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RLF6 UX5 B8 Hazop
RLF6 UX5 B8 Hazop
FOREWORD
M/s Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited (HPCL) has one of its a bulk petroleum oil Depot &
marketing division of Motor Spirit (MS), High Speed Diesel (HSD), Superior Kerosene Oil (SKO),
Ethanol, Furnace Oil (FO) and Lubes at Bakrapet village, Kadapa-Rajampeth road, Kadapa, dist:
Kadapa, Andhra Pradesh state.
The Depot is receiving the petroleum products from HPCL Vijayawada & Chennai POL Terminals
through Railway Wagons. These petroleum products include Motor Spirit (MS), High Speed Diesel
(HSD), Superior Kerosene Oil (SKO) and Furnace Oil (FO). Ethanol is received through truck
tanker. Kadapa new Depot is an intermediate stock point for feeding HPCL’s retail outlets (RO) in
the Kadapa, Chitoor & Kurnool Districts surrounding area to ensure there is no distruption in the
feed from the Depot to the ROs. The products are filled in the separate aboveground tanks and
dispatched from the Depot by road tankers. The existing storage Depot consists of 08 aboveground
and 05 underground tanks.
In order to assess the damage potential and thus risk arising due to storage and handling of these
flammable petroleum products at Kadapa POL Depot, M/s Hindustan Petroleum Corporation
Limited, engaged Marty India Engineering And Consultancy Services., Nagpur to undertake&
Revalidate Risk Analysis & HAZOP Study for Kadapa POL Depot with consideration of current
available facilities and our specific observations in line with OISD-244, OISD-117,MSIHC rules and
other statutory compliances.
This report presents the HAZOP study of Kadapa POL Depot. HAZOP Study helps to find the “weak
link” in a Depot and to provide a basis for developing procedural or engineering controls to remove
or lessen the risks from the identified problem area.The cooperation and assistance rendered by
M/s HPCL officials, Kadapa POL Depot in carrying out the studies is gratefully acknowledged.
CONTENTS
1 INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................... 4
1.1 Preamble ............................................................................................................ 4
1.2 Study Objectives & Scope Of Work ......................................................................... 4
1.2.1 Study Objectives............................................................................................ 4
1.2.2 Scope Of Work .............................................................................................. 5
1.2.3 Organization Of Report ................................................................................... 5
2 ABOUT HAZARD & OPERABILITY STUDIES (HAZOP) ............................................... 5
2.1 Hazop: A Study For Hazard Identification ................................................................ 6
2.2 Hazop Procedure, Significance Of Guideword & Data/ Documents Required ................. 7
2.3 Hazop As Explained In “A Guide To Manufacture, Storage & Import Of Hazardous
Chemicals Rules, 2000” ........................................................................................ 8
2.4 Methodology Of HAZOP ......................................................................................... 9
3 KADAPA DEPOT DESCRIPTION .............................................................................. 11
3.1 About Hpcl, Kadapa Depot .................................................................................. 11
3.1.1 Ongoing Operations At Depot ........................................................................ 11
3.1.2 Maximum Inventory Of Petroleum Oil Products At Depot ................................... 11
3.2 Various Facilities Equipped & Propose To Equip At Depot ......................................... 13
3.2.1 Details Of Pol Product Transfer Pumps ............................................................ 14
3.2.2 Vapor Recovery Unit (VRU) ........................................................................... 15
3.2.1 Interunit Distances For Important Structures................................................... 16
3.3 Details Of Firefighting Facilities ............................................................................ 18
3.3.1 Communication Facilities............................................................................... 22
4 HAZARD & OPERABILITY STUDY (HAZOP) AT KADAPA DEPOT .............................. 25
4.1 Types Of Hazards Considered In The Hazop Study ................................................. 25
4.2 Listing Of Ongoing Operations Of Depot ................................................................ 25
4.2.1 Receipt Of Petroleum Products (MS, HSD, & SKO) Through Pipeline And Road Tankers
................................................................................................................. 26
4.2.2 Storage Of Petroleum Products And Dispatch Of Filled Truck Tankers ................. 26
4.3 Selection Of Nodes For Hazop Study ..................................................................... 26
4.4 Hazard & Operability Studies For Various Sections ................................................. 26
5 RECOMMENDATIONS ............................................................................................. 54
LIST OF TABLES:
LIST OF FIGURES:
LIST OF APPENDIX:
1 introduction
1.1 preamble
M/s Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited (HPCL) has one of its a bulk petroleum oil Depot &
marketing division of Motor Spirit (MS), High Speed Diesel (HSD), Superior Kerosene Oil (SKO),
Ethanol, Furnace Oil (FO) and Lubes at Bakrapet village, Kadapa-Rajampeth road, Kadapa, dist:
Kadapa, Andhra Pradesh state.
