The 1974 Malari Student Movement, Press and the Soeharto’s New Order:

A Political Reflection

Herdi Sahrasad

ABSTRACT:
This article argues The Malari 1974 incident was triggered by a series of
protests carried out by the opposition and students against foreign capital,
which in this case were owned and Japanese outbreaks of fraud and
corruption committed by officials in the New Order period, Hariman
Siregar, the leader of Malari 1974 student movement himself, argued that
this event was an anticlimax of the alliance between the campus and the
military under Soeharto which was so warm in the previous times, namely
in 1966 which was campus, in this case represented by students together
with the military same to bring down the Old Order regime that was in
power at the time. But that did not last long, because the alliance was then
broken when students as a moral force found their critical reasoning again
in criticizing the New Order government, which at the time was said to
have deviated from the message of the actual suffering of the people. This
then led to the Malari incident as an appropriate means to get rid of
"opponents" who tried to overthrow the New Order power. At that time
there were around 12 banned print media, such as: Nusantara, Indonesia
Raya, Pedoman, KAMI, Mahasiswa Indonesias, The Jakarta Times, Abadi,
Suluh Berita, Pemuda Indonesia, Pos Indonesia, Wenang weekly and
Ekspress magazine. The government accused the press of being partially
responsible for the Malari incident. The press is considered to have
participated in finalizing the political situation which later exploded into
riotous actions which claimed lives and material.

Keywords: Demonstration, student movement, Malari, Hariman Siregar,

Orde Baru, Soeharto, press, media.

Backgrounds
The student movement in Indonesia post colonial, as is generally the case in the
Third World, plays an important role as the control of the educated for various abuses by
the ruling regimes in the developing countries. Press /Media reports and analysis show
that The 1974 student demonstrations in Indonesia have historical threads with previous
student movements. 1

1Kompas daily newspaper, 13-16 Januari 1974. Pedoman, Indonesia Raya, Abadi and Kompas daily,
16-21 Januari 1974
 In this context, Julian Benda in his work The Betrayal of Intellectuals (La Trahison
des Clercs,) describes intellectuals as ideal human beings who have the principle of "my
kingdom not on this earth". This means that intellectuals are constructed as human beings
who have no worldly interests. Intellectuals involved in the world of politics, for Julian
Benda are seen as a manifestation of " the Betrayal of the Intellectual ". Benda is more or
less willing to say that the ancient ideal intellectuals were moralists whose activities
constituted resistance to mass realism. Julian Benda's work on " the Betrayal of the
Intellectual " was the foundation of the moral movement in Indonesia. 2
The pioneers of the power of morality include Soe Hoe Gie and Soe Hok-Djin (Arief
Budiman), two brothers who study at the University of Indonesia and also students of
generation 1966 who often quote Julian's work as the foundation of their morality ideas. 3
Soe Hok Gie and Arief Budiman, two student activists, gave their ideas and thoughts
to the articulation of their moral movements in a series of writings in newspapers since the
beginning of 1967 (Maxwell, in Aspinall, 2012: 166). 4 Soe Hoe Gie and Soe Hok-Djin were
part of the student activist leadership of generation 1966 and loudly demanded that
Soekarno step down and support the destruction of the left and the rise of pro-Soeharto
civil and military forces. 5
The most important event towards the end of the 20th century was the eruption of
the 1998 student movement which succeeded in forcing the resignation of President
Soeharto who had been in power for 32 years. The 1998 student movement was the
culmination of the 1974 student movement (Peristiwa Malari 1974), the 1977/78 student
movement and the 1980s not extinguished its enthusiasm to correct the authoritarian New
Order.
Masminar Mangiang noted, variations in student movements such as the Anti-
Corruption Committee, the white group in the 1971 General Election, and the rejection of
the construction of the Beautiful Indonesia Miniature Park (TMII) and the Marriage Bill
during the 1970 to Malari Events 1974 were indications of increasingly heated relations
between Soeharto government and students .6
This paper will examine the dynamics of the 1974 student movement known as the
Malari Event 1974 based on mass media/press reports and analysis. The mass media/press
then it was suppressed by the New Order regime's rulers, just days after the 1974 Malari
Event, because it was deemed by the government to be too siding with the aspirations and
ideas of the students who conducted the demonstration. There were around 12 banned
print media banned, such as: Nusantara, Indonesia Raya, Pedoman, Mahasiswa Indonesia,

2 Julian Benda ‘’La trahison des Clercs’’, English translation The Betrayal of the Intellectuals, by
Richard Aldington: 1955, Beacon Press. See, Aswab Mahasin, & Ismed Natsir (eds.). Cendikiawan dan Politik.
Jakarta: LP3ES, 1983, pp. 164-186.
3, Wiratmo Soekito, Keterlanggaran Batas-batas Kultural, in Mahasin, Aswab & Natsir, Ismed (ed).

Cendikiawan dan Politik. Jakarta: LP3ES, 1983, pp. 164-186.

4 Edward Apinall, Indonesia: moral force politics and the struggle against authoritarianism , in Weis,

Meredith L & Aspinall, Edward (ed). Student Activism in Asia: Between Protest, and Powerlessness. London:
University of Minnesota Press. 2012 pp. 153-180.
5 Arief Budiman, 1983. Peranan Mahasiswa Sebagai Inteligensia, in Aswab & Natsir, Ismed (ed).

Cendikiawan dan Politik. Jakarta: LP3ES, 1983, pp. 143-163.

6 Masminar Mangiang “Mahasiswa, Ilusi tentang Sebuah Kekuatan”, majalah Prisma (No. 12,

Desember 1981).
KAMI, The Jakarta Times, Abadi, Suluh Berita, Pemuda Indonesia, Pos Indonesia daily,
Wenang weekly and Ekspress magazine.7
In Indonesia, the 1974 student movement was the most dramatic and most popular
student action at the beginning of the New Order, which was colored by riots that claimed
lives and property. Later the 1974 Malari Event activists and actors became mentors for
younger students as their next generation in the student movement, which reached its peak
in May 1998 with the successful end of Soeharto's New Order regime.
As is known, at the Malari 1974 Event for two days the area around the capital city
of Jakarta was covered in smoke. Burning and looting became a very worrying scene at that
time. The Jakarta Senen shopping area became the focus of attention on January 15, 1974,
dan The Minister of Defense and Security Maraden Panggabean was considering that the
construction of shops that cost Rp. 2.7 billion was sold out by the red rooster. He said at the
time that there were 11 people died, 300 were injured, quite a number of material losses
incurred during the two days of recorded riots. Reportedly, a number of people were killed,
at least 807 cars and 187 motorbikes damaged or burned, 144 buildings damaged or
burned (including Coca-cola factories), and 160 kilograms of gold lost from a number of
jewelry stores. 8

