People vs.

Jabinal
G.R. No. L-30061 February 27, 1974

FACTS

Respondent appealed from the judgment of the MTC Batangas finding him guilty of the crime of
Illegal Possession of Firearm and Ammunition he contested the validity of his conviction based
on a retroactive application of the ruling in People v. Mapa.

Respondent was appointed as Secret Agent from the Provincial Governor of Batangas and an
appointment as Confidential Agent from the PC Provincial Commander, and the said
appointments expressly carried with them the authority to possess and carry the firearm in
question.

Respondent alleged that at the time of his appointments the prevailing doctrines are
Macarandang and Lucero doctrine.

In Macarandang it was held that "peace officers" are exempted from the requirements relating to
the issuance of license to possess firearms.

While Lucero doctrine provides that the granting of the temporary use of the firearm to the
accused was a necessary means to carry out the lawful purpose of the battalion commander and
must be deemed incident to or necessarily included in the duty and power of said military
commander to effect the capture of a Huk leader.
Respondent and OSG alleged that the decision held in Mapa Case is of no applicability in this
case

ISSUE

Whether or not the appellant should be acquitted on the basis of Our rulings in Macarandang
and Lucero, or should his conviction stand in view of the complete reversal of the Macarandang
and Lucero doctrine in Mapa case?

RULING

The SC held that the decision in People v. Mapa reversing the Macarandang and Lucero
doctrines came only in 1967, it has no proper application in this case.

Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the
legal system in the Philippines.
The doctrine laid down in Lucero and Macarandang was part of the jurisprudence, hence, of the
law, of the land, at the time appellant was found by possession of the firearm in question and
when he was arraigned by the trial court.

It is true that the doctrine was overruled in the Mapa case in 1967, but when a doctrine of this
Court is overruled and a different view is adopted, the new doctrine should be applied
prospectively, and should not apply to parties who had relied on the old doctrine and acted on the
faith thereof.

Petitioner incurred no criminal liability at the time of the commission of the crime since the
prevailing doctrine then were the doctrines of Macarandang and Lucero
 Bayot v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No.155635, 7 November 2008

FACTS:

On April 20, 1979, Vicente, a Filipino, and Rebecca, an American, were married in Muntinlupa.
They had a child name Alix, born in November 27, 1982 in California.

In February 22, 1996, Rebecca initiated divorce proceedings in Dominican Republic, which
resulted to judgment ordering the dissolution of the marriage and the distribution of conjugal
properties

After obtaining a Department of Justice affirmation of her Filipino citizenship, she then filed a
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage on the ground of Vicente’s alleged psychological
incapacity, seeking for distribution of conjugal properties and support.

On June 8, 2001, Vicente filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds of lack of cause of action and
that the petition is barred by the prior judgment of divorce.

RTC denied Vicente’s motion to dismiss but CA reversed lower court’s decision. According to
the CA, RTC ought to have granted Vicente’s motion to dismiss, since the marriage between the
spouses is already dissolved when the divorce decree was granted since Rebecca was an
American citizen when she applied for the decree.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the divorce decree obtained by Rebecca in Dominican Republic is valid.

RULING:

Yes, the divorce is valid.

Article 26 (2) of the Civil Code states that: “Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have the capacity to
remarry under Philippine law.”

Rebecca at that time she applied and obtained her divorce was an American citizen and remains
to be one, being born to American parents in Guam, an American territory which follows the
principle of jus soli granting American citizenship to those who are born there. She was, and still
may be, a holder of American passport. She had consistently professed, asserted and represented
herself as an American citizen, as shown in her marriage certificate, in Alix’s birth certificate,
when she secured divorce in Dominican Republic.

Being an American citizen, Rebecca was bound by the national laws of the United States of
America, a country which allows divorce. The fact that Rebecca may have been duly recognized
as a Filipino citizen by affirmation of the DOJ Secretary does not invalidate the foreign divorce
secured by Rebecca as an American citizen in 1996. In determining whether or not a divorce is
secured abroad would come within the jurisdiction of the country’s policy against absolute
divorce, the reckoning point is the citizenship of the parties at the time a valid divorce is
obtained.
 Scheneckerburger vs. Moran
63 Phil. 249 (1943)

FACTS

Schneckenburger, who is an honorary consul of Uruguay at Manila was subsequently charged in

CFI-Manila with the crime of falsification of a private document. He objected to this
saying that under the US and Philippine Constitution, the CFI has no jurisdiction to try him.
After his objection was overruled, he filed a petition for a writ of prohibition to prevent the CFI
from taking cognizance of the criminal action filed against him. Aside from this, he contended
that original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors and consuls is conferred exclusively
upon the Supreme Court of the Philippines.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the US Supreme Court has Original Jurisdiction over cases affecting
ambassadors, consuls, et. al and such jurisdiction excludes courts of the Phils.

No. First of all, a consul is not entitled to the privilege of diplomatic immunity. A consul is not
exempt from criminal prosecution for violations of the laws of the country where he resides. The
inauguration of the Philippine Commonwealth on Nov. 15, 1935 caused the Philippine
Constitution to go into full force and effect. This Constitution is the supreme law of the land.
This Constitution provides that the original jurisdiction of this court “shall include all cases
affecting ambassadors, consuls et.al.”

2. Whether or not original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, consuls, et. al. is
conferred exclusively upon the Supreme Court of the Philippines

“The Supreme Court shall have original and appellate jurisdiction as may be possessed and
exercised by themSupreme Court of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this
constitution.” According to Sec. 17. of Act No. 136 and by virtue of it, jurisdiction to issue writs
of quo warranto, certiorari, mandamus, prohibition and habeas corpus was also conferred on the
CFI’s. As a result, the original jurisdiction possessed and exercised by the Supreme Court of the
Philippines at the time the Constitution was adopted was not exclusive of, but concurrent with,
that of the CFI’s. The original jurisdiction conferred to Supreme Court by the Constitution was
not an exclusive jurisdiction.