The Depot is receiving the petroleum products from HPCL Vijayawada & Chennai POL Terminals
through Railway Wagons. These petroleum products include Motor Spirit (MS), High Speed Diesel
(HSD), Superior Kerosene Oil (SKO) and Furnace Oil (FO). Ethanol is received through truck
tanker. Kadapa new Depot is an intermediate stock point for feeding HPCL’s retail outlets (RO) in
the Kadapa, Chitoor & Kurnool Districts surrounding area to ensure there is no distruption in the
feed from the Depot to the ROs. The products are filled in the separate aboveground tanks and
dispatched from the Depot by road tankers. The existing storage Depot consists of 08 aboveground
and 05 underground tanks
In order to assess the damage potential and thus risk arising due to storage and handling of these
flammable petroleum products at Kadapa POL Depot, M/s Hindustan Petroleum Corporation
Limited, engaged Marty India Engineering And Consultancy Services., Nagpur to undertake&
Revalidate Risk Analysis & HAZOP Study for Kadapa POL Depot with consideration of current
available facilities and our specific observations in line with OISD-244, OISD-117,MSIHC rules and
other statutory compliances.
This report presents Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) Study of Kadapa POL Depot. Findings of the
study have been presented in the report in the form of worksheets and recommendations are made
accordingly.
Relevant regulations of “Manufacture, Storage and Import of Hazardous Chemicals Rules, 2000;
under Environmental Protection Act, 1986, pertinent OISD guidelines are used for carrying out the
HAZOP study. Basic guideline being developed by ICI UK and further developed & published by UK
chemical industries association.
To analyze chemical and process hazards, i.e. to examine the possible pathways of
occurrence of an unintentional event that may lead to any accident
To evaluate the protection measures that are already incorporated in terms of their
To carry out Hazard & Operability Study (HAZOP) of the Kadapa Depot and to identify
potential hazards incorporating the following aspects:
2. Study of measuring instruments, alarms, controls, safety, fire prevention & fire
fighting systems provided & what if analysis.
To examine the safety measures incorporated in the Depot to suggest the suitable safety
measures if any require.
The report commences with `Contents’, which gives a list of various topics along with the page
numbers. Separate list has been prepared for tables, figures and annexure.
Heading - 3 explains/describes various facilities, utilities, ongoing operations and safety measures
provided at “Kadapa POL Depot”.
Heading - 4 gives “Hazard & Operability Study of Depot” Ongoing operations and selected
nodes for HAZOP study are listed in this Chapter.
Early detection of hazards and visualization of disastrous situations helps to impart safety in a
systematic way. The existing Plant can continue to operate for many years and can be modified
several times in its life span, so due care must be given to avoid any compromise on the safety
concept included in the original Plant design and operating conditions. Hazard & Operability Studies
on existing Plant improve operating methods, operational safety, deficiencies in available systems
and can show potholes responsible for accidents or even a disaster.
HAZOP is a structured methodology, which allows its user to employ imaginative thinking in the
identification of hazards and operational problems. It involves a systematic, methodical
examination of design document that describe the facility. A multidisciplinary team performs the
study to identify hazards or operability problems that could result in an accident. Deviations in key
parameters are studied, using guide words to direct the process of evaluation. This technique
presumes that the values of flows, temperatures, and other process variables are inherently safe
and operable.
This HAZOP guideword approach was originally developed by Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd.
(ICI); which was further modified and made user friendly by the American Institute of Chemical
Engineers - Centre for Chemical Process Safety.
Assisting the management with information of where the potential hazard may exist and
facilitate recommendations towards improved safety.
Providing the safety related documentation of the Plant, which is very useful when
modifications are carried out.
Hazard : Anything (chemical reaction, equipment malfunction, or operator error) that can
lead to an unwanted event.
Operability : Suggestions which assist the operators to improvise in their actions
These definitions are an important part of the basic HAZOP premise that the process does not have
inherent hazards or operating problems when the unit is operating as designed, and as defined by
the basic documents such as the process flow diagrams, equipment specifications, and operating
procedures.
HAZOP is a recommended tool when making Plant expansion, modifications or revamps, since the
changes introduce opportunities for error that might not be obvious unless reviewed as part of a
"system" instead of a localized change. HAZOP is also very useful for existing facilities, where they
can be used for evaluating hazards and operations from an unbiased viewpoint, to identify possible
process improvements or as a quality-assurance effort.
Hazard & Operability Study systematically analyses foreseeable deviations from normal operating
conditions, which includes description of deviations, the causes of these deviations, the possible
consequences and the necessary preventive measures to be taken.
