Human Rights: A New Standard of Civilization?

Author(s): Jack Donnelly

Source: International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-), Vol. 74, No. 1
(Jan., 1998), pp. 1-23
Published by: Wiley on behalf of the Royal Institute of International Affairs
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 Human rights:

a new standardof civilization?

JACK DONNELLY

JohnVincenthad hoped thathis Human rights and international

relations
might
make some inroads into Hedley Bull's 'cheerful scepticismabout human
rights'.'This memoriallecturecontinuesto attackthe stillcommon scepticism
towardsinternationalhuman rights-although from an unorthodox angle.
Taking offfromthe work of anotherof Bull's students,GerritGong,2 I will
argue thatinternationally recognizedhuman rightshave become verymuch
like a new international
'standardof civilization'.

Civilization and systems of states

Institutionalizedrelationsamong separatepoliticalunitstypicallyrestnot only
on power and interestbut also on a communalbond linked to highervalues.
A'moral standardhas seemed to underlieinternationalorder and to suggest
that thereis some social cement which helps,however tenuously,to affixa
generalsense thatthereis an internationalcommunity'.3Power may make a
statepart of an internationalsystem;collectiverecognitionas part of interna-
tional society,4
however,appeals to 'principlesthatprevail(or are at least pro-
claimed) withina majorityof the states...as well as in the relationsbetween

* I received
numerous criticisms
helpful andsuggestions
at and aftertheJohnVincentlecture,
andin sem-
inarparticipations at Keele University andtheUniversity ofDenver.I alsothankDave Forsythe, Alan
Gilbert, Arthur Gilbert, LisaHall,Lori Hartmann-Mahmud, AngeliqueHaugerud,CurtisHolme,Rhoda
Howard,MichaelineIshayandHaiderKahnfortheirwritten comments on earlierdrafts.
R. J.Vincent, Humanrights andinternationalrelations(Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press,i986),
p. viii.
2 Gerrit W Gong,Thestandard of'civilisation'
ininternationalsociety
(Oxford:Clarendon, i984). See also
GeorgSchwarzenberger, 'The standard ofcivilisation in international
law', CurrentLegalProblems 17,
1955, pp.2I2-34; B.V.A. Roling,International lawinan expanded world (Amsterdam: Djambatan,i960),
ch.4.Vincentaddressed relatedissuesin 'The factorofculturein theglobalinternational order',Year
BookofWorld Affairs1980 (London:Stevens) p. 34;'Race in internationalrelations',
International
Affairs
58:3Autumni982, pp.658-70;and'Racial equality', in HedleyBull andAdamWatson,eds,Theexpan-
sionofinternational society(Oxford:Clarendon, i984).
3 PeterLyon,'New statesandinternational order',inAlanJames, ed., Thebasesofinternationalorder:essays
inhonour ofC. A. W Manning (London:OxfordUniversity Press,I973),p. S7
4 See HedleyBull,Theanarchical society:
a studyoforder inworldpolitics
(NewYork:ColumbiaUniversity
Press,I 977), pp.9-I 5.

InternationalAffairs
74, I (I998) I-24 I

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JackDonnelly

them'.5'Inside' and'outside',in international no less thannationalsocieties,are

definednot simplyby geographyor evenby a historyofinteraction, but by cul-
turalvalues thatmake insidersdifferent from,and in many ways superiorto,
outsiders.
Internationallegitimacy,'the collectivejudgment of internationalsociety
about rightful membershipof thefamilyof nations',6has manydimensionsand
sources.I will focus on appeals to high cultureor civilization.I startwith the
factthatin East andWestalike,'civilized'and 'barbarian'peoples and stateshave
typicallybeen treatedaccordingto different rules.
China's 'traditional'internationalrelations-somewhatmore precisely,Qing
diplomatictheory-assumed a world hierarchically orderedunder the Son of
Heaven,Emperorof the Middle Kingdom.7The Emperor,'farfrombeing the
ruler of one state among many,was the mediator between heaven and
earth...theapex of civilization,unique in the universe'.8To put'Chinese' before
civilizationwas redundant.Foreignerswere by definitionbarbariansand 'no
different fromthe lower animals'.9They were expected to accept subordinate
statusin relationsof tributeand vassalage(as did,at varioustimes,more or less
willingly, neighbouringstatessuch as Korea,Assam,Burma and Siam). China
also used standard'realist'tactics,such as policies of deterrenceand 'divide and
conquer',for'barbarianmanagement'.Those evil or ignorantenough to refuse
to acknowledge'natural'Chinese superioritywere to be kept at a safe dis-
tance-preferablybehind walls,such as the GreatWall or tradingenclavesin
Macao and Canton. The civilization-basedtributarylogic gave a distinctive
characterto thissystemof relations,especiallyin dealingswith'barbarians'.
Civilization,defined in largelyreligious terms,was also importantin the
internaland externalrelationsof the Ottoman Empire.EarlyOttoman expan-
sion was justifiedby the idea of gaza, an 'ideological complex of heroism,
honor,and strivingin the name of Islam'.'0 The doctrineofjihad (holy war)
justified Ottoman relationswith Europeans and other infidels.Success in
spreadingthe faithinto Europe helped to legitimateOttoman power both at
home and in the broaderMuslim world.

5 MartinWight,Systems
ofstates
(Leicester:
Leicester
University
Press,I977), p. I53.
6 Ibid.Cf.ThomasM. Franck,
Thepoweroflegitimacy
amongnations
(NewYork:OxfordUniversity
Press,
I 990), pp. I 89-92.
7 The followingdrawsheavilyonJohnKingFairbank, ed.,TheChinese worldorder:
traditional
China'sforeign
relations
(Cambridge,MA: Harvard UniversityPress,I968); andImmanuel C.Y Hsu,China'sentranceintothe
family
ofnations:
thediplomatic
phase,1858-1880(Cambridge, MA: Harvard UniversityPress,i960). The over-
simplified
essentialism
posesfewproblems, givenmylimited, illustrative JamesL. Hevia,
purposes.
Cherishing
menfrom afar:Qingguestritual
andtheMacartney embassy of1793(Durham, NC: Duke University
Press,I995), providesa more complex,post-structuralist
readingthatpointsin a similardirection.
8 MarkMancall,'TheCh'ingtribute system:an interpretive
essay',in Fairbank,
ed., TheChinese world
order,
p. 63.
9 Hsu,China'sentrance, p. 7.
'O CemalKafadar, Between twoworlds:theconstruction oftheOttoman state(Berkeley,CA: Universityof
California Press,I995),p. I20. ShaiHar-El,Strugglefor domination in theMiddleEast(Leiden:E. J.Brill,
I995), pp. 8-I3, brieflydiscussesthe place of Islam in the rise of the OttomanEmpire.

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Human rights:
a newstandard
ofcivilization?

In the West,the ancient Greeks,who saw themselvesas distinguishedand

bound by a commnonlanguage and culture,applied different rules of war and
peace to relationsamong Hellenes and withbarbarians.Christendom,and then
the idea of'Europe', playeda similarrole in the medievaland modern eras."
Appeals to advanced civilizationwere also commnonin the marchofWestern
imperialismin Africaand Asia.
I will focuson the changefromthe late nineteenth-century European impe-
rial standardof civilizationto contemporarynotionsof internationally recog-
nized humanrights. At the riskof provokingepistemologicaland interpretative
disputesthatI cannot address,I would describemy approachas 'genealogical',
in a verylooselyFoucauldian sense of thatterm.'2What followsis a selective,
retrospective and episodic account of normativechanges thathave helped to
shape one dimensionof our currentinternational society.TheevolutionI trace
was not necessaryor foreordained.Other equally good, perhaps even 'more
important',storiesmnight be told.For example,myfocuson the societyof states
largelyignoresthe local actors and social processesby which the changes I
chroniclewere broughtabout.Nonetheless,the historicaland conceptuallink-
ages to which I drawattentiondo, I believe,illuminatecontemporary practices.
This storyalso has implicationsforour understanding of the place of knowl-
edge and valuesin international relations.Norms almostalwaysappearin inter-
nationalsocietymingledwith power and interest.Nonetheless,as we shallsee,
theyhelp to definepolitical spaces and shape the characterand tone of the
internationalrelationsof an era.They may even constrainhow statespursue
theirmaterialinterests.

