Cecille Therese G.

Pedregosa JD 1 - A

RIGHT TO INFORMATION
Chavez v. PCGG
G.R. No. 130716 December 9, 1998
Panganiban, J.

Facts:
Petitioner Francisco Chavez (Chavez), as taxpayer, citizen and former government official
who initiated the prosecution of the Marcoses and their cronies who committed unmitigated
plunder of the public treasury and the systematic subjugation of the country’s economy, alleges
that what impelled him to bring this action were several news reports bannered in a number of
broadsheets sometime in September 1997. These news items referred to:
(1) the alleged discovery of billions of dollars of Marcos assets deposited in various
coded accounts in Swiss banks; and
(2) the reported execution of a compromise, between the government (through PCGG)
and the Marcos heirs, on how to split or share these assets.
Petitioner, invoking his constitutional right to information and the correlative duty of the
state to disclose publicly all its transactions involving the national interest, demands that
respondents make public any and all negotiations and agreements pertaining to PCGG’s task of
recovering the Marcoses’ ill-gotten wealth. He claims that any compromise on the alleged
billions of ill-gotten wealth involves an issue of paramount public interest, since it has a
debilitating effect on the country’s economy that would be greatly prejudicial to the national
interest of the Filipino people. Hence, the people in general have a right to know the transactions
or deals being contrived and effected by the government.
The respondents argued that the action was premature since he has not shown that he had
asked the respondents to disclose the negotiations and agreements before filing the case.

Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner has the personality or legal standing to file the instant petition.

Held:
Chavez explains that as a taxpayer and citizen, he has the legal personality to file the instant
petition. He submits that since ill-gotten wealth belongs to the Filipino people and [is], in truth
and in fact, part of the public treasury, any compromise in relation to it would constitute a
diminution of the public funds, which can be enjoined by a taxpayer whose interest is for a full,
if not substantial, recovery of such assets.
Besides, Chavez emphasizes, the matter of recovering the ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses
is an issue of transcendental importance to the public. He asserts that ordinary taxpayers have a
right to initiate and prosecute actions questioning the validity of acts or orders of government
agencies or instrumentalities, if the issues raised are of paramount public interest; and if they
immeasurably affect the social, economic, and moral well-being of the people.
The instant petition is anchored on the right of the people to information and access to
government records, documents and papers- a right guaranteed under section 7, article III of the
Philippine Constitution. The petitioner, Chavez, a former solicitor general, is a Filipino citizen,
and because of the satisfaction of the two basic requisites laid down by decisional law to sustain
petitioner's standing: (1) Enforcement of Legal Right and (2) Espoused by a Filipino Citizen, the
Court ruled that petition at bar is allowed.
Cecille Therese G. Pedregosa JD 1 - A

Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers

G.R.No. 180643 March 25 2008
Leonardo – De Castro, J.

Facts:
The Senate issued various Senate Resolutions directing SBRC, among others, to conduct an
investigation regarding the NBN-ZTE deal. Neri, the head of NEDA, was then invited to testify
before the Senate Blue Ribbon. He disclosed that the COMELEC Chairman Abalos offered him
P200M in exchange for his approval of the NBN Project, that he informed PGMA about the
bribery and that she instructed him not to accept the bribe. However, when probed further on
what they discussed about the NBN Project, he refused to answer, invoking “executive
privilege”. In particular, he refused to answer the questions on:
(a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project
(b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it, and
(c) whether or not she directed him to approve. As a result, the Senate cited him for
contempt.

Issue:
Whether or not the communications elicited by the 3 questions covered by executive
privilege.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court recognized the executive privilege which is the Presidential
communications privilege. It pertains to “communications, documents or other materials that
reflect presidential decision-making and deliberations and that the President believes should
remain confidential.” Presidential communications privilege applies to decision-making of the
President. It is rooted in the constitutional principle of separation of power and the President’s
unique constitutional role.
The claim of executive privilege is highly recognized in cases where the subject of inquiry
relates to a power textually committed by the Constitution to the President, such as the area of
military and foreign relations. The information relating to these powers may enjoy greater
confidentiality than others.

