ROMEO REYES

vs.

COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS:

Petitioners question the respondent Court’s decision, which affirmed with

modification the agrarian court’s decision, which ordered them and the other
defendants therein to, among others, restore possession of the disputed
landholding to private respondent, Dela Cruz.

Juan Mendoza, father of defendant Olympio, is the owner of farm lots in

Bahay Pare, Candaba, Pampanga. Devoted to the production of palay, the lots
were tenanted and cultivated by now deceased Julian dela Cruz, husband of
plaintiff Eufrocina dela Cruz.

Eufrocina alleged that her husband’s death, she succeeded him as bona
fide tenant of the subject lots; that Olympio, in conspiracy with the other
defendants, prevented her daughter Violeta and her workers through force,
intimidation, strategy and stealth, from entering and working on the subject
premises; and that until the filing of the instant case, defendants had refused
to vacate and surrender the lots, thus violating her tenancy rights. Plaintiff
therefore prayed for judgment for the recovery of possession and damages with
a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction in the meantime.

Defendant barangay officials denied interference in the tenancy

relationship existing between plaintiff and defendant Mendoza, particularly in
the cultivation of the latter’s farm lots and asked for the dismissal of the case,
moral damages and attorney’s fees.

Mendoza raised abandonment, sublease and mortgage of the farm lots

without his consent and approval, and non-payment of rentals, irrigation fees
and other taxes due the government, as his defenses.

Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the court erred in holding petitioners liable.

RULING:

The Court ruled that pieces of evidence presented before the trial court
and CA served as basis in arriving at their findings of fact. The Supreme Court
will not analyze such evidence all over again because settled is the rule that
only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court absent the exceptions which do not obtain in the
instant case.

In agrarian cases, the quantum of evidence is no more than substantial

evidence. Substantial evidence does not necessarily import preponderant
evidence, as is required in an ordinarily civil case. It has been defined to be
such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion and its absence is not shown by stressing that there is
contrary evidence on record, direct or circumstantial, for the appellate court
cannot substitute its own judgment or criteria for that of the trial court in
determining wherein lies the weight of evidence or what evidence is entitled to
belief.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

vs.

RODEGELIO TURCO, Jr., aka “TOTONG”

FACTS:

Accused-appellant was charged with the rape of his neighbor 13-year-old

Escelea Tabada. Escelea was about to sleep when she heard a familiar voice
calling her from outside her house. She recognized appellant Turco
immediately as she had known him for 4 years and he is her second cousin.
Unaware of the danger that was about to befall her, Escelea opened the door.
Turco, with the use of towel, covered Escelea’s face, placed his right hand on
the latter’s neck and bid her to walk. When they reached a grassy part, near
the pig pen which was about 12 meters away from the victim’s house, appellant
lost no time in laying the victim on the grass, laid on top of the victim and took
off her short pants and panty and succeeded in pursuing his evil design-by
forcibly inserting his penis inside Escelea’s private part despite Escelea’s
resistance. Appellant then threatened her that he will kill her if she reports the
incident to anybody.

10 days after the incident, she just kept it to herself until she was able to
muster enough courage to tell her brother-in-law, Orlando Pioquinto, who in
turn informed Alejandro, the victim’s father, about the rape of his daughter.
Alejandro did not waste time and immediately asked Escelea to see a doctor for
medical examination and eventually file a complaint after the issuance of the
medical certificate. Turco, meanwhile, alleged that he and Escelea were
sweethearts.

The trial court ruled Turco guilty of the crime of rape.

In his appeal, Turco argues, among others, that no actual proof was
presented that the rape of the complainant actually happened considering that
although a medical certificate was presented, the medico-legal officer who
prepared the same was not presented in court to explain such medical
findings.

 
ISSUE:

1. Whether or not the trial court erred in finding the appellant guilty of rape
 2. Whether or not the appellant’s contention that the medical certificate
may not be considered is with merit.

 
RULING:

 The Court opined that it agrees with the lower court’s finding of
credibility in the testimony and evidence presented by the victim, and finds the
appellant guilty of rape beyond reasonable doubt.

The appellant’s argument on the proof of medical certificate, while the

certificate could be admitted as an exception to the hearsay rule since entries
in official records constitute exceptions to the hearsay evidence rule, since it
involved an opinion of one who must first be established as an expert witness,
it could not be given weight or credit unless the doctor who issued it is
presented in court to show his qualifications. Emphasis must be placed on the
distinction between admissibility of evidence and the probative value thereof.

Evidence is admissible when it is relevant to the issue and is not

excluded by the law or the rules or is competent. Since admissibility of
evidence is determined by its relevance and competence, admissibility is,
therefore, an affair of logic and law. On the other hand, the weight to be given
to such evidence, once admitted, depends on judicial evaluation within the
guidelines provided in Rule 133 and the jurisprudence laid down by the Court.
Thus, while evidence may be admissible, it may be entitled to little or no weight
at all. Conversely, evidence which may have evidentiary weight may be
inadmissible because a special rule forbids its reception.

Withal, although the medical certificate is an exception to the hearsay

rule, hence admissible as evidence, it has very little probative value due to the
absence of the examining physician. Nevertheless, it cannot be said that the
prosecution relied solely on the medical certificate. In fact, reliance was made
on the testimony of the victim herself which, standing alone even without
medical examination, is sufficient to convict. It is well-settled that a medical
examination is not indispensable in the prosecution of rape. The absence of
medical findings by a medico-legal officer does not disprove the occurrence of
rape. It is enough that the evidence on hand convinces the court that
conviction is proper. In the instant case, the victim’s testimony alone is
credible and sufficient to convict.
BAUTISTA

vs.

APERECE

FACTS:

Nicolas Anasco, as owner of the lot subject of the case, sold the same to
Valentin Justiniani. In the same year, Valentin sold this property to Claudio
Justiniani, In October 12, 1935, Claudio Justiniani executed a public
instrument whereby he sold the same property for P100 to Apolonio Aperece in
whose name it was assessed since 1935. While Aperece was in possession,
Hermogenes Bautista illegally entered a part of the land and took possession
thereof. Thus, Aperece file a complaint with the guerilla forces then operating
in the Province of Bohol.

When the case was called for hearing, and after inspection was made by
a guerilla officer, Bautista executed a public instrument wherein he promised
to return the land to Aperece in good will, and recognized Aperece’s lawful
ownership over the land. Thus, possession of the land was restored to Aperece.
However, claiming that the property belongs to him, and alleging that with the
aid of armed men and pretending to be owner, usurped the land, Bautista filed
a complaint in the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Bohol. The CFI rendered
judgment declaring Aperece as owner of the land. On appeal, Bautista raised
as defense the error of the trial court in admitting the public instrument which
he executed as evidence. He argued that the document was executed under
duress, violence, and intimidation, and that the guerilla officer before whom it
was executed, had no jurisdiction over the matter

ISSUE:

Whether or not the trial court erred in admitting as evidence, a public

document executed before an officer who had no jurisdiction over the matter.

RULING:

The test for the admissibility or inadmissibility of a certain document is

whether or not it is relevant, material or competent. The public document is
not only relevant, but is also material and competent to the issue of ownership
between the parties litigants. Relevant evidence is one that has any value in
reason as tending to prove any matter probable in an action. And evidence is
said to be material when it is directed to prove a fact in issue as determined by
the rules of substantive law and pleadings, while competent evidence is one
that s not excluded by law in a particular case. With these criteria in mind, we
hold that the mere fact that the public document was executed before a guerilla
officer does not make the same as irrelevant, immaterial or incompetent to the
main issue raised in the pleadings. The public document, considered together
with the other evidence, documentary and oral, satisfies the Court that the
portions of land in question really belong to defendant Aperece.
JESSE G. LOPEZ

vs.

ROBERT HEESEN

FACTS:

In the early afternoon of October 14, 1958, appellee, Heesen, an Air

Force officer, purchased a J.C. Higgins Model 51, 30.06 rifle from the store of
appellee, Sears. Said rifle has a bolt action known more particularly as a
“Mauser type action” with which Heesen was familiar. Appellee, although
experienced in hunting, was not familiar with the Higgins Model 51 and had
never used such a rifle.

The safety mechanism on the rifle is as a “Class 1” safety, meaning that

it interrupts the firing pin directly. To release the safety, you push the safety
lever to the left and down to a horizontal position and the gun is then ready to
fire. Heesen went to appellee’s store and purchased the rifle. Immediately after
the purchase of the rifle, Heesen commenced hunting that morning he place a
live cartridge in the chamber and placed the gun on safety position. There after
Heesen checked the safety position on frequent occasions. He carried the rifle
in a different position in going through brush and in climbing or stepping upon
rocks.

Although the gun moved from “safe” to “fire” position at least twice
during the hours before the shooting. He arrived at Ute Park that night and
began hunting the next morning. Heesen hunted without success and had seen
no game up. Thereafter, Heesen wanted to cross the log to see the deer better,
and as he stepped across the log his left foot caught on a little limb sticking out
and caused him to stumble. His left foot went down hard on the ground on one
side of the log and his right foot slipped on the grass. This brought the gun
down and the gun discharged, the bullet striking appellant. When the trial
commenced, Paul A. La Violette, Jr., testified without objection that the Higgins
Model 51 rifle is safe by all commercial sporting goods standards, and that the
design of the safety device of the Higgins. He also testified that Model 51 was
not negligent or defective. On the other hand, Appellant’s witnesses testified at
great length in what respect they considered the safety mechanism
“dangerous,” “unsafe,” and “defective,” and expressed the opinion that the
safety mechanism was not a safe piece and was unsafe without the telescopic
sight.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the safety device on the Higgins Model 51 was dangerous
and defective or unsafe, and was properly the subject of expert testimony.

RULING:

The Supreme Court of New Mexico ruled that opinion evidence on an

ultimate issue of fact does not attempt or have the power to usurp the
functions of the jury, and this evidence could not usurp the jury’s function
because the jury may still reject these opinions and accept some other view.

In 20 Am. Jur., Evidence, the rule is stated as follows:

“In such cases, witnesses possessing requisite

training, skill, or knowledge, denominated ‘experts,’ may testify,
not only to the facts, but to their opinions respecting the facts, so
far as necessary to enlighten the jury and to enable it to come to a
right verdict. Issues of this kind are said to create a necessity for
the admission in evidence of the opinions or conclusions of
witnesses who are shown to be specially skilled or experienced in
the particular field in question.”

Opinion evidence is admissible on the basis that it will aid the jury to
understand the problem and lead them to the truth on the ultimate facts, and
opinions may be disregarded by the jury in whole or in part. It is left to the jury
to decide the issue.
STATE OF MISSISSIPI

vs.

WILLIAM ARTHUR BALL

FACTS:

In the afternoon of October 15, 1958, two colored men, only identified as
tall man and a short man, entered into the Krekeler Jewelry Shop. The taller
man inquired about a cigarette lighter and also looked at the watches and rings
while the short man was looking around the store. Later that day, the owner of
the shop John Krekeler was placing rings and watches in the safe preparatory
for closing when two men entered the shop, one tall man and the other short
and Krekeler recognized them as the men who entered the shop earlier in the
afternoon. He recognized the taller man’s narrow-brimmed tall hat, brown
jacket, gray shirt and a particular scar on his face. The short man led Krekeler
to the bathroom, threatening him with a gun. While inside, he could hear the
jewelries being dumped into a bag and the jingle of the cash register. The two
men left him and that is when he called the police. The two men had taken
watches and rings. Krekeler identified the appellant from the pictures, and
three weeks later after his capture and confined in a hospital, he was again
identified as the taller of the two men.