Atmosphere Approaches The 1974 Student Movement

In the last months of 1973 to the beginning of 1974, the temperature of the battle in
the body of power in the layers just under Suharto continued to increase. One of the strong
groups in the competition for power struggles was General Soemitro's group, who at that
time was in a powerful position as the Kopkamtib Commander. Other groups are Aspri
group Maj. Gen. Ali Moertopo and Maj. Gen. Sudjono Hoemardani, who are known to have a
complete line of semi-formal intelligence. Outside of this group, there was a technocrat
group Widjojo Nitisastro and friends who began to feel uncomfortable in their inner
relations and interests with Soeharto. "9
In the student critical movement 1970-1974 Hariman Siregar represented the
Jakarta group in the mainstream of the strength and movement of Indonesian students.
Whereas the other main groups are the Bandung student group, mainly by three prominent
campuses, ITB-Padjadjaran University-Parahyangan University. Unlike the Bandung
students, it seems that Jakarta students in the 1970s faced a variety of more complex
problems. One thing is obvious, the influence of extra universiter organizations in the intra-
campus student government body is still very strong, continuing the atmosphere of campus
politicization from 1960-1965. This makes the situation of movement on behalf of the
campus more complicated.
Every extra organization through an extension of their respective hands moves
individually to utilize movements on behalf of the campus for the benefit of their respective
parents - both the parent organization and the parent of political groups or groups within
the body of power. On the Jakarta campuses, it can be seen, for example, how HMI

7 The newspapers and magazine were banned on Januari 21, 1974.

8 Antara and Kompas daily, 21-22 Januari 1974.
9 Widiarsi Agustina, Masalah Misterius Malari : Rusuh Politik Pertama Dalam Sejarah Orde Baru,

penerbit Tempo, Jakarta : Tempo Publishing, 2014.

(Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam- Islamic Student Association) has its own purpose and
agenda of interest or political agenda, so much the experiment has colored the student
movement for its specific interests. While in some other specific campuses, the dominance
of other extra organizations also does not miss doing the same thing.
In the context of intra-campus upheaval, there is no doubt that the least troubled is
the University of Indonesia Student Council. The election of Hariman Siregar, a Medical
Faculty student, as Chairman of the DM-UI was the first time for a long time that DM-UI was
led by non HMI. But the increase, Hariman Siregar was inseparable from the support of his
initial closeness with the political group Tanah Abang (under the supervision of the Ali
Moertopo group) - which Hariman himself recognized and mentioned as a support for
Golkar. In the past, Hariadi Darmawan, who was an HMI and at the same time an army
officer, also led DM-UI and was very influential, one thing after another was also related to
the support of Ali Moertopo's group.
But after becoming Chairman of the DM-UI Hariman Siregar was deemed to have
deviated from the Tanah Abang line, then considered close to GDUI (University of
Indonesia Discussion Group) and the PSI group (the Indonesian Socialist Party group
founded by the late Sutan Sjahrir) whose representation on campus was linked at the
Faculty of Economics, Sjahrir from Somal and Drs Dorodjatun Kuntjoro Jakti. Hariman was
suspected of being linked to the PSI connotation group, especially when Hariman became
the son-in-law of Prof. Sarbini Somawinata who was known as a hardline PSI economist. In
addition, Hariman was considered to have committed treason when handing over the
position of the Secretary General of DM-UI to Judil Herry who was an HMI and not to the
student leaders desired by Tanah Abang.
Media reports and Analysis disclosed, when Hariman was rumored to have
established a new relationship with General Soemitro which was considered by General Ali
Moertopo's rival in power, there was complete outrage at Hariman's actions in the political
and power game. One of the reasons why Hariman was considered united with Soemitro
was because of his participation in the anti-Japanese movement which meant attacking
Soedjono Hoemardani and by itself meant anti-Aspri (anti-Asisten Pribadi, anti- personal
assistant) . In addition, throughout the knowledge of the Tanah Abang group, Hariman said
several times that Suharto needed to be replaced and his successor was General Soemitro.
Hariman repeatedly denied the existence of a special relationship with General Soemitro on
the back of the day. Hariman's rebuttal in fact at some point parallels an internal
information in the General Pangkopkamtib environment of General Soemitro, that in the
eyes of Soemitro and Sutopo Juwono until the last moments Hariman Siregar was somehow
concluded to be under the influence of Ali Moertopo. First, Hariman was historically elected
General Chair of DM-UI because of Tanah Abang's support. Second, his attitude which
criticized the development strategies of the technocrats was considered in line with Ali
Moertopo. However, Ali Moertopo was once troubled by Hariman's attitude and criticisms
of this technocrat.
One time President Soeharto - who apparently based on several reports that entered
him also considered Hariman to be under the influence and guided by Ali Moertopo -
asking Ali to reprimand Hariman for stopping attacks on the development strategies put
forward by the technocrats, because for Soeharto to attack development strategies meant
by opposing GBHN (Garis-Garis Besar Haluan Negara- Outlines of State Policy) . Ali was
asked to persuade Hariman to soften his criticisms, if indeed he could not stop him, to be a
critic of 'implementation' and not 'strategy'.
So the Tanah Abang group was busy looking for Hariman, but failed because
Hariman avoided them. One reason or another why Hariman is still considered in the area
of Ali Moertopo's influence, not least because some of the 'operators' Ali Moertopo
themselves claim several times in reports to superiors that they succeeded in 'influencing'
and 'fostering' Hariman. But what actually communicates with Hariman is Dr. Midian Sirait
who handles the coordination of Youth-Students-Scholars (pemuda, mahasiswa,
cendekiawan- Pemacen) in the Golkar DPP, and it seems that the relationship can run well
for some time. One time, the communication assignment was transferred to David
Napitupulu, but the task was mostly recycled by others in the Tanah Abang group.
According to Dr. Midian Sirait, Hariman Siregar once expressed his displeasure with this
'transition'.
On December 28, 1973, 10 DM-UI functionaries issued a motion of no confidence in
Hariman Siregar. Ten people clearly identified their closeness and were part of the Tanah
Abang group. They were Potsdam Hutasoit, Leo Tomasoa, Togar Hutabarat, Arifin
Simanjuntak, Agus Napitupulu, Saman Sitorus, Tisnaya Irawan Kartakusuma, Ria Rumata
Aritonang, Max Rusni and Sarwoko (although the latter name was mentioned actually did
not participate in the vote of no confidence. Hariman himself said that they were only 8
people, because 2 others did not join the motion, including Sarwoko). Before launching a
no-confidence motion reported by the DM- UI functionaries had a meeting at the house of a
Lieutenant Colonel who happened to be the adjutant to General Ali Moertopo.
The UI Student Council Hariman group (DM-UI group) brought the issue of non-
confidence motions into the category of barriers to struggle against unrighteousness in the
body of power. "Of course, every struggle is not free from risks and obstacles," DM-UI
responded in the media. "Every social movement is of any size, in addition to giving birth to
heroes, it also produces no less traitors: cheap gadgets, paid accomplices, low-opportunist
opportunists and the like. Students are not professional politicians, even have no political
experience at all. We are only students and part of the Indonesian young generation. But
we are aware enough and mature to understand and understand the dirty practices of
hired henchmen who want to screw it up. With a variety of backgrounds, including money,
personal ambition, envy and jealousy, adventure, competition for popularity, some young
people and students surrender themselves to become accomplices of groups who feel
threatened by their open and sharp criticisms directed by students so far ".10
In a vote of no confidence, they charged that "the activities of the Chairperson of the
DM UI were never formally discussed in the institutional environment of the UI Student
Council as a whole. They accused "The activities of the Chairperson of the DM-UI have led
to personal activities and beyond the decisions of the DM-UI work meeting in November
1973 so that they cannot be accounted for". They considered the activities to have a
tendency to betray the results of the University of Indonesia's alma mater struggle which
had begun since October 1965. They accused Hariman Siregar of acts of manipulation
which in the language of the plaque attached to a motion "masterminded by the back of a
certain party".

