Safety Department

Imperial College London

South Kensington Campus
London SW7 2AZ
Tel: +44 (0) 20 7594 9423
safetydept@imperial.ac.uk
www.imperial.ac.uk

Ionising Radiations
Code of Practice & Guidance
Contingency Arrangements
Where any radiation user uses a source of ionising radiations, which may for example include
working with sealed (closed) sources, unsealed (open) sources, geological specimens, or x-ray
generator, they shall ensure that a suitable and sufficient prior risk assessment has been
completed. The prior risk assessments will be specific to the work being undertaken and will
identify any reasonably foreseeable events that could cause a ‘radiation accident’.

A ‘radiation accident’ is an accident or incident where immediate action would be required to

prevent or reduce the radiation exposure to employees or any other persons to ionising radiation.

The purpose of the contingency plan is to ensure, as far as is reasonably practicable, the
restriction of exposure to ionising radiation and the health and safety of persons who may be
affected by the identified radiation accident. In compilation of the contingency plan, consultation is
to be undertaken with the College RPO/RPA.

The Divisional / Group Heads are responsible for ensuring that suitable and sufficient risk
assessments, Local Rules and contingency arrangements are in place prior to the work with
ionising radiations commencing. The RPS and users will assist in the production of the risk
assessments, the writing of local rules and the implementation of contingency arrangements as
appropriate.

Definitions

A Radiation User / User is a person who is registered by the College to

Radiation User / User
undertake work using ionising radiations.
The College is classed as a radiation employer where it undertakes
Radiation Employer
work or practices involving the use of ionising radiations
RPA Radiation Protection Adviser RPO Radiation Protection Officer
IRR99 Ionising Radiations Regulations 1999 RPS Radiation Protection Supervisor

Code of Practice

1. Requirement for Contingency Arrangements

The College is required (under IRR99) to have contingency arrangements1 in place for processes
where the prior risk assessment has determined that there is a reasonably foreseeable risk of a
radiation accident. Such risks shall have been identified in compliance with the following section of
the manual.

IRPM-IRCP-002 (Work Registration & Risk Assessments)

Where contingency arrangements are required, their nature and scope shall be detailed in Local
Rules, which are also required in all radiation areas, as described in the following manual section.
1
The Reactor Centre at Silwood Park has contingency arrangements in compliance with Nuclear Site
Licence Conditions. In general these will take precedence over this manual section.
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 Safety Department
Imperial College London
South Kensington Campus
London SW7 2AZ
Tel: +44 (0) 20 7594 9423
safetydept@imperial.ac.uk
www.imperial.ac.uk

IRPM-IRCP-006 (Completion of Local Rules)

The purpose of the contingency arrangements is to restrict any radiation exposure of College
employees and to others including College Security staff, emergency services and members of the
public, that arises from an accident / incident.

Reasonably foreseeable incident scenarios2 might include a fire or explosion in a College

Laboratory releasing radioactive materials into the environment, a dropped radioactive closed
source in an instrument laboratory, a small spill of radioactive material on the open bench or an X-
ray generator failing to terminate. Only by carrying out a suitable and sufficient risk assessment as
part of the work registration process, will this be determined.

The process of developing contingency arrangements requires thought to be given beforehand to

the correct course of action to be taken in the event of an incident, the recording of those actions in
a Contingency Plan and the training of those identified to implement the plan.

For most cases at Imperial College the contingency arrangements are going to be similar to those
required for best laboratory practice and will naturally form part of Local Rules without significant
extra resource required to develop the contingency plans. The likely elements of a contingency
plan are shown in the following table. The guidance, which follows, can be used to determine the
relevance of the table entries.

Factor Comment / Example

Person responsible for implementing the
Likely to be the Radiation Protection Supervisor
Contingency plan.
Use of suitable radiation and contamination
Determining the extent of the incident
monitors / radiation user reporting a spill
Use of barrier / door locks / tape to secure area,
Securing the Area (immediate mitigation) thus ensuring exposure is minimised and
contamination spread is avoided.
Personal Protective Equipment which is required in
Personal Protective Equipment
addition to that which is mandatory
Personal Dosimetry that is required in addition to
Additional Personal Dosimetry
that provided for use by radiation users
Plan-specific training required and arrangements
Appropriate Training & Rehearsal
and frequency of plan rehearsals
Radiation Protection Advice, Support and Contact details for the Radiation Protection Adviser
Reporting Arrangements / Officer
2. Implementation of Contingency Plans