HAZOP study involves a set of standardized GUIDE WORDS, which are used to initiate the
discussion in the team. Possible deviations in process parameters in a process or a pipeline are
considered to predict their causes and consequences. If a hazard is identified, first the existing
protective measures are analyzed with respect to the intensity of the hazard. If the protective
measures need to be increased, recommendations are given to mitigate the hazard. Examples of
recommended guidewords are as follows:
None No forward flow when there should be, i.e. no flow or reverse flow.
More of More of any relevant physical property than there should be, e.g. higher flow
(rate or total quantity), higher temperature, higher pressure, higher viscosity,
etc.
Less of less of any relevant physical property than there should be e.g. lower
flow (rate or total quantity), lower temperature, lower pressure, etc.
Part of Composition of system different from what it should be, e.g. change in
components, component missing, etc.
More than More components present in the system than there should be, e.g. extra
phase present (vapor, solid), impurities (air, water, acids, corrosion
products), etc.
Hazard & Operability Study require prior understanding of the behavior and hazards of the
hazardous chemicals being used in the Plant, which mainly includes:
Hazardous Properties of petroleum products received at Depot are given in Appendix-I as MSDS
(Material Safety Data Sheet).
First HAZOP sheets are prepared and then the team discusses on possibilities of occurrence of
various deviations from the intended operating conditions by employing the guidewords;
responsibility/provision of the control equipments for these deviations are analyzed. Then,
consequences of the deviations are examined for vulnerability towards occurrence of unsafe
situations and suggestions are given to check improve system reliability, if felt necessary by
HAZOP team.
HAZOP Expert
Fire & Safety Officer
Process Engineer
Instrumentation engineer
Electrical engineer
Maintenance personnel
Plot plan
Process Manuals, Process flows Diagrams and SOP
P&I diagrams
2.3 hazop as explained in “a guide to manufacture, Storage & import of hazardous chemicals
rules, 2000”
HAZOP is a technique commonly used by chemical process facilities to identify hazards and
difficulties that prevent safe operation. There are two versions of the technique, one that deals with
"deviations" and the other with "disturbances". "Deviations are caused by malfunction or mal-
operation of a specific production system.”Disturbances" include problems caused by influences
outside the specified system including other activities and the environment. The first version of
HAZOP to be developed and the most widely known was aimed at deviations and is called a "Guide
Word" HAZOP. Elements of the process are evaluated on basis of guidewords. The purpose of the
element is specified and associating this purpose of the element with distinctive words or phrases
called “Guide Words” generates notational deviations. Typical guidewords are "no" or "not",
"more", "less", "as well as", "reverse", and "other than”, etc.
For each notable deviation, we have tried to make an assessment whether this is a possible
situation (e.g., no flow or reverse flow in a transfer line that should have forward flow). If this is
possible, the conditions in which that situation might occur and the possible hazardous
consequences shall be identified. The guidewords are applied to materials and operating
parameters (e.g., flow, temperature, pressure). The guidewords are applied not only to the
equipment, but also to the operating procedures. The phases of operation (e.g., start up,
operation, shutdown, and backwash) must also be included. This assessment can be time
consuming.
The second version of HAZOP studies is called a "creative checklist" HAZOP. This version has been
developed as a complement to the guideword HAZOP to cover "disturbances". It is of particular
value in two situations. These are to enable HAZOP study to be carried out early in the design
process, even before the detailed design necessary for a "guide word" HAZOP is available: and to
cover hazards which may be caused by interactions between units which could be perfectly safe if
built in isolation, but may be capable of adverse interactions. This second method is use as
checklist of known major hazards and nuisances. The checklist would contain words such as "fire,"
"explosion", "toxicity", "corrosion", "dust", and "small". The checklist is initially applied to every
material likely to be present; raw materials, intermediates, finished products, by products and
effluents. This establishes qualitatively whether hazards and nuisances exist and also provides a
quantitative database of the numerical intensities of different hazards. Thus "fire" would result in
not only a note that material is flammable but numerical measurements such as a "flash point" and
"flammable limits". Any missing data are pinpointed and timely steps taken to collect such data.
The second method continues with the association of the same checklist with each item of
equipment. The materials present in such equipment together with the inventories are known as
the "materials hazards". As the analysis proceeds, the potential for all major hazards including
interactions between units or the unit and its environment are identified. The flow of hazards can
be in both directions. For example, the environment may pose hazards to the unit (e.g., flooding
and earthquakes), which would have to be considered in the site selection, design, and layout of
the unit. Although less well known than the guideword HAZOP, the creative checklist HAZOP has
been found to be a quick and valuable complementary approach.
