Student: Alvaro Montenegro Class: Arab Revolutions

Proffesor: Al-Zawawy Date: 11.9.2018

What caused the Syrian 2011 uprisings?

Understanding three main motives

Introduction

Yassin al-Haj Saleh (2012) classifies the history of the modern Syrian State in three: the period of 1943
to 1970 as the first republic, the following Bath´st rule from 1971 until 2011 as the second republic and
the after math that can emerge when the conflict finishes as the third republic.

Why the second republic, that is to say, the Bath rule, faced an existential threat in 2011? The revolts
were just a spillover effect from the bigger Arab Spring? Was modern Syria, a country with no more than
60 years of independent life, due to its colonial past, doomed to explode at any moment?

In order to understand any revolution 1, according to Wickham (1997), two questions are needed to be
address 1) the sources of grievance in the population and 2) what make these groups revolutionary
active or not.

The present paper, though not fully focusing on the theory of revolutions, it will apply some of it
concepts, specifically from Huntington’s Political Order and Changing Societies (1998), and analyze the
main motives behind the so called Syrian “Revolution” of 2011.

The paper is divided in three sections, each of one explaining a possible reason of the 2011 conflict: 1)
Syria´s historical inconsistency and colonial past, 2) Bath rule and sectarianism and 3) Foreign
intervention (Syrian Government narrative).

1) Syra´s historically non consistency and colonial legacy

Modern conflict in Syria can be explained and understood by looking how in the first place the nation
was born. As Sorenson (2016) observes “the current conflict reflects centuries of development” (pp. 9).

a) Modern Syria is incomplete: The Syrian Social Nationalist Party considered the new Syrian Arab
Republic, founded in 1946, as an artificial entity; an incomplete part of Greater Syria (Bilad Al-Sham)
which in the past encompassed the entire Fertile Crescent region; ranging from Baghdad to the Sinai
Peninsula. (Van Dam. 2017).

Indeed, from an historical stand point, modern Syria is a fragment of the Bilad Al-Sham area. Many
empires, since Akkadian times, passing to the Assyrian’s and Babylonian´s until Persian rule, rose and
fallen in the Fertile Crescent. This territory, as a whole, can be seen as having historical, cultural and
political integrity.

Historically, the specific region where modern Syria is located, as Wakim (2013) argues, has always been
disputed by the three big neighbors: Anatolia, Mesopotamia and Egypt.
1
Although the author personally does not consider the 2011 events in Syria as a revolution”, for the class objectives purpose, it
will be viewed as one.

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Student: Alvaro Montenegro Class: Arab Revolutions
Proffesor: Al-Zawawy Date: 11.9.2018

In that time (and also now), having control of Syria meant a huge geostrategic gain because it opened
the conquest for new territories. For example, by seizing modern Syria, the ancient Assyrian Empire
could extend their rule to Anatolia in the north or Egypt and Africa in the south. When the Ottomans
controlled Syria they were able to reach Iraq, the Persian Gulf, and then Egypt (until the Red Sea).

Due to its strategic position, modern Syria was always occupied by one of the major empires, being
Colonial Europe the last one. Today is noexception, with many regional and global powers having
military presence there.

b) French rule under ethnic lines: Syria was the last Arab nation who left the grip of the Ottoman Empire
in 1918. Two years later, in 1920, the French Mandate in Syria began.

Further dismemberment of Greater Syria came under the French rule. The Levant region (Syria, Jordan,
Lebanon and Palestine), which also could be viewed as geographically, culturally and historically united
entity, was separated by the British, who, fearful of the complete French control over the Levant, carved
new states from it such as British occupied Jordan and Palestine.

These divide and rule colonial policies, according to Sorenson (2016) were a prime factor in Syria´s weak
national integration today. Not only long standing integrated cultural, social and economic relations
were torn up, but also, the seeds of what later would be denominated as a “sectarian conflict”, were
being planted and watered.

