Qra HPCL Jalandhar Ird-Draft r1

QUANTITATIVE RISK ANALYSIS STUDY
FOR HPCL, Jalandhar POL IRD, Jalandhar(Punjab.)
HINDUSTAN PETROLEUM CORPORATION

LIMITED;
Report on
Quantitative risk analysis
Glossary
FOR
Jalandhar Depot, Jalandhar (Punjab)
Prepared By
PAB TEQNIKO
32/3T, Gariahat Road, Ground Floor, Kolkata-700031.

Tel. + 91 33 89020 18854
E-mail : Info@Pab.Co.In, Sales@Pab.Co.In
MAY 2022
Page 1 of 92
FOREWORD
M/s Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited (A Government of India Enterprise under Ministry of
Petroleum & Natural Gas with a Maharatna Status and a Forbes 2000 & Global Fortune 500 company),
dealing with Petroleum Products, has a bulk petroleum oil storage (POL DEPOT) located near Pakni Railway
Station in district Jalandhar of Maharashtra State.
The Jalandhar DEPOT is located near Suchi Pind ,Jalandhar Railway Station. BPCL and IOCL Depots are
very close to this HPCL-DEPOT and have direct pipeline connection for product transfer(PLT) from IOCL.
Other surroundings are of plain terrain with some farm fields. There is no major residential area near the
DEPOT.
The cooperation rendered by M/s HPCL officials of Jalandhar DEPOT, in carrying out the studies is gratefully
acknowledged.
Place: Kolkata
Date:19 th May, 2022
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
1 Itroduction ............................................................................................. 4
1.1 Site Information............................................................................................................................. 5
1.2 Objectives And Scope Of Quantitative Risk Analysis ............................................................7 -13
1.3 Major Facilities At Hpcl Jalandhar Depot...................................................................... 13-18
1.4 Details Of Fire Fighting Facilities Available .................................................................... 18-20
2 Hazard Identification And Visualization Of Mca Scenarios ................................... 23
2.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................................. 23
2.2 Hazard Potential: Deciding Factor .............................................................................................. 23
2.3 Identification Of Hazards ...................................................................................................... 24-34
2.4 Occupational Safety And Health ........................................................................................... 34-39
2.5 Visualization Of Mca Scenarios ............................................................................................ 39-42
2.6 Short Listing Of Major Credible Accident (Mca Scenarios )................................................ 42-50
3 Consequence Analysis .............................................................................. 50
3.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................................... 50
3.2 Models For Determining The Source Strength For The Release Of Hazardous Substances ...... 51
3.3 Model FOR Dispersion ............................................................................................................... 52
3.4 Model For Heat Load And Shock Waves ................................................................................... 53
3.5 Vulnerability Model .............................................................................................................. 54-59
3.6 Results Of Maximum Credible Accident Analysis (Mca) .................................................... 59-67
3.7 Catagorization/Evaluation Of Risk ....................................................................................... 67-69
3.8 Analysis For Propensity Towards Predicted Consequences ........................................................ 69
3.9 Alarp Principle ............................................................................................................................. 70
3.10 Societal risk (fn curve) .................................................................................................................. 71
3.11 Mitigation/Preventive Measures For Mca Scenarios .............................................................. 72-75
4 Recommendations 80
4.1 Additional Recommendations & Suggestions 76
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LIST OF TABLES:
LIST OF FIGURES:
Figure1: Layout plan of HPCL’s Jalandhar DEPOT ....................................................................................................... 21

Figure 2: Aerial View of HPCL’s Jalandhar DEPOT ................................................. 23Error! Bookmark not defined.
Figure 3: Event Tree Analysis for Atmospheric Storage of Flammable Liquids ...................................................... 46-48
Figure 4: Fault Tree Analysis for Top Event of Pool Fire Scenario ................................................................................ 49
Figure 5: Accidental Release of POL Products ............................................................................................................... 50
Figure 6: FN Curve for Considered MCA Scenarios for Jalandhar DEPOT................................................................... 72
Figure 7: Schematic of a Pool Fire/Spilled Fire .............................................................................................................. 74
Figure 8: Schematic of Unconfined Vapour Cloud Explosion (UVCE) ......................................................................... 75
LIST OF APPENDIX:
APPENDIX– I: MANUFACTURE, STORAGE & IMPORT OF HAZARDOUS CHEMICAL'S

RULES, UNDER ENVIRONMENT PROTECTION ACT, 1986, MoEF, GOI, 2000 (MSIHC RULES)
........................................................................................................................................................................ 81
APPENDIX - II : MATERIAL SAFETY DATA SHEET 78
APPENDIX – III : APPROACH FOR FETI CALCULATION 79-82
APPENDIX – IV : FIRE WATER CALCULATIONS ................................................................. 83-84

APPENDIX – V : ABBREVIATIONS 85
APPENDIX – VI : REFERENCES 86
APPENDIX – VII : LEGAL DISCLAIMER 87
ODUCTION
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1.1 SITE INFORMATION
M/s Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited (HPCL) has bulk petroleum oil storage located near
Jalandhar Railway Station in Jalandhar district of Punjab State. BPCL and IOCL Depots are in
neighborhood of this DEPOT and have a pipeline for product transfer from IOCL. Other surroundings
are of plain terrain with some farm fields. There is no major residential area near the DEPOT.
M/s HPCL owns and operates two major oil refineries producing a wide variety of petroleum fuels
and specialties, one in Mumbai (West Coast) of 6.5 Million Metric Tons Per Annum (MMTPA)
capacity and the other in Visakhapatnam, (East Coast) with a capacity of 8.3 MMPTA.
The POL products viz. MS (Petrol), HSD (Diesel) and SKO (Kerosene) are received through pipeline
from IOCL and tank truck from HPCL’s Bhatinda refinery and are stored in respective above ground
and Underground tanks. The stored petroleum products are distributed through Tank Trucks to
various retail outlets to cater the demand of POL products in the Jalandhar and adjoining areas.
There is no manufacturing process being carried out neither at HPCL’s Jalandhar DEPOT . However
Blending process of MS (Motor Spirit) and Ethanol (10%) is carried out as per MOPNG Guidelines.
There are in total 6 A/G tanks and 5 U/G tanks for storage of POL products. Maximum storage
Inventory of all POL products, tank dimensions with storage type and flammability class of product(s)
are tabulated as under:
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Table 1: Existing Product Storage Tankage at HPCL’s Jalandhar DEPOT
Size of Tank Storage

Product Flammabilit Tank
SN DIA (m) Ht. (m)/ Capacity in Type of Tank
Name y Class No.
LG KL
1 MS A Tk 1 16 14 2500 Int FRVT
2 MS A Tk 2 16 14 2500 Int FRVT
3 MS A Tk 7 3 10.6 70 U/G HORI. TK
4 MS A Tk-14 3.9 16 180 U/G HORI. TK
Total Storage Capacity of MS in KL 5250
5 ETHANOL A Tk-12 3 10.6 70 U/G HORI. TK
6 ETHANOL A Tk-13 3.9 16 180 U/G HORI. TK
7 ETHANOL A Tk-16 3.9 16 180 U/G HORI. TK
Total Storage Capacity of Ethanol in KL 430
8 HSD B Tk 3 22 14.5 5000 CRVT
9 HSD B Tk 4 22 14.5 5000 CRVT
10 HSD B Tk 5 10.5 12.5 1000 CRVT
11 HSD B Tk 6 10.5 12.5 1000 CRVT
12 HSD B Tk 8 3 10.6 70 U/G HORI. TK
13 HSD B Tk 15 3.9 16 180 U/G HORI. TK
Total Storage Capacity of HSD in KL 12250
14 SKO B Tk 9 3 10.6 70 U/G HORI. TK
Total Storage Capacity of SKO in KL 70
Total storage Inventory of POL products at DEPOT 18,000 KL
Construction of storage tanks confirms to API 650/IS 803. MS steel confirms to IS 2062-Grade A/B.
To meet the marketing discipline guidelines some tankage conversion for products has been
undertaken.
The Depot has been constructed as per all applicable OISD ( available at the time of construction )
and other relevant standards. However, to meet all statutory requirements applicable to DEPOT after
the change in product configuration for Tank No Tk-5 & 6 to HSD from SKO; 3 nos. of 180 KL
each underground Tanks have been provided to accommodate MS,HSD & Ethanol. M/s HPCL is
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also putting 2 nos. of Underground Tanks of Ethanol to meet 20 % of Ethanol blending in Petrol.
Construction is in progress.
1.2 OBJECTIVES AND SCOPE OF QUANTITATIVE RISK ANALYSIS
The purpose of carrying out the Quantitative Risk Assessment/Analysis is to analyze the hazards,
nature & impact of hazards from Hazard Analysis due to handling & storage of hazardous petroleum
products and also tankage conversion with products. The analysis aims at quantitative evaluation of
the risk involved due to location & operation of the DEPOT and also to ascertain that the risk is
within its acceptable limits or not. At last, recommendations and suggestions for safe operations based
on the finding of risk Assessment study.
All the important aspects of the Manufacture, Storage & Import of Hazardous Chemicals Rules, 2000,
and relevant OIL Industries Safety Directorate (OISD) 117 and 244 Guidelines are referred as
directives in conducting the Quantitative Risk Assessment Study.
Objectives of Quantitative Risk Assessment

The objectives of Risk assessment is to identify, eliminate , control, prevent or reduce loss of life,
illness, or injury, damage to property and consequential loss and environmental impact.
Before risk can be effectively managed, it must be analyzed. The analysis of risk is a useful tool for:
a) Identifying risks and approaches to their solutions for mitigations measures.

b) Facilitating objective decisions on the acceptability of risk.
c) Meeting regulatory requirements.
The results of risk assessment can be used by Top Management for decision-making to assess/judge
the tolerability of risk and aid in choosing between potential risk reduction or avoidance measures.
From the decision-makers perspective some of the principal benefits of Quantitative risk assessment
include:
✓ Systematic identification of potential hazards

✓ Systematic identification of potential failure modes
✓ Quantitative risk statements or ranking
✓ Evaluation of possible modifications to reduce risk or achieve better dependability levels
✓ Identification of the important contributors to risk and weak links in a system
✓ Better Understanding of the system and its installation
✓ Comparison of risks to those of alternative systems or technologies
✓ Identification and communication of risks and uncertainties
✓ Help in establishing priorities for improved health and safety
✓ A basis for preventive maintenance and inspection to be rationalized
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✓ Post-accident investigation and prevention

✓ Selection between alternatives such as different risk-reduction measures and technologies
✓ Prevention of economic loss, loss of insurance premium, loss of company’s Brand , etc.
All these play an important role in effective risk management.
HAZARDS & RISKS- Analysis- FLOW DIAGRAM
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• Hazard: A chemical, physical, social, or political condition that has the potential
to cause damage or any kind of harm to people, property/ production,
or the environment.
• Risk: A measure of potential damage due to a hazard, taking into account both
the likelihood and magnitude of damage.
• Safety: A judgment of the acceptability of risk .A thing Is ‘‘safe’’ if its risks are
judged to be acceptable. There are degrees of risk, and consequently
there are degrees of safety.
• Hazard inherent in an activity that is otherwise deemed to be beneficial

• A potential undesirable event, which has the capability to bring out the hazard
• Adverse consequence of that undesirable event
• Uncertainty as to whether or not the undesirable event will happen (likelihood)
Perception about the combination of the above
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QRA/ RISK ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY
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Scope of Work
(A) Hazard Identification:
1. Study of ongoing operations being carried out at Depot using facility and Engineering
information, Piping and Instrumentation diagrams (P&ID), plot and layout plans.
2. Identification of fire, explosion & other health hazards;
3. Analysis of inventories in storage and handling units with recourse to Manufacture, Storage &
Import Of Hazardous Chemical Rules, 2000 and Fire- Explosion & Toxicity Index (FE& TI);
4. Identification of accident sequences and consequences with recourse to Event Tree Analysis
(ETA) and to evaluate propensity of occurrence of the top event through Fault Tree Analysis
(FTA);
5. Past accident data/information analysis in similar installations to develop the credibility of worst
come worst accident scenarios; and
6. Visualization of Maximum Credible Accident (MCA) scenarios.
(B) Listing and analysis of MCA Scenarios:
1. Analysis of identified MCA scenarios and quantification of primary effects and to evaluate the
domino effects with recourse to computerized mathematical models pertaining to cases of:
✓ Tank on fire
✓ Pool Fire
✓ Unconfined Vapor cloud explosion (UVCE) in case of Class A Product (here MS)
2. Application of damage criteria for heat radiation with recourse to health criteria, dose-response
relations and vulnerability models.
3. Study of on-site and off-site population and nearby land usage characteristics.
4. Characterization of risk/Hazard levels through study of nature of exposure, pathway and

consequences of MCA scenario and presentation of results.
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(C) Recommendations based on:
1. Observations on the operational practices & Installation hardware

2. Findings of the Risk Analysis & safety review Check-list
3. Fire-fighting& other emergency facilities available
4. Observations during the Mock Drill
5. Manufacture, Storage & Import of Hazardous Chemicals Rules, 2000
6. Relevant OIL Industries Safety Directorate (OISD) Guidelines
7. In place onsite and offsite Disaster Management Plan (DMP)
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1.3 MAJOR FACILITIES AT HPCL JALANDHAR DEPOT
1.3.1 OPERATION RELATED FACILITIES AT DEPOT AND IT’S LAYOUT DRAWING.
Layout plan detailing all facilities of Jalandhar Depot is shown as Figure 1.
Area occupied by all major/important facilities is tabulated as under:
Table 2: Area Occupied By the Important/Vulnerable Structures
AREA(SQ.M)
SN STRUCTURE / BUILDING SIZE (M)
EXISTING FACILITIES
1 GATE CABIN 4X3 12
2 OFFICE BUILDING 18.75 X11.0 206.25
3 WORKERS CHANGE ROOM 8X6 48
4 CONTROL ROOM 7.5 X 8.5 63.75
4A EXTN. OF CONTROL ROOM 3.5X 8.5 297.5
5 TRAINING HALL 12 X 7.50 90
LUBE WAREHOUSE-1 9 x 24
6 216
7 LUBE WAREHOUSE-1 9 x 26.6

