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G.R. No. L-47745 April 15, 1988
JOSE S. AMADORA, LORETA A. AMADORA, JOSE A. AMADORA
JR., NORMA A. YLAYA PANTALEON A. AMADORA, JOSE A.
AMADORA III, LUCY A. AMADORA, ROSALINDA A. AMADORA,
PERFECTO A. AMADORA, SERREC A. AMADORA, VICENTE A.
AMADORA and MARIA TISCALINA A. AMADORA, petitioners
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, COLEGIO DE SAN JOSE-
RECOLETOS, VICTOR LLUCH SERGIO P. DLMASO JR., CE-
LESTINO DICON, ANIANO ABELLANA, PABLITO DAFFON thru his
parents and natural guardians, MR. and MRS. NICANOR GUMBAN,
and ROLANDO VALENCIA, thru his guardian, A. FRANCISCO
ALONSO, respondents.
FACTS:
On April 13, 1972, while they were in the auditorium of their school, the
Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos, a classmate, Pablito Damon, fired a gun
that mortally hit Alfredo, ending all his expectations and his life as well.
The victim was only seventeen years old.
Daffon was convicted of homicide thru reckless imprudence. Additionally,
the herein petitioners, as the victim's parents, filed a civil action for dam-
ages under Article 2180 of the Civil Code against the Colegio de San
Jose-Recoletos, its rector the high school principal, the dean of boys, and
the physics teacher, together with Daffon and two other students,
through their respective parents. The complaint against the students was
later dropped.
CFI: Held the remaining defendants liable to the plaintiffs.
CA: The decision of CFI was reversed and all the defendants were complete-
ly absolved. It found that Article 2180 was not applicable as the Colegio
de San Jose-Recoletos was not a school of arts and trades but an academ-
ic institution of learning. It also held that the students were not in the
custody of the school at the time of the incident as the semester had al-
ready ended, that there was no clear identification of the fatal gun and
that in any event the defendant, had exercised the necessary diligence in
preventing the injury.
PETITIONERS’ CONTENTION: That their son was in the school to show
his physics experiment as a prerequisite to his graduation; hence, he was then
under the custody of the private respondents.
RESPONDENTS: That Alfredo Amadora had gone to the school only for the
purpose of submitting his physics report and that he was no longer in their
custody because the semester had already ended.
RE: IDENTITY OF THE GUN USED (negligence on the part of private
respondents)
There is also the question of the identity of the gun used which the petition-
ers consider important because of an earlier incident which they claim un-
derscores the negligence of the school and at least one of the private re-
spondents. It is not denied by the respondents that on April 7, 1972, Sergio
Damaso, Jr., the dean of boys, confiscated from Jose Gumban an unlicensed
pistol but later returned it to him without making a report to the principal or
taking any further action. As Gumban was one of the companions of Daf-
fon when the latter fired the gun that killed Alfredo, the petitioners con-
tend that this was the same pistol that had been confiscated from Gum-
ban and that their son would not have been killed if it had not been re-
turned by Damaso. The respondents say, however, that there is no proof
that the gun was the same firearm that killed Alfredo.
ISSUE: WON respondent school is liable? NO.
HELD:
Resolution of all these disagreements will depend on the interpretation of
Article 2180 which, as it happens, is invoked by both parties in support of
their conflicting positions. The pertinent part of this article reads as follows:
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable
for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices so long as
they remain in their custody.
Three cases have so far been decided by the Court in connection with the
above-quoted provision, to with: Exconde vs. Capuno, Mercado vs. CA, and
Palisoc vs. Brillantes.
In the Exconde Case, the decision exculpated the school in an obiter dictum
(as it was not a party to the case) on the ground that it was not a school of
arts and trades.
Exconde was reiterated in the Mercado Case, the Court declared in another
obiter as the school itself had also not been sued that the school was not
liable because it was not an establishment of arts and trades. Moreover,
the custody requirement had not been proved as this "contemplates a
situation where the student lives and boards with the teacher, such that
the control, direction and influences on the pupil supersede those of the
parents."
In Palisoc vs. Brillantes, the Court declared that "so long as (the students)
remain in their custody" — means the protective and supervisory cus-
tody that the school and its heads and teachers exercise over the pupils
and students for as long as they are at attendance in the school, including
recess time. There is nothing in the law that requires that for such liabili-
ty to attach, the pupil or student who commits the tortious act must live
and board in the school, as erroneously held by the lower court, and the
dicta in Mercado (as well as in Exconde) on which it relied, must now be
deemed to have been set aside by the present decision.
MAIN RULING:
Unlike in Exconde and Mercado, the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos has been
directly impleaded and is sought to be held liable under Article 2180; and
unlike in Palisoc, it is not a school of arts and trades but an academic institu-
tion of learning. The parties herein have also directly raised the question of
whether or not Article 2180 covers even establishments which are techni-
cally not schools of arts and trades, and, if so, when the offending student
is supposed to be "in its custody."
The Court has come to the conclusion that the provision in question should
apply to all schools, academic as well as non-academic. Where the school
is academic rather than technical or vocational in nature, responsibility for
the tort committed by the student will attach to the teacher in charge of
such student, following the first part of the provision. This is the general
rule. In the case of establishments of arts and trades, it is the head thereof, and
only he, who shall be held liable as an exception to the general rule. In other
words, teachers in general shall be liable for the acts of their students
except where the school is technical in nature, in which case it is the head
thereof who shall be answerable. Following the canon of reddendo singula
singulis "teachers" should apply to the words "pupils and students" and
"heads of establishments of arts and trades" to the word "apprentices."
These questions, though, may be asked: If the teacher of the academic school
is to be held answerable for the torts committed by his students, why is it the
head of the school only who is held liable where the injury is caused in a
school of arts and trades? And in the case of the academic or non- technical
school, why not apply the rule also to the head thereof instead of imposing
the liability only on the teacher?
The reason for the disparity can be traced to the fact that historically the head
of the school of arts and trades exercised a closer tutelage over his pupils than
the head of the academic school. The old schools of arts and trades were
engaged in the training of artisans apprenticed to their master who personally
and directly instructed them on the technique and secrets of their craft. The
head of the school of arts and trades was such a master and so was personally
involved in the task of teaching his students, who usually even boarded with
him and so came under his constant control, supervision and influence. By
contrast, the head of the academic school was not as involved with his stu-
dents and exercised only administrative duties over the teachers who were the
persons directly dealing with the students. The head of the academic school
had then (as now) only a vicarious relationship with the students. Conse-
quently, while he could not be directly faulted for the acts of the students, the
head of the school of arts and trades, because of his closer ties with them,
could be so blamed.
The other matter to be resolved is the duration of the responsibility of the
teacher or the head of the school of arts and trades over the students. Is such
responsibility co-extensive with the period when the student is actually un-
dergoing studies during the school term, as contended by the respondents and
impliedly admitted by the petitioners themselves?
In the view of the Court, the student is in the custody of the school au-
thorities as long as he is under the control and influence of the school and
within its premises, whether the semester has not yet begun or has al-
ready ended.
It is too tenuous to argue that the student comes under the discipline of the
school only upon the start of classes notwithstanding that before that day he
has already registered and thus placed himself under its rules. Neither should
such discipline be deemed ended upon the last day of classes not-
withstanding that there may still be certain requisites to be satisfied for
completion of the course, such as submission of reports, term papers,
clearances and the like. During such periods, the student is still subject to
the disciplinary authority of the school and cannot consider himself re-
leased altogether from observance of its rules.
As long as it can be shown that the student is in the school premises in
pursuance of a legitimate student objective, in the exercise of a legitimate
student right, and even in the enjoyment of a legitimate student right,
and even in the enjoyment of a legitimate student privilege, the responsi-
bility of the school authorities over the student continues. Indeed, even if
the student should be doing nothing more than relaxing in the campus in
the company of his classmates and friends and enjoying the ambience
and atmosphere of the school, he is still within the custody and subject to
the discipline of the school authorities under the provisions of Article
2180.
During all these occasions, it is obviously the teacher-in-charge who must
answer for his students' torts, in practically the same way that the par-
ents are responsible for the child when he is in their custody. The teacher-
in-charge is the one designated by the dean, principal, or other administrative
superior to exercise supervision over the pupils in the specific classes or
sections to which they are assigned. It is not necessary that at the time of the
injury, the teacher be physically present and in a position to prevent it.
The school can show that it exercised proper measures in selecting the
head or its teachers and the appropriate supervision over them in the
custody and instruction of the pupils pursuant to its rules and regula-
tions for the maintenance of discipline among them. In almost all cases
now, in fact, these measures are effected through the assistance of an ade-
quate security force to help the teacher physically enforce those rules upon
the students. This should bolster the claim of the school that it has taken
adequate steps to prevent any injury that may be committed by its students.
A fortiori, the teacher himself may invoke this defense as it would otherwise
be unfair to hold him directly answerable for the damage caused by his stu-
dents as long as they are in the school premises and presumably under his
influence.