In French dominated Syria, as opposed to British Irak, which was ruled under the concept of Arab
nationalism a thus considered all Iraqis under a homogenous Arab umbrella, the French ruled under
stark distinctions between groups, establishing a mosaic of various minorities; perceiving and
understanding Syria as a fragment society along ethnic lines.

The French fear and rejecttion of the rising British sponsored Arab Nationalism lied in the threat it could
pose to their possessions in North Africa. If France decided to embrace the Arab nationalism revolts may
take place over there.

Consequently, under French mandate, within modern Syria, alongside with Christian and Sunni Muslim
states, an Alawite state was created. It was the French administrations who decided to build a military
force just composed of Alawi´s who enjoyed a special status.

b) Independent but unstable Syria: As Huntington2 layed out, new independent countries are likely to
suffer instability and political disorder. The development of social institutions takes time and meanwhile
the people may feel frustrated because they cannot take proper part in the political system.

To overcome such scenario, according to Huntington (1968), an “authoritarian transition” is needed. The
newly born states fragile political systems can be destabilized by premature political participation like
elections. If there is no political order no modernization nor economic or social development can take
place. A “modernizing dictator” can provide the necessary stability by implementing the rule of law and

2
Hutington, Samuel. (1968). Political Order in Changing Socities

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Student: Alvaro Montenegro Class: Arab Revolutions
Proffesor: Al-Zawawy Date: 11.9.2018

the building blocks for a future economic development. Once this is achieved, other properties of
modernization like democracy and citizen participation can take place. Authoritarian regimes may not
prove liberty but they do provide stable governance.

Unfortunately, the first years of Syrian independence were characterized precisely by the lack of any
“modernizing dictator” strong enough who could lead the country to stability. Instead, after French
evacuation in 1946, a successive period of military coups followed for almost two decades.

Unlike Turkey´s Ataturk, Egypt´s Nasser or Jordan´s King Abdullah, in Syria, as Sorenson (2016) points
out, “there was no leading political figure to guide the first steep to nationhood (…) No national figure
emerged to move Syria into modernity, unity, or sense of purpose. Instead, there were contesting
groups of elites, including both rural and urban” (p.15)

Cleveland (2009) also agrees that Syria´s post independent instability can be explained; alongside with
the French divide and rule policies, due the lack of a figure that could lead and unite the army, like the
case of the Free Officers in Egypt.

However, after the end of the Syrian-Egyptian Union in 1958, the Bath´ist Coup of 1963 marked the
beginning of a relative stability in Syria. After internal struggles, Hafez al-Assad consolidated power in
1971 and managed to rule five decades. Did the much needed “modernizing dictator” arrived?

2) Bath´ist Dictatorship & sectarianism

Syria´s current conflict can be also explained by the exhausted long time authoritarian rule of the Bath
party.

a) 1963 Bath Coup Significance: In 1963 the Secret Military Committee launched a coup against the
Syrian ‘separatist regime’ (sunni damascene dominated) who, two years before, ended the Syrian-
Egyptian union. The Secret Military Committee was composed by three main Alawi figures: Umrad, Jalil
and Hafez al-Assad alongside with other religious minorities such as Ismaelis, Druzes and Christians.

This coup meant, as Nikolaos Van Dam (2017) puts it, a “social revolution”: rural and religious minorities
which previously had been discriminated archived a national emancipation. The panorama in which
urban Sunnis held the economic power began to change gradually after 1963.

It was not just an overthrow of the government; the 1963 coup also implied a change of the social
system. The old Sunni urban elite was overthrown and replaced with religious minority rural groups. In
such scenario, the influx of rural peasants into the cities began to grow.

Now, if the Alawis wanted to establish themselves as the new ruling elite, they needed to secure their
position by changing the old Sunni dominated regime, and put loyal people instead; other fellow Alawis.