Contingency arrangements for radiation accidents or incidents, including a description of the

accidents or occurrences to which they relate, are to be detailed in Local Rules. Contingency
plans are to be brought to the attention of any persons who may be affected by the accidents or
2
A reasonably foreseeable incident scenario is more than simply a ‘credible’ situation, which might lead to a
radiation accident. The degree of assessment required in developing a plan should be proportional to the
radiation risk – thus a large F-18 spill will require more assessment than a small H-3 spill. A spill of P-32 onto
someone’s hand in a radioisotope laboratory is reasonably foreseeable; whereas an aeroplane crashing into
the same laboratory would not be considered so even though it is ‘credible’ (radiation risks would be
inconsequential should this actually occur).
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 Safety Department
Imperial College London
South Kensington Campus
London SW7 2AZ
Tel: +44 (0) 20 7594 9423
safetydept@imperial.ac.uk
www.imperial.ac.uk

occurrences to which they relate, including those persons who may be required to take action in
implementing those plans.

The RPS and other relevant personnel are to be provided with training and instruction appropriate
to the actions that they may be required to take.

The effectiveness of any contingency plan will be dependent upon the timeliness of actions taken
by appropriately trained personnel. For this reason, all relevant personnel will participate in
periodic planned rehearsals. Records of these rehearsals will be retained together with
observations and recommendations for improvements.

Guidance

1. Contingency Plans & Local Rules

Contingency plans should be a part of Local Rules and in most cases best laboratory practice and
working to the rules will suffice. Information on local rules can be found in the following manual
section:

IRPM-IRCP-006 (Completion of Local Rules)

The RPS should make all radiation users aware of the local rules, ensuring that they are read and
understood before starting work with ionising radiations. Where contingency arrangements are
present the RPS should make the radiation users aware of procedures, equipment, personal
protective equipment and spill kits that might be required to action the contingency plan.

2. Developing the Plans

This section contains a few examples of how contingency plans might be developed for a number
of possible scenarios. The examples demonstrate the process of information collection and
assessment, which is used to develop the plans and local rules. This process should not be
considered separate to the work registration (prior risk assessment) process – adequately
completed work registrations with attached protocols will more than likely be sufficient for
developing the plans.

2.1 Laboratory Spill

Nature of the work P-32 PAGE Work

Nature of radiation hazard P-32, Beta emitter (High Energy)
Physical nature of ‘Wet Chemistry’, large volumes of buffer solution
hazards
 A spill of stock isotope onto bench
Foreseeable incidents  A spill of stock isotope onto exposed skin
 A large spill of buffer solution onto the floor
 Procedure for dealing with a spill on the bench
Contingency Plan  Procedure for dealing with personal contamination
Content3  Procedure for dealing with a large spill of low activity
radioactive liquid

3
In general the content will include all of those shown in the COP table on page 2.
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 Safety Department
Imperial College London
South Kensington Campus
London SW7 2AZ
Tel: +44 (0) 20 7594 9423
safetydept@imperial.ac.uk
www.imperial.ac.uk

 Spill Kit (small volume, high activity)

Contingency Plan  Personal Decontamination Kit
Equipment4  Spill kit (large volume)
 Contamination monitoring equipment

In developing a contingency plan based on the above scenario you should consider consulting the
following manual sections:

IRPM-ICRP-016 (Decontamination Procedures)

IRPM-ICRP-023 (Isotope Data)
IRPM-ICRP-032 (Personal Protective Equipment)
In developing the plan for the above scenario, it is not sufficient to simply reference the documents
or copy the content into the Local Rules. For some circumstances it will be appropriate to reference
the Decontamination Procedure if they wholly and entirely deal with the foreseeable scenario as
assessed. Otherwise, the manual guidance should be used as the basis for developing plans that
meet the specific requirements on a case-by-case basis.

2.2 Dropped Closed Source

Nature of the work Densitometry work using radioactive closed sources in a rig
Ba-133 high activity sealed sources, activity 2 GBq, radiation
Nature of radiation hazard
exposure to wholly exposed source at contact : 50 mSv/h gamma
Physical nature of Sources are small, need to be handled with remote tongs
hazards
 Source drops from rig onto floor
Foreseeable incidents
 Source drops from rig onto floor into surface water drain
 Procedure for dealing with a dropped source
Contingency Plan  Procedure for pre-checks prior to source removal (reference
Content3 in local rules are subject to a separate operational
procedure)
 Remote Handling Tongs
Contingency Plan
 Drain Covers
Equipment4
 Radiation Monitor

In developing a contingency plan based on the above scenario you should consider consulting the
following manual sections:

IRPM-ICRP-005 (Restriction of Exposure)

IRPM-ICRP-023 (Isotope Data)
IRPM-ICRP-032 (Personal Protective Equipment)

In developing the plan for the above scenario, it is not sufficient to simply reference the documents
or copy the content into the local rules. This example represents work in the College, which is more
specialised and unique compared to more ‘routine’ isotope work. However, the principles in
developing the foreseeable scenarios and contingency plans are no different.

