Dinamicas:

Study Case 1 (13.1):

A case study of a severely corroded horizontal pressure vessel belonging to the YMGF Petroleum
Development Company in Nigeria was carried out. The large horizontal pressure vessel was manufactured
from carbon steel and commissioned in 1975 to separate three-phase streams containing a significant
amount of free water, CO2, H2S and other elements.
Which of the following mitigation measures would you recommend in this case:

A. Equipment Replacement and Repair

B. Evaluating Flaws for Fitness-For-Service
C. Equipment Modification, Redesign, and Rerating
D. Modify Process

Study Case 2:

Sometime before 11:22 p.m. on June 27, 2016, a major loss of containment (LOC) resulted in the
release of methane, ethane, propane, and several other hydrocarbons at the Enterprise Products
Pascagoula Gas Plant (PGP)1 in Pascagoula, Mississippi.

The hydrocarbons ignited, initiating a series of fires and explosions, which ultimately shut down
the site for almost six months.

Figure 1. Field of view (yellow) for the operators from their vantage point, located just outside the control
room and just inside the access control fencing, from which they assessed the magnitude of the incident
(circle).
The PGP site considered the potential for a vapor cloud explosion. To minimize the potential for a
vapor cloud to form, travel outside the boundaries of the PGP property, and then find an ignition
source, PGP’s emergency response plan was to vent the fuel both to the atmosphere and to flares,
and to allow any fires to burn until they self-extinguished. PGP established this “let it burn” philosophy
when it designed and built the plant, and its staff and responders generally followed the plan on June
27, 2016.

Two workers were on the night shift when the incident occurred and were uninjured. Had the
event happened during the day, when a larger number of personnel were working amid the
process line, the consequences could have been much worse.

Enterprise Products (Enterprise) incurred $10.4 million of expense due to fire response activities
and another non-cash loss of $7.1 million as a consequence of this incident. Although no off-site
property damage was reported, many nearby residents chose to evacuate.

The probable cause of this incident was the failure of a brazed aluminum heat exchanger (BAHX)
due to thermal fatigue. The absence of a reliable process to ensure the mechanical integrity of
the heat exchanger contributed to the catastrophic failure of the equipment. Thermal fatigue, as
a damage mechanism, commonly forms small cracks in BAHXs.
These small cracks can develop into hydrocarbon leaks that typically can be repaired with minimal
expense or consequence before a major LOC occurs.

Activities:

1. Specify the failure mechanism and mode present in this event (see section 8).
2. Indicate the type of product that was released and the consequences.

3. Categorize the consequences of this event. (see 10.1.1)

a) safety and health impacts,

b) environmental impacts,
c) economic impacts.

4. According to the following table, how would you classify the category of consequences of
this event (see 10.3.3):

5. According to the following table, indicate the category of consequences Safety, health and
environment of this event (see 10.3.6)

6. According to the category of explosion, which category would you say was presented at
the facility during this event:

a) vapor cloud explosion,

b) pool fire,
c) jet fire,
d) flash fire,
e) boiling liquid expanding vapor explosion (BLEVE).
Answer:

7. How would you calculate the consequences for the business (see 10.5.6)

a) business interruption = cost for cleanup + fines + other costs

b) business interruption = process unit daily value × downtime (days)
c) business interruption = cost for cleanup + fines
Answer:
Study case 3

La alimentación se inicia cuando, las Olefinas de la Unidad FCC se envían mediante las
bombas G-6219 A/B al Absorbedor de Olefinas D-6504.

10

D-6504

2
OLEFINAS DE FCC (G-
6219 A/B)
1

Figura 1.1. Diagrama Simplificado del lazo N° 1.

La Unidad de Aminas cumple con la función de minimizar el contenido de Sulfuro de

Hidrógeno de las corrientes de Olefinas C3/C4/C5 y Gas Combustible provenientes de la
Unidad de FCC.

Las Olefinas de la Unidad FCC se envían mediante las bombas G-6219 A/B al
Absorbedor de Olefinas D-6504, mediante control de flujo entran al Absorbedor por debajo del
segundo plato y ascienden poniéndose en contacto con una corriente de Amina pobre la cual
se introduce en el plato de tope. El H2S es selectivamente disuelto en la Amina Pobre cuya
concentración en la solución es de 20 % peso de MEA.