A Sunni purge began alongside “loyalist” recruitment. The new incomers packed the army, security
services and bureaucrat government positions. It was the rise of what Goldstone (1982) called as the

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Student: Alvaro Montenegro Class: Arab Revolutions
Proffesor: Al-Zawawy Date: 11.9.2018

“elite within” the bureaucracy. “This may occur when a state, in the course of seeking more effective,
centralized rule, provides certain civil or military officials with special status or elite training” (pp.196).

The 1963 Coup marked the end of the supremacy of the Sunni urban elite in Syria. However, Sunnis,
especially Islamists, did not surrender that easy. On the contrary, they fought back and took every
opportunity available to antagonize the government end the rule of the “heretic” Alawis, including, of
course, the 2011 uprisings.

b) ¿Aggravation of sectarianism during the Bath Rule?: As Van Dam (2017) highlights, many viewed the
1963 Bath Coup basically as a sectarian plot; a movement which had designs for supplanting the
traditional order in which Sunnis were dominant.

Through partially true, according to Van Dam, the Bath coup was not planned as sectarian plot. However
it ended like one. Ironically, the Bath Party “although pursuing an ideology that wanted to do away with
sectarian, regional and tribal loyalties, found itself more or less forced to revert to those same
traditional loyalties when it took power in order to not lose the strength that was needed to realize that
ideology” (p.17).

The new religious minority elite in power held a kind of revanchist against the Sunnis, who in the past
had so often denigrated Alawis, Christians or Druzes. For their part, the Sunnis also were resented and
could not tolerate being ruled by who have been previous second class citizens.

Although the Sunnies in the beginning still retain some power share, since the late 1970´s, their
importance started to decline, “and a new practice took over in which Alawite deputy shadowed every
Sunni role who had a leading role in an institution” (Slim, Hugo; Trombetta, Lorenzo. 2014. pp:12)

The sectarian antagonism, which developed since colonial times, began to emerge and became a taboo
subject under the five decades of Bath rule.

In 1979 a Sunni Officer (who belonged to a sect from Muslim brotherhood) killed many Alawi conscripts,
in what is now called the “Aleppo Artillery Academy Incident”. Immediately after the Government
launched a brutal response against Muslim Brotherhood activists.

One year later in 1980 an assassination attempt was directed toward the president Hafiz Al Assad. Many
Muslim Brotherhood members and oppositions suspects were took to the Tadmor Prision in Palmyra
and tortured and massacred by Hafez brother; Rifaat Al-Assad.

The same year various Sunnis groups formed “The Islamic Front Syria” and called for uprising against the
government. Even though the action gained some support and achieved to take the Hama town, in 1982
government forces regain the control and the “Hama Massacre” took place.

Such sequence of events were neither forgotten nor forgiven, and contributed to create “persistent
insurgencies”3: opposition groups who are able to survive for long periods an accumulated power
despite the drawbacks.
3
The concept is utilized by Wickham (1997) to address the guerrillas from Latin America.

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Student: Alvaro Montenegro Class: Arab Revolutions
Proffesor: Al-Zawawy Date: 11.9.2018

Hafez Al-Assad was not able to neutralize these persistent insurgencies groups, who were ready take
revenge at any moment possible. And indeed, when the time came in 2011 under Bashar Al-Assad rule,
old resentments were ignited again without thinking twice.

c) Bashar Al- Assad economic liberalization effects on the poor rural class: According to Wakin (2013),
apart from the nepotism, corruption and monopolization of political life that contributed to the protests
eruption of 2011, the main reasons for the population resentment where the “unchecked economic
liberalization process” undertook by the Syrian Minister of Finance Abdallah Dardari between 2005 and
2011.

“These economic reforms benefited the urban bourgeois class at the expense of small and medium
industrial firms and crafts, especially since they encouraged an import policy that flooded the market
with foreign goods and led to many factories going bankrupt” (pp: 173).

Erlich (2014) also points out the negative effects of the neoliberal policies implemented by Bashar which
privatized state owned business and only benefited the Alawite elite in disregard of the common people.
Also the capital that was coming from the gulf countries contributed to the rise of inflation, prices of real
state and living costs in general. When the Arab spring reached Syria, apart for the demands for a less
repressive regime, the poor rural classes saw an opportunity to express their discomfort about the harsh
economic conditions they were living in.

