International Phenomenological Society

Suarez on Individuation, Metaphysical Disputation V: Individual Unity and its Principle by

Jorge J. E. Gracia
Review by: Alfred J. Freddoso
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 44, No. 3 (Mar., 1984), pp. 419-421
Published by: International Phenomenological Society
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2107695 .
Accessed: 31/01/2014 13:19

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

International Phenomenological Society is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded from 150.161.145.52 on Fri, 31 Jan 2014 13:19:19 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Reviews
Suarez on Individuation, Metaphysical Disputation V: Individual Unity and its
Principle. Translation, Introduction, and Glossary by JORGE J. E. GRACIA. Mil-
waukee: Marquette University Press, i98z. Pp. 2z9.
Francisco Suarez was a leading light in the i6th century revival of Scholasticism
among the Dominicans and Jesuits on the Iberian peninsula, a revival that also
produced such luminaries as Domingo Bafiez and Luis de Molina. Despite their
importance, these thinkers are, regrettably, unfamiliar even to those Anglo-
American philosopers who share their metaphysical and theological interests,
largely because few of their works have been translated into English. So it is a
pleasure to welcome Jorge Gracia's translation of Suarez's tract on individua-
tion.
As is his wont, Suarez treats us-to a rigorous, insightful, and often convincing
critique of his predecessors' views before charting his own via media. This by
itself renders Metaphysical Disputation V worthy of careful scrutiny. Still, I
must confess that, Gracia's protestations to the contrary notwithstanding, Sua-
rez's own positive contribution strikes me as an unduly circuitous and at times
baffling restatement of Ockham's position, viz., that there really is no problem
of individuation or, more accurately, that the fact that a thing, x, is an individ-
ual is metaphysically basic and hence requires no explanation. More on this
below.
Suarez correctly insists from the beginning that x's being an individual (or:
being numerically one) is different from x's being (numerically) distinct from
other things of the same species. For being an individual is non-relational and
thus intrinsic to x, whereas being distinct from a given y is relational and thus
extrinsic to x in the sense that it depends on the existence of y. Suarez goes on to
affirm with many others that for x to be an individual is for x to be a thing that
is not divisible into things of x's species or natural kind. It follows that the ques-
tion (a) "What makes x indivisible into things of x's species?" is different from
the question (b) "What makes x distinct from other members of x's species?".
In his introduction Gracia contends (pp. 5-6) that "many medievals often
failed" to make this distinction between individuality and distinctness, as evi-
denced by the fact that they asked question (b) rather than question (a) when
inquiring about the principle (intrinsic cause) of individuality. They were
thereby easily led, he continues, to identify that principle with accidental fea-
tures that vary from one to another member of the same species - an egregious
error, since a thing's individuality is presupposed by, and hence cannot be
explained by, its posession of accidents.
There may be some truth to this contention, but Gracia has not been very
careful here. First, he accuses Aquinas of falling into the trap just described - a
charge he quickly qualifies with a i9-line footnote (p. 25) - but that is nonethe-
less misguided, though I do not have the space to argue the point here. Second,
and more poignantly, Suarez himself begins his discussion of the individuator
by asking, "What does the individual add to the common specific nature?" - a
question that looks suspiciously like (b) and not at all like (a). But so what?
Even if (a) is metaphysically more basic than (b), it may still be that a plausible