Applying the foregoing considerations, the Court has arrived at the following
conclusions:
1. At the time Alfredo Amadora was fatally shot, he was still in the custody of
the authorities of Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos notwithstanding that the
fourth year classes had formally ended. It was immaterial if he was in the
school auditorium to finish his physics experiment or merely to submit his
physics report for what is important is that he was there for a legitimate
purpose. As previously observed, even the mere savoring of the company
of his friends in the premises of the school is a legitimate purpose that
would have also brought him in the custody of the school authorities.
2. The rector, the high school principal and the dean of boys cannot be
held liable because none of them was the teacher-in-charge as previously
defined. Each of them was exercising only a general authority over the stu-
dent body and not the direct control and influence exerted by the teacher
placed in charge of particular classes or sections and thus immediately in-
volved in its discipline. The evidence of the parties does not disclose who the
teacher-in-charge of the offending student was. The mere fact that Alfredo
Amadora had gone to school that day in connection with his physics report
did not necessarily make the physics teacher, respondent Celestino Dicon, the
teacher-in-charge of Alfredo's killer.
3. At any rate, assuming that he was the teacher-in-charge, there is no
showing that Dicon was negligent in enforcing discipline upon Daffon or
that he had waived observance of the rules and regulations of the school
or condoned their non-observance. His absence when the tragedy happened
cannot be considered against him because he was not supposed or required to
report to school on that day. And while it is true that the offending student
was still in the custody of the teacher-in-charge even if the latter was physi-
cally absent when the tort was committed, it has not been established that it
was caused by his laxness in enforcing discipline upon the student. On the
contrary, the private respondents have proved that they had exercised due
diligence, through the enforcement of the school regulations, in maintaining
that discipline.
4. In the absence of a teacher-in-charge, it is probably the dean of boys who
should be held liable especially in view of the unrefuted evidence that he had
earlier confiscated an unlicensed gun from one of the students and returned
the same later to him without taking disciplinary action or reporting the mat-
ter to higher authorities. While this was clearly negligence on his part, for
which he deserves sanctions from the school, it does not necessarily link
him to the shooting of Amador as it has not been shown that he confiscat-
ed and returned pistol was the gun that killed the petitioners' son.
5. Finally, as previously observed, the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos
cannot be held directly liable under the article because only the teacher
or the head of the school of arts and trades is made responsible for the
damage caused by the student or apprentice. Neither can it be held to
answer for the tort committed by any of the other private respondents
for none of them has been found to have been charged with the custody
of the offending student or has been remiss in the discharge of his duties
in connection with such custody.
In sum, none of the respondents is liable for the injury inflicted by Pablito
Damon on Alfredo Amadora that resulted in the latter's death at the
auditorium of the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos on April 13, 1972.
DP: WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, without any pronouncement as
to costs. It is so ordered.
Separate Opinions
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring and dissenting:
I concur, except with respect to the restricted meaning given the term
"teacher" in Article 2180 of the Civil Code as "teacher-in-charge." This would
limit liability to occasions where there are classes under the immediate charge
of a teacher, which does not seem to be the intendment of the law.
As I understand it, the philosophy of the law is that whoever stands in loco
parentis will have the same duties and obligations as parents whenever in
such a standing. Those persons are mandatorily held liable for the tortious
acts of pupils and students so long as the latter remain in their custody, mean-
ing their protective and supervisory custody.
The protective custody of the school heads and teachers is mandatorily sub-
stituted for that of the parents, and hence, it becomes their obligation as well
as that of the school itself to provide proper supervision of the students' activ-
ities during the whole time that they are at attendance in the school, including
recess time, as well as to take the necessary precautions to protect the students
in their custody from dangers and hazards that would reasonably be anticipat-
ed, including injuries that some students themselves may inflict wilfully or
through negligence on their fellow students.
Of course, as provided for in the same Article 2180, the responsibility treated
of shall cease when the persons mentioned prove that they observed all the
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.
And while a school is, admittedly, not directly liable since Article 2180
speaks only of teachers and schools heads, yet, by virtue of the same provi-
sion, the school, as their employer, may be held liable for the failure of its
teachers or school heads to perform their mandatory legal duties as substitute
parents. Again, the school may exculpate itself from liability by proving that
it had exercised the diligence of a good father of the family.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring:
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I concur in the Court's opinion so carefully analyzed and crafted by Justice
Isagani A. Cruz. However, I would like to stress the need for a major amend-
ment to, if not a complete scrapping of, Article 2180 of the Civil Code insofar
as it refers to teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades in relation
to pupils and students or apprentices. The seventh paragraph of Art. 2180 is a
relic of the past and contemplates a situation long gone and out of date. In a
Palisoc v. Brillantes (41 SCRA 548) situation, it is bound to result in mischief
and injustice.
The ordinary rules on quasi-delict should apply to teachers and schools of
whatever nature insofar as grown up students are concerned. The provision of
Art. 2180 of the Civil Code involved in this case has outlived its purpose. The
Court cannot make law. It can only apply the law with its imperfections.
However, the Court can suggest that such a law should be amended or re-
pealed.
PHILIPPINE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION, JUAN D.
LIM, BENJAMIN P. PAULINO, ANTONIO M. MAGTALAS, COL.
PEDRO SACRO and LT. M. SORIANO, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. REGINA ORDOÑEZ-BENITEZ, in her
capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 47, Regional Trial Court, Manila,
SEGUNDA R. BAUTISTA and ARSENIA D. BAUTISTA, respondents.
FACTS: A stabbing incident on 30 August 1985 which caused the death of
Carlitos Bautista while on the second-floor premises of the Philippine
School of Business Administration (PSBA) prompted the parents of the
deceased to file suit in the Regional Trial Court of Manila (Branch 47)
presided over by Judge (now Court of Appeals justice) Regina Ordoñez-Ben-
itez, for damages against the said PSBA and its corporate officers.
At the time of his death, Carlitos was enrolled in the third year commerce
course at the PSBA. It was established that his assailants were not mem-
bers of the school's academic community but were elements from outside
the school.
Specifically, the suit impleaded the PSBA and the following school authori-
ties: Juan D. Lim (President), Benjamin P. Paulino (Vice-President), Antonio
M. Magtalas (Treasurer/Cashier), Col. Pedro Sacro (Chief of Security) and a
Lt. M. Soriano (Assistant Chief of Security). Substantially, the plaintiffs (now
private respondents) sought to adjudge them liable for the victim's untime-
ly demise due to their alleged negligence, recklessness and lack of securi-
ty precautions, means and methods before, during and after the attack
on the victim.
During the proceedings a quo, Lt. M. Soriano terminated his relationship with
the other petitioners by resigning from his position in the school.
PETITIONER ALLEGATIONS: since they are presumably sued under
Article 2180 of the Civil Code, the complaint states no cause of action against
them, as jurisprudence on the subject is to the effect that academic institu-
tions, such as the PSBA, are beyond the ambit of the rule in the afore-stated
article.
RTC: overruled petitioners' contention and thru an order dated 8 December
1987, denied their motion to dismiss
CA: deny the petitioners' motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE: WON PSBA is liable for the death of the student.
HELD: YES!
At the outset, it is to be observed that the respondent appellate court pri-
marily anchored its decision on the law of quasi-delicts, as enunciated in
Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code
At any rate, the law holds the teachers and heads of the
school staff liable unless they relieve themselves of
such liability pursuant to the last paragraph of Article
2180 by "proving that they observed all the diligence to
prevent damage." This can only be done at a trial on
the merits of the case. 5
While we agree with the respondent appellate court that the motion to dismiss
the complaint was correctly denied and the complaint should be tried on the
merits, we do not however agree with the premises of the appellate court's
ruling.
Article 2180, in conjunction with Article 2176 of the Civil Code, establishes
the rule of in loco parentis. This Court discussed this doctrine in the afore-
cited cases of Exconde, Mendoza, Palisoc and, more recently, in Amadora
vs.Court of Appeals. 6 In all such cases, it had been stressed that the law (Ar-
ticle 2180) plainly provides that the damage should have been caused or
inflicted by pupils or students of he educational institution sought to be
held liable for the acts of its pupils or students while in its custody. How-
ever, this material situation does not exist in the present case for, as earli-
er indicated, the assailants of Carlitos were not students of the PSBA, for
whose acts the school could be made liable.
However, does the appellate court's failure to consider such material
facts mean the exculpation of the petitioners from liability? It does not
necessarily follow.
When an academic institution accepts students for enrollment, there is estab-
lished a contract between them, resulting in bilateral obligations which both
parties are bound to comply with. 7 For its part, the school undertakes to
provide the student with an education that would presumably suffice to equip
him with the necessary tools and skills to pursue higher education or a profes-

sion. On the other hand, the student covenants to abide by the school's acad-
emic requirements and observe its rules and regulations.
Institutions of learning must also meet the implicit or "built-in" obligation of
providing their students with an atmosphere that promotes or assists in attain-
ing its primary undertaking of imparting knowledge. Certainly, no student can
absorb the intricacies of physics or higher mathematics or explore the realm
of the arts and other sciences when bullets are flying or grenades exploding in
the air or where there looms around the school premises a constant threat to
life and limb. Necessarily, the school must ensure that adequate steps are
taken to maintain peace and order within the campus premises and to prevent
the breakdown thereof.
Because the circumstances of the present case evince a contractual rela-
tion between the PSBA and Carlitos Bautista, the rules on quasi-delict do
not really govern. 8 A perusal of Article 2176 shows that obligations aris-
ing from quasi-delicts or tort, also known as extra-contractual obliga-
tions, arise only between parties not otherwise bound by contract,
whether express or implied. However, this impression has not prevented
this Court from determining the existence of a tort even when there ob-
tains a contract
Immediately what comes to mind is the chapter of the Civil Code on Human
Relations, particularly Article 21, which provides:
Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to anoth-
er in a manner that is contrary to morals, good custom
or public policy shall compensate the latter for the
damage. (emphasis supplied).
In the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, however, there is, as
yet, no finding that the contract between the school and Bautista had
been breached thru the former's negligence in providing proper security
measures. This would be for the trial court to determine. And, even if
there be a finding of negligence, the same could give rise generally to a
breach of contractual obligation only. Using the test of Cangco, supra, the
negligence of the school would not be relevant absent a contract. In fact, that
negligence becomes material only because of the contractual relation between
PSBA and Bautista. In other words, a contractual relation is a
condition sine qua non to the school's liability. The negligence of the
school cannot exist independently of the contract, unless the negligence
occurs under the circumstances set out in Article 21 of the Civil Code.
This Court is not unmindful of the attendant difficulties posed by the obliga-
tion of schools, above-mentioned, for conceptually a school, like a common
carrier, cannot be an insurer of its students against all risks. This is specially
true in the populous student communities of the so-called "university belt" in
Manila where there have been reported several incidents ranging from gang
wars to other forms of hooliganism. It would not be equitable to expect of
schools to anticipate all types of violent trespass upon their premises, for
notwithstanding the security measures installed, the same may still fail
against an individual or group determined to carry out a nefarious deed inside
school premises and environs. Should this be the case, the school may still
avoid liability by proving that the breach of its contractual obligation to
the students was not due to its negligence, here statutorily defined to be
the omission of that degree of diligence which is required by the nature of
the obligation and corresponding to the circumstances of persons, time
and place. 9
PETITION DENIED.
JOSEPH SALUDAGA, petitioner,
vs.
FAR EASTERN UNIVERSITY and EDILBERTO C. DE JESUS in his
capacity as President of FEU, respondents.
Facts:
Petitioner Joseph Saludaga was a sophomore law student of respondent Far
Eastern University (FEU) when he was shot by Alejandro Rosete (Rosete),
one of the security guards on duty at the school premises on August 18, 1996.
Petitioner was rushed to FEU-Dr. Nicanor Reyes Medical Foundation (FEU-
NRMF) due to the wound he sustained. Meanwhile, Rosete was brought to
the police station where he explained that the shooting was accidental. He
was eventually released considering that no formal complaint was filed
against him.
Petitioner thereafter filed a complaint for damages against respondents
on the ground that they breached their obligation to provide students
with a safe and secure environment and an atmosphere conducive to
learning.
Respondents, in turn, filed a Third-Party Complaint against Galaxy Develop-
ment and Management Corporation (Galaxy), the agency contracted by re-
spondent FEU to provide security services within its premises and Mariano
D. Imperial (Imperial), Galaxy's President, to indemnify them for whatever
would be adjudged in favor of petitioner, if any; and to pay attorney's fees and
cost of the suit. On the other hand, Galaxy and Imperial filed a Fourth-Party
Complaint against AFP General Insurance.
RTC- rendered a judgment in favor of Petitioner
CA- reversed RTC’s decision
CASE:
Petitioner is suing respondents for damages based on the alleged breach of
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student-school contract for a safe learning environment. The pertinent por-
tions of petitioner's Complaint read:
6.0. At the time of plaintiff's confinement, the defendants or any of their
representative did not bother to visit and inquire about his condition.
This abject indifference on the part of the defendants continued even
after plaintiff was discharged from the hospital when not even a
word of consolation was heard from them. Plaintiff waited for more
than one (1) year for the defendants to perform their moral obligation but
the wait was fruitless. This indifference and total lack of concern of de-
fendants served to exacerbate plaintiff's miserable condition.
11.0. Defendants are responsible for ensuring the safety of its students
while the latter are within the University premises. And that should any-
thing untoward happens to any of its students while they are within the
University's premises shall be the responsibility of the defendants. In this
case, defendants, despite being legally and morally bound, miserably
failed to protect plaintiff from injury and thereafter, to mitigate and com-
pensate plaintiff for said injury;
12.0. When plaintiff enrolled with defendant FEU, a contract was entered
into between them. Under this contract, defendants are supposed to
ensure that adequate steps are taken to provide an atmosphere con-
ducive to study and ensure the safety of the plaintiff while inside
defendant FEU's premises. In the instant case, the latter breached this
contract.
COURT: Respondents failed to discharge the burden of proving that they
exercised due diligence in providing a safe learning environment for their
students.
It is undisputed that petitioner was enrolled as a sophomore law student
in respondent FEU. As such, there was created a contractual obligation
between the two parties. On petitioner's part, he was obliged to comply
with the rules and regulations of the school. On the other hand, respondent
FEU, as a learning institution is mandated to impart knowledge and equip its
students with the necessary skills to pursue higher education or a profession.
At the same time, it is obliged to ensure and take adequate steps to maintain
peace and order within the campus.
It is settled that in culpa contractual, the mere proof of the existence of
the contract and the failure of its compliance justify, prima facie, a corre-
sponding right of relief. In the instant case, we find that, when petitioner
was shot inside the campus by no less the security guard who was hired to
maintain peace and secure the premises, there is a prima facie showing that
respondents failed to comply with its obligation to provide a safe and secure
environment to its students.
RESPONDENT’S DEFENSE: the shooting incident was a fortuitous event
because they could not have reasonably foreseen nor avoided the accident
caused by Rosete as he was not their employee;16and that they complied with
their obligation to ensure a safe learning environment for their students by
having exercised due diligence in selecting the security services of Galaxy.
After a thorough review of the records, we find that respondents failed to
discharge the burden of proving that they exercised due diligence in
providing a safe learning environment for their students. They failed to
prove that they ensured that the guards assigned in the campus met the re-
quirements stipulated in the Security Service Agreement. Indeed, certain
documents about Galaxy were presented during trial; however, no evidence
as to the qualifications of Rosete as a security guard for the university
was offered.
Respondents also failed to show that they undertook steps to ascertain and
confirm that the security guards assigned to them actually possess the qualifi-
cations required in the Security Service Agreement. It was not proven that
they examined the clearances, psychiatric test results, 201 files, and other
vital documents enumerated in its contract with Galaxy.
Total reliance on the security agency about these matters or failure to
check the papers stating the qualifications of the guards is negligence on
the part of respondents. A learning institution should not be allowed to
completely relinquish or abdicate security matters in its premises to the secu-
rity agency it hired. To do so would result to contracting away its inherent
obligation to ensure a safe learning environment for its students.
RE: Defense of force majeure
In order for force majeure to be considered, respondents must show that no
negligence or misconduct was committed that may have occasioned the loss.
The fact that the immediate or proximate cause of the damage or injury was a
fortuitous event would not exempt one from liability. When the effect is
found to be partly the result of a person's participation - whether by active
intervention, neglect or failure to act - the whole occurrence is humanized and
removed from the rules applicable to acts of God.
Article 1170 of the Civil Code provides that those who are negligent in the
performance of their obligations are liable for damages. Accordingly, for