10 Statemen activists DM-UI , Tempo edisi khusus Senin, 09 Maret 2009.

 Leo Tomasoa confirmed this latest accusation without mentioning which party he
intended. Hariman they mentioned a thousand-faced, small dictator who had sold the
University of Indonesia. However, not a single charge from the motion group dared to
mention the relationship between Hariman and General Soemitro's group. Hariman himself
denied his relationship with any party except Golkar through the coordination of Pemacen
( the Youth-Students-Scholars, Pemuda, Mahasiswa, Cendekiawan- Permacen), which he
admitted helped him become Chairman of the DM-UI.
It is interesting that, along with the radicalization of Jakarta students in the last
months of 1973 to the beginning of 1974, the temperature of the struggle in the body of
power in the layers just under Suharto also increased. One of the strong groups in the
competition for power struggles was General Soemitro's group, who at that time was in a
powerful position as the Kopkamtib Commander. Other groups are Aspri group Maj. Gen.
Ali Moertopo and Maj. Gen. Sudjono Hoemardani, who are known to have a complete line of
semi-formal intelligence. Outside of this group, there was a technocrat group Widjojo
Nitisastro and friends who began to feel uncomfortable in their inner relations and
interests with Suharto. These three groups, as of that moment, cannot be considered as
strategic friends whose loyalty to Soeharto can be guaranteed. Around the groups there
were also a number of generals and figures who were not "clear" but were always careful in
calculating the direction of the wind. "In what ways do students carry out the demands of
the nation's conscience? With the power struggle movements on the street that come into
contact with practical politics or with movements that rely on the power of thought and
concept as moral strength according to the nature of their role as young intellectuals? Or is
it a smart and wise mix of all ways? " DM-UI activists said.
Between Bandung-Jakarta. In the last months of 1973, after the August 5 1973 event
in Bandung, campus-based student activities increased. Many inter-campus meetings are
held. Whether it is between Bandung campuses themselves, as well as with other city
campuses such as Surabaya, Yogya, Bogor and Jakarta. In addition to students, there are
often other critical movement exponents in the community, both cultural and intellectual.
One of the meetings that received the attention of the authorities was a meeting on
the ITB campus which was reported by the press as 'Dissatisfied People's Meeting'. Other
student meetings observed by the power circles were meetings before the January 15, 1974
event, on the campus of the University of Padjadjaran, which was attended by leaders of
student councils who were not expected by the authorities to 'consolidate' namely ITB, UI
and Unpad. In the meeting attended Hariman Siregar from DM-UI, Komarudin from Dewan
Mahasiswa ITB (DM-ITB) and Hatta Albanik from DM-Unpad as the host. Also present were
several other DM leaders from Bandung and outside Bandung. But what was most
observed by the intelligentsia at that time was the three people.
Towards Malari 1974, the arrival of the Chairperson of the Inter Governmental
Group on Indonesia (IGGI), Jan P Pronk in Jakarta on Sunday, November 11, 1973, was
welcomed by students with anti-foreign capital demonstrations at Kemayoran Airport,
Jakarta. The event then culminated with the eruption of the anti-foreign capital student
movement, expanding and culminating on the arrival of Japanese Prime Minister Tanaka,
January 15, 1974.

Procession of Eruption Malari 1974

 On January 12, the head of the DMUI, Hariman Siregar stated that a movement to
welcome Tanaka would be held to inform that the Indonesian people still had national
pride and there were still many people who could not be bought with property. This
statement was then the opening phase of the student demonstration movement in greeting
Prime Minister (PM) Tanaka on January 14. This was then realized with a massive
demonstration on that date determined, in protest against the arrival of Japanese Prime
Minister at Halim Perdanakusuma airport, although it failed to break in because security
officers swiftly blocked the demonstrators with unsheathed weapons. The students, in this
case also no longer pay attention to warnings from Laksana Sudomo and Minister of
Defense M. Panggabean who began to offend the student movement "as something that is
not pure and leads to treason." Student actions that had been a moral force to do control
and criticism, continue to nag and move, especially after the "contact" between student
demonstrators and the Japanese PM Tanaka cannot occur due to layered escort from the
security forces.11
As a result, this increased the political temperature that had happened at that time.
In the evening, held at the University of Indonesia Student Center, dozens of
representatives of the Student Council (Dema) from Javanese universities, led by the UI
Student Council held a meeting to evaluate the demonstration to welcome the arrival of
Japanese Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka. This preparatory meeting was led by Gurmilang
Kartasasmita, the deputy chairman of the DMUI as well best friend from Hariman Siregar.
Two themes discussed were plans for dialogue with Tanaka and the route of the
demonstration. After agreeing, the meeting was finally closed half an hour after the turn of
the day. Some of the masses slept in the UI campus as the basis of the movement, while the
rest chose to return home to then take part in the demonstration together in the morning.12
The following morning, dated January 15, 1974, demonstrators consisting of
students and non-campus activists gathered at the University of Indonesia Student Council
(DMUI) Secretariat, Jalan Salemba, Central Jakarta, to carry out the action. The mass action
itself at that time agreed to the event and then focused on Trisakti University. By bringing
the central theme with three demands, namely disbanding Aspri, lowering prices, and
eradicating corruption which became known as "Tritura 1974", they began walking from
Salemba around 08.00 to Jalan Raden Saleh, then to Cikini, Gambir, and Merdeka Timur.
After the mass action then moved on to the National Monument. On the way, the number of
demonstrators increased, mainly because of the high school students. Along the way the
demonstrators lowered the flags to welcome state guests to half a pill as a sign of grief
because of the arrival of Prime Minister Tanaka.
After the apples were dissolved, they returned to their homes. He did not say
afterwards, "uncontrolled elements" outside the mass of students, where hundreds and
thousands of mobs, among them containing thugs, rioters, and thieves then began making
riots and acts that are not commendable: they burn Japanese cars, deflate tires, while
ransacking shops, buildings and others. The DM- UI chairman, Hariman Siregar himself
who knew about this after the student apple tried to control the masses who were so out of