Elements of presidential communications privilege:

1) The protected communication must relate to a “quintessential and non-delegable
presidential power.” - i.e. the power to enter into an executive agreement with other
countries. This authority of the President to enter into executive agreements without the
concurrence of the Legislature has traditionally been recognized in Philippine jurisprudence.
2) The communication must be authored or “solicited and received” by a close advisor of the
President or the President himself. The judicial test is that an advisor must be in
“operational proximity” with the President.
3) The presidential communications privilege remains a qualified privilege that may be
overcome by a showing of adequate need, such that the information sought “likely contains
important evidence” and by the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an
appropriate investigating authority. - there is no adequate showing of a compelling need that
would justify the limitation of the privilege and of the unavailability of the information
elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.
Cecille Therese G. Pedregosa JD 1 - A

Center for People Empowerment in Governance v. COMELEC

G.R. No. 189546 September 21, 2010
Abad, J.

Facts:
Center for People Empowerment in Governance (CenPEG), a non-government organization,
wrote respondent COMELEC, requesting a copy of the source code of the Precinct Count
Optical Scan (PCOS), the Board of Canvassers Consolidation/Canvassing System (BOC CCS),
programs for the municipal, provincial, national, and congressional canvass, the COMELEC
server programs, and the source code of the in-house COMELEC programs called the Data
Capturing System (DCS) utilities. CenPEG invoked Section 12 of Republic Act No. 9369, which
provides that once an AES technology is selected for implementation, the Commission shall
promptly make the source code of that technology available and open to any interested political
party or groups which may conduct their own review thereof.
Comelec granted the request for the PCOS and CCS, but denied that for the DCS. According
to COMELEC, if the source code for the DCS were to be divulged, unscrupulous individuals
might change the program and pass off an illicit one that could benefit certain candidates or
parties. Still, the COMELEC apparently did not release even the kinds of source code that it said
it was approving for release.

Issue:
Whether or not CenPEG has the right to the codes

Held:
Yes. The pertinent portion of Section 12 of R.A. 9369 is clear in that once an AES
technology is selected for implementation, the Commission shall promptly make the source code
of that technology available and open to any interested political party or groups which may
conduct their own review thereof. The COMELEC has offered no reason not to comply with this
requirement of the law. Indeed, its only excuse for not disclosing the source code was that it was
not yet available when CenPEG asked for it and, subsequently, that the review had to be done,
apparently for security reason, under a controlled environment. The elections had passed and that
reason is already stale.
Cecille Therese G. Pedregosa JD 1 - A

RIGHT TO FORM ASSOCIATION

In re: Edillion
A.M. No. 1928 August 3, 1978
Castro, C.J.

Facts:
The respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing Attorney in the Philippines.
The IBP Board of Governors recommended to the Court the removal of the name of the
respondent from its Roll of Attorneys for stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues assailing
the provisions of the Rule of Court 139-A and the provisions of par. 2, Section 24, Article III, of
the IBP By-Laws pertaining to the organization of IBP, payment of membership fee and
suspension for failure to pay the same.
Edillon contends that the stated provisions constitute an invasion of his constitutional rights
in the sense that he is being compelled as a pre-condition to maintain his status as a lawyer in
good standing, to be a member of the IBP and to pay the corresponding dues, and that as a
consequence of this compelled financial support of the said organization to which he is admitted
personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of the rights to liberty and properly guaranteed to
him by the Constitution. Hence, the respondent concludes the above provisions of the Court Rule
and of the IBP By-Laws are void and of no legal force and effect.

Issue:
Whether or not to compel him to become a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
is unconstitutional for it impinges on his constitutional right of freedom to associate.

