**RULE 117 The mauling incident involving neighbors that transpired on January 18,
2003 outside the house of the petitioners in St. Francis Subdivision,
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 166414               October 22, 2014
GODOFREDO ENRILE AND DR. FREDERICK ENRILE, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. DANILO A. MANALASTAS (AS PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT OF MALOLOS BULACAN, BR. VII), HON. ERANIO G. CEDILLO, SR., (AS
PRESIDING JUDGE, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT OF MEYCAUAYAN, BULACAN,
BR.1) AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
The remedy against the denial of a motion to quash is for the movant
accused to enter a plea, go to trial, and should the decision be adverse,
reiterate on appeal from the final judgment and assign as error the denial
of the motion to quash. The denial, being an interlocutory order, is not
appealable, and may not be the subject of a petition for certiorari because
of the availability of other remedies in the ordinary course of law.
Antecedents
Petitioners Godofredo Enrile and Dr. Frederick Enrile come to the Court on
appeal, seeking to reverse and undo the adverse resolutions promulgated
on August 31, 20041 and December 21, 2004,2 whereby the Court of
Appeals (CA) respectively dismissed their petition for certiorari and
prohibition (assailing the dismissal of their petition for certiorariby the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 7, in Malolos, Bulacan, presided by RTC
Judge Danilo A. Manalastas, to assail the denial of their motions to quash
the two informations charging themwith less serious physical injuries by
the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Meycauayan, Bulacan), and denied their
motion for reconsideration anent such dismissal.
Barangay Pandayan, Meycauayan Bulacan gave rise to the issue subject of
this appeal. Claiming themselves to be the victims in that mauling, Josefina
Guinto Morano,3 Rommel Morano and Perla Beltran Morano charged the
petitioners and one Alfredo Enrile4 in the MTC with frustrated homicide
(victim being Rommel) in Criminal Case No. 03-275; with less serious
physical injuries (victim being Josefina) in Criminal Case No. 03-276; and
with less serious physical injuries (victim being Perla) in Criminal Case No.
03-277, all of the MTC of Meycauayan, Bulacan on August 8, 2003 after the
parties submitted their respective affidavits, the MTC issued its joint
resolution,5 whereby it found probable cause against the petitioners for
less serious physical injuries in Criminal Case No. 03-276 and Criminal Case
No. 03-277, and set their arraignment on September 8, 2003. On August
19, 2003, the petitioners moved for the reconsideration of the joint
resolution, arguing that the complainants had not presented proof of their
having been given medical attention lasting 10 days or longer, thereby
rendering their charges of less serious physical injuries dismissible; and
that the two cases for less serious physical injuries, being necessarily
related to the case of frustrated homicide still pending in the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor, should not be governed by the Rules on Summary
Procedure.6 On November 11, 2003, the MTC denied the petitioners’
motion for reconsideration because the grounds of the motion had already
been discussed and passed upon in the resolution sought to be
reconsidered; and because the cases were governed by the Rules on
Summary Procedure, which prohibited the motion for
reconsideration.7 Thereafter, the petitioners presented a manifestation
with motion to quash and a motion for the deferment of the arraignment. 8
On February 11, 2004, the MTC denied the motion to quash, and ruled that
the cases for less serious physical injuries were covered by the rules on
ordinary procedure; and reiterated the arraignment previously scheduled
on March 15, 2004.9 It explained its denial of the motion to quash in the
following terms, to wit:
xxxx
As to the Motion to Quash, this Court cannot give due course to said
motion. A perusal of the records shows that the grounds and/or issues
raised therein are matters of defense that can be fully ventilated in a full
blown trial on the merits.
Accordingly, Criminal Cases Nos. 03-276 and 03-277 both for Less Serious
Physical Injuries are hereby ordered tried under the ordinary procedure.
The Motion to Quash is hereby DENIED for reasons aforestated.
Meanwhile, set these cases for arraignment on March 15, 2004 as
previously scheduled.
SO ORDERED.10
Still, the petitioners sought reconsideration of the denial of the motion to
quash, but the MTC denied their motion on March 25, 2004. 11
Unsatisfied, the petitioners commenced a special civil action for certiorari
assailing the order dated February 11, 2004 denying their motion to quash,
and the order dated March 25, 2004 denying their motion for
reconsideration. The special civil action for certiorari was assigned to
Branch 7, presided by RTC Judge Manalastas.
On May 25, 2004, the RTC Judge Manalastas dismissed the petition for
certiorari because:
As could be gleaned from the order of the public respondent dated
February 11, 2004, the issuesraised in the motion toquash are matters of
defense that could only be threshed outin a full blown trial on the merits.