In his motion for new trial, appellant objects to the fact that the police
officers who arrested him testified as to the amount of $258. 02 was taken from
him. It is said that the introduction of these evidence were immaterial and
irrelevant, neither tended to prove nor disprove any of the issues involved in
the case. The said money as seized at the time of the arrest was neither
identified by Mr. Krekeler nor by any other person as the money alleged to be
stolen from the jewelry store. Hence, according to appellant, the evidence being
considered by the jury in completing its decision is prejudicial to the accused.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the jury erred in its decision.

RULING:

Based on the records of the case, the police officer who seized the
personal effects of Bell to be used as evidence testified that Krekeler failed to
identify the money as having come from the jewelry store. Unlike the roll of
dimes in State vs. Hampton, the testimony as to the $258.02 was not offered in
proof of the substantive fact of the crime. In that case the five-dollar roll of
dimes wrapped in a roll of green paper was found on the defendant the same
day of the burglary and while the fact was a circumstance admissible in
evidence it was held to not constitute substantive evidence inconsistent with
the hypothesis of the defendant's innocence of burglary.

In State v. Gerberding, there was no timely or proper objection to the

proof but $4,000 was taken in a robbery and the appellant had $920 in
currency in his topcoat pocket when captured the day of the robbery. The proof
of the money here was evidently on the theory that Ball did not have or was not
likely to have such a sum of money on his person prior to the commission of
the offense. 

It was claimed by Bell that he worked as a janitor and won the $258.02
in a series of crap games. Not only did Krekeler failed to identify the money
seized from Bell as from the jewelry shop which makes the evidence
inadmissible, there was no proof as to the denomination of the money in the
cash register, it was merely a total of $140. Nineteen days has passed from the
crime to his arrest and there was no proof that Bell had suddenly come into
possession of the $258.02. In all these circumstances, The mere possession of
a quantity of money is in itself no indication that the possessor was the taker
of money charged as taken, because in general all money of the same
denomination and material is alike, and the hypothesis that the money found
is the same as the money taken is too forced and extraordinary to be
receivable.

In the absence of proof or of a fair inference from the record that the
money in Ball's possession at the time of his arrest came from or had some
connection with the robbery and in the absence of a plain showing of his
impecuniousness before the robbery and his sudden affluence, the evidence
was not in fact relevant and in the circumstances was obviously prejudicial for
if it did not tend to prove the offense for which the appellant was on trial the
jury may have inferred that he was guilty of another robbery. The admission of
the evidence in the circumstances of this record infringed the right to a fair
trial and for that reason the judgment is reversed and the cause remanded.
EDGARDO A. GANAAN

vs.

INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT

FACTS:

Complainants offered to withdraw the complaint for direct assault they

filed against Laconico after demanding P8,000 from him. This demand was
heard by Atty. Gaanan through a telephone extension as requested by Laconico
so as to personally hear the proposed conditions for the settlement. Atty. Pintor
was subsequently arrested in an entrapment operation upon receipt of the
money. Since Atty. Gaanan listened to the telephone conversation without
complainant''s consent, complainant charged Gaanan and Laconico with
violation of the Anti- Wiretapping Act (Republic Act No. 4200).

ISSUE:

Whether or not an extension telephone is among the prohibited devices

in Sec. 1 of RA 4200 such that its use to overhear a private conversation would
constitute an unlawful interception of communication between 2 parties using
a telephone line.

RULING:

The Court opined that an extension telephone cannot be placed in the

same category as a dictaphone, dictagraph, or other devices enumerated in
Sec. 1 of the law as the use thereof cannot be considered as "tapping" the wire
or cable of a telephone line. This section refers to instruments whose
installation or presence cannot be presumed by the party or parties being
overheard because, by their very nature, they are not of common usage and
their purpose is precisely for tapping, intercepting, or recording a telephone
conversation. The telephone extension in this case was not installed for that
purpose. It just happened to be there for ordinary office use. Furthermore, it is
a general rule that penal statutes must be construed strictly in favor of the
accused.

A perusal of the Senate Congressional Record shows that our lawmakers

intended to discourage, through punishment, persons such as government
authorities or representatives of organized groups from installing devices in
order to gather evidence for use in court or to intimidate, blackmail or gain
some unwarranted advantage over the telephone users. Consequently, the
mere act of listening, in order to be punishable must strictly be with the use of
the enumerated devices in Republic Act No. 4200 or others of similar nature
TERESITA SALCEDO – ORTANEZ

vs.

COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS:

Private respondent filed with the Quezon City RTC a complaint for
annulment of marriage with damages against petitioner Teresita Salcedo-
Ortanez, on grounds of lack of marriage license and/or psychological
incapacity of the petitioner. Among the exhibits offered by private respondent
were three (3) cassette tapes of alleged telephone conversations between
petitioner and unidentified persons.

These tape recordings were made and obtained when private respondent
allowed his friends from the military to wire tap his home telephone.

The Appellate Court denied the petition because (1) Tape recordings are not
inadmissible per se. They and any other variant thereof can be admitted in
evidence for certain purposes, depending on how they are presented and
offered and on how the trial judge utilizes them in the interest of truth and
fairness and the even handed administration of justice; and (2) A petition for
certiorari is notoriously inappropriate to rectify a supposed error in admitting
evidence adduced during trial. The ruling on admissibility is interlocutory;
neither does it impinge on jurisdiction. If it is erroneous, the ruling should be
questioned in the appeal from the judgment on the merits and not through the
special civil action of certiorari. The error, assuming gratuitously that it exists,
cannot be anymore than an error of law, properly correctible by appeal and not
by certiorari.
 Petitioner then filed the present petition for review under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the recordings of the telephone conversations are

admissible in evidence.

RULING:

The Court elucidated that the recordings of the telephone conversations are
inadmissible in evidence.

Rep. Act No. 4200 entitled “An Act to Prohibit and Penalize Wire Tapping
and Other Related Violations of the Privacy of Communication, and for other
purposes” expressly makes such tape recordings inadmissible in evidence thus:

Sec. 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the
parties to any private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable,
or by using any other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or
record such communication or spoken word by using a device commonly
known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape-
recorder, or however otherwise described.
 Sec. 4. Any communication or spoken word, or the existence, contents,
substance, purport, or meaning of the same or any part thereof, or any
information therein contained, obtained or secured by any person in violation
of the preceding sections of this Act shall not be admissible in evidence in any
judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative or administrative hearing or investigation.
Absent a clear showing that both parties to the telephone conversations
allowed the recording of the same, the inadmissibility of the subject tapes is
mandatory under Rep. Act No. 4200.
SOCORRO D. RAMIREZ

vs.

COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS:

Petitioner filed a civil case for damages in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City against private respondent Esther Garcia alleging that the latter “vexed,
insulted and humiliated her in a hostile and furious mood and in a manner
offensive to petitioner's dignity and personality, contrary to morals, good
customs and public policy.” Ramirez produced a verbatim transcript taken
from a tape recording of the confrontation. As a result of petitioner's recording
of the event and alleging that the said act of secretly taping the confrontation
was illegal, respondent Garcia filed a criminal case against Ramirez alleging
that the recording of the event was illegal and thus, a violation of Republic Act
4200, entitled "An Act to prohibit and penalize wire tapping and other related
violations of private communication, and other purposes.” Ramirez filed a
motion to quash on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an
offense. The trial court agreed with her and granted the motion to quash,
reasoning that the facts charged do not constitute an offense under R.A. 4200;
and that the violation punished by R.A. 4200 refers to a the taping of a
communication by a person other than a participant to the communication.
The Court of Appeals, however, reversed reasoning that the allegations
sufficiently constituted an offense under Section 1 of RA4200.

ISSUE:
 Whether or not the applicable provision of Republic Act 4200 does not
apply to the taping of a private conversation by one of the parties to the
conversation.

RULING:

The Court ratiocinated that s ection 1 of RA 4200 applies to the taping of

private conversations by one of the parties to the conversation. Section 1 of RA
4200 clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for any person, not authorized
by all the parties to any private communication to secretly record such
communication by means of a tape recorder. The law makes no distinction as
to whether the party sought to be penalized by the statute ought to be a party
other than or different from those involved in the private communication. The
statute's intent to penalize all persons unauthorized to make such recording is
underscored by the use of the qualifier "any". A perusal of the Senate
Congressional Records, moreover, supports the respondent court's conclusion
that in enacting R.A. 4200 our lawmakers indeed contemplated to make illegal,
unauthorized tape recording of private conversations or communications taken
either by the parties themselves or by third persons.
CITY OF MANILA

vs.

GERARDO GARCIA

FACTS:

The City of Manila is the owner of certain parcels of land. Without the
knowledge and consent of plaintiff, defendants occupied the property and built
their houses. Having discovered, plaintiff through its Mayor gave each
defendant written permits, each labeled as “lease contract” to occupy specific
areas. For their occupancy, defendants were charged nominal rentals. After
sometime, plaintiff, through its treasurer, demanded payment of their rentals
and vacate the premises for the Epifanio de los Santos Elementary School’s
expansion. Despite the demand, defendants refused to vacate the said
property.

Hence, this case was filed for recovery of possession. The trial court ruled
in favor of plaintiff taking judicial notice of Ordinance No. 4566 appropriating
P100,000 for the construction of additional building of Epifanio De Los Santos
Elementary School. Defendants appealed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the trial court properly found that the city needs the
premises for school purposes.

RULING:

The trial court ruled out the admissibility of the documentary evidence
presented by plaintiff Certification of the Chairman, Committee on
Appropriations of the Municipal Board which recites the amount of P100,000
had been set aside in Ordinance No. 4566 for the construction of additional
building of the said school. But then the decision under review, the trial court
revised his views. He there declared that there was a need for defendants to
vacate the premises for school expansion; he cited the very document. Because
of the court’s contradictory stance, defendants brought this case on appeal.
However, the elimination of the certification as evidence would not profit
defendants. For, in reversing his stand, the trial judge could well have taken —
because he was duty bound to take — judicial notice of Ordinance No. 4566 .
The reason being that the city charter of Manila requires all courts sitting
therein to take judicial notice of all ordinances passed by the municipal board
of Manila. And, Ordinance No. 4566 itself confirms the certification aforesaid
that an appropriation of P100,000.00 was set aside for the "construction of
additional building" of the Epifanio de los Santos Elementary School.
GABRIEL BAGUIO

vs.

TEOFILA L. VDA. DE JALAGAT

FACTS:

Petitioner filed for the quieting of title to real property against respondent
and her minor children with the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Misamis
Oriental. The Jalagats filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the present
complaint is barred by a previous judgment rendered by the same court. The
previous case involved practically the same property, the same cause of action,
and the same parties, with Melecio Jalagat (Teofila’s deceased husband and
predecessor in interest) as the defendant. The previous case was terminated
with the court dismissing Baguio’s complaint. Acting on the motion and taking
judicial notice of its previous judgment, the lower court dismissed the present
complaint on the ground of res judicata. Consequently, Baguio appealed the
order of dismissal. He claimed that for the ground of res judicata to suffice as a
basis for dismissal it must be apparent on the face of the complaint.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CFI of Misamis Oriental was correct in finding that
there was res judicata by taking judicial notice of its previous judgment.