REVIEWS 4I9

This content downloaded from 150.161.145.52 on Fri, 31 Jan 2014 13:19:19 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
answerto (b) will yield a plausibleanswerto (a). Perhapsthey even have the
same answer.Suarez,if not Gracia,would seem to agree.
Unfortunately,Suarez'sown responseto question(b) is a flounderingattempt
to find a middlegroundbetweenthe positionsof Scotusand Ockham.Accord-
ing to Scotus, the common naturehuman being is a real constitutentof every
individualhuman being. But it cannot be the individuator,since in itself it is
communicableto and hence "divisibleinto" many numericallydistinctentities
of whichit is trulypredicable.Thus,Scotusreasons,what the individualaddsto
the specificnaturehumanbeing is a real (as opposedto conceptual)entity, an
individualdifference,which "contracts"the natureto producethis'particular
humanbeing,say Socrates.So Socrates,a realindividual,is the productof a real
compositionof the specificnaturehumanbeing,which is real, and the individ-
ual differenceof Socrates,which is also real.
Ockham,by contrast,deniesthat Socrateshas such "metaphysical"constitu-
ents in additionto his "physical"constituents,i.e., his body (matter)and intel-
lective soul (form).Accordingly,human being is a conceptual(and not a real)
entity,specificallya termin the mentallanguage.Hence,eventhough "Socrates
is a humanbeing"is a true statement,Socratesdoes not have humanbeingas a
real constituentthat has to be "contracted"in orderto producea real individ-
ual. (We could perhapstalk -aboutwhat the conceptSocratesaddsconceptually
to the concepthumanbeing, but that of courseis anothermatter.)The conclu-
sion Ockhamdrawsis that we have no need to explainSocrates'individuality.
Socratesis an individual"by himself."That is, the fact that Socratesis an indi-
vidualis metaphysicallyprimitiveand hence requiresno explanation.
Suarez'scompromiseis a mystifyingamalgamof these two perfectlyintelligi-
ble, thoughcontrary,positions.With Ockhamhe affirmsthat humanbeingis a
conceptualratherthan a realentity.Nonetheless,he concurswith Scotus(i) that
Socratescan correctlybe said to be composed"metaphysically" of humanbeing
plus somethingelse, and (ii) that this somethingelse is real ratherthan concep-
tual. He then claims(p. 5z) in the spiritof Ockhamthat the compositionis itself
conceptualand not real. So Socrates,a real individual,is composedmetaphysi-
cally though only conceptuallyof somethingreal (the individuator)and some-
thing conceptual(humanbeing)!The coup de grace comes when Suarez,again
in the spirit of Ockham, identifies the individuatorwith Socrates himself,
thoughmore principallybecauseof his form than becauseof his matter.
At worst, this position is simplyincoherent.At best, it can charitablybe con-
struedto be Ockham'sposition statedmisleadingly.Graciaargues(p. Zi) to the
contrarythat the two positions are different,since Suarez,but not Ockham,
"explains"the individualityof Socratesin termsof the priorindividualityof his
matter and form. But this differencehas nothing to do with individualityas
such. Suarezand Ockhamagreethat the metaphysicallybasic entitiesare indi-
viduals"by themselves."They differ,at mpst,on Aristotle'sage old questionof
whetherindividualsubstancesare metaphysicallymore basic or less basic than
their "physical"constituents.
I found Gracia'stranslationto be almostalwaysreliable,thougha bit too lit-
eral and hence not as readableas it mighthave been. But this criticismreflects
my personalpreferencemore than anythingelse. There were, however,a few
errors.For instance,the argumenttranslatedby the secondparagraphon p. 32
has as its conclusion"Everyactualbeing is an individual"ratherthan, as Gra-

420 PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH

This content downloaded from 150.161.145.52 on Fri, 31 Jan 2014 13:19:19 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
cia would have it, "Whateverexists has a fixed and determinateentity." (The
latteris in fact the majorpremise.)Graciashouldhaverealizedthat his interpre-
tation of the argumentwas dubiouswhen he found himselfforcedto translate
'quia'as 'that'insteadof 'since'or 'because'.Butneitherthis mistakenor any of
the othersI found seriouslydistortedany crucialphilosophicalpoint.
The glossaryis an impresive(IO4 pages) and useful philosophicalguide to
technicalScholasticterminology.ThoughI have a few quibbleswith it (e.g., the
entryon 'aevum'fails to mentionthe importantuse of this termto designatethe
analogue of temporal duration for angels), this compendiumis a splendid
achievementfor which Graciadeserveshigh praise.
I have a final commentabout the introduction,which is generallylucid and
illuminating.Apparentlyin an effort to make Suarezpalatableto those who do
not sharehis religiousbeliefs,Graciaemphasizes"thecompletelyphilosophical
characterof Suarez'sanalysis.Althoughsome theologicalconsiderationscreep
in, the discussionis guided wholly by philosophicalprinciples . . . . In this
senseSuarezis no less modernthanDescartesor Leibniz"(p. 23). I do not know
exactly what Graciameans here by "modern,"but I take it that he wants to
contrastSuarez'sattitudetoward philosophywith that of a zealot who might
say somethinglike the following:
InthisworkI amdoingphilosophy in sucha wayasto keepalwaysin mindthatourphi-
losophyshouldbe Christiananda servantto divineTheology.I havekeptthisgoalin
the questionsbut alsoin choosingmy viewsor opinions,
view,not onlyin discussing
towardthosewhichseemto comportbetterwithpietyandrevealed
inclining doctrine.
The sourceof this quotation(you haveprobablyguessed)is Suarez'sMetaphys-
ical Disputations (Preface).Perhaps Suarez is not so "modern"as Gracia
would have us believe.But, then again,perhapsSuarezwould not regardbeing
modernin that sense a virtue.
ALFRED J. FREDDOSO
Universityof Notre Dame

Identity and Essence. BARUCH BRODY. Princeton: Princeton University

Press,i980.
In this interesting book, Baruch Brody presents a wide range of challenging
arguments for two theories, one a theory of identity through and at a time, and
the other a version of Aristotelian essentialism.
Some philosophers have sought to analyze the identity of different kinds of
objects, e.g., persons, material objects, properties, sets, etc., differently. Brody
argues that this approach is fundamentally misguided. In support of this claim,
he provides what he believes to be the correct analysis of the identity of all enti-
ties, and he claims to refute prominent examples of analyses which purport to
be specific to one kind of entity or another. Some of the latter are the spatio-
temporal continuity analysis of the identity through time of physical objects, var-
ious versions of the memory theory of personal identity, the co-extensionality
theory of property identity, and Goldman's, Davidson's, and Kim's theories of
event identity. Brody's critical arguments are, I believe, almost always cogent. I
shall, therefore, concentrate on his positive contribution to the theory of iden-

REVIEWS 421

This content downloaded from 150.161.145.52 on Fri, 31 Jan 2014 13:19:19 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions