the report
(inspected and edited) would have to be submitted to the prosecution at the
end of the investigator’s impeachment testimony. The defense refused to
produce the report, and the court did not allow the impeachment testimony.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit said that the lower
court decision was reversible error, and the United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari.

People of the Philippines vs Sandiganbayan

Facts : On December 22, 1993, which denied petitioners motion for the
discharge of respondent Generoso S. Sansaet to be utilized as a state witness,
and its resolution of March 7, 1994 denying the motion for reconsideration of
its preceding disposition. The records show that during the dates material to
this case, respondent Honrada was the Clerk of Court and Acting Stenographer
of the First Municipal Circuit Trial Court, San Francisco-Bunawan-Rosario in
Agusan del Sur. Respondent Paredes was successively the Provincial Attorney
of Agusan del Sur, then Governor of the same province, and is at present a
Congressman. Respondent Sansaet was a practicing attorney who served as
counsel for Paredes in several instances pertinent to the criminal charges
involved in the present recourse.
The same records also represent that sometime in 1976, respondent
Paredes applied for a free patent over Lot No. 3097-A, Pls-67 of the Rosario
Public Land Subdivision Survey. His application was approved and, pursuant
to a free patent granted to him, an original certificate of title was issued in his
favor for that lot which is situated in the poblacion of San Francisco, Agusan
del Sur.
However, in 1985, the Director of Lands filed an action for the cancellation
of respondent Paredes patent and certificate of title since the land had been
designated and reserved as a school site in the aforementioned subdivision
survey. The trial court rendered judgment nullifying said patent and title after
finding that respondent Paredes had obtained the same through fraudulent
misrepresentations in his application. Pertinently, respondent Sansaet served
as counsel of Paredes in that civil case.
Consequent to the foregoing judgment of the trial court, upon the
subsequent complaint of the Sangguniang Bayan and the preliminary
investigation conducted thereon, an information for perjury was filed against
respondent Paredes in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court. On November 27,
1985, the Provincial Fiscal was, however, directed by the Deputy Minister of
Justice to move for the dismissal of the case on the ground inter alia of
prescription, hence the proceedings were terminated. In this criminal case,
respondent Paredes was likewise represented by respondent Sansaet as
counsel.
Nonetheless, respondent* Paredes was thereafter haled before the
Tanodbayan for preliminary investigation on the charge that, by using his
former position as Provincial Attorney to influence and induce the Bureau of
Lands officials to favorably act on his application for free patent, he had
violated Section 3(a) of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended. For the third time,
respondent Sansaet was Paredes counsel of record therein.
On August 29, 1988, the Tanodbayan, issued a resolution recommending
the criminal prosecution of respondent Paredes. Atty. Sansaet, as counsel for
his aforenamed co-respondent, moved for reconsideration and, because of its
legal significance in this case, we quote some of his allegations in that motion:

x x x respondent had been charged already by the complainants before the

Municipal Circuit Court of San Francisco, Agusan del Sur, went to jail on
detention in 1984 under the same set of facts and the same evidence x x x but
said case after arraignment, was ordered dismissed by the court upon
recommendation of the Department of Justice. Copy of the dismissal order,
certificate of arraignment and therecommendation of the Department of
Justice are hereto attached for ready reference; thus the filing of this case will
be a case of double jeopardy for respondent herein x x x.(Italics supplied.)

A criminal case was subsequently filed with the Sandiganbayan charging

respondent Paredes with a violation of Section 3(a) of Republic Act No. 3019, as
amended. However, a motion to quash filed by the defense was later granted in
respondent courts resolution of August 1, 199 and the case was dismissed on
the ground of prescription.
 On January 23, 1990, one Teofilo Gelacio, a taxpayer who had initiated the
perjury and graft charges against respondent Paredes, sent a letter to the
Ombudsman seeking the investigation of the three respondents herein for
falsification of public documents.He claimed that respondent Honrada, in
conspiracy with his herein co-respondents, simulated and certified as true
copies certain documents purporting to be a notice of arraignment, dated July
1, 1985, and transcripts of stenographic notes supposedly taken during the
arraignment of Paredes on the perjury charge. These falsified documents were
annexed to respondent Paredes motion for reconsideration of the Tanodbayan
resolution for the filing of a graft charge against him, in order to support his
contention that the same would constitute double jeopardy.
In support of his claim, Gelacio attached to his letter a certification that no
notice of arraignment was ever received by the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of
Agusan del Sur in connection with that perjury case; and a certification of
Presiding Judge Ciriaco Ario that said perjury case in his court did not reach
the arraignment stage since action thereon was suspended pending the review
of the case by the Department of Justice.
Respondents filed their respective counter-affidavits, but Sansaet
subsequently discarded and repudiated the submissions he had made in his
counter-affidavit. In a so-called Affidavit of Explanations and
Rectifications,respondent Sansaet revealed that Paredes contrived to have the
graft case under preliminary investigation dismissed on the ground of double
jeopardy by making it that the perjury case had been dismissed by the trial
court after he had been arraigned therein.
For that purpose, the documents which were later filed by respondent
Sansaet in the preliminary investigation were prepared and falsified by his co-
respondents in this case in the house of respondent Paredes. To evade
responsibility for his own participation in the scheme, he claimed that he did
so upon the instigation and inducement of respondent Paredes. This was
intended to pave the way for his discharge as a government witness in the
consolidated cases, as in fact a motion therefor was filed by the prosecution
pursuant to their agreement.
Issue: Whether or not the projected testimony of respondent Sansaet, as
proposed state witness, is barred by the attorney-client privilege
Held: The Court said that It may correctly be assumed that there was a
confidential communication made by Paredes to Sansaet in connection with
Criminal Cases Nos. 17791-93 for falsification before respondent court, and
this may reasonably be expected since Paredes was the accused and Sansaet
his counsel therein. Indeed, the fact that Sansaet was called to witness the
preparation of the falsified documents by Paredes and Honrada was as
eloquent a communication, if not more, than verbal statements being made to
him by Paredes as to the fact and purpose of such falsification. It is significant
that the evidentiary rule on this point has always referred to any
communication, without distinction or qualification.
In the American jurisdiction from which our present evidential rule was
taken, there is no particular mode by which a confidential communication shall
be made by a client to his attorney. The privilege is not confined to verbal or
written communications made by the client to his attorney but extends as well
to information communicated by the client to the attorney by other means. Nor
can it be pretended that during the entire process, considering their past and
existing relations as counsel and client and, further, in view of the purpose for
which such falsified documents were prepared, no word at all passed between
Paredes and Sansaet on the subject matter of that criminal act. The clincher
for this conclusion is the undisputed fact that said documents were thereafter
filed by Sansaet in behalf of Paredes as annexes to the motion for
reconsideration in the preliminary investigation of the graft case before the
Tanodbayan. Also, the acts and words of the parties during the period when
the documents were being falsified were necessarily confidential since Paredes
would not have invited Sansaet to his house and allowed him to witness the
same except under conditions of secrecy and confidence.
On the final requirement of the Rules, it does not appear that respondent
Sansaet has at any time been convicted of any offense involving moral
turpitude. Thus, with the confluence of all the requirements for the discharge
of this respondent, both the Special Prosecutor and the Solicitor General
strongly urge and propose that he be allowed to testify as a state witness.
This Court is not unaware of the doctrinal rule that, on this procedural aspect,
the prosecution may propose but it is for the trial court, in the exercise of its
sound discretion, to determine the merits of the proposal and make the
corresponding disposition. It must be emphasized, however, that such
discretion should have been exercised, and the disposition taken on a holistic
view of all the facts and issues herein discussed, and not merely on the sole
issue of the applicability of the attorney-client privilege.
LIM vs Court of Appeals