breach of contract due to negligence in providing a safe learning environ-
ment, respondent FEU is liable to petitioner for damages.
DE JESUS IS NOT LIABLE
Personal liability of a corporate director, trustee or officer along (although not
necessarily) with the corporation may so validly attach, as a rule, only when -
(1) he assents to a patently unlawful act of the corporation, or when he is
guilty of bad faith or gross negligence in directing its affairs, or when there is
a conflict of interest resulting in damages to the corporation, its stockholders
or other persons; (2) he consents to the issuance of watered down stocks or
who, having knowledge thereof, does not forthwith file with the corporate
secretary his written objection thereto; (3) he agrees to hold himself personal-
ly and solidarily liable with the corporation; or (4) he is made by a specific
provision of law personally answerable for his corporate action.27
None of the foregoing exceptions was established in the instant case;
hence, respondent De Jesus should not be held solidarily liable with re-
spondent FEU.
De Jesus cannot also be held vicariously liable under Article 2180 of the Civil
Code, which provides:
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for
one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is
responsible.
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and
household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though
the former are not engaged in any business or industry.
He cannot be held because respondents are not the employers of Rosete. The
latter was employed by Galaxy. The instructions issued by respondents' Secu-
rity Consultant to Galaxy and its security guards are ordinarily no more than
requests commonly envisaged in the contract for services entered into by a
principal and a security agency. They cannot be construed as the element of
control as to treat respondents as the employers of Rosete.28
GALAXY’S LIABILITY
Respondents and Galaxy were able to litigate their respective claims and
defenses in the course of the trial of petitioner's complaint. Evidence duly
supports the findings of the trial court that Galaxy is negligent not only in the
selection of its employees but also in their supervision. Indeed, no administra-
tive sanction was imposed against Rosete despite the shooting incident;
moreover, he was even allowed to go on leave of absence which led eventual-
ly to his disappearance.34 Galaxy also failed to monitor petitioner's condition
or extend the necessary assistance, other than the P5,000.00 initially given to
petitioner. Galaxy and Imperial failed to make good their pledge to reimburse
petitioner's medical expenses.
For these acts of negligence and for having supplied respondent FEU with an
unqualified security guard, which resulted to the latter's breach of obligation
to petitioner, it is proper to hold Galaxy liable to respondent FEU for such
damages equivalent to the above-mentioned amounts awarded to peti-
tioner.
Unlike respondent De Jesus, we deem Imperial to be solidarily liable with
Galaxy for being grossly negligent in directing the affairs of the security
agency. It was Imperial who assured petitioner that his medical expenses will
be shouldered by Galaxy but said representations were not fulfilled because
they presumed that petitioner and his family were no longer interested in
filing a formal complaint against them.35G.R. No. 182353 June 29,
2010
ST. JOSEPH'S COLLEGE, SR. JOSEPHINI AMBATALI, SFIC, and
ROSALINDA TABUGO, Petitioners,
vs.
JAYSON MIRANDA, represented by his father, RODOLFO S. MIRAN-
DA, Respondent.
FACTS:
On November 17, 1994, at around 1:30 in the afternoon inside St. Joseph
College’s [SJC’s] premises, the class to which [respondent Jayson Val Miran-
da] belonged was conducting a science experiment about fusion of sulphur
powder and iron fillings under the tutelage of [petitioner] Rosalinda Tabugo,
she being the subject teacher and employee of [petitioner] SJC. The adviser of
[Jayson’s] class is x x x Estefania Abdan.
Tabugo left her class while it was doing the experiment without having
adequately secured it from any untoward incident or occurrence. In the
middle of the experiment, [Jayson], who was the assistant leader of one of the
class groups, checked the result of the experiment by looking into the test
tube with magnifying glass. The test tube was being held by one of his
group mates who moved it close and towards the eye of [Jayson]. At that
instance, the compound in the test tube spurted out and several particles
of which hit [Jayson’s] eye and the different parts of the bodies of some
4 of 12
of his group mates. As a result thereof, [Jayson’s] eyes were chemically
burned, particularly his left eye, for which he had to undergo surgery
and had to spend for his medication. Upon filing of this case [in] the lower
court, [Jayson’s] wound had not completely healed and still had to undergo
another surgery.
PETITIONERS’ ALLEGATION: Before the science experiment was con-
ducted, [Jayson] and his classmates were given strict instructions to fol-
low the written procedure for the experiment and not to look into the test
tube until the heated compound had cooled off. [Jayson], however, a per-
son of sufficient age and discretion and completely capable of understanding
the English language and the instructions of his teacher, without waiting for
the heated compound to cool off, as required in the written procedure for the
experiment and as repeatedly explained by the teacher, violated such in-
structions and took a magnifying glass and looked at the compound, which at
that moment spurted out of the test tube, a small particle hitting one of
[Jayson’s] eyes.
On December 6, 1994, however, the parents of [Jayson], through counsel,
wrote SJC a letter demanding that it should shoulder all the medical ex-
penses of [Jayson] that had been incurred and will be incurred further
arising from the accident caused by the science experiment. In a letter
dated December 14, 1994, the counsel for SJC, represented by Sr. Josephini
Ambatali, SFIC, explained that the school cannot accede to the demand
because "the accident occurred by reason of [Jayson’s] failure to comply
with the written procedure for the experiment and his teacher’s repeated
warnings and instruction that no student must face, much less look into,
the opening of the test tube until the heated compound has cooled.”
Since SJC did not accede to the demand, Rodolfo, Jayson’s father, on
Jayson’s behalf, sued petitioners for damages.
RTC: Judgment was rendered in favor of [Jayson] and against [petitioners].
CA: Affirmed in toto the ruling of the RTC.
ISSUE: WON petitioner school is liable? YES. THE SCHOOL LIABLE
FOR IT IS GUILTY OF INEXCUSABLE LAXITY IN THE SUPERVI-
SION OF ITS TEACHERS AND IN THE MAINTENANCE OF WHAT
SHOULD HAVE BEEN A SAFE AND SECURED ENVIRONMENT
FOR CONDUCTING DANGEROUS EXPERIMENTS.
HELD:
We find no reason to depart from the uniform rulings of the lower courts
that petitioners were "negligent since they all failed to exercise the re-
quired reasonable care, prudence, caution and foresight to prevent or
avoid injuries to the students."
PETITIONERS’ CONTENTION: Yet, petitioners maintain that the proxi-
mate cause of Jayson’s injury was his own negligence in disregarding the
instructions given by Tabugo prior to the experiment and peeking into
the test tube.
Contrary to petitioners’ assertions, the lower courts’ conclusions are borne out
by the records of this case. Both courts correctly concluded that the imme-
diate and proximate cause of the accident which caused injury to Jayson
was the sudden and unexpected explosion of the chemicals, independent
of any intervening cause. The assailed Decision of the CA quotes with favor
the RTC decision, thus:
In this case, [petitioners] failed to show that the negligence of [Jayson] was
the proximate cause of the latter’s injury. We find that the immediate cause of
the accident was not the negligence of [Jayson] when he curiously looked into
the test tube when the chemicals suddenly exploded which caused his injury,
but the sudden and unexpected explosion of the chemicals independent of any
intervening cause. [Petitioners] could have prevented the mishap if they
exercised a higher degree of care, caution and foresight. The court a quo
correctly ruled that:
"All of the [petitioners] are equally at fault and are liable for negligence
because all of them are responsible for exercising the required reasonable
care, prudence, caution and foresight to prevent or avoid injuries to the
students. The individual [petitioners] are persons charged with the teaching
and vigilance over their students as well as the supervision and ensuring of
their well-being. Based on the facts presented before this Court, these
[petitioners] were remiss in their responsibilities and lacking in the de-
gree of vigilance expected of them. [Petitioner] subject teacher Rosalinda
Tabugo was inside the classroom when the class undertook the science exper-
iment although [Jayson] insisted that said [petitioner] left the classroom. No
evidence, however, was presented to establish that [petitioner] Tabugo was
inside the classroom for the whole duration of the experiment. It was unnat-
ural in the ordinary course of events that [Jayson] was brought to the
school clinic for immediate treatment not by [petitioner] subject teacher
Rosalinda Tabugo but by somebody else. The Court is inclined to believe
that [petitioner] subject teacher Tabugo was not inside the classroom at
the time the accident happened. The Court is also perplexed why none of
the other students (who were eyewitnesses to the incident) testified in Court
to corroborate the story of the [petitioners]. The Court, however, understands
that these other students cannot testify for [Jayson] because [Jayson] is no
longer enrolled in said school and testifying for [Jayson] would incur the ire
of school authorities. Estefania Abdan is equally at fault as the subject
adviser or teacher in charge because she exercised control and supervi-
sion over [petitioner] Tabugo and the students themselves. It was her
obligation to insure that nothing would go wrong and that the science experi-
ment would be conducted safely and without any harm or injury to the stu-
dents. [Petitioner] Sr. Josephini Ambatali is likewise culpable under the
doctrine of command responsibility because the other individual [peti-
tioners] were under her direct control and supervision. The negligent acts

of the other individual [petitioners] were done within the scope of their as-
signed tasks.
xxxx
"The defense of due diligence of a good father of a family raised by [peti-
tioner] St. Joseph College will not exculpate it from liability because it
has been shown that it was guilty of inexcusable laxity in the supervision
of its teachers (despite an apparent rigid screening process for hiring)
and in the maintenance of what should have been a safe and secured
environment for conducting dangerous experiments. [Petitioner] school is
still liable for the wrongful acts of the teachers and employees because it
had full information on the nature of dangerous science experiments but
did not take affirmative steps to avert damage and injury to students.
The fact that there has never been any accident in the past during the
conduct of science experiments is not a justification to be complacent in
just preserving the status quo and do away with creative foresight to
install safety measures to protect the students. Schools should not simply
install safety reminders and distribute safety instructional manuals.
More importantly, schools should provide protective gears and devices to
shield students from expected risks and anticipated dangers.
"Ordinarily, the liability of teachers does not extend to the school or universi-
ty itself, although an educational institution may be held liable under the
principle of RESPONDENT SUPERIOR. It has also been held that the
liability of the employer for the [tortuous] acts or negligence of its employees
is primary and solidary, direct and immediate and not conditioned upon the
insolvency of or prior recourse against the negligent employee.”
Under the foregoing circumstances, we are hard pressed to disturb the find-
ings of the RTC, which the CA affirmed.
Nonetheless, petitioners make much of the fact that Tabugo specifically in-
structed her students, including Jayson, at the start of the experiment, not to
look into the heated test tube before the compound had cooled off. Petitioners
would allocate all liability and place all blame for the accident on a twelve
(12)-year-old student, herein respondent Jayson.
We disagree.
As found by both lower courts, the proximate cause of Jayson’s injury
was the concurrent failure of petitioners to prevent the foreseeable
mishap that occurred during the conduct of the science experiment. Peti-
tioners were negligent by failing to exercise the higher degree of care,
caution and foresight incumbent upon the school, its administrators and
teachers.
Article 218 of the Family Code, in relation to Article 2180 of the Civil
Code, bestows special parental authority on the following persons with the
corresponding obligation, thus:
Art. 218. The school, its administrators and teachers, or the individual, entity
or institution engaged in child care shall have special parental authority and
responsibility over the minor child while under their supervision, instruction
or custody.
Authority and responsibility shall apply to all authorized activities whether
inside or outside the premises of the school, entity or institution.
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only
for one’s own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is
responsible.
xxxx
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable
for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as
they remain in their custody.
Petitioners’ negligence and failure to exercise the requisite degree of care
and caution is demonstrated by the following:
1. Petitioner school did not take affirmative steps to avert damage and injury
to its students although it had full information on the nature of dangerous
science experiments conducted by the students during class;
2. Petitioner school did not install safety measures to protect the students who
conduct experiments in class;
3. Petitioner school did not provide protective gears and devices, specifically
goggles, to shield students from expected risks and dangers; and
4. Petitioner Tabugo was not inside the classroom the whole time her class
conducted the experiment, specifically, when the accident involving Jayson
occurred. In any event, the size of the class—fifty (50) students— conducting
the experiment is difficult to monitor.
Moreover, petitioners cannot simply deflect their negligence and liability by
insisting that petitioner Tabugo gave specific instructions to her science class
not to look directly into the heated compound. Neither does our ruling in St.
Mary’s preclude their liability in this case. The accident was caused by a
mechanical defect and there was no evidence that the school allowed the
minor to drive.
In marked contrast, both the lower courts similarly concluded that the
mishap which happened during the science experiment was foreseeable
by the school, its officials and teachers. This neglect in preventing a fore-
seeable injury and damage equates to neglect in exercising the utmost
degree of diligence required of schools, its administrators and teachers,
and, ultimately, was the proximate cause of the damage and injury to
Jayson. As we have held in St. Mary’s, "for petitioner [St. Mary’s Academy]
to be liable, there must be a finding that the act or omission considered as
5 of 12
negligent was the proximate cause of the injury caused because the negli-
gence must have a causal connection to the accident."
RE: CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE OF JAYSON
[Jayson] is partly responsible for his own injury, hence, he should not be
entitled to recover damages in full but must likewise bear the conse-
quences of his own negligence. [Petitioners], therefore, should be held liable
only for the damages actually caused by their negligence.
DP: WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 68367 is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
FILAMER CHRISTIAN INSTITUTE, Petitioner, v. HON. INTERME-
DIATE APPELLATE COURT, HON. ENRIQUE P. SUPLICO, in his
capacity as Judge of the Court of Appeals, Branch XIV, Roxas City and
POTENCIANO KAPUNAN SR., Respondents.
Mini facts:
Funtecha was a working student, being a part-time Janitor and a scholar
of petitioner Filamer. He was, in relation to the school, an employee
even if he was assigned to clean the school premises for only two (2)
hours in the morning of each school day.