The 'classic' (nineteenth-century) standard of civilization

As late as the mid-nineteenthcentury,positiveinternationallaw included no
explicit civilizational test for membership in (European) international
society'3-probablybecause the issue had neverseriouslypresenteditself.But

"See e.g.Wight,Systems ofstates,

chs4, S; Roling,International
law,chs2, 3.Vincent's
mostdirectapproach
to thisissuewas,'EdmundBurkeandthetheoryofinternational relations',
ReviewofInternational
Studies
IO: 3, I984,pp.205-I8. See alsotheworkofhisstudent JenniferM.Welsh,Edmund Burkeandinternationl
relations:
thecommonwealth ofEuropeandthecrusade theFrench
against Revolution(NewYork:St Martin's
Press,i995), ch. 3.
I2 Foran exposition,accompanied bya brilliant applicationto modernsovereignty practices, seeJens
Bartelson,A genealogyofsovereignty(Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press,i995). See also Steve
Smith,'Positivismandbeyond',in SteveSmith, Ken Booth,andMarysiaZalewski,eds,International theo-
ry:positivism
andbeyond (Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press,i996); CynthiaWeber, Simulatingsover-
eignty:intervention,
thestate,andsymbolic exchange (Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press,i995),ch.3.
Withoutdirecdyaddressing thetheoretical literatureon socialconstructivist
approaches,I offerthisessay
as an exampleoftheinsights thatmaybe availablefromtakingideasandhistorical contingency much
moreseriously thanmainstream 'positivist'
approaches. Foran argument thattheEnglishSchool,run-
ningfromMartinWightthrough HedleyBull andJohnVincent, shouldbe seenin largelyconstructivist
terms, seeTimothyDunne,'The socialconstruction ofinternationalsociety',EuropeanJournal of
International
Relations
I, September i995,pp.367-89.See also,somewhat lessdirectly,JamesDer Derian,
'HedleyBull andtheidea ofdiplomatic culture',in Rick FawnandJeremy Larkins,eds,International
soci-
etyaftertheColdWar:anarchy andorder reconsidered
(London:Macmillan, i996).
'3 Gong,Standard of'civilisation',
pp.4-6,25-35.

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JackDonnelly

as the Ottoman Empire was draggedinto the European balance of power,as

China andJapangrappledwith the termsof theirrelationswith an increasing-
ly assertiveand powerfulWest, and as Africabecame an arenaofEuropean great
power rivalries,what I will call the'classic'(late nineteenth-century
European)
standardof civilizationemerged.

Colonialism
and extraterritoriality:
twoimperialist
logics
Sub-Saharan Africanpeoples and states typicallywere both weak and, to
Westerneyes,unusually'savage'.'4European international societythusrestrict-
ed itselfto regulating
Africanterritorialacquisitions,mostnotablyat theBerlin
and Brusselsconferences. As JohnWestlakeput it,'of uncivilisednativesinter-
nationallaw takesno account',leavingtheirtreatment 'to the conscienceof the
stateto which the sovereignty is awarded'.'5 China, however,could not easily
be colonized, pushed aside, or ignored. And even nineteenth-century
Europeans,despitetheircontemptformanyparticularsof China's civilization,
could not dismissthe Chinese as 'savages'.For example,Lord Lugardbegan his
famousbook on BritishAfricaby notingthat'Africahas been justly termed
"the Dark Continent"in contrastto Persia,Assyria,Arabia and China, which
were the seats of ancient civilizations,some of them highly developed'.'6
Notwithstandingthis distinction,Europeans could not conceive of allowing
China fullmembershipin 'the familyof nations'.
Relationswith such more thansavagebut less thanfullycivilizedstatesrelied
heavilyon the practiceof extraterritoriality. China, Japan and the Ottoman
Empire were recognizedas sovereignstatesbut not fullmembersof interna-
tionalsociety.'7 Their authorityovertheirown people was acknowledged,and
generallyrespected.But Westerners,in those countries,refusingto submit
themselvesto 'Asiaticbarbarism',were placed under the extraterritorial juris-
dictionof theirown consuls.'8Althoughabusiveand discriminatory, the result-
ing 'unequal treaties'recognized and limited,ratherthan extinguished,local
sovereignty.
The testof theclassicstandardof civilizationwas 'governmentcapable of con-
trollingwhite men [and] underwhich white civilisationcan exist'.'Ifeven the

'4 On thecategoryof 'savage',see Gong,Standard of'civilisation',

pp.55-8.
I5 L. Oppenheim,ed.,Thecollected papersofJohnWestlake onpublicinternational
law,(Cambridge:
Cambridge
University
Press,I914), pp. I38, I45.
I6 LordLugard,Thedualmandate inBritishtropical
Africa (Edinburgh:WilliamBlackwood& Sons,I922),
p. I.
'7 RelationswiththestatesofSouthandSouth-East Asia,despitetheirinherent interest
and obviousrele-
vance,arebeyondmyscope,largelyout ofan ignorance thatlimitationsofspacehaveallowedme to
leaveunremedied.
I8 Chinaalsofacedincreasingly
onerousinternationallegal'servitudes',
involving(moreor less)permanent
territorial
rights
offoreignsovereigns,
includingrailway andtelegraph rights,
military
garrisons and spe-
cialrights
forChristian
missionaries.
In addition,
trading privileges,
whichinitially
werevoluntarily
granted,becameincreasingly
involuntary.WestelWWiWloughby, Foreign
rights
andinterests
in China
(Baltimore,
MD:JohnsHopkinsUniversity Press,I927), vol.II, provides
an extensive
summary.

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Human rights:
a newstandard
ofcivilization?

nativescould furnishsuch a government afterthemannerof theAsiaticempires,

thatwould be sufficient...[and] the law of our own international
societyhas to
take account of it."9 In principle,only the minimuminterference necessaryto
ensurethe prosperingof'[white] civilization'beyondEurope was allowed.

Power,knowledge,
and universal
morality
The Ottomans,Chinese and Japanese,like the Europeans and Americans,saw
themselvesfaced with not merelyhostile force but 'uncivilized barbarians'.
Power decided which standardsgovernedrelationsbetween civilizations, often
with devastatinghuman consequences.The suffering of China in the century
followingthe Opium Wars and the brutalcolonial penetrationof Africaare
tragicexamplesof non-Westernpeoples being forcedto endurethe most sav-
age barbaritiesin the name of superiorcivilization.
I want to drawattention, however,to a less sinister,and in manywaysattrac-
tive,side of the classicstandardof civilization.Power and controlover territo-
rywere held to be insufficient forfullmembershipin the societyof states.Even
undertakinginternational legal obligationsand participating in the (European)
practicesof diplomacywere not enough. Outlawing 'uncivilized'behaviour
placed substantive moralrestrictions on the actionsof sovereignstates,includ-
ingWesternstates,and establishedexplicitethicalprincipleswithinthe main-
streamof positiveinternational law.'Civilized' stateswere expectedto conform
to the laws of war.20'Civilized' stateswere expected to protectthe rightsof
aliensto life,personaldignity, property, and freedomof commerceand religion.
'Civilized' stateswere also expected to prohibitshockingly'uncivilized'prac-
ticessuch as slavery, piracy,polygamy, infanticideand 'barbaric'penal practices.
Economic interests, power politics,and a host of relatedideas and interests
coalesced into a distinctive imperial system of what Foucault called
power/knowledge2'thathad as one of its more strikingelementsthe classic
standardof civilization.TheGramscianidea of hegemony22pointsto a similar
mixtureof economic interests, militarymightand ideas. For example,British
attitudes towards overseas territorialacquisitions changed from sceptical

'9 Oppenheim, Papers ofJohn

Westlake,
pp.I45, I43-4. CompareSchwarzenberger,'The standard
ofcivilisa-
tion',p. 22i, andL. Oppenheim, law:a treatise,
International 3rdedn (London:Longmans, Green& Co.,
I920), vol. I, p. 32.
20 I wililargelyignoreissuesofcivilizedwarfare, however, becausethisstoryis relatively
wellcoveredin
theinternational legalliterature andbecausethisbodyofnormsdevelopedlargely of
independently
thoseconnectedwithcolonialism andextraterritoriality.
2I See e.g.MichelFoucault,Power/knowledge: selected andother
interviews writings1972-1977(NewYork:
PantheonBooks,I980).
22 Gramsci's own discussion is scatteredthrough (andcanbe roughly followedusingtheindexin) Antonio
Gramsci, Selectionsfrom
theprison notebooks,
eds,QuintinHoare and Geoffrey N. Smith(NewYork:
InternationalPublishers, I97I). See also StephenGill,ed., Gramsci,
historical
materialismandinternational
relations
(Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press,I993); RobertCox,Approaches toworldorder
(Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press,I996), chs6, 7.