Indeed, proof of the actual healing period of the alleged injuries of the
private complainants could only be established in the trial of the cases filed
against herein petitioners by means of competent evidence x x x. On the
other hand, this court is likewise not in a position, not being a trier of fact
insofar as the instant petition is concerned, to rule on the issue as to
whether or not there was probable cause to prosecute the petitioners for
the alleged less physical injuries with which they stand charged. x x x.
All things considered, it would be premature to dismiss, the subject
criminal cases filed against the herein petitioners when the basis thereof
could be determined only after trial on the merits. x x x. 12
The petitioners moved for the reconsideration, but the RTC denied their
motion on July 9, 2004.13
The petitioners next went to the CA via a petition for certiorari and
prohibition to nullify the orders issued by the RTC on May 25, 2004 and
July 9, 2004, averring grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction on the part of the RTC. They urged the dismissal of the
criminal cases on the same grounds they advanced in the RTC.
However, on August 31, 2004, the CA promulgated its assailed resolution
dismissing the petition for certiorari and prohibition for being the wrong
remedy, the proper remedy being an appeal; and ruling that they should
have filed their notice of appealon or before August 18, 2004 due to their
receiving the order of July 9, 2004 on August 3, 2004. 14
On December 21, 2004, the CA denied the petitioners’ motion for
reconsideration.15
Issues
In this appeal, the petitioners submit that:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE TRIAL
COURTS’ RULING DENYING THE PETITIONERS' MOTION TO QUASH THE
COMPLAINTS DESPITE THE CLEAR AND PATENT SHOWING THAT BOTH
COMPLAINTS, ON THEIR FACE, LACKED ONE OF THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS
OF THE ALLEGED CRIME OF LESS SERIOUS PHYSICAL INJURIES.
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE
INJURIES SUSTAINED BY THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANTS WERE NOT
PERPETRATED BY THE PETITIONERS.16
Ruling of the Court
The CA did not commit any reversible errors.
Firstly, considering that the certiorari case in the RTC was an original
action, the dismissal of the petition for certiorarion May 25, 2004, and the
denial of the motion for reconsideration onJuly 9, 2004, were in the
exercise of its original jurisdiction. As such, the orders were final by reason
of their completely disposing of the case, leaving nothing more to be done
by the RTC.17 The proper recourse for the petitioners should be an appeal
by notice of appeal,18 taken within 15 days from notice of the denial of the
motion for reconsideration.19
Yet, the petitioners chose to assail the dismissal by the RTC through
petitions for certiorari and prohibition in the CA, instead of appealing by
notice of appeal. Such choice was patently erroneous and impermissible,
because certiorari and prohibition, being extra ordinary reliefs to address
jurisdictional errors of a lower court, were not available to them. Worthy
to stress is that the RTC dismissed the petition for certiorari upon its
finding that the MTC did not gravely abuse its discretion in denying the
petitioners’ motion to quash. In its view, the RTC considered the denial of
the motion to quash correct, for it would be premature and unfounded for
the MTC to dismiss the criminal cases against the petitioners upon the
supposed failure by the complainants to prove the period of their
incapacity or of the medical attendance for them. Indeed, the timeand the
occasion to establish the duration of the incapacity or medical attendance
would only be at the trial on the merits.
Secondly, the motion to quash is the mode by which an accused, before
entering his plea, challenges the complaint or information for insufficiency
on its facein point of law, or for defects apparent on its face. 20 Section 3,
Rule 117 of the Rules of Court enumerates the grounds for the quashal of
the complaint or information, as follows: (a) the facts charged do not
constitute an offense; (b) the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over
the offense charged; (c) the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over
the person of the accused; (d) the officer who filed the information had no
authority to do so; (e) the complaint or information does not conform
substantially to the prescribed form; (f) more than one offense is charged
except when a single punishment for various offenses is prescribed by law;
(g) the criminal action or liability has been extinguished; (h) the complaint
or information contains averments which, if true, would constitute a legal
excuse or justification; and (i) the accused has been previously convicted or
acquitted of the offense charged, or the case against him was dismissed or
otherwise terminated without his express consent.
According to Section 6,21 Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, the complaint or
information is sufficient if it states the names of the accused; the
designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions
complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party;
the approximate date of the commission of the offense; and the place
where the offense was committed. The fundamental test in determining
the sufficiency of the averments in a complaint or information is,
therefore, whether the facts alleged therein, if hypothetically admitted,
constitute the elements of the offense.22
By alleging in their motion to quashthat both complaints should be
dismissed for lack of one of the essential elements of less serious physical
injuries, the petitioners were averring that the facts charged did not
constitute offenses. To meet the test of sufficiency, therefore, it is
necessary to refer to the law definingthe offense charged, which,in this
case, is Article 265 of the Revised Penal Code, which pertinently states:
Article 265. Less serious physical injuries– Any person who shall inflict upon
another physical injuries x x x which shall incapacitate the offended party
for labor for ten days or more, or shall require medical assistance for the
same period, shall be guilty of less serious physical injuries and shall suffer
the penalty of arresto mayor.
x x x x.