RULING:

The CFI of Misamis Oriental was correct in taking judicial notice of its
previous judgment. It ought to be clear even to the appellant that under the
circumstances, the lower court certainly could take judicial notice of the
finality of judgment in a case that was previously pending and thereafter
decided by it. That was all that was done by the lower court in decreeing the
dismissal. Certainly, such an order is not contrary to law. The Supreme Court
quoted Chief Justice Morgan, who said: “Courts have also taken judicial notice
of previous cases to determine whether or not the case pending is a moot one
or whether or not the previous ruling is applicable in the case under
consideration.”
GABRIEL P. PRIETO

vs.

MEDEN ARROYO

FACTS:

Zeferino Arroyo filed for registration of several parcels of land. He has

given OCT No. 39 covering said lot in his name. The same year and same court
Gabriel Prieto filed a petition for registration of an adjoining parcel of land. OCT
No. 11 was given to him in his name. After the death of Zeferino, OCT No. 39
was cancelled and in lieu thereof TCT No. 227 was issued in the names of his
heirs, the defendants in this case. Said heirs filed in court and claimed that the
technical description that TCT and OCT did not conform and is less in area by
some 157 square meters. The petition was filed in the registration record but
was docketed as Special Proceedings No. 900. This was granted by the court.

Prieto filed against the defendant for annulment of Special Proceedings

No. 900. He next points out that the lower court should not have dismissed his
petition for annulment because no “parole” evidence need be taken to support
it, the matters therein alleged being parts of the records which were well within
the judicial notice and cognizance of the same court.

ISSUE:
 Whether or not the petition for annulment is within the ambit of judicial
notice.

RULING:

The Court opined as a general rule, courts are not authorized to take
judicial notice in the adjudication of cases pending before them, of the contents
of other cases, even when such cases have been tried or are pending in the
same court, and notwithstanding the fact that both cases may have been tried
or are actually pending before the same judge (Municipal Council of San Pedro,
Laguna, et al. v. Colegio de San Jose, et al., 65 Phil. 318). Secondly, if
appellant had really wanted the court to take judicial notice of such records, he
should have presented the proper request or manifestation to that effect
instead of sending, by counsel, a telegraphic motion for postponement of
hearing, which the court correctly denied. Finally, the point raised by counsel
is now academic, as no appeal was taken from the order dismissing his first
petition, and said order had long become final when the complaint in the
present action was filed.
YAO KEE

vs.

AIDA SY – GONZALES

FACTS:

A Chinese national, Sy Kiat died leaving behind real and personal

properties here in the Philippines. Thereafter, Aida Sy-Gonzales filed a petition
in CFI. She alleged that they are the children of the deceased with Asuncion
Gillego, that Sy Kiat died intestate, they do not recognize Sy Kiat’s marriage to
Yao Kee nor filiation of her children to him, and nominating Aida Sy-Gonzales
as administratrix. These was opposed by the herein petitioner. The CFI ruled in
favour of herein petitioners. The decision was appealed to the Appellate Court.

The Court found out that, Sy Kiat was married to Yao Kee in Fookien,
China. The ceremony was not officiated by an officer. They did not have any
marriage certificate because the practice during that time was for elders to
agree upon the betrothal of their children, and in her case, her elder brother
was the one who contracted or entered into an agreement with the parents of
her husband.

On the other hand Sy Kiat had lived with Asuncion Gillego for 25 years
without the benefit of marriage and acknowledged his children with her.

ISSUE:
 Whether or not the law on marriage in Fookien, China is valid through
testimonial evidence presented.

RULING:

The Court ruled in the negative. The Court has held that to establish a
valid foreign marriage two things must be proven, namely: (1) the existence of
the foreign law as a question of fact; and (2) the alleged foreign marriage by
convincing evidence.

In proving a foreign law the procedure is provided in the Rules of Court.

With respect to an unwritten foreign law, Rule 130 section 45 states that:

SEC. 45. Unwritten law.—The oral testimony of witnesses, skilled

therein, is admissible as evidence of the unwritten law of a foreign
country, as are also printed and published books of reports of
decisions of the courts of the foreign country, if proved to be
commonly admitted in such courts.

Proof of a written foreign law, on the other hand, is provided for under Rule
132 section 25, thus:

SEC. 25. Proof of public or official record.—An official record or an

entry therein, when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced
by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer
having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and
accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a
certificate that such officer has the custody. If the office in which
the record is kept is in a foreign country, the certificate may be
made by a secretary of embassy or legation, consul general,
consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the
foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in
which the record is kept and authenticated by the seal of his office.

In the case at bar petitioners did not present any competent evidence
relative to the law and custom of China on marriage. The testimonies of Yao
and Gan Ching cannot be considered as proof of China's law or custom on
marriage not only because they are self-serving evidence, but more
importantly, there is no showing that they are competent to testify on the
subject matter. For failure to prove the foreign law or custom, and
consequently, the validity of the marriage in accordance with said law or
custom, the marriage between Yao Kee and Sy Kiat cannot be recognized in
this jurisdiction.

Well-established in this jurisdiction is the principle that Philippine courts

cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. They must be alleged and proved as
any other fact.

Moreover a reading of said case would show that the party alleging the
foreign marriage presented a witness, one Li Ung Bieng, to prove that
matrimonial letters mutually exchanged by the contracting parties constitute
the essential requisite for a marriage to be considered duly solemnized in
China. Based on his testimony, which as found by the Court is uniformly
corroborated by authors on the subject of Chinese marriage, what was left to
be decided was the issue of whether or not the fact of marriage in accordance
with Chinese law was duly proven.

Further, even assuming for the sake of argument that the Court has
indeed taken judicial notice of the law of China on marriage in the aforecited
case, petitioners however have not shown any proof that the Chinese law or
custom obtaining at the time the Sy Joc Lieng marriage was celebrated in 1847
was still the law when the alleged marriage of Sy Kiat to Yao Kee took place in
1931 or eighty-four (84) years later.

Accordingly, in the absence of proof of the Chinese law on marriage, it should

be presumed that it is the same as ours. Since Yao Kee admitted in her
testimony that there was no solemnizing officer as is known here in the
Philippines when her alleged marriage to Sy Mat was, it therefore follows that
her marriage to Sy Kiat, even if true, cannot be recognized in this jurisdiction.
JOSE TABUENA

vs.

COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS:

The subject of the dispute is a parcel of residential land consisting of

about 440 square meters and situated in Poblacion, Makato, Aklan. In 1973,
an action for recovery of ownership thereof was filed in the Regional Trial Court
of Aklan by the estate of Alfredo Tabernilla against Jose Tabuena, the herein
petitioner. After trial, judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiff and the
defendant was required to vacate the disputed lot. 

As the trial court found, the lot was sold by Juan Peralta, Jr. sometime
in 1926 to Alfredo Tabernilla while the two were in the United States.
Tabernilla returned to the Philippines in 1934, and Damasa Timtiman, acting
upon her son Juan's instruction, conveyed the subject land to Tabernilla. At
the same time, she requested that she be allowed to stay thereon as she had
been living there all her life. Tabernilla agreed provided she paid the realty
taxes on the property, which she promised to do, and did. She remained on the
said land until her death, following which the petitioner, her son and half-
brother of Juan Peralta, Jr., took possession thereof. The complaint was filed
when demand was made upon Tabuena to surrender the property and he
refused, claiming it as his own.

The trial court rejected his defense that he was the absolute owner of the
lot, which he inherited from his parents, who acquired it even before World War
II and had been living thereon since then and until they died.

Tabuena appealed to the respondent court, complaining that, in arriving

at its factual findings, the trial court motu proprio took cognizance of Exhibits
"A", "B" and "C", which had been marked by the plaintiff but never formally
submitted in evidence.

In sustaining the trial court, the respondent court held that, contrary to
the allegations of the appellant, the said exhibits were in fact formally
submitted in evidence as disclosed by the transcript of stenographic notes,
which it quoted at length. 
ISSUE:

Whether or not the exhibits were formally offered in evidence.

RULING:

The Court ratiocinated that a particular document is marked as an

exhibit does not mean it has thereby already been offered as part of the
evidence of a party. It is true that Exhibits "A," "B" and "C" were marked at the
pre-trial of the case below, but this was only for the purpose of identifying them
at that time. They were not by such marking formally offered as exhibits. As we
said in Interpacific Transit, Inc. vs. Aviles,  "At the trial on the merits, the party
may decide to formally offer if it believes they will advance its cause, and then
again it may decide not to do so at all. In the latter event, such documents
cannot be considered evidence, nor can they be given any evidentiary value."

In People vs. Napat-a  that even if there be no formal offer of an exhibit,

it may still be admitted against the adverse party if, first, it has been duly
identified by testimony duly recorded and, second, it has itself been
incorporated in the records of the case. But we do not find that these
requirements have been satisfied in the case before us. The trial court said the
said exhibits could be validly considered because, even if they had not been
formally offered, one of the plaintiffs witnesses, Cunegunda Hernandez,
testified on them at the trial and was even cross-examined by the defendant's
counsel. We do not agree. Although she did testify, all she did was identify the
documents. Nowhere in her testimony can we find a recital of the contents of
the exhibits.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

vs.

DANNY GODOY

FACTS:

Accused-appellant was charged in two separate informations filed before

the Regional Trial Court, for Palawan and Puerto Princesa City, Branch 47,
with rape and kidnapping with serious illegal detention, respectively punished
under Articles 335 and 267 of the Revised Penal Code. During the arraignment
on both indictments, appellant pleaded not guilty to said charges and, after the
pre-trial was terminated, a joint trial of the two cases was conducted by the
trial court. During the time that Danny Godoy was detained, that is, prior to
the commencement of the criminal case against him, the mother of Danny
went to Mia and her parents to settle the case. All of them settled before the
office of the prosecutor where, upon payment, Mia executed an affidavit of
desistance. Danny was not aware of such settlement. Nonetheless the case
persisted and Godoy was meted out the penalty of death. The case went to the
Supreme Court by Automatic Review.

ISSUE:

What is the effect of settlement in a criminal case?

RULING:

The Court ruled that an offer of compromise is generally admissible as

evidence against the party making it. It is a legal maxim, which assuredly
constitutes one of the bases of the right to penalize, that in the matter of public
crimes which directly affect the public interest, no compromise whatever may
be entered into as regards the penal action. It has long been held, however,
that in such cases the accused is permitted to show that the offer was not
made under a consciousness of guilt, but merely to avoid the inconvenience of
imprisonment or for some other reason which would justify a claim by the
accused that the offer to compromise was not in truth an admission of his guilt
or an attempt to avoid the legal consequences which would ordinarily ensue
therefrom.

A primary consideration here is that the evidence for the defense

overwhelmingly proves appellant's innocence of the offense charged. Further,
the supposed offer of marriage did not come from appellant but was actually
suggested by a certain Naem, who is an imam or Muslim leader and who
likewise informed appellant that he could be converted into a Muslim so he
could marry complainant. As a matter of fact, when said offer was first made to
appellant, he declined because of the fact that he was already married. On top
of these, appellant did not know, not until the trial proper, that his mother
actually paid P30,000.00 for the settlement of these cases. Complainant's own
mother, Helen Taha, testified that present during the negotiations were herself,
her husband, Mia, and appellant's mother. Appellant himself was never
present in any of said meetings.