Allan Masa, the son of Filamer’s President Mr. Agustin Masa, was the
official driver of the school vehicle. Since Funtecha and Allan lived in
the same house, Funtechs (holder of driver license), requested Allan to
take over the vehicle only after driving down a road, negotiating a sharp
dangerous curb, and viewing that the road was clear. According to Al-
lan’s testimony, a fast moving truck with glaring lights nearly hit them so
that they had to swerve to the right to avoid a collision. Upon swerving,
they heard a sound as if something has bumped against the vehicle, but
they did not stop to check. Unfortunately, their jeep swerved towards
the pedestrian, Potenciano Kapunan who was walking in his lane in
the direction against vehicular traffic, and hit him.
The heirs of Kapunan filed an action against Filamer for damages. In
its defense FIlamer alleged that Funtecha acted outside the scope of his
authority. Therefore, it was only Funtecha who was liable and not Fil-
ame.
FACTS: The private respondents, heirs of the late Potenciano Kapunan, seek
reconsideration of the decision rendered by this Court on October 16, 1990
(Filamer Christian Institute v. Court Appeals, 190 SCRA 477) reviewing the
appellate court’s conclusion that there exists an employer-employee relation-
ship between the petitioner and its co-defendant Funtecha. The Court ruled
that the petitioner is not liable for the injuries caused by Funtecha on the
grounds that the latter was not an authorized driver for whose acts the peti-
tioner shall be directly and primarily answerable, and that Funtecha was
merely a working scholar who, under Section 14, Rule X, Book III of the
Rules and Regulations Implementing the Labor Code is not considered an
employee of the petitioner.
The private respondents assert that the circumstances obtaining in the
present case call for the application of Article 2180 of the Civil Code
since Funtecha is no doubt an employee of the petitioner. The private
respondents maintain that under Article 2180 an injured party shall have
recourse against the servant as well as the petitioner for whom, at the time of
the incident, the servant was performing an act in furtherance of the interest
and for the benefit of the petitioner. Funtecha allegedly did not steal the
school jeep nor use it for a joy ride without the knowledge of the school au-
thorities.
After a re-examination of the laws relevant to the facts found by the trial
court and the appellate court, the Court reconsiders its decision. We reinstate
the Court of Appeals’ decision penned by the late Justice Desiderio Jurado
and concurred in by Justices Jose G. Campos, Jr. and Serafin E. Camilon
Applying Civil Code provisions, the appellate court affirmed the trial court
decision which ordered the payment of the P20,000.00 liability in the Zenith
Insurance Corporation policy, P10,000.00 moral damages, P4,000.00 litiga-
tion and actual expenses, and P3,000.00 attorney’s fees.
It is undisputed that Funtecha was a working student, being a part-time Jani-
tor and a scholar of petitioner Filamer. He was, in relation to the school, an
employee even if he was assigned to clean the school premises for only
two (2) hours in the morning of each school day.
Having a student driver’s license, Funtecha requested the driver, Allan Masa,
and was allowed, to take over the vehicle while the latter was on his way
home one late afternoon. It is significant to note that the place where Allan
lives is also the house of his father, the school president, Agustin Masa.
Moreover, it is also the house where Funtecha was allowed free board while
he was a student of Filamer Christian Institute.
Allan Masa turned over the vehicle to Funtecha only after driving down a
road, negotiating a sharp dangerous curb, and viewing that the road was clear.

(TSN, April 4, 1983, pp. 78-79) According to Allan’s testimony, a fast mov-
ing truck with glaring lights nearly hit them so that they had to swerve to the
right to avoid a collision. Upon swerving, they heard a sound as if something
had bumped against the vehicle, but they did not stop to check. Actually, the
Pinoy jeep swerved towards the pedestrian, Potenciano Kapunan who was
walking in his lane in the direction against vehicular traffic, and hit him.
Allan affirmed that Funtecha followed his advise to swerve to the right. (Ibid.,
p. 79) At the time of the incident (6:30 P.M.) in Roxas City, the jeep had only
one functioning headlight.
Allan testified that he was the driver and at the same time a security guard of
the petitioner-school. He further said that there was no specific time for him
to be off-duty and that after driving the students home at 5:00 in the after-
noon, he still had to go back to school and then drive home using the same
vehicle.
ISSUE: WON Filamer is liable for the acts of Funtecha.
HELD: YES! Driving the vehicle to and from the house of the school presi-
dent where both Allan and Funtecha reside is an act in furtherance of the
interest of the petitioner-school. Allan’s job demands that he drive home the
school jeep so he can use it to fetch students in the morning of the next school
day.
It is indubitable under the circumstances that the school president had knowl-
edge that the jeep was routinely driven home for the said purpose. Moreover,
it is not improbable that the school president also had knowledge of Fun-
techa’s possession of a student driver’s license and his desire to undergo
driving lessons during the time that he was not in his classrooms.
In learning how to drive while taking the vehicle home in the direction of
Allan’s house, Funtecha definitely was not, having a joy ride Funtecha was
not driving for the purpose of his enjoyment or for a "frolic of his own" but
ultimately, for the service for which the jeep was intended by the petitioner
school. Therefore, the Court is constrained to conclude that the act of
Funtecha in taking over the steering wheel was one done for and in be-
half of his employer for which act the petitioner-school cannot deny any
responsibility by arguing that it was done beyond the scope of his janitor-
ial duties. The clause "within the scope of their assigned tasks" for pur-
poses of raising the presumption of liability of an employer, includes any
act done by an employee, in furtherance of the interests of the employer
or for the account of the employer at the time of the infliction of the in-
jury or damage. Even if somehow, the employee driving the vehicle derived
some benefit from the act, the existence of a presumptive liability of the
employer is determined by answering the question of whether or not the
servant was at the time of the accident performing any act in furtherance of
his master’s business.
The present case does not deal with a labor dispute on conditions of em-
ployment between an alleged employee and an alleged employer. It in-
vokes a claim brought by one for damages for injury caused by the
patently negligent acts of a person, against both doer-employee and his
employer. Hence, the reliance on the implementing rule on labor to disre-
gard the primary liability of an employer under Article 2180 of the Civil
Code is misplaced. An implementing rule on labor cannot be used by an
employer as a shield to void liability under the substantive provisions of
the Civil Code.
There is evidence to show that there exists in the present case an extra-
contractual obligation arising from the negligence or reckless impru-
dence of a person "whose acts or omissions are imputable, by a legal
fiction, to other(s) who are in a position to exercise an absolute or limited
control over (him)."
Funtecha is an employee of petitioner Filamer. He need not have an offi-
cial appointment for a driver’s position in order that the petitioner may
be held responsible for his grossly negligent act, it being sufficient that
the act of driving at the time of the incident was for the benefit of the
petitioner. Hence, the fact that Funtecha was not the school driver or was
not acting with the scope of his janitorial duties does not relieve the peti-
tioner of the burden of rebutting the presumption juris tantum that there
was negligence on its part either in the selection of a servant or employee,
or in the supervision over him. The petitioner has failed to show proof of
its having exercised the required diligence of a good father of a family
over its employees Funtecha and Allan.
In the present case, the petitioner has not shown that it has set forth such
rules and guidelines as would prohibit any one of its employees from
taking control over its vehicles if one is not the official driver or prohibit-
ing the driver and son of the Filamer president from authorizing another
employee to drive the school vehicle. Furthermore, the petitioner has
failed to prove that it had imposed sanctions or warned its employees
against the use of its vehicles by persons other than the driver.
The petitioner, thus, has an obligation to pay damages for injury arising
from the unskilled manner by which Funtecha drove the vehicle. (Cangco
v. Manila Railroad Co. 38 Phil. 760, 772 [1918]) In the absence of evidence
that the petitioner had exercised the diligence of a good father of a family
6 of 12
in the supervision of its employees, the law imposes upon it the vicarious
liability for acts or omissions of its employees.
RE: LIABILITY
COURT: The liability of the employer is, under Article 2180, primary and
solidary. However, the employer shall have recourse against the negligent
employee for whatever damages are paid to the heirs of the plaintiff.
RE: ALLAN MASA was not made party to the case
COURT: This is quite understandable considering that as far as the injured
pedestrian, plaintiff Potenciano Kapunan, was concerned, it was Funtecha
who was the one driving the vehicle and presumably was one authorized by
the school to drive. The plaintiff and his heirs should not now be left to suffer
without simultaneous recourse against the petitioner for the consequent injury
caused by a janitor doing a driving chore for the petitioner even for a short
while. For the purpose of recovering damages under the prevailing circum-
stances, it is enough that the plaintiff and the private respondent heirs were
able to establish the existence of employer-employee relationship between
Funtecha and petitioner Filamer and the fact that Funtecha was engaged in an
act not for an independent purpose of his own but in furtherance of the busi-
ness of his employer. A position of responsibility on the part of the petitioner
has thus been satisfactorily demonstrated.
MA. LOURDES VALENZUELA, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, RICHARD LI and ALEXANDER COMMER-
CIAL, INC., respondents.
Facts:
Plaintiff's version of the accident is as follows: At around 2:00 in the morn-
ing, plaintiff Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela was driving a blue Mitsubishi lancer
from her restaurant at Marcos highway to her home at Palanza Street, Araneta
Avenue.
She was travelling along Aurora Blvd. with a companion, Cecilia Ramon,
heading towards the direction of Manila. Before reaching A. Lake Street,
she noticed something wrong with her tires; she stopped at a lighted
place where there were people, to verify whether she had a flat tire and to
solicit help if needed. Having been told by the people present that her
rear right tire was flat and that she cannot reach her home in that car's
condition, she parked along the sidewalk, about 1-1/2 feet away, put on
her emergency lights, alighted from the car, and went to the rear to open
the trunk.
She was standing at the left side of the rear of her car pointing to the
tools to a man who will help her fix the tire when she was suddenly
bumped by a 1987 Mitsubishi Lancer driven by defendant Richard Li
and registered in the name of defendant Alexander Commercial, Inc.
Because of the impact plaintiff was thrown against the windshield of the car
of the defendant, which was destroyed, and then fell to the ground. She was
pulled out from under defendant's car. Plaintiff's left leg was severed up to the
middle of her thigh, with only some skin and sucle connected to the rest of
the body. She was brought to the UERM Medical Memorial Center where she
was found to have a "traumatic amputation, leg, left up to distal thigh (above
knee)". She was confined in the hospital for twenty (20) days and was even-
tually fitted with an artificial leg.
RTC- found Richard Li negligent
CA- affirmed. It however absolved Li's employer, Alexander Commercial,
Inc. from any liability towards petitioner Lourdes Valenzuela.
COURT:
Re: liability of Alexander Commercial, Inc. Li's employer.
In denying liability on the part of Alexander Commercial, the respondent
court held that:
There is no evidence, not even defendant Li's testimony, that the visit was
in connection with official matters. His functions as assistant manager
sometimes required him to perform work outside the office as he has to
visit buyers and company clients, but he admitted that on the night of the
accident he came from BF Homes Paranaque he did not have "business
from the company". The use of the company car was partly required
by the nature of his work, but the privilege of using it for non-official
business is a "benefit", apparently referring to the fringe benefits
attaching to his position.
Under the civil law, an employer is liable for the negligence of his em-
ployees in the discharge of their respective duties, the basis of which
liability is not respondeat superior, but the relationship of pater famil-
ias, which theory bases the liability of the master ultimately on his
own negligence and not on that of his servant. Before an employer