The rural poor classes, who were the government’s traditional main supporters, were the most affected
by the liberal economic reforms and played key role in the weakening the governments legitimacy. As
Huntington (1968) point outs; “If the countryside supports the political system and the government, the
system itself is secure against revolution and the government has some hope of making itself secure
against rebellion. If the countryside is in opposition, both system and government are in danger of
overthrow.” (p. 312). The rural class actions are critical in achieving a revolution or not.

Although Huntington regards the powerful middle class as the true revolutionary actor in the modern
societies it also states that they cannot make revolution alone. The middle class can build a strong
opposition against the government and organize protests; nonetheless all those activities are confined in
the city. The government can easily isolate the urban centers and contain the opposition. In order to
make a revolution, there is a need of participation of the rural groups.

For their part, the opposition was not able to forge a consistent and unified revolutionary alliance, let
alone gain the rural support. The opposition soon understood that a regime change was not going to
happen and their only hope was to create a situation where foreign intervention was necessary and
justified.4

c) Bashar Al- Assad reforms attempts: Bashar Al-Assad tried to introduce reforms; he putted an end to
the state of emergency that was still applied since 1963, introduced new laws for more press freedom
and political participation, increased salaries of the public sector, released political prisoners, granted

4
Jenkins. (2014). (pp.12)

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Student: Alvaro Montenegro Class: Arab Revolutions
Proffesor: Al-Zawawy Date: 11.9.2018

naturalization to Kurds, and proposed new elections 5. However all these measures prove to be
unsuccessful and failed calming the protests that erupted in 2011.

As the natural history of revolutions theory states, one of the sequence that all “Great Revolutions” 6
pass upon is the intention of implementing reforms. “Just prior to the fall of the old regime, the state
attempts to meet its sharpest criticism by undertaking major reforms”. None the less, “such reforms
generally serve to further undermine the regime” (Goldstone. 1982, pp:190)

3) Syrian Government narrative

a) Foreign intervention: En octubre del 2011, justo después de que estallaran las protestas en Daraa, el
periodista Reese Erlich (2014. pp: 84) entrevistó al gobernador de esa ciudad, Mohammed Khaled
Hanos. Desde esa fecha Hanos establecería lo que iba a ser la versión oficial del gobierno, que ahora,
siete años después, sigue siendo la misma.

La narrativa del gobierno acepta que las protestas en Daara comenzaron pacíficamente y fueron
legítimas, sin embargo, "casi de inmediato", fueron secuestradas por agitadores y extremistas
financiados por Qatar y Arabia Saudita. No solo las monarquías del golfo comenzaron a intervenir
directamente en el problema interno de Siria, sino también Israel, EE. UU. y algunos estados de Europa
aprovecharon la oportunidad para apoyar militar y políticamente a los manifestantes, que mataron a
más de 1200 efectivos del ejército oficialista, policías y otras fuerzas de seguridad siria.

b) ¿Intervenció directa de Estados Unidos? Naiman, la persona encargada de analizar los cables
relacionados con Siria en el libro The Wikileaks Files, The World According to the US Empire (2015),
afirma que el cambio de régimen sirio fue una política de los Estados Unidos que ya venía de
antes. Incluso era anterior a los levantamientos del 2011, llegando hasta la administración
Bush.

El nombre del cable que respalda dicha declaración se llama " Influencing the SARG (Syrian
Government) in the end of 2006" y revela las muchas estrategias y propuestas de William Roebuck
(en ese momento parte del personal que trabajaba en la Embajada de los Estados Unidos en
Damasco), que podían usarse para desestabilizar al gobierno sirio.