FACTS: Petition for review on the rule of confidentiality the patient-doctor relationship on

November 25, 1987 Juan Sim filed with Pangasinan RTC a petition for annulment based
on Art 36, alleging that Nelly Lim (petitioner) is suffering from schizophrenia before, during
and after marriage and until the present January 11, 1989 .Sim announced he will
present Dr Lydia Acampado (psychiatrist) as a witness on January 25, 1989.
 Petitioner opposed on the grounds that the testimony sought to be elicited from the
witnessis privileged since Dr Acampado had examined Lim in a professional capacity and
had diagnosed her with schizophrenia. Subpoena was issued on January 12, 1989
On January 24, 1989 the petitioner filed urgent motion to quash subpoena and suspend
proceedings. Overruled
Respondent claimed that Dr Acampado will be presented as expert witness and would not
testify on any information acquired while attending to the petitioner as doctor.
March 3, 1989  petitioner filed with CA petition for certiorari and prohibition but was
denied on September 18, 1989 on the ground that petitioner failed to establish the
confidential nature of the testimony obtained from Dr Acampado

ISSUE: Whether Dr Acampado can be presented as expert witness in testifying

schizophrenia in case where petitioner is her client

HELD: In order for patient-doctor privilege can be claimed, the following requisites must
concur:
Privilege claimed is in a civil case. The person against whom the privilege is claimed is one
duly authorized to practice medicine. Such person acquired the information while he was
attending to the patient in his professional capacity. The information was necessary for
him to enable him to act in that capacity ,These requisites must concur with the
4 fundamental conditions necessary for invoking doctor-patient confidentiality:
The communications must originate in a confidence that they will not be disclosed.
Element of confidentiality must be essential to the full and satisfactory maintenance of the
relation between the parties. The relation must be one which the opinion of the
community ought to be sedulously fostered. The injury that would inure to the relation by
the disclosure of the communications must greater than the benefit thereby gain for
correct disposal of litigation Dr Acampado was only presented as an expert witness; she
did not disclose anything obtained in the course of her examination, interview and
treatment of the petitioner. There is nothing specific or concrete offered to show that the
information obtained from Dr Acampado would blacken the petitioners
reputation/character. Lastly, she makes no claim in any of her proceedings that her
counsel had objected to any questions asked of the witness on the ground that it elicited
an answer that would violate the confidentiality privilege
Krohn vs ca

FACTS: A confidential psychiatric evaluation report is being presented in evidence before

the trial court in a petition for annulment of marriage grounded on psychological
incapacity. The witness testifying on the report is the husband who initiated the
annulment proceedings, not the physician who prepared the report. Ma. Paz
Fernandez Krohn, invoking doctor-patient confidentiality, seeks to enjoin her husband
from disclosing the contents of the psychiatric evaluation report. June 14, 1964. Edgar
Krohn Jr. and Ma. Paz Fernandez were married in San Marcelino Manila. In
1971, Paz underwent psychological testing in an effort to ease marital strain; 1973 both
separated in 1975. Edgar was able to secure a copy of the confidential psychiatric report
signed by Dr Cornelio Banaag and Baltazar Reyes.
 
November 2, 1978. Edgar obtained a decree from family court nullifying his marriage with
Paz. On June 10, 1979, decree was confirmed and pronounced final. On July 30, 1982.
Pasig CFI granted voluntary dissolution of conjugal partnership. October 23, 1990. Edgar
filed petition for annulment, citing the confidential psychiatric evaluation report.
May 8, 1991. Edgar testified on the contents of the psych report but was objected due to
patient-doctor confidentiality. Petitioner asserted that there is no factual or legal basis for
Edgars claims since reports were fabricated.
June 4, 1991.RTC admitted confidential psychiatric report as evidence
Petitioner argued pursuant to Sec. 24 (c), Rule 130 ROC<, prohibits a physician from
testifying on matters which he may have acquired in attending to a patient in a
professional capacity, more so a third person testifying on privileged matters between a
physician and patient or from submitting any medical report prepared by a physician
which the latter has acquired as a result of his confidential and privileged relation with the
patient
May 29, 1991 Edgar opposed Paz motion to disallow the introduction of the confidential
psych report as evidence

ISSUE: Whether or not the confidential psychiatric report obtained by Edgar Krohn

constitutes as evidence in filing an annulment complaint on the account of psychological
incapacity

HELD: NO. In the instant case, the person against whom the privilege is claimed is not
one duly authorized to practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics. He is simply the patient's
husband who wishes to testify on a document executed by medical practitioners. Plainly
and clearly, this does not fall within the claimed prohibition.
Neither can his testimony be considered a circumvention of the prohibition because his
testimony cannot have the force and effect of the testimony of the physician who examined
the patient and executed the report. Such testimony then is considered nothing but
hearsay.
Us vs Nixon

Facts. The special prosecutor in the Watergate scandal subpoenaed the tape

recordings of conversations involving the President and his advisers regarding
the scandal. The President’s counsel moved to quash the subpoena citing
Article II of the United States Constitution (the “Constitution”) and its grant of
privilege to the President. The President’s counsel also argued it was a non-
justiciable question because it was a disagreement between parts of the
executive branch.

Issue. Is the President’s Article II constitutional privilege absolute?

Held. The President’s executive privilege is not absolute and must bend to

Amendment 4 and Amendment 5 requirements of speedy and fair trials and of
the ability of defendants to face their accusers.
Courts are not required to proceed against the President as if the President was
any other individual. Courts should review communications claimed to be
privileged in camera (by the judge only in chambers).

Banko Filipino vs monetary board

Facts: On November 4, 1985, Petitioner Bank filed in the instant case a

"Motion to Pay Back Salaries to All BF Officers and Employees from February
to August 29, 1985" in connection with its "Opposition to Respondents" Motion
for Reconsideration or for Clarification of the Resolution of the Court En Banc
of October 8, 1985." On November 7, 1985, this Court referred said motion to
pay back salaries to Branch 136 (Judge Ricardo Francisco, presiding) of the
Makati Regional Trial Court, which this Court had earlier directed under our
Resolution of October 8, 1985 issued in G.R. No. 77054, to conduct hearings
on the matter of the closure of petitioner Bank and its alleged pre-planned
liquidation.