Los especialistas en corrosión y de proceso han determinado la posibilidad de tener

presente como mecanismos de degradación el Ampollamiento por Hidrógeno. El fenómeno se
desarrolla de la siguiente manera:

Durante el proceso de corrosión del acero al carbono por H2S o HCN, los iones sulfuro y
cianuro envenenan parcialmente la superficie por una fuerte adsorción de estos, de manera
que el hidrógeno formado en la reacción del hierro con estos entes, no puede combinarse en la
superficie metálica para formar hidrógeno molecular y abandonarla.
 Por el contrario, estos agentes favorecen la penetración del hidrógeno atómico en el
acero. A medida que este difunde dentro del material, puede formar hidrógeno molecular en
imperfecciones o defectos de este. Como la presión de equilibrio del hidrógeno molecular en
contacto con el hidrógeno atómico es de varios miles de atmósferas, se crean cavidades dentro
del acero producto de su deformación y falla interna.

1.1. Actividades:
Basado en esta información determine:

1. Tipo de data que sugiere utilizar para el estudio inicial (ver 7.2.1 y 7.5 del API 580,
ver tabla 4.1 de 581)
2. Susceptibilidad a ataque por hidrogeno ( ver tabla 9.1 del api 581)
3. Los métodos de ensayos no destructivos que sugeriría para detectar daños
causados por este tipo de mecanismo de degradación. (Ver Tabla 2.C.9.9. API
581)
4. Modos de fallas se esperan en este equipo. (ver 8.3 API 580)

Respuestas:

1. Tipo de datos que usted sugiere utilizar para el estudio inicial (ver 7.2.1 y 7.5, API 580
ver tabla 4.1 de 581)

2 Susceptibilidad al ataque de hidrógeno (ver tabla 9.1 de api 581), lo siguiente debe ser
evaluado.

3. Los métodos de pruebas no destructivas que usted sugeriría para detectar los daños
causados por este tipo de mecanismo de degradación. (Ver Tabla 2.C.9.9. API 581)
4. Indicar qué modos de fallo se esperan en este equipo. (ver 8.3 API 580)

Case study 4

An unusual method of construction produced another hidden hazard. A steel fractionation column was fitted
with an internal condenser that had an aluminum-bronze tubesheet. It had the same diameter as the vessel
but was welded to it in an unusual way, as shown in Figure.

No one at the plant was aware of this unusual method of construction

One of the welds cracked in service, and flammable vapor escaped. Fortunately, it did not ignite.
The column had been inspected twice in the five years since it had been built, but nothing unusual was
found. It is possible that no special attention was paid to the bimetallic welds, as all the engineers there
when the unit was built had left and none of their replacements knew that the construction was unusual.

The underlying cause, of course, was the lack of any system for keeping necessary information extant.
Unusual design features and points to watch during inspections should be recorded on vessel registration
records and vessel inspection schedules.

What type of documentation would you have requested to develop the risk-based inspection plan?
 STUDY CASE 5
The effectiveness of inspections is determined for each type of damage mechanism and is a function of
the type of technique used and the extent of coverage (reference API 581 Part 2, Annex 2.C for
informative examples of inspection effectiveness).

MAIN FRACTIONATION SYSTEM.

Summary
Hydrocarbon vapors from the top of the D-6202 main fractionating tower pass through the E-6210-1/12
condensers and are then sent to the E-6211 condensers.
Once these vapors are partially condensed, they are mixed with a separate naphtha stream in the D-6206
compressor suction drum of the gas compression system to enter the D-6205 accumulator drum.
Process Description
E-
E-

E- NA
FTA

GASES
D
D

GASO
AG
Figure. Simplified diagram.

At the top of the main column, a mixture of unstabilized gasoline and light gases leave at a temperature of
245ºF to be sent to the air coolers E-6210-1/12. The hydrocarbon vapors are cooled to a temperature of
163ºF.

Subsequently, the current enters the E-6211 top condensers, where by means of cooling water from the
tube side, hydrocarbon vapors are allowed to lower their inlet temperature to the D-6205 accumulator
drum to 100°F. The E-6211 A/B/C/D/E/F/G/H consist of a series of pairs of exchangers that operate in
series (E-6211 A/B, E-6211 C/D, E-6211 E/F and E-6211 G/H) in a parallel arrangement between them.