239.4
8 LUBE DRUM YARD 31.2 X 42.5 1326
9 FIRE PUMP HOUSE 12 X 8 96
10 TLF PUMP HOUSE – 1 21 X 5 105
11 T/T GANTRY 8 BAY 41 X 13 533
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12 DG CONTROL ROOM – 15 X 8 120
13 CALIBRATION SHED 8X8 64
14 TTD PUMP HOUSE 18 X 5 90
15 PLANT TOILET 5X3 15
17 TRANSFORMER YARD 10 X 10 100
18 CHECKING PLATFORM 1.5 X 1.5 2.25
19 FLOOD LIGHT TOWER 30 M High
20 FOAM SYSTEM 3X3 9
21 DG PLATFORM 4.6 X 2.8 12.88
22 DG PLATFORM 5X2 10
23 FOAM SHED 9X7 63
25 METER ROOM/ MCC ROOM 8 X4 32
26 NEW SECURITY CABIN 3.5 X 8.5 297.5
26 ADDITIVE PUMP HOUSE 9X7 63
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Approximate Inter-Unit distances for available facilities have been shown for HPCL’s Jalandhar
by following recommended OISD Standards 244 and 118 . It is found that some facilities do not
meet the requirement of OISD 244. Red Block in above table and mentioned sentences indicates
the distance not meeting the requirement for that facility with another. Suitable recommendation
has been given to M/s HPCL for these points.
Table3: Approximate Inter-Unit Distances of Important/Vulnerable Structures of HPCL’s Jalandhar

DEPOT
OISD 244
Actual
S/No. Facility recommended
Distance(m)
distance (m)
TTL Gantry to Control Room
1 60 48
(Automation)
MS Tk No. 1 to MCC Room 51
2 60
Distance between tank no. 5 and
3 10 6
6**
Distance between TTL Gantry
4 60 * 45
and FW Pump House **
Proper and Satisfactory mitigation measures for the above pending non complied points/ items 1 & 2
(raised by OISD team in the recent past ) for safe and accident free operation of the plant.
**Adequate mitigation measures have been taken by the location for item nos. 3 & 4.
For item no. 3 : Fire fighting measures have been strengthened by means of Foam Sprinkler System
Both inside the Cone roof fixed foam induction and also thru HVLR induces Foam blanketing.
For item no. 4 : Fire screen wall has been constructed to ward off radiation heat emanating from TTL
Gantry.
1.3.2 DYKE VOLUME CAPACITY
All storage tanks are enclosed in dyke wall having sufficient volume to occupy the release quantity of high-
capacity tank in case of any damage. There are five Dyke walls being constructed at Depot for enclosing
POL product storage tanks. The capacity of dyke walls enclosures to the all product storage tanks are shown
as under:
[ Courtsey : MECON M B Lall Recommendations Report ]
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Considering 200 mm Free Float
Average
Dyke Capacity of
Dyke Dyke Wall Total Inventory
Enclosed Storage Tanks volume Largest Tank Remarks
Walls Height (KL)
(KL) (KL)
( m)
1 Tankfarm-1 [ Tk1,2 ] 1.75 5000.00 3894.23 2500.00 Adequate
2 Tankfarm-2[Tk 3,4,5,6] 2.10 12000.00 5000 5000.00 Adequate
➢ Dyke wall 1 providing enclosure to the MS product Tanks (TK-1, TK-2) and can accommodate
3894.23 KL of spilled product occupied, which is more than the maximum inventory capacity
of Product in the Biggest Tank (2500 KL).
➢ Dyke wall 2 providing enclosure to the HSD product Tanks ( Tk-03,Tk-04,TK-05 and TK-06)
can accommodate around 5000 KLs of spilled product occupied, which is equal to maximum
inventory of Product in the Biggest Tank (5000 KL) and hence adequate to contain the largest
volume. From above points, it is concluded that the Dyke walls enclosing POL product storage
Tanks have required enclosure wall capacity to accumulate spilled product of largest tank as
per requirement & OISD-244 Norms.
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1.3.3 DETAILS PRODUCT TRANSFER ( PLT) PUMPS
At Jalandhar DEPOT, there are 15 nos. of product pump available for loading and unloading
operation of the Petroleum Products. The details of these product Pumps are as follows:
Table 4: Schedule of Product Pumps
SN CAPACITY LPM NOS. PRODUCT REMARK

1 4800 2 HSD TTF
2 1200 1 SKO TTF
3 4800 1 HSD TTD
4 1200 1 HSD TTF
5 3600 3 MS TTF
6 1200 2 HSD TTF/ITD
7 3600 1 MS TTF/ITD
8 4800 1 HSD TTF/ITD
9 2400 1 ETHANOL TTF
All fittings in T/T filling shed, pump house and electrical motors are flame proof confirming to IS
2148, 1981,2206 (Part 1) 1968 & 2147-1962. All earth pits confirm to IS 3043.
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1.4 DETAILS OF FIRE FIGHTING FACILITIES AVAILABLE AT

JALANDHAR DEPOT
At Jalandhar DEPOT, adequate fire-fighting facilities as per the OISD std. 244 & 117 (amended
July 2012) are available for emergency situation. The DEPOT is having robust safety system with
latest technology of fire-fighting Equipments (HVLRs, ROSOVs, ESDs, HCD, etc.) as per the
recommendations of OISD std. and Dr.M.B Lal Committee.
Details of all available facilities are briefed in following subsequent headings.
1.4.1 FIRE WATER TANKAGE DETAILS
Two Open Roof above ground water storage tanks for fire-fighting purpose are being constructed
and maintained at Depot. Details of these Tanks with Fire Water pumps are as below:
Table 5: Details of Fire Water Storage Tanks
SN Tank No. Tank Dimensions Capacity Tank Type

1 10 13 m φ x 14 m Ht. 1800 ORVT
2 11 13 m φ x 14 m Ht. 1800 ORVT
Total Fire Water Storage 3600 KL
From Fire water Calculations (refer Appendix III), it is found that; the total water requirement for fire-fighting
purpose (pump able water requirement is 3280. Thus the fire water storage available at DEPOT is sufficient in
quantity as per OISD – 117 & 244 guidelines.
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1.4.2 Table 6: Availability of Fire Extinguishers and accessories as per OISD Norms
Sr.No. ITEMS DCP DCP DCP CO2 CO2 CO2 TOTAL

9 Kg 25 Kg 75Kg 2.5Kg 4.5 Kg 6.5 Kg
1 New security 1 1 2
cabin
2 Fire engine shed 2 2 4
3 Lock room
4 Calibration shed
5 Drum yard
6 TLF gantry 8 1 9
7 U G Tank-1 4 4
8 Product pump 10 1 1 12
house
9 Power turbo shed 1 1
10 Tank farm-1 4 3 1 8
11 Tank farm-2 8 5 2 15
12 Mob rickshaw 1 1
13 UG tank farm-2 4 1 5
14 PLT pump house 4 1 1 6
15 Transformer area 3 4 7
16 Bridging gantry 6 1 7
17 MCC room 1 4 5
18 Control room 1 1 2
19 Flash point 1 1 2
20 Battery room 1 1
21 Main office 3 1 1 5
/safety room
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22 Grease 10 1 2 1 14
godown/foam
house pipe
23 Inova VEH
24 Meeting room 1 1
25 Coyven TT 2 2
26 Lube
store/sample
room
27 Hose pipe foam
trolley
28 HVLR hose 1 1
pipe/sample
room
29 Emergency kit
trolley
Total 75 8 5 4 18 4 114
*Note: The above guidelines are minimum requirement of each item. It can be increased as per scale of
installation/size of installation or requirement of local statutory bodies.
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Figure1: Layout plan of HPCL’s Jalandhar DEPOT
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2 HAZARD IDENTIFICATION AND VISUALIZATION OF MCA

SCENARIOS
2.1 INTRODUCTION
“Risk” is loss per unit time and is the product of the consequence of an event and the frequency of
its occurrence. All activities involve some risk. In our everyday life, people engaged in an activity
frequently perform their own risk assessment often intuitively. The level of risk deemed to be
acceptable is highly subjective, varies from person to person, and depends on many factors. Total
avoidance of risk (zero risk) is an unattainable goal. Risk can, however, be reduced through the
implementation of control measures, engineering design and good management practices.
The starting point of the risk analysis study is the identification of hazards and selection of scenarios
which are then addressed for further analysis.
"Hazard" is a characteristic of a system, Installation or processes that present potential for an

accident. It is defined as a chemical or physical condition that has the potential for causing damage
to people, property or the environment. Therefore, all the relevant aspects of petroleum Products
storage and handling process have been thoroughly examined to assess their potential for initiating
or propagating an unintentional event or sequence of events, which can lead to an accident or
disaster. Type, quantity, location & conditions of release of the petroleum Products under various
scenarios have been examined in order to estimate its damage potential, area affected, and based
on that, the precautionary measures needed to be taken are suggested in Independent Heading –
“RECOMMENDATIONS”.
2.2 HAZARD POTENTIAL: DECIDING FACTOR
Factors considered to identify and analyze the hazard potential are:
1. Flash point & Boiling point of the petroleum Products

2. Inventory of the petroleum Products
3. Potential for loss from containment
4. Pool size & dyke capacity
5. Potential for availability of ignition sources in the vicinity of leakage or spillage
Apart from the petroleum Products characteristics and process of its handling, size & layout of the
DEPOT are also analyzed in order to assess the hazard potential.
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2.3 IDENTIFICATION OF HAZARDS
Identification of hazards is of primary significance in the analysis, quantification and cost effective
control of accidents involving Petroleum Products and their Operations.
Petroleum Products require sufficient interaction with air or oxygen for their explosive mixture to
form and then for occurrence of their hazards associated with them. Under certain circumstances,
vapors of the products when mixed with air may be explosive especially in confined spaces.
Following methods of hazard identification have been employed in this study:
1. All hazardous materials present on the site, and or transported to and from the site are
identified
2. The properties of these hazardous materials are reviewed in order to categories the possible
hazards
3. Characterization of major hazardous units based on Manufacture, Storage and Import of
Hazardous Chemicals Rules, Government of India, 2000; referred here as MSIHC Rules.
4. Identification of hazardous installations based on relative ranking technique, viz. Dow's Fire
Explosion Index and Mond's Toxicity Index (FE & TI)
5. The site facilities and transport systems are examined to identify where the hazardous
materials are present and the conditions under which they are contained
The major hazards in petrochemical, chemical plants and installations are due to substances within
the Installations that can be released to cause either:
✓ Fire
✓ Explosion
✓ Toxic effect (Poisoning)
At Jalandhar DEPOT, Fire and Explosion are the major hazards due to handling and storage of
products.
2.3.1 PHYSICAL & CHEMICAL PROPERTIES OF PETROLEUM PRODUCTS
Petroleum Products are highly inflammable in their basic character (depending on Flammability
class). They are dangerous because of their intrinsic properties, i.e. flash point, ignition energy
required, heat of combustion, flammability limits, etc. In addition to such intrinsic properties,
extrinsic factors like quantity of storage, Type of storage (A/G or U/G) and operating conditions
are also considered for hazard identification. Physio-chemical properties of the available petroleum
products at DEPOT are given in following Table.
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Table 7: Hazardous Properties of Petroleum Products
SN Properties POL Products

MS SKO HSD Ethanol
1 Physical State Highly Volatile Liquid Liquid Highly Volatile
2 Petroleum Act/OISD Flammability
A B B A
Class
3 Specific Gravity 0.72-0.77 0.81 0.82-0.91 0.79
4 Molecular Weight (g/mole) 121 170 178.6 46.08
5 Reactive to Strong Oxidizers - - Strong Oxidizers
6 Flash point ºC (Range) < 23 35 > 23 ≤ 65 < 23
7 Boiling point ºC Upto 150 150 - 250 225 - 300 78.32
8 Auto – Ignition Temperature ºC 280 – 429 254 277 422
9 Specific Heat (KJ/Kg °K) 2.9 3.25 3.39 2.13
10 Heat of Evaporation (KJ/Kg) 98 115.9 134.2 85.38
11 Heat of Combustion (KJ/Kg) 47025 46398 45980 30624
Table : 8 Flammability Classification Criteria:
SN Flammability Class Flash point (°C)