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JackDonnelly

resistanceto enthusiasticembrace.23The verymeaning of the term'empire'

changed,itsprincipalreferent movingfromtheBritishIsles24to Britain'sover-
seas colonial holdings.Social Darwinismand'scientific'racism25gave an 'objec-
tive' 'scientific'basis to the superiorityof Westernculture,makingWestern
dominance a necessaryexpressionof scientificlaws ratherthan an accidentof
power politics.More generally, the Enlightenment idea of progress,along with
liberalideas of the pacifyingand civilizinginfluenceof trade,providedan inte-
grativeintellectualcontext.
In internationaltheory,positivismdecisivelydisplacednaturallaw jurispru-
dence,which had been associated,at leastin theory, with a more humane atti-
tude towardssavage and barbaricpeoples.Althoughjustifyingrule by 'superi-
or' civilizations,the naturallaw tradition-runningfromLas Casas through
GrotiusandVattel,and expressedwith special vigour in Burke'swritingsand
political activityon India-emphasized common humanity, rejectedcolonial
exploitation,and stressedthe naturalobligationsof alien rulersto protectand
improve'inferior'subjectpeoples. Positivismstrippedtheseconcernsfromthe
classicstandardof civilizationby restricting legal obligationsto thosevoluntar-
ily incurredby states,26 makinginternationallaw more a dimensionof power
politicsthana potentialchallenger.
Even as theclassicstandard ofcivilization
was beingimposedon resistant African
andAsianpeoples,however,it appealedto (allegedly)universalmoralvalues.And
thosevalueswere more thana coverforthe pursuitof self-interest. Althoughan
integralpartof a systemof imperialdomination,the classicalstandardof civiliza-
tionwas not onlya'hook forinterests'.27 Campaignsagainsttheslavetradeand for
penal reformhad only modestconnectionswith materialinterests. The laws of
war,beyondtheirinstrumental politicaland militaryvalue,reflectedthe idea that

23 See C. A. Bodelsen,Studies
inmid-Victorian (Copenhagen:
imperialism GyldendalskeBoghandel,I924);
J.R. Seeley,Theexpansion
ofEngland(London:Macmillan, i883) is a classicexpression
ofthenew
imperialideology.By contrast,RonaldHyanand Ged Martin(Reappraisals inBritishimperial
history
(London:Macmillan, I975),ch.5) stress betweentheold imperialism
continuities andthenew.
24 See RichardKoebner,Empire (Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press,i96i).
25 See MikeHawkins,SocialDarwinism inEuropean
andAmerican thought, 1860-1945:Natureas modeland
Nature as threat
(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity Press,I997),ch.8; H.W Koch,'SocialDarwinismas
a factorin the"New Imperialism"', in Theorigins
oftheFirstWorld War, 2ndedn (London:Macmillan,
I984).
26 C. H. Alexandrowicz theimportance
stressed in latenineteenth-century
oftheriseoflegalpositivism
imperialism.See An introduction
tothehistory ofthelawofnations in theEastIndies(Oxford:Clarendon,
i967),pp.I49-56,235-7;'New and originalstates',International Affairs 45,Julyi969,pp.466-7I. Gong
challengesa causalconnection(Standard of'civilization',
pp.9-IO, 4I-5, 239-40,247) whicheven
Alexandrowicz admits(Introduction,
p. i56) is unclear.
My argument is morelimited,namely,thatthereis
a clearcorrelationanda mutually reinforcing betweentheriseoflegalpositivism,
interaction theclassic
standardofcivilization,
andthe'newimperialism' ofthenineteenth century.
27 Thisphraseis StephenKrasner's. See his'Westphalia and all that',inJudith GoldsteinandRobert0.
Keohane,eds,Ideasandforeign policy:
beliefs, andpolitical
institutions, change (Ithaca:CornellUniversity
Press,I993) foran argument thatideasarelargely generated tojustify material
interests
(although
Krasnerdoesallowthatonce ideashaveenteredpolitics, theymaythenexerta secondary impact).
This
logicis similar
realist to hiswell-known accountofinternational regimesas 'interveningvariables'.
See
causesand regimeconsequences:
'Structural regimesas intervening variables',
International
Organization
36,Springi982, pp. I85-206.

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Human rights:
a newstandard
ofcivilization?

war is not hellbut a socialpracticesubjectto moralevaluation.28Even extrater-

ritorialjurisdictionto protectaliens appealed to the morallyattractivenotion
of internationalsafeguardsof basic rights.29
These potentiallyprogressiveelementsof the classicstandardof civilization
came into play primarilyin the twentiethcentury.But even in the late nine-
teenthcenturytheycould have surprisingresults.

The endofextraterritoriality
inJapan
Although largely imposed by force, extraterritoriality was not seen by
Europeans as inconsistentwith the legal equalityof states.The treatyrightsof
Westernersin China and Japan allegedlyrested on the obligation of every
memberof international societyto abide by minimumrulesof civilizedbehav-
iour as a condition of membership.For example,Article i of the Treatyof
Nanking (i842), the cornerstoneof the systemof unequal treaties, guaranteed
Chinese and Britishsubjects'fullsecurityand protectionfortheirpersonsand
propertywithin the dominions of the other' state.China's profoundlack of
interestin obtainingsuch rightswas convenientlyoverlooked,and extraterri-
torialitywas justifiedby appeals to 'reciprocal'enjoymentof 'universal'mini-
mum standardsof legal fairness. 'Failure to meet thisobligationis a delinquen-
cy which justifiesinterpositionof the alien's governmentto secure redress.'30
But when 'thosedutiesofjurisdictionwhich are requiredof everyindependent
State'3' could be dischargedby the local sovereign,internationallaw required
thatjurisdictionoveraliensbe returnedto local authorities.Thediscrimination
implicitin extraterritoriality
was presentedas a regrettable,but necessary, tem-
porarydeviationfromthe overarchingideal of sovereignequality.
China,which saw sovereignequalityas an affront to the'natural'Sinocentric
world order,resistedeven the formsof (Western)diplomacyinto the early
twentiethcentury.32 Decliningpower,however,broughtChina constantly esca-

28 Evenarch-realist
GeorgSchwarzenberger
presented
therulesofwaras 'theresultofa tug-of-war
betweentwomajorformative agencies:thenecessities
ofwarand therequirements
ofthestandard of
civilisation',
International
law,vol.II: The lawofarmed 3rdedn (London:Stevens& Sons,i968),
conflict,
p. 4. Cf. pp. IO, I IO-I I.
29 In a lovelyparadox,
thesovereignty ofbarbarous statesdeniedto theircitizensthe'universal'
rights
enjoyedextraterritorially
byaliens.Aliens,.butnotnationals, hadinternationallegalrights,because
uncivilizedbehaviourwasa legitimate international concernonlywheninternationalized bythe
involvement ofaliens.Totreatone'sown citizensbarbarously was,strictly
speaking,nota matter for
(positive)
international
law.
30 ElleryC. Stowell,
International
law:a restatementofprinciplesinconformitywithactual
practice
(NewYork:
HenryHolt,I93I), pp.367-8 (and,moregenerally, Partiv,chs2, 3). Cf.Oppenheim, International
law,
3rdedn,vol.I, pp.495-6,andEdwinDeWittDickinson,Theequality ofstates
ininternational
law
(Cambridge, MA: HarvardUniversity Press,ig20), ch.6.
3' CharlesCheneyHyde,International lawchieflyas interpreted
andapplied bytheUnited States(Boston,MA:
Little,Brown & Co. I922), p. 462.
32 Forexample, in the ig0i Protocolfollowing
theBoxerrebellion,
theWestern
powersactedagainstcon--
tinuingChinesesymbolic resistance
byregulatingtheplaceofdiplomaticmeetings,themodeoftrans-
portusedbyambassadors, thedoorsbywhichtheyenteredand exited,thereceiptofofficial letters(the
Emperorwasrequiredto takethemdirectly intohisown hands),and evendetailsofofficial
banquets
heldin theImperialPalace.JamesL. Hevia,'MakingChina"perfectlyequal"',Journal
ofHistorical
Sociology
3,DecemberI990, pp. 379-400 nicelycaptures
someofthecomplexities ofthesecompeting
(andchanging)systemsofideasandpower.
7

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JackDonnelly

lating humiliations,and material losses. By contrast,Japan,which initially

adopted a no less hostile and superior attitudetowardsthe American and
European barbarianswho forcedentryinto theircountry,quicklylearned to
play the game of Westerndiplomacy33and skilfullyexploited the pledge of
equal treatmentimplicitin the classic standardof civilization.34Legal and
administrative reformsallowed Japanto protectWesternersas they expected.
'Barbaric'practices,especiallyin the criminallaw,were eliminated.New repre-
sentativeparliamentary institutionseven provideda positivesymbolofJapan's
'progress'and 'civilization'.Accordingly,Britain provisionallyrenounced its
extraterritorialrightsin the I894 Aoki-KimberleyTreaty,a decade before
Japan'sstunningdefeatof Russia (the firstmajor indicationthatJapanmight
possessthe power to tryto abrogatethe unequal treatiesunilaterally).In both
the Sino-Japaneseand Russo-Japanesewars,Japan underscoredits claims to
membershipin the societyof statesby going out of itsway to complywith the
laws of war, publicizing this compliance and drawing attentionto non-
complianceby its opponents.
Japan'sgrowingpower was importantto its acceptance in the (European-
dominated) society of states.Appeals to the formalnorm of reciprocityand
ostensiblyuniversalcriteriaof civilized behaviour,however,were also essen-
tial.35The importanceof thesenormsis even clearerin respectof the entryinto
international societyof the much less powerfulSiam.36
The classicstandardof civilization(largelyunintentionally)outlined a path
for non-Westernstatesto become recognized as sovereignequals and thus
obtain the protectionsof (Western)internationallaw.Entryinto (Eurocentric)
internationalsociety requiredneitherreligiousconversion,as the Ottomans
and medievaland earlymodernEuropeansdemanded,nor subordinationto an
imperialsuperior,as the Chinese and the Ottomans required.Full and equal
membershipin internationalsocietywas (in principle,and to some degree in
practice)opened to non-European,non-Christian,and even non-whitestates
willingto complywith relativelyclear behaviouralstandardscodifiedin posi-
tiveinternationallaw.