Por ejemplo:1) publicitar e intentar dirigir la atención regional, con la ayuda de Egipto y Arabia
Saudita, sobre el tema de la influencia chiíta iraní sobre Siria, 2) dar acceso a los medios de
comunicación a importantes figuras de la oposición siria (como el ex vicepresidente Abdul
Khaddam) y alentarlos a difundir su mensaje contra el gobierno, 3) promover rumores y señales
de conspiración interna (y así hacer que el régimen sea más paranoico), 5) cuestionar,
desacreditar e intentar socavar las reformas económicas de Assad 6) desalentar la Inversión
Extranjera Directa del Golfo en Siria y 7) destacar, resalatar las quejas kurdas.
5
Wakim, Jamal. (2013). (pp. 180)
6
Even though the Syrian Revolution is not a “Great Revolution” like the French or Chinese, and not even a successful revolution,
these concept of the natural history theory still is usefull.

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Student: Alvaro Montenegro Class: Arab Revolutions
Proffesor: Al-Zawawy Date: 11.9.2018

Naiman, al examinar otros cables, también descubrió que Estados Unidos estaba financiando
secretamente a grupos de oposición sirios (hecho el cual el servicio de inteligencia sirio tenia
conocimiento)

Naiman concluye: “saber que Estados Unidos nunca abandonó su política de cambio de
régimen en Siria da luz sobre nuestra comprensión de la cuestión de la intervención militar de
Estados Unidos en Siria hoy. Nos muestra que Estados Unidos no es una víctima inocente de las
circunstancias, que tuvo que considerar el uso de la fuerza porque la diplomacia se había
agotado; más bien Estados Unidos se encuentra en una situación a la que ayudó a crear, al
buscar el cambio de régimen durante años y nunca buscar honestamente una salida
dimplomática". (pp: 228)

c) ¿Porqué Estados Unidos intervino en Siria? La alianza Siria con Irán podría ser uno de los motivos
principales. La intención estadounidense de controlar el Líbano y neutralizar a Hezbolá ayudaría al
futuro aislamiento del gobierno sirio y el consiguiente cambio de régimen.

Sin embargo, para tratar de comprender los motivos reales de los Estados Unidos, es necesario mirar a
la imagen completa. ¿Por qué Estados Unidos intervino en Medio Oriente en primer lugar? El petróleo
generalmente constituye la razón principal. Aunque Siria no es precisamente un país rico en petróleo, su
riqueza radica en su posición geográfica, como se vio en la primera sección.

Wakim (2007) argumenta que el motivo principal detrás de la intervención de Estados Unidos en el
Medio Oriente fue (¿es?) la intención de evitar la formación de un bloque euroasiático que podría
ignorar y marginar a Washington. El ex asesor de seguridad nacional de EE. UU. Zbigniew Brzezinski,
quien siguió las enseñanzas del padre de la geopolítica moderna Halford Mackinder, sabía que una
región eurasiática integrada era una gran amenaza para la hegemonía unipolar de la posguerra fría de
EE. UU.

En este sentido, los ataques al 11 de septiembre fueron la oportunidad perfecta para que Estados
Unidos comenzara a controlar el Medio Oriente: la región que separa Europa de Asia. Afganistán fue
seguido por la invasión de Irak en 2003, y luego "un próximo paso lógico sería derrocar o socavar los
regímenes en Irán y Siria para controlar completamente el Medio Oriente" (págs. 157)

Siguiendo esta lógica, Wakim (2013) concluye en su epílogo:

"La primavera siria fue, al menos en parte, una lucha entre las superpotencias y las potencias regionales
por el corazón del Medio Oriente moldeado por los deseos de Estados Unidos de imponer el control
total sobre Siria y así establecer un orden mundial que lo mantenga como el primer poder en el mundo.
EE. UU. sabe que quien controle a Siria puede ejercer su control sobre Irak, Turquía y Egipto, países
cuales están todos conectados por el primero. Quien controla esas tres regiones geopolíticas puede
ejercer su influencia en todo el Medio Oriente. Y quien lo haga puede controlar el mundo ”(págs. 192)

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Student: Alvaro Montenegro Class: Arab Revolutions
Proffesor: Al-Zawawy Date: 11.9.2018

d) Apoyo de Sud-America hacia la narrtiva del gobierno de Assad: Además del respaldo de Rusia y
China, Assad también contó con el curioso apoyo de muchos países de América Latina.