On January 22, 1986, said Regional Trial Court, after considering the
petitioner's motion of November 4, 1985, the respondents' opposition thereto
dated January 15, 1986; the petitioner's Reply dated January 16, 1986, and
the respondents' Rejoinder dated January 20, 1986, issued an order directing
the respondents herein "to pay all officers and employees of petitioner their
back salaries and wages corresponding to the period from February to August
29, 1985."

On February 4, 1986, respondents herein filed with this Court an "Appeal from,
or Petition to Set Aside, order to Pay Back Salaries dated 22 January 1986"
praying for the reversal and setting aside of the aforestated trial court's Order
dated January 22, 1986. This was formally opposed by Petitioner when it filed
its "Answer to Appeal (re: back salaries)" on February 26, 1986. A month later,
on March 26, 1986, respondents filed their "Reply to the Answer" which
petitioner traversed in a "Rejoinder to the Reply" dated April 2, 1986.

In a normal situation, no controversy would be expected in the matter of the

payment of said back salaries because in the instant case, the party praying for
the same is the employer Bank. The attendant circumstances here present
have, however, created a peculiar situation. There is resistance to the claim
because the management of the assets of the Bank has been transferred to the
Respondents' Receiver who perceived that the directive to pay back salaries
after closure of the Bank would be dissipation of the banks' assets to the
prejudice of its various creditors.

Issue : Whether or not the employees of petitioner Bank had actually worked
during said period should now be discounted considering this voluntary act of
respondent Monetary Board which would remove by estoppel any impediment
to the receipt by all bank employees of their back salaries from January 25,
1985 up to June, 1985, assuming that some of them have not yet received the
same.

Held: The Court said that in the case at bar, the respondents have not
established that public interest would suffer by the disclosure of the papers
and documents sought by petitioner. Considering that petitioner bank was
already closed as of January 25, 1985, any disclosure of the aforementioned
letters, reports, and transcripts at this time pose no danger or peril to our
economy. Neither will it trigger any bank run nor compromise state secrets.
Respondent's reason for their resistance to the order of production are tenuous
and specious. If the respondents public officials acted rightfully and prudently
in the performance of their duties, there should be nothing at all that would
provoke fear of disclosure

On the contrary, public interests will be best served by the disclosure of the
documents. Not only the banks and its employees but also its numerous
depositors and creditors are entitled to be informed as to whether or not there
was a valid and legal justification for the petitioner's bank closure. It will be
well to consider that—

Public interest means more than a mere curiosity; it means something in which
the public, the community at large, has some pecuniary interest by which their
legal rights or liabilities are affected (State vs. Crocket, 206, p. 816 cited in
Words and Phrases, Vol. 35, p. 229).

Almonte vs Vasquez

FACTS:  Ombudsman Vasquez required Rogado and Rivera of Economic

Intelligence and Investigation Bureau (EIIB) to produce all documents
relating to Personal Service Funds yr. 1988 and all evidence for the whole
plantilla of EIIB for 1988. The subpoena duces tecum was issued in
connection with the investigation of funds representing savings from
unfilled positions in the EIIB which were legally disbursed. Almonte and
Perez  denied the anomalous activities that circulate around the EIIB
office.  They moved to quash the subpoena duces tecum. They claim
privilege of an agency of the Government.

ISSUE:
Whether or not an Ombudsman can oblige the petitioners by virtue of
subpoena duces tecum to provide documents relating to personal service
and salary vouchers of EIIB employers.

RULING:
Yes. A government privilege against disclosure is recognized with respect
to state secrets bearing on military, diplomatic and similar matters. This
privilege is based upon public interest of such paramount importance as
in and of itself transcending the individual interests of a private citizen,
even though, as a consequence thereof, the plaintiff cannot enforce his
legal rights.
In the case at bar, there is no claim that military or diplomatic secrets
will be disclosed by the production of records pertaining to the personnel
of the EIIB. EIIB's function is the gathering and evaluation of intelligence
reports and information regarding "illegal activities affecting the national
economy, such as, but not limited to, economic sabotage, smuggling, tax
evasion, dollar salting." Consequently while in cases which involve state
secrets it may be sufficient to determine the circumstances of the case
that there is reasonable danger that compulsion of the evidence will
expose military matters without compelling production, no similar excuse
can be made for privilege resting on other considerations.
Mc. Cray vs Illinois

Facts. An undercover informant told Chicago police that the defendant was
selling drugs and had drugs in his possession. The police found the defendant
with drugs on him in the area where the informant said he would be. The
officers further testified that during the past two years, the informant had
proved to be reliable regarding other drug dealers. The informant pointed out
the defendant to the officers, then left the scene before the arrest.

Issue. Must the government identify an undercover informant whose testimony

went only to probable cause, not guilt?

Held. The government need not identify an undercover informant whose

testimony goes only to probable cause.

Dissent. Previous decisions of the Supreme Court encourage the police to

obtain warrants. This decision goes against that trend. Arrests with warrants
are weighed more heavily than those without because a neutral magistrate
controls whether the police have met their probable cause burden. This
decision allows the police themselves to make that decision. Disclosure of
informants is necessary to determine the validity of a probable cause affidavit.
Kastigar vs United States

Facts. Subpoenaed to appear before a federal grand jury, the petitioners

refused to answer questions in asserting the Fifth Amendment, despite the
government having granted them immunity. The immunity was based on a part
of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 stating that neither the testimony
nor any other information from the testimony could be used against the
witnesses. Petitioners argued that the scope of the immunity they were given
was not as broad as the scope of the privilege against self-incrimination, and
were unsuccessful in the District Court. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed the order, and the petitioners were granted certiorari.

Issue. Can the government compel immunized testimony even if the

subpoenaed persons have invoked the privilege versus self-incrimination?

Held. Yes. Affirm the lower court’s decision allowing the compulsion of

testimony.
The total proscription on use found in this federal statute, that is, from both
use and derivative use, provides enough of a safeguard against Fifth
Amendment rights being infringed on by barring the testimony from even being
used as an investigatory lead.