1 Class A Flammable Liquid FP < 23
2 Class B Flammable Liquid 23 > FP <65
3 Class C Flammable Liquid 65 > FP < 93
4 Excluded petroleum More than 93
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MSDS of All the POL Products being handled in Location like MS, HSD, Ethanol & Additives is
enclosed as in Appendix –II
2.3.2 METEROLOGICAL DATA
The consequences of released flammable material are largely dependent on the prevailing weather
conditions. For the assessment of major scenarios involving release of flammable material, the most
important meteorological parameters are those that affect the atmospheric dispersion of the
escaping material. The crucial variables are wind direction, wind speed, atmospheric stability and
temperature. Rainfall does not have any direct bearing on the results of the risk analysis; however,
it can have beneficial effects by absorption / washout of released materials. Actual behavior of any
release would largely depend on prevailing weather condition at the time of release.
20 years average meteorological data for Jalandhar is also taken into consideration. It
is summarized as under:
Table 9: Average Meteorological Data for Jalandhar
January February March April May June July August September October November December
Avg. 11.5 °C 14.6 °C 19.9 26.5 31.1 32.1 29.6 28.5 °C 27.4 °C 24.2 °C 18.6 °C 13.3 °C
Temperature (52.8) (58.3) °F °C °C °C °C °C (83.4) (81.4) °F (75.6) (65.5) °F (55.9) °F
°C (°F) °F (67.9) (79.8) (88) °F (89.7) (85.3) °F °F
°F °F °F °F
Min. 6 °C 8.4 °C 12.8 18.2 23.1 26 °C 25.9 25.3 °C 23.2 °C 18.1 °C 12.3 °C 7.3 °C
Temperature (42.7) (47.2) °F °C °C °C (78.8) °C (77.6) (73.8) °F (64.6) (54.1) °F (45.1) °F
°C (°F) °F (55) °F (64.8) (73.6) °F (78.7) °F °F
°F °F °F
Max. 17.9 °C 21.1 °C 27.1 34.4 38.6 37.8 33.6 32.3 °C 32.1 °C 31 °C 25.9 °C 20.4 °C
Temperature (64.1) (69.9) °F °C °C °C °C °C (90.2) (89.9) °F (87.9) (78.6) °F (68.7) °F
°C (°F) °F (80.7) (93.8) (101.5) (100.1) (92.4) °F °F
°F °F °F °F °F
Precipitation / 48 74 62 38 30 92 243 214 101 19 15 21
Rainfall mm (1.9) (2.9) (2.4) (1.5) (1.2) (3.6) (9.6) (8.4) (4) (0.7) (0.6) (0.8)
(in)
Humidity(%) 78% 72% 59% 38% 34% 48% 75% 82% 75% 60% 62% 71%
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January February March April May June July August September October November December
Rainy days (d) 3 4 5 4 6 9 17 17 9 2 1 2
avg. Sun hours 6.9 8.9 10.4 11.5 12.3 12.0 10.2 9.8 9.7 10.0 9.2 7.9
(hours)
[ Courtesy : https://en.climate-data.org/asia/india/punjab/jalandhar-4856/ ]
There is a difference of 228 mm | 9 inch of precipitation between the driest and wettest months. During
the year, the average temperatures vary by 20.5 °C | 37.0 °F.
The month with the highest relative humidity is August (81.55 %). The month with the lowest relative
humidity is May (33.66 %).
The month with the highest number of rainy days is August (22.57 days). The month with the lowest
number of rainy days is November (1.67 days).
Jalandhar are in the northern hemisphere.
Summer starts here at the end of June and ends in September. There are the months of summer: June,
July, August, September.
Analysis of Daily wind speed shows that the winds are minimum to moderate in this area. The average
wind speed varies from 3.8 to 6.2 km/hr. The predominant wind flow was mostly calm and from North,
North-West, South-West, West and North-East direction.
https://weatherspark.com/y/108388/Average-Weather-in-Jalandhar-India-Year-Round#Figures-
WindDirection
The percentage of hours in which the mean wind direction is from each of the four cardinal wind directions,
excluding hours in which the mean wind speed is less than 1.0 mph. The lightly tinted areas at the
boundaries are the percentage of hours spent in the implied intermediate directions (northeast, southeast,
southwest, and northwest).
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2.3.3 ATMOSPHERIC STABILITY CLASSES
The tendency of the atmosphere to resist or enhance vertical motion and thus turbulence is termed
as stability. Stability is related to both the change of temperature with height (the lapse rate) driven
by the boundary layer energy budget, and wind speed together with surface characteristics
(roughness).
A neutral atmosphere neither enhances nor inhibits mechanical turbulence. An unstable

atmosphere enhances turbulence, whereas a stable atmosphere inhibits mechanical turbulence.
Stability classes are defined for different meteorological situations, characterized by wind speed
and solar radiation (during the day) and cloud cover during the night. The so called Pasquill-Turner
stability classes of dispersion estimates include Six (6) stability classes as below:
SN Stability Class Description

1 A Very Unstable Atmosphere
2 B Unstable Atmosphere
3 C Slightly Unstable Atmosphere
4 D Neutral Atmosphere
5 E Stable Atmosphere
6 F Very Stable Atmosphere
The typical stability classes for various wind speed and radiation levels during entire day are
presented in table below -
Table 10: Typical Pasquill's Stability classes
Day: Solar Radiation Night: Cloud Cover

Wind Speed
Overcast >
(m/s) Strong Moderate Slight Thin < 40% Moderate
80%
<2 A A-B B - - D
2–3 A-B B C E F D
3–5 B B-C C D E D
5–6 C C-D D D D D
>6 C D D D D D
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2.3.4 APPLICABLE MSIHC RULES 2000 TO Jalandhar Depot
Major hazard installations in the country have been identified & characterized by MSIHC
(Manufacturing, storage and Identification of Hazardous Chemicals) Rules, amended in 2000. The
rules employ certain criteria based on flammable, explosive & toxic properties and quantity of the
chemicals. Indicative criteria adopted in the MSIHC Rules, 2000 and description of applicable
provisions of the rules is given in Appendix I.
As per provisions of the MSIHC Rules, 2000 quantity of Petroleum Product Storage at the
Installations has been analyzed and the applicable rules are identified based on the type of
petroleum products, quantity of storage and the threshold quantity given in the rules. Applicable
regulations of MSIHC Rules, 2000 to the Installations are identified in the following Table.
All petroleum products marketing locations fall under the category of isolated storage, which comes
under schedule 2 of MSIHC Rules. Threshold quantities and applicability of various rules are as
follows:
Table 11: Applicability of MSIHC Rules to HPCL’s Jalandhar DEPOT
SN Product Storage Capacity Threshold Quantity (MT) as per Applicable Rules

MSIHC Rules*
Class In KL In MT For Rules 4,5,7 to For Rules
9 & 13 to 15 10 to 12
1 Class A 5680 4320 7000 7000 2(e)(i) & (ii), 2(h)(i),
4,5,7 to 9, 10 to 12 &
13 to 15
2 Class B 12320 10475 10,000 10,000 4,5,7 to 9, 10 to 12 &
13 to 15
Grand Total 18000 14795
*Specific Gravity of MS = 0.69-0.77, HSD = 0.81-0.91, SKO = 0.80, Ethanol = 0.79
Rule 2: Identification for Existence of "Hazardous Chemicals”:
* "Hazardous chemicals" are existing in the HPCL, Installation as per rule 2(e)(i) &2(e)(ii), petroleum
products existing at the Depot are covered under Schedule I(b)(ii)
* "Industrial Activity" carried out in the Depot involves operation / processes having hazardous chemicals
and includes their on-site storage & transportation as per Rule 2(h)(i). “Isolated storage” of petroleum
products is covered in schedule 2.
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Rule 3 : Duties of the Government Authorities :
* Duties of the Government Authorities as per schedule V.
Rule 4 : General Responsibility of Occupier :
* As "hazardous chemicals" exist in the Depot the occupier has to provide evidence to show that he has:
a) Identified the major accident hazards &

b) Taken adequate steps to:
i. Prevent such major accidents and to limit their consequences to persons & environment.
ii. Provide information, training and safety Equipments, including antidotes to the persons
working on site to ensure their safety
Rule 5: Notification of Major Accidents:
* Notification of "Major Accidents" in the format given in Schedule 6 to Chief Inspector of factories
and to other authorities as listed in Schedule V.
Rule 7: Notification of Site:
* Notification of site and updated information of the modifications to the competent authority as
per Schedule VII.
Rule 8: Updating of the Site Notification Following Changes in the Threshold Quantity:
* Any change in the “threshold quantity” (storage quantity) is to be notified to the competent
authority.
Rule 9: Transitional Provision:
* Transitional Provision for the existing activity
Rule 10: Safety Reports:
*Preparation of Safety report by the occupier & to carry out an independent safety audit once in a
year.
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Rule 11: Updating of report under rule 10:
*Updating of safety reports based on modification.
Rule 12: Requirement for further information to be sent to the authority:
*Further information on safety reports to the authority.
Rule 13: Preparation to On-sire emergency plan by the occupier:
*Preparation of onsite emergency plan by the occupier & to conduct mock drill once in every
6 months.
Rule 14: Preparation of Off-sire emergency plan by the occupier:
* Preparation of offsite emergency plan by the occupier & to conduct mock drill once in every
Year.
Rule 15: Information to be given to persons liable to be affected by a major accident
Rule 17: Collection, Development and Dissemination of Information on "Hazardous Chemicals" Employed
by the Occupier
a) Material Safety Data Sheet is to be prepared as per Schedule IX

b) Every container of hazardous chemical should be labeled or marked to identify -
I. Contents of the container

II. The name and the address of the manufacturer
III. Physical, Chemical and Toxicological data as per the criteria given in Schedule I : Part I
Rule 18: Import of Hazardous Chemicals
(1) The rule is applicable as “hazardous chemicals” as per Schedule 1 Part I (b) (ii) exist in the
Installation.
(2) To provide timely information to various Govt. Authorities listed in Schedule V:

I. Name & address of the company receiving the consignment in India
II. The port of entry in India
III. Mode of transport from exporting country to India
IV. The quantity of chemicals being imported
V. Complete product safety information
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2.3.5 FIRE EXPLOSION INDEX (FEI) ANALYSIS FOR HPCL’S Jalandhar Depot.
Introduction & Objectives:
The most widely used relative ranking hazard indices are Dow chemical Company's Fire
Explosion Index (FEI) and Mond's Toxicity Index (TI). They are commonly together referred
to as Fire Explosion and Toxicity Index (FEI & TI).
FEI and TI involve objective evaluation of the realistic fire, explosion, toxicity and reactivity
potential of process or storage units. The quantitative methodology relies on the analysis based on
historic loss data, the energy content of the chemical under study and the extent to which loss
prevention measures are already incorporated. FEI are primarily designed for operations involving
storage, handling and processing of flammable, combustible and reactive chemicals.
Fire & Explosion Index & Category:
SN Fire & Explosion Index (FEI) Category

1 FEI <60 Light
2 61> FEI <96 Moderate
3 97>FEI <127 Intermediate
4 128 >FEI <158 Heavy
5 159 and more Severe
Computations of FEI for storage units of Jalandhar DEPOT are computed in the following Table. The
approach for FEI calculations is shown in Appendix II. Here only FEI is computed, because petroleum oils
are explosive in nature and not toxic. Toxic effect is left just momentary and hence not dangerous as other
real toxic chemicals e.g. Chlorine.
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Table 12: Fire Explosion Index for Storage Units of HPCL’s Jalandhar DEPOT
Material Factor Penalties Fire & Explosion

Product Capacity
SN Tank No. Product
(m3) NH NF NR MF GPH SPH Index Category
1 1 MS 2500 0 3 0 10 0.5 1.69 64.59 Moderate

2 2 MS 2500 0 3 0 16 0.5 1.69 64.59 Moderate
3 3 HSD 5000 0 2 0 10 0.5 1.72 40.78 Light
4 4 HSD 5000 0 2 0 10 0.5 1.72 40.78 Light
5 5 HSD 1000 0 2 0 10 0.5 1.48 37.20 Light
6 6 HSD 1000 0 2 0 10 0.5 1.48 37.20 Light
8 7 MS 70 0 3 0 16 0.5 1.33 55.99 Light
9 8 HSD 70 0 2 0 10 0.5 1.11 31.62 Light
10 9 SKO 70 0 2 0 10 0.5 1.10 31.51 Light
11 12 Ethanol 70 0 3 0 16 0.5 1.99 55.99 Light
12 13 Ethanol 180 0 3 0 16 0.5 1.54 60.90 Light
13 14 MS 180 0 3 0 16 0.5 1.33 55.99 Light
14 15 HSD 180 0 2 0 10 0.5 1.84 31.62 Light
Except MS Storage Tanks (Coming under Moderate), all other product Tanks fall under “light
category”. Hence, except MS all other products are comparatively less hazardous to Depot.
However, while doing software calculations for fire hazards, quantity of product matters a lot.
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2.4 OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH
Occupational safety and health (OSH), also commonly referred to as workplace health and safety
(WHS), is a multidisciplinary field concerned with the safety, health, and welfare of people at
work. Workers have a right to work at a safe workplace. The law requires employers to provide
their employees with safe and healthful workplaces.
There are many types of hazards which can cause harm or adverse effects in the workplace. They
are mainly categorized as under –
1. Chemical – Every workplace has chemicals - ranging from cleaning products to full scale
chemical production. If chemicals are not used, stored and handled properly, they can cause
injury, illness, disease, fire, explosions, or property damage. Know the hazards of chemicals
and appropriate precautions to take to work safely and avoid injury.
2. Ergonomic – Manual materials handling (MMH) means moving or handling things by lifting,
lowering, pushing, pulling, carrying, holding, or restraining. MMH is also the most common
cause of occupational fatigue, low back pain and lower back injuries.
3. Health – Many workplace hazards have the potential to harm workers' short- and long-term
health, resulting in diseases, disorders and injuries. It is advise able to clean and wash hands
and face properly before taking food at the work place.
4. Physical – Physical hazards are substances or activities that threaten your physical safety.
They are the most common and are present in most workplaces at one time or another. These
include unsafe conditions that can cause injury, illness and death. Suggested to identify near
miss situation by everybody on daily basis to reduce unsafe situation and make this as a habit.
5. Psychosocial – It mainly refers to metal health of workers at the work place. It involves stress,
violence, bullying, and other behaviors in the context of a workplace environment. It is advice
able not to engage any person in the work unless he/she is fit (both mentally and physically),
otherwise chances of probability of making mistakes will be more and that leads to accident
scenario.
6. Safety – Safety hazards include tools, machinery, materials, handling, tractors, welding, etc.
Also covered are prevention of slips, trips and falls, as well as driving tips and working safely
with compressed air. Also use of proper tools and follow of SOP is mandatory for safe
working.
7. Workplace – Hazards can be found in every workplace, and can come from a wide range of
sources. This section looks at some of the more common workplace hazards such as confined
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space, Indoor Air Quality, ventilation, temperature etc. and how to eliminate or control them.
Job safety analysis for any new type or critical job should be done before undertaking the job.
Similarly Plant safety analysis also to be done for more critical jobs. Follow of SOP and proper
tools and PPE are mandatory along with trained person on safety is a must. Periodic safety
training to working personnel on safety for recap is a must.
2.4.1 OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH AT HPCL’S DEPOT AT

JALANDHAR
CHEMICAL HAZARD
The facility is handling highly flammable materials. The petroleum products such as MS, SKO
and HSD are categorized as flammable and may lead to fire and explosion if not handled carefully.
Specially vapors of MS can enter body through Inhalation / Ingestion / Dermal absorption / Eyes.
Motor Spirit (MS)
Inhalation in very Inhalation:

high concentration of vapor causes loss of consciousness, coma Symptoms and sudden death.
In less severe cases, causes headache, nausea and mental confusion and
depression may occur.
Ingestion: Ingestion causes irritation of gastro intestinal tract with vomiting colic and
diarrhea.
Skin: Prolonged skin contact will dry an defat skin with dermatitis.
Eye: Contact with eye causes pain and slight transient corneal epithelial disturbaxes
High Speed Diesel (HSD)
Inhalation: Dizziness, headache Symptoms and bluish tint to the skin.