11Aditia Muara Padiatra, Introduction to Malari: Dari Situasi,Aksi, hingga Tusuh pada Awal Orde
Baru 1970-1974, Jurnal Criksetra, Universitas Sriwijaya , Volume 4, Number 8 Agustus 2015, pp. 103-110.
12 ibid.
control at the time, but were unsuccessful. The following excerpts of the interview cited
here:

‘’ Jadi gua sendiri waktu itu bilang ke masyarakat minta kebijakan, boleh nyanyi
dulu... “maju tak gentar” dulu... gak ada yang bisa nyanyi, nah dalam hati gua nih,
wah ini kacau juga sedikit nih gua pikir... Seriussss.. “perjuangan kita tidak untuk
untuk pengrusakan”, “pulang dulu nanti kita kumpul lagi”....

("So, I myself told the community at that time to ask for a policy, I could sing first ..."
"Go forward without fear" "No one can sing, now in my heart, this is a little chaotic, I
think. ... Seriously ... "our struggle is not for destruction", "we will return home first"
).13

Through the Tempo forum, Abar tried to explore how the events we know more
about the "Fifteen January 1974 Plagues" incident took place 14: "In terms of the paralysis it
caused to the life of the capital, people seemed to be able to compare it to the paralysis of
Paris due to the riots there in May 1968. And the tensions felt by the residents of Jakarta
last week, were like the tensions experienced by Peking residents broke out at Peking
University at the height of the cultural revolution there. For the first time having goods
made in Japan, especially motorized vehicles, for the Jakarta people last week was a burden
of tormenting thoughts and a kind of sin. "15
Mass riots continued until the next day even though various organizations had
called for calm. Finally on the 16th night, DMUI chairman Hariman Siregar surrendered to
the authorities, and then presented himself on a television screen to appease the
demonstrators. He read a declaration from the University of Indonesia Student Council that
opposed the violence.
As we know, at that time in the Kompas, Pedoman, Abadi and Indonesia Raya daily
newspapers, the call for democracy and justice came out loud along with the eruption of
the 1974 Malari Event during the New Order. The Malari 1974 event was the first critical
criticism of the student movement against the power of the New Order which opened itself
to the dominance of foreign capital, in the midst of inequality, poverty and injustice in
Indonesia at that time.16
Kompas daily reported that Hariman Siregar as Chair of the Student Council of the
University of Indonesia (DM UI) as well as the leader of the mass action demonstrating on
January 15, 1974. At his command, the students conducted a long march from the UI
campus, Salemba, to Trisakti University, Jalan Kiai Tapa, West Jakarta. 17

13 Interview with Hariman Siregar, Tokoh Malari dan General Chairman DM-UI Period 1973 –

1974, Jakarta 7 Mei 2015. See, Hariman Siregar, Hati Nurani Seorang Demonstran, Jakarta: Mantika Media
Utama, 1994.
14 Widiarsi Agustina, Masalah Misterius Malari : Rusuh Politik Pertama Dalam Sejarah Orde Baru,

penerbit Tempo, Jakarta : Tempo Publishing, 2014.

15 ibid.
16 See, Reports and analysis Kompas, Pedoman, Abadi dan Indonesia Raya daily newspapers, 12

November 1973-20 Januari 1974.

17 Kompas, 16 Januari 1974.
 Students condemn the dominance of foreign capital. In this case, at that time the
amount of American investment had exceeded Japanese capital, the main investment was
directed at mining companies on islands outside Java, on the other hand Japanese investors
were directed not only to exploitation of raw materials / tobacco, but also to companies -
the company making goods, so that the number of Japanese projects surpassed other
countries' projects Until 1973 approval had been given to 135 Japanese projects worth US $
534 Million and 115 American projects valued at US $ 935 million. 18
According to Sudjono Humardani, all investments for factories amounted to US $
300 million. With guidance from presidential aides, Maj. Gen. Suedjono Humardani, who
became an unofficial supervisor of Japanese investors, the sector of modern factories was
increasingly dominated by joint Japanese-Chinese-Military companies. 19 In other parts of
Jakarta, mass action also took place. One of the most gripping happened in Pasar Senen.
There the masses burned down the project of the newly built shopping complex. They put
forward three demands called "New Tritura 1974": First, dissolve the President's Personal
Assistant institution (Aspri); second, reduce prices; third, corruption.
For the demonstrators, foreign capital circulating in Indonesia was excessive.
According to them also, Tanaka along with investment, corporations, and products from
Japan are forms of new style of imperialism. "We will burn all Japanese products," said one
demonstrator, as reported by New York Times journalist Richard Halloranjan. 20

Malari 1974: Symbol of Resistance

Basically, all critical activities of students are driven by the same idealism.
Therefore, student movements in one city are quickly appreciated by students from other
cities in the form of similar movements. But the behavior and treatment of military rulers
in each city is often not the same. The farther away from Jakarta, the more repressive.
Student movements are often expressed by the student movement in Jakarta as
containing the nuances of practical politics, which in the past was often interpreted as a
power struggle among the national political elite. The student movement in Bandung - and
generally other student movements outside Jakarta - is more visible to contain a lower
level of practical political content compared to the student movement in Jakarta which
because of their position in the capital is easily labeled as a practical political movement.
Generally the student movement which is considered successful in overthrowing the
power regime, is when the student movement combines student movements with a
practical power struggle in Jakarta with the forces of thought and idealism which are
usually born in the student movement in Bandung. The ruler actually understands this so
much that trying to undermine the chain that connects Bandung with Jakarta. Other
university cities such as Yogyakarta, Surabaya, Medan, Makassar and Bogor by themselves
also have certain characteristics which, if successfully connected to the Jakarta-Bandung
axis, will also be a powerful force capable of breaking down any power of power that
hinders student idealism.