The petitioners’ concern that the bar against derivative use could not be
enforced effectively is overcome by subsequent prosecuting authorities having
the burden of showing that their evidence comes from an independent source.
Galman vs Pamaran

Facts : The fact is that both majority and minority reports were one in rejecting
the military version as propounded by the chief investigator, respondent Gen.
Olivas, that Rolando Galman was the NPA-hired assassin, stating that "the
evidence shows [to the contrary] that Rolando Galman had no subversive
affiliations." They were in agreement that "only the soldiers in the staircase
with Sen. Aquino could have shot him;" that Galman, the military's "fall guy"
was "not the assassin of Sen. Aquino and that "the SWAT troopers who gunned
down Galman and the soldiers who escorted Sen. Aquino down the service
stairs, deliberately and in conspiracy with one another, gave a perjured story to
us regarding the alleged shooting by Galman of Sen. Aquino and the mowing
down, in turn, of Galman himself;" in short, that Ninoy's assassination was the
product of a military conspiracy, not a communist plot The only difference
between the two reports is that the majority report found all the twenty-six
private respondents abovenamed in the title of the case headed by then AFP
Chief General Fabian C. Ver involved in the military conspiracy and therefore
"indictable for the premeditated killing of Senator Benigno S. Aquino, Jr. and
Rolando Galman at the MIA on August 21, 1983;" while the chairman's
minority report would exclude nineteen of them and limit as plotters "the six
persons who were on the service stairs while Senator Aquino was descending"
and "General Luther Custodio . . . because the criminal plot could not have
been planned and implemented without his intervention."

The chairman wrote in her minority report (somewhat prophetically) that "The
epilogue to our work lies in what will transpire in accordance with the action
that the Office of the President may thereafter direct to be taken. "The four-
member majority report (also prophetically) wrote in the epilogue (after warning
the forces who adhere to an alien and intolerable political ideology against
unscrupulously using the report "to discredit our traditionally revered
institutions"), that "the tragedy opened our eyes and for the first time
confirmed our worst fears of what unchecked evil would be capable of doing."
They wrote:

The task of the Board was clear and unequivocal. This task was
not only to determine the facts and circumstances surrounding the
death of the late former Senator. Of greater significance is the
awesome responsibility of the Board to uphold righteousness over
evil, justice over injustice, rationality over irrationality,
humaneness over inhumanity. The task was indeed a painful test,
the inevitable result of which will restore our country's honored
place among the sovereign nations of the free world where peace,
law and order, freedom, and justice are a way of life.

More than any other event in contemporary Philippine history, the

killing of the late former Senator Aquino has brought into sharper
focus, the ills pervading Philippine society. It was the
concretization of the horror that has been haunting this country
for decades, routinely manifested by the breakdown of peace and
order, economic instability, subversion, graft and corruption, and
an increasing number of abusive elements in what are otherwise
noble institutions in our country-the military and law enforcement
agencies. We are, however, convinced that, by and large, the great
majority of the officers and men of these institutions have
remained decent and honorable, dedicated to their noble mission
in the service of our country and people.

The tragedy opened our eyes and for the first time confirmed our
worst fears of what unchecked evil would be capable of doing. As
former Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban observes. "Nobody who
has great authority can be trusted not to go beyond its proper
limits." Social apathy, passivity and indifference and neglect have
spawned in secret a dark force that is bent on destroying the
values held sacred by freedom-loving people.

To assert our proper place in the civilized world, it is imperative

that public officials should regard public service as a reflection of
human Ideals in which the highest sense of moral values and
integrity are strictly required.

A tragedy like that which happened on August 21, 1983, and the
crisis that followed, would have normally caused the resignation of
the Chief of the Armed Forces in a country where public office is
viewed with highest esteem and respect and where the moral
 responsibilities of public officials transcend all other
considerations.

Issue : Whether or not the petitioner has a valid contention

Held: The Court said that it is true that where an accused was not a party to
the fraud, a conviction secured fraudulently by the State's officer cannot be
avoided by the state (State vs. Heflin, 96 So. 459, 19 Ala. App. 222). However,
that exception is inapplicable to the cases at bar where both the prosecution
and the Trial Court itself were parties to the fraud and collusion. Nor can it be
said that the accused were not a part thereof. The agreement to file the murder
charge in Court so that, after being acquitted as planned, the accused could no
longer be prosecuted under the doctrine of double jeopardy; the
"categorization" of the accused into principals, accomplices and accessories so
that not all of them would be denied bail during the trial, were fraudulently
conceived for their benefit and for the purpose of protecting them from
subsequent prosecution. It is, thus, no bar to a subsequent prosecution for the
same offense (Coumas vs. Superior Court, 192 P. 2d. 449, 452, 31 C. 2d. 682).
"A verdict of acquittal procured by the accused by fraud and collusion is a
nullity and does not put him in jeopardy; and consequently, it is no bar to a
second trial for the same offense (State vs. Lee, 30A. 1110, 65 Conn. 265,48
Am. S.R. 202,27 L. RA. 498).

The proceedings below having been fatally flawed by pressure, fraud and
collusion, with the legal consequence that there was no trial and judgment to
speak of, and under the circumstances peculiar only to these cases, I vte for a
re-trial in the interest of truth and the ends of public justice. As in all criminal
proceedings, however, the accused must be guaranteed a fair, speedy, and
impartial re-trial before an unbiased Tribunal and prosecutor and, I might add,
safeguarded against trial by publicity.

Viacrusis vs Court of Appeals

Facts : Private Respondents Orias and Spouse brought an action to establish
their title to a land of about 4 hectares in leyte. They alleges that it is part of a
bigger lot sold to them by its registered owner,Pedro Sanchez by virtue of a
deed of sale they sought to recover the land from Viacrucis. Viacrucis claims
that the deed of sale was simulated.

The Lower Court and the Appellate Court ruled in favor of Orias, considering
among others the admission of one Mrs. Costelo. Mrs. Costelo stated that
although the land in dispute was physically in the possession of her deceased
husband they still recognized Orias as the owner of the land.The Court also
considered the admission of Mr. Costelo which was in a public document.
Viacrusis assails that the Court use of the Costelos spouses admissions,
claiming that he cannot be prejudiced by an act or declaration of another.

Issue : Whether or not the Admission of Mrs. Costelo was binding on Viacrucis.

Held: The Court said YES, The testimony and the Public Document constitute
declarations of the Costelos adverse to their interest which is admissible in
Evidence ,Pursuant to the rule on declarations against interest. Viacrusis has
no reason whatsoever to object to the consideration in favor Orias of said
admission, the same having been made in 1936,more than 5 years before
Viacrucis predecessors in interest entered the picture. Such admission may be
received in Evidence, not only against the party who made it or his successors
in interest, but also against third persons.
Keller and Co., Ltd vs COB group marketing