Ingestion: Nausea and vomiting. Irritation of mouth and gastro intestinal tract may follow,
rapidly developing potentially fatal chemical
Skin: Irritation, will remove fat from the skin. Prolonged or repeated contact should
be avoided; otherwise skin chapping, cracking or possible contact dermatitis
may occur. Dry skin, erythema, oil acne, and oil folliculitis & watery growth
may occur which may become skin cancer subsequently on repeated exposure.
Eye Eye irritation
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Superior Kerosene Oil (SKO)
Inhalation: Can cause unconsciousness which may go to coma. Stentorious breathing

Symptoms and bluish tint to the skin.
Ingestion: In mild form, intoxication resembles drunkenness. Sometimes headache, lack
of appetite, dizziness, sleepiness, indigestion, nausea, chemical pneumonotis,
results if aspirated during ingestion or while vomiting. Can cause systemic
effects after repeated exposure.
Skin: Causes irritation to the skin, prolonged or repeated contact results in dry
scaly skin and development of dermatitis.
Eye acute irritation
Ethanol
Inhalation: If inhaled, remove to fresh air. If not breathing, give artificial respiration. If
breathing is difficult, give oxygen. Seek medical attention immediately
Ingestion: If swallowed Do NOT induce vomiting. Aspiration of material into lungs can
cause pulmonary edema. Never give anything by mouth to an unconscious
person.
Seek medical attention immediately.
Skin: In case of contact, immediately flush skin with plenty of water. Take off
contaminated clothing and shoes immediately. Wash contaminated clothing
before re-use. Contaminated leather, particularly footwear, must be discarded.
Note that contaminated clothing may be a fire hazard. If skin irritation persists,
seek medical attention.
Eye Remove contact lenses. Rinse immediately with plenty of water, also under the
eyelids, for at least 15 minutes. If eye irritation persists, seek medical attention.
ERGONIMIC HAZARDS
Activity At HPCL Prevention

Lifting, pushing, Though there are very 1. Provide all materials at a work level that is
pulling less or rare activities adjusted to the worker's body size.
related to this, drums or 2. Eliminate deep shelves to avoid bending.
chemical containers 3. Ensure sufficient space for the entire body to
may need lifting pulling turn.
by workers. 4. Locate objects within easy reach.
5. Ensure that there is a clear and easy access to
the load.
6. Use handles or have a good grip whenever
possible.
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7. Use slings and hooks to move loads that do
not have handles.
8. Balance contents of containers.
9. Use rigid containers.
10. Change the shape of the load so the load can
be handled close to the body.
11. Loads are allowed to handle as per Factory act
1948 and limit ergonomically allowed.
Lighting - Work during night The amount of light we need varies and depends on:
Insufficient requires proper lighting 1. Type of task being done (such as demands for speed
light/ Glare to enable shift workers and accuracy).
to operate normally. 2. Type of surfaces (does it reflect or absorb light).
3. General work area.
4. Individual's vision.
The hazard can be controlled by –
1. Using several small low-intensity light fixtures rather
than one large high-intensity light fixture. 2. Using light
fixtures that diffuse or concentrate light well. Indirect
light fixtures or direct light fixtures with parabolic
louvres are two possibilities.
3. Covering bare bulbs with louvers, lenses or other
devices to control light.
4. Painting ceiling and walls in light colours that reflect
light.
5. Cleaning ceilings, walls and light fixtures for getting
proper illumination & lux level required to suit to the
work.
Slips, trips and Oil spills Work at 1. Good housekeeping

falls height in tanker loading 2. Spills, wet spots, or any debris should be immediately
area cleaned up.
3. Use of Safety/ Fall Arrestors during tanker filling
4. Use of PPE such as Safety Shoes, Helmets, Goggles,
gloves, musk and others as required for safe operation
of the work activity.
5. Broken or malfunctioning lighting should be repaired
or replaced.
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Cuts, lacerations Welding or repair 1. Training workers on the safe use of tools and
and bruises due activity combating hazards involved in working with them. 2.
to hand tools The work break is a time period between tasks to relax
muscles.
3. Consider using chairs or stools to allow work in a
sitting or standing position. Ergonomically suitable
chairs based on postural analysis to be used.
Shift work – People work in three 1. Monitor health and safety. Look for any changes in
Extended shifts. Optimizing the accident rates, health levels and especially fatigue.
Workday or design of the shift Periodic health check up to be adhered to.
Rotational Shifts schedule is the most 2. Ask for workers' reactions and listen to their
effective way of comments to find out how satisfied they are with the
reducing the health and extended workday, and how well they have accepted it
safety problems. HPCL and adapted to it. Work for extended period to be done
has scheduled well as per Factory Rules.
designed shifts with 3. Direction of rotation of shifts - It is recommended that
allocated shifts rotate forward from day to afternoon to night
responsibilities. because circadian rhythms adjust better when moving
ahead than back.
HEALTH HAZARDS
These mainly include biological hazards (bacteria, viruses, insects), Diseases, Disorders,
Injuries and Pandemics (outbreak of any disease such as Dengue).
Health hazards are covered under Chemical hazards.
PHYSICAL HAZARDS
Physical hazards include: Temperature, Indoor air quality and Noise.
Jalandhar falls in Punjab state of India which is not having extreme temperatures to work in
except summer. In summer, the temperatures are moderate and conducive to workers with
some protection. Following measures can be undertaken –
1. Provision of shelter if possible (available at DEPOT)

2. Breaks for rest during work
3. Good Ventilation. Also consider cooling facilities (Fans) if possible
4. Limited working hours without exceeding during summers
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5. Availability of energy drinks (such as Glucose)
2.5 VISUALIZATION OF MCA SCENARIOS
2.5.1 INTRODUCTION
A Maximum Credible Accident (MCA) can be characterized as an accident with a maximum

damage potential, which is believed to be credible. For selection of a MCA scenario following
factors have been taken into account.
* Flammability of the petroleum Products

* Quantity of Products present in the tank
* Process or storage conditions such as temperature, pressure, flow, mixing and presence of
incompatible materials
In addition to the above factors, location of the unit with respect to adjacent establishment has
been taken into consideration to account for the potential of escalation of an accident. This
phenomenon is known as the domino or secondary effect. In order to visualize MCA scenarios
Chemical Inventory Analysis, Event Tree Analysis and Past Accident Review have been
employed.
2.5.2 CHEMICAL INVENTORY ANALYSIS
Maximum inventory of petroleum Products in pipeline sections, storage units and handling
equipments has been considered. Diagram showing accidental release of chemicals is shown as
figure 5.
2.5.3 IDENTIFICATION OF CHEMICAL RELEASE & ACCIDENT SCENARIOS
Credible accident scenarios for the DEPOT have been divided into following categories according
to the mode of release of petroleum products, physical effects and the resulting damages:
➢ Pool fire (release of petroleum products from a tank, rupture of pipeline sections, etc. forming
a pool within the area thereafter catching fire)
➢ Tank On Fire (due to external heat, joints of roof of tank get loose and it get thrown outside
and if the surface of tank catches fire, it is termed as tank on fire)
➢ Unconfined Vapor Cloud Explosion (UVCE) as a secondary effect of above mentioned

scenarios (MS)
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**Note: Jet Fire and Flash Fire are also possible. scenarios for study of fire hazards. In case of
Jalandhar DEPOT, the damage due to Pool Fire scenario and UVCE covers the maximum damage
potentiality to DEPOT irrespective of any reasons. Hence, these scenarios have not been covered
under this study.
2.5.4 ETA - EVENT TREE ANALYSIS TO DEFINE OUTCOME OF RELEASE
Different outcomes of a leakage or catastrophic failure are possible depending on if and when
ignition occurs and the consequences thereupon. ETA considers various possibilities such as
immediate or delayed ignition for the different outcomes to occur.
ETA diagram for various modes of failures of storage tank/ pump/ pipe/ joints for atmospheric
storage of petroleum products have been developed for conditions such as overfilling, over-
pressure and remote incidents like missile, lightening or bomb attack and earthquake. The
resultant ruptures of vessels or leak incidents have been identified with possible outcomes of such
incidents. Even tree Analysis for Jalandhar DEPOT is shown in Figure 3, 3A,3B,3C &3D.
Scenarios pertaining to leakage & spillage are most credible in such Installation.
2.5.5 FTA (FAULT TREE ANALYSIS) TO EXPLORE PROBABILITY OF OCCURRENCE OF THE

TOP EVENT.
In Petroleum installations or LPG Installations, it is important to analyze the possible mechanisms
of failure and to perform probabilistic analysis for the expected rate of such failures. A technique
like Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) can suitably be used for this purpose.
Any system represented by a fault tree has components that operate in series or parallel, with the
contribution of the two being most frequent. These components are studied for their failure and
the possible causes are linked together through logical gates. Thus a complete network is formed
using logical gates for different causes and consequences. This network represents a system for
which propensity towards top event is examined.
To construct a fault tree for a present case, Pool fire scenario is designated as the "top event”.
Tracing backward, exactly opposite to the forward approach followed in Event Tree Analysis
(ETA), all failures that could lead to the top event are found. Then all failures leading to each of
those events are identified. The word `event' means conditions, which are deviations from the
normal or planned state of operation of a system.
The evaluation of fault tree may be qualitative or quantitative or both depending on the scope of
analysis and requirement. The aim of fault tree evaluation is to determine whether an acceptable
level of safety has been incorporated in the design of the system or not. Suitable design
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improvements to minimize the probability of occurrence of top event are found out. The system
safety is upgraded by evaluating the critical events that significantly contribute to the top event and
the measures provided to cope with such eventualities.
Fault tree Analysis study for HPCL’s Jalandhar DEPOT is shown in Figure 4.
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2.6 SHORT LISTING OF MAJOR CREDIBLE ACCIDENT (MCA SCENARIOS
Based on the study of Depot and comparing the nature of installation with that from past accidents
in similar units, a final list of MCA scenarios for the DEPOT has been made, which is tabulated
below. These are the maximum credible accidents, which may occur, in the respective unit.
Table 8: Short Listing of MCA Scenarios for HPCL’s Jalandhar DEPOT
SN Tank No. Product MCA Scenario