33 For example,
on thefirst
Japanese
diplomatic
missionabroad,in I87I-72, theJapanese
envoysaban-
donedtheirnationalceremonial dressaftera singleofficial
meeting.Thiswaslessthan20 yearsafter
Perry's first
voyagetoJapan.By contrast,
Chinadid notsenditsfirst resident
minister
to Europeuntil
I876, a fullthird
ofa centuryaftertheOpiumWars.See Hsu, China'sentrance, part3;J.D. Frodsham,
The
firstChinese embassytotheWest:
thejournalsofKuo Sung-t'ao,Liu Hsi-hungandChangTe-yi(Oxford:
Clarendon, I974).
34 The following is basedprimarily
on F.C. Jones,Extraterritoriality
inJapanandthediplomatic result-
relations
ingin itsabolition,
1853-1899 (New Haven,CT:Yale University Press,I93i); Gong,Standard
of'civilisation',
ch.6; HidemiSuganami,'Japan's entryintointernational in Bull andWatson,
society', eds,Expansion of
international
society.
35 Conversely, thelackof effectivereforms wasregularly advancedbyadvocatesofcontinuedextraterrito-
rialityin China.See e.g.Hosea BallouMorse,Theinternational relations
oftheChineseEmpire(London:
Longman, Green& Co., I9I0), vol.II, p. 4I5; Stowell,International
law,pp. 7I9-20.
36 See Gong,Standard of'civilisation',
ch.8.

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 a newstandard
Human rights: ofcivilization?

Capitulations, colonies and minorities in the interwar era

The interwarperiod saw importantchangesin attitudestowardsboth extrater-
ritorialityand colonialism.In addition,minorityrightswere added to the
evolvingstandardof civilization.

equalityand colonialtrusteeship
Sovereign
Argumentsof'superiorcivilization'lost groundto a state-centric logic of sov-
ereign equality.For example, the Treaty of Lausanne ended the regime of
extraterritorial'capitulations'37-the Ottoman analogue to China's unequal
treaties-just fouryearsafterTurkey'sdefeatin the FirstWorldWar.Although
thiswas the resultlargelyof power politics,supplementedby reformsintro-
duced byTurkey'snew aggressively secularand modernizingregime,the grow-
ing internationalsense of discomfortwith such formaldiscriminations helped
to defeatBritishand Frenchefforts to reimposeextraterritoriality.
More generally, the specialprivilegesof recognitionas a (Great)Power con-
tinued to erode during the era of the League of Nations. For example,the
League's universalmembershipbuilt on the prewartrendof more,and more
diverse,participants in internationalconferences,a centralsymbolof member-
ship in the familyof nations.The firstHague Conference,in I899, had been
notable for the attendanceof China,Japan,the Ottoman Empire,Persia and
Siam.The second Hague Conference,in I907, was the firstinternationalgath-
ering of the modern statessystemat which Europeans were outnumberedby
non-Europeans.
Power remainedcloselycorrelatedwith'advancedcivilization'and continued
to provideimmenseinternationaladvantages.Formallegal status,however,was
becoming more equal-at leastforinternationally recognizedstates.Although
extraterritorialitywas not finallyabolished in China until the Second World
War,the legal distinctionbetweencivilizedand barbarianstateswas givingway
to a more egalitarianunderstanding of sovereignty.
Norms governingrelationswith'savagetribes',which remainedundercolo-
nial domination,also changed substantially. ArticleI2 of the League Covenant
proclaimedcolonies transferred afterthe war as mandatesunder'a sacredtrust
of civilization'to be ruled for'the well-beingand development'of the subject
peoples.38Even in the vastmajorityof colonies which technicallydid not fall
under the mandatessystem,obligationsto the colonized were increasingly
acknowledged.For example,the Britishdoctrineof the'dual mandate'consid-
ered a colony to be held in trust'on the one hand,forthe advancementof the

37See G. Pelissi6du Rausas,Le Regime dansl'empire

descapitulations 2ndedn (Paris:Arthur
ottoman,
Rousseau,I9IO); NasimSousa,Thecapitulary regimeofTurkey: origin,
itshistory, andnature (Baltimore,MD:
JohnsHopkinsUniversity Press,I933).
38 See Wm.RogerLouis,'The eraofthemandates systemand thenon-European world',in Bull and
Watson,eds,Expansion ofinternational H. DuncanHall,Mandates,
society; dependencies
andtrusteeship (New
York:CarnegieEndowment forInternational Peace,1948).

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JackDonnelly

subject races, and on the other hand, for the developmentof its material
resourcesforthe benefitof mankind'.39AlthoughWesternattitudesremained
profoundlycondescending and the gap between realityand rhetorialself-
justificationwas oftenimmense,40differences of civilizationwere increasingly
seen as historicalartefacts
to be eliminatedover time.
Such attitudescould be found even in late nineteenth-century Britain.For
example,JamesLorimerarguedin i88o thatcolonial rule is justifiedonly if it
'does really promote the human developmentof the lower or retrograde
race...The momentthattheloweror retrograde race becomes capable of attain-
ing thisend by its own efforts,the rule of the higherrace,unlessspontaneous-
ly retained,degeneratesinto tyranny.'4'The number of those with such
'enlightened'views, however,grew dramaticallyin the interwarperiod,42
when,forthe firsttime,a significant numberof politicians,administrators, and
privatecitizensseriouslyconsideredreformsbased on such views.Even formal
equalityremaineddecades away.Nonetheless,the language of civilizationwas
beginningto be used in thecontextof overcoming, ratherthaninstitutionalizing,
differences.

The Leagueand minorities

In peace treatiesacceptedby the defeatedpowersafterthe FirstWorldWar and
declarationsrequiredof newly createdstatesupon entryinto the League of
Nations,i6 states-Albania,Austria,Bulgaria,Czechoslovakia,Estonia,Finland,
Germany, Greece,Hungary,Iraq,Latvia,Lithuania,Poland,Romania,Turkeyand
Yugoslavia-undertook substantialobligationsto protectthe rightsof national
and religiousminoritiesin theirterritories.43Furthermore, these rightswere
declared,as thetreatywithPolandput it (ArticleI2),'obligations ofinternational
concern...underthe guaranteeof the League of Nations'.The classicstandardof
civilizationguaranteed'civilized' treatment
(preferential) to Europeanminorities
abroad.Westernpowers had also assertedspecial rightsto protectChristian
minoritiesin theOttomanEmpire,againestablishing preferentialtreatment.The
minoritiestreatiesand declarations, broughtthe standardof civiliza-
by contrast,
tion back home.

39 Lugard,Thedualmandate,
p. 6o6.
40 For example,
Lugardcontendedthat'thereis no colourbarin British
Africa,
andtheeducatednative
enjoysthefullestliberty',yetclaimedto knowofno 'educatedAfrican youthswho arebycharacter and
temperament suitedto postsin whichtheymayriseto positionsofhighadministrative responsibility':
Thedualmandate, pp.86,88.
4I Lorimer, Theinstitutes
oflaw:a treatise
oftheprinciples
ofjurisprudence
as determined
byNature,2ndedn
(Edinburgh andLondon:WilliamBlackwood& Sons,i 880),pp.3IO--ii. In lightofthediscussion of
legalpositivismabove,it is interesting
to notethatthisexceptionis rootedin natural
lawjurisprudence.
42 See e.g.AlfredZinunern,Thethird British 2ndedn (London:OxfordUniversity
Empire, Press,I927);
M. F Lindley,Theacquisition andgovernmentofbackward ininternational
territory law(London:Longman,
Green & Co., i926), esp. ch. 36.
43 See LucyP.Mair,Theprotection theworking
ofminorities: andscopeoftheminorities
treaties
under
theLeagueof
Nations(London:Christophers, I928); C. A. Macartney,
National andnational
states minorities
(Oxford:
OxfordUniversityPress,I934) and'LeagueofNations'protection ofminority in EvanLuard,
rights',
ed.,Theinternational ofhuman
protection rights
(NewYork:Praeger,i967).

I0

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 a newstandard
Human rights: ofcivilization?

Only statesdefeatedin or createdafterthe FirstWorldWar were requiredto

accept these obligations.Internationalsupervisionwas extremelyweak.44
Japan'seffortto include a referenceto racial equalityin the Covenant of the
League of Nations was defeated.Nonetheless,the minoritiesregimeimposed
substantivenormsofjustice,which had only a loose connectionto the mater-
ial interestsof the victoriouspowers,on (some) statesof'higher'civilizationas
a conditionforentryor re-entryinto internationalsociety.

Self-determination
and human rights
The post-SecondWorldWar or Cold War era saw two normswithpartlycom-
plementaryand partlycompetingimplications-self-determinationand human
rights-emerge into prominence.To help analysethese changes,I distinguish
(in Figure i) fourideal typesof standardsof civilization.