Based on the law, the elements of the crime of less serious physical injuries
are, namely: (1) that the offender inflicted physical injuries upon another;
and (2) that the physical injuries inflicted either incapacitated the victim
for labor for 10 days or more, or the injuries required medical assistance
for more than 10 days.
Were the elements of the crime sufficiently averred in the complaints? To
answer this query, the Court refersto the averments of the complaints
themselves, to wit:
Criminal Case No. 03-276
That on the 18th day of January 2003, at around 7:30 in the evening more
or less, in Brgy. Pandayan (St. Francis Subd.), Municipality of Meycauayan,
Province of Bulacan, Republic of the Philippines and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above named accused motivated by anger by
conspiring, confederating and mutually helping with another did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and strike the face
of one JOSEFINA GUINTO MORAÑO, thereby inflicting upon his (sic)
physical injuries that will require a period of 10 to 12 days barring healing
and will incapacitate his customary labor for the same period of time
attached Medical Certificate (sic).
CONTRARY TO LAW.23
Criminal Case No. 03-277
That on the 18th day of January 2003, at around 7:30 in the evening more
or less, in Brgy. Pandayan (St. Francis Subd.), Municipality of Meycauayan,
Province of Bulacan, Republic of the Philippines and within the jurisdiction
of the Honorable Court, the above named accused MOTIVATED by anger
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and
right and give hitting her head against pavement of one PERLA BELTRAN
MORAÑO inflicting the latter physical injuries and will require Medical
Attendance for a period of 12 to 15 days barring unforeseen complication
as per Medical Certificate hereto attached.
CONTRARY TO LAW.24
The aforequoted complaints bear out that the elements of less serious
physical injuries were specifically averred therein. The complaint in
Criminal Case No. 03-276 stated that: (a) the petitioners "wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and strike the face of one
JOSEFINA GUINTO MORAÑO;" and (b) the petitioners inflicted physical
injuries upon the complainant "that will require a period of 10 to 12 days
barring healing and will incapacitate his customary labor for the same
period of time;" while that in CriminalCase No. 03-277 alleged that: (a) the
petitioners "wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and right
and give hitting her head against pavement of one PERLA BELTRAN
MORAÑO;" and (b) the petitioners inflicted upon the complainant "physical
injuries [that] will require Medical Attendance for a period of 12 to 15 days
barring unforeseen complication."
In the context of Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, 25 the complaints
sufficiently charged the petitioners with less serious physical injuries.
Indeed, the complaints onlyneeded to aver the ultimate facts constituting
the offense, not the details of why and how the illegal acts allegedly
amounted to undue injury or damage, for such matters, being evidentiary,
were appropriate for the trial. Hence, the complaints were not quashable.
In challenging the sufficiency of the complaints, the petitioners insist that
the "complaints do not provide any evidence/s that would tend to
establish and to show that the medical attendance rendered on private
complainants actually and in fact lasted for a period exceeding ten (10)
days;" and the medical certificates attached merely stated that "the
probable disability period of healing is 10 to 12 days, for Josefina G.
Morano, and, 12-15 days, for Perla B. Morano, hence, the findings of the
healing periods were merely speculations, surmises and conjectures ."They
insist that the "private complainants should have presented medical
certificates that would show the number of days rendered for medication
considering that they filed their complaint on March 15, 2003 or about two
(2) months after the alleged incident." 26
The petitioners’ insistence is utterly bereft of merit.1âwphi1
As the MTC and RTC rightly held, the presentation of the medical
certificates to prove the duration of the victims’ need for medical
attendance or of their incapacity should take place only at the trial, not
before or during the preliminary investigation. According to Cinco v.