Held:
The Integrated Bar is a State-organized Bar which every lawyer must be a member of as
distinguished from bar associations in which membership is merely optional and voluntary. All
lawyers are subject to comply with the rules prescribed for the governance of the Bar including
payment a reasonable annual fees as one of the requirements. The Rules of Court only compels
him to pay his annual dues and it is not in violation of his constitutional freedom to associate.
Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not
the meeting of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its election as he chooses.
The only compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of annual dues. The Supreme Court
in order to further the State’s legitimate interest in elevating the quality of professional legal
services, may require thet the cost of the regulatory program – the lawyers.
Such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police power of the State. The right to
practice law before the courts of this country should be and is a matter subject to regulation and
inquiry. And if the power to impose the fee as a regulatory measure is recognize then a penalty
designed to enforce its payment is not void as unreasonable as arbitrary. Furthermore, the Court
has jurisdiction over matters of admission, suspension, disbarment, and reinstatement of lawyers
and their regulation as part of its inherent judicial functions and responsibilities thus the court
may compel all members of the Integrated Bar to pay their annual dues.
Cecille Therese G. Pedregosa JD 1 - A

Malabanan v. Ramento
G.R. No. L-62270 May 21, 1984
Fernando, C.J.

Facts:
Petitioners were officers of the Supreme Student Council of respondent University. They
sought and were granted by the school authorities a permit to hold a meeting from 8:00 A.M. to
12:00 P.M, on August 27, 1982. Pursuant to such permit, along with other students, they held a
general assembly at the Veterinary Medicine and Animal Science basketball court (VMAS), the
place indicated in such permit, not in the basketball court as therein stated but at the second floor
lobby. At such gathering they manifested in vehement and vigorous language their opposition to
the proposed merger of the Institute of Animal Science with the Institute of Agriculture. The
same day, they marched toward the Life Science Building and continued their rally. It was
outside the area covered by their permit. Even they rallied beyond the period allowed. They were
asked to explain on the same day why they should not be held liable for holding an illegal
assembly. Then on September 9, 1982, they were informed that they were under preventive
suspension for their failure to explain the holding of an illegal assembly. The validity thereof was
challenged by petitioners both before the Court of First Instance of Rizal against private
respondents and before the Ministry of Education, Culture, and Sports. Respondent Ramento
found petitioners guilty of the charge of illegal assembly which was characterized by the
violation of the permit granted resulting in the disturbance of classes and oral defamation. The
penalty was suspension for one academic year.

Issue:
Whether or not the suspension of students for one academic year was violative of the
constitutional rights of freedom of assembly and free speech?

Held:
Yes. Student leaders are likely to be assertive and dogmatic. They would be ineffective if
during a rally they speak in the guarded and judicious language of the academe. But with the
activity taking place in the school premises and during the daytime, no clear and present danger
of public disorder is discernible. This is without prejudice to the taking of disciplinary action for
conduct, "materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights
of others."
The rights to peaceable assembly and free speech are guaranteed students of educational
institutions. Necessarily, their exercise to discuss matters affecting their welfare or involving
public interest is not to be subjected to previous restraint or subsequent punishment unless there
be a showing of a clear and present danger to a substantive evil that the state, has a right to
present. As a corollary, the utmost leeway and scope is accorded the content of the placards
displayed or utterances made. The peaceable character of an assembly could be lost, however, by
an advocacy of disorder under the name of dissent, whatever grievances that may be aired being
susceptible to correction through the ways of the law. If the assembly is to be held in school
premises, permit must be sought from its school authorities, who are devoid of the power to deny
such request arbitrarily or unreasonably. In granting such permit, there may be conditions as to
the time and place of the assembly to avoid disruption of classes or stoppage of work of the non-
academic personnel. Even if, however, there be violations of its terms, the penalty incurred
should not be disproportionate to the offense.
Cecille Therese G. Pedregosa JD 1 - A

United Pepsi-Cola Supervisory Union (UPSU) v Hon. Bienvenido E. Laguesma

G.R. No. 122226 March 25, 1998
Mendoza, J.