2.3 Release of Radioactive Gas/Vapour e.g. I-125 Inhalation Hazard

4
This list is not exhaustive and is for illustration only.
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 Safety Department
Imperial College London
South Kensington Campus
London SW7 2AZ
Tel: +44 (0) 20 7594 9423
safetydept@imperial.ac.uk
www.imperial.ac.uk

Nature of the work I-125 Iodination Work in a Controlled Area laboratory

I-125 is a low energy x-ray/gamma emitter. The target organ for
internal exposure is the thyroid. I-125 is fairly radiotoxic and only
Nature of radiation hazard
small amounts need to be inhaled for an appreciable dose to be
delivered.
I-125 in the free state (i.e. as NaI) is volatile. This increases the
Physical nature of
inhalation hazard. Bound I-125 can also present an inhalation
hazards
hazard if it undergoes appreciable heating with acidification.
 I-125 Spill inside fume cupboard
Foreseeable incidents  I-125 Spill outside fume cupboard
 Known inhalation of I-125 during experiment
 Procedure for dealing with I-125 spill inside fume cupboard
Contingency Plan  Procedure for dealing with I-125 spill outside fume cupboard
Content3  Procedure for dealing with a known or suspected intake of I-
125
 I-125 Spill Kit
Contingency Plan  Solution of alkaline Sodium Thiosulphate
Equipment4  Contamination Monitor
 Potassium Iodide tablets

In developing a contingency plan based on the above scenario you should consider consulting the
following manual sections:

IRPM-ICRP-005 (Restriction of Exposure)

IRPM-ICRP-023 (Isotope Data)
IRPM-ICRP-032 (Personal Protective Equipment)

In addition, due to the severity of the hazard, you would be expected to consult with the College
RPA/RPO during the work registration development phase. This is in order to develop specific
contingency plans for your work, which you may have insufficient knowledge or experience to
undertake on your own. For example, for a suspected I-125 intake, rapid deployment of
contingency arrangements – including the issue of Potassium Iodate tablets – may be required
which will involve the RPA and College Appointed Doctor.

2.4 Loss/Damage of HASS

Nature of the work Irradiation of biological samples.

Cs-137 high activity sealed sources, activity up to 60 GBq. Radiation
Nature of radiation hazard exposure to wholly exposed source not possible under normal
conditions.
Sources are built into irradiator units and are shielded so that user
Physical nature of exposure to an unshielded source is not possible. Background
hazards gamma dose rates are up to about 5Sv hr-1 in some areas around
irradiator units.
 Loss of theft of irradiator unit.
 Failure of mechanisms on irradiator unit.
Foreseeable incidents  Failure of room security measures.
 Room defects.
 Malicious damage to room/ irradiator unit.

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 Safety Department
Imperial College London
South Kensington Campus
London SW7 2AZ
Tel: +44 (0) 20 7594 9423
safetydept@imperial.ac.uk
www.imperial.ac.uk

 Fire/flood.
 Spillage of experimental samples.
 Loss or theft of the HASS source. Call the RPA/O if they are
not already present. The RPA/RPO can then ensure the
correct procedures are followed and the correct notifications
of the necessary agencies are made and necessary written
reporting carried out.
 Fault with locking mechanisms or keys to open rooms
containing HASS sources. Immediately contact the
Administrator, RPA/O if they are not already present.
 Flooding of the area containing the HASS source. Leave and
secure the room at once. Report to the RPA/O immediately.
 Defects in any part of the room. Report to the RPA/O and the
Administrator as soon as possible.
Contingency Plan
 Any signs of malicious damage to rooms and/or equipment
Content3
containing HASS sources. Report to the RPA/O at once.
 Loss of any keys to access irradiator rooms or other HASS
areas must be reported to the RPA/O and the Administrator
at once.
 In the event of the building fire alarm sounding evacuate
areas immediately. Ensure they are secure on exit.
 Experimental samples spilled or dropped in the vicinity of
HASS sources. These must be dealt with by the appropriate
procedures. Procedures should be detailed in the relevant
risk assessments, so ensure you are familiar with these
before working in the area.

Contingency Plan  Radiation Monitor

Equipment4

In all circumstances, do not attempt to continue to use the HASS source. The RPA / RPO will help
by giving advice on restriction of exposure or de-contamination using appropriate radiation
protection principles if necessary.

Of course, the onus is on developing procedures and methods that mitigate the foreseeable
incident, rather than simply provide contingency arrangements and hoping you never have to use
them.

Other scenarios that might be considered for typical work at the College could include:

 A lost radioactive source

 A damaged isotope package arriving at the College
 A fire in a laboratory
 A chemical reaction between a reagent and radioisotope.

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