It has been held that where the accused was not present at the time the
offer for monetary consideration was made, such offer of compromise would not
save the day for the prosecution. In another case, this Court ruled that no
implied admission can be drawn from the efforts to arrive at a settlement
outside the court, where the accused did not take part in any of the
negotiations and the effort to settle the case was in accordance with the
established tribal customs, that is, Muslim practices and traditions, in an effort
to prevent further deterioration of the relations between the parties.
BPI FAMILY SAVINGS BANK, INC.,

vs.

COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS:

The crux of the controversy involves a claim for tax refund in the amount
of P112,491.00 representing petitioner's tax withheld for the year 1989. The
petitioner had a total refundable amount of P297,492 inclusive of the
P112,491.00 being claimed as tax refund. However, petitioner declared in the
same 1989 Income Tax Return that the said total refundable amount of
P297,492.00 will be applied as tax credit to the succeeding taxable year.

In 1990, petitioner filed a written claim for refund in the amount of

P112,491.00 with the respondent Commissioner of Internal Revenue alleging
that it did not apply the 1989 refundable amount of P297,492.00 (including
P112,491.00) to its 1990 Annual Income Tax Return or other tax liabilities due
to the alleged business losses it incurred for the same year.

Without waiting for respondent Commissioner of Internal Revenue to act

on the claim for refund, petitioner filed a petition for review with respondent
Court of Tax Appeals, seeking the refund of the amount of P112,491.00. CTA
dismissed petitioner's petition on the ground that petitioner failed to present as
evidence its corporate Annual Income Tax Return for 1990 to establish the fact
that petitioner had not yet credited the amount of P297,492.00 to its 1990
income tax liability. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, however, the
same was denied. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether the petitioner is entitled to a tax refund.

RULING:

Yes. Petitioner presented evidence to prove its claim that it did not apply
the amount as a tax credit. During the trial before the CTA, Ms. Yolanda
Esmundo, the manager of petitioner's accounting department, testified to this
fact. It likewise presented its claim for refund and a certification issued by Mr.
Gil Lopez, petitioner's vice-president, stating that the amount of P112,491 "has
not been and/or will not be automatically credited/offset against any
succeeding quarters' income tax liabilities for the rest of the calendar year
ending December 31, 1990." Also presented were the quarterly returns for the
first two quarters of 1990.
 The Bureau of Internal Revenue, for its part, failed to controvert
petitioner's claim. In fact, it presented no evidence at all. Because it ought to
know the tax records of all taxpayers, the CIR could have easily disproved
petitioner's claim. To repeat, it did not do so.

More important, a copy of the Final Adjustment Return for 1990 was
attached to petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration filed before the CTA. A final
adjustment return shows whether a corporation incurred a loss or gained a
profit during the taxable year. In this case, that Return clearly showed that
petitioner incurred P52,480,173 as net loss in 1990. Clearly, it could not have
applied the amount in dispute as a tax credit.

Again, the BIR did not controvert the veracity of the said return. It did
not even file an opposition to petitioner's Motion and the 1990 Final
Adjustment Return attached thereto. In denying the Motion for
Reconsideration, however, the CTA ignored the said Return. In the same vein,
the CA did not pass upon that significant document.

True, strict procedural rules generally frown upon the submission of the
Return after the trial. The law creating the Court of Tax Appeals, however,
specifically provides that proceedings before it "shall not be governed strictly by
the technical rules of evidence." The paramount consideration remains the
ascertainment of truth. Verily, the quest for orderly presentation of issues is
not an absolute. It should not bar courts from considering undisputed facts to
arrive at a just determination of a controversy.

In the present case, the Return attached to the Motion for

Reconsideration clearly showed that petitioner suffered a net loss in 1990.
Contrary to the holding of the CA and the CTA, petitioner could not have
applied the amount as a tax credit. In failing to consider the said Return, as
well as the other documentary evidence presented during the trial, the
appellate court committed a reversible error.

It should be stressed that the rationale of the rules of procedure is to

secure a just determination of every action. They are tools designed to facilitate
the attainment of justice. But there can be no just determination of the present
action if we ignore, on grounds of strict technicality, the Return submitted
before the CTA and even before this Court. To repeat, the undisputed fact is
that petitioner suffered a net loss in 1990; accordingly, it incurred no tax
liability to which the tax credit could be applied. Consequently, there is no
reason for the BIR and this Court to withhold the tax refund which rightfully
belongs to the petitioner.
LEONARD LUCIDO

vs.

GELASIO CALUPITAN

FACTS:

Plaintiff is the owner of some chattels and real estate, Lucido, regularly
sold at an execution sale on February 10, 1903, to one Rosales, who the next
day transferred a one-half interest in the property of Zolaivar. On March 30,
1903, a public document was executed and signed by all of the above parties
and the defendant, Gelasio Calupitan, wherein it was stated that Rosales and
Zolaivar, with the consent of Lucido, sold all their rights had obligation
pertaining to the property in question to Calupitan for the amount of the
purchase price together with 1 per cent per month interest thereon up to the
time of redemption.

On the same day, Lucido and Calupitan executed a document whereby

Calupitan certified that he had ceded to Lucido all the irrigated lands until
such time as he may repurchase said lands from Calupitan, as well as some of
the chattels. Their agreement is to permit three (3) whole years to elapse from
the date of the instrument before Lucido may repurchase the same. The lower
court held that the said agreement constitutes a sale with a right to
conventional redemption, and that the said redemption period had not expired.

Also prior to the institution of the action, Lucido offered the redemption
price to Calupitan, who refused it. The latter claims that the transaction
involved a sale to him of the rights of the execution purchasers to the property.
Therefore, the redemption period should only be within one year from the date
of the sale. However, in his original answer, he expressly stated that the
transaction was one of sale with the right to repurchase.

ISSUE:

Whether the answer of Calupitan can be considered as an admission

RULING:

Considerable doubt might arise as to the correctness of the ruling of the

lower court upon the first question, if the document executed by the execution
purchasers and the parties to this action stood alone. In that document it
appears that Calupitan acquired the rights and obligations of the execution
purchasers pertaining to the property in question. These rights and obligations
are defined in the Code of Civil Procedure to be the ownership of the property
sold, subject only to the right of redemption on the part of the judgment debtor
or a redemptioner, within one year from the date of the sale. Were this the
nature of the transaction between the parties, however, the intervention of
Lucido in the transfer would be wholly unnecessary. Hence, the fact that he
intervened as an interested party is at least some indication that the parties
intended something more or different by the document in question than a
simple assignment of the rights and obligations of the execution purchasers to
a third person.

Any doubt, however, as to the character of this transaction is removed by

the agreement entered into between Lucido and calupitan on the same day. In
this document it is distinctly stipulated that the right to redeem the property is
preserved to Lucido, to be exercised after the expiration of three years. The
right to repurchase must necessary imply a former ownership of the property.

Further indication that Calupitan himself considered this transaction as

a sale with the right to conventional redemption is to be found in his original
answer to the complaint. This original answer was introduced in evidence by
the plaintiff over the objection of the defendant. Its admission was proper,
especially in view of the fact that it was signed by Calupitan himself, who was
the time acting as his own attorney.

Jones on evidence (secs. 272, 273), after remarking that the earlier cases were
not in harmony on the point, says:

Many of the cases holding that pleadings inadmissible as admissions

were based on the theory that most of the allegations were merely
pleader's matter -- fiction stated by counsel and sanctioned by the
courts. The whole modern tendency is to reject this view and to treat
pleadings as statements of the real issues in the cause and hence as
admissions of the parties, having weight according to the circumstances
of each case. But some of the authorities still hold that if the pleading is
not signed by the party there should be some proof that he has
authorized it.

On the same principles where amended pleadings have been filed,

allegations in the original pleadings are held admissible, but in such case
the original pleadings can have no effect, unless formally offered in
evidence.

In this original answer it was expressly stated that the transaction was
one of sale with the right to repurchase governed by the provisions of articles
1507 et seq. of the Civil Code.
 It further appears from the uncontradicted testimony of the plaintiff that
he furnished $20 Mexican of the account necessary to redeem the property
from the execution purchasers. It therefore appears beyond dispute that the
redemption of the property from the execution purchasers was made by the
plaintiff himself by means of a loan furnished by the defendant Calupitan, who
took possession of the major portion of the land as his security for its
redemption. The ruling of the lower court the transaction between Lucido and
Calupitan was one of purchase and sale with the right to redeem was therefore
correct.
MACARIA A. TORRES

vs.

COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS:

In the case at bar the controversy in dispute are the respective claims of
petitioner and private respondents over Lot No. 551 of the Sta. Cruz de
Malabon Estate (part of the friar lands) in Tanza, Cavite, with an area of
approximately 1,622 square meters. The propositus, Margarita Torres was
married to Claro Santillan. Vicente and Antonina were begotten of this union.
Claro predeceased Margarita. Antonina married and had six children, herein
private respondents together with Vicente Santillan.

After the death of her husband, Margarita Torres cohabited with Leon
ArvisuArbole, without benefit of marriage. Out of their cohabitation, petitioner
Macaria Torres (later married to Francisco Bautista) was born. In a Certificate
of Baptism, Leon ArvisuArbole and Margarita Torres were named as father and
mother of petitioner whose name was listed as MacariaArvisu. Another
Baptismal Certificate, however, listed her name as Macaria Torres, while her
father's name was left blank. Subsequently, Leon Arbole and Margarita Torres
were married.

Lot No. 551(subject lot) had been leased temporarily by the Government
to Margarita Torres who was the actual occupant of the lot. On December 13,
1910, the Government, through the Director of Lands, issued to Margarita
Torres, Sale Certificate No. 222 payable in 20 annual installments. The
rental/s previously paid of P17.40 was credited to the purchase price.
Testimonial evidence is to the effect that Leon Arbole paid the installments out
of his earnings as a water tender at the Bureau of Lands, Tanza, Cavite.

On August 25, 1933, twenty (20) days before his death, Leon Arbole sold
and transferred in a notarial deed all his rights and interest to the one-half
(1/2) portion of Lot No. 551 in favor of petitioner.

However, based on the Affidavit executed by Vicente Santillan the

Bureau of Lands issued the corresponding patent in the name of the legal heirs
of Margarita Torres. TCT No. T-6804 was eventually issued by the Register of
Deeds of Cavite on November 7, 1957, also in the name of said heirs.
 On June 3, 1954, private respondents filed a complaint against petitioner
for Forcible Entry, with the Justice of the Peace, alleging that petitioner had
entered a portion of Lot No. 551 without their consent, constructed a house.
and refused to vacate upon demand. For her part, petitioner claimed that she
is a co-owner of the lot in question, being one of the daughters of Margarita
Torres. The ejectment case was decided against petitioner and the latter
appealed.

Apropos to said case, petitioner instituted an action for partition of of the

subject land before the CFI of Cavite, , alleging that said lot was conjugal
property of the spouses Margarita Torres and Leon Arbole, and that she is their
legitimated child. Private respondents filed an Answer alleging that the lot
belonged exclusively to Margarita Torres; that they are her only heirs, and that
the complaint for partition should be dismissed.