Facts: Edward A. Keller & Co., Ltd. (Keller) appointed COB Group Marketing,
Inc. (COB) as exclusive distributor of its household products in Panay and
Negros> this was evidenced by a sales agreement w/c said Keller sold on credit
its products to COB> as security for COB's credit purchases up to the amount
of P35,000, one Asuncion Manahan mortgaged her land to Keller and bound
herself solidarily w/ COB> Keller and COB executed a second sales agreement
whereby the latter's territory was extended to northern and southern Luzon>
as security for COB's credit purchases up to P25,000 for that area, Tomas C.
Lorenzo, Jr. and his father Tomas, Sr., executed a mortgage on their land> like
Manahan, the Lorenzos were solidarily liable with COB for its obligations under
the sales agreement> COB's president and general manager, Jose Bax, soon
apprised the firm's board of directors that they owed Keller about P179,000>
Bax was authorized to negotiate with Keller for the settlement of his firm's
liability> Bax and a representative of Keller's signed the conditions for the
settlement of COB's liability> twelve days later, COB executed two more chattel
mortgages over its 12 trucks(already mortgaged to another) as security for its
obligation to Keller> these mortgages did not become effective since the first
mortgagee did not give its consent> HOWEVER, the failed mortgages did serve
the purpose of being admissions of the liability of COB to Keller> COB's
stockholders, Moises Adao and Tomas Lorenzo, Jr., proposed in a letter to pay
Keller P5,000 every thirtieth day of the month for three years until the
obligation is satisfied> Adao and Lorenzo likewise proposed to substitute
Manahan's mortgage with one on Adao's lot in Quezon City> Bax at some point
presented his own reconciliation statements where he claimed overpayment on
the part of his firm -- i.e. that COB overpaid Keller P100,596.72[> the Supreme
Court noted at this juncture that Bax was not an accountant]> the matter was
brought before the courts when Keller sued COB, its stockholders and
mortgagors Manahan and Lorenzo (Tomas, Sr. died in the interim)> COB was
declared in default> court below dismissed the complaint and ordered Keller to
pay COB the "overpaid" amount + interest + moral damages for the
stockholders and Manahan + attorney's fees and costs of suit; the lower court
also declared void the mortgages executed by Manahan and Lorenzo> Keller
appealled, but in vain> hence this petition

ISSUE: Was the ruling of the lower court, affirmed by the Appellate Court,
proper?

RULING: NO. the Supreme Court called out the lower and appellate courts for
misapprehension of facts and for adopting findings contradicted by evidence.
COB Group marketing, Inc. is ordered to pay Edward A. Keller & Co., Ltd. the
sum of P182,994.60 with 12% interest per annum from August 1, 1971 up to
the date of payment plus P20,000 as attorney's fees.

Asuncion Manahan and Tomas C. Lorenzo, Jr. are ordered to pay solidarity
with COB Group Marketing the sums of P35,000 and P25,000, respectively.

The following respondents are solidarity liable with COB Group Marketing up
to the amounts of their unpaid subscription to be applied to the company's
liability herein: Jose E. Bax P36,000; Francisco C. de Castro, P36,000; Johnny
de la Fuente, P12,000; Sergio C. Ordonez, P12,000; Trinidad C. Ordonez,
P3,000; Magno C. Ordonez, P3,000; Adoracion C. Ordonez P3,000; Tomas C.
Lorenzo, Jr., P3,000 and Luz M. Aguilar-Adao, P6,000. If after ninety (90) days
from notice of the finality of the judgment in this case the judgment against
COB Group Marketing has not been satisfied fully, then the mortgages
executed by Manahan and Lorenzo should be foreclosed and the proceeds of
the sales applied to the obligation of COB Group Marketing. Said mortgage
obligations should bear six percent legal interest per annum after the expiration
of the said 90-day period. Costs against the private respondents.
People of the Philippines vs Paragsa

Facts: The evidence for the prosecution consists of the testimony of Mirasol
Magallanes, the alleged rape victim, her aunt-in-law, Mrs. Lita Parochel, and
Dr. Luis L. Gandiongco of the Bantayan Emergency Hospital, Bantayan, Cebu,
who examined the offended party and submitted Exhibit A embodying his
findings thereon,

Substantially, the records show that in the afternoon of July 13, 1971, Mirasol,
who was then a little over twelve and a half (12½) years old (Exhibit B, p. 7,
rec.), was alone in her parents' house in Sitio Tabagac of Barrio Bunacan,
Municipality of Madridejos, Cebu, cooking hog feed. Her parents were away at
the time — her father was in Cadiz, while her mother was in Sagay, both in
Negros Occidental (p. 16, t.s.n., Jan. 5, 1972) while the rest of the family were
with Mirasol's grandmother in Barrio Codia; also in Madridejos, Cebu. Mirasol
was a 6th grade student of the Bunacan Elementary School (p. 6, t.s.n., Dec. 3,
1971). Upon instruction of her mother, she did not go to school that afternoon
so that she could look after the pigs and cook their feed. Thus, she was alone
in the ground floor of their house cooking hog feed when the accused,
Bienvenido Paragsa, armed with a hunting knife, entered the house and closed
the door after him. Approaching from behind, he placed his left arm around
Mirasol's neck, encircled her abdomen with his right arm, at the same time
pointing the hunting knife with s right hand at her breast, and threatened her
not to shout otherwise she would be killed. Thereafter, the accused pushed her
to a bamboo bed nearby, rolled up her dress and, with his two hands, removed
her panties. The accused then placed his hunting knife on the bed by Mirasol's
side, opened the zipper of his pants while kneeling on the bed, opened
Mirasol's thighs, picked up the hunting knife again, placed himself on top of
Mirasol, inserted his erect penis into her sexual organ and then made four
push and pull movement until he ejaculated (pp. 7, 10-11, 12, 13, 14,
t.s.n., Ibid). In the process, Mirasol's dress and panties were not torn, since,
because of fear, she allowed the accused to roll up her dress and pull her
panties without any resistance whatsoever. During the intercourse, the
accused was not holding the hunting knife. After the accused had discharged,
he ran to the storeroom of the house upstairs because he heard Mrs. Lita
Parochel, wife of the younger brother of Mirasol's father, calling from outside
the gate of the house, asking Mirasol to open the gate. Mirasol did not answer
because she was then in the act of putting on her panties (p. 14, t.s.n., Ibid; p.
10, t.s.n., Jan. 5, 1972). After she had put on her panties, she opened the gate
and saw her aunt Lita, who asked her what the accused did to her, but she did
not answer because she was afraid as the accused was still inside the house.
She also did not tell her aunt Lita that the accused had sexual intercourse with
her under threats and against her will. Her aunt Lita then walked away.

Thereafter, the accused reappeared in the room and told Mirasol that if she
would tell her aunt Lita what he did, he would kill her (pp. 13-14, t.s.n., Dec.
3, 1971). After the incident, Mirasol went to Barrio Codia later in the afternoon
of the same day and joined her brother and sister and grandmother. She did
not reveal to any of them what transpired between her and the accused in
Tabagac.