Sandiganbayan,27 the preliminary investigation, which is the occasion for
the submission of the parties’ respective affidavits, counter-affidavits and
evidence to buttress their separate allegations, is merely inquisitorial, and
is often the only means of discovering whether a person may be
reasonably charged with a crime, to enable the prosecutor to prepare the
information.28 It is not yet a trial on the merits, for its only purpose is to
determine whether a crime has been committed and whether there is
probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty thereof. 29 The scope of
the investigation does not approximate that of a trial before the court;
hence, what is required is only that the evidence be sufficient to establish
probable causethat the accused committed the crime charged, not that all
reasonable doubtof the guilt of the accused be removed. 30
We further agree with the RTC’s observation that "the issues raised in the
motion to quash are matters of defense that could only be threshed out in
a full blown trial on the merits. Indeed, proof of actual healing period of
the alleged injuries of the private complainant could only be established in
the trial of the cases filed against herein petitioners by means of
competent evidence, and to grant the main prayer of the instant petition
for the dismissal of the criminal cases against them for less serious physical
injuries is to prevent the trial court to hear and receive evidence in
connection with said cases and to render judgments thereon. x x x All
things considered, it would be premature to dismiss the subject criminal
cases filed against the herein petitioners when the basis thereof could be
determined only after trial of the merits." 31
And, lastly, in opting to still assail the denial of the motion to quash by the
MTC by bringing the special civil action for certiorariin the RTC, the
petitioners deliberately disregarded the fundamental conditions for
initiating the special civil action for certiorari. These conditions were,
firstly, the petitioners must show thatthe respondent trial court lacked
jurisdiction or exceeded it, or gravely abused its discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction; and,secondly, because the denial was
interlocutory, they must show that there was no plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.32
The petitioners’ disregard of the fundamental conditions precluded the
success of their recourse. To start with, the petitioners did not show that
the MTC had no jurisdiction, or exceeded its jurisdiction in denying the
motion to quash, or gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in its denial. That showing was the door that would
have opened the way to their success with the recourse. Yet, the door
remained unopened to them because the denial by the MTC of the motion
to quash was procedurally and substantively correct because the duration
of the physical incapacity or medical attendance should be dealt with only
during the trial on the merits, not at the early stage of dealing with and
resolving the motion to quash. As to the second condition, the fact that the
denial was interlocutory, not a final order, signified that the MTC did not
yet completely terminate its proceedings in the criminal cases. The proper
recourse of the petitioners was to enter their pleas as the accused, go to
trial in the MTC, and should the decision of the MTC be adverse to them in
the end, reiterate the issue on their appeal from the judgment and assign
as error the unwarranted denial of their motion to quash. 33 Certiorari was
not available to them in the RTC because they had an appeal, or another
plain, speedy or adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition for review on certiorari;
AFFIRMS the resolutions promulgated on August 31, 2004 and December
21, 2004; and ORDERS the petitioners to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
 FIRST DIVISION
G.R. Nos. 143618-41               July 30, 2002
BENJAMIN "Kokoy" ROMUALDEZ, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN (First Division) and THE PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES represented by SPECIAL PROSECUTION OFFICER II
EVELYN TAGOBA LUCERO, respondents.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Previous to this case, petitioner instituted a petition docketed as G.R. No.
105248, entitled, "Benjamin (Kokoy) Romualdez, Petitioner, versus
Sandiganbayan (First Division) and Presidential Commission on Good
Government (PCGG), Respondents."1 He assailed therein, among others,
the validity of twenty-four informations which the PCGG filed against him
for violation of Section 7 of Republic Act No. 3019, more specifically for
failure to file his statements of assets and liabilities covering the years
1962 to 1985 when he was in the government service. The cases were filed
with the Sandiganbayan as Criminal Cases Nos. 13406-13429. He argued
that PCGG Commissioner Augusto E. Villarin, who conducted the
preliminary investigation, had no authority to do so.
On May 16, 1995, a Decision was rendered in said case declaring the
preliminary investigation conducted by the PCGG invalid, based on the
following findings:
Now, the crimes ascribed to Romualdez (failure to file his annual
statements of assets and liabilities) do not "relate to alleged ill-gotten
wealth" amassed by him. No such relation may be perceived in the
indictments themselves, which in fact merely state that there was no
justifiable cause for Romualdez’s refusal or failure to file his annual
statements. Moreover, the Sandiganbayan itself made the finding that the
cases against Romualdez did not refer to acquisition of wealth under a
crony status, but "solely ** (to) his bare physical non-compliance with his
mechanical duty to file his statement of assets and liabilities over a period
of twenty-four (24) years **;" and that the omissions have no bearing on
Civil Case No. 0035 against Romualdez involving transactions in which he
"allegedly took advantage of his relationship with the spouses Ferdinand
and Imelda Marcos." These considerations also call for rejection of the
Solicitor General’s theory that Romualdez’s "non-filing of statements of
assets and liabilities ** (was) a means of concealing  ** (his) assets and
frustrating the efforts of the Government to determine the actual value or
extent of ** (his) wealth."
The Court therefore declares invalid the preliminary investigation
conducted by the PCGG over the 24 offenses ascribed to Romualdez (of
failure to file annual statements of assets and liabilities), for lack of
jurisdiction of said offenses.2
While the preliminary investigation was invalid, we ruled that the invalidity
of the preliminary investigation did not impair the validity of the
informations much less did it affect the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
Hence, we held that the Sandiganbayan did not commit grave abuse of
discretion in refusing to quash the warrants of arrest against petitioner.
However, the Sandiganbayan was directed to suspend the proceedings in
Criminal Cases Nos. 13406-13429, and to require the Office of the
Ombudsman to conduct a proper preliminary investigation of the charges
against petitioner.