1. TK-1,2 MS Pool Fire, Tank on Fire & VCE
2. TK-3,4,5,6 HSD Pool Fire & Tank on Fire
The above foreseen accident scenarios will have certain adverse effects on the nearby
units/structures in the DEPOT which may lead to escalation of the accident further.
Consequences of the entire above maximum credible accident scenarios have been analyzed in
detail in the subsequent Heading 3: Consequence Analysis.
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Figure 3A: Event Tree Analysis for Atmospheric Storage of Flammable Liquids
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Figure -3B, Event Tree Analysis for continuous Vapour Release.
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Figure -3C, Event Tree Analysis for continuous Release with Rainout.
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Figure -3D, Instantaneous Vapour Release
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Fig 3E , Instantaneous Release with Rainout
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Figure 4: Fault Tree Analysis for Top Event of Pool Fire Scenario
Page 48 of 92
Release of Chemicals
Instantaneous Continuous
Bottom Top
Two Phase Flow Liquid
No
Ignitio Pool Formation Vapours
n
Yes Yes
Yes Ignitio Pool Fire Ignitio Flare
n? n?
No
Detonation
No
Evaporation
Dispersion
Vapour Cloud Formation
No
Toxicity Ignitio
n?
Yes
Vapour Cloud Explosion
Pressure Waves Heat Radiation
Toxicity Computation Consequences Modeling
Figure 5 : Accidental Release of POL Products
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3 CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS
3.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter deals with the quantification of various effects of release of Petroleum products on the
surrounding area by means of mathematical models and internationally recognized Safety software.
Consequence analysis computes the consequence impacts in terms of damage distances due to heat
radiation, unconfined vapor cloud explosion, etc. A list of probable or potential accidents (as
mentioned in Chapter 2) in the DEPOT due to storage and handling of the hazardous chemicals
(POL products) is examined to establish their credibility.
3.1.1 FACTORS WHICH INFLUENCE THE USE OF PHYSICAL EFFECT MODEL.
In order to calculate the physical effects of the incidental release of hazardous substances the
following steps have been carried out in succession:
• Understanding of the form in which the hazardous substance is in existence (i.e. liquid of highly
volatile nature in case of petroleum Product)
• Determination of the various ways in which the release can take place
• Determination of the outflow volume or quantity (as a function of time) i.e. estimating rate of
evaporation from the pool of liquid;
In the case of petroleum Product, quantity of leaked or spilled Product along with pool size has
2
been calculated. Finally, the analysis results in computation of heat radiation intensity (KW/m )
with respect to distance for various MCA scenarios. In this analysis, final effect calculations have
been made for pool fire for heat radiation intensity effects with respect to distance from dyke wall.
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3.2 MODELS FOR DETERMINING THE SOURCE STRENGTH FOR THE RELEASE
OF HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCES
Source strength of a release means the quantity of the substance released with respect to time. The
release may be instantaneous or continuous. In case of instantaneous release, the strength of the
source is given in kg whereas in continuous release source strength depends on the outflow time
and expressed in kg/s. In order to find the source strength, it is first necessary to determine the state
of a substance in a vessel or pipe along with physical properties, viz. vapor pressure & minimum
ignition energy required. Phase of petroleum Product at the time of accidental release is also to be
determined. This may be gas, gas condensed to liquid or liquid in equilibrium with its vapor.
3.2.1 INSTANTANEOUS RELEASE
In the event of the instantaneous release of a liquid a pool of liquid will form. The evaporation can
be calculated on the basis of pool size, volatile nature of the product (i.e. vapor pressure) and
meteorological conditions.
3.2.2 SEMI- CONTINUOUS OUTFLOW
In the case of a semi continuous outflow, it is again first of all necessary to determine whether it is
gas, a gas condensed to liquid or liquid that is flowing out. The following situations can occur here.
(A) Gas Outflow:
The model with which the source strength is determined in the event of a gas outflow is based
on the assumption that there is no liquid in the system.
(B) Liquid Outflow:
In case of liquid outflow, discharge due to overall head difference takes place.
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3.3 MODEL FOR DISPERSION
The gas or vapor released either instantaneously or continuously will be spread in the surrounding
area under the influence of the atmospheric turbulence. In the case of gas dispersion, a distinction
is required to be made between neutral gas dispersion and heavy gas dispersion.
The concentrations of the gas released in the surrounding area can be calculated by means of these
dispersion models. These concentrations are important for determining the nature of accidents for
example an explosive gas cloud formation injuries will occur in the case of toxic gases.
Heavy Gas Dispersion Model
If the gas density is higher than that of air due to higher molecular weight or marked cooling, it will
tend to spread in a radial direction because of gravity. This results in a "gas pool" of a particular
height and diameter. As a result of this, in contrast to a neutral gas, the gas released may spread
against the direction of the wind.
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3.4 MODEL FOR HEAT LOAD AND SHOCK WAVES
3.4.1 MODEL FOR SPILLED / POOL FIRE
The released flammable material which is a liquid stored below its normal boiling point, will collect
in a pool. The geometry of the pool will be dictated by the surroundings. Once sustained combustion
is achieved, liquid fires quickly reach steady state burning. The heat release rate is a function of the
liquid surface area exposed to air. An unconfined spill will tend to have thin fuel depth (typically
less than 5 mm) which will result in slower burning rates. A confined spill is limited by the
boundaries (e.g. a dyke area) and the depth of the resulting pool is greater than that for an
unconfined spill.
Pool fires are less directional and so may affect a larger area although it is mostly influenced by
wind conditions. Pool fire also causes structural failure of equipment/nearby storage tank(s)
although the time taken is longer than jet fires.
The schematic of a pool fire is depicted in Figure 6. The heat load on objects outside a burning
pool of liquid can be calculated with the heat radiation model. This model uses average radiation
intensity, which is dependent on the liquid. Account is also taken of the diameter-to-height ratio of
the fire, which depends on the burning liquid. In addition, the heat load is also influenced by the
following factors:
* Distance from the fire

* Relative humidity (water vapor has relatively high heat absorbing capacity)
* The orientation i.e. horizontal/vertical of the object irradiated with respect to the fire
Page 53 of 92
3.5 VULNERABILITY MODEL
Vulnerability models or dose response relations, which, are used in order to determine how people
are injured by exposure to heat load or a toxic dose. Such models are designed on the basis of
animal experiments or on the basis of the analysis of injuries resulting from accidents, which have
occurred. Vulnerability models often make use of a Probit function. In a Probit function a link is
made between the load and the percentage of people exposed who suffer a particular type of injury.
The Probit function is represented as follows:
Pr = k1 + k2ln V
in which,
Pr= Probit, a measure for the percentage of people exposed who incur a particular injury (relation
between percentages & Probit is given in Table 14.
k1 = A constant depending on the type of injury and type of load
k2 = A constant depending on the type of load
V = Load or dose
Table 14: Relationship between Percentage and Probit
Percentage Probit
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
0 - 2.67 2.95 3.12 3.25 3.36 3.45 3.52 3.59 3.66
10 3.72 3.77 3.82 3.87 3.92 3.96 4.01 4.05 4.08 4.12
20 4.16 4.19 4.23 4.26 4.29 4.33 4.36 4.39 4.42 4.45
30 4.48 4.50 4.53 4.56 4.59 4.61 4.64 4.67 4.69 4.72
40 4.75 4.77 4.80 4.83 4.85 4.87 4.90 4.92 4.95 4.97
50 5.00 5.03 5.05 5.08 5.10 5.13 5.15 5.18 5.20 5.23
60 5.25 5.28 5.31 5.33 5.36 5.39 5.41 5.44 5.45 5.50
70 5.52 5.55 5.58 5.61 5.64 5.67 5.71 5.74 5.77 5.81
80 5.84 5.88 5.92 5.95 5.99 6.04 6.08 6.13 6.18 6.23
90 6.28 6.34 6.41 6.48 6.55 6.64 6.75 6.88 7.05 7.33
- 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
99 7.33 7.37 7.41 7.46 7.51 7.58 7.65 7.75 7.88 8.09
Page 54 of 92
3.5.1 INJURIES RESULTING FROM FLAMMABLE LIQUIDS AND GASES
In the case of flammable liquids/gases with immediate ignition, a pool fire or a flare will occur
depending on the conditions. The injuries in this case are mainly caused by heat radiation.
3.5.2 DAMAGE MODELS FOR HEAT RADIATION
It is assumed that everyone inside the area covered by the fire ball, a torch, a burning pool or gas
cloud will be burned to death or will asphyxiate. The following Probit functions are an example of
a method, which can be used to calculate the percentage of lethality, and first-degree burns that will
occur at a particular thermal load and period of exposure of an unprotected body.
Lethality: Pr = -36.83 + 2.56 ln (t.q4/3)
First degree burn symptoms: Pr = -39.83 + 3.0186 in (t.q4/3)
In which, t = exposure time in seconds and;

q = thermal load W/m2
Two values have been chosen for the exposure time to heat radiation:
* 10 seconds: for exposed persons in populated area it is assumed that they will have found protection
from the heat radiation e.g. from a wall, within 10 seconds
* 30 seconds: this pessimistic assumption applies if people do not run away immediately or when no
protection is available
Thermal radiations for particular Heat Radiation Intensity (kw/m 2) give different impacts. It depends on
Intensity of Heat Radiation and surrounding facilities. Following table describes the damage due to particular
Heat Intensity.
Page 55 of 92
Table 15: Damages Envisaged at Various Heat Loads
Incident Radiation Type of damage Intensity

intensity, KW/m2 Damage to Equipment Damage to People
62.0 Spontaneous Ignition of Wood 100% Lethality (severe damage)
37.5 Sufficient to cause damage to 100% lethality in 1 min. and 1% lethality in 10 sec.
process equipment
25.0 Minimum energy required to 50% Lethality in 1 min. and Significant injury in
ignite wood, at infinitely long 10 sec.
exposure (non-piloted)
19.0 Maximum thermal radiation -----
intensity allowed on thermally
unprotected equipment
12.5 Minimum energy required for 1% lethality in 1 min.
piloted ignition of wood,
melting plastic tubing etc.
9.5 ---- Pain threshold reached after 15 seconds
6.4 ------ Pain threshold reached after 8 seconds. Second
Degree burns after 20 seconds.
4.5 ------- Sufficient to cause pain to personnel if unable to
reach cover within 20 seconds, however blistering
of skin (first degree burns) is likely
2.0 PVC insulated cables damaged ----
1.6 ----- Will cause no discomfort to long exposure. Pain
threshold reached after 60 seconds
0.7 ----- Equivalent to solar radiation. Exposed skin reddens
and burns on prolonged exposure
* Source: Reference Green book “Methods for Determination of Possible Damage”, TNO, Netherlands;
World Bank (1988); Technical Report No. 55: Techniques for Assessing Industrial Hazards; D.C.: The
World Bank
The level of damage caused is a function of duration of exposure as well as heat flux. This is true both for
the effects on buildings and Installation equipment as well as personnel. However, the variation in likely
exposure time is much more marked with personnel due to possibility of findings shelter.
The following table gives the relationship between exposure time and heat flux against the fatality
probability factors. Fatality Probability due to thermal radiation:
Page 56 of 92
Percentage of Fatality 10% 50% 99%

Heat Flux (KW/m2) Times in Seconds
1.6 500 1300 3200
4.0 150 370 930
12.5 30 80 200
37.5 8 20 50
In general it might be possible to take to a “shelter” within 30-60 seconds. As can be seen from
above table, the change between very low to very high fatality probabilities occurs between flux
levels of 12.5 kw/m2 and 37.5 kw/m2.
For transient fires like fire ball, the steady state heat flux levels cannot be used to estimate the
damage. The degree of thermal radiation in terms of total incident thermal energy dose levels are
relevant as shown in table below:
Physiological effect of Threshold Thermal Dose:
Thermal Threshold Dose (KW/m2) Effects

rd
37.5 3 Degree Burns
25.0 2nd Degree Burns
12.5 1st Degree Burns
6.5 Threshold of Pain or blistering of skin
3.5.3 IMPACT OF OVERPRESSURE
Pressure wave’s results due to catastrophic failure or rupture of storage tank/pipeline etc. it results
in generation of high pressure waves which have potential to cause damage to
property/personnel/Equipments/neighboring areas. A peak over pressure of 0.1 bar is taken as the
limit for fatal injury and 0.03 bar as the limit for the occurrence of wounds as the result of flying
fragments of glass. Following inferences are used to translate an explosion in terms of damage to
the surrounding area:
 Everyone within the contours of the exploding gas cloud will die as a result of burns or
asphyxiation. Establishments in this zone will be fully destroyed.
 In houses with serious damage it is assumed that one in eight persons present will be killed as
a result of the building collapsing. Within the zone with a peak over pressure of 0.3 bar the risk
of death in houses is 0.0125, i.e. one in eighty people will be killed.
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Table 16: Damage Effects of Blast Overpressure
Peak Overpressure (Bar) Damage Level

5.0 – 8.0 Major structural damage (assumed fatal to people inside
building or within other structures)
100% Lethality
3.5 – 3.0 Oil storage tank failure
50% Lethality
2.0 – 3.0 Eardrum rupture
Threshold Lethality
1.33 - 2.0 Repairable damage. Pressure vessels intact; light structures
collapse
Severe lung Damage
1.0 – 1.33 Window breakage, possibly causing some injuries
50% eardrum Rupture
0.3 Heavy (90% Damage)
0.1 Repairable (10% Damage)
0.03 Damage of glass
0.01 Crack of windows
Page 58 of 92
3.6 RESULTS OF MAXIMUM CREDIBLE ACCIDENT ANALYSIS (MCA)
The maximum credible accident scenarios for the HPCL’s Jalandhar DEPOT have been identified and listed
in Table 13.Using software models, results of those identified scenarios are tabulated in subsequent
headings as under.
3.6.1 POOL FIRE SCENARIO
At Jalandhar Depot, during handling or storage operation of petroleum products (MS, HSD, Ethanol
&SKO), if there is a major leakage or catastrophic failure of tank due to any reason, there will be formation
of pool within the Dyke wall in case of less volatile or non-volatile liquid. If the liquid does not overflow
firebreak wall, then the pool will be limited to the respective unit. However, if the liquid overflows the
firebreak wall, it may engulf the complete dyke area. In both of the cases if it catches fire depending on
availability of potential ignition source in the vicinity, it will take form of Pool fire. Provided that an ample
supply of oxygen is available, the amount of surface area of the given liquid becomes the defining
parameter. The diameter of the pool fire depends upon the release mode, release quantity and burning rate.
Liquid pool fires with a given amount of fuel can burn for long periods of time if they have a small surface
area or for short periods of time over a large spill area.
The pool fire radiation distances are directly proportional to the pool diameter. In case of tanks, the
pool diameter is assumed to be restricted by dykes.
Pool fire may occur in the Depot in various ways as described below –
1. Leak of POL products from valves (flanges), pipelines, pump seal, Equipments and instrument
tapings etc. forming a pool around leak locations and catching fire leading to pool fire (this
scenario not studied here because major loss is studied under Dyke pool fire scenario).
2. Loss of containment in the tank farm area where the leaked material is contained in the
dyke/bund. This pool spread catching fire is termed as “Bund Fire”.
There are five dyke walls for enclosing Oil tanks of Petroleum products. Individual petroleum product for
each dyke wall is considered for pool fire study and using software model, results have been obtained for
pool fire scenario. Damage distances obtained for pool fire scenario are tabulated as under:
Page 59 of 92
Table 17: Results of Pool Fire Scenario for all Dyke walls
Distance
Wind Heat Distance along
POL Product Dyke radial from
SN Stability Radiations height of
with Tank No. No. Flame Center
Class (KW/m2) simulation (m)
(m)
37.5 118.67 108.34
25 140.92 132.34
1 D (TK-3,4)HSD
12.5 193.98 187.84
4.5 335.36 331.84
2
37.5 108.63 98.91
(TK-5,6) HSD 25 129.45 121.41
2 D
12.5 177.68 171.91
4.5 307.21 303.91
37.5 106.61 96.54
25 126.40 118.04
3 D (TK-1,2) MS 1
12.5 173.53 167.54
4.5 299.47 296.04
Outcome of software shows that, HSD tank – 3,4 will yield maximum heat radiation distances and
maximum damage potential to Depot due to Pool Fire. The Damage distances are crossing the
Depot boundary, hence, if such accident occurs in Depot it will result in maximum damage
potential to Depot as well as to neighborhood facilities and fire injuries to Personnel working
nearby to Dyke (if any). However, the occurrence of such accident can be restricted by
adopting strict supervision, precautions and safe operations must be followed at Depot by
working personnel.
The occurrence of such accident may halt pumping operation and eventually water pumping to
activate hydrants and monitors switch results in stoppage of firefighting operation. In such case,
the objective and purpose of Diesel driven engine meant for firefighting in absence of power is
defeated. There will be no control over the emergency and mitigation preparedness.
3.6.2 TANK ON FIRE SCENARIO
Escaping of roof of storage tank due to internal pressure (due to surrounding heat or any other
reason) or due to roof structure failure may result in tank on fire if product within the tank catches
fire.
Each tank of Oil is examined for this scenario and the results were scrutinized. The effect of fire
on people and property outside and inside the Depot is in the form of thermal radiations. A criterion
was selected for deciding the maximum level of thermal radiation to which the outside population
can be subjected. Thermal radiation levels from fire scenarios of each tank were worked out at
various distances and their effects are evaluated against the set criteria.
Page 60 of 92
Thermal radiation due to tank on fire may cause various degrees of burns on exposed to human
bodies. Moreover their effects on piping and equipment are to be evaluated to assess their impact.
Table gives type of damage due to various heat radiation intensities.
SN Radiation
Load Type of Damage Remarks
(kW/m2)
Sufficient To Cause Damage to process Can Impact the equipments severely leading to
1 37.5 stoppage of Vital fire fighting network.
Equipment
Can lead to 3rd Degree Burns to personnels
Min to ignite wood (without flame Significant Damage can be effected on the
2 25 contact). 100% fatal in 1 min. Significant equipments.
injury in 10 Sec Can lead to 2nd Degree Burns.
Minimum Energy Required For Piloted Wood ,Plastic may give way and process may get
3 12.5 effected. Can lead to Ist Degree Burn
Ignition of Wood, Molting of plastic etc.
Sufficient to cause pain to personnel if Threshold of Pain or Blistering of skin
unable to reach cover within 20 seconds,
4 4.5
however blistering of skin (1st Degree
Burn) is Likely
For HPCL’s Jalandhar Depot, each product tank is examined for Tank on fire scenario. The results are shown
in following table:
Table 18: Damage Distances Due to Tank on Fire Scenario
Damage Distance (m) From Tank Surface For