Mirasol's father returned from Cadiz, Negros Occidental that same day; but
Mirasol did not also reveal the incident to him because she was afraid her
father might punish her. Her mother returned home on July 16, 1971 from
Sagay, Negros Occidental; but Mirasol did not also tell her mother about what
happened to her on July 13 in Tabagac It was her aunt Lita who revealed the
matter to Mirasol's mother, who thereupon confronted her daughter. Mirasol
had to reveal the incident of July 13 to her mother only when her mother asked
her about it; because, according to her, she wanted to take revenge on the
accused.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner has a valid contention

Held: The Court had observed that Mirasol Magallanes is an intelligent, honest
and reliable witness notwithstanding the fact that she was of a very tender age
and the Court cannot accept the theory of the defense that the intercourse that
took place on July 13, 1971 was voluntary on her part. It would be very hard to
believe that the complainant would easily submit to such an intercourse if her
will to resist had not been overpowered or overcome by threat, intimidation and
force on the part of the accused who was armed with a knife.

The accused was twenty-one (21) years old while the victim was twelve years
and six months old. The fact of the accused in taking advantage of the victim's
immaturity is a form of unpardonable sexual perversion which is worse than
the offense committed by Roman Polanski the Hollywood director who was
convicted of cohabiting with thirteen-year old girl.

To acquit the accused would be a miscarriage of justice. The lower court's

judgment of conviction should be affirmed and the accused should be
sentenced to reclusion perpetua.
People vs Alegre

Facts: This case arose from the death of Adelina Sajo y Maravilla, Spinster, 57
years old, whose body was found in her bathroom inside her house at the
Maravilla compound, Ignacio Street, Pasay City, in the early morning of July
26, 1966. According to the Necropsy Report, she died of asphyxia by manual
strangulation, and the time of her death was placed between eighteen to
twenty-two hours before 12:30 p.m. of July 26, 1966.

Her bedroom was in "shambles," evidently indicating that it was ransacked.

The drawers and several cabinets were open, and some personal garments,
hadbags and papers were scattered on the floor. No witness saw the
commission of the crime. Appellant Ramiro Alegre, who was then living with
relatives in one of the rented rooms on the ground floor of the victim's house,
was taken to the Pasay City police headquarters for investigation in connection
with the case, but was later released that same day for lack of any evidence
implicating him in the crime.

During the latter part of July, 1966, Melecio Cudillan was apprehended in
Tacloban City, Leyte, in the act of pawning a bracelet, one of the pieces of
jewelry taken from the victim. In explaining how he came into possession of the
stolen pieces of jewelry, he admitted his participation in the killing and robbery
of Adlina Sajo. This appears in his extrajudicial confession before the police
authorities of Tacloban City on July 29, 1966 (Exhibits "F", "F-1" and "F-2"). In
this statement, which was written in the English language, Melecio Cudillan
implicated a certain "Esok" of Villalon, Calubian, Leyte; Jesus Medalla, of
Villahermosa, Calubian, Leyte; Mario Cudillan, also of Villahermosa, Calubian,
Leyte; one "Danny" Fernandez, of Balaquid, Cabucgayan, Biliran Sub-province;
and one "Rammy, " another Leyteno. When brought to Metro Manila and while
he was inside the Pasay City police headquarters, Melecio Cudillan again
executed an extrajudicial confession (Exhibits "A ", "A-1 " to "A-6" on July 31,
1966. This was sworn to before the Assistant City Fiscal of Pasay City on
August 1, 1966. In this second statement, he narrated in detail the
participation in the commission of the crime of Jesus Medalla, "Celso"
Fernandez, "Rami" and "Mario." According to said statement, the declarant
went near the cell within the Office of the Investigation Section, Secret Service
Division, and Identified Ramiro Alegre, Jesus Medalla and Mario Comayas as
the persons he referred to as Jesus Medalla, "Rami" and "Mario" in his
declaration. On the basis of the aforementioned extrajudicial confession of
Melecio Cudillan, an Information for Robbery with Homicide was filed by the
Special Counsel of Pasay City against Celso Fernandez, alias "Esok," Jesus
Medalla y Cudillan, Ramiro Alegre y Cerdoncillo, Mario Comayas y Cudillan,
Melecio Cudillan y Arcillas, and one John Doe."
When arraigned on August 10, 1966, Mario Comayas, Melecio Cudillan, Jesus
Medalla and Ramiro Alegre entered a plea of not guilty. The prosecution
presented nine (9) witnesses. None of them, however, testified on the actual
commission of the crime. The recital of facts contained in the decision under
review was based principally and mainly on the extrajudicial confessions of
Melecio Cudillan. Thus, the details of the planning and the execution of the
crime were taken from the "Pasay Sworn Statement" (Exhibits "A", "A-1" to "A-
6"). The only evidence, therefore, presented by the prosecution to prove the
guilt of appellants are the testimonies of Sgt. Mariano Isla and Hernando
Carillo.

Issue : Whether or not the petitioner has a valid contention

Held: The Court said that it must be stressed here that even under a regime of
martial law, the operations of our laws governing the rights of an accused
person are not open to doubt. Under the code for the administration of
detainees, all officers, civilian and military personnel are sworn to uphold the
rights of detainees. Among such fundamental rights are the right against
compulsory testimonial self-incrimination, the right, when under investigation
for the commission of an offense, to remain silent, to have counsel, and to be
informed of his rights; the right not to be subjected to force, violence, threats,
intimidation and degrading punishment or torture in the course of one's
detention, and the safeguard that any confession obtained in violation of the
foregoing rights shall be inadmissible in evidence. The 1973 Constitution gives
explicit constitutional sanction to the right to silence. Thus, in Section 20 of
Article IV of the Constitution, there is this categorical mandate: "Any person
under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to
remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right. No force,
violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free will
shall be used against him. Any confession obtained in violation of this section
shall be inadmissible in evidence."

We hold, therefore, that it was error for the trial court to draw from appellants'
silence while under police custody, in the face of the incriminatory statements
of Melecio Cudillan, the conclusion that the aforesaid appellants had tacitly
admitted their guilt. We hold, further, that in view of the inadmissibility of the
extrajudicial confession of Melecio Cudillan implicating herein appellants, the
remaining evidence against them, consisting in the testimonies of Sgt. Mariano
Isla and Hernando Carillo, is insufficient to sustain the judgment of conviction.
Indeed, it is inherently improbable that herein appellants would have readily
confessed their participation in the commission of a heinous crime to a casual
acquaintance in a prison detention cell, considering that on the same occasion
they strongly denied any involvement in such crime before the police
authorities.

Philippine trust co., vs Antigua botics Ramirez

Facts: In case G.R. No. 34686, plaintiff-appellant seeks to collect from

defendants-appellees, Antigua Botica Ramirez, Daniel Boquer, and J. J.
Dunbar, the amount of P7,531.28 which represents the balance of an overdraft
account of the Antigua Botica Ramirez with the plaintiff as of December 17,
1928. J. J. Dunbar and Daniel Boquer were guarantors for the overdraft.

For some time before the complaints were filed the Antigua Botica Ramirez was
under the control and management of the plaintiff, and a few months after
plaintiff's complaints were filed, and upon plaintiff's petition a receiver of the
properties of the defendant Antigua Botica Ramirez was appointed.

