Philosophical Review

On Efficient Causality: Metaphysical Disputations 17, 18, and 19. by Francisco Suarez; Alfred
J. Freddoso
Review by: Robert Pasnau
The Philosophical Review, Vol. 105, No. 4 (Oct., 1996), pp. 533-535
Published by: Duke University Press on behalf of Philosophical Review
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 BOOK REVIEWS

In sum: This is great stuff.Assign it for your students.Learn from it

yourself.

FIONA COWIE
CaliforniaInstitute
of Technology

Review,Vol. 105, No. 4 (October 1996)

ThePhilosophical

ON EFICMENT CAUSALITY METAPHYSICALDISPUTATIONS 17, 18, AND

19. By FRANCIsCoSuAREz.Translated by ALFRED J. FREDDOSO. New Ha-
ven: Yale UniversityPress, 1994. Pp. xx, 428.

A quick scan of the leading figuresin westernphilosophyrevealsthatrel-

ativelyfew have made a name for themselvesby defendingintuitive,nat-
ural, and sensible positions. Aristotleis one, and perhaps Aquinas is an-
other.Francisco Suarez, the sixteenth-century Spanish scholastic,would be
a third.His invariableworkingprocedure is to give copious consideration
to the various ancient and medieval views,and then to findsome sensible
compromise position. But today Suarez can hardlyclaim to have a broad
readership.Of his fifty-four MetaphysicalDisputations(DM), only nine have
now been published in English,while his other worksremain almost en-
tirelyuntranslated.This clear and accurate new translationaims to show
readers what theyhave been missing.
What is most immediatelyimpressiveabout thislong and dense volume
is the lightit shines on medieval and early modern thought.Suarez's co-
pious referencesto earlier figures-to Plato and other ancients, and to
dozens of earlier scholastics-make his workvaluable as an historicaldoc-
ument. On the other hand, his wide readership in the seventeenthand
eighteenthcenturiesmakes him importantfor studentsof the earlymod-
ern period. It is less clear, however,how much thisvolume has to offeron
a strictlyphilosophical level. In his briefintroduction,Freddoso writesthat
DM 17-19 "constitute,as far as I know,the longest,most profound,and
most thoroughtractever writtenon creaturelyefficientcausalityfroman
Aristotelianperspective" (xvii). Those who make it throughDM 17 and 18
withstrengthenough to begin DM 19 will indeed be rewarded.Here Sua-
rez takes up freedom and necessity,and he offersa detailed and sophisti-
cated analysisof human action. But DM 17 and 18 (which are almost en-
tirelyindependent of DM 19) seem farless interesting.Here Suarez offers
a general account of efficientcausality,but it is oftendifficultto see how
his Aristotelianperspectivesheds lighton modern questions about causal-
ity.
Still,perhaps thisAristotelianperspectivecan be valuable withoutshed-
ding light on modern (that is, Humean) problems about causality-in-

533

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 BOOK REVIEWS

deed, perhaps it can be valuable preciselybecause it offersa different

perspective.Freddoso thinksso: "in presentingthis translation... I hope
to contribute to the current resuscitationof Aristotelianmetaphysics"
(xvi). So what does an Aristoteliantheoryof causalitylook like? As one
mightexpect, Suarez gives separate treatmentto the four kinds of Aristo-
telian causes. The presentvolume is devoted to efficientcausality,whichis
of course the varietythatcorresponds most closelyto our modern idea of
a cause. In DM 17 Suarez clarifiesa great deal of standard scholasticter-
minology,explainingwhatefficientcauses are, and then the different types
of efficientcauses, includingperse versusperaccidenscauses, principalver-
sus instrumentalcauses, and univocal versus equivocal causes. As readers
with an interestin the medieval period will immediatelysee, this whole
discussion is extremelyvaluable as a guide to earlier usage. Readers with
no special interestin the terminologywill likelybe less impressed.
DM 18 is much more ambitious. It begins by asking "whethercreated
thingsreallyeffectanything" (37), a question that leads Suarez to reject
occasionalism. Then, over the next two-hundred-plus pages, Suarez takes
up a detailed metaphysicalanalysisof how one thingcan be the efficient
cause of another. Here the reader looking for a promisingtheoryof cau-
sation faces considerable impediments,because almost the entireaccount
presupposes an Aristotelianmetaphysicsthatis not readilytransferableinto
modern lines of thought.Suarez argues, among other things,that form
and not matterwill alwaysbe the principleof causality(51); thataccidents
can be instrumentalcauses in the production of a substance (62) but that
the substantialformwill be the principal principle involvedin such cau-
sation (52); that among accidents only qualities are per se principles of
acting (117). Are these interestingclaims? It is certainlynot immediately
evident that they are; on the other hand it would be foolish to dismiss
them as uninterestingrelics.Evaluatingthese issueswould be a major task.
This is a task that Freddoso has already taken up, not just with this
translationbut in a series of published articles.Yet even in this splendid
translationSuarez oftenseems to be movingin a closed theoreticalcircle.
One senses his philosophical skill,but often feels frustratedin tryingto
connect his concerns withour concerns. Even when the debate shiftsto a
more concrete level, and examples are offered,the gulfstillremains.The
examples he considers (forexample, in discussingthe possibilityof action
at a distance,how magnetswork (209), and whythe bottom of a kettleis
cooler than the boilingwaterabove it (203)) willbe of interestto historians
of science,but don't advance the philosophicaldebate as we now defineit.
In contrast,DM 19 clearlydeserves a broad philosophic audience. Sua-
rez's basic position is that "freedom existsformallyin the will and not in
the intellect" (337). This gets explained and defended in termsof a so-
phisticatedaction theory.Like all the appetitivefaculties,an act of will is

534

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 BOOK REVIEWS

"an intrinsicand spontaneous tendencyor inclinationtowardthe object"

(340). This means that desires and inclinationsare not commanded or
chosen by will, but simply are will's commands and choices. Only such
inclinationscount as intrinsicallyvoluntary.Other human actions,includ-
ing intellection,are extrinsicallyvoluntary,and thereforecannot be for-
mallyfree.
In all of this,Suarez attemptsto followsAquinian lines, but he seems at
crucial pointsto make concessions to the voluntarismof earlierfigureslike
Olivi and Scotus. Thus, Suarez maintainsthat it is probable, though not
certain,thatwill can choose either of two objects even when intellecthas
judged one of the two to be better (356). And he later holds thateven at
the instantat which a choice is made, the will must be both capable of
choosing the act and capable of not choosing it. To explain how this can
be true even at thatinstantat which the choice is made, he distinguishes
between temporalinstantsand instantsof nature (380).
Freddoso is medieval philosophy's best and most prolific translator.
Here, as in his earlier works,the English is both clear and faithfulto the
original. The translationis literalenough to satisfyphilosophers,but not
so ploddinglyliteralas to wear down the reader. Frequent footnoteshelp
make sense of obscure referencesand tangled arguments.In comparing
fortypages of the translationwith the original Latin I was unable to find
a single significantmistake,omission,or even questionable rendering.
Some minor complaints:Freddoso's practiceis to leave $uarez's sources
as theystand in the Latin. As a result,readers must either recognize on
theirown names like Henry,Gabriel,Durandus, the Master,Hervaeus, etc.,
or discover on their own that full names and dates are provided in the
index (although there Durandus [of St. Pourcain] is wronglyidentifiedas
William Durandus). Also, Freddoso includes withoutcomment the para-
graph tides of the standard 1866 edition, which suggeststhat these are
Suarez's own headings. That assumptionstrikesme as dubious.

ROBERT PASNAU
St.Joseph'sUniversity

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