Figure i Dimensions of a standardcivilization

Application
Inclusive Exclusive
(universal) (particular)

i Positive 'Lockean' 'fundamentalist'

= (maximal) (humanrights) (Islam?/Calvinist)

mr Negative 'Hobbesian' 'Burkean'

(minimal) (self-determination) (classicstandard
(sovereignequality) of civilization)

Standardsof civilizationmayapplyeitherinclusively(primarily among'civilized'

states)or exclusively(primarily in relationswith'barbarians').
Inclusivestandards
emphasizecommonalities and thustendto be relatively
universal.Exclusivestan-
dards emphasize differenceand thus tend to be relativelyparticularistic.
'Civilization'mayalso be definedeitherprimarily negatively-avoidingtheworst
sortsof barbarism-or positively. Negativestandards tendto be minimalin their
substance.Positivestandards tendto makemoreextensive(maximal)demandson
states.The classicstandardof civilizationwas exclusiveand negative:civilized
powersimposedminimalobligationsprimarilyon barbarians.Thenormsof self-
determination are inclusivebut stillnarrowlynegative.A positiveand universal
international standardof civilizationemergedonly in the idea of human rights.

44 See
InisL. Claude,Jr,
National an international
minorities: problem MA: HarvardUniversity
(Cambridge,
Press,s9S5),
ch.3.

II

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JackDonnelly

Self-determination
The struggleforself-determination ironicallydrewnormativesupportfromthe
classicstandardof civilization.Colonial territoriesincreasinglyargued,in effect,
thattheytoo,with only modestinternalreforms, could meet establishedmin-
imum requirementsformembershipin internationalsociety.Internalcontra-
dictionsin the classicstandard,however,were at least as important.The 'civi-
lization'thatbroughtthe world the Holocaust,the Gulag,the atom bomb,and
two global warsof appallingdestructiveness in barely30 yearsfoundit increas-
inglydifficult to suggestthatAsiansand Africanswere too 'uncivilized'to join
theirranks-especially as the other intellectualsupportsof imperialismwere
also crumbling.
Social Darwinismhad givenway at home to the welfarestateand foundfew
remainingexponentsin international relations.Scientificracismwas retreating
in the face of a tolerantculturalrelativistanthropology. Nineteenth-century
European defencesof nationalismwere revivedin anti-colonialforms.More
generally,universalistic(Western)religiousand moraltheorieswere increasing-
ly turnedagainsttheWest.45As Westerners began to open theireyesto the suf-
feringand injusticethey had inflictedin Africa and Asia, the stillpowerful
Enlightenmentidea of progressincreasinglybecame associated with self-
determination ratherthancolonialism.It was but a smallstepforpositivist inter-
nationallaw to extendthe doctrineof sovereignequalityto post-colonialstates.
Westernimperialismhad neverdepended entirelyon superiorarms,nor were
its rationalesand rewardsentirelyeconomic and strategic.Power and interest
were accompanied by a sense of righteousnessbased on highercivilization,46
importantelementsof which the colonized internalized.Beyond militaryand
economic power,Western privilegerestedon a sharedsense of legitimacy, even
if for the colonized thiswas expressedin the destructiveformof feelingsof
inferiority.47Self-determination too involvedmore than (decliningimperial)
power and (changing)economic interests. Shiftsin relativepower were decisive

ofAsian andAfrican
45 Rupert Emerson, Fromempireto nation:theriseto self-assertion peoples(Boston, MA:
Beacon Press,I960) is a classic account thatemphasizes'the turningof the weapons-the ideas, the
instruments, the institutions-of theWest againstitself'(p.I7).
46 This was particularly true in Britain.See e.g. Ronald Robinson and John Gallagherwith Alice Denny,
Africaand theVictorians: mindofimperialism
theofficial (London: Macmillan, I96I); C. E. Carrington,The
Britishoverseas:exploitsofa nationofshopkeepers (Cambridge: Cambridge UniversityPress,Ig50), esp. chs
I I, I2, i5; Charles Pelham Groves,'Missionaryand humanitarianaspects of imperialismfrom I870 to
I9I4', in L. H. Gann and Peter Duignan, eds, ColonialisminAfrica,1870-1960,vol. I: The historyand politics
ofcolonialism, 1870-1914(Cambridge: Cambridge UniversityPress,i969);Wallace G. Mills,'Victorian
imperialismas religion-civil or otherwise',in Robert D. Long, ed., The man on thespot:essayson British
Empirehistory (Westport,CT: Greenwood Press,i995); L. H. Gann and Peter Duignan, The rulersof
BritishAfrica,1870-1914(Stanford,CN: StanfordUniversityPress,I978). For a briefgeneral assessmentof
Westernimperialismthatcapturessome of the higheraspirationsand progressiveachievementswhile
giving primaryemphasisto the devastationit caused, see V. G. Kiernan,'Europe and the world: the
imperial record',in Moorhead Wright,ed., Rightsand obligations in North-Southrelations (NewYork: St
Martin'sPress,I986).
47 See e.g. AlbertMenmmi,The colonizer and thecolonized(NewYork: Orion Press,i965) and Dominated
man:notestowards a portrait(NewYork: Orion Press,I968); Franz Fanon, Blackskins,whitemasks(New
York: Grove Press,I967).

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Human rights:
a newstandard
ofcivilization?

in Indo-China, India and Indonesia.In most ofAfrica,however,power was of

minor importance.Normative change was essential-and was an important
part of the storyin Asia as well.48In theWest,it became increasingly difficult
to claimsuperiorcivilizationwitha straight face,while such claimswere reject-
ed with growingvigourin Asia and Africa.
Self-determination,however,in practicecame to mean decolonization:a right
of colonial territoriesto recognitionas sovereignstates,within colonial bor-
ders.49Considerationsofjustice were thusbanishedfromdecisionson mem-
bershipin internationalsociety.50In addition,these newly independentstates
(understandably) emphasizedtheirsovereignequality, understoodin radicallegal
positivistterms,and met effortsto hold themto minimumstandardsof humane
behaviourtowardstheirown citizenswith chargesof neo-colonialism.Non-
interventionbecame the centralprincipleof internationallaw for the Afro-
Asian bloc.5' The result,as Georg Schwarzenberger put it in a slightlydifferent
context, was an international relationsbased on 'pristinesovereigntyin the
formof lawlessness'.52 The (rightlycelebrated)death of the classicstandardof
civilizationwas accompaniedby the entrenchment of a Hobbesian conception
of sovereignty.Rather than seek to raise all statesto a higherstandard,self-
determinationwas interpretedto require accepting the lowest common
denominatorof sovereignequality.
The whole globe was recognizedas civilized.'Civilization',however,lost all
substantivemeaning.The Idi Amins,the Macias Nguemas, the Mobutus, the
Maos, the Sukharnosand the Pinochetsof the world were accepted as, to use
Westlake'slanguage,'civilised,though with other civilisationsthan ours'.53
Althoughpreferableto uncheckedpower politicsand the depredationsof civ-
ilizationalimperialism,thisthin,power-basedaccount of internationallegiti-
macy had few positivemoral attractions.

48 See Robert H. Jackson,'The weight of ideas in decolonization: normativechange in internationalrela-

tions',in Goldstein and Keohane, eds, Ideas andforeign policyand Quasi-states:sovereignty,
international
rela-
tions,and theThirdWorld(Cambridge: Cambridge UniversityPress,I990); Neta C. Crawford,
'Decolonization as an internationalnorm: the evolution of practices,arguments,and beliefs',in Laura W
Reed and Carl Kaysen,eds, Emergingnormsofjustfiedintervention (Cambridge,MA: American Academy
of Artsand Sciences, I993). In contrastto the immense literatureon imperialism,Stephen Howe, Anti-
colonialismin Britishpolitics:theleftand theend ofempire, 1918-1964 (Oxford: Clarendon, I993) provides
one of the few detailed studiesofWesternanti-colonial attitudesand activitiesthatseeks to addressbasic
theoreticalissues.See also R. Robinson,'The moral disarmamentof Africanempire,I9I9-I947',Journal
ofImperialand Commonwealth History8, I979, pp. 86-i04.
49 See Michla Pomerance, Self-determination in law and practice:
thenewdoctrinein the UnitedNations(The
Hague: MartinusNijhoff,I982).
so Ideological standardsforrecognition-as championed by the United Statesin its relationswith Cuba,
China, and Cambodia, or as expressedin theJohnsonand Brezhnev Doctrines- did have a centralnor-
mative element,but theywere primarilyof bloc or regional (not global) significance.
5' Vincent's Nonintervention and international order(Princeton,NJ: Princeton UniversityPress,I974) is a clas-
sic studyof the theoryand practice of non-intervention.
52 Schwarzenberger, International law,p. 207.
53 Oppenheim, PapersofJohnWestlake, p. I03.