After trial, the court below rendered judgment, dismissing the three
complaints, ordering the cancellation of the mortgage of Manuela Reyes' land,
discharging the receiver and ordering him to turn over the properties of the
defendant Antigua Botica Ramirez to plaintiff. 
Under the first assignment of error, counsel for the plaintiff contend that the
defendant Eduardo Gutierrez Repide should not have been permitted by the
lower court to testify that he signed the promissory notes marked plaintiff's
Exhibits J and M as a mere surety, and for no consideration.

We think that this point is well taken. It is admitted by the defendant Eduardo
Gutierrez Repide that he signed the promissory notes as a surety, and it was
immaterial, so far as the plaintiff was concerned, whether or not the said
Gutierrez Repide received anything in payment for the use of his signature.
(Clark vs. Sellner, 42 Phil., 384.)

The second assignment of error has reference to the action of the lower court in
not striking from the record the testimony of the defendant Eduardo Gutierrez
Repide that he was told by the defendant Daniel Boquer that the plaintiff bank
gave him (Boquer) several extensions for the payment of the promissory notes
Exhibits J and M, and in finding that plaintiff gave such extensions.

Issue : Whether or not the petitioners has a valid contention

Held: The Court said that they have carefully examined the evidence, and are
of the opinion that plaintiff's contention should be sustained. The defendants
Eduardo Gutierrez Repide and Daniel Boquer testified, in direct examination,
that a deed of assignment to plaintiff of the shares in question in payment of
the obligations of the defendants was to be executed, and the record shows
that no such document was ever executed.

It is claimed by the defendants that the assignment of their shares of the stock
of the corporation Antigua Botica Ramirez to the plaintiff bank was made in
payment of their obligations. Examining, however, the notice for the special
stockholders' meeting on April 26, 1929, which notice was prepared by the
defendant Eduardo Gutierrez Repide himself, no mention is made therein of
any assignment of the shares in question in payment of the obligations of the
defendants to plaintiff. The notice simply says that the meeting was being
called "for the purpose of electing the new members of the Board of Directors
and determining the manner of liquidating with the Philippine Trust Company
and Fidelity & Surety Company of the Philippine Islands the obligations of the
corporation (Antiga Botica Ramirez) pending payment, and at the same time
resolve the indorsement of all the shares of the corporations to the creditor
corporations in order that the latter might reorganize the Antigua Botica
Ramirez (antes Zobel), Inc. in the manner most convenient to their interest."
Had such an assignment as claimed by the defendants been made, it is but
natural to except that the defendant Gutierrez Repide would have made some
mention thereof in the notice for the meeting prepared by him.

The fourth and fifth assignments of error relate to the action of the lower court
in holding that plaintiff administered the business of the defendant corporation
Antigua Botica Ramirez without any intervention on the latter's part; in not
permitting the witness J. M. Araullo to testify as to the condition of the
corporation in the month of April, 1929; and in finding that plaintiff sold
certain properties of the defendant Antigua Botica Ramirez at very reduced
prices.
Varadero vs Insular Lumber

Facts : El Varadero de Manila completed satisfactorily certain repairs on the

lighter Tatlo, the property of the Insular Lumber Company. The work was
performed pursuant to no express agreement, but with the implicit
understanding that the price would be as low as, or lower than, could be
secured from any other company.

The Insular Lumber Company being of the opinion that the bill as presented
by El Varadero de Manila was grossly exorbitant and a proposed compromise
having failed of realization, the matter was taken to court with the result that
in the Court of First Instance of Manila, El Varadero de Manila, the plaintiff,
secured judgment against the Insular Lumber Company, the defendant, in the
amount of P5,310.70, with legal interest from the presentation of the
complaint, and costs. Still dissatisfied, the plaintiff has appealed to this court
and here as asked us to increase the amount of the judgment to P12,412.62.

To arrive at as correct a judgment as is possible, it will first be necessary to set

down a number of figures and thereafter to seize upon a few salient facts as
having influence.

The itemized bill presented by the plaintiff, the amount which it still claims,
totals P12,412.62. At one time during the course of the negotiations, the
plaintiff was willing to accept P10,241.37. (Exhibit I.) The witnesses for the
plaintiff naturally took the view that the bill was correct. But the trial judge
was of the opinion that it was excessive.

The defendant, on the other hand, says that a reasonable figure for the work
would be P5,310.70. Witnesses were offered to substantiate this contention.
Their testimony so impressed the trial judge that he adopted their statements
as his own. During the course of the abortive negotiations, however, the
defendant expressed a willingness to pay the plaintiff P8,070.12.

Issue : Whether or not the court erred in its decision

Held : The Court said that to emphasize three points which will materially
assist us in rendering judgment. The first point relates to the offer of
compromise which naturally, under the general rules of evidence, must be
excluded, except that as the amounts named in the offers to accept certain
sums in settlement appear to have been arrived at as a fair estimate of value,
they are relevant. (City of Springfield vs. Schmook [1878], 68 Mo., 394;
Daniels vs. Town of Woonsocket [1874], 11 R. I., 4; Teasley vs. Bradley [1900],
110 Ga., 497.) Here, there was no denial of liability and the only question
discussed was the amount to be paid which the plaintiff insisted should not be
more than P8,070.12. The second point of interest relates to the testimony of
Mariano Yengko, inspector of vessels, admittedly a disinterested witness, who
in one synopsis of a fair value of the repairs, arrived at P5,134.20, but which,
on cross-examination, he raised to between seven and eight thousand pesos.
And the third point is that the tacit understanding between the parties was
that the cost of the repairs should be approximately the same as what other
companies would charge. The defendant admits that El Varadero de
Navotas would have done the work for about P8,000. Basing our findings,
therefore, on the foregoing considerations, we are of the opinion that the
reasonable value of the repairs performed by El Varadero de Manila on the
Tatlo owned by the Insular Lumber Company, was something less than P8,000.
We fix the sum definitely at P7,700.

Judgment is modified, and in lieu of the judgment rendered in the lower court,
another shall issue in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant for the
recovery of P7,700, with legal interest to begin to run from the date when this
judgment shall become final and to continue until payment, without express
finding as to costs in either instance. So ordered.
United States vs Torres

Facts : That the testimony of George W. Walker and Juan Samson, secret
service agents of the Cebu Customhouse who arrested the defendants, and the
seizure of the corpus delicti (Exhibits A, B, and C) were held by the trial court to
be conclusive evidence against defendants.

That Walker testified that he had received information that on the night of
January 20, 1914, Regino Torres would go to the house of the widow of one
Franco to get some opium; that at 7:30 that evening they stationed themselves
in Calle de Colon, where the said house stood, and a short while afterwards
saw the two defendants come out of the door of the garage on the premises;
that Samson seized Torres, and as Padilla started to run away Walker went in
pursuit of him and on passing by Samson and Torres saw two tins of opium;
that three times he ordered Padilla to halt, and, as the latter continued to run,
after he had thrown one tin over a fence; that, after the arrest of both
defendants, Walker and Samson set out with lights to search for the tins and
found the one thrown by Padilla inside the inclosure, and the other two tins,
about a meter from the place where Samson had been holding Torres.