Radiation Intensity KW/m2
SN Tank No. Product
37.5 25 12.5
4.5 KW/m2
KW/m2 KW/m2 KW/m2
3 TK-1,2 MS 23.01 28.01 40.01 71.01
4 TK-3,4 HSD 31.42 38.92 54.92 96.92
From above table, it is concluded that fire in HSD tank (TK-3) of the Depot has maximum damage potential
than fire in any other tanks.
Analyzing the damage distances and heat radiation intensities for various Tank on fire scenarios it can be inferred that
there will not be any fatality outside the Depot premises as there will be sufficient time to escape. Only burn injuries
may occur inside Depot to Depot personnel. Thus, damage in the Depot could be limited to the Depot only.
However, necessary due precautions must be undertaken by Depot Personnel to ensure safety within the
Depot. Frequency of occurrence of such accidents has been found extremely low.
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3.6.3 UNCONFINED VAPOUR CLOUD EXPLOSION (UVCE)
Vapour Cloud can ignite and burn as deflagration or fire balls causing lot of damage by radiation
starting secondary fires at some distance. Vapour Cloud ignites and explodes causing high over
pressures and very heavy damage. The latter is termed as “Percussive unconfined Vapour Cloud
Explosion” i.e. PUVCE in short.
Various meteorological conditions (refer heading 2.3.2) have been considered for analyzing drifting
& dilution of a vapor cloud, so that all probable consequences of a vapor cloud explosion can be
foreseen. Worst come worst, there may be instantaneous release of the entire volatile POL product
present in the storage tank. If it comes in to contact of an ignition source immediately after the
release or as in a case of backfire resulting in jet fire, it may lead to a BLEVE.
Otherwise, the second MCA scenario is drifting & dilution of a vapor cloud along the wind and
then coming into contact of an ignition source (i.e., case of delayed ignition), leading to a VCE.
This scenario is particularly important to identify unforeseen OFF-SITE emergencies. Two kinds
of vapor release scenarios have been considered, i.e. instantaneous and continuous.
Continuous release:
Continuous release of a product occurs where the outflow of product is in small quantity form the
inventory. This release will get dispersed in atmosphere after a period of time. For ignition of
product, a particular mixture of product with air is required (mixture between lower & upper
explosive limit of POL product). For this precaution should be taken by DEPOT personnel’s.
However, Hydrocarbon Detectors for a leak of Class A petroleum products are being installed at
DEPOT.
Instantaneous Release:
As the vapor cloud drifts in the wind direction, it may explode depending on the quantity of MS
present within flammability limits and availability of ignition source. Applying the pertinent
models, quantity of MS within flammability limits for various downwind distances have been
calculated for below mentioned wind conditions.
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Wind Conditions:
I II III
Very Stable Atmosphere Neutral Atmosphere Unstable Atmosphere
Velocity = 1 m/s Velocity = 2 m/s Velocity = 4 m/s
At Jalandhar DEPOT, class A product (here MS and Ethanol) is highly flammable and volatile in
nature. Leakage through storage tank or catastrophic rupture of tank (results in delayed ignition)
may lead to formation of vapour cloud in the atmosphere and in presence of ignition source may
result in vapour cloud explosion. The catastrophic failure of Tank results in formation unconfined
vapour cloud is one of the major accidental scenarios whose damage effect may fall beyond DEPOT
boundary.
For study of VCE scenario, following approach is followed and according to that, release quantity
for VCE is considered.
As per USEPA standard (Chapter – 4: Offsite consequence analysis) for flammable liquid released
into a containment area with a depth greater than 1 cm it is assumed that, the quantity that
volatilizes in 10 min is involved in a vapor cloud explosion. Release of total quantity of a flammable
substance in a storage tank/vessel or pipe into a vapor cloud generally would be highly unlikely.
Vapour Cloud Events are also unlikely events; in an actual release, the flammable gas or vapor
released to air might disperse without ignition, or it might burn instead of exploding with more
limited consequences. For getting USEPA standard document follow the link mention below:
www.epa.gov/osweroe1/docs/chem/Chap-04-final.pdf
The standard rate of release for MS (Gasoline) is 0.055 Kg/m2/s. catastrophic failure of MS Tank
101D is considered for study of UVCE.
Following these guidelines, release quantity for occurrence of VCE as per release rate of MS is
found as under:
MS release Quantity = 208791 Kg
Page 63 of 92
3.6.4 DAMAGE DISTANCES DUE TO PRESSURE WAVES
The damage distances for overpressure/pressure waves due to catastrophic failure of MS Tank 1
Dare quantified using software model.
Overpressure / pressure wave’s distances are computed for wind velocity 2m/s & Neutral
atmosphere. Result is presented in following table:
Table 19: Hazard Distances for Pressure waves
Pressure-waves
SN Damage units Distance (m)
(bar)
1 Storage Tank / frameless structure damage limit 64.43 0.2069
2 50% Brick Wall damage 4-9 inch thick 77.18 0.1724
3 Sheet / panel damage 3 mm thick 202.94 0.0690
4 100 % fatal 16.49 2.1156
5 50 % Fatal 22.01 1.2336
6 Fatal Distance 30.94 0.6076
7 100 % structural Damage 35.45 0.4511
8 50 % Structural Damage 104.91 0.1261
9 Ear Drum Damage 273.65 0.0550
10 100 % Glass Break 3-5 mm thick 136.52 0.0963
11 50 % Glass Break 3-5 mm thick 453.18 0.0375
12 Loud Noise 75-85 (dB) 2128.48
Page 64 of 92
Table 9: Probit Table and Absolute Fatality / Injury
% Absolute
Over % Ear %
Distance Fatality % Glass Area
Pressure Drum Structural Fatality Injury
(m) Lung Break (Ha)
(Bar) Rupture Damage No. No.
rupture
22.007 1.2335 10.22 96.38 100.00 100.00 0.152 0.000 0.000
34.589 0.4764 0.00 62.29 98.37 100.00 0.224 0.000 0.000
47.171 0.3041 0.00 20.14 91.30 100.00 0.323 0.000 0.000
59.753 0.2234 0.00 9.43 72.58 100.00 0.423 0.000 0.000
72.335 0.1841 0.00 5.87 40.91 100.00 0.522 0.000 0.000
84.917 0.1565 0.00 3.94 22.33 100.00 0.622 0.000 0.000
97.499 0.1358 0.00 2.78 13.22 100.00 0.721 0.000 0.000
110.082 0.1200 0.00 2.05 8.33 100.00 0.821 0.000 0.000
122.664 0.1076 0.00 1.56 5.52 98.65 0.920 0.000 0.000
135.246 0.0972 0.00 1.22 3.80 98.07 1.019 0.000 0.000
147.828 0.0889 0.00 0.98 2.71 97.33 1.119 0.000 0.000
160.410 0.0814 0.00 0.79 1.98 96.40 1.218 0.000 0.000
172.992 0.0758 0.00 0.66 1.48 95.25 1.318 0.000 0.000
185.547 0.0703 0.00 0.55 1.13 93.86 1.417 0.000 0.000
198.157 0.0655 0.00 0.47 0.88 92.20 1.517 0.000 0.000
210.739 0.0669 0.00 0.49 0.95 92.74 1.616 0.000 0.000
223.321 0.0641 0.00 0.44 0.81 91.51 1.716 0.000 0.000
235.903 0.0614 0.00 0.40 0.69 90.15 1.815 0.000 0.000
248.485 0.0593 0.00 0.36 0.60 88.67 1.915 0.000 0.000
261.067 0.0572 0.00 0.33 0.52 87.05 2.014 0.000 0.000
Damages due to pressure or shock wave are primarily important for analysis of damage to various facilities
of the Depot, surrounding off-site area and secondary effects (domino effect).
Page 65 of 92
3.6.5 SPILLAGE OF PRODUCT WHEN ROAD TANKER MEETS WITH AN ACCIDENT

ENROUTE RESULTING IN FIRE
This kind of eventualities comes under NDMA and guideline/ruling (for POL tankers) has been
prescribed to deal with such situations.
3.6.6 FIRE IN TT PARKING AREA OUTSIDE DEPOT PREMISES
Parking area for lorry loading usually having empty Tank Trucks and in waiting mode for their
turns to get in for loading. All loaded Lorrie’s leaves immediately after security/statuary clearance.
If there is by any chance of fire in tonnage/spillage etc. due to ignorance/mischief /unknown reason
etc. will be of miner nature and can be checked conveniently with available resources in -house.
3.6.7. STORAGE TANK HIT BY A FLYING OBJECT/UNDER FIRE DUE TO SOME

EXPLOSION IN CLOSE VICINITY AREA
Storage Tank hit by a flying object, worst of worst total failure of tank will be possible as an outcome or
leakage of product through hole/rupture made in tank after hitting by a flying object. As a result the product
will accumulate within the Dyke, if this leaked product catches fire it will results in Pool Fire accident
which is already considered in MCA Scenarios. Tank on Fire scenario is also possible which is covered in
MCA’s. Tank under fire due to some explosion in close vicinity areas is the Tank on fire scenario which
is covered under Tank on Fire Scenario as well as worst possible case is catastrophic rupture of tank which
may result in VCE which is also covered in report.
Page 66 of 92
3.7 CATAGORIZATION/EVALUATION OF RISK
Based on ranking of likelihood and frequencies, each identified hazard has been evaluated based
on the likelihood of occurrence and the magnitude of consequences. The significance of the risk is
expressed as the product of likelihood and the consequence of the risk event, expressed as follows:
Significance = Likelihood X Consequence.
The Table 21below illustrates all possible product results for the five likelihood and consequence
categories while the Table 22assigns risk significance criteria. Depending on the position of the
intersection of a column with a row in the risk matrix, hazard prone activities have been classified
as low, medium and high thereby qualifying for a set of risk reduction / mitigation strategies.
Table21 : Risk Matrix
Likelihood →
Frequent Probable Remote Not Likely Improbable
5 4 3 2 1
Catastrophic 5 25 20 15 10 5
Consequence →
Major 4 20 16 12 8 4
Moderate 3 15 12 9 6 3
Minor 2 10 8 6 4 2
Insignificant 1 5 4 3 2 1
Page 67 of 92
Table 10: Risk Criteria and Action Requirements
Risk Significance Criteria Definition & Action Requirements

High (16 - 25) “Risk requires attention” – HSE Management need to ensure that necessary mitigation are
adopted to ensure that possible risk remains within acceptable limits
Medium (10 – 15) “Risk is tolerable” – HSE Management needs to adopt necessary measures to prevent any
change/modification of existing risk controls and ensure implementation of all practicable
controls.
Low (5 – 9) “Risk is acceptable” – Identified risks are managed by well-established controls and routine
processes/procedures. Implementation of additional controls can be considered.
Very Low (1 – 4) “Risk is acceptable” – All risks are managed by well-established controls and routine
processes/procedures. Additional risk controls need not to be considered
Risk category as per incidents mentioned under heading 2.5 is as per below:
Table 23: Categorization of Risk as per Identified MCA Scenarios
SN Risk Source Risk Category