The Ejectment Case and the Partition Case were jointly tried and decided
with a finding that Lot No. 551 is the paraphernal property of Margarita Torres.
On motion for reconsideration, the CFI issued an Order granting
reconsideration and amended the Decision declared that petitioner is the
legitimated child of Sps. Leon Arbole and Margarita Torres; the subject lot is a
conjugal property of the spouses; adjudicated to the heirs their respective
shares.

Private respondents appealed. The Court of Appeals rendered the

assailed judgment sought to be set aside herein found thatthe petitioner is not
legitimated child of Sps. Leon Arbole and Margarita Torres; the subject lot is a
conjugal property of the spouses; adjudicated to the heirs their respective
shares(modified).

A Motion for Reconsideration and for New Trial. In support thereof,

petitioner submitted a typewritten Sworn Statement, dated March 5, 1930, of
spouses Leon Arvisu (Arbole) and Margarita Torres evidencing that the latter
recognized the former and as such their legitimized daughter. This document
was not, however produced before the court below considering that according
to the petitioner was in the possession of Vicente Santillan and that the same
was found only after his death.
ISSUES:

1. Whether or not private respondents are estopped by their

admission in their original complaint in the ejectment case that petitioner is
one of the legal heirs of Margarita Reyes?

2. Whether or not the CA gravely abused its discretion when it denied

New Trial?

RULING:

In the Amended Complaint filed by private respondents in the same

Ejectment Case, plaintiffs (private respondents herein) alleged that they are the
legal heirs and nearest of kin of the propositus. Therefore, the Amended
Complaint takes the place of the original. The latter is regarded as abandoned
and ceases to perform any further functions as a pleading. The original
complaint no longer forms part of the record. If petitioner had desired to utilize
the original complaint she should have offered it in evidence. Having been
amended, the original complaint lost its character as a judicial admission,
which would have required no proof, and became merely an extrajudicial
admission, the admissibility of which, as evidence, required its formal offer.
Contrary to petitioner's submission, therefore there can be no estoppel by
extrajudicial admission made in the original complaint, for failure to offer it in
evidence.

Moreover, private respondents denied legitimacy of petitioner in their

Answer to the Partition Case.

It is our considered opinion that new trial was warranted to prevent a

possible miscarriage of justice. Assuming that the genuineness and due
execution of the Sworn Statement of March 5, 1930 is established in
accordance with procedural due process, a new trial would resolve such vital
considerations as (1) whether or not said Sworn Statement qualifies as the
public document prescribed in Article 131 of the old Civil Code; (2) whether or
not it conforms to an act of acknowledgment by the parents after the
celebration of their marriage as required by Article 121 of the same code; and
(3) whether or not petitioner's signature as a witness to said document was the
equivalent of the consent necessary for acknowledgment of an adult person
under Article 133 of that Code. Affirmative answers would confer upon
petitioner the status of a legitimated child of her parents, and would entitle her
to enjoy hereditary rights to her mother's estate.

Case remanded to the Intermediate Appellate Court for new trial.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

vs.

ADELINO BARDAJE

FACTS:

The private complainant Marcelina Cuizon, beautician, alleged that in

the evening of December 14, 1965 at around 7:00PM while she and her mother
were living in the house of her aunt, Sofia Fernandez, at Barrio Crossing, Sta.
Rita, Samar, ADELINO, her childhood friend, accompanied by the FIVE
OTHERS, entered the house and had drinking spree. Accused, together with
his companion, brought her to the mountain about two kilometers from Barrio
Crossing. In a hut, ADELINO succeeded in having carnal knowledge with
MARCELINA notwithstanding the strong resistance exerted by the latter. The
FIVE OTHERS served as a look-out.

At about 8:00 o'clock the following morning, December 15, ADELINO and
the FIVE OTHERS brought her to another mountain, 6 kilometers farther,
arriving there past twelve o'clock noon at the house of one called Ceferino (also
called Cipriano) who lived there with his family. She was kept in one room. In
the evening, ADELINO had another sexual intercourse with her even though
she bit and kicked him and shouted for help which was to no avail as all
present were relatives of ADELINO. She curled the hair of Narita (daughter of
Ceferino) the next day, because ADELINO threatened to kill her if she did not.
Her curling paraphernalia was taken by Adriano Odal, upon ADELINO's
instructions, from Norma Fernandez (her cousin) who gave the equipment as
she (Norma) was also threatened. MARCELINA and her "captors" stayed in
Ceferino's house for two days.

For his part, ADELINO, admitted having had carnal knowledge of

MARCELINA but denied having raped her. He claims that they eloped on
December 14 to 17, 1965 as previously planned, they having been sweethearts
since November 12, 1964. As such, they used to date in Tacloban and
"anything goes". In the evening of December 14, 1965, while Sofia,
MARCELINA's mother and others were eating, MARCELINA handed him a bag
and beauty culture equipment through the window, went downstairs, after
which the two of them walked to the mountains, to Ceferino Armada's house.
Ceferino was a cousin of ADELINO's mother. He and MARCELINA slept in the
bedroom with 18-year old Narita, Ceferino's daughter. While in that hut, food
was brought to them by his sister, Nenita. MARCELINA curled Narita's hair the
next day.

ADELINO was arrested on December 17th, and it was on December 20th, when
he signed the alleged confession, Exhibit "C", admitting having kidnapped and
molested MARCELINA, which was probably the basis for MARCELINA's
complaint, presumably prepared with the help of the Fiscal.

The trial Court found the prosecutors version of the incident more
worthy of credence stating that Complainant had no improper motive to
implicate ADELINO in such a detestable crime as Rape.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the testimony of MARCELINA is credible?

2. Whether or not an extrajudicial confession made by the accused is a
sufficient ground for conviction?

RULING:

In crimes against chastity, the conviction or acquittal of an accused

depends almost entirely on the credibility of a complainant's testimony since by
the intrinsic nature of those crimes they usually involve only two persons —
the complainant and the accused. The offended party's testimony, therefore,
must be subjected to thorough scrutiny for a determination of its veracity
beyond reasonable doubt.

In the instant case, we find MARCELINA's charge that she was forcibly
abducted and afterwards raped by ADELINO in conspiracy with FIVE OTHERS
highly dubious and inherently improbable.

Firstly, according to the medical findings, "no evidence of external

injuries was found around the vulva or any part of the body" of Complainant, a
fact which is strange. The presence of "old healed lacerations" in the hymen
which, according to the testimony of the examining physician would have
occurred two weeks or even one month before if said lacerations had been
caused by sexual intercourse.

Secondly, by Complainant's own admission, the first hut she was taken
to was a small one-room affair occupied by a woman and two small children.
Her charge, therefore, that she was ravished in that same room is highly
improbable and contrary to human experience.

Thirdly, from her own lips, Complainant testified that the second hut
where she was taken, that of Ceferino Armada, consisted of a small room
separated from the sala by a wall of split bamboos. Further, that Ceferino with
his wife and seven children all lived therein. It challenges human credulity that
she could have been sexually abused with so many within hearing and
distance.

Complainant admits that she even curled the hair of Narita, one of
Ceferino's daughters, a fact inconsistent with her allegation of "captivity". That
she was threatened with death if she did not accede to such an inconsequential
request defies credulity.

The totality of the foregoing circumstances count with such great weight
and significance that they lend an aura of improbability and reasonable doubt
to the allegation that MARCELINA had been "kidnapped" or "illegally detained"
and that when she and ADELINO engaged in sexual intercourse, it was
because of force or intimidation exercised upon her. They are circumstances
that were overlooked by the trial Court and justify a reversal of its finding of
guilt as an exception to the established rule that the findings of fact of a trial
Judge based on the relative credibility of witnesses are entitled to great respect
and will not be disturbed by appellate Courts.

In respect of the alleged confession of ADELINO, suffice it to re-state that

"an extrajudicial confession made by an accused shag not be sufficient ground
for conviction unless corroborated by evidence of corpus delicti.Corpus delicti is
proved when the evidence on record shows that the crime prosecuted had been
committed. That proof has not been met in the case at bar, the evidence
establishing more of an elopement rather than kidnapping or illegal detention
or forcible abduction, and much less rape. Moreover, ADELINO, aged 18, was
by himself when being investigated by soldiers, without benefit of counsel nor
of anyone to advise him of his rights. Aside from his declaration that the
confession was obtained through maltreatment and violence, it was also
vitiated by a procedural irregularity testified to by no less than prosecution
witness Sgt. Pedro Gacelos to the effect that he and room after he presented
the statement to the Clerk of Court, Mr. Rojas.  There is reason to believe,
therefore that the so called confession was attested without ADELINO's
presence so that the latter cannot be said to have duly subscribed and sworn
to it.

On the basis of the evidence adduced, the guilt of ADELINO has not been
established beyond reasonable doubt.
PEOPLE

vs.

ADAMSON

FACTS:

Defendant, an inmate of San Quentin State Prison, is under

sentence of death. He has brought before us a purported appeal from an order
sustaining without leave to amend a demurrer to his "Petition for a Writ of
Error Coram Nobis." The People move to dismiss the appeal as being "irregular,
frivolous, sham and only groundless delay in the execution of a valid final
judgment," and also move to vacate an order of the trial court staying execution
of sentence. It appearing on the face of the record that the purported appeal is
from a non-appealable order, the court concluded that for that reason the
appeal should be dismissed and that the motion to vacate the order staying
execution should be denied without prejudice.

ISSUE:

Whether or not defendant may order affecting his substantial rights of the
party.

RULING:

The Supreme Court of California opined that the proposition has not
been suggested by the parties, it seems obvious that there is no appealable
order in this case. A defendant may appeal "From any order made after
judgment, affecting the substantial rights of the party." If the proceeding is
viewed, formally, as a motion to vacate the judgment, there is no order
whatsoever which purports to dispose of the motion; it has been neither
granted nor denied. If the proceeding be regarded, formally, as one arising
upon a petition for a writ, the order sustaining a demurrer does not finally
dispose of the matter; the proceeding is still pending until a judgment of
dismissal is entered. Speaking generally, "It is well established that no appeal
will lie from an order sustaining a demurrer to a pleading." This rule applies to
an order sustaining a demurrer to a petition for a writ, and an attempted
appeal from such an order will be dismissed.
ROMEO SISON

vs.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

FACTS:

At the time the of President Corazon C. Aquino’s government was newly-

installed, it was often challenged in rallies, demonstration and other public fora
by “Marcos loyalists” supporters of the deposed President Ferdinand E. Marcos.
On July 27,1986 it resulted in the murder of Stephen Salcedo , one of the
supporters of President Aquino known as” Coryista”.