That the other officer, Samson, gave nearly the same testimony. He added,
however, when questioned by the defense as to whether Walker had said
anything to him on his return from his pursuit of Padilla, that Walker did say
that he saw Regino Torres throw away two tins and that he was looking for
them. He was also asked by the defense whether Walker had proposed to the
defendants that they pay a fine in the form of a compromise, to which he
replied that he had not, but that, on the contrary, it was the defendants who
made this offer.

That the defendant Regino Torres testified that Padilla told him that there was
a large amount of opium, and they agreed that at 6 o'clock in the evening they
would go to the house above mentioned; that Padilla went to Torres' house at 6
o'clock in the evening and hurried him up, saying: "Eat in a hurry, for the
owner of the opium needs money"; that when they arrived at the house of
Franco's widow, Padilla entered the door of the place where the automobiles
were kept, and five minutes afterwards called witness to enter the garage and
there Padilla showed Torres a tin of opium, at the same time saying that it was
first class and cost P60 without haggling; that witness replied that he would
first show it to some trustworthy friends to determine its class; that Padilla
agreed and they both left for this purpose, but that when they had gone about
ten brazas from the door, he was seized by Samson and saw that Padilla had
run away and was being pursued by Walker. The court asked Torres whether
he had wished to investigate first and buy afterwards, to which he replied that
he did, and that if he had been convinced of the quality of the opium he would
have bought about 20 or 25 tins. "But have you so much money?" inquired the
judge. The defendant replied: "Yes, sir."

That, upon arraignment, Pablo Padilla pleaded guilty. "The defendant's

counsel," says the trial court in his decision, "requested that his client be
permitted to state the circumstances that surrounded the case and which
induced this defendant to commit the crime under prosecution." The court
further says therein: "It is preferable that counsel himself state the
circumstances that, in his opinion, attended the crime and which may be
considered as extenuating."

Pantaleon del Rosario, Padilla's counsel, stated that according to the

information given by his client, the latter is a poor man who accompanied the
other defendant Regino Torres principally in order that, in case they were
caught by the authorities, Torres might transfer the material possession of the
opium to counsel's client and the latter would assume liability for such
possession and suffer the legal consequences.

That the trial court took that statement into consideration in extenuation of the
penalty he imposed upon Padilla, concluding by saying that this defendant
appeared to a be a poor man who, impelled by poverty, had accompanied
Torres for the purpose, as every probability indicated, of obtaining a relatively
small share in the business in which Torres was engaged; while, with respect
to Torres, the court said that he played the most important role, for he
confessed to have sufficient means to purchase opium to the amount of twenty
tins at P60 a tin.
From the judgment of conviction Regino Torres bases his appeal on four
assignments of error: (1) In that the trial court concluded that two tins were
taken from the appellant's possession; (2) in holding that the appellant, in his
testimony, confessed to having been engaged in the business of buying and
selling opium, and in grounding the judgment of conviction on the said
confession; (4) in accepting, as evidence for the prosecution, the compromise
that it is asserted he proposed to the agent George Walker; and (5), in that the
penalty imposed upon the appellant was excessive.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner has a valid contention

Held: The Court said that, it is a legal maxim, which assuredly constitutes one
of the bases of the right to penalize, that in the matter of public crimes which
directly affect the public interest, in so far as public vengeance and private
interests are concerned, no compromise whatever may be entered into as
regards the penal action, however it may be with respect to the civil liability.
But section 25 of Act No. 1761, under which this case was prosecuted,
expressly authorizes the Collector of Internal Revenue to compromise a case
after action has been begun, "instead of commencing or prosecuting suit
thereon." The words in quotation marks are textual. A compromise necessarily
implies two elements, one of which is the offer and the other the acceptance, in
order that the penal action may be extinguished and there remain only the civil
liability to deal with. Of course ordinarily it is the defendant who makes the
offer, — a lawful act sanctioned by law in this class of prosecutions, — and
because it is made, no presumption of guilt must be raised against the maker,
as occurs in other criminal causes for public crimes in which the offer is not
lawful because it is a thing prohibited by law. The offer may have been
prompted simply to avoid the annoyance of a prosecution, as sometimes
happens in a civil case where a person involved in the litigation is perhaps
entirely in the right but prefers to lose a sum of money rather than commence
and prosecute an action. This case is, therefore, on all fours with that of
section 346 of the Code of Civil Procedure, above cited. At all events, for the
conviction of the defendants it is not necessary to consider and weigh this
evidence; it could only be considered as cumulative, and it was not taken into
account by the trial court.

With regard to the 5th assignment of error which alleges that the penalty was
excessive, it must be remembered that the trial court exercised his discretion
in fixing the penalty within the limits established by law and that, in principle,
what is authorized by law cannot be held to be arbitrary. But the penalty
imposed by the trial court in his discretion will not necessarily have to stand
for that reason. If such a principle governed, appeals would be useless. This
Supreme Court also exercises its discretion, and, in a higher degree, by its
right of review in criminal causes brought up on appeal or consultation and of
high inspection over the administration of justice, it has the power to modify
within the limits of the penalty provided by law, in order to maintain uniformity
in its application. If judicial decisions vary in the different provinces of the
Archipelago, even in identical or at least analogous cases, it is principally due
to the fact that the judges, acquainted with the extent of crime in their
respective jurisdictions, are justified, in order to suppress crime, in applying
the law more strictly and severely in some provinces than in others in
accordance with the greater or lesser propensity to disobey the laws and the
peculiar circumstances that prevail in each locality. But within the same
province such variation would not be justifiable, as it would transgress the law
which fits the penalty to the crime. In the Province of Cebu the court sentenced
Lao Lock Hing, for the possession of 70 tins of opium, to five years'
imprisonment and a fine of P10,000, or, in case of insolvency, to subsidiary
imprisonment; but this Supreme Court reduced the penalty to two years'
imprisonment and a fine of P3,000 (14 Phil. Rep., 861). In the same Province of
Cebu, Miguel Villano was charged with having bought and sold 190 tons of
opium — although one of the charges was for 100 tins only, valued at P3,000,
because the 190 tins were received on different dates — and was sentenced on
the charge for the 100 tins, to one year and two months' imprisonment and to
pay a fine of P2,500, a judgment which was affirmed by this Supreme Court
(18 Phil. Rep., 3592). In another cause, also tried in Cebu against one Loo
Chaw for the sale of 30 tins of opium, the penalty imposed was one year's
imprisonment and a fine of P2,000; this also was affirmed by this Supreme
Court