18 Harian Abadi 4 Desember 1973.

19 Harian Kompas, 3 Desember 1973.
20 Richard Halloranjan, “Violent Crowds in Jakarta Protest the Visit by Tanaka”, New York Times,16

Januari 1974. See also, https://www.nytimes.com/1974/01/16/archives/violent-crowds-in-jakarta-

protest-the-visit-by-tanaka-thousands.html accessed 20 November 2018.
 The failure of the student movement on January 15, 1974 in Jakarta to replace
Soeharto's power occurred because of the breakdown of the chain linking the movements
of the students of Jakarta and Bandung, so that it automatically decided to also connect
with the student movements of the main cities of other universities. One thing or another, it
happened because of the emergence of a large 'suspicion' of the figure of Hariman Siregar
whose political 'game' often confuses opponents and friends. The question arises to him:
Who is he playing for? This impression seems to underlie the attitudes of Bandung student
leaders, Hatta Albanik (Unpad) and friends in Bandung and outside Jakarta, including
Tampubolon Muslim (ITB) who seemed not always 'harmonious' with Hatta.
It is undeniable, the various demands of Bandung students, very much colored the
political decisions made by the government, such as the dissolution of Aspri, credit policies
for entrepreneurs and small investments, and restrictions on luxury lifestyles - such as
among others the satirical contingents of Bandung students about the high like a prison in
Jakarta but inside it is a palace, when a meeting took place 11 January 1974 with President
Soeharto at Bina Graha.
Even the Japanese government once sent an official from the OECF (Overseas
Economic Cooperative Fund) to meet Hatta Albanik and his friends who were considered
as representatives of the Japanese anti-capital student movement, to ascertain what forms
of assistance and cultural cooperation Japan should give to reduce the bad impression '
economic animal '. After such an exploration, Japan then gave birth to Japanese-Indonesian
cultural assistance and cooperation programs. Even a similar program was later expanded,
covering a number of other Asean countries, especially the Philippines and Thailand whose
student movements also strongly expressed anti-Japanese attitudes. Anti-Japanese
movements did start with Bandung students who received a lot of complaints from textile
entrepreneurs around Bandung which were hit by the presence of Japanese capital. This
movement was then expressed with extreme, radical and quite vulgarity by Jakarta
students, resulting in a massive riot on January 15, 1974 - which was later dubbed the
January 15 Catastrophe or Malari, especially by the ruling circles.
Indeed, it cannot be denied that the hands of power also play in creating a radical
and extreme situation at the event. Especially in the same dimension of time and space,
there was an internal struggle of elements of power - especially between the groups of
General Ali Moertopo and the group General Soemitro. Provocations from the power
groups involved in internal battles caused the outbreak of riots (which had been scanned)
on January 15, 1974. Jakarta that day was hit by a big riot. The event was enough to be a
reason for the authorities to act on all the critical movements, especially those launched by
the students, as a movement of treason that intended to overthrow President Soeharto and
his government. And, in the following periods the rulers "had" the reasons for carrying out
suppression actions to suppress and tame college campuses throughout Indonesia. The
ruler wants to make the campus just "campo vaccino" or cattle grazing, a place to maintain
beneficial creatures but not clever to fight, like the Medici nobles treat their people
according to the contents of the Niccolo Machiavelli book.
When suppression enters campus. With the events of January 15, 1974, there was
indeed a way for the Soeharto regime to "act on" the campus which had been a hotbed of
freedom and critical movement. Many blame Hariman Siregar and Jakarta students who on
the one hand chose positions in General Soemitro's group in the power struggle that
occurred, and on the other hand they were not careful in carrying out their movements, so
the student movement on 15 January was successfully led by the group Ali Moertopo flared
into social unrest. As said Dr. Kusnadi Hardjasumantri, former UGM Chancellor, if the
January 15, 1974 event, was not provoked to explode, Suharto had fallen earlier, by itself.
Because, at the end of 1973 and the beginning of 1974, actually Suharto was at the nadir,
losing the support of the majority in the military and at the same time losing the support of
the technocrats and the strength of the students.
But on the other hand, Hariman and his friends were also hailed as a symbol of
resistance to the Suharto regime. Hariman and his friends from Jakarta's power struggle
style movement was used as a model for a number of student movements in the following
period. This movement can also be called the student movement on the street, which relies
more on muscle strength in action taking to the streets, which in itself can also be loaded
with various excesses such as student involvement in acts of violence. The existence of acts
of violence that often display anarchist scent, invited critics that students had also been
infected by the style of thuggery.
If the student movement in 1966 until partially in 1974 and 1978, still always
prioritized movement with the power of thought or concept, combined with several
student movements on the street, then in the following times a reversal occurred. Now, it
seems that power struggle on the street is the first choice, while movements based on the
power of thought and concept are increasingly being abandoned. At the same time, intra-
campus as the basis of the strength of the student movement as well as in 1967-1974 and
even 1978, has also shifted back to campus as in the 1960-1965 period, with the
onderbouw campus extra-party organizations as the main role holders.
Current BEM from various campuses in various movements tends to be merely a
subordination of off-campus organizations such as Kammi (Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa
Muslim Indonesia-Kammi) for example. Apart from the control of the initiative to move
outside the campus fence, it naturally opens up opportunities for contamination of
practical political interests in the student movement. In other words, there is an open
opportunity for students to use in various intra-political political battles.
After the events of January 15, 1974, a number of suppression measures were
implemented on campuses. Aside from the army, the suppression action was mainly
through the hands of the Minister of Education and Culture who was appointed after
Suharto's January 15 incident, namely Maj. Gen. Dr. Sjarif Thajeb. This suppression style
became a mode for the authorities to face the campus until 1978. The peak was in the form
of campus occupation which dared to 'fight' Soeharto such as ITB and several other
universities throughout Indonesia, by army units in 1978.
Initially, Dr. Sjarif Thajeb, who had sat as Minister of Higher Education in the
Soekarno transition cabinet in 1965-1966, had become a 'hope' for students, given his track
record as someone who contributed to the birth of US (Indonesian Student Action Unit) -
which eventually became the spearhead of the overthrow of the Soekarno regime.
However, his good words which were always conveyed in meetings with students, proved
to be mere nonsense, because even he became one of the sword actions of suppression on
campuses. Later he often made loud words that pressed students into various meetings.
Therefore, many times he had an argument with the students. Even no one could guess the
atmosphere of the father-son meeting that had happened at first, in the future it almost
developed into a duel of fist fights when he wanted to impose his will.
 But the campus has never really been subdued by power alone. Student critical
movements in various ways can still take place, including by holding 'scientific' discussions
under the umbrella of the Tri Dharma of Higher Education. Meanwhile, human resources
for the campus never run out, each year the campus gets 'fresh blood' in the form of flowing
in the entry of new students who in time bring new aspirations. College campus is like a
river, the water never stops flowing. An endless process. History notes that after the
student critical movements of 1970-1974, a student resistance movement emerged in 1978
and the subsequent 1998 student movement became the main ignition of Soeharto's fall.
Actually, so far the national conscience has always seen a red thread on student
movements. It is clear that the more the ruler takes a distance from the student movement,
then that means the age of power in the hands of the ruler, whoever he is, in any given time,
has become shorter. However, it becomes an interesting question, in what ways do
students carry out the demands of the nation's conscience? With the power struggle
movements on the street that come into contact with practical politics or with movements
that rely on the power of thought and concept as moral strength according to the nature of
their role as young intellectuals? Or is it a smart and wise mix of all these methods?