In compliance with the said decision, the Sandiganbayan, on November 13,
1995, issued a resolution giving petitioner fifteen days from receipt thereof
within which to submit his counter-affidavit and controverting evidence,
furnishing copies thereof to the PCGG. The Sandiganbayan also gave the
PCGG the same period to file a reply affidavit or pleading if it so desired.
Thereafter, the Office of the Special Prosecutor was directed to conduct
the reinvestigation.3
At that time, however, petitioner was still in exile abroad. Naturally, he
failed to submit the required counter-affidavits. He returned to the
Philippines only on April 27, 2000, after which he voluntarily surrendered
to the Sandiganbayan and posted the required bail bond.
On May 8, 2000, the Sandiganbayan gave Special Prosecutor Evelyn T.
Lucero ten days within which to submit the result of any reinvestigation
she may have undertaken.4 Prosecutor Lucero informed the Sandiganbayan
that she has set a clarificatory hearing on June 2, 2000, and moved for a
thirty-day extension to submit the results of the reinvestigation. 5
Prosecutor Lucero sent notice of the clarificatory hearing to Atty. Jesus
Borromeo, on behalf of petitioner. The latter immediately went to
Prosecutor Lucero’s office to inform her that he was not the counsel for
petitioner in these particular cases, although he represented petitioner in
other cases pending before different divisions of the Sandiganbayan. The
scheduled hearing on June 2, 2000 was cancelled for non-appearance of
petitioner and counsel.
In the meantime, petitioner, through Atty. Otilia Dimayuga-Molo, filed with
the Sandiganbayan on June 2, 2000 a Motion to Quash the informations in
Criminal Cases Nos. 13406-13429.6 He argued therein that the PCGG
Commissioner who filed the informations had no authority to do so.
On June 6, 2000, petitioner received at his address in Tacloban City a
notice from Prosecutor Taguba of the clarificatory hearing scheduled on
June 9, 2000.7
The Motion to Quash was heard by the Sandiganbayan on June 8, 2000,
one day before the clarificatory hearing. Without granting the prosecution
time to oppose the motion, the Presiding Justice, in open court, denied the
Motion to Quash and terminated the preliminary investigation being
conducted by Prosecutor Lucero. Furthermore, the Presiding Justice set the
arraignment of petitioner on June 26, 2000.
On June 23, 2000, petitioner was able to obtain a written copy of the order
dated June 8, 2000 denying his Motion to Quash and setting his
arraignment on June 26, 2000.8 Petitioner likewise received another order
dated June 8, 2000, denying his oral motion for reconsideration. 9
The arraignment scheduled on June 26, 2000 was reset to July 28, 2000. 10
On July 7, 2000, petitioner filed the instant petition, seeking to annul the
assailed orders dated June 8, 2000 and to prohibit the Sandiganbayan from
implementing the same. Petitioner further prayed for the issuance of a writ
of preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order, enjoining his
arraignment on July 28, 2000.
In a resolution dated July 17, 2000, respondents were required to
comment and the parties were directed to maintain the status quo
ante prevailing at the time of filing of the petition.11
The petition is anchored on the following grounds:
I. RESPONDENT COURT ACTED WITHOUT JURISDICTION AND/OR
WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF
JURISDICTION IN DENYING PETITIONER’S MOTION TO QUASH THE
INFORMATION FILED IN CRIMINAL CASES NOS. 13406-13429
NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT THE PCGG COMMISSIONER
WHO FILED SAID INFORMATIONS HAD NO AUTHORITY TO DO SO;
II. THE RESPONDENT COURT ACTED WITHOUT JURISDICTION
AND/OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO
LACK OF JURISDICTION IN NOT COMPLYING WITH THE DIRECTIVE
OF THE SUPREME COURT IN THE ROMUALDEZ CASE THAT IT
SHOULD ORDER THE OMBUDSMAN TO CONDUCT A PROPER
PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION;
III. THE PETITION WAS DENIED DUE PROCESS THAT SHOULD
COME FROM AN IMPARTIAL AND COLDLY NEUTRAL JUDGE.
RESPONDENT PREJUDGED THE ISSUES WHEN IT DICTATED IN
OPEN COURT THE LENGTHY ORDER OF JUNE 8, 2000, DENYING
OUTRIGHT THE MOTION TO QUASH AND ISSUING ANOTHER
ORDER ON THE SAME DATE DENYING AN ALLEGED ORAL MOTION
FOR RECONSIDERATION.12
Respondents counter that the first issue raised by petitioner has already
been resolved in G.R. No. 105248, thus:
The invalidity or absence of a preliminary investigation does not however
affect the jurisdiction of the Trial Court which may have taken cognizance
of the information. The controlling principles are set out by a well known
authority now sitting in the Court, in his work entitled "Remedial Law
Compendium," as follows:
"**. Any objection to lack of preliminary investigation must be made
before entry of the plea (People vs. Monteverde, G.R. No. 60962, July 11,
1986)  and the court, instead of dismissing the information, must remand
the case for preliminary investigation (People vs. Casiano, L-15309, Feb. 16,
1961; People vs. Figueroa, L-24273, April 30, 1960; Zacarias vs. Cruz, L-
25899, Nov. 29, 1969; People vs. Abejuela, L-29715, Mar. 31, 1971;
Sanciangco, et al. vs. People, G.R. No. 12830, Mar. 24, 1987).  The refusal of
the court to remand the case for preliminary investigation can be
controlled by certiorari and prohibition to prevent trial (Bandiala vs. CFI, L-
24652, Sept. 30, 1970).**."