The HAZOP examine the process or at least those parts of process, which could cause major
Hazard. It systematically questions every parts of process in order to discover how deviations from
the can occur and decides whether these deviations can give rise to hazardous conditions.
Sections of Plant are subjected to a number of questions formulated around a series of guide words
derived from method study techniques. This usually produces number of theoretical deviations and
each deviation is then considered to decide how it could be caused and what would be
consequence.
Some of the causes may be unrealistic and so the derived consequences will be rejected as not
meaningful. Some of the consequences may be trivial and would not be considered any further.
However, there may be some deviations with both causes that are conceivable and consequences
that are potentially serious. These are then noted for remedial action. The study progresses to
focus on the next part of the design. The examination is repeated until the whole Plant has been
studied.
The causes which are considered likely to occur with certain possibility are addressed first, while
those causes which are less likely are addressed next. We have tried to explore possibility of
deviation (from intended operation/output) which can result in hazardous consequences. Provisions
already made in the Installation design/Process are looked into and Suggestions are given for
reducing/minimizing those causes which are more likely or can result in more serious
consequences.
M/s Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited (HPCL), dealing in essential commodities, has a POL
Depot at at Bakrapet village, Kadapa-Rajampeth road, Kadapa, dist: Kadapa, Andhra Pradesh state.
This Depot was commissioned in July 2015. Total Plot area occupied by depot is 56 acre. Kadapa
Depot was commissioned primarily for storage and distribution of POL products viz. Motor Spirit
(MS), High Speed Diesel (HSD), Superior Kerosene Oil (SKO), Furnace Oil (FO) and Ethanol
through rail tank wagons and truck tanker.
Kadapa Depot is receiving the petroleum products from HPCL Vijayawada & Chennai POL Depot
through Railway Wagons. These petroleum products include Motor Spirit (MS), High Speed Diesel
(HSD), Superior Kerosene Oil (SKO) and Furnace Oil (FO). Ethanol is received through truck
tanker. Kadapa new Depot is an intermediate stock point for feeding HPCL’s retail outlets (RO) in
the Kadapa, Chitoor & Kurnool Districts surrounding area to ensure there is no distruption in the
feed from the Depot to the ROs. The products are filled in the separate aboveground tanks and
dispatched from the Depot by road tankers.
3.1.2 maximum inventory of petroleum oil products at depot
Maximum inventory of petroleum oil products as per flammability class and Product storage tanks
are located in different groups with separate surrounding walls (Dyke Walls) in the Kadapa Depot
are provided in following two tables.
S.N. Dyke Dyke wall containing Tanks (No.) Total Dyke Max.
No Max. Volume Capacity
Inventory (m3) Tank (m3)
(m3)
1 Dyke-1 Tk.201A/B 16800 9323 8400
2 Dyke-2 Tk.101A/B 5600 3642 2800
3 Dyke-3 Tk.202A/B & Tk.301A/B 11380 5295 4390
4 Dyke-4 Tk.102/103/104/105/105/203/204/205 840 250 180
Construction of storage tanks confirms to API 650/IS 803. MS steel confirms to IS 2062-Grade A/B.
List of other major facilities constructed at site is as under:
S. N. DESCRIPTION DETAILS
9 Transformer Yard Required for getting power connection
10 Oil water separator Requires for spillage oil segregation
11 Watch Tower For lighting requirements
12 Fire Water Tank Fire water storage
13 Scrap Yard Scrap storage
14 Vapour Recovery Unit For Lighter component recovery from MS
15 Area for Additive dozing For Additive dozing
16 TW Gantry Product dispatch Facility to other installation
17 Air Compressor For Pneumatic control
18 Engineering store & Site Office Work shop and spare parts store
Location of various sheds & other facilities at Kadapa Depot are shown in layout drawing which is
given in figure 1. Plot area occupied by the Depot premise is about 56 acres. Area covered by
various facilities is tabulated as below:
Schedule of these Product pumps for transfer of POL products is provided below:
Table 5: Schedule of Product Pumps for POL Product Transfer at TLF Shed
All fittings in T/T filling shed, pump house and electrical motors are flame proof confirming to IS
2148, 1981,2206 (Part 1) 1968 & 2147-1962. All earth pits confirm to IS 3043.
3.2.2 Vapor Recovery UNIT (VRU)
During storage and distribution of petroleum products large streams of vapors are released by
evaporation and displacement procedures, e.g. by truck-, railcar- or ship loading applications.