1 Pool Fire Intermediate (if controlled within time)
2 Tank On Fire Intermediate (if controlled within time)
3 Unconfined Vapour Cloud Explosion Intermediate
[because no habitation in surrounding of
DEPOT(considered from storage tanks)for a
minimum 500 m distance]
4 Spillage of product when road tanker meets with Low
an accident enroute resulting in fire
5 fire in parking area outside DEPOT premises Low
6 storage tank hit by a flying object/under fire due to Intermediate (if controlled within time)
some explosion in close vicinity areas
Page 68 of 92
3.8 ANALYSIS FOR PROPENSITY TOWARDS PREDICTED CONSEQUENCES
Risk of operation of any activity involving hazardous chemicals consists of the following two elements:
1. Consequences of certain unwanted event &
2. Propensity that these consequences will occur.
Propensity or likelihood of the predicted consequence for the Installation will depend upon the following
items:
1. Propensity of the DEPOT towards occurrence of initiating event.
2. Propensity that the designed counter measures provided in the Installation would fail.
3. Propensity of certain consequence of an accident.
3.8.1 PROPENSITY OF THE DEPOT TOWARDS OCCURANCE OF SUCH INITIATING

EVENT
The event could be a single component failure, for example, leakage of product from pipeline or any
equipment or any tank. To evaluate this aspect for the DEPOT, Hazard and Operability Studies (HAZOP)
should to be carried out.
3. 8. 2 PROPENSITY OF FAILURE OF THE DESIGNED COUNTER MEASURES
Upon occurrence of the initiating event, certain designed counter measures in the DEPOT would start
functioning for example isolation of the affected area from other areas by the personnel by closing the
valves to restrict the quantity of escaping petroleum product; on hearing the emergency alarm the
emergency team would immediately start functioning and take the necessary action to restrict or limit the
damage. On the contrary these counter measures may fail also. Therefore, a lot would depend on response
of the emergency team. Hazards & Operability Studies, (HAZOP) needs to be carried out to evaluate this
aspect in detail.
3.8.3 PROPENSITY
Any initiating event would take place first, there after the designed counter measures would attempt
to limit the effects of the initiating event. Such deviations from the intended operation may lead to
an accident. In reality, accident scenario and severity of the consequences will depend on type of
product leaked, quantity of the product leaked, location of the incident (tank farm/pump shed/T/T
platform), availability of ignition source, response of emergency systems and emergency team,
weather conditions (wind velocity & direction), etc. Further propensity of being killed or injured
would also depend on the aspects like time of accident and number of people in damage area at that
time.
Page 69 of 92
3.9 ALARP PRINCIPLE
ALARP stands for "as low as reasonably practicable". The ALARP principle is that the residual
risk shall be as low as reasonably practicable. It has particular connotation as a route to reduce
risks SFAIRP (so far as is reasonably practicable) in UK Health and Safety law.
For a risk to be ALARP it must be possible to demonstrate that the cost involved in reducing the
risk further would be grossly disproportionate to the benefit gained. The ALARP principle arises
from the fact that infinite time, effort and money could be spent on the attempt of reducing a risk
to zero. It should not be understood as simply a quantitative measure of benefit against detriment.
It is more a best common practice of judgment of the balance of risk and societal benefit. Following
figure shows ALARP diagram.
IRPA Fundamental improvements needed.

Intolerable Only to be considered if there are no
alternatives and people are well informed
10-3/yr
Too high, significant effort required to
improve
10-4/yr
The ALARP or Tolerable
High, investigate alternatives
region (Risk is tolerated only)
10-5/yr
Low, consider cost-effective alternatives
Broadly Acceptable region
(no need for detailed working to 10-6/yr
demonstrate ALARP)
Negligible, maintain normal precautions
NOTE- A risk of 10 per million per year or 10-5/Year; effectively means that any person standing at
a point of this level of risk would have a 1 in 100 000 chance of being fatally injured per year.
Page 70 of 92
3.10SOCIETAL RISK (FN CURVE)
Societal Risk is the presentation of Results or outcome of Risk Analysis Study in a graphical form.
It represents the frequency of having an accident with N (fatality) or more people being killed
simultaneously. The persons involved in an accident are assumed to have some means of protection.
The societal risk is presented as an FN Curve, where N is the number of deaths and F is the
Cumulative frequency (frequency corresponding to no. of persons to be killed by an accident).
Graph showing Societal Risk is shown below:
Figure 6: FN Curve for Considered MCA Scenarios for Jalandhar DEPOT
Page 71 of 92
3.11 MITIGATION/PREVENTIVE MEASURES FOR MCA SCENARIOS
In order to mitigate/prevent any minor incident from becoming a major accident

following measures along with Onsite and if required Offsite Emergency (Disaster)
Management Plan should be followed:
1. Pool Fire in Dyke Area: Failure of outlet valve of tanks or any one of valve will lead
to leakage of product. This will form a pool inside dyke area if not identified
immediately. This pool if comes in contact with an ignition source will lead to a
major accident. In order to mitigate it, stop the operation immediately. Be ready will
all firefighting Equipment at the site. Start sprinkler system to cool the surrounding
tanks. Immediately follow both onsite and offsite emergency plan. Always strict
supervision be followed.
2. Tank On Fire: For preventing tank on fire, cool the surrounding tanks by means of
sprinkler system and foam system. Bring all firefighting Equipments at the site and
start fighting with fire following proper onsite emergency plan. Always strict
supervision be followed.
3. Unconfined Vapor Cloud Explosion: UVCE is a secondary domino effect. Vapors

releasing into atmosphere are not in so much quantity that it leads to an explosion.
For an ignition, a proper mixture of fuel to air is required, if this mixture between
UEL & LEL comes in contact with an ignition source, it will lead to an explosion.
In order to prevent it, immediately stop the leakage from the source by identifying it
or by isolation the system and if tank is failed, then isolate the operation. For this, it
is RECOMMENDED to maintain and calibrate the installed Hydrocarbon Detectors
satisfactorily. The HCD will give alarms in Control Room and also trigger the
hooters in the Tank Farm area as well as in Control Room.
Page 72 of 92
Figure 7: Schematic of a Pool Fire/Spilled Fire
Page 73 of 92
Figure 8: Schematic of Unconfined Vapour Cloud Explosion (UVCE)
Page 74 of 92
Figure 9: Contour Drawing for Pool Fire Scenario due to catastrophic failure of SKO TK-05
Page 75 of 92
Figure 10: Contour Drawing for Pool Fire Scenario due to catastrophic failure of SKO TK-06
Page 76 of 92
Figure 11: Contour Drawing for Pool Fire Scenario due to catastrophic failure of HSD TK-04
Page 77 of 92
Figure 12: Contour Drawing for Pool Fire Scenario due to catastrophic failure of HSD TK-03
Page 78 of 92
Figure 13: Contour Drawing for Pool Fire Scenario due to catastrophic failure of MS TK-01 & 02.
Page 79 of 92
4 RECOMMENDATIONS
Quantitative Risk Analysis Study has been carried out for M/s HPCL’s Jalandhar DEPOT. Identified
Maximum Credible Accidents have been identified and studied through using software model. From
findings of MCA’s it is found that, Pool Fire in case of catastrophic failure of Tank will yield maximum
damage distances which are crossing the DEPOT boundary. Maximum hazardous distance reaches 575 m
which severely can cause damage to HPCL’s Facilities. Necessary precautions and safety measures must
be always followed by HPCL’s Officials all the time. Based on Earlier QRA Done during April 2017, there
is no change in the Emergency/Risk Level .Only the change in product Configuration of one of the Tank is
envisaged.
Based on the Study, following recommendations have been aroused for the Jalandhar DEPOT. These are
as under –
4.1 ADDITIONAL RECOMMENDATIONS AND SUGGESTIONS –
A. Use of proper PPE to be done always and also the effectiveness of the PPEs to be done periodically
to ensure their workability before discarding.
B. 2 nos. UL/LISTE foam water monitors provided in front of TT Gantry at a distance of 20 mts.for
cooling TT Gantry roof top. These will take care of cooling the TT gantry, its roof and also helps to
control the thermal radiation from TT gantry towards control room , office Building and MCC room.
C. Findings of NEAR MISS situations to be identified by every one on daily basis to eliminate the
hazard without giving any further scope to escalate further for better managing plant safety and employee
safety.
D. Proper Fire Fighting equipments like Fire Monitors or Double Hydrant Points are to be provided in TT
Parking Area . Also sufficient water arrangement to be made for combating any fire emergency at this
area.
E. Wind direction plays major role in case of fire, hence adequate wind socks are to be provided at strategic
locations, so that people can visualize it and take appropriate action in case of any emergency. Wind
direction plays major role in case of fire, hence adequate wind socks are to be provided at strategic locations,
so that people can visualize it and take appropriate action in case of any emergency.
F. Borewell yield to be reconfirmed/reascertained during peak summer to maintain the adequacy of water
for fire fighting.
Page 80 of 92
APPENDIX– I: MANUFACTURE, STORAGE & IMPORT OF

HAZARDOUS CHEMICAL'S RULES, UNDER ENVIRONMENT
PROTECTION ACT, 1986, MoEF, GOI, 2000 (MSIHC RULES)
1. Indicative Criteria for Identification of Toxic, Flammable & Explosive Chemicals:
a. Toxic Chemicals
Chemicals having the following values of acute toxicity and which, owing to their physical and
chemical properties, are capable of producing major accident hazards:
Medium lethal dose Medium lethal

Medium lethal dose by
by the oral route concentration by
the dermal route
Degree of (oral toxicity) inhalation route (four
SN (dermal toxicity) LD 50
Toxicity LD50* (mg/Kg hours) LC50* mg/L
(mg/Kg body weight of
body weight of test inhalation in test
test animals)
animals) animals)
1. Extremely toxic 1-50 1-200 0.1-0.5
2. Highly toxic 51-500 201-2000 0.5-2.0
* LD50/LC50: Lethal Dose / Lethal Concentration of a compound for 50 % of the population

exposed.
b. Flammable Chemicals
i. Flammable Gases: Chemicals which in the gaseous state at normal pressure & mixed with air
become flammable and the boiling point of which at normal pressure is 23oC or below,
ii. Highly Flammable Liquids: chemicals which have a flash point lower than 23°C and the boiling
point of which at normal pressure is above 20°C,
iii. Flammable Liquids: chemicals which have a flash point lower than 65oC and which remain liquids
under pressure, where particular processing conditions, such as high pressure and high
temperature, may create major accident hazards.
c. Explosives
Page 81 of 92
Chemicals which may explode under the effect of flame, heat or photo-chemical conditions or which are more
sensitive to shocks or friction than dinitrobenzene.
APPENDIX-II
MSDS OF Products Handled in the Location
Page 82 of 92
APPENDIX – III: APPROACH FOR FETI CALCULATION
Objectives:
The basic objectives that characterize FEI & TI are:

* Identification of Equipments in a process plant that would contribute to the initiation or escalation of an
accident involving fire, explosion or toxic gas release
* Classifications of Equipments based on their damage potential into Low Hazard, Moderate Hazard &
Severe Hazard category
FEI & TI Methodology:
In order to estimate FEI & TI, approach given in "Major Hazard Control" (An ILO Publication) has been
referred. Dow's Fire & Explosion Index (FEI) is a product of Material factor (MF) and hazard factor (HF)
while MF represents the flammability and reactivity of the substances, the hazard factor (HF), is itself a
product of General Process Hazards (GPH) and Special Process Hazards (SPH).
(A) Selection of Pertinent Storage or Process Unit
For the purpose of FEI & TI calculations, a Process Unit is defined as any unit or pipeline under
consideration for the purpose of estimating FEI & TI. Hence, all the process units, storage tanks and
units, handling hazardous chemicals etc., can be termed as process units. However, only pertinent
process units that could have an impact from the loss prevention standpoint need to be evaluated. The
selection of pertinent process / storage units is based on the following factors:
1. Energy potential of the chemical/chemicals in the unit for flammable & reactive hazards,
represented by Material Factor (MF)
2. Inventory/quantity of hazardous material in the process unit
3. Operating temperature and pressure
4. Past accident record
(B) Determination of Material Factor (MF)
MF is a measure of intrinsic rate of potential energy release from fire or explosion produced by
combustion or any other chemical reaction. Hazard potentials of a chemicals has been represented
by flowing three Indices:
Page 83 of 92
Index Indicates
Nh (for health) Toxic hazard potential
Nf (for flammability) Fire hazard potential
Nr (for reactivity) Explosion/Reactive hazard potential
Values of Nh, Nf& Nr ranges from 0 to 4, depending on their hazard potential. Significance of Nf, Nh& Nr
values has been defined in Appendix I, while MF is calculated based on Nf& Nr.
National Fire Protection Agency of the USA (NFPA) has specified standard values of Nh, Nf Nr & MF for
large number of chemicals in codes NFPA 49 and NFPA 325 M.
(C) Computation of General Process Hazard Factor (GPH)
Operations or processing conditions, which contribute to a significant enhancement of

potential for fire and explosion, have been identified. Accordingly numerical values of
penalties are to be allocated. Sum of these penalties would be GPH for the unit. The penalties
include :
1. Exothermic and endothermic reaction,

2. Handling and transfer of chemicals,
3. Enclosed or indoor process units &
4. Accessibility of equipment and facilities with respect to drainage or spill control
(D) Computation of Special Process Hazard Factor (SPH)
SPH includes the factors that are specific to the process unit, under
consideration:
1. Process temperature
2. Low pressure
3. Operation in or near flammable range
4. Operating pressure
5. Low temperature
6. Quantity of flammable or toxic material
7. Corrosion and erosion
8. Leakage, joints and packing
(E) Computations & Evaluation of Fire Explosion Index
It is calculated from
Page 84 of 92
FEI = MF x (1 + GPH) x (1 + SPH)
The degree of hazard potential is identified based on the numerical value of FEI as per
following criteria:
FEI Range Degree of Hazard