As regards proceedings in the Sandiganbayan, particularly, another author
observes that:
"Since absence of preliminary investigation is not a ground to quash the
complaint or information (Sec. 3, Rule 117, Rules of Court), proceedings
upon such information in the Sandiganbayan should be held in abeyance
and the case remanded to the Ombudsman, for him or the Special
Prosecutor to conduct a preliminary investigation (Luciano vs. Mariano, 40
SCRA 187, 201; Ilagan vs. Enrile, 139 SCRA 349; Sanciangco, Jr. vs. People,
149 SCRA 1, 3-4).
The principle was applied despite the fact that trial on the merits had
begun and the prosecution had already presented four witnesses. The trial
was ordered suspended pending the preliminary investigation (Go vs.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 101837, February 11, 1992)."
Considering that the invalidity of the preliminary investigation "did not
impair the validity of the informations or otherwise render it defective,
** (m)uch less did it affect the jurisdiction of the Court **," the only effect,
to repeat, being the imposition on the latter of the obligation to suspend
the proceedings and require the holding of a proper preliminary
investigation," it follows that all acts done by the Court prior thereto must
be accorded validity and effect, subject to the outcome of the preliminary
investigation yet to be conducted. The dispositions thus made by
respondent Sandiganbayan, i.e., its refusal to recall and quash the warrants
of arrest or to modify the conditions laid down by it for petitioner's cash
bond; and its confiscation of the cash deposit of petitioner for violation by
the latter of the conditions thereof, cannot be regarded as having been
made without or in excess of jurisdiction, or so whimsical, capricious or
oppressive or so utterly without foundation as to amount to grave abuse of
discretion.13
The above-quoted ruling is based on our earlier decisions in the cited cases
of Luciano v. Mariano,14 Ilagan v. Enrile,15 Sanciangco, Jr. v. People16 and Go
v. Court of Appeals.17 In these cases, what was assailed was the lack of
proper preliminary investigation before the filing of the informations. The
informations therein were filed by the proper officer albeit without
conducting the requisite preliminary investigation. The case at bar, on the
other hand, differs in that the officer who filed the informations against
petitioner, PCGG Commissioner Villarin, was not authorized to do so.
This defect invoked by petitioner is one of the grounds for filing a motion
to quash, to wit:
Grounds. --- The accused may move to quash the complaint or information
on any of the following grounds:
x x x           x x x          x x x.
(d) That the officer who filed the information had no authority to do so;
x x x           x x x          x x x18
What was assailed in G.R. No. 105248 was the Sandiganbayan’s refusal to
quash the warrants and modify the conditions of the bail bond, as well as
its confiscation of the cash deposit. While we ruled therein that the PCGG
Commissioner had no authority to conduct the preliminary investigation,
we did not squarely rule on his lack of authority to file the informations.
The issue before the Court was the invalidity of the preliminary
investigation and its consequences.
The Solicitor General, on behalf of the Sandiganbayan, argues that a
petition for certiorari is not the proper remedy against the denial of a
motion to quash. He cites the cases of Quiñon v. Sandiganbayan19 and Raro
v. Sandiganbayan.20 That, however, is the general rule, from which there
are known exceptions. In both cases, we qualified the rule by stating that
"[i]t is only where there are special circumstances clearly demonstrating
the inadequacy of an appeal that the special civil action of certiorari and
prohibition may exceptionally be allowed."21
There are such special circumstances in the case at bar. Indeed, it would be
a gross infringement of petitioner’s right to due process, not to mention an
utter waste of time and judicial resources, if trial is allowed to proceed only
to be nullified by the higher courts later on upon the ground that the
charges were filed by a person who had no authority to file the same.
An information is defined as an accusation in writing charging a person
with an offense, subscribed by the prosecutor and filed with the court.22
As can be clearly gleaned, it is the prosecutor, not the PCGG, who
subscribes and files the information. In cases before the Sandiganbayan,
the prosecutor is the Ombudsman. As we have held, the crimes charged
against petitioner do not relate to alleged ill-gotten wealth, over which the
PCGG had no jurisdiction.