Before the incident occured, a group of Marcos loyalist applied for a

permit to rally. However it was denied. Only July 27, 1986 the said group
despite the fact that they did not have a permit, still they conducted a rally.
With them were Atty. Oliver Lozano and Atty. Benjamin Nuega. It was attended
by several number of persons. The said rally was conducted at the Rizal
monument in Luneta at 2:30 p.m. When Col. Edgar Dula Torres then Deputy
Superintendent of Western Police District arrived in the said place, he asked
the leader of the group to show him the permit. But the leader was not able to
show the permit. Because the one they applied was denied. The Dula Torres
gave them 10 minutes to disperse, but the group asked him to give them 30
minutes. Dula Torres refused to grant their request. Atty. Oliver Lozano
ordered the crowd to maul any Coryista whom they may see within the place,
by saying “gulpihin ninyo ang lahat ng Cory infiltrators”. It was seconded by
Atty.Nuega,” sige gulpihin ninyo”. The police pushed the crowd, used tear gas
and truncheons to disperse them. The loyalist scampered, and some of them
fought back and threw stones at the Police. Eventually the crowd fled towards
Maria Orosa St.,

At 4:00 pm, a small group of Macos loyalists saw the popular movie star
named Annie Ferrer, jogging around the fountain at the Chinese Garden,phase
111 of the Luneta. They approached her and informed her of the dispersal.
Annie Ferrer got angry and ordered them “Gulpihin ninyo ang mga Cory
hecklers”. Then continued jogging while chanting “Marcos pa rin, Marcos pa
rin. Pabalikin si Marcos, pabalikin si Marcos, bugbugin ang mga nakadilaw.
Minute after, she was arrested by the Police.

Renato Banculo a cigarette vendor, saw a group of persons attacking

persons in yellow; the color of the Coryista. He then saw a man wearing a
yellow t-shirt being chased by a group of persons who were identified as
Marcos loyalists. The man in yellow was Salcedo. They caught Salcedo boxed,
kicked and mauled him. He tried to extricate himself from the group but they
again pursued him, punched and pummeled him with fist blows and kick
hitting him on various parts of the body. Ranulfo Sumilang and electrician at
the Luneta rush to Salcedo’s aid. The persons who mauled him were identified
as: Raul Billosos; Richard delos Santos; Joel Tan; Nilo Pacadar; Joselito
Tamayo; Romeo Sison and Gerry Neri. Salcedo was able to extricate himself but
his attackers pursued him. Then the mauling resumed at Rizal monument and
continued along Roxas Boulevard, until Salcedo collapsed and lost
consciousness. Sumilang flagged down a van and with the help of a traffic
officer, brought Salcedo to the Medical Center Manila, but he was refused
admission. So they took him to the Philippine General Hospital, where he died
upon arrival. The media photographers were able to take picture of the
incident.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the photographs taken by the media photographers on

the incident appearing thereof the accused are admissible in
evidence?

2. Whether or not the cause of the death of Salcedo was a tumultuous

affray?

RULING:

In the case at bar the photographs presented in evidence, must be

identified by the photographer as to its production and testified as to the
circumstances under which they were produced. The value of this kind of
evidence lies in its being correct representation in reproduction of the original.
And its admissibility is determined by its accuracy in portraying the scene at
the time of the crime. The photographers however is not the only witness who
can identify the pictures he had taken. The correctness of the photographs as a
faithful representation of the object portrayed can be proved prima facie, either
by the testimony of the persons who made it or by other competent witnesses,
after which the court can admit it subject to impeachment as to its accuracy.
Photographs, therefore can be identified by the photographer or by any other
competent witness who can testify its exactness and accuracy.

Article 251 Death caused in a tumultuous affray when, while several

persons, not composing a group organized the common purpose of assaulting
and attacking each other reciprocally, quarrel and assault each other in a
confused and tumultuous manner, and in the course of the affray someone is
killed, and it cannot be ascertained was actually killed the deceased, but the
person or persons who inflicted serious physical injuries can be identified
,such person or persons shall be punished by prison mayor.
 If it cannot be determined who inflicted the serious physical injuries in
the deceased, the penalty of prison correctional in its medium and maximum
periods shall be imposed upon all those who shall held violence upon the
person of the victim. In this case Salcedo was not killed due to tumultuous
affray. But was killed intentionally by the identified group of persons, by
mauling him.
THE PEOPLE

vs.

WALTER BOWLEY

FACTS:

Defendant appeals from a judgment of conviction entered upon a jury

verdict finding him guilty of a violation of Penal Code section 288 (a) and of a
prior felony conviction. The only witness who testified for the prosecution was a
woman named Joan. She testified that in April of 1960 the defendant's brother
employed her to play a part in a motion picture to be filmed in a San Francisco
studio; that she went to the studio; that the picture was taken; that in making
this picture, in addition to several other sexual activities, she voluntarily
engaged in an act of oral copulation with the sexual organ of defendant.

A film purporting to show these activities was produced by the

prosecution. Joan testified that she had seen portions of the film, and that
those portions accurately represented what took place during the making of the
film. Over objection, it was introduced into evidence and was shown to the
jury. In response to the question: "Is that the film of the events in which you
participated on this particular date at the Beaumont Studio," Joan said "yes."
She also testified that the defendant was the male in the film whose face was
covered with a coat of dark grease, whose hair was covered with a cloth turban,
and with whom frequent acts in violation of Penal Code section 288a were
shown.

Joan was, of course, an accomplice. As such her testimony must be

corroborated. This is a strict requirement, much stricter than found in many
other states. It is based on the fear that an accomplice may be motivated to
falsify his testimony in the hope of securing leniency for himself. Defendant's
main contention is that the film may not be used to corroborate Joan's
testimony because its admission into evidence rests solely upon her foundation
testimony. Under these circumstances, it is argued, the film is not "other
evidence" within the meaning of Penal Code.

According to Professor Wigmore, a photograph is no more than the

nonverbal expression of the witness upon whose foundation testimony its
authenticity rests. It is merely that witness' testimony in illustrated form; a
"pictorial communication of a qualified witness who uses this method of
communication instead of or in addition to some other method." If this theory
were accepted, it would necessarily follow that the film in this case does not
fulfill the corroboration requirement. An accomplice cannot, of course,
corroborate his own testimony.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the plaintiff has a valid contention.

RULING:

The Court held that the photograph was admissible in evidence. Since no
eyewitness laid the foundation for the picture's admission into evidence in the
Doggett case, the picture necessarily was allowed to be a silent witness; to
"speak for itself." It was not illustrating the testimony of a witness. This seems
to be a sound rule. Similarly, X-ray photographs are admitted into evidence
although there is no one who can testify from direct observation inside the
body that they accurately represent what they purport to show.

There is no reason why a photograph or film, like an X-ray, may not, in a

proper case, be probative in itself. To hold otherwise would illogically limit the
use of a device whose memory is without question more accurate and reliable
than that of a human witness. It would exclude from evidence the chance
picture of a crowd which on close examination shows the commission of a
crime that was not seen by the photographer at the time. It would exclude from
evidence pictures taken with a telescopic lens. It would exclude from evidence
pictures taken by a camera set to go off when a building's door is opened at
night. Therefore, the photograph may, in a proper case, be admitted into
evidence not merely as illustrated testimony of a human witness.

In other words, the section requires evidence apart from that of the
accomplice which tends to instill trust in the inherently suspect testimony of
the accomplice. The film in the instant case can fulfill this function only if it is
assumed to be authentic. Since the film cannot "speak for itself" as to its own
authenticity, reliance must first be placed in the veracity of Joan that it is
accurate before it can supply any corroboration. This is the very reliance which
penal code tells us cannot be assumed but reason for which must be found
elsewhere.
AIR FRANCE

vs.

RAFAEL CARRASCOSO

FACTS:
Sometime in March 1958, Rafael Carrascoso and several other Filipinos
were tourists en route to Rome from Manila. Carrascoso was issued a first
class round trip ticket by Air France. But during a stop-over in Bangkok, he
was asked by the plane manager of Air France to vacate his seat because a
white man allegedly has a “better right” than him. Carrascoso protested but
when things got heated and upon advise of other Filipinos on board,
Carrascoso gave up his seat and was transferred to the plane’s tourist class.
After their tourist trip when Carrascoso was already in the Philippines,
he sued Air France for damages for the embarrassment he suffered during his
trip. In the Court of First Instance, Carrascoso testified, among others, that he
when he was forced to take the tourist class, he went to the plane’s pantry
where he was approached by a plane purser who told him that he noted in the
plane’s journal. Air France also questioned the admissibility of Carrascoso’s
testimony regarding the note made by the purser because the said note was
never presented in court.

ISSUE: 
Whether or not the testimonies of the defendants’ witnesses are
admissible in evidence.

RULING:
The Court finds that the subject of inquiry is not the entry, but the
ouster incident. Testimony on the entry does not come within the proscription
of the best evidence rule. Such testimony is admissible. Besides, from a
reading of the transcript just quoted, when the dialogue happened, the impact
of the startling occurrence was still fresh and continued to be felt. The
excitement had not as yet died down. Statements then, in this environment,
are admissible as part of the res gestae. Because they grow "out of the nervous
excitement and mental and physical condition of the declarant". The utterance
of the purser regarding his entry in the notebook was spontaneous, and related
to the circumstances of the ouster incident. Its trustworthiness has been
guaranteed. It thus escapes the operation of the hearsay rule. It forms part of
the res gestae.

At all events, the entry was made outside the Philippines. And, by an
employee of petitioner. It would have been an easy matter for petitioner to have
contradicted Carrascoso's testimony. If it were really true that no such entry
was made, the deposition of the purser could have cleared up the matter.

As a result, the Court holds that the transcribed testimony of Carrascoso

is admissible in evidence.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

vs.

BIENVENIDO A. TAN

FACTS:

Freddie Saavedra, a tricycle driver went to see his wife, Delfa, to inform
her that he will drive Lito Amido and appellant Herson Tan to Barangay
Maligaya. It was the last time that Freddie was seen alive. His lifeless body was
later found sprawled on a diversion road with fourteen stab wounds.

Subsequently, Lt. Santos, Cpl. Numeriano Aguilar and Pat. Rolando

Alandy invited appellant in connection with the instant case and with respect
to two other robbery cases reported in Lucena City. During their conversation,
appellant allegedly gave an explicit account of what actually transpired in the
case at bar. He narrated that he and co-accused Amido were responsible for
the loss of the motorcycle and the consequent death of Saavedra. Moreover, he
averred that they sold the motorcycle to a certain Danny Teves of Barrio
Summit, Muntinlupa. With the help of appellant as a guide, the Lucena PNP
immediately dispatched a team to retrieve the same. Tan and Amido were
charged with the crime of highway robbery with murder

Lt. Carlos, on cross-examination, testified that when he invited appellant

to their headquarters, he had no warrant for his arrest. In the course thereof,
he informed the latter that he was a suspect, not only in the instant case, but
also in two other robbery cases allegedly committed in Lucena City. In the
belief that they were merely conversing inside the police station, he admitted
that he did not inform appellant of his constitutional rights to remain silent
and to the assistance of counsel; nor did he reduce the supposed confession to
writing. The trial court convicted appellant.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the confession of the appellant, given before a police

investigator upon invitation and without the benefit of counsel, is admissible in
evidence against him.
RULING:

Settled is the rule that the Constitution abhors an uncounselled

confession or admission and whatever information is derived therefrom shall be
regarded as inadmissible in evidence against the confessant. R.A. No. 7438 re-
enforced the constitutional mandate protecting the rights of persons under
custodial investigation, a pertinent provision of which reads:

As used in this Act, "custodial investigation" shall include the practice of

issuing an "invitation" to a person who is investigated in connection with an
offense he is suspected to have committed, without prejudice to the liability of
the "inviting" officer for any violation of law.