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JackDonnelly

Universal
humanrights
The decadesfollowingtheSecondWorldWar,however,also saw thedevelopment
of an extensivebody of international humanrightslaw thatrecaptured, in a sub-
stantiallypurifiedform,the morallyappealingidea of adherenceto sharedstan-
dardsofjustice as a conditionforfullmembershipin international society.The
linkto the classicstandardof civilizationwas to the underlying idea of universal
rightsratherthanextraterritorial discrimination in favourof aliens.The prelimi-
naryefforts of theinterwarminorities regimeto bringthestandardof civilization
back home were dramatically expandedin substanceand applieduniversally.
AfterHitlerrevealedthe barbarian'other'inside the 'civilized'West'civiliza-
tion' was in need of constructivereassertion, above all at home.This required
an idiom more demandingthaneitherthe classicstandardof civilizationor self-
determination. Human rightsoffereda new inclusivestandardthatemphasized
what is sharedby and owed to everyone.Furthermore, contemporaryinterna-
tional human rightsnormsinsiston elevatingpracticeto veryhigh standards,
in contrastto both extraterritorial preferencesfor those whose rightsare
already relativelywell protected and the extremelymean lowest common
denominatorof self-determination.
The classicstandardof civilizationcan be describedas Burkean,based on the
idea thatsome peoples have developed furtherthan others,and thus should
enjoymorerightsand a greatersayin politics.Self-determination and sovereign
equalitydrawmoreon Hobbes's uncivilizedstateofnature.International human
rightsappeal to a Lockean or liberalprogressivist understanding of civilization
and a social contractconceptionofthestateas an instrument to realizetherights
of its citizens.54But thisliberalstandardof legitimacy-a governmentis enti-
tledto fullmembershipin international societyto the extentthatit implements
internationally recognizedhuman rights-faced the competinglegal positivist
(Hobbesian) theoryof recognition,which grantsmembershipin international
societyifa statecontrolsitsterritory and dischargestheinternational obligations
it has undertaken.During the Cold War era, internationalpracticegenerally
favouredpristinepositivistsovereignty (which was most stronglysupportedby
communistand ThirdWorld states).
Universalhuman rightsideas did become a standardsubjectof bilateraland
multilateral diplomacyby the earlyI98os. Multilateralimplementationmecha-
nisms,however,remained extremelyweak and few statesundertook strong
bilateralhuman rightsinitiatives.55 Furthermore, duringthe Cold War human
rightsissues (otherthan self-determination and racism)were raisedprimarily
externally,especiallyacross the 'three worlds'.Although individualstatesdid

54 In Figure i, I label a maximal and exclusive standard'fundamentalist'.

One mightalternativelyconsider
all exclusive standards'Burkean' or'prescriptive',and distinguishbetween strong(maximal) and weak
(minimal) variants.Likewise,we mightcall all inclusivestandards'liberal' or 'universal',and then distin-
guish between Paineite or social democratic (maximal) and Hobbesian or libertarian(minimal) variants.
55 For an overview of Cold War era practice,in both multilateraland bilateralarenas,see JackDonnelly,
International
humanrights, 2nd edn (Boulder, CO, Oxford:Westview,I998), chs 4, 5.

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Human rights:
a newstandard
ofcivilization?

addresshuman rightsviolationsin a considerablenumberand varietyof coun-

tries,especiallyin thelate I970S and I98os, systematic
international
efforts
were
focusedlargelyon pariahregimesin SouthAfrica,SouthernRohdesia,Portugal
and Israel,the new 'barbarians'.And the supportgivento thesepariahregimes
by the United Statesand some otherWesternpowers revealedan interesting
disjunctionbetween traditionalpower politicsand the new, emergingglobal
logic of legitimacy.

Europe'snewconception
ofcivilization
To preventthe terminologyof'internationalhuman rights'fromdegenerating
into a languageof smugself-satisfaction,greateremphasishad to be placed on
the positivedemands of 'civilization'.This in turn requiredshiftingattention
fromthe exclusiveor particularistic,interculturaldimensionsof'civilization'to
the inclusiveand universal.Rather thanstigmatizing outsiders,appeals to 'civ-
ilization'had to recallall,including(even especially)insiders,to highervalues.
During the ColdWar, thisoccurredsystematically onlyin westernEurope; and
only in Europe did internationalhuman rightsbecome as much a matterof
internalas externalpolitics.56
The statesof western(and especiallynorthern)Europe, for all theirshort-
comings,have most consistentlyand most successfullysought to implement
internationally recognized human rights. Furthermore, the European
Comnmission on Human Rightshas extensivepowersto investigatecomplaints
and the European Court of Human Rights has the power,which it exercises
regularly,to issuebindinglegaljudgments.57 Therefore,as westEuropean states
in the I98os and I99OS increasinglyemphasizedhuman rightsin theirforeign
policies,theyoperatedfroma moral high ground.
European human rightsinitiativeshave been missionaryin the best sense of
thatterm,seekingto spreadthe benefitsof (universal)values enjoyedat home.
Fear and historicguilt,arisingfromthe moral blindnessand abuses of mis-
sionariesoperatingunder earlierstandardsof civilization,should not immobi-
lize us in the face of abuses of power by murderousdictatorshiding behind
the legal norm of sovereigntyor a claim to radical culturaldifferences.58
Something like a standardof civilization is needed to save us from the

56 KathrynSikkink,'The power of principledideas: human rightsnorms in the United Statesand western

Europe', in Goldstein and Keohane, eds, Ideasandforeign policy,
emphasizesEuropean acceptance and
American rejection of regional and internationalmonitoring.
57Between ig60 and i995 the Court handed down 439 decisions,320 of which found at least one viola-
tion. Like the restof the European system,the level of activityhas increasedsubstantiallyin the I99Os. In
i995 alone, decisions were handed down on 46 cases (30 of which found violations).See Council of
Europe, Yearbook oftheEuropean Convention onHumanRights, 1995,vol. 38 (The Hague: Martinus
Nijhoff,I997), p. 2I9.
58 Space precludes addressingissues of human rightsculturalrelativism.For my (not verysympathetic)
views see Universal human rights,
chs 3-8. I would note,however,thatthe classic standardof civilization
providesa strikingexample of the logic of strongculturalrelativism.More attractiveversionsof strong
relativismtypicallyrelyon an implicitappeal to values such as toleration,respectfor diversity,or equali-
ty,which it would seem hard to justifyin relativistterms.

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JackDonnelly

barbarismof a pristinesovereigntythatwould consign countlessmillionsof

individualsand entirepeoples to internationalneglect.At the presenthistori-
cal juncture, only the idea of internationallyrecognized human rights,as
expressed in authoritativedocuments such as the UniversalDeclarationof
Human Rightsand the internationalhuman rightscovenants,59seems capable
of playingsuch a role.I have triedto show thatdespitethe fataltaintingof the
language of 'civilization'by abuses carried out under (and by the exponents
of) the classicstandardof civilization,internationally
recognizedhuman rights
sharea similarlegitimatinglogic.

A new standardof civilization?

One need not be a realistto allow thatpower and perceivedself-interest will
continueto dominateforeignpolicyin the comingdecades.Sovereignequality
will also remaina paramountnorm of international society.More controversial
is the suggestionthatpositiveinternationallaw is becoming supplementedby
human rightsnormsthat,like those of the classicstandardof civilization,hold
even againstresistantstates.6o

Genocideand minimum
humanitarian
standards
Genocide is at the core of an emergingpost-Cold War minimumstandardof
civilization.Internationalresponsesto the genocides in Bosnia and Rwanda,
althoughweak and tardy,6'marka significant advance over previousinterna-
tional inaction in, for example,Cambodia.62The West,despitethe powerful
resurgenceof anti-Islamicsentiments, ultimatelycame to the aid of Bosnia's
Muslims.
Regional securityinterestscertainlywere at the heart of thisresponse;but
there was also a genuine humanitarianconcern over, for example, ethnic
cleansing,rape as a tactic of warfare,and the plightof Sarajevo.Even UN-

59 For an overview of the substanceof these norms,which include extensivesets of both civil and political
and economic, social, and culturalrights,see JackDonnelly and Rhoda E. Howard, 'Assessingnational
human rightsperformance:a theoreticalframework',Human RightsQuarterlyIn, May I988, pp. 2I4-48;
Rhoda E. Howard and JackDonnelly,'Human dignity,human rightsand political regimes',American
PoliticalScienceReview80, September I986, pp. 80I-I7.
60 My argumenthere is political.On the legal sources,status,and force of internationalhuman rights
norms,see Theodor Meron, Human rightsand humanitarian normsas customary law (Oxford: Clarendon,
I989), ch. 2; Bruno Simma and Philip Alston,'The sources of human rightslaw: custom,jus cogens, and
generalprinciples',AustralianYearBook ofInternational Law I2, I992, pp. 82-I08; and (fora sceptical
view) J.S. Watson,'Legal theory,efficacyand validityin the developmentof human rightsnorms in
internationallaw', UniversityofIllinoisLaw Forum3, I979, pp. 609-4I.
6i See e.g. David Rieff,Slaughterhouse:Bosnia and thefailure
oftheWest(NewYork: Simon & Schuster,I995);
Thomas Cushman and Stjepan G. Mestrovic,eds, This timewe knew:Western togenocidein Bosnia
responses
(NewYork: NewYork UniversityPress,I996); Alex De Waal and Rakiya Omaar,'The genocide in
Rwanda and the internationalresponse',CurrentHistory, April I995, pp. I56-6I.
62 For a thoroughoverview and a generallybalanced analysis,see Jamie Frederic Metzl, Western to
responses
humanrights abusesin Cambodia,1975-1980(London, NewYork: Macmillan and St Martin'sPress,I996).