Como un continente que en el siglo XX logró una transición exitosa y relativamente pacífica de los
regímenes dictatoriales militares a la democracia, se esperaba que América Latina, como Occidente,
apoyara el levantamiento impulsado por los demócratas contra los dictadores árabes totalitarios
durante la Primavera Árabe.

No obstante, muchos gobiernos de América Latina, aunque no rechazaron los llamados a la

implementación de un régimen más democrático, demostraron su apoyo a Gadafi y Assad.

Cuba, Bolivia, Venezuela, Nicaragua y Ecuador se constituyeron en ese momento como estados con
gobiernos de izquierda que simpatizaban con Assad debido a la ideología común anti Estados Unidos.
Especialmente Fidel Castro de Cuba y Hugo Chávez de Venezuela representaron y lideraron el
movimiento antiimperialista de América Latina.

La doctrina del antiimperialismo inspirada en el marxismo puede definirse como una "consideración
hostil de las acciones de los gobiernos occidentales, específicamente el de los Estados Unidos, que me
consideran imponente y contradictorio con los intereses de otros actores". (Galindo, A; Baeza, C; Brun,
E. (2014). (p:132)

The Marxist inspired doctrine of anti-imperialism can be defined as a “hostile consideration of western
government actions, specifically those of the U.S, which are considering to me imposing and being
contradictory to the interests of other actors” 7

The NATO intervention in Libya confirmed the anti-imperialist doctrine worries. It set a precedent in
what would later be many Latin American left governments position towards Syria: total rejection of
intervention and total respect of Syria´s sovereignty. The doctrine of “responsibility to protect” (military
intervention for humanitarian purposes), was fully mistrusted.

In 2004 Venezuela and Cuba founded the “Bolivarian Alliance for People of our America” (ALBA): an
intergovernmental institution which served as a forum for left wing governments of the region (or, as
someone also qualifies them, “radical” 8 left wing governments) with clear position against the neoliberal
principles of the West and a critical view of his policies.

In 2011, just after the Syrian Crisis unleashed, the ALBA sent a delegation to Damascus as a gesture of
support9. The ALBA delegation reunited with President Bashar Al-Assad and expressed their support and
condemnation of western intervention.

7
Galindo, A; Baeza, C; Brun, E. (2014). (p:132)
8
Galindo, A; Baeza, C; Brun, E. (2014).
9

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Student: Alvaro Montenegro Class: Arab Revolutions
Proffesor: Al-Zawawy Date: 11.9.2018

4. Conclusions

The Syrian 2011 revolution can be explained by 1) Syria´s history of sectarianism inherited from the
French rule, 2) five decades of relative stable Bath rule which used repression and clientelism as a tool
and 3) foreign west intervention directed to topple Assad.

All of these causes played a part and the conjunction of all made the 2011 Syrian crisis possible. As
Goldstone (1982) notes “they key to revolution lies in the coalescence, in time of crisis, of diverse
moments –peasant uprisings, elite political revolts, religious heterodoxies- into a widespread attack on
the institutions of the old regime” (pp.203)

Historically Syria belonged to greater Fertile Crescent area, which hosted many empires. In modern
colonial times, Greater Syria, or “Bilad al-Sham”, or the Levant, was separated by the French and the
British. After its independent, Syria faced almost two decades of military coups. Following the failure of
a union with Egypt, the Bath party took control in the 1963 “social revolution”.

In the new scenario rural minorities (Alewi, Druze) started to dominate the urban sunnis. This emerging
rural elite composed from religious minorities started to favor only members of their own communities
in order to secure power and thus reinforcing a structure based on tribal loyalties and clientelism.