0 to 65 Light
65 to 93 Moderate
93 & above Severe
(F) Computations and Evaluation of Toxicity Index (TI)
It is calculated as:
Th + Ts
TI = ------- (1 + GPH + SPH)
100
Th = Toxicity Factor, calculated as
NFPA Health Index (Nh) 0 1 2 3 4

Toxicity Factor (Th) 0 50 125 250 325
Ts = A penalty depends on MAC
In addition, the toxicity factor has to be corrected for the MAC (Maximum Allowable
Concentration) value of the toxic substance by adding a penalty Ts. Ts values are assigned
according to the following criteria:
MAC-ppm <5 5-50 >50

Penalty Ts 125 75 50
(G) Classification of Hazard Categories
By comparing the indices FEI and TI, the unit in consideration is classified into one of the
following three categories based on their hazard potential.
Category FEI TI
Light < 65 <6
Moderate 65 to 93 6 to 10
Page 85 of 92
Severe > 93 > 10
NATIONAL FIRE PROTECTION AGENCY (NFPA, US) RATINGS:
Health:
Health hazard in firefighting is that of a single exposure which may vary from a few seconds upto an hour.
The physical exertion demanded in firefighting or other emergency conditions may be expected to intensify
the effects of any exposure. Only hazards arising out of an inherent property of the material are considered.
Nh Significance & Description
4 Materials too dangerous to health on exposure. A few whiffs of the vapor could cause death or the vapor
or liquid could be fatal on penetrating through fire fighters normal full protective clothing. The normal
full protective clothing and breathing apparatus available to the average fire department will not provide
adequate protection against inhalation or skin contact with these materials.
3 Materials extremely hazardous to health but areas may be entered with extreme care. Full protective
clothing including self-contained breathing apparatus, coat, pants, gloves, boots, and bands around legs,
arms and waist should be provided. No skin surface should be exposed.
2 Materials hazardous to health, but areas may be entered freely with full-faced mask self-contained
breathing apparatus which provides eye protection.
1 Materials only slightly hazardous to health. It may be desirable to wear self-contained breathing
apparatus.
0 Materials which on exposure under fire conditions would offer no hazard beyond that of ordinary
combustible material.
Flammability:
Susceptibility to burning is the basis for assigning degrees within this category. The method of attacking
the fire is influenced by this susceptibility factor.
Nf Significance & Description
4 Very flammable gases or very volatile flammable liquids. Shut off flow and keep cooling water streams
on exposed tanks or containers.
Page 86 of 92
3 Materials which can be ignited under almost all normal temperature conditions. Water may be
ineffective because of the low flash point.
2 Materials which must be moderately heated before ignition will occur. Water spray may be used to
extinguish the fire because the material can be cooled below its flash point.
1 Materials that must be preheated before ignition can occur. Water may cause frothing if it gets below
the surface of the liquid and turns to the surface will cause a frothing which will extinguish the fire.
0 Materials that will not burn
Reactivity (Stability):
The assignment of degrees in the reactivity category is based upon the susceptibility of materials to release
energy either by themselves or in combination with water. Fire exposure was or of the factors considered
along with conditions of shock and pressure.
Nr Significance & Description
4 Materials, which (themselves) are readily capable of detonation or of explosive decomposition or

explosive reaction at normal temperature & pressures. Includes materials, which are sensitive to
mechanical or localized thermal shock. If a chemical with this hazard rating is in an advanced or
massive fire, the area should be evacuated.
3 Materials, which (themselves) are capable of detonation or of explosive decomposition or of explosive

reaction but which require a strong initiating source or which must be heated under confinement before
initiation. Includes materials which are sensitive to thermal or mechanical shock at elevated
temperature & pressures or which react explosively with water without requiring heat or confinement.
Firefighting should be done from an explosion resistant location.
2 Materials, which (themselves) are normally unstable and readily undergo violent chemical change but
do not detonate. Includes materials which can undergo chemical change with rapid release of energy
at normal temperature pressures or which can undergo violent chemical change at elevated temperature
& pressures. Also includes those materials which may react violently with water or which may force
potentially explosive mixtures with water. In advanced or massive fires, firefighting should be done
from a safe distance or from a protected location.
1 Materials which (themselves) are normally stable but which may become unstable at elevated
temperature and pressures or which may react with water with some release of energy but not violently.
Precautions must be taken while approaching the fire & applying water.
0 Material which (themselves) are normally stable even under fire exposure conditions and which are not
reactive with water. Normal firefighting procedures may be used.
Page 87 of 92
APPENDIX –IV: FIRE WATER CALCULATIONS
There are Two Dykes constructed for enclosing POL product Storage Tanks. As per revised OISD 117
(Amended July 2012) & OISD-244, requirement of fire water storage to meet the OISD standard and to
fulfill the requirement during any emergency situation is examined and the calculations are made as under.
As per OISD Std 117, following case is applicable to Jalandhar DEPOT:
“Fire water Flow Requirement shall be considered for fighting one largest fire contingency for
location where total aggregated storage capacity in the Installation is less than 30, 000 KL”.
As per this, the calculations are done and presented below:

Note: Flow Rate of 3 LPM is considered for all tanks in Single Dyke irrespective of Distance from Tank
Under fire. Max. Foam Dam width is considered as 0.8 Mtr as per OISD 117
Dyke -1: Dyke 1 is enclosing 2nos. tank of MS having capacity of 2500 KL each . The Tanks are of
Internal FRVT storage type.
Dyke 2: Dyke 2 is enclosing HSD Tanks 2nos. (TK-3 & 4) having 5000 KL and 2 nos. ( Tk -5 & 6 ) . All
storage tanks are of CRVT storage type.
Table : 24 Fire water requirements for various facilities as per OISD-117:
[ Courtsey : MECON Assessment Report of M B Lall Recommendations]
Sr. Area Fire Water Requirement

No. m3/Hr
1. Tank farm 1 280.13
2. Tank farm 2 620.09
3. Product Pump House 64.26
Flow rate for supplementary streams
A) Total design fire water flow rate considering aggregate of 764.09
one largest fire considering point 1,2,3 and adding
144m3/h
B) Maximum water required for tank sinking scenario and 492.26
adding 144 m3/h
A) Single fire contingency
Largest of A & B 765 m3/hr considering single fire contingency
Page 88 of 92
Total fire water storage required for 4 Hrs Fire Fighting = 4X 765 m3 = 3280 m³ min.
Total fire water available = 3532 m3 [ Adequate ]
Thus the fire water storage available at DEPOT is sufficient in quantity as per OISD – 117 guidelines.
Page 89 of 92
APPENDIX V : ABBREVIATIONS
IS Indian Standard
EPA Environment Protection Act
MoEF Ministry of Environment & Forest
OS&H Occupational Safety & Health
PPE Personal Protective Equipment
MSIHC Manufacturing, Storage & Import of Hazardous Chemicals
FA Factories Act
SMPV Static Mobile & Pressure Vessel
LFB Laminar Flow Booth
OHC Occupational Health Center
SHE Safety Health & Environment
MSDS Material Safety Data Sheet
SOP Standard Operating Procedure
MOM Minutes of Meeting
IE Indian Electricity
GW Guide Word
P& IDs Piping and instrumentation diagram
Page 90 of 92
APPENDIX VI: REFERENCES
1. OISD -244 : 2015 : STORAHE & HANDLING OF PETROLEUM PRODUCTS AT DEPOTS

& TERMINALS
2. OISD -206 : 2001 :GUIDELINES ON SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM IN PETROLEUM

INDUSTRY
3. OISD -117 : 2012 : FIRE PROTECTION FACILITIES FOR PETROLEUM DEPOTS,
TERMINALS, PIPELINE INSTALLATIONS AND LUBE OIL

INSTALLATIONS
4. IS 14889: 2018 : OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH AND SAFETY AUDIT- CODE OF
PRACTICE
5. ASSESSMENT REPORT ON JALANDHAR DEPOT ON M B LALL RECOMENDATIONS BY

MECON LTD.
6. TNO,Guidelines for Quantitative Risk Analysis, “ The Purple Book “, 2009
7. https://en.climate-data.org/asia/india/punjab/jalandhar-4856/
8. https://weatherspark.com/y/108388/Average-Weather-in-Jalandhar-India-Year-Round#Figures-
WindDirection
Page 91 of 92
APPENDIX VII: LEGAL DISCLAIMER & LIABILITY
The consulting services conducted by M/s Pab Teqniko, Kolkata were performed using generally accepted
guidelines, standards, and/or practices, which the Company considers reliable. Although the Company
performed its consulting services pursuant to reliable and generally accepted practices in the industry,
the Company does not guarantee or provide any representations or warranties with respect to Client’s
use, interpretation or application of the findings, conclusions, and/or suggestions of the consulting
services provided by the Company. Moreover, the findings, conclusions, and the suggestions resulting
from the consulting service are based upon certain assumptions, information, documents, and procedures
provided by the Customer. AS SUCH, IN NO EVENT AND UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCE SHALL THE COMPANY
BE LIABLE FOR SPECIAL, INDIRECT, PUNITIVE OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMGES OF ANY NATURE
WHATSOEVER, INCLUDING WITHOUT LIMITATION, ANY LOST REVENUE OR PROFITS OF THE CUSTOMER
OR ITS CUSTOMERS, AGENTS AND DISTRIBUTORS, RESULTING FROM, ARISING OUT OF OR IN
CONNECTION WITH, THE SERVICES PROVIDED BY THE COMPANY. The Customer agrees that the Company
shall have no liability for damages, which may result from Client’s use, interpretation or application of the
consulting services provided by the company.
Page 92 of 92

Qra HPCL Jalandhar Ird-Draft r1

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QUANTITATIVE RISK ANALYSIS STUDY

FOR HPCL, Jalandhar POL IRD, Jalandhar(Punjab.)

HINDUSTAN PETROLEUM CORPORATION

Jalandhar Depot, Jalandhar (Punjab)

32/3T, Gariahat Road, Ground Floor, Kolkata-700031.

Date:19 th May, 2022

Figure1: Layout plan of HPCL’s Jalandhar DEPOT ....................................................................................................... 21

APPENDIX– I: MANUFACTURE, STORAGE & IMPORT OF HAZARDOUS CHEMICAL'S

APPENDIX – III : APPROACH FOR FETI CALCULATION 79-82

APPENDIX – IV : FIRE WATER CALCULATIONS ................................................................. 83-84

1.1 SITE INFORMATION

Table 1: Existing Product Storage Tankage at HPCL’s Jalandhar DEPOT

Size of Tank Storage

1.2 OBJECTIVES AND SCOPE OF QUANTITATIVE RISK ANALYSIS

Objectives of Quantitative Risk Assessment

a) Identifying risks and approaches to their solutions for mitigations measures.

✓ Systematic identification of potential hazards

✓ Post-accident investigation and prevention

HAZARDS & RISKS- Analysis- FLOW DIAGRAM

• Hazard inherent in an activity that is otherwise deemed to be beneficial

QRA/ RISK ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY

(A) Hazard Identification:

(B) Listing and analysis of MCA Scenarios:

4. Characterization of risk/Hazard levels through study of nature of exposure, pathway and

(C) Recommendations based on:

1. Observations on the operational practices & Installation hardware

1.3 MAJOR FACILITIES AT HPCL JALANDHAR DEPOT

1.3.1 OPERATION RELATED FACILITIES AT DEPOT AND IT’S LAYOUT DRAWING.

Layout plan detailing all facilities of Jalandhar Depot is shown as Figure 1.

Area occupied by all major/important facilities is tabulated as under:

Table 2: Area Occupied By the Important/Vulnerable Structures

1 GATE CABIN 4X3 12

2 OFFICE BUILDING 18.75 X11.0 206.25

3 WORKERS CHANGE ROOM 8X6 48

4 CONTROL ROOM 7.5 X 8.5 63.75

4A EXTN. OF CONTROL ROOM 3.5X 8.5 297.5

5 TRAINING HALL 12 X 7.50 90

7 LUBE WAREHOUSE-1 9 x 26.6

8 LUBE DRUM YARD 31.2 X 42.5 1326

9 FIRE PUMP HOUSE 12 X 8 96

10 TLF PUMP HOUSE – 1 21 X 5 105

11 T/T GANTRY 8 BAY 41 X 13 533

12 DG CONTROL ROOM – 15 X 8 120

13 CALIBRATION SHED 8X8 64

14 TTD PUMP HOUSE 18 X 5 90

15 PLANT TOILET 5X3 15

17 TRANSFORMER YARD 10 X 10 100

18 CHECKING PLATFORM 1.5 X 1.5 2.25

19 FLOOD LIGHT TOWER 30 M High

20 FOAM SYSTEM 3X3 9

21 DG PLATFORM 4.6 X 2.8 12.88

23 FOAM SHED 9X7 63

25 METER ROOM/ MCC ROOM 8 X4 32

26 NEW SECURITY CABIN 3.5 X 8.5 297.5

26 ADDITIVE PUMP HOUSE 9X7 63

Table3: Approximate Inter-Unit Distances of Important/Vulnerable Structures of HPCL’s Jalandhar

1.3.2 DYKE VOLUME CAPACITY

[ Courtsey : MECON M B Lall Recommendations Report ]

Considering 200 mm Free Float

1.3.3 DETAILS PRODUCT TRANSFER ( PLT) PUMPS

Table 4: Schedule of Product Pumps

SN CAPACITY LPM NOS. PRODUCT REMARK