may be held liable for the negligence of his employee, the act or omis-
sion which caused damage must have occurred while an employee
was in the actual performance of his assigned tasks or duties.
In defining an employer's liability for the acts done within the scope of
the employee's assigned tasks, the Supreme Court has held that this in-
cludes any act done by an employee, in furtherance of the interests of
the employer or for the account of the employer at the time of the
infliction of the injury or damage. An employer is expected to impose
upon its employees the necessary discipline called for in the performance
of any act "indispensable to the business and beneficial to their employ-
er”.
In light of the foregoing, We are unable to sustain the trial court's
finding that since defendant Li was authorized by the company to use the
company car "either officially or socially or even bring it home", he can
be considered as using the company car in the service of his employer or
on the occasion of his functions. Driving the company car was not among
his functions as assistant manager; using it for non-official purposes
would appear to be a fringe benefit, one of the perks attached to his posi-
tion. But to impose liability upon the employer under Article 2180 of
the Civil Code, earlier quoted, there must be a showing that the
damage was caused by their employees in the service of the employer
or on the occasion of their functions. There is no evidence that
Richard Li was at the time of the accident performing any act in
furtherance of the company's business or its interests, or at least for
its benefit. The imposition of solidary liability against defendant
Alexander Commercial Corporation must therefore fail.
We agree with the respondent court that the relationship in question is
not based on the principle of respondeat superior, which holds the master
liable for acts of the servant, but that of pater familias, in which the liabil-
ity ultimately falls upon the employer, for his failure to exercise the dili-
gence of a good father of the family in the selection and supervision of his
employees. It is up to this point, however, that our agreement with the re-
spondent court ends.
Utilizing the bonus pater familias standard expressed in Article 2180 of
the Civil Code, we are of the opinion that Li's employer, Alexander
Commercial, Inc. is jointly and solidarily liable for the damage caused by
the accident of June 24, 1990.
The employer's primary liability under the concept of pater familias embod-
ied by Art 2180 (in relation to Art. 2176) of the Civil Code is quasi-delictual
or tortious in character. His liability is relieved on a showing that he exercised
the diligence of a good father of the family in the selection and supervision of
its employees. Once evidence is introduced showing that the employer exer-
cised the required amount of care in selecting its employees, half of the em-
ployer's burden is overcome. The question of diligent supervision, however,
depends on the circumstances of employment.
Ordinarily, evidence demonstrating that the employer has exercised diligent
supervision of its employee during the performance of the latter's assigned
tasks would be enough to relieve him of the liability imposed by Article 2180
in relation to Article 2176 of the Civil Code. The employer is not expected to
exercise supervision over either the employee's private activities or during the
performance of tasks either unsanctioned by the former or unrelated to the
employee's tasks. The case at bench presents a situation of a different
character, involving a practice utilized by large companies with either
their employees of managerial rank or their representatives.
It is customary for large companies to provide certain classes of their em-
ployees with courtesy vehicles. These company cars are either wholly owned
and maintained by the company itself or are subject to various plans through
which employees eventually acquire their vehicles after a given period of
service, or after paying a token amount. Many companies provide liberal "car
plans" to enable their managerial or other employees of rank to purchase cars,
which, given the cost of vehicles these days, they would not otherwise be able
to purchase on their own.
Under the first example, the company actually owns and maintains the car up
to the point of turnover of ownership to the employee; in the second example,
the car is really owned and maintained by the employee himself.
ISSUE: In furnishing vehicles to such employees, are companies totally
absolved of responsibility when an accident involving a company-issued
car occurs during private use after normal office hours?
Most pharmaceutical companies, for instance, which provide cars under the
first plan, require rigorous tests of road worthiness from their agents prior to
turning over the car (subject of company maintenance) to their representa-
tives. In other words, like a good father of a family, they entrust the com-
pany vehicle only after they are satisfied that the employee to whom the
car has been given full use of the said company car for company or pri-
vate purposes will not be a threat or menace to himself, the company or
to others. When a company gives full use and enjoyment of a company
car to its employee, it in effect guarantees that it is, like every good fa-
7 of 12
ther, satisfied that its employee will use the privilege reasonably and
responsively.
In the ordinary course of business, not all company employees are given the
privilege of using a company-issued car. For large companies other than those
cited in the example of the preceding paragraph, the privilege serves impor-
tant business purposes either related to the image of success an entity intends
to present to its clients and to the public in general, or - for practical and
utilitarian reasons - to enable its managerial and other employees of rank or
its sales agents to reach clients conveniently. In most cases, providing a com-
pany car serves both purposes. Since important business transactions and
decisions may occur at all hours in all sorts of situations and under all
kinds of guises, the provision for the unlimited use of a company car
therefore principally serves the business and goodwill of a company
and only incidentally the private purposes of the individual who actually
uses the car, the managerial employee or company sales agent. As such, in
providing for a company car for business use and/or for the purpose of fur-
thering the company's image, a company owes a responsibility to the public
to see to it that the managerial or other employees to whom it entrusts
virtually unlimited use of a company issued car are able to use the com-
pany issue capably and responsibly.
As applied:
In the instant case, Li was an Assistant Manager of Alexander Commercial,
Inc. In his testimony before the trial court, he admitted that his functions as
Assistant Manager did not require him to scrupulously keep normal
office hours as he was required quite often to perform work outside the
office, visiting prospective buyers and contacting and meeting with com-
pany clients. 30 These meetings, clearly, were not strictly confined to routine
hours because, as a managerial employee tasked with the job of representing
his company with its clients, meetings with clients were both social as well as
work-related functions. The service car assigned to Li by Alexander Com-
mercial, Inc. therefore enabled both Li - as well as the corporation - to
put up the front of a highly successful entity, increasing the latter's
goodwill before its clientele. It also facilitated meeting between Li and its
clients by providing the former with a convenient mode of travel.
Moreover, Li's claim that he happened to be on the road on the night of the
accident because he was coming from a social visit with an officemate in
Paranaque was a bare allegation which was never corroborated in the court
below. It was obviously self-serving. Assuming he really came from his of-
ficemate's place, the same could give rise to speculation that he and his of-
ficemate had just been from a work-related function, or they were together to
discuss sales and other work related strategies.
In fine, Alexander Commercial, inc. has not demonstrated, to our satis-
faction, that it exercised the care and diligence of a good father of the
family in entrusting its company car to Li. No allegations were made as
to whether or not the company took the steps necessary to determine or
ascertain the driving proficiency and history of Li, to whom it gave full
and unlimited use of a company car. Not having been able to overcome the
burden of demonstrating that it should be absolved of liability for entrusting
its company car to Li, said company, based on the principle of bonus pater
familias, ought to be jointly and severally liable with the former for the in-
juries sustained by Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela during the accident.
G.R. No. 132266 December 21, 1999
CASTILEX INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
VICENTE VASQUEZ, JR. and LUISA SO VASQUEZ, and CEBU
DOCTORS' HOSPITAL, INC., respondents.
FACTS:
On 28 August 1988, at around 1:30 to 2:00 in the morning, Romeo So
Vasquez, was driving a Honda motorcycle around Fuente Osmeña Rotunda.
He was traveling counter-clockwise, (the normal flow of traffic in a rotunda)
but without any protective helmet or goggles. He was also only carrying a
Student's Permit to Drive at the time. Upon the other hand, Benjamin Abad
[was a] manager of Appellant Castilex Industrial Corporation, registered
owner [of] a Toyota Hi-Lux Pick-up with plate no. GBW-794. On the same
date and time, Abad drove the said company car out of a parking lot but in-
stead of going around the Osmeña rotunda he made a short cut against [the]
flow of the traffic in proceeding to his route to General Maxilom St. or to
Belvic St.
In the process, the motorcycle of Vasquez and the pick-up of Abad collid-
ed with each other causing severe injuries to the former. Abad stopped his
vehicle and brought Vasquez to the Southern Islands Hospital and later to the
Cebu Doctor's Hospital.
On September 5, 1988, Vasquez died at the Cebu Doctor's Hospital. It was
there that Abad signed an acknowledgment of Responsible Party wherein
he agreed to pay whatever hospital bills, professional fees and other inciden-
tal charges Vasquez may incur.
After the police authorities had conducted the investigation of the accident, a
Criminal Case was filed against Abad but which was subsequently dis-
missed for failure to prosecute. So, the present action for damages was
commenced by Vicente Vasquez, Jr. and Luisa So Vasquez, parents of the