In the D-6205 accumulator drum, the net stop liquid known as "Unstabilized Gasoline" is separated from
the sour water that accumulates in the boot of the accumulator. On the other hand, the incondensable
gases of the system leave the buffer accumulator to go towards the wet gas compression system.

D-6202 Tower Inspection History

DATE
PURPOSE OF THE
EQUIPMENT NOTE
INTERVENTION
INSPECTION

THERMOGRAPHIC INSPECTION AT THE BOTTOM OF THE

VISUAL FEB-04
EQUIPMENT AND ITS OUTPUT LINES
INSPECTION
D-6202
SCHEDULED WELDING OF THE UPPER HALF BODY OF THE BOTTOM VALVES.
SHUTDOWN ENE-04 HEAT TREATMENT CARRIED TO COMPLETION
 SCHEDULED DISHED PLATES.

SHUTDOWN PLATES WITH STINGS, NEW PLATES ADDED. SLIGHT EXTERNAL

DIC-03 CORROSION. LINE FLANGE LEAKAGE. STEAM LINE WITH
UNIFORM CORROSION AND GENERALIZED PITTING (EXTERNAL
CORROSION)

From the data provided, determine:

1. Credible damage mechanisms.

2. Effectiveness of inspection (see Annex 2.C of API 581)

STUDY CASE 6 Dinámica. Métodos cuantitativos para el análisis de riesgos

Se reseña a continuación un árbol de sucesos correspondiente al siguiente iniciador: «Fuga de

hidrocarburo líquido en la proximidad de una esfera de GLP (Gas Licuado del Petróleo)».

A) CONSTRUCCIÓN DEL ÁRBOL DE SUCESOS

En la figura 2.15 se representa el árbol de sucesos. Básicamente contiene:

Notas:
(1) Incendio de charco.
(2) Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapour Explosion.
(3) Unconfined Vapour Cloud Explosion.
(4) Llamarada.
(5) f = 10-3 oc/año.

Halle el valor de consecuencia para cada caso

 Study case 7
A comprehensive analysis was performed by an engineering team with knowledge of the relevant
processes, operating parameters, corrosion analysis and damage mechanisms. This team assesses
potential damages that can adversely affect the equipment based on the material of construction. They
was also assess the operating parameters of process conditions, such as temperature, stream
constituents, pressure, vibration, abrasiveness and more. Once the team has identified potential
corrosive streams and the equipment materials of construction, the limits associated with the damage
mechanism are identified.

The applicable mitigation method for this case corresponds with:

A. Reduce Inventory
B. Modify Process
C. A Fitness-For-Service analysis
D. Establish Integrity Operating Windows

Question No: (14)

Explosion and Fire at Texas Chemical Plant Result from Faulty Welds. investigators determined that the
failed vessel, known as Tank 7, had been modified by Marcus Oil to install internal heating coils, as were
several other pressure vessels at the facility. Following coil installation, each vessel was resealed by
welding a steel plate over the 2- foot-diameter temporary opening. The repair welds did not meet accepted
industry quality standards for pressure vessels. Marcus Oil did not use a qualified welder or proper welding
procedure to reseal the vessels and did not pressure-test the vessels after the welding was completed. The
weld used to close the temporary opening on Tank 7 failed during the incident because the repair weld
(Figure 1) did not meet generally accepted industry quality standards for pressure vessel fabrication. The
original, flame-cut surface was not ground off the plate edges before the joint was re-welded, and the weld
did not penetrate the full thickness of the vessel head. Furthermore, the welds contained excessive porosity
(holes from gas bubbles in the weld). These defects significantly degraded the strength of the weld
From the event described above, indicate which of the following reasons justified a reassessment of the
risk:

A. Changes in process conditions and hardware

B. RBI Assessment Premise Change

From the event described above when to conduct an RBI Reassessment (14.3.4)

A. After a Set Time Period

B. After Implementation of Risk Mitigation Strategies
C. Before and After Maintenance Turnarounds

In this case which of the following governing inspection codes should have been revised?

A. API 570
B. API 653
C. API 510,
D. ASME SECC 8 DIV 1.