According to the latest common international emission legislations and technical guidelines these
vapours must be treated. VRU process is a Recovery of vapors (mainly volatile hydrocarbons) in
form of liquid, during loading/unloading process from truck tankers. The purposes of the facility are
to take care of
The process design developed provided by BORSIG Membrane technology. BORSIG VRU is based on
a combination of absorption or condensation and membrane separation. Main equipment is liquid ring
compressor, scrubber column, membrane separation stage and vacuum pump. The process enables an
effective treatment of the vapours meeting the required emission level.
Process layout diagram of BORSIG VRU is shown below
HAZOP of VRU
The process Hazop of VRU has been conducted based on the Process Instrumentation diagram and
understanding of the process philosophy. Refer Hazop sheet number HAZOP/VRU/Vap 05/Liq
06/Mem 07/PSA 08 under table 16 to 19.
There are three above ground ORVT Type Fire water storage tanks at POL Depot, available for
Fire Fighting purpose. Details of these Tanks with Fire Water pumps are as below:
Pump able water requirement for firefighting purpose at Depot, as per revised OISD – 117 is
found to be equal to 9840 KL. However, water available at Depot is 9990 m3. Thus, the fire
water storage at Depot is more than the stipulated quantity as per revised OISD – 117
(amended July 2012). Hence, available fire water storage meets the OISD 117 guidelines
requirement.
Calculations for fire water requirement & Fire Water Pump requirement with standby pumps are
shown in Appendix – VII.
A fire hydrant pipeline covers tank farm, pump house lube ware house, lube drum yard & grease
drum shed, office building, TLF Gantry has been provided.
Fire extinguishers:
Fire extinguishers available at various strategic locations as per revised OISD – 177 (Amended
July 2012) are as below:
For communication with plant personnel & outside agencies during any emergency situation
following facilities are available at plant:
8. E-mail
9. Portable Loud Speakers (Mega Phone).
Receipt, Storage & Dispatch of petroleum oil products is the operating processes at HPCL,
Kadapa Depot.
4.2.1 receipt of petroleum products (ms, hsd, & sko) through pipeline and road tankers
At Kadapa POL Depot, Petroleum products viz. MS, HSD, SKO, FO & ETHANOL are received
mainly from from HPCL Vijayawada & Chennai POL Terminals through Railway Wagons.
The pumped Petroleum products are stored in respective storage tanks in Tank Farm area.
Details of Product pumps & Storage tanks with maximum storage capacity are mention in above
chapter 3.
The various petroleum product handling processes/storage units have been selected for HAZOP
evaluation with respect to most hazardous petroleum product as listed below:
Hazard & Operability Study has been carried out for the ongoing operations of Depot by applying
the significant guidewords and adequacy of safety systems are evaluated; and suggestions have
been made accordingly in worksheets.
Table 12: HAZOP STUDY WORKSHEET 1 - Receipt of MS/HSD/SKO/FO from Wagon Unloading gantry to Storage Tanks
NODE: Receipt of MS/HSD/SKO/FO from Wagon Unloading Gantry
HAZOP Sheet No.: HAZOP/Products/01
to Storage Tanks
Facilities: Tank Wagon Gantry to Storage Tanks Drawing/Diagram No.:
S.N.
Guide Measures /
Possible Action/Corrective
Parameter Words Possible Causes Existing Facilities
Consequences measures Required
(Deviation) Safeguard
12.1 Flow
12.1.1 No No HSD/SKO flow No transfer of Liquid level Strict Visual
to Wagon Pump HSD/SKO in indicator Inspection of
house Storage Tank provided on all operations to be
carried out
Major leakage at Dry run of storage Tanks
Calibration of the
wagon unloading pumps may Temperature instruments to be
point due to result in Indicator are carried out as per
improper hose increase in provided on schedule
connections temp. storage Tank
Leakage in Chances of Control and
Underground cavitation in monitoring
pipeline pumps/dry run through TAS
Pump Inlet/outlet of pump may Isolation of
valve may be results in operation is in
closed electricity place
Leakage in consumption Safety training is
pipeline between Operability provided to all
Pump(s) & Tank Problems working / new
Strainer of Loss of product personnel’s
Pump(s) may be Soil Pressure Gauge
fully choked. contamination and vacuum
gauge provided
Failure of pipeline Fire Hazards if
Table 13: HAZOP STUDY WORKSHEET 2: Receipt of Ethanol from TT Gantry to Ethanol U/G Tank
S.N. NODE: Receipt of Ethanol from TT Gantry to Ethanol U/G Tank HAZOP Sheet No.: HAZOP/ETH/EX-
TT/02
S.N. NODE: Receipt of Ethanol from TT Gantry to Ethanol U/G Tank HAZOP Sheet No.: HAZOP/ETH/EX-
TT/02
Facilities: Outlet of Tank Truck at TT Gantry to Storage Tank Drawing/Diagram No.:
Parameter Guide Possible Causes Possible Measures / Action/Corrective
Words Consequences Existing Facilities measures Required
(Deviation) Safeguard
13.1.2 Less Connecting hoses Delay in Tank Liquid level As above
not connected loading operation indicator provided
properly to if not identified on All storage
unloading arm soon. Tanks and on TT.