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Human rights:
a newstandard
ofcivilization?

guaranteed'safe havens', for all their tragic shortcomings,63 representeda

noble refusalto bow to the logics of power politics and ethnic cleansing.In
Rwanda, theWest took a step away fromthe convenientlydemeaningnotion
that'tribal'violence was to be expected in Africa,and UN Secretary-General
Boutros Ghali's effectiveuse of the Bosnian interventionas a precedentillus-
tratesthe potentialpower of moral ideas to mobilize action (at least in cases
of economic and strategicuninterest).France's shamefulpursuitof regional
power politicsis also a major part of the story.In contrastto earliergenocides
in Rwanda and Burundi, however,the internationalcommunityresponded
with relativelyforcefulaction, and attentionremainsfocused on ethnic vio-
lence in Rwanda, Burundi and EasternZaire (now Congo).
The internationalcommunitystillrefusesto act beforeethnicconflicterupts
into widespreadbloodshed,or even to develop earlywarningsystems.Belated
remedialaction,however,is both new and of some value.Bosnia and Rwanda
also revivedthe dormant Nurembergprecedent of individual international
At minimum,theseresponsesexpressan intrinsically
legal responsibility. impor-
tantinternationalsense of justice and humanity.Prohibitinggenocide,how-
ever,representsa veryminimalstandardof civilizedbehaviour.To go no fur-
therwould be to accept consigningcountlessindividualsand entirepeoples to
a lifeof systematicpoliticaland economic abuse that,althoughnot subjectto
being shortenedin certainways,remainspoor, nastyand brutish.The crucial
question is whetherstatesare willing to act on the positivestandardsof the
UniversalDeclaration and Covenants.

Tiananmen
China after
The internationalcampaign against China following the I989 Tiananmen
Square massacreprovidesa good example of changinginternationalattitudes
towardshumanrights.Alargecountrywithsubstantialregionalmilitarypower
and a huge,rapidlygrowingeconomy was politicallyostracizedforover a year
and subjectedto modest economic sanctionsforup to fiveyears.Even today
China must devote considerable diplomatic energy to fendingoff human
and China's criticsaccepted net politicaland economic costs
rightscriticisms;
in pursuingtheirhuman rightsobjectives.64
The other side of the picture,of course,is that China's partydictatorship
remainsin power and continuesto violate most internationally recognized
human rights.Afterthe initialoutragesubsided,and repressionin China once
more became routinized,internationalsanctionsunravelled.Even the United

63 See JanWillem Honig and Norbert Both, Srebenica: ofa warcrime(Harmondsworth:Penguin,

record
I996); David Rohde, Endgame:
thebetrayal
andfallofSrebenica
(NewYork: Farrar,Strauss& Giroux, I996);
Human RightsWatch/Helsinki,Thefall ofSrebrenica and thefailure
of UNpeacekeeping(NewYork: Human
RightsWatch,October I995).
64 For an overview of internationalresponsesto theTiananmen episode, see Donnelly, International
human
rights,
ch. 6.

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JackDonnelly

States,China's harshestcritic,has not been willingto make major economic,

political or strategicsacrificesto press human rightsconcerns;and Chinese
appeals to sovereignty have had considerableimpact.
Human rightsare not an alternative to powerpoliticsor theinternational law
of sovereignequality.They do, however,impose supplementary constraints on
the freedomof action of states.The realityof theseconstraints,and the impor-
tance of assertingthe relevanceof standardsof internationaljustice,are no less
importantthantheirlimits.

A rightto democratic
government?
Thomas Franck has recentlyargued that'both textuallyand in practice the
internationalsystemis moving towardsa clearlydefineddemocraticentitle-
ment,with nationalgovernancevalidatedby internationalstandardsand sys-
tematic monitoringof compliance.'65Despite serious exaggeration,Franck
does point to the infusionof more positiveuniversalhuman rightsvalues into
contemporaryinternationalpolitics.
Almost all Latin American governmentscan plausiblyclaim to have been
selectedin open and fairelections.Although nilitaryand civilianoligarchies
oftenretaingrosslydisproportionate power,theyhave been forcedto accept the
formsof electoraldemocracyand to open politicalspaces thatin manycoun-
trieshad been closed forat least decades. In sub-SaharanAfrica,militarygov-
ernments,personalistdictatorships and single-partyautocraciesare becoming
more the exceptionthanthe rule.Electionshave as oftenas not failedto meet
highstandardsoffairnessand openness;manyformsofpreviouslyrepresseddis-
sentand politicalopposition,however,have become regularly available.Military
rule has been largelydelegitimated.For example,the coup in SierraLeone in
May 1997 provokedunusuallystrongand widespreadregionaland internation-
al condemnation,includinga unanimousvote of the Organizationof African
Unitynot to recognizethe new regime.In Asia,South Korea and Taiwan have
replaceddecades of rnilitarydictatorshipand one-partyrule with lively,if cor-
rupt,competitiveelections.Burma's rulingState Law and Order Restoration
Commission(SLORC) has faced substantialand growingdiplomaticand eco-
nomic pressuresand has become,in manyeyes,an international pariahbecause
of itsfloutingof theprincipleof electoralgovernment. But pressureson Burma
have come primarilyfromoutsidethe region,as witnessedby its admissionin
July1997 to theAssociationof SoutheastAsian Nations (ASEAN); indeed,the
democraticcredentialsof governmentsin most of the restof South-EastAsia
are questionable.We must also note that the Middle East presentsan almost
uniformlydismalpicture.

65 ThomasM. Franck, (Oxford:Clarendon,

law and institutions
Fairnessin international I995), p. I39.

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Human rights:
a newstandard
ofcivilization?

In general,though,the internationalnormativeenvironmenthas changed

dramaticallyfromthe Cold War era, when the United Statesand the Soviet
Union supportedelections primarilywhen the resultswent their way,and
when mostThirdWorld governmentsand intellectualswere contemptuousof
the claim that open and fairelectionswere a centralsource of international
politicallegitimacy.
Governmentsthatcannotplausiblyclaimto havebeen cho-
sen in open and fairelectionsare becomingsubjectto at leastpartialostracism.
Their membershipin internationalsocietyis thus devalued,even when (as is
usuallythe case) theyescape major materialsanctions.
The emergingnorm of electorallegitimacyis unlikelyto displace power,
interestand sovereignequality.Nonetheless,statestodayface politicalcostsfor
practicesthatjust two decades ago were standard,and the dramaticupsurgein
internationalelectionmonitoring66indicatesgrowingacceptance of an active
internationalinterestin nationalelectoraldemocracy.

International
humanrights
standards: butnotmaximal
inclusive
If we comparethe fulllistof rightsin the UniversalDeclarationwith the cases
thathave provokedsubstantial, sustainedinternationalaction,currentpractices
mustbe describedas stillrelatively minimal.In addition,the (veryweak) mul-
tilateralhuman rightsinstitutionscreatedduringthe Cold War era have not
been substantially strengthened, especiallygiven the disappointing(in)activity
of the new UN High Commissionerfor Human Rights.The infusionof
human rightsinto the mainstreamof internationalrelations,however,has sub-
tlyreshapednationaland internationalpoliticalspace.
For example,recentcriticismsof the PalestinianAuthorityformistreatment
of prisonersand attackson freespeech have come fromsympathetic as well as
hostilestates,and manyPalestinianshave treatedsuch discussionsas a legitimate
part of everydaypolitics,ratherthan slanderagainstthe nation.The image of
Arafatas a corrupt,dictatorialthugremainssubordinateto thatof nationallib-
eratorand essentialpartnerin the peace process;nonetheless,human rights
abuseshave tarnishedhis nationaland internationalprestige.
More generally, a growingnumberof statesseem w,rilling to pursuesustained, if
modest, internationalhuman rights For
initiatives. example, the United States con-
tinuesto pressBosnia,Croatiaand Serbiaon issuessuchas pressfreedomand polit-
as well as specifichuman rightsundertakings
ical participation, in the Dayton
Accords.Nigeria,one ofAfrica's wealthiestand mostpowerfulcountries, hasfaced
if
persistent, largelyverbal,pressure over militaryrule and politicalrepression.
Human rightshavebecome an everyday, and remarkably non-partisan,partoffor-
eign policyin mostWesternand manynon-Westernstates.Furthermore, human
rightsissuesareincreasingly raisedwithfriendsas well as adversariesand pariahs.