Custodial investigation involves any questioning initiated by law

enforcement authorities after a person is taken into custody or otherwise
deprived of his freedom of action in any significant manner. The rules on
custodial investigation begin to operate as soon as the investigation ceases to
be a general inquiry into an unsolved crime and begins to focus a particular
suspect, the suspect is taken into custody, and the police carries out a process
of interrogations that tends itself to eliciting incriminating statements that the
rule begins to operate.

In addition, not only does the fundamental law impose, as a requisite

function of the investigating officer, the duty to explain those rights to the
accused but also that there must correspondingly be a meaningful
communication to and understanding thereof by the accused. A mere
perfunctory reading by the constable of such rights to the accused would thus
not suffice.

Under the Constitution and existing law and jurisprudence, a confession

to be admissible must satisfy the following requirements: (1) it must be
voluntary; (2) it must be made with the assistance of competent and
independent counsel; (3) it must be express; and (4) it must be in writing.
LEE M. SEILER

vs.

LUCASFILM, LTD.,

FACTS:

Plaintiff – appellant, Lee Seiler, a graphic artist and creator of science

fiction creatures, alleged copyright infringement by George Lucas and others
who created and produced the science fiction movie "The Empire Strikes Back."
Seiler claimed that creatures known as "Imperial Walkers" which appeared in
The Empire Strikes Back infringed Seiler's copyright on his own creatures
called "Garthian Striders." The Empire Strikes Back appeared in 1980; Seiler
did not obtain his copyright until 1981.

Plaintiff-Appellant held a copyright on creatures called “Garthian

Striders,” which he obtained from the U.S. Copyright Office in 1981. The film
appeared in 1980. Plaintiff-Appellant deposited “reconstructions” of the
originals with the U.S. Copyright Office, claiming the reconstructions were of
originals that he had created in 1976 and 1977.

In an evidentiary hearing that lasted seven days, the court found that
Plaintiff-Appellant had destroyed the originals in bad faith under the best
evidence rule of Federal Rule of Evidence 1004(1). Specifically, the court found
that Plaintiff-Appellant “testified falsely, purposefully destroyed or withheld in
bad faith the originals, and fabricated and misrepresented the nature of his
reconstructions.”

Following the hearing, the court granted summary judgment in favor of

Defendant-Appellee.

ISSUE:

Did the lower court properly exclude the secondary evidence of Plaintiff-
Appellant’s works and therefore properly grant summary judgment in favor of
Defendant-Appellee?

RULING:
 The United States Court of Appeals opined that plaintiff’s claims for
copyright infringement of his works but cannot produce original evidence of his
works, then the plaintiff as a last resort to prove his claims must show that the
originals were not destroyed in bad faith under the best evidence rule of
Federal Rule of Evidence 1004(1); if the plaintiff cannot make such showing,
then any secondary evidence of his works is inadmissible.

Rule 1002 states: "To prove the content of a writing, recording, or

photograph, the original writing, recording, or photograph is required, except
as otherwise provided in these rules or by Act of Congress." Writings and
recordings are defined in Rule 1001 as "letters, words, or numbers, or their
equivalent, set down by handwriting, typewriting, printing, photostating,
photographing, magnetic impulse, mechanical or electronic recording, or other
form of data compilation."

The facts of this case implicate the very concerns that justify the best
evidence rule. Seiler alleges infringement by The Empire Strikes Back, but he
can produce no documentary evidence of any originals existing before the
release of the movie. His secondary evidence does not consist of true copies or
exact duplicates but of "reconstructions" made after The Empire Strikes Back.
In short, Seiler claims that the movie infringed his originals, yet he has no
proof of those originals.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

vs.

MARIO TANDOY y LIM

FACTS:

Accused was feloniously sold eight (8) pieces of dried marijuana flowering
tops, two(2) pieces of dried marijuana flowering tops and crushed dried
marijuana flowering tops, which are all prohibited drugs, for and in
consideration of P20.00. The accused-appellant raises the following assignment
of errors in this appeal. The Court a quo erred in admitting in evidence against
the accused Exh. "E-2-A" which is merely a xerox copy of the P10.00
bill allegedly used as buy-bust money.

  The evidence of the prosecution may be summarized as follows:

One of them was the accused-appellant, who said without preamble:

"Pare, gusto mo bang umiskor?" Singayan said yes. The exchange was made
then and there two rolls/pieces of marijuana for one P10.00 and two P5.00
bills marked ANU (meaning Anti-Narcotics Unit).The team then moved in
and arrested Tandoy. The accused-appellant invokes the best evidence rule
and questions the admission by the trial court of the xerox copy only of the
marked P10.00 bill.
 
ISSUE:

Whether or not such document was actually executed, or exists, or in the

circumstances relevant to or surrounding its execution, the best evidence rule
does not apply and testimonial evidence is admissible.

RULING:

The Court held that the aforesaid marked money was presented by the
prosecution solely for the purpose of establishing its existence and not its
contents, other substitutionary evidence, like a xerox copy thereof, is therefore
admissible without the need of accounting for the original. Moreover, the
presentation at the trial of the "buy-bust money" was not indispensable to the
conviction of the accused-appellant because the sale of the marijuana had been
adequately proved by the testimony of the police officers. So long as the
marijuana actually sold by the accused-appellant had been submitted as an
exhibit, the failure to produce the marked money itself would not constitute a
fatal omission.
 

UNITED STATES

vs.

BERNARDO GREGORIO and EUSTAQUIO BALISTOY

FACTS:

The defendants Bernardo Gregorio and Eustaquio Balistoy from the

judgment rendered in the two causes prosecuted, No. 1574, against Bernardo
Gregorio, and No. 1575, against Eustaquio Balistoy, which were consolidated
and in which but one judgment was rendered, and forwarded to this court and
registered under No. 5791.

In the suit instituted by Pedro Salazar, as a creditor, against Eustaquio

Balistoy, in the justice of the peace court of Libog, for the payment of a certain
sum of money, judgment was rendered, on April 4, 1908, wherein the debtor
was sentenced to pay to the plaintiff P275.92, with interest thereon, and the
costs. For the execution of the said judgment, two rural properties belonging to
the debtor were attached and the 27th of May, 1908, was set as the date for
the sale and adjudication of the said attached properties to the highest bidder.
On the 18th of the same month, Bernardo Gregorio requested the deputy
sheriff to exclude the said realty from the attachment, alleging that he was the
owner of the land situated in Tambogon, one of the properties levied upon,
400 brazas in circumference, situate in the pueblo of Bacacay, the location and
boundaries of which are expressed in his petition, for the reason that he had
acquired it by purchase from the judgment debtor, Balistoy, in 1905, prior to
the filing of the complaint. By reason of this claim and petition the judgment
creditor, Salazar, had to give a bond, in view of which the sheriff proceeded
with the sale of the said property, and of another, also attached for the sum of
P300, and both were adjudicated to the judgment creditor, according to the
certificate, Exhibit C. In order that the claim of intervention presented to the
sheriff might prosper, Bernardo Gregorio attached thereto the document
Exhibit D, at the end of which and among other particulars appears the
memorandum dated in Libog as of February 22, 1905, and signed by
Eustaquio Balistoy, Lorenzo Gregorio, and Cirilo Valla, and in which Balistoy
states that he bought the land referred to in the said document from Luis
Balistoy and sold it to Bernardo Gregorio for P300, wherefore he signed as such
vendor.

The charge consists in that Balistoy, with intent to injure his creditor,
Pedro Salazar, and for the purpose of avoiding the attachment and sale of one
of the properties belonging to him, to secure the payment of the judgment
obtained by his creditor in the aforementioned suit, did, with disregard of the
truth in the narration of the facts, execute or write the said memorandum
whereby, on February 25, 1905, he made or simulated a conveyance of one of
the attached properties in favor of the said Bernardo Gregorio, according to the
aforesaid copy, when in fact the said memorandum was written in April, 1908.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the plaintiff has a valid contention

RULING:

The Court said that through the lack of the original document containing
the memorandum alleged to be false, it is improper to hold, with only a copy of
the said original in view, that the crime prosecuted was committed; and
although, judging from the testimony of the witnesses who were examined in
the two consolidated causes, there is reason to entertain much doubt as to the
defendants' innocence, yet, withal, this case does not furnish decisive and
conclusive proof of their respective guilt as co principals of the crime charged.
Defendants in a criminal cause are always presumed to be innocent until their
guilt be fully proven, and, in case of reasonable doubt and when their guilt is
not satisfactorily shown, they are entitled to a judgment of acquittal. In view of
the evidence produced in both of the aforesaid criminal causes, said causes
can only be terminated by such a finding.
PROVINCIAL FISCAL OF PAMPANGA

vs.

HERMOGENES REYES

FACTS:
 
The Fiscal of Pampanga filed two informations for libel against Guevarra.
The informations alleged that Guevarra with malicious intent published an
article, a squib in verse, of which a translation in Spanish was included
therein, intended to impeach the honesty, integrity and reputation of Dayrit
and Nepomuceno.

Fiscal attempted to present as evidence exhibits A, B, C and D which are copies

of the Ing Magumasid containing the article with the innuendo, another article
in the vernacular published in the same weekly, and its translation into
Spanish. Counsel for defendant objected to this evidence. Objection was
sustained by the court.

The petitioner contends that the exhibits in question are the best
evidence of the libel, the subject matter of the information, and should
therefore be admitted; while the respondents maintain that, inasmuch as the
libelous articles were not quoted in the information, said evidence cannot be
admitted without amending the information. The prosecution asked for an
amendment to the information, but the court denied the petition on the ground
that it would impair the rights of the defendant, holding that the omission of
the libelous article in the original was fatal to the prosecution.

ISSUE:

Whether or not exhibits ABCD are admissible in evidence?

RULING:

The Court elucidated that the general rules regarding the admissibility of
evidence are applicable to cases of libel or slander. The evidence must be
relevant and not hearsay. The rule of procedure which requires the production
of best evidence is applicable to the present case. And certainly, The copies of
the weekly where the libelous article was published, and its translation,
constitute the best evidence of the libel charged. The newspaper itself is the
best evidence of an article published in it
VDA. DE CORPUS

vs.

BRABANGCO

FACTS:

Tiburcia Brabangco is the declared owner of two parcels of land at

Bugang, Alimodia, Iloilo, which the survivingwidow and children of German
Corpus alleged were sold by the former to Corpus in 1925 for P450, of which
P300 waspaid right upon the execution of the deed of sale in due form, as
witnessed by Pablo and Bonifacio Villareal andacknowledged by Tiburcia before
the Notary Public, Jose Tirador. The balance was also alleged to have been paid
by Corpus to Tiburcia, as evidenced by a receipt. Corpus’ heirs claim that
Corpus had been in possession of said landsfrom 1925 until his death.

Six months after Corpus’ death, however, the defendants, with the aid
and protection of policemen, entered the property, cut down and carried away
1,000 bamboos as well as 2 and ½ sacks of corn. Tiburcia denied having sold
the land, alleging that she “simply accommodated and allowed the Corpuses to
build their evacuation cottage when Japanese forces occupied the Philippines.”
Corpus’ heirs could not produce the deed of sale, however, which had allegedly
been lost during the war. The tria lcourt ruled in favor of the heirs and upheld
the sale.

ISSUE:

Were the heirs of Corpus able to establish the contents of the deed of
sale despite the absence of the original document?