Facts:
The petitioner is a union of supervisory employees. It appears that on March 20, 1995 the
union filed a petition for certification on behalf of the route managers at Pepsi-Cola Products
Philippines, Inc. However, its petition was denied by the med-arbiter and, on appeal, by the
Secretary of Labor and Employment, on the ground that the route managers are managerial
employees and, therefore, ineligible for union membership under the first sentence of Art 245 of
the Labor Code, which provides:
Ineligibility of managerial employees to join any labor organization; right of supervisory
employees-Managerial employees are not eligible to join, assist or form any labor organization.
Supervisory employees shall not be eligible for membership in a labor organization of the rank-
and-file employees but may join, assist or form separate labor organizations of their own.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, pressing for resolution its contention that the
first sentence of Art. 245 of the Labor Code, so far declares managerial employees to be
ineligible to form, assist or join unions, contravenes Article III, Section 8 of the 1987
Constitution which provides:
The right of the people, including those employed in the public and private sectors to form
unions, associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged.

Issue:
Whether or not Art. 245, insofar as it prohibits managerial employees from forming, joining
or assisting labor unions, violates Article III, Section 8 of the Constitution.

Ruling:
Art. 245 do not violate Article III, Section 8 of the Constitution. The real intent of Article
III, section 8 is evident in Lerum’s proposal. The Commission intended the absolute right to
organize of government workers, supervisory employees and security guards to be
constitutionally guaranteed. By implication, no similar absolute constitutional rights to organize
for labor purposes should be deemed to have been granted to top-level and middle managers. Nor
is the guarantee of organizational right in Art. III, Section 8 of the Constitution infringed by a
ban against managerial employees forming a union. The guaranteed right in Art. III, Section 8 is
subject to the condition that its exercise should be for the purposes “not contrary to law.” In the
case of Art 245, there is rational basis for prohibiting managerial employees from forming or
joining labor organization. For the reason that these managerial employees would belong to or
be affiliated with a Union, the latter might not be assured of their loyalty to the Union in view of
evident conflict of interest. The union also becomes company-dominated with the presence of
managerial employees in Union membership.
Cecille Therese G. Pedregosa JD 1 - A

Acosta v. CA
GR No. 132088 28 June 2000
De Leon, Jr., J.

Facts:
Petitioners are teachers from different public schools in Metro Manila. On various dates in
September and October 1990, petitioners did not report for work and instead, participated in
mass actions by public school teachers at the Liwasang Bonifacio for the purpose of petitioning
the government for redress of their grievances.
Petitioners were administratively charged with such offenses as grave misconduct, gross
neglect of duty, gross violation of civil service law, rules and regulations and reasonable office
regulations, refusal to perform official duty, gross insubordination, conduct prejudicial to the
best interest of the service and absence without official leave. Petitioners failed to answer these
charges. Following the investigations conducted by the DECS Investigating committees,
Secretary Cariño found petitioners guilty as charged and ordered their immediate dismissal from
the service. Petitioners appealed and the CSC modified the said orders of Secretary Cariño to six
(6) months suspension without pay. Appeal to CA denied

Issue:
Whether or not petitioner’s participation in the mass actions was an exercise of their
constitutional rights to peaceably assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances

Held:
These ‘mass actions’ were to all intents and purposes a strike; they constituted a concerted
and unauthorized stoppage of, or absence from, work which it was the teachers’ sworn duty to
perform, undertaken for essentially economic reasons.
The ability to strike is not essential to the right of association. In the absence of statute,
public employees do not have the right to engage in concerted work stoppages for any purpose.
Further, herein petitioners, are being penalized not because they exercised their right of
peaceable assembly and petition for redress of grievances but because of their successive
unauthorized and unilateral absences which produced adverse effects upon their students for
whose education they are responsible.
As aptly stated by the Solicitor General, “It is not the exercise by the petitioners of their
constitutional right to peaceably assemble that was punished, but the manner in which they
exercised such right which resulted in the temporary stoppage or disruption of public service and
classes in various public schools in Metro Manila. For, indeed, ther are efficient and non-
disruptive avenues, other than the mass actions in question, whereby peetitioners could petition
the government for redress of grievances.”
It bears stressing that suspension of public services, however temporary, will inevitably
derail services to the public, which is one of the reasons why the right to strike is denied
government employees. It may be conceded that the petitioners had valid grievances and noble
intentions in staging the “mass actions,” but that will not justify their absences to the prejudice of
innocent school children. Their righteous indignation does not legalize an illegal work stoppage.