66 For a comprehensivehistoricaloverview,seeYves Beigbeder, International

monitoring
ofplebiscites,
referenda
and nationalelections
(Dordrecht:MartinusNijhoff,I994).

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JackDonnelly

Human rightshave become a (small)part of the post-Cold War calculus of

politicallegitimacy. They are,to re-quoteMartinWight,'principlesthatprevail
(or are at leastproclaimed)within a majorityof thestatesthatforminternational
society,as well as in the relationsbetweenthem'.Like the classicstandardof civ-
ilization,human rightshave theirgreatestinternational forcein cases of shock-
ing barbarism,such as Bosnia,Rwanda or Tiananmen Square.Unlike the clas-
sic standard,however,they link national and internationallegitimacyto an
inclusive,positivemodel of civilizedbehaviour.
Those who violate human rightsnorms rarelyface coercive international
enforcement. But systematic violators-especiallyifthe violationsare unusual-
ly shockingor telegenic-often do pay (modest)politicalcostsand findtheir
legitimacyquestioned.Thisrepresents a remarkablechange fromthe heydayof
rnilitary and single-party regimesjust a quarter-century ago. Respect for the
inalienablerightsof one's citizenshas become an inescapable,ifsecondary, part
of the languageand practiceof post-ColdWar internationalrelations.

Moral progress and the new universalism of international human

rights
Althoughappeals to universalvalues suggestthatone is actingon more than
narrow,selfishinterests,allegedlyuniversalnormsoftenreflectinsteadthe par-
ticularvalues or interestsof a giventime,place or group.Contemporaryinter-
nationalhuman rightsnorms,no less than the classicstandardof civilization,
are European in origin.But genealogyis no substitutefor moral argument.
Unless we deny all distinctions between social constructions-and thus aban-
don moraldiscourseor reduceit to unarguable,emotiveexpressionsofpersonal
or culturalpreferences-we mustask whetherthereare good reasonsto sup-
port or oppose particularpractices.
At the risk of both substantivecriticismand charges of methodological
inconsistency, I want to suggestthatnot merelythe demise of racistimperi-
alism but also the rise of universalhuman rightsideas presentsa storyof
moral progress.Elsewhere I have argued thathuman rightsreston a morally
attractivevision of a life of equality and autonomy and presenta relatively
effectiveresponseto severalmajor threatsto human dignityposed by mod-
ern marketsand states.67Here I will focus on proceduralgroundsforclaim-
ing that incorporatinghuman rightsinto the regulativenorms of interna-
tional societyrepresentsmoral progress.
Universalprohibitionsof particularpractices,althoughnot all equally sus-
pect-consider, forexample,prohibitionof the slave trade are mostlikelyto
reflectgeneralizationsfromthe presentthatare difficult to defend.For exam-
ple, nineteenth-century Europeans excoriated'barbaric'Chinese penal prac-

67 See Donnelly,Universal
human chs I-5.
rights,

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 a newstandard
Human rights: ofcivilization?

tices such as execution by strangulationbut considered hanging perfectly

civilized.Most internationally recognizedhumanrights, however,are appropri-
atelyformulatedin fairlygeneralterms-and those thatare not, such as the
requirementof segregating shouldbe treatedwith
juvenilesin penitentiaries,68
caution,especiallywith the passageof time.
We should also be unusuallysuspiciousof'universal'normsthatapplyprin-
cipallyto the behaviourof others.Norms thatapplyequally to oneselfand to
othersare farless likelyto be discriminatory in effector appearance.Inclusive
norms are relatively well insulatedfromself-interested or partisanabuse. Most
internationally recognizedhuman rightseasilypass thistest.
Contemporaryappeals to universalhuman rightsare also relativelyunprob-
lematicbecause theyreston a moral claim thatwe are all equallyhuman and,
as a result,are equallyentitledto certaingoods,services,opportunitiesand pro-
tections.Moral systemsthat reject fundamentalhuman equality have been
historicallycommon and remainlogicallyplausible.In the late twentiethcen-
tury, however,none has broadinternational appeal-a factthatitselfcan be seen
as a significant signof moralprogress.
That internationalhuman rightsnorms are not being imposed internation-
ally by force (except in a limitedfashionin the least controversialcases of
genocide and extremehumanitarianemergency)also makes them relatively
unproblematic. Many states,internationalorganizationsand non-governmental
organizationshave been strongverbal advocates of human rights.They have
occasionallyresortedto punitivesanctionsand positiveinducements.But by
stoppingshortof (the threatof force,the risk of imposingparticularprefer-
ences,or even selfishinterests, in the name of universalvalues is dramatically
reduced. In addition,even the strongestpersuasivemeans reflecta morally
attractiverespectforthe autonomyof thosewhose practicesone abhors.
Social conditionsand moralunderstandings will changein waysthatwill lead
international societyto rejectat leastsome contemporaryinternational human
rightsnorms.Nevertheless, humanrightsrepresenta progressive late twentieth-
centuryexpressionof the importantidea thatinternationallegitimacyand full
membershipin internationalsociety must rest in part on standardsof just,
humane or civilizedbehaviour.Despite the continuingsplitbetween national
and internationallaw embodied in dominantconceptionsof sovereignty, the
societyof stateshas come to accept thatour common humanitymakestheway
in which anystatetreatsitscitizensa legitimateconcern of otherstates,foreign
nationalsand internationalsociety.Althoughwe remainfarfromrealizingany
plausibleinternationalmoral ideal,we have moved a significant distancefrom
both civilizationalimperialismand the politicsof pristinesovereignty. This, I
believe,represents clear moralprogress, howevermuch we may disagreeabout
the size of the steptakenor the distanceremainingfromthe ideal.

68 International
Covenant
on CivilandPolitical
Rights,
ArticleIO, para.3.

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JackDonnelly

Concluding observations
I want to conclude with threebrief,interrelatedobservationson the storyI
have told.The firstconcernshow we look at human rightsin contemporary
internationalrelations.The human rightsliteraturehas tended to emphasize
legal and politicalpower and enforcement, as expressedin formalmultilateral
institutions such as the United Nations Conumissionor the European Court
and in coercivebilateralforeignpolicyinitiatives.
The metaphorof a new stan-
dard of civilizationsuggeststhatwe look-not instead,but no less important-
ly-at human rightsas legitimizingnorms.Greaterattentionshouldbe paid to
the waysin which human rightssubtlyshape nationaland international polit-
ical spaces and identitiesby demanding,justifyingor delegitimatingcertain
practices.My narrative, I hope, thusmakesa minorcontributionto the grow-
ing literatureon the role of normsand ideas in internationalrelations.69
Second, even in the late nineteenth-century heydayof power politics and
imperialism,internationalnorms had a place in internationalsocietyand an
independent(if minor) impact on statepractices.Appeals to civilizedbehav-
iour,despitedramaticchangesin theirsubstance,have been a constantfeature
of nineteenth-and twentieth-century internationalrelations.At the veryleast,
the contextsof power politics,the spaces availableforinternationally accept-
to
able appeals power and varyover timewith such changingnorms.
interest,
Finally,the storyI have told has bracketedthe most abusive elementsof the
classicstandardof civilizationbetween a more humane and universalistic nat-
ural law jurisprudenceand the extensivecontemporarybody of international
human rightslaw. Schwarzenberger's 'pristinesovereigntyin the formof law-
lessness'is a contingenthistoricalconstructionratherthan an unproblematic
starting-point forinternational
theory.Absoluteor'original'statesovereignty is
a myth,in both the constructiveand pejorativesensesof thatterm.
For most of the historyof the modern European statessystem,the practices
of statesovereignty and power politicshave been embedded withina norma-
tive frameworkthatappeals to standardsof justice and legitimacyabove and
beyond the consent and practiceof states.Late nineteenth-century positivist
jurisprudenceand the classicstandardof civilizationrepresenta low point in
such moral appeals-although even then universalnorms were not entirely

69 See e.g.Goldstein
andKeohane,eds,Ideasandforeign
policy;
MarthaFinnemore, in inter-
Nationalinterests
nationalsociety
(Ithaca,NY: CornellUniversity Press,I996); PeterJ.Katzenstein,
ed.,Theculture ofnational
security:
normsandidentity inworld politics(NewYork:ColumbiaUniversity Press,I996); andJeffrey
T.
Checkel,Ideasandinternationalpolitical change:
Soviet/Russian behavior
andtheendoftheColdWar(New
Haven,CT:Yale University Press,I997). FriedrichV.Kratochwil, Rules,norms,
anddecisions: onthecondi-
tionsofpractical
andlegalreasoningininternationalrelations
anddomestic affairs
(Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press,I989) providesthemostoftencitedgeneraltheoretical discussion.

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Human rights:
a newstandard
ofcivilization?

abandoned.Internationalhumanrights,ratherthana deviationfromprinciples
definingthe essence of the 'Westphalian'system,representa returnto a con-
ception of internationalsocietythatis older and morallymuch more attractive
thanthe positivistvision of pristinesovereignty.

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