Pipeline may be Loss of product. Tripping system
partially leaking Pressure may to pump is
from joints, flanges rise in pipeline. provided
& valves. Low level of Temperature
GV of Tank(s) may Ethanol in transmitter
be partially opened Tank(s) provided on
or choked. Formation of VCE storage Tanks.
Partial choking of may occur, Strict supervision
strainer of which may result Regular
pump(s). in VCE scenario if maintenance
Level Indicator of catches ignition schedule is
tank / TT may be source followed
malfunction System will be
Less quantity of isolated
ethanol in Tank immediately.
Truck TAS Monitoring
Flow Indictor is
provided at
Pump(s)
S.N. NODE: Receipt of Ethanol from TT Gantry to Ethanol U/G Tank HAZOP Sheet No.: HAZOP/ETH/EX-
TT/02
Facilities: Outlet of Tank Truck at TT Gantry to Storage Tank Drawing/Diagram No.:
Parameter Guide Possible Causes Possible Measures / Action/Corrective
Words Consequences Existing Facilities measures Required
(Deviation) Safeguard
13.1.3 More
13.1.4 Reverse None NRV provided in
the discharge of
pump(s)
13.2 Temperature
13.2.1 High Due to Two phase flow Vent is provided
surrounding heat. may occur in on tank
pipeline Hydrant line is
Pressure rise in provided through
storage tank out the Depot.
TAS monitoring
Sprinkler system
is provided
13.2.2 Low No Issue
Table 14: HAZOP STUDY WORKSHEET 3: Dispatch of Products from Storage Tanks through Product Pumps
S.N NODE: Dispatch Of products from Storage tank through Product HAZOP Sheet No.:HAZOP/PDT/TT/03
Pumps
Facilities: Storage tank Outlet to TT loading Gantry Drawing/Diagram No.
Parameter Guide Possible Causes Possible Measures / Action/Corrective
Words Consequences Existing Facilities measures Required
(Deviation) Safeguard
14.1 Flow
14.1.1 No No product flow No transfer of Pressure Level It is required to
to Pump house product to TT alarms/ pressure follow relevant OISD
loading. indicator/Local for maintenance of
Pump Inlet/outlet
pressure gauges
valve may be Failure of Pumps, valves &
are provided in
closed pumps network as per pipelines.
Leakage in Chances of design standard. Adherence to SOP.
pipeline between cavitations in Control and
monitoring
Pumps & Tank pumps/dry run
through TAS
Strainer of of pump may Isolation of
Pump(s) may be results in operation is in
fully choked. electricity place
Failure of TT consumption SOP are in
Operability placed.
loading pumps
- Mechanical Problems
failure Loss of product
- Electrical Fire Hazards if
Failure catches ignition
Inlet Valve of source
Storage Tank
may be closed
Pipeline may be
S.N NODE: Dispatch Of products from Storage tank through Product HAZOP Sheet No.:HAZOP/PDT/TT/03
Pumps
Facilities: Storage tank Outlet to TT loading Gantry Drawing/Diagram No.
Parameter Guide Possible Causes Possible Measures / Action/Corrective
Words Consequences Existing Facilities measures Required
(Deviation) Safeguard
fully choked.
14.1.2 Less Suction Delay in TT Pressure Level Seal flushing /
/discharge of loading alarms/ quenching system
pump(s) may be operation if not pressure for clogging must be
indicator/Local
low identified soon. checked regularly.
pressure gauges
Leakage in Loss of product It is required to
are provided in
pipeline at flange network. follow relevant OISD
Fire Hazards if
joints Temperature for maintenance of
catches ignition
Indicator are Pumps, valves &
Low suction to source.
provided on pipelines.
Pipeline pumps Pressure may storage Tank Adherence to SOP.
Gate valve of rise in that in Control and
Tank(s) may be that section of monitoring
partially opened pipeline. through TAS
or choked Isolation of
operation is in
Partial choking of place.
strainer of SOP are in
pump(s) placed.
Level Indicator of
tank may be
failure
Connecting hoses
not connected
properly at
Gantry area.
S.N NODE: Dispatch Of products from Storage tank through Product HAZOP Sheet No.:HAZOP/PDT/TT/03
Pumps
Facilities: Storage tank Outlet to TT loading Gantry Drawing/Diagram No.