Soeharto's Footsteps and the Malari Event : “The Shadow of an Unseen Hand”
In the book Autobiography of Soeharto (1989), the Malari 1974 case was passed
over, not mentioned at all. Though about Petrus (mysterious shooting), Soeharto was quite
forthright.21 For the January 15, 1974 case, better known as the "Malari Event", it was
recorded that at least 11 people died, 300 were injured, 775 people were detained. A total
of 807 cars and 187 motorbikes were damaged / burned, 144 buildings were severely
damaged. As much as 160 kg of gold is lost from a number of jewelry stores. This violent
event can only be experienced and felt (consequently). But not to be revealed thoroughly.
News in the paper only reveals facts that can be seen with the naked eye.
The Malari incident occurred when Japanese Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka was
visiting Jakarta (January 14-17 1974). Students plan to welcome their arrival by
demonstrating at Halim Perdanakusuma. Because they were tightly guarded, a group of
students failed to break into the air base. On January 17, 1974 at 08:00, the Japanese PM
departed from the Palace not by car, but was delivered by President Soeharto by helicopter
from the Bina Graha Building to the air base. That shows that the atmosphere of the city of
Jakarta is still tense.
Tanaka is considered a symbol of foreign capital that must be eliminated. The action
in the form of a long march from Salemba to Trisakti University in Grogol, West Jakarta,
brought three demands: eradicating corruption, changing economic policies regarding
foreign capital, and dissolving the President's Personal Assistant institution. Hundreds of
thousands of people took to the streets. But this action then led to riots.
According to Hariman Siregar, the student action was over at 14.30. "While the riots
occurred an hour later," he said. The masses who claimed to be from the workers stormed
Pasar Senen, Blok M, and the Glodok area. They carried out looting and burned Japanese-
made cars and shops.

G. Dwipayana dan Ramadhan KH , Soeharto: Pikiran, Ucapan, dan Tindakan Saya, Penerbit Citra
21

Lamtoro Gung Persada, 1988.

 The Commander of the Operations Command Restoring Security and Order General
Soemitro was able to block the mob in the Sarinah area, Central Jakarta. He tried to deflect
the mass movement that led to the Presidential Palace. "Come on, come with me, we will go
together to Kebayoran!" "I mean, they want to make their goals deviate, so that they don't
get to the National Monument ...". The crowd did not move. To Tempo a few years ago,
Soemitro claimed to have offered a dialogue between the UI and Tanaka Student Council.
Tanaka was willing, but the DM-UI replied that "dialogue was replaced by street dialogue
..."22 But Jakarta has already become an abang reef. That day dozens of people were killed,
hundreds were injured, nearly a thousand cars and motorbikes were damaged and burned,
and hundreds of buildings were damaged. This is still added by 160 kilograms of gold lost
from a number of jewelry stores. So vulnerable, Soeharto had to take Tanaka to take a
helicopter ride to Halim Airport before going back to his country.
Hariman Siregar, then Chair of the University of Indonesia Student Council, was
dragged to court on charges of subversion. After four months of trial, he must bear the
sentence of six years in prison. "I am considered to undermine the authority of the state,"
Hariman said when we met in March 2006. The price he had to pay was too expensive.
When inhabiting the prodeo hotel, his father died, his beloved wife was sick, and his twin
children died.
The tragedy known as Malari changed Indonesia's journey. Because, according to
historian Asvi Warman Adam in an article, after that Soeharto systematically repressed.
Sjahrir, who was arrested after the incident, considered Malari a form of consolidation of
Suharto's power. In total the apparatus scratched 750 people, including student leaders
and scholars, such as Hariman Siregar, Sjahrir, Yap Thiam Hien, Mohtar Lubis, Rahman
Tolleng, and Aini Chalid. "Imagine, on January 11, still being embraced by Soeharto, on the
17th I was arrested," Hariman recalled. On January 11, Soeharto did accept Hariman with
other student leaders at Bina Graha. Suharto intended to reduce student action. The figures
were detained under the Anti-Subversion Law. Some of them were released a year after
being held in prison, because they were proven not involved. The court, based on the Anti-
Subversion Law, drew criticism.
The 1974 Malari tragedy can be seen from various perspectives. Some see it as a
student demonstration against foreign capital, especially Japan. Some observers saw the
incident as the intellectual displeasure of Aspri (personal assistant) of President Soeharto
(Ali Moertopo, Soedjono Humardani, etc.) who had enormous power. There is also an
analysis of military elite friction, particularly the rivalry of General Soemitro with Ali
Moertopo. As is known, a similar trend was also seen later in the May 1998 case (Wiranto
versus Prabowo). Both of these cases - borrowing the phrase Chalmers Johnson (Blowback,
2000) - may be called the game of "scorpion generals" (jenderal-jenderal kalajengking).
After demonstrations were accompanied in other places with riots, arson and
looting, Jakarta became smoky. Soeharto dismissed Soemitro as Pangkomkamtib and
immediately took over the post. Aspri President was dissolved. The Head of BAKIN Soetopo
Juwono was sentenced and replaced by Yoga Sugama. For Suharto, the January 15, 1974
riots tarnished his forehead because the incident took place in front of the nose of a state
guest, the Japanese PM. The irresistible embarrassment caused him to be very wary of all
people / groups and to carry out unforgiving sanctions against those who could disturb the

22 Majalah Tempo dalam Edisi Khusus Malari, 13 Januari 2014.

government. Furthermore, he was very selective in choosing his close aides, among others,
with the criteria of "being a president's aide". Every effort is made to maintain and
preserve power, both physically and mentally.
So from this angle, the events of January 15, 1974 can be called as one of the
milestones of the history of the New Order violence. Since then repression has been carried
out more systematically.