It was precisely due to this clientelist nature of the government, that the 2011 protests were deemed to
turn into an armed conflict. Expecting a nonviolent transition, in which Bashar Al-Assad will step out of
power because the peaceful demonstrations demand him to do so, is nothing but “wishful thinking”
(Van Dam. 2017). On the contrary, if the government was going to be changed, a military confrontation
was inevitable.

The Syrian Bath´ Party, despite governing the country for five decades with relative stability, was not
able to solve the sectarian inherited problem of Syria that haunted the country since independent times.
The Sunni-Alewwi tensions were always present, year by year fueled by hate, patiently but surely
waiting for the time to explode: since the 1961 coup, to the 1982 Hamma Masacre until the 2011 revolts
where the conflict could not be contained anymore. The Sunni/alawi and other minorities resentment
instead of healing exploded. Alongside with this the economic liberalization policies implemented by
Bashar al-Assad did prejudice the traditional rural loyal classes in.

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Student: Alvaro Montenegro Class: Arab Revolutions
Proffesor: Al-Zawawy Date: 11.9.2018

For Huntington, historically, revolution has led to either: “(a) the restoration of traditional structures of
authority; or (b) military dictatorship and the rule of force; or (c) the creation of new authority
structures, reflecting the fundamental changes in the amount and the distribution of power in the
political system produced by the revolution”. (pp.333)

In the Syrian case, the actual state of affairs is directed towards a mix of the first and second option.

How will the distant future portray Assad? As the murder of almost half million Syrians and the
responsible for the destruction of a nation? Or as the one who save Syria from destruction and stood
against the west?

Winning history will tell.

What it can be concluded is that many people died, and much suffering was caused. Nonetheless,
adopting an optimistic view, Syria can re-emerge stronger that before. Many European countries, as well
as China, Korea or Japan, and even the US, achieved their national unity after bloody wars.

As Fukuyama writes at the end of the preface that made for Hobsbawm book, “If one examines
historical cases of state formation and state building in the regions of the world that have strong states
(primarily Europe and East Asia), the uncomfortable truth emerges: violence has always been a key
ingredient.” (p.xvi).

5. Bibliography

Al-Haj Saleh, Yassin. (2012). From the Kingdom of Assad to the Third Republic, in Syria´s Revolution
Society, Power Ideology (pp. 12- 20). Heinrich Boll Stiftung.

Cleveland, William; Buton, Martin. (2009). The Midle East in the Age of Nasse: The Radicalization of Arab
Politics, in A History of the Modern Middle East. Westview Press

Erlich, Reese. (2014). Inside Syria. New York, Prometheus Books.

Escobar, Pepe. (2012, 8 Agust). Syria´s Pipelineistan War. Al Jazeera

Goldstone, Jack. (1982). The Comparative and Historical Study of Revolutions. Annual Review of
Sociology 8, 187-207

Hutington, Samuel. (1968). Political Order in Changing Socities. London, Yale University Press

Jenkins, Brian. (2014). The Dynamics of Syria´s Civil War. Rand Corporation

Naiman, Robert. (2015). Syria, in The Wikileaks Files, The World According to the US Empire. London,
Verso.

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Student: Alvaro Montenegro Class: Arab Revolutions
Proffesor: Al-Zawawy Date: 11.9.2018

Slim, Hugo; Trombetta, Lorenzo. (2014). Syria Crisis Common Context Analysis. Inter Agency
Humanitarian Evaluations Steering Group

Sorenson, David. (2016). Syria in Ruins. The Dynamycs of the Syrian Civil War. Praeger Security
International

Van Dam, Nikolaos. (2017). Destroying a Nation: The Civil War in Syria. London, I.B. Tauris

Wakim, Jamal. (2013). The Struggle of Mayor Powers over Syria. Ithaca Press

Wickham, Timothy. (1997). Structural Theories of Revolution, in Theorizing Revolutions (pp. 36-61).
Routledge

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