Parameter Guide Possible Causes Possible Measures / Action/Corrective
Words Consequences Existing Facilities measures Required
(Deviation) Safeguard
Level Indicator of
tank truck may
be failure.
Pipeline may be
partially choked
14.1.3 More Suction/Discharge Pressure rise in Safety Measures Adherence to SOP.
of pump may be pipeline. as listed in SOP.
more. Overfilling of Recirculation
Low back wagon may system is
pressure result in loss of provided.
product.
Possibility of
leakage form
joints/valve
flanges and
gland may
result in Fire
Hazards.
14.1.4 Reverse None None
14.2 Temperature
14.2.1 High Due to fire in the Two phase flow Hydrant line is Fire protection
surrounding area. may occur in provided system check should
line which may through out the include in regular
rise pressure in Depot. checklist to ensure
S.N NODE: Dispatch Of products from Storage tank through Product HAZOP Sheet No.:HAZOP/PDT/TT/03
Pumps
Facilities: Storage tank Outlet to TT loading Gantry Drawing/Diagram No.
Parameter Guide Possible Causes Possible Measures / Action/Corrective
Words Consequences Existing Facilities measures Required
(Deviation) Safeguard
pipeline. Temperature the healthiness of
Indication is the system.
provided on
Tank(s)
Sprinkler
system is
provided.
14.2.2 Temperature Less None No Issue None
14.3 Pressure
14.3.1 High TT loading Pressure get Pressure Level High pressure trip
Pump(S) suction / rise in pipeline alarms/ must be integrated
discharge is more may result in pressure with pump.
indicator/Local
Pump malfunction generation of Adherence to SOP.
pressure
Flow Indicator at static gauges.
railway pump electricity. PRV’s are
house Temp. of provided in line
product will get at both stations.
Malfunctioning Control and
rise in pipeline.
Minimum TT point monitoring
loading. Pressure may through TAS
rise in tank(s) Strict
supervision
during
operations
SOP is in place.
14.3.2 Low No Issue No Issue
PCV033 may
stucked at
minimum
opening.
18.2 Temperature
18.2.1 Low Less vapor PSA may be on low Temperature Adherence to
flow. efficiency. sensors are at SOP.
Low Cycle time may strategic
surrounding. prolong. Locations.
temperature PLC is in place.
Less loading SOP is in place.
operation at
TT.
18.2.2 High More vapor TE111/121 may go PLC is in place. Adherence to
load to PSA up. SOP is in place. SOP.
Heavy Hot spot may be on
5 RECOMMENDATIONS
Based on findings of HAZOP study in the form of HAZOP worksheets of KADAPA PETROLEUM
DEPOT, the aroused recommendations are listed in worksheets. However, these are also
summarized below as specific recommendations. Some other general recommendations are
listed under “General Recommendation” heading.
1. Specific Recommendations:
REPORT
HPCL/HAZOP/ KDP/64/REV/00
NO.
2. General Recommendations:
4. In case of major change in process parameter /facility, risk analysis and HAZOP
study must be carries out.
REPORT
HPCL/HAZOP/ KDP/64/REV/00
NO.
9. Earthing must be provided on the pipeline & storage tanks and should be
checked.
10. All the hydrant points should be easily accessible. All should be in working
condition. Maintenance of all fire fighting systems should be done on regular basis
as per schedule developed at Depot.
11. Back washing of strainer should be done in regular interval in order to avoid
chocking.
12. All Electrical Equipment & their installation should be as per OISD standard 137.
All electrical fittings should be flame proof type.
REPORT
HPCL/HAZOP/ KDP/64/REV/00
NO.
A. Identification
B. Physical Properties
This oil presents an extreme fire hazard. Liquid evaporates very quickly, even at
low temperatures, and forms vapor, which can catch fire & burn with explosive
violence. Invisible vapor is heavier than air & spreads along the ground (that is
why more susceptible to meet with an ignition source). It can be set on fire by
many sources such as pilot lights, welding unit, and spark from electrical motors &
switches. Heating can cause pressure rise with risk of bursting & subsequent
explosion.
Fire Fighting: Foam, carbon dioxide, dry chemical powder, halones or water
sprays/fog to be used.
D. Health Hazards
E. First Aid
REPORT
HPCL/HAZOP/ KDP/64/REV/00
NO.
Eye - If this chemical contacts the eyes, immediately wash the eyes with large
amount of water, occasionally lifting lower and upper lids. Get medical
attention immediately. Contact lenses should not be worn when working
with this chemical.
Skin - If this chemical contacts the skin, promptly wash the contaminated skin
with soap and water. If this chemical penetrates the clothing, promptly
remove the clothing and wash the skin with soap and water. Get
medical attention promptly.