deceased Romeo So Vasquez, against Jose Benjamin Abad and Castilex
Industrial Corporation.
RTC: Ruled in favor of private respondents.
CASTILEX and ABAD separately appealed the decision.
CA: Affirmed the ruling of the trial court holding ABAD and CASTILEX
liable but held that the liability of the latter is "only vicarious and not sol-
idary" with the former.
PETITIONER’S CONTENTION: Hence, CASTILEX filed the instant
petition contending that the Court of Appeals erred in (1) applying to the case
the fifth paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code, instead of the fourth
paragraph thereof; (2) that as a managerial employee, ABAD was deemed to
have been always acting within the scope of his assigned task even outside
office hours because he was using a vehicle issued to him by petitioner; and
(3) ruling that petitioner had the burden to prove that the employee was not
acting within the scope of his assigned task.
RESPONDENT SPOUSES’ CONTENTION: On the other hand, respon-
dents Spouses Vasquez argue that their son's death was caused by the neg-
ligence of petitioner's employee who was driving a vehicle issued by peti-
tioner and who was on his way home from overtime work for petitioner; and
that petitioner is thus liable for the resulting injury and subsequent death
of their son on the basis of the fifth paragraph of Article 2180.
CEBU DOCTOR’S HOSPITAL: Petitioner CASTILEX is indeed vicarious-
ly liable for the injuries and subsequent death of Romeo Vasquez caused by
ABAD, who was on his way home from taking snacks after doing overtime
work for petitioner. Although the incident occurred when ABAD was not
working anymore "the inescapable fact remains that said employee
would not have been situated at such time and place had he not been
required by petitioner to do overtime work."
ISSUE: WON petitioner may be held vicariously liable for the death result-
ing from the negligent operation by a managerial employee of a company-
issued vehicle? NO. ABAD WAS CARRYING OUT A PERSONAL PUR-
POSE NOT IN LINE WITH HIS DUTIES AT THE TIME HE FIG-
URED IN A VEHICULAR ACCIDENT, HENCE, PETITIONER
CASTILEX IS NOT LIABLE.
HELD:
PETITIONER’S CLAIM: It is not vicariously liable for the injuries and
subsequent death caused by ABAD.
PETITIONER’S CONTENTION: Petitioner contends that the fifth para-
graph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code should only apply to instances where
the employer is not engaged in business or industry. Since it is engaged in the
business of manufacturing and selling furniture it is therefore not covered by
said provision. Instead, the fourth paragraph should apply.
Petitioner's interpretation of the fifth paragraph is not accurate. The
phrase "even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry"
found in the fifth paragraph should be interpreted to mean that it is not neces-
sary for the employer to be engaged in any business or industry to be liable
for the negligence of his employee who is acting within the scope of his as-
signed task.
A distinction must be made between the two provisions to determine what is
applicable. Both provisions apply to employers: the fourth paragraph, to
owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise; and the fifth para-
graph, to employers in general, whether or not engaged in any business or
industry. The fourth paragraph covers negligent acts of employees commit-
ted either in the service of the branches or on the occasion of their functions,
while the fifth paragraph encompasses negligent acts of employees acting
within the scope of their assigned task. The latter is an expansion of the for-
mer in both employer coverage and acts included. Negligent acts of employ-
ees, whether or not the employer is engaged in a business or industry, are
covered so long as they were acting within the scope of their assigned task,
even though committed neither in the service of the branches nor on the occa-
sion of their functions. For, admittedly, employees oftentimes wear different
hats. They perform functions which are beyond their office, title or designa-
tion but which, nevertheless, are still within the call of duty.
This court has applied the fifth paragraph to cases where the employer was
engaged in a business or industry such as truck operators and banks. The
Court of Appeals cannot, therefore, be faulted in applying the said para-
graph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code to this case.
Under the fifth paragraph of Article 2180, whether or not engaged in any
business or industry, an employer is liable for the torts committed by employ-
ees within the scope of his assigned tasks. But it is necessary to establish
the employer-employee relationship; once this is done, the plaintiff must
show, to hold the employer liable, that the employee was acting within
the scope of his assigned task when the tort complained of was commit-
ted. It is only then that the employer may find it necessary to interpose the
defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of the employee.
It is undisputed that ABAD was a Production Manager of petitioner
CASTILEX at the time of the tort occurrence. As to whether he was
acting within the scope of his assigned task is a question of fact, which
the court a quo and the Court of Appeals resolved in the affirmative.
Well-entrenched in our jurisprudence is the rule that the factual findings of
the Court of Appeals are entitled to great respect, and even finality at times.
This rule is, however, subject to exceptions such as when the conclusion is
grounded on speculations, surmises, or conjectures. Such exception obtain in
the present case to warrant review by this Court of the finding of the Court of
8 of 12
Appeals that since ABAD was driving petitioner's vehicle he was acting with-
in the scope of his duties as a manager.
Before we pass upon the issue of whether ABAD was performing acts within
the range of his employment, we shall first take up the other reason invoked
by the Court of Appeals in holding petitioner CASTILEX vicariously liable
for ABAD's negligence, i.e., that the petitioner did not present evidence that
ABAD was not acting within the scope of his assigned tasks at the time of the
motor vehicle mishap. Contrary to the ruling of the Court of Appeals, it was
not incumbent upon the petitioner to prove the same. It was enough for
petitioner CASTILEX to deny that ABAD was acting within the scope of
his duties; petitioner was not under obligation to prove this negative
averment. Ei incumbit probatio qui dicit, non qui negat (He who asserts, not
he who denies, must prove). The Court has consistently applied the ancient
rule that if the plaintiff, upon whom rests the burden of proving his cause of
action, fails to show in a satisfactory manner facts which he bases his claim,
the defendant is under no obligation to prove his exception or defense.
WON the private respondents have sufficiently established that ABAD
was acting within the scope of his assigned tasks?
ABAD, who was presented as a hostile witness, testified that at the time of
the incident, he was driving a company-issued vehicle, registered under the
name of petitioner. He was then leaving the restaurant where he had some
snacks and had a chat with his friends after having done overtime work for
the petitioner.
The court a quo and the Court of Appeals were one in holding that the driving
by a manager of a company-issued vehicle is within the scope of his assigned
tasks regardless of the time and circumstances.
We do not agree. The mere fact that ABAD was using a service vehicle at
the time of the injurious incident is not of itself sufficient to charge peti-
tioner with liability for the negligent operation of said vehicle unless it
appears that he was operating the vehicle within the course or scope of
his employment.
The following are principles in American Jurisprudence on the employ-
er's liability for the injuries inflicted by the negligence of an employee in
the use of an employer's motor vehicle:
I. Operation of Employer's Motor Vehicle in Going to or from Meals
It has been held that an employee who uses his employer's vehicle in going
from his work to a place where he intends to eat or in returning to work from
a meal is not ordinarily acting within the scope of his employment in the
absence of evidence of some special business benefit to the employer.
II. Operation of Employer's Vehicle in Going to or from Work
In the same vein, traveling to and from the place of work is ordinarily a per-
sonal problem or concern of the employee, and not a part of his services to his
employer. Hence, in the absence of some special benefit to the employer other
than the mere performance of the services available at the place where he is
needed, the employee is not acting within the scope of his employment even
though he uses his employer's motor vehicle.
The employer may, however, be liable where he derives some special benefit
from having the employee drive home in the employer's vehicle as when the
employer benefits from having the employee at work earlier and, presumably,
spending more time at his actual duties. However, even if the employee be
deemed to be acting within the scope of his employment in going to or from
work in his employer's vehicle, the employer is not liable for his negligence
where at the time of the accident, the employee has left the direct route to his
work or back home and is pursuing a personal errand of his own.
III. Use of Employer's Vehicle Outside Regular Working Hours
An employer who loans his motor vehicle to an employee for the latter's
personal use outside of regular working hours is generally not liable for the
employee's negligent operation of the vehicle during the period of permissive
use, even where the employer contemplates that a regularly assigned motor
vehicle will be used by the employee for personal as well as business purpos-
es and there is some incidental benefit to the employer. Even where the em-
ployee's personal purpose in using the vehicle has been accomplished and he
has started the return trip to his house where the vehicle is normally kept, it
has been held that he has not resumed his employment, and the employer is
not liable for the employee's negligent operation of the vehicle during the
return trip.
The foregoing principles and jurisprudence are applicable in our jurisdiction
albeit based on the doctrine of respondent superior, not on the principle of
bonus pater familias as in ours. Whether the fault or negligence of the em-
ployee is conclusive on his employer as in American law or jurisprudence, or
merely gives rise to the presumption juris tantum of negligence on the part of
the employer as in ours, it is indispensable that the employee was acting in
his employer's business or within the scope of his assigned task.
In the case at bar, it is undisputed that ABAD did some overtime work at the
petitioner's office, which was located in Cabangcalan, Mandaue City. There-
after, he went to Goldie's Restaurant in Fuente Osmeña, Cebu City, which is
about seven kilometers away from petitioner's place of business. A witness for
the private respondents, a sidewalk vendor, testified that Fuente Osmeña is a
"lively place" even at dawn because Goldie's Restaurant and Back Street were
still open and people were drinking thereat. Moreover, prostitutes, pimps, and
drug addicts littered the place.
At the Goldie's Restaurant, ABAD took some snacks and had a chat with
friends. It was when ABAD was leaving the restaurant that the incident in
question occurred. That same witness for the private respondents testified that
at the time of the vehicular accident, ABAD was with a woman in his car,

who then shouted: "Daddy, Daddy!" This woman could not have been
ABAD's daughter, for ABAD was only 29 years old at the time.
To the mind of this Court, ABAD was engaged in affairs of his own or
was carrying out a personal purpose not in line with his duties at the time
he figured in a vehicular accident. It was then about 2:00 a.m. of 28 August
1988, way beyond the normal working hours. ABAD's working day had end-
ed; his overtime work had already been completed. His being at a place
which, as petitioner put it, was known as a "haven for prostitutes, pimps, and
drug pushers and addicts," had no connection to petitioner's business; neither
had it any relation to his duties as a manager. Rather, using his service vehicle
even for personal purposes was a form of a fringe benefit or one of the perks
attached to his position.
Since there is paucity of evidence that ABAD was acting within the scope
of the functions entrusted to him, petitioner CASTILEX had no duty to
show that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in provid-
ing ABAD with a service vehicle. Thus, justice and equity require that
petitioner be relieved of vicarious liability for the consequences of the
negligence of ABAD in driving its vehicle.
DP: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, and the appealed decision
and resolution of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with the modification
that petitioner Castilex Industrial Corporation be absolved of any liability for
the damages caused by its employee, Jose Benjamin Abad.
SO ORDERED.
ARMANDO JOSE y PAZ and MANILA CENTRAL BUS LINES (MCL),
represented by its General Manager MR. DANILO T. DE DIOS, petition-
ers,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, ROMMEL ABRAHAM, represented by his
father FELIXBERTO ABRAHAM, JOSE MACARUBO and MER-
CEDES MACARUBO, respondents.
FACTS: Petitioner Manila Central Bus Lines Corporation (MCL) is the oper-
ator-lessee of a public utility bus (hereafter referred to as Bus 203) with plate
number NVR-III-TB-PIL and body number 203. Bus 203 is owned by the
Metro Manila Transit Corporation and is insured with the Government Ser-
vice Insurance System.
On February 22, 1985, at around six o'clock in the morning, Bus 203, then
driven by petitioner Armando Jose, collided with a red Ford Escort driven by
John Macarubo on MacArthur Highway, in Marulas, Valenzuela, Metro
Manila. Bus 203 was bound for Muntinlupa, Rizal, while the Ford Escort was
headed towards Malanday, Valenzuela on the opposite lane. As a result of the
collision, the left side of the Ford Escort's hood was severely damaged while
its driver, John Macarubo, and its lone passenger, private respondent Rommel
Abraham, were seriously injured. The driver and conductress of Bus 203
rushed Macarubo and Abraham to the nearby Fatima Hospital where
Macarubo lapsed into a coma. Despite surgery, Macarubo failed to recover
and died five days later. Abraham survived, but he became blind on the left
eye which had to be removed. In addition, he sustained a fracture on the
forehead and multiple lacerations on the face, which caused him to be hospi-
talized for a week.
On March 26, 1985, Rommel Abraham, represented by his father, Fe-
lixberto, instituted Civil Case No. 2206-V-85 for damages against peti-
tioners MCL and Armando Jose in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 172,
Valenzuela.
On July 17, 1986, the spouses Jose and Mercedes Macarubo, parents of
the deceased John Macarubo, filed their own suit for damages in the same
trial court, where it was docketed as Civil Case No. 2428-V-86, against MCL
alone.
On the other hand, MCL filed a third-party complaint against Juanita
Macarubo, registered owner of the Ford Escort on the theory that John
Macarubo was negligent and that he was the "authorized driver" of
Juanita Macarubo.
The latter(Juanita), in turn, filed a counterclaim for damages against
MCL for the damage to her car.
Civil Case No. 2206-V-85 and Civil Case No. 2428-V-86 were consolidated
and later tried jointly.
The facts, as found by the trial court, are as follows:
In Civil Case No. 2206-V-85, the Court heard the testimonies that during the
night previous to the accident of February 22, 1985 at 6:15 a.m., Rommel
Abraham and John Macarubo were at a party. There was therefore, no sleep
for them, notwithstanding testimony to the contrary and the service of drinks
cannot be totally discounted. After the party at 11 p.m., while both Rommel
and John were enroute home to Valenzuela from La Loma, the car encoun-
tered mechanical trouble and had to be repaired as its cross-joint was de-
tached. The defect of a cross-joint is not minor and repair thereof would as
testified to by Rommel lasted up to early dawn and the car started to run only
after five o'clock in the morning. With lack of sleep, the strains of a party still
on their bodies, and the attention to the repair coupled with the wait until the
car was ready to run, are potentials in a driver for possible accident. The
accident happened at 6:15 a.m. when the physical and mental condition of the
driver John Macarubo was as expected not too fit for the driving as he could
not anymore control the car. The desire to be home quick for the much needed
sleep could have prompted him to overtake the preceding vehicle.
9 of 12
Indeed the pictures taken of the two vehicles (Exh. 1, 2 and 3) will clearly
show that the MCL bus was at its proper lane and not in an overtaking
position while the car driven by John Macarubo was positioned in a
diagonal manner and crossed the line of the MCL, which is an indication
of an overtaking act. If it were the bus that was overtaking at the time,
the car would have been thrown farther away from the point of the im-
pact.
The court is convinced of the close supervision and control of MCL over their
drivers, and its exercise of due diligence in seeing to it that no recklessness is
committed by its employees, drivers especially, from the unrebutted testi-
monies of Cesar Cainglet.
The Court noted the respective damages of the two vehicles especially the
point of the impact. From these damages as shown by the picture, it can be
clearly deduced which vehicle did the bumping. It was the car driven by
John Macarubo that hit the MCL which was on its right and correct
lane.2
RTC: dismissing both civil cases against MCL and ruling favorably on its
third-party complaint against Juanita Macarubo, ordering the latter to pay
MCL P54,232.12 as actual damages, P24,000.00 for lost income, and
P10,000.00 as attorney's fees.
CA: reversed RTC.
ISSUE1: RE: SUPERVISION AND CONTROL
COURT:
Appellate court also ruled that MCL failed to make a satisfactory showing
that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection
and supervision of its bus driver, Armando Jose.13 Under the circum-
stances of this case, we hold that proof of due diligence in the selection
and supervision of employees is not required.
The Civil Code provides in pertinent parts:
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another,
there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage
done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contrac-
tual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is
governed by the provisions of this chapter.
Art. 2180 The obligation imposed in Art. 2176 is demandable not
only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons
for whom one is responsible.
xxx xxx xxx
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their em-
ployees and household helpers acting within the scope of their
assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any
business or industry.
xxx xxx xxx
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the
persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the dili-
gence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.
Therefore, before the presumption of the employer's negligence in the
selection and supervision of its employees can arise, the negligence of the
employee must first be established. While the allegations of negligence
against the employee and that of an employer-employee relation in the
complaint are enough to make out a case of quasi-delict under Art. 2180
of the Civil Code, the failure to prove the employee's negligence during
the trial is fatal to proving the employer's vicarious liability. In this case,
private respondents failed to prove their allegation of negligence against
driver Armando Jose who, in fact, was acquitted in the case for criminal
negligence arising from the same incident.15
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the appellate court erred in holding
petitioners liable to private respondents.
(TOPIC)
ISSUE2: WON Juanita Macarubo is liable for the negligence of John
Macarubo (“authorized driver”).
HELD: NO! Art. 2180 of the Civil Code makes the persons specified therein
responsible for the quasi-delicts of others. The burden is upon MCL to prove
that Juanita Macarubo is one of those specified persons who are vicariously
liable for the negligence of the deceased John Macarubo.
In its third-party complaint, MCL alleged that Juanita Macarubo was the
registered owner of the Ford Escort car and that John Macarubo was the
"authorized driver" of the car.16 Nowhere was it alleged that John Macarubo
was the son, ward, employee or pupil of private respondent Juanita Macarubo
so as to make the latter vicariously liable for the negligence of John
Macarubo. The allegation that John Macarubo was "the authorized dri-
ver" of the Ford Escort is not equivalent to an allegation that he was an
employee of Juanita Macarubo. That John Macarubo was the "autho-
rized driver" of the car simply means that he drove the Ford Escort with
the permission of Juanita Macarubo.
Nor did MCL present any evidence to prove that Juanita Macarubo was
the employer of John Macarubo or that she is in any way liable for John
Macarubo's negligence under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code. For failure to
discharge its burden, MCL's third-party complaint should be dismissed.
ISSUE3: whether it was the driver of Bus 203 or that of the Ford Escort
who was at fault for the collision of the two vehicles.