Malari 1974 as Discourse

The Malari event still contains a dark side of history that we cannot fully
understand, and perhaps because of that, this event is always interesting to discuss in the
present context. In the Memory of General Yoga (1990), the event was described as the
climax of student activities that had been going on since 1973. Yoga Sugomo was in New
York when there was a riot on January 15, 1974. But five days after that he was called to
Jakarta to replace Soetopo Juwono Head of BAKIN.23
According to Yoga, activities in various campuses both lectures and demonstrations
that ripen the situation and ultimately lead to opposition to the government's economic
policies. Initially it was a discussion on the UI Jakarta campus (August 13-16 1973) with
speakers Subadio Sastrosatomo, Sjafrudin Prawiranegara, Ali Sastroamidjojo, and TB
Simatupang. Followed by the Youth Oath Commemoration which produced the "October 24
Petition". The arrival of IGGI Chairman JP Pronk was the momentum for anti-foreign capital
demonstrations. The accumulation of this activity finally reached its climax with the arrival
of Japanese PM Tanaka in January 1974 accompanied by demonstrations but also riots.24
In books written by Ramadhan KH (1994) and Heru Cahyono (1998), Soemitro's
tendency was to blame Ali Moertopo who was his rival in the world of high-level politics.
Ali Moertopo and Soedjono Humardani "fostered" ex DI / TII people in GUPPI (Combined
Islamic Education Improvement Business). This pattern of utilization of radical Islamic
elements often recurs during the New Order era. It might even be able to walk to this day.25
In the Malari case, through the organization mass mobilization was carried out by
Ramadi and Kyai Nur from Banten. Bambang Trisulo was said to have spent Rp. 30 million
to pay for thugs. While Roy Simandjuntak mobilized pedicab drivers from around Senen.
These activities - including the destruction of Japanese cars, Toyota Astra offices and Coca
Cola - were carried out to damage the image of students and beat the duo of Soemitro-
Soetopo Juwono . 26
On the contrary, in the "Ramadi document", Soemitro's plan was revealed to
mobilize power on campuses so that finally "a General with the initials S would take power
by overthrowing the president around April to June 1974. The social revolution must have
erupted and Pak Harto would fall". Ramadi is known to be close to Soedjono Hoemardani
and Ali Moertopo. Allegations in the "document" certainly refer to General Soemitro.

23 B. Wiwoho dan Bandjar Chaeruddin, Memori Jenderal Yoga. Penerbit Bina Rena Pariwara, April
1991.
24 Asvi Warman Adam , ‘’Malari 1974 dan Sisi Gelap Sejarah’’, Kompas 16 Januari 2003.
25 Heru Cahyono, Pangkopkamtib Jenderal Soemitro dan Peristiwa Malari, Pustaka Sinar Harapan;
first edition, 1992. See, G. Dwipayana dan Ramadhan KH , Soeharto: Pikiran, Ucapan, dan Tindakan Saya,
Penerbit Citra Lamtoro Gung Persada, 1988.See, Asvi Warman Adam , ‘’Malari 1974 dan Sisi Gelap Sejarah’’,
Kompas, 16 Januari 2003.
26 Heru Cahyono, Pangkopkamtib Jenderal Soemitro dan Peristiwa Malari, p.166.
 The information provided by Soemitro and Ali Moertopo is different, even
contradictory. Which is true: Soemitro or Ali Moertopo? We see riots, apprehended
perpetrators in the field, but who is actually an intellectual actor has never been revealed.
Ramadi was arrested and some time later died mysteriously under arrest.

The Door is Closed for The Pluralist, PSI

Malari 1974 marked the end of the New Order's relationship with a group of
"pluralist modern" political thinkers. This group - as written by David Bourchier and Vedi
R. Hadiz in Indonesian Politics and Society (2003) - covers urban intellectuals associated
with PSI.27 Pluralists have a vision of Indonesia as a modern industrial country. In creating
a political system, they adhere to the principle of democracy. They want a modern elite
technocrat who leads the country.
However, the thinking of modern pluralists clashed with Suharto's steps. As a result,
the opportunity to revive socialism is often deadlocked. As a political party of pluralists ,
PSI has long since died. Through Presidential Decree Number 200 of 1960 on August 15,
Soekarno dissolved PSI and Masyumi on suspicion of being involved in PRRI or the
Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia. But popular socialist
understanding, Sutan Sjahrir's fruit, was never truly buried. In the book The Carrier of
Political Missions (1995), Soebadio states PSI is a state of mind, a state of mind that cannot
be detected. The network is based on the similarity of ideas, spiritual, not just
organizations.
Senior journalist Rosihan Anwar, who has been regarded as a PSI person escaped
from Malari because it was declared "clean" by General Soemitro, confirming this. "PSI is a
cadre party. Supporters of an understanding never disappear. " According to Rosihan, since
the PSI was dissolved by Soekarno, the former members were still communicating. They
exchange ideas about the latest political developments. "Many young people are interested
too."28
The late Sarbini economist once mentioned the most powerful and unchanging
within the PSI was the spirit of socialism, the spirit of defending the people, and the
struggle for justice and equality. Even though the party broke up, his enthusiasm never
went out. At the beginning of Suharto's rule, old groups and social forces emerged. There
are Islam-oriented groups that were once related to history with Masyumi. There are other
groups formed by students, for example the Indonesian Student Action Unit. This student
group has a lot in common with PSI and plays an important role in the political process of
the New Order.
In the military there are two camps. William Liddle in his book, Participation and
Indonesian Political Parties in the Early New Order (1992), said there were radical and
Soeharto-centric groups of soldiers. Commander of the Siliwangi Military Regional
Command Lieutenant General H.R. Dharsono was a progressive military known to be close
to the PSI. He was classified as a radical army. Likewise, the Tanjung Pura Military
Command Commander XII Brigadier General A.J. Witono.