Breath - If a person breathes large amounts of this chemical, move the exposed
person to fresh air at once. If breathing has stopped, perform mouth-
to mouth resuscitation. Keep the affected person warm and at rest. Get
medical attention as soon as possible.
Swallow - If this chemical has been swallowed, get medical attention immediately.
Do not make person vomit
A. Identification
B. Physical Properties
C. Fire/Explosion Hazards
This oil presents a moderate fire hazard. The vapor is invisible, heavier than air
and spreads along the ground. Heating can cause pressure rise with risk of
bursting and subsequent explosion
Fire Fighting: Foam, carbon dioxide, dry chemical powder, halones or water
sprays /fog to be used.
REPORT
HPCL/HAZOP/ KDP/64/REV/00
NO.
D. Health Hazards
E. First Aid
Eye - If this chemical contacts the eyes, immediately wash the eyes with
large amount of water, occasionally lifting lower and upper lids. Get
medical attention immediately. Contact lenses should not be worn
when working with this chemical.
Skin - If this chemical contacts the skin, promptly wash the contaminated
skin with soap and water. If this chemical penetrates the clothing,
promptly remove the clothing and wash the skin with soap and water.
Get medical attention promptly.
A. Identification
B. Physical Properties
REPORT
HPCL/HAZOP/ KDP/64/REV/00
NO.
This oil presents a moderate fire hazard. Heating can cause pressure rise with risk
of bursting and subsequent explosion. Can form explosive mixture with air
particularly in empty containers.
Fire Fighting: Foam, carbon dioxide, dry chemical powder, halones or water
sprays/ fog to be used.
D. Health Hazards
E. First Aid :
Eye - If this chemical contacts the eyes, immediately wash the eyes with large
amount of water, occasionally lifting lower and upper lids. Get medical
attention immediately. Contact lenses should not be worn when working
with this chemical.
Skin - If this chemical contacts the skin, promptly wash the contaminated
skin with soap and water. If this chemical penetrates the clothing,
promptly remove the clothing and wash the skin with soap and water.
Get medical attention promptly.
Breath - If a person breathes large amounts of this chemical, move the exposed
person to fresh air at once. If breathing has stopped, perform mouth-to-
mouth resuscitation. Keep the affected person warm and at rest. Get
medical attention as soon as possible.
Swallow - If this chemical has been swallowed, get medical attention immediately.
Do not make person vomit
A. Identification
REPORT
HPCL/HAZOP/ KDP/64/REV/00
NO.
C. Fire/Explosion Hazards
Forms explosive products on reaction with ammonia + silver nitrate (forms silver
nitrite and silver fulminate)
Fire Fighting: Alcohol Foam, carbon dioxide, dry chemical powder, halones is
used.
D. Health Hazards
E. First Aid:
Eye - If this chemical contact the eyes, immediately wash the eyes with large
amount of water for 15 min, occasionally lifting lower and upper lids. Get
medical attention immediately. Contact lenses should not be worn when
working with this chemical.
Skin - If this chemical contacts the skin, promptly wash the contaminated skin
with soap and water. If this chemical penetrates the clothing, promptly
remove the clothing and wash the skin with soap and water. Get
medical attention promptly.
Breath - If a person breathes large amounts of this chemical, move the exposed
person to fresh air at once. If breathing has stopped, perform mouth-to-
mouth resuscitation. Keep the affected person warm and at rest. Get
medical attention as soon as possible.
Identification
REPORT
HPCL/HAZOP/ KDP/64/REV/00
NO.
B. Physical Properties
D. Fire/Explosion Hazards
Fire Fighting: Carbon dioxide, dry chemical powder, Aqueous Film coating foam
are used. Water spray to be used to cool containers if exposed to fire.
D. Health Hazards
E. First Aid:
Eye - If this chemical contact the eyes, immediately wash the eyes with large
amount of water for 15 min, occasionally lifting lower and upper lids. Get
medical attention immediately. Contact lenses should not be worn when
working with this chemical.
Skin - If this chemical contacts the skin, promptly wash the contaminated skin
with soap and water. If this chemical penetrates the clothing, promptly
remove the clothing and wash the skin with soap and water. Get
medical attention promptly.
Breath - If a person breathes large amounts of this chemical, move the exposed
person to fresh air at once. Keep the affected person warm and at rest.
Do not induce vomiting if ingested. Affected body parts to be washed
with water and soap. Wash eyes thoroughly with water.
REPORT
HPCL/HAZOP/ KDP/64/REV/00
NO.
REPORT
HPCL/HAZOP/ KDP/64/REV/00
NO.