COURT: The trial court was justified in relying on the photographs rather
than on Rommel Abraham's testimony which was obviously biased and un-
supported by any other evidence.
The photograph shows that the left side of Bus 203 is about a few feet
from the center line and that the bus is positioned parallel thereto. This
negates the claim that Bus 203 was overtaking another vehicle and, in so
doing, encroached on the opposite lane occupied by the Ford Escort.
If there had been a great impact, such as would be the case if Bus 203
had been running at a high speed, the two vehicles should have ended up
far from each other.
Thus, as Rommel Abraham himself admitted, the Ford Escort's rear
cross-joint was cut/detached. This mechanism controls the movement of
the rear tires. Since trouble in the cross-joint affects a car's maneuver-
ability, the matter should have been treated as a serious mechanical
problem. In this case, when asked if they were able to repair the cross-
joint, Abraham said "Ginawaan ng paraan, ma'am," by simply welding
them just so they could reach home. His testimony indicates that the rear
cross-joint was hastily repaired and that, at most, the kind of repairs
made thereon were merely temporary; just enough to enable Abraham
and Macarubo to reach home. Given such fact, the likelihood is that
while the Ford Escort might not have been overtaking another vehicle, it
actually strayed into the bus' lane because of the defective cross-joint,
causing its driver to lose control of the vehicle.
The appellate court refused to give credence to the physical evidence on the
ground that the photographs were taken an hour after the collision and that
within such span of time the bus could have been moved because there was
no showing that the driver left the scene of the accident. This is not correct.
Constancia Gerolada, Bus 203's conductress, testified that, immediately after
the collision, she and bus driver, petitioner Armando Jose, took the injured
driver and passenger of the Ford Escort to the Fatima Hospital.12 This fact is
not disputed by private respondents.
Rommel Abraham mentioned in his appellant's brief in the appellate court a
sketch of the scene of the accident allegedly prepared by one Patrolman
Kalale, which shows Bus 203 to be occupying the Ford Escort's lane. Howev-
er, the records of this case do not show that such a sketch was ever pre-
sented in evidence in the trial court or that Patrolman Kalale was ever
presented as a witness to testify on the sketch allegedly prepared by him.
Under Rule 132, §3 of the Rules on Evidence, courts cannot consider any
evidence unless formally offered by a party.
Hermana R. Cerezo, petitioner, vs. David Tuazon, respondent.
Facts:
Around noontime of 26 June 1993, a Country Bus Lines passenger
bus collided with a tricycle along Captain M. Palo Street, Sta. Ines, Mabala-
cat, Pampanga. On 1 October 1993, tricycle driver Tuazon filed a com-
plaint for damages against Mrs. Cerezo, as owner of the bus line, her
husband Attorney Juan Cerezo (Atty. Cerezo), and bus driver Danilo A.
Foronda (Foronda). The complaint alleged that:
7At the time of the incident, Tuazon was in his proper lane when the
second-named defendant [Foronda], being then the driver and person in
charge of the Country Bus with plate number NYA 241, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously operate the said motor vehicle
in a negligent, careless, and imprudent manner without due regard to
traffic rules and regulations, there being a Slow Down sign near the scene
of the incident, and without taking the necessary precaution to prevent
loss of lives or injuries, his negligence, carelessness and imprudence
resulted to severe damage to the tricycle and serious physical injuries to
plaintiff thus making him unable to walk and becoming disabled, with his
thumb and middle finger on the left hand being cut.
RTC- ruled in Tuazons favor. The trial court made no pronouncement on
Forondas liability because there was no service of summons on him. The
trial court did not hold Atty. Cerezo liable as Tuazon failed to show that
Mrs. Cerezos business benefited the family, pursuant to Article 121(3) of
the Family Code. The trial court held Mrs. Cerezo solely liable for the
damages sustained by Tuazon arising from the negligence of Mrs. Cere-
zos employee, pursuant to Article 2180 of the Civil Code.
Petitioner’s contention:
Mrs. Cerezo contends that the basis of the present petition for annulment is
lack of jurisdiction. Mrs. Cerezo asserts that the trial court could not validly
render judgment since it failed to acquire jurisdiction over Foronda. Mrs.
Cerezo points out that there was no service of summons on Foronda. More-
over, Tuazon failed to reserve his right to institute a separate civil action for
damages in the criminal action. Such contention betrays a faulty
foundation. Mrs. Cerezos contention proceeds from the point of view of crim-
inal law and not of civil law, while the basis of the present action of Tuazon is
quasi-delict under the Civil Code, not delict under the Revised Penal Code.
Court:The petition has no merit.
Mrs. Cerezos Liability and theTrial Courts Acquisition of Jurisdiction
10 of 12
The same negligent act may produce civil liability arising from a delict
under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, or may give rise to an ac-
tion for a quasi-delict under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. An aggrieved
party may choose between the two remedies. An action based on a quasi-
delict may proceed independently from the criminal action. There is,
however, a distinction between civil liability arising from a delict and civil
liability arising from a quasi-delict. The choice of remedy, whether to sue for
a delict or a quasi-delict, affects the procedural and jurisdictional issues of the
action.[37]
Tuazon chose to file an action for damages based on a quasi-
delict. In his complaint, Tuazon alleged that Mrs. Cerezo, without exercising
due care and diligence in the supervision and management of her employees
and buses, hired Foronda as her driver. Tuazon became disabled because of
Forondas recklessness, gross negligence and imprudence, aggravated by Mrs.
Cerezos lack of due care and diligence in the selection and supervision of her
employees, particularly Foronda.
The trial court thus found Mrs. Cerezo liable under Article 2180 of
the Civil Code. Article 2180 states in part:
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and
household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though
the former are not engaged in any business or industry.
Contrary to Mrs. Cerezos assertion, Foronda is not an indis-
pensable party to the case. An indispensable party is one whose interest is
affected by the courts action in the litigation, and without whom no final
resolution of the case is possible.[39] However, Mrs. Cerezos liability as an
employer in an action for a quasi-delict is not only solidary, it is also
primary and direct. Foronda is not an indispensable party to the final resolu-
tion of Tuazons action for damages against Mrs. Cerezo.
The responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for a
quasi-delict is solidary. Where there is a solidary obligation on the part of
debtors, as in this case, each debtor is liable for the entire obligation. Hence,
each debtor is liable to pay for the entire obligation in full. There is no merger
or renunciation of rights, but only mutual representation.[41]Where the obliga-
tion of the parties is solidary, either of the parties is indispensable, and the
other is not even a necessary party because complete relief is available from
either.[42]Therefore, jurisdiction over Foronda is not even necessary as Tuazon
may collect damages from Mrs. Cerezo alone.
Moreover, an employers liability based on a quasi-delict is pri-
mary and direct, while the employers liability based on a delict is merely
subsidiary. The words primary and direct, as contrasted with subsidiary, refer
to the remedy provided by law for enforcing the obligation rather than to the
character and limits of the obligation.[44] Although liability under Article
2180 originates from the negligent act of the employee, the aggrieved
party may sue the employer directly.
When an employee causes damage, the law presumes that the employer
has himself committed an act of negligence in not preventing or avoiding
the damage. This is the fault that the law condemns. While the employer is
civilly liable in a subsidiary capacity for the employees criminal negligence,
the employer is also civilly liable directly and separately for his own civil
negligence in failing to exercise due diligence in selecting and supervising his
employee. The idea that the employers liability is solely subsidiary is wrong.
[45]
The action can be brought directly against the person responsible (for
another), without including the author of the act. The action against the
principal is accessory in the sense that it implies the existence of a prejudicial
act committed by the employee, but it is not subsidiary in the sense that it can
not be instituted till after the judgment against the author of the act or at least,
that it is subsidiary to the principal action; the action for responsibility (of the
employer) is in itself a principal action.[46]
Thus, there is no need in this case for the trial court to acquire
jurisdiction over Foronda. The trial courts acquisition of jurisdiction
over Mrs. Cerezo is sufficient to dispose of the present case on the merits.
In contrast, an action based on a delict seeks to enforce the sub-
sidiary liability of the employer for the criminal negligence of the employee
as provided in Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code. To hold the employer
liable in a subsidiary capacity under a delict, the aggrieved party must initiate
a criminal action where the employees delict and corresponding primary
liability are established.[47] If the present action proceeds from a delict,
then the trial courts jurisdiction over Foronda is necessary. However, the
present action is clearly for the quasi-delict of Mrs. Cerezo and not for
the delict of Foronda.
The Cerezo spouses contention that summons be served anew on
them is untenable in light of their participation in the trial court
proceedings. To uphold the Cerezo spouses contention would make a fetish of
a technicality. Moreover, any irregularity in the service of summons that
might have vitiated the trial courts jurisdiction over the persons of the Cerezo
spouses was deemed waived when the Cerezo spouses filed a petition for
relief from judgment.
We hold that the trial court had jurisdiction and was competent to
decide the case in favor of Tuazon and against Mrs. Cerezo even in the ab-