All trial courts, the Sandiganbayan included, are reminded that they should
take all the necessary measures guaranteeing procedural due process from
the inception of custodial investigation up to rendition of judgment. 23 They
are not to turn a blind eye to procedural irregularities which transpired
before the criminal case reached the court. The validity and sufficiency of
the information are important.24
In the case at bar, the flaw in the information is not a mere remediable
defect of form, as in Pecho v. Sandiganbayan25 where the wording of the
certification in the information was found inadequate, or in People v.
Marquez,26 where the required certification was absent. Here, the
informations were filed by an unauthorized party. The defect cannot be
cured even by conducting another preliminary investigation. An invalid
information is no information at all and cannot be the basis for criminal
proceedings.
In fact, where an information does not conform substantially to the
prescribed form, it is subject to quashal. More particularly, the information
may be quashed where the officer who filed it had no authority to do so. 27
At all stages of the proceedings leading to his trial and conviction, the
accused must be charged and tried according to the procedure prescribed
by law and marked by observance of the rights given to him by the
Constitution. In the same way that the reading of the information to the
accused during arraignment is not a useless formality, 28 so is the validity of
the information being read not an idle ceremony.
Criminal due process requires that the accused must be proceeded against
under the orderly processes of law. 29 In all criminal cases, the judge should
follow the step-by-step procedure required by the Rules. The reason for
this is to assure that the State makes no mistake in taking the life or liberty
except that of the guilty.30
The case of Cruz, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan31 is directly in point:
Consequently, the amended information that was filed against petitioner
did not fall under the category of criminal actions for recovery of ill-gotten
wealth filed against a member of the family of President Marcos, relatives,
subordinates or close associates who took advantage of their office or
authority as contemplated under Section 2(a) of Executive Order No. 1.
What the petitioner is actually charged with is for a violation of Republic
Act No. 3019. Public respondent PCGG does not pretend that the President
assigned to it this particular case against the petitioner for investigation
and prosecution in accordance with Section 2(b) of Executive Order No. 1.
Moreover, an examination of the complaint filed with respondent PCGG, as
well as the affidavits, counter-affidavits and exhibits submitted at the
preliminary investigation show that there is no evidence at all that this
alleged violation is crony-related, committed by petitioner by taking
advantage of his public office, and was committed in relation with the ill-
gotten wealth being sought to be recovered as aforestated. There is,
therefore, no evidence in the hands of the respondent PCGG to justify the
amendment of the information.
Indeed, the said amendment appears to be an afterthought to make it fall
under the type of offenses respondent PCGG may investigate and
prosecute under the law. It is a fundamental principle that when on its
face the information is null and void for lack of authority to file the same,
it cannot be cured nor resurrected by an amendment. Another
preliminary investigation must be undertaken and thereafter, based on
evidence adduced, a new information should be filed.
Consequently all the actions respondent PCGG had taken in this case
including the filing of the information and amended information with the
respondent court should be struck down.32
Recently, we ruled that the infirmity in the information caused by lack of
authority of the officer signing it cannot be cured by silence, acquiescence
or even by express consent. A new information must be filed by the proper
officer. Thus:
xxx xxx xxx. It is a valid information signed by a competent officer, among
other requisites, which confers jurisdiction on the court over the person of
the accused (herein petitioner) and the subject matter of the accusation. In
consonance with this view, an infirmity in the information, such as lack of
authority of the officer signing it, cannot be cured by silence, acquiescence,
or even by express consent.
In fine, there must have been a valid and sufficient complaint or
information in the former prosecution. If, therefore, the complaint or
information was insufficient because it was so defective in form or
substance that the conviction upon it could not have been sustained, its
dismissal without the consent of the accused cannot be pleaded. As the
fiscal had no authority to file the information, the dismissal of the first
information would not be a bar in petitioner’s subsequent prosecution.
Jeopardy does not attach where a defendant pleads guilty to a defective
indictment that is voluntarily dismissed by the prosecution. 33
The Sandiganbayan also committed grave abuse of discretion when it
abruptly terminated the reinvestigation being conducted by Prosecutor
Lucero. It should be recalled that our directive in G.R. No. 105248 for the
holding of a preliminary investigation was based on our ruling that the
right to a preliminary investigation is a substantive, rather than a
procedural right. Petitioner’s right was violated when the preliminary
investigation of the charges against him were conducted by an officer
without jurisdiction over the said cases. It bears stressing that our directive
should be strictly complied with in order to achieve its objective of
affording petitioner his right to due process.