27 David Bourchier, Vedi R. Hadiz (Eds) Indonesian Politics and Society: A Reader, London:

Routledge, 2003.
28 Pintu Tertutup untuk PSI , pernyataan Rosihan Anwar, Tempo edisi khusus, Senin, 09 Maret

2009.
 In the economic team there are Widjojo Nitisastro, Mohammad Sadli, Sarbini
Sumawinata, and Emil Salim. Widjojo and Emil were not PSI people, but because of their
shared thoughts they were considered sympathizers of the PSI. The spread of PSI people
and sympathizers in the Soeharto era was considered a great opportunity for the PSI to
come back. "Because our opportunity is open," said Rahman Tolleng.
On August 25-31, 1966, the Second Army Seminar took place at the Army Staff and
Command School, Bandung, under the leadership of Major General Suwarto. He gave the
opportunity for a number of economists to become teaching staff. One of them was
Mohammad Sadli, a member of Soeharto's economic advisory team. Sadli expressed the
danger of militarism, it is necessary to have equal cooperation between civil and military,
and freedom of the press. The idea was rejected. Failing with civil-military equality, Sadli
often wrote a proposal note to Suharto to change the political situation. He proposed to
rehabilitate PSI and Masyumi. The proposal did not answer. The reason? "The military
doesn't need an excuse. For me it is clear: we cannot work with this person, "Sadli said in
an interview with Tempo magazine in 1999.
Because the effort to rehabilitate the PSI was already impossible, the idea emerged
to pioneer a movement that was not based on ideology, but based on a program. This
movement is known as an independent group. This thought reached the ears of Adam
Malik, the Presidium Minister for Political and Foreign Affairs. He also contacted Adnan
Buyung Nasution (Chair of the Indonesian Bachelor of Action Unit), Yozar Anwar (Chair of
the Central Indonesian Student Action Unit), and Marsillam Simandjuntak (Chair of US
Jakarta). Bung Adam's invitation was welcomed.
Unfortunately, this idea did not go smoothly. Through several tough meetings, Umar
Kayam, Director General of Radio & Television and culture, finally was elected as chairman.
But, after the group was formed, a number of figures withdrew, including Mashuri, Adnan
Buyung, and Adam Malik. Like they are not independent values. Adam Malik commented,
"Independent groups have died before birth."
Despite the lack of support, the independent group continues to run. Ahead of the
General Assembly of the People's Consultative Assembly While in 1968, Kayam conveyed
the group's critical attitude to Suharto. Independent groups apparently worry about a
number of people. When the Unity of Action Indonesian Students met with President
Soeharto, Rahman Tolleng, Chair of the US Central Presidium, witnessing someone
proposing that Suharto dissolve the independent group. The reason: the group is a neo-PSI
alias the new PSI. "Leave it alone. If it is not supported by the people, it will also die. This is
democracy, "Soeharto said at the time. Secure? The next day, in Jakarta and a number of
independent "headquarters" groups, circulated dark pamphlets. Contents: invitation to
crush independent groups. But they survive. Some names then entered the Mutual
Cooperation Council.
Meanwhile, in Bandung, a bipartai movement emerged. The idea was sparked:
limiting the number of parties participating in the election. Soemarno and Soelaiman
Soemadi, intellectual leaders of the PSI, stood out in this idea. The idea of Dwipartai
received broad support. But many interpretations developed among supporters. The basic
idea is simple, later there will only be two parties: one supporting the government and the
other the opposition party. This idea "died" after Suharto refused and decided to hold an
election.
 The contribution of other PSI intellectual thoughts came from economist Sarbini
Sumawinata. In 1966, he argued that maintaining political stability was a condition for
creating economic growth. The rationale then became a reference to the New Order's frame
of mind. Rahman Tolleng - in front of the Plenary Session of the Gotong Royong House of
Representatives representing the Golkar Faction in 1969 - argued that the electoral system
should be district based, replacing proportional representation. The district system is
adopted by the United States.29 The district system allows direct relations between the
elected and the voters. Elections are slowly becoming a qualitative election. Proposed
Rahman was rejected, but the idea of a district system often appeared until now.
After going through ups and downs, the efforts of modern pluralists to arouse
popular socialism in the New Order era finally failed in January 1974. The Malari incident
was mentioned by David Bourchier and Vedi R. Hadiz as the culmination of the tension of
modern pluralists with groups of officers, entrepreneurs and politicians in around Opsus
led by Ali Moertopo.30 After the Malari incident, modern pluralists were often in the
vanguard of the opposition of the New Order. "After 1974, it seemed the door was closed to
the rise of PSI, including its people," said Rahman Tolleng, a senior activist who imprisoned
without legal process after the 1974 Malari riots.31
Finally, In the 1974 Malari incident, it seemed clear that the press / media
supported the student movement at the time, but were suppressed by the New Order
authorities. The press / media banning was a sign that the New Order's authoritarianism
was increasingly strong which could only be ended in May 1998. For the newsmen/press
activists in Indonesia, Hariman Siregar (born in Padang Sidempuan, North Sumatra, 1950)
became a legend of Indonesian reform activists. He was with other student leaders, such as
Syahrir, Muhammad Aini Chalid, Judilherry Justam, and others. Hariman was the main
figure in the Malari incident on January 15, 1974. Before the historic event, he was General
Chair of the University of Indonesia (DM-UI) Student Council after being elected through
elections intervened by the New Order government through Ali Murtopo.
The Malari 1974 tragedy made a number of newspapers sympathize and side with
Hariman Siregar's actions. But the newspapers later banned and never published again, a
sign that the authoritarianism of the New Order did not recognize empathy and did not
care about press freedom. Even for the New Order regime, the press / media must be
supervised, controlled and if it does not comply, it will be banned forever. Because of the
Malari incident, Hariman and several other student leaders were later imprisoned for quite
a long time by the New Order regime, and until then he was the "legendary icon" of the
student movement in Indonesia, which should be appreciated dan respected by our
students and young activists. ***

29 Rahman Tolleng berbicara kepada wartawan, Tempo edisi khusus Senin, 09 Maret 2009.
30 David Bourchier, Vedi R. Hadiz (Eds) Indonesian Politics and Society: A Reader, London:
Routledge, 2003.
31 Pintu Tertutup untuk PSI , Pernyataan Rosihan Anwar, Tempo edisi khusus Senin, 09 Maret 2009.
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Newspapers, Interviews and Internets Sources

Antara and Kompas daily, 21-22 Januari 1974.

Harian Abadi 4 Desember 1973.
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Tempo edisi khusus Senin, 09 Maret 2009. Rahman Tolleng berbicara kepada wartawan.
Tempo edisi khusus, Senin, 09 Maret 2009. Pintu Tertutup untuk PSI , pernyataan Rosihan Anwar.
https://www.nytimes.com/1974/01/16/archives/violent-crowds-in-jakarta-protest-the-visit-by-tanaka-
thousands.html accessed 20 November 2018.