sence of Foronda. Contrary to Mrs. Cerezos contention, Foronda is not an
indispensable party to the present case. It is not even necessary for Tuazon to
reserve the filing of a separate civil action because he opted to file a civil
action for damages against Mrs. Cerezo who is primarily and directly liable
for her own civil negligence. The words of Justice Jorge Bocobo in Barredo
v. Garcia still hold true today as much as it did in 1942:
x x x [T]o hold that there is only one way to make defendants liability effec-
tive, and that is, to sue the driver and exhaust his (the latters) property first,
would be tantamount to compelling the plaintiff to follow a devious and cum-
bersome method of obtaining relief. True, there is such a remedy under our
laws, but there is also a more expeditious way, which is based on the primary
and direct responsibility of the defendant under article [2180] of the Civil
Code. Our view of the law is more likely to facilitate remedy for civil wrongs,
because the procedure indicated by the defendant is wasteful and productive
of delay, it being a matter of common knowledge that professional drivers of
taxis and other similar public conveyances do not have sufficient means with
which to pay damages. Why, then, should the plaintiff be required in all cases
to go through this roundabout, unnecessary, and probably useless
procedure? In construing the laws, courts have endeavored to shorten and
facilitate the pathways of right and justice.
G.R. No. L-25142 March 25, 1975
PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES, INC. and FELIX PANGALAN-
GAN, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
PHIL-AMERICAN FORWARDERS, INC., ARCHIMEDES J. BALIN-
GIT and FERNANDO PINEDA, defendants-appellees.
FACTS:
Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. and Felix Pangalangan appealed on pure
questions of law from the order of the Court of First Instance of Tarlac, dis-
missing their complaint against Archimedes J. Balingit.
The dismissal was based on the ground that Balingit as the manager of Phil-
American Forwarders, Inc., which together with Fernando Pineda and Balin-
git, was sued for damages in an action based on quasi-delict or culpa aquil-
iana, is not the manager of an establishment contemplated in article 2180 of
the Civil Code (Civil Case No. 3865).
In the complaint for damages filed by the bus company and Pangalangan
against Phil-American Forwarders, Inc., Balingit and Pineda, it was alleged
that on November 24, 1962, Pineda drove recklessly a freight truck, owned
by Phil-American Forwarders, Inc., along the national highway at Sto. Tomas,
Pampanga. The truck bumped the bus driven by Pangalangan, which was
owned by Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. As a result of the bumping,
Pangalangan suffered injuries and the bus was damaged and could not be
used for seventy-nine days, thus depriving the company of earnings amount-
ing to P8,665.51. Balingit was the manager of Phil-American Forwarders,
Inc.
DEFENDANTS’ DEFENSE: Among the defenses interposed by the defen-
dants in their answer was that Balingit was not Pineda's employer.
Balingit moved that the complaint against him be dismissed on the ground
that the bus company and the bus driver had no cause of action against him.
As already stated, the lower court dismissed the action as to Balingit. The bus
company and its driver appealed.
The Civil Code provides:
ART. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there
being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or
negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties,
is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
ART. 2180. The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only
for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is
responsible.
xxx xxx xxx
The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise
responsible for damages caused by their employees in the service of the
branches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their func-
tions.
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and
household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though
the former are not engaged in any business or industry.
xxx xxx xxx
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein
mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a
family to prevent damage. (1903a)
ISSUE: The novel and unprecedented legal issue in this appeal is whether the
terms "employers" and "owners and managers of an establishment or enter-
prise" (dueños o directores de un establicimiento o empresa) used in article
2180 of the Civil Code, formerly article 1903 of the old Code, embrace the
manager of a corporation owning a truck, the reckless operation of which
allegedly resulted in the vehicular accident from which the damage arose.
NO.
HELD:
We are of the opinion that those terms do not include the manager of a
corporation. It may be gathered from the context of article 2180 that the term
11 of 12
"manager" ("director" in the Spanish version) is used in the sense of "em-
ployer".
Hence, under the allegations of the complaint, no tortious or quasi-
delictual liability can be fastened on Balingit as manager of Phil-Ameri-
can Forwarders, Inc., in connection with the vehicular accident already
mentioned because he himself may be regarded as an employee or depen-
diente of his employer, Phil-American Forwarders, Inc.
Thus, it was held "que es dependiente, a los efectos de la responsabilidad
subsidiaria establecida en el num 3.0 del (art.) 1903, el director de un periodi-
co explotado por una sociedad, porque cualquiera que sea su jerarquia y
aunque Ileve la direccion de determinadas convicciones politicas no por eso
deja de estar subordinado a la superior autoridad de la Empresa" (Decision of
Spanish Supreme Court dated December 6, 1912 cited in 12 Manresa, Codigo
Civil Español 5th Ed. 662; 1913 Enciclopedia Juridica Española 992).
>> GOOGLE TRANSLATE: ”that is dependent, for the purposes of the
subsidiary liability established in number 3.0 of (art.) 1903, the director of a
newspaper exploited by a company, because whatever its hierarchy and al-
though it directs certain political convictions that is why it ceases to be sub-
ordinated to the superior authority of the Company”
RE: NEW ISSUE NOT ALLEGED IN THE COMPLAINT
The bus company and its driver, in their appellants' brief, injected a new
factual issue which was not alleged in their complaint. They argue that
Phil- American Forwarders, Inc. is merely a business conduit of Balingit
because out of its capital stock with a par value of P41,200, Balingit and his
wife had subscribed P40,000 and they paid P10,000 on their subscription,
while the other incorporators, namely, Rodolfo Limjuco, Ponciano Caparas
and Rafael Suntay paid P250.25 and P25, respectively.
That argument implies that the veil of corporate fiction should be pierced and
that Phil-American Forwarders, Inc. and Balingit and his wife should be
treated as one and the same civil personality.
We cannot countenance that argument in this appeal. It was not raised in
the lower court. The case has to be decided on the basis of the pleadings
filed in the trial court where it was assumed that Phil-American For-
warders, Inc. has a personality separate and distinct from that of the
Balingit spouses.
The legal issue, which the plaintiffs-appellants can ventilate in this appeal, is
one which was raised in the lower court and which is within the issues framed
by the parties (Sec. 18, Rule 46, Rules of Court).
When a party deliberately adopts a certain theory and the case is decided
upon that theory in the court below, he will not be permitted to change his
theory on appeal because, to permit him to do so, could be unfair to the ad-
verse party (2 Moran's Comments on the Rules of Court, 1970 Ed. p. 505).
DP: WHEREFORE, the lower court's order of dismissal is affirmed. Costs
against the plaintiffs-appellants.
SO ORDERED.
SPS. JAYME VS. APOSTOL
FACTS: On February 5, 1989, Mayor Miguel of Koronadal, South
Cotabato was on board the Isuzu pick-up truck driven by Fidel Lozano, an
employee of the Municipality of Koronadal.[2] The pick-up truck was regis-
tered under the name of Rodrigo Apostol, but it was then in the possession of
Ernesto Simbulan.[3] Lozano borrowed the pick-up truck from Simbulan to
bring Miguel to Buayan Airport at General Santos City to catch
his Manila flight.[4]
The pick-up truck accidentally hit Marvin C. Jayme, a minor, who was then
crossing the National Highway in Poblacion, Polomolok, South Cotabato.
[5] The intensity of the collision sent Marvin some fifty (50) meters away from
the point of impact, a clear indication that Lozano was driving at a very high
speed at the time of the accident.[6]
Marvin sustained severe head injuries with subdural hematoma
and diffused cerebral contusion. [7] He was initially treated at
the Howard Hubbard Memorial Hospital.[8]Due to the seriousness of his in-
juries, he was airlifted to
the Ricardo Limso Medical Center in Davao City for more intensive treat-
ment.[9] Despite medical attention, Marvin expired six (6) days after the acci-
dent.[10]
Petitioners spouses Buenaventura and Rosario Jayme, the parents
of Marvin, filed a complaint for damages with the RTC against respondents.
[11] In their complaint, they prayed that all respondents be held solidarily
liable for their loss. They pointed out that that proximate cause of Marvins
death was Lozanos negligent and reckless operation of the vehicle. They
prayed for actual, moral, and exemplary damages, attorneys fees, and litiga-
tion expenses.
In their respective Answers, all respondents denied liability for
Marvins death. Apostol and Simbulan averred that Lozano took the pick-up
truck without their consent.Likewise, Miguel and Lozano pointed out that
Marvins sudden sprint across the highway made it impossible to avoid the
accident. Yet, Miguel denied being on board the vehicle when it hit
Marvin. The Municipality of Koronadal adopted the answer of Lozano and
Miguel. As for First Integrated Bonding and Insurance Company, Inc., the
vehicle insurer, it insisted that its liability is contributory and is only condi-

tioned on the right of the insured. Since the insured did not file a claim within
the prescribed period, any cause of action against it had prescribed.
RTC: in favour of Sps. Jayme
12 of 12
attributed to a fellow employee who only happens to be an occupant of
the vehicle. [27] Whatever right of control the occupant may have over the
driver is not sufficient by itself to justify an application of the doctrine of
vicarious liability. Handley v. Lombardi[28] is instructive on this exception to
the rule on vicarious liability:

MAYOR MIGUEL CONTENTION: RTC erred in ruling that he was
Lozanos employer and, hence, solidarily liable for the latters negligent
act. Records showed that the Municipality of Koronadal was the drivers true
and lawful employer. Mayor Miguel also denied that he did not exercise due
care and diligence in the supervision of Lozano. The incident, although unfor-
tunate, was unexpected and cannot be attributed to him.
CA: REVERSED and SET ASIDE decision of RTC, insofar as defendant-
appellant Mayor Fernando Q. Miguel is concerned
Plaintiff was not the master or principal of
the driver of the truck, but only an intermediate and
superior employee or agent. This being so, the doctrine
of respondeat superior or qui facit per alium is not
properly applicable to him. His power to direct and
control the driver was not as master, but only by virtue
of the fact that they were both employed by Kruse, and
the further fact that as Kruses agent he was delegated
Kruses authority over the driver. x x x

ISSUE: WON MAYOR MIGUEL is liable for the negligence of Lozano
(driver).
HELD: NO!
SPOUSES CONTENTION: vicarious liability attaches to Mayor
Miguel. He was not a mere passenger, but instead one who had direct
control and supervision over Lozano during the time of the accident. Ac-
cording to petitioners, the element of direct control is not negated by the fact
that Lozanos employer was the Municipality of Koronadal. Mayor Miguel,
being Lozanos superior, still had control over the manner the vehicle was
operated.
In the case of actionable negligence, the rule is well settled both in this state
and elsewhere that the negligence of a subordinate employee or subagent is
not to be imputed to a superior employee or agent, but only to the master or
principal and see the elaborate note in 61 A. L. R. 277,and particularly that
part commencing at p. 290.) We can see no logical reason for drawing any
distinction in this regard between actionable negligence and contributory
negligence. x x
In the case at bar, Mayor Miguel was neither Lozanos employ-
er nor the vehicles registered owner. There existed no causal relationship
between him and Lozano or the vehicle used that will make him account-
able for Marvins death. Mayor Miguel was a mere passenger at the time
of the accident.

Parenthetically, it has been held that the failure of a passenger

COURT: Article 2180[16] of the Civil Code provides that a person is not only
to assist the driver, by providing him warnings or by serving as lookout
liable for ones own quasi-delictual acts, but also for those persons for whom
does not make the passenger liable for the latters negligent acts.[35] The
one is responsible for.This liability is popularly known as vicarious or imput-
drivers duty is not one that may be delegated to others.[36]
ed liability. To sustain claims against employers for the acts of their employ-
ees, the following requisites must be established: (1) That the employee was
As correctly held by the trial court, the true and lawful employer of
chosen by the employer personally or through another; (2) That the service to
be rendered in accordance with orders which the employer has the authority Lozano is the Municipality of Koronadal. Unfortunately for Spouses
to give at all times; and (3) That the illicit act of the employee was on the Jayme, the municipality may not be sued because it is an agency of the
occasion or by reason of the functions entrusted to him.[17] State engaged in governmental functions and, hence, immune from suit.

Significantly, to make the employee liable under paragraphs 5 The law on the matter is clear: only the negligent driver, the
and 6 of Article 2180, it must be established that the injurious or tortuous drivers employer, and the registered owner of the vehicle are liable for
act was committed at the time the employee was performing his func- the death of a third person resulting from the negligent operation of the
tions.[18] vehicle.

Furthermore, the employer-employee relationship cannot be assumed. It is

incumbent upon the plaintiff to prove the relationship by preponderant evi-
dence.

In resolving the present controversy, it is imperative to find

out if Mayor Miguel is, indeed, the employer of Lozano and therefore
liable for the negligent acts of the latter.To determine the existence of an
employment relationship, We rely on the four-fold test. This involves: (1)
the employers power of selection; (2) payment of wages or other remu-
neration; (3) the employers right to control the method of doing the
work; and (4) the employers right of suspension or dismissal.[21]

Applying the foregoing test, the CA correctly held that it was

the Municipality of Koronadal which was the lawful employer of Lozano
at the time of the accident. It is uncontested that Lozano was employed as a
driver by the municipality. That he was subsequently assigned to Mayor
Miguel during the time of the accident is of no moment. This Court has, on
several occasions, held that an employer-employee relationship still exists
even if the employee was loaned by the employer to another person or entity
because control over the employee subsists.[22] In the case under review,
the Municipality of Koronadal remains to be Lozanos employer not-
withstanding Lozanos assignment to Mayor Miguel.

Spouses Jayme argued that Mayor Miguel had at least supervi-

sion and control over Lozano and how the latter operated or drove the Isuzu
pick-up during the time of the accident. They, however, failed to buttress
this claim.
Even assuming arguendo that Mayor Miguel had authority to give
instructions or directions to Lozano, he still can not be held liable. In Benson
v. Sorrell,[23] the New England Supreme Court ruled that mere giving of direc-
tions to the driver does not establish that the passenger has control over the
vehicle. Neither does it render one the employer of the driver. This Court,
in Soliman, Jr. v. Tuazon,[24] ruled in a similar vein, to wit:

x x x The fact that a client company may give instruc-

tions or directions to the security guards assigned to
it, does not, by itself, render the client responsible as
an employer of the security guards concerned and
liable for their wrongful acts and omissions. Those
instructions or directions are ordinarily no more than
requests commonly envisaged in the contract for ser-
vices entered into with the security agency. x x
x[25] (Emphasis supplied)

Significantly, no negligence may be imputed against a fellow

employee although the person may have the right to control the manner of the
vehicles operation.[26] In the absence of an employer-employee relation-
ship establishing vicarious liability, the drivers negligence should not be