RULING:

The Court sided with the heirs in their contention that the original deed
of sale signed by Tiburcia was lost during the war. Corpus’ heirs made efforts
to trace the whereabouts of Notary Public Jose Tirador to get a copy of the
deed, but the latter’s children said that their parents were already dead and
that their house in which their father had kept his documents had burned
down. The existence of the deed, however, was convincingly proven not only by
the testimony of Corpus’ widow, and by the environmental facts disclosed by
the evidence, but also by the disinterested testimony of Pablo Ableza, a
municipal counselor who served as one of the witnesses in the execution of the
sale. After proper proof of the due execution and delivery of the instrument,
and its loss or destruction, oral evidence may be given of its contents by any
person who signed the document or read it. It is not necessary that the witness
should be able to testify with verbal accuracy as to the contents of a lost
instrument; it is sufficient that the contents are stated in substance. Witnesses
cannot be expected to recite the content word for word. It is enough if
intelligent witnesses have read the paper and can state substantially its
contents and import with reasonable accuracy.
COMPANIA MARITIMA

vs.

ALLIED FREE WORKERS UNION

FACTS:

Compania Maritima (CM) and Allied (union) entered into a contract

whereby the union agrees to perform arrastre (handling of cargo on the
wharf) and stevedoring (handling of cargoes in the holds of vessels) work for the
consignees of the cargoes of vessels, for a period of 1 month; CM has a right to
revoke the contract if union failed to render proper service. Shippers and
consigners paid the union for arrastre work, but refused to pay the
stevedoring. CM refused to pay the stevedoring work also, because contract
provides that it will be paid by the shippers and consignees. Union requested
CM to recognize it as SEBA but CM refused; CM thru Teves (branch manager)
terminated the contract; union filed charges of ULP.

CM entered the same contract with another association; union picketed

the wharf and prevented the new workers from performing their work; CM sued
the union and its officers for the rescission of contract and to enjoin union
from interfering with the loading/unloading of cargo and recovery of damages.
Lower court ruled in CM’s favor and awarded CM 450K as damages; it held
that the officers of the union are solidarily liable for this amount. Union
appealed.

CM in its original complaint prayed that union and its officials be

ordered to pay 450K actual damages, consisting of: 15K for failure to
load/unload cargo; 50K for union’s inefficiency in performing the work; 50K
moral and exemplary damages; 178K+and 62K+ for lost profit (due to union’s
obstruction). CM hired 2auditors to ascertain the losses. Reports of the 2
accountants show that the aggregate amount of damage is 349K+.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the evidence presented by CM warrants the award

of damages in its favor.

RULING:

On the basis of the reports of the two accountants, the damages,

claimed by the complaint as a matter of simple addition, does not reach the
sum of P 450,000 fixed by the trial court. The damages, shown in the
accountants' reports and in the statement made by the consignees, chief clerk
(who did not testify) amount to P349,245.37 CM argues that the accountants'
reports are admissible in evidence because of the rule that "when the original
consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot be examined
in court without great loss-of time and the fact sought to be established from
them is the general result of the whole", the original writings need not be
produced.
VILLA REY TRANSIT, INC.,

vs.

EUSEBIO E. FERRER

FACTS:

Jose Villarama was an operator of a bus transportation pursuant to two

certificates of public convenience granted him by the Public Service
Commission (PSC). Later, he sold the certificates to the Pangasinan
Transportation Company, Inc. (Pantranco) with the condition that the seller
(Villarama) "shall not for a period of 10 years, apply for any TPU service
identical or competing with the buyer. "Barely three months thereafter, a
corporation called Villa Rey Transit, Inc. (the Corporation) was organized with a
capital stock of P500,000.00 divided into 5,000 shares of the par value of
P100.00 each;P200,000.00 was the subscribed stock; Natividad Villarama (wife
of Jose Villarama) was one of the incorporators, and she subscribed for
P1,000.00; the balance of P199,000.00 was subscribed by the brother and
sister-in-law of Jose Villarama; of the subscribed capital stock, P105,000.00
was paid to the treasurer of the corporation, Natividad. In less than a month
after its registration with the SEC, the Corporation bought five  certificates
of public convenience and 49 buses from one Valentin Fernando. Later, the
Sheriff of Manila levied on  2 of the 5 certificates  , in favor of Eusebio Ferrer,
judgment creditor, against Fernando, judgment debtor. Apublic sale was
conducted. Ferrer was the highest bidder. Ferrer sold the two certificates to
Pantranco. The Corporation filed a complaint against Ferrer, Pantranco and the
PSC for the annulment of the sheriff's sale. Pantranco, on its part, filed a third-
party complaint against Villarama, alleging that Villarama and/or the
Corporation was disqualified from operating the two certificates in question by
virtue of theprevious agreement. The trial court declared null and void the
sheriff's sale of   two \  certificates of public convenience in favor of Ferrer and
the subsequent sale thereof by the latter to Pantranco and declaring Villa Rey
Transit, Inc., to be the lawful owner of the said certificates of public
convenience. Pantranco disputes the correctness of the decision insofar as it
holds that Villa Rey Transit, Inc. is a distinct and separate entity from
Villarama. Ferrer, for his part, challenges the decision insofar as it holds that
the sheriff's sale is null and void.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the stipulation between Villarama and Pantranco binds

Villa Rey Transit, Inc.
RULING:
The restrictive clause in the contract entered into by the Villarama and
Pantranco is also enforceable and binding against the said Corporation. The
rule is that a seller or promisor may not make use of a corporate entity as a
means of evading the obligation of his covenant. The evidence has disclosed
that Villarama, albeit was not an incorporator or stockholder of the
Corporation, his wife, however, was an incorporator and was elected treasurer
of the Corporation. The evidence further shows that the initial cash
capitalization of the corporation was mostly financed by Villarama; he supplied
the organization expenses and the assets of the Corporation, such as trucks
and equipment; There was no actual payment by the original subscribers of the
amounts of P95,000.00 and P100,000.00 as appearing in the books; Villarama
made use of the money of the Corporation and deposited them to his private
accounts; and the Corporation paid his personal accounts.
 
The foregoing circumstances are strong persuasive evidence showing that
Villarama has been too much involved in the affairs of the Corporation to
altogether negate the claim that he was only a part-time general manager. They
show beyond doubt that the Corporation is his 
alter ego .

The doctrine that a corporation is a legal entity distinct and separate

from the members and stockholders who compose it is recognized and
respected in all cases which are within reason and the law. When the fiction is
urged as a means of perpetrating a fraud or an illegal act or as a vehicle for the
evasion of an existing obligation, the circumvention of statutes, the
achievement or perfection of a monopoly or generally the perpetration of
knavery or crime, the veil with which the law covers and isolates the
corporation from the members or stockholders who compose it will be lifted to
allow for its consideration merely as an aggregation of individuals.
MICHAEL & CO., INC.

vs.

ADRIANO ENRIQUEZ

FACTS:

The crux of the controversy is based on a sale with a right to repurchase

made by Adriano Enriquez in favor of E. Michael and E. Michael & Co., of
which appellant claims to be the successor, by reason of an instrument, duly
executed and delivered by said companies to appellant, transferring property,
business and assets of every kind, including the land which is the subject of
this litigation.

It is alleged in the complaint that the time to repurchase having expired,

the title to the property became absolute in appellant and that it is accordingly
the owner of the land described in said instruments.

However, the said document was lost. During trial, appellant’s counsel in
putting question to the witness, characterized and described the instrument as
one of transfer of properties and assets of appellee. Appellee objected on the
ground that the character of the document was not yet established. Hence, the
court refused the appellant to prove the execution and loss of the document, as
such, introduction of secondary evidence was not allowed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CFI correct in preventing the appellant from

establishing the execution and loss of the instrument?

RULING

The Court held that counsel for appellant, in putting his question to the
witness, characterized or described the instrument as one of transfer, while
objectionable, was not sufficient to cut him off altogether from proving the
execution and delivery of the document if other requisites were present.

The court well knowing that it cannot accept the characterization as

evidence but must go to the document itself or the evidence of its contents to
determine its nature and legal effect. Trial courts should not be so strict with
reference to matters of the character under discussion as to cause a
miscarriage of justice; but on the other hand, they should see to it that they
are not impose on by the introduction of fabricated testimony and that
injusticeshall not result from an evasion of the rules of evidence by designing
persons. The judgment was be reversed and a new trial ordered.
BASILIO DE VERA

vs.

SPOUSES MARIANO AGUILAR and LEONA AGUILAR

FACTS:

Marcosa Bernabe owned a parcel of land in Bulacan. His children are

Basilio, Luis, Felipe, Eustaquia, Maria, and Leona-married to Mariano Aguilar.
Basilio and Felipe mortgaged the parcel of land to Atty. Bordador. When the
mortgage matured, spouses Maria and Mariano Aguilar redeemed the property
and in turn Marcosa Bernabe sold the same to them as evidenced by a deed of
absolute sale and was registered at the Registry of Deeds in Bulacan.

Since then, the spouses paid the taxes of the land. Marcosa Bernabe
died. On 1980, petitioners demanded to respondents that as children of
Marcosa Bernabe, they were co-owners of the property and demanded the
partition thereof. They claimed that the respondents had resold the property to
their father Bernabe. Petitioners filed a case of Reconveyance against
respondent spouses.

The evidence presented by the plaintiff are the following:

• Exhibit A- A xerox copy of a Deed of Absolute Sale executed by the

respondents selling, transferring, and conveying the parcel of land in favor of
Marcos Bernabe.

• Testimony of the notary public before whom it was acknowledged

• Testimony of Luis who was present during its execution

• Testimony of the representatives of the offices of the National Archives and

the Provincial Assessor of Bulacan regarding the loss of the original document.

ISSUE:
 Whether or not the petitioners have satisfactorily proven the loss of the
original deed of sale so as to allow the presentation of the secondary evidence
(xeroxed copy).

RULING:

The petitioners established the existence of the alleged document,

however it failed to establish the facts and circumstances surrounding the loss
or destruction of the same.

Secondary evidence is admissible when the original documents were

actually lost or destroyed. But prior to the introduction of such secondary
evidence, the proponent must establish the former existence of the instrument.
The correct order of proof is as follows: Existence; execution; loss; contents
although this order may be changed if necessary in the discretion of the court.
Loss may be shown by any person who knew the fact of its loss, or by anyone
who had made, in the judgment of the court, a sufficient examination in the
place or places where the document or papers of similar character are usually
kept by the person in whose custody the document lost was, and has been
unable to find it; or who has made any other investigation which is sufficient to
satisfy the court that the instrument is indeed lost.

However, all duplicates or counterparts must be accounted for before

using copies. For, since all the duplicates or multiplicates are parts of the
writing itself to be proved, no excuse for non-production of the writing itself
can be regarded as established until it appears that all of its parts are
unavailable.

In the instance case petitioner Luis even claimed during the trial that an
original of the document existed and was submitted to the Office of the Register
of Deeds of Malolos for registration. The appellees, therefore, should have
asked the office to produce it in court and if it could not be produced for one
reason or another should have called the Register of Deeds or his
representative to explain why. That they failed to do. The loss or destruction of
the original of the document in question has not, therefore, been established.
Hence, secondary evidence of it is inadmissible. Hence, all originals must be
accounted for before secondary evidence can be given of anyone. This
petitioners failed to do. Records show that petitioners merely accounted for
three out of four or five original copies.