The Sandiganbayan contends that petitioner waived his right to a proper
preliminary investigation. This is untenable.1âwphi1 The records show that
petitioner was unable to attend the clarificatory hearings on June 2 and 5,
2000 simply due to lack of notice. Prosecutor Lucero herself admits that
Atty. Borromeo, to whom she initially served notice of the hearing, did not
represent petitioner in Criminal Cases Nos. 13406-13429. Effectively,
petitioner was only notified of the clarificatory hearing scheduled on June
9, 2000. That setting, however, no longer materialized because the day
before, the Sandiganbayan prematurely terminated the reinvestigation.
Finally, petitioner charges the Sandiganbayan with having prejudged the
cases and deprived him of his right to due process. Considering the
defective nature of the informations in the criminal cases below, there is
no more need to pass upon this last assignment of error. The
Sandiganbayan has committed grave abuse of discretion in refusing to
quash the informations against petitioner. In the exercise of their
discretion, all courts are admonished to uphold the law and procedure and
to do what is fair and just.34 The Sandiganbayan failed in this regard.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is GRANTED. The
assailed orders of the Sandiganbayan dated June 8, 2000 are ANNULLED
and SET ASIDE. SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 179477             February 6, 2008
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,
vs.
JIMMY TABIO, appellant.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
Appellant Jimmy Tabio was charged with three (3) counts of rape in a
single Information,1 the accusatory portion of which reads as follows:
That between June 13, 2002 and June 28, 2002 in [Aurora 2] the
said accused, did then and there, unlawfully, feloniously and
willfully, have carnal knowledge of mentally retarded AAA 3 by
means of force and intimidation three times all committed while
the victim was alone inside their house and during nighttime
which was taken advantage of to facilitate the commission of the
crime.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Appellant pleaded not guilty on arraignment before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Baler, Aurora, Branch 96. 4 Trial on the merits ensued. The
victim, AAA testified that one night in June 2002, while she was alone in
her home, appellant entered her house. He pressed a knife on AAA’s
breast, removed her clothing, fondled her breast, undressed himself, and
mounted her as she was seated on a bed. He inserted his penis in her
vagina and ejaculated. AAA was able to recognize the appellant as her
house was lighted with a gas lamp. AAA further testified that the appellant
on two succeeding occasions again entered her home and repeated the
same acts on her. 5
Other witnesses for the prosecution presented testimony concerning
AAA’s mental condition. A doctor6 who had trained with the National
Center for Mental Health testified that he had examined AAA and
concluded that while she was 23 years old at the time of the rape, she
nonetheless had the mental age of a six-year old child. 7 AAA’s mother and
grand aunt also testified on her mental retardation and the occurrences
after she had reported the rape to them. 8
Appellant testified in his own behalf, denying that he had raped AAA and
offering as alibi that he was up in the mountain at the time of the
rape.9 Appellant’s wife10 and his brother-in-law, Jaime Bautista, 11 tried to
corroborate his alibi through their own testimony.
On 25 November 2003, the RTC handed down a decision finding appellant
guilty and imposing the penalty of death on three (3) counts of qualified
rape, defined in Article 266-A, paragraph 1 (d) and penalized under Article
266-B, paragraph 6 (10) of the Revised Penal Code. The RTC also ordered
appellant to pay P75,000.00 as civil indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral
damages. 12 The records of the case were thereafter forwarded to this
Court on automatic review. On 7 June 2005, the Court issued a
Resolution13 transferring the case to the Court of Appeals for appropriate
action.14
The Court of Appeals15 affirmed with modification the decision of the trial
court. The appellate court found appellant guilty of all three (3) counts for
simple rape only and not qualified rape. It also reduced the civil indemnity
to P50,000.00 and added an award of P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.16
The case is again before us for our final disposition. Appellant had assigned
three (3) errors in his appeal initially passed upon by the Court of Appeals,
to wit: whether the RTC erred in finding him guilty of qualified rape with
the penalty of death in view of the prosecution’s failure to allege a
qualifying circumstance in the information; whether the RTC erred in
finding him guilty of all three (3) counts of rape despite the alleged failure
of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt; and
whether the RTC erred in awarding P75,000.00 as civil indemnity.
The Court of Appeals properly resolved the first error in appellant’s favor.
The information should have warranted a judgment of guilt only for simple,
not qualified rape. We quote with approval the appellate court when it
said:
Under Article 266-B(10)17 of the Revised Penal Code, knowledge
by the offender of the mental disability, emotional disorder, or
physical handicap at the time of the commission of the rape is the
qualifying circumstance that sanctions the imposition of the death
penalty. Rule 110[16 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure
requires both qualifying and aggravating circumstances to be
alleged with specificity in the information. [16
In the case at bench, however, the information merely states that
the appellant had carnal knowledge with a mentally retarded
complainant. It does not state that appellant knew of the mental
disability of the complainant at the time of the commission of the
crime. It bears stressing that the rules now require that the
qualifying circumstance that sanctions the imposition of the death
penalty should be specifically stated in the information. Article
266-B (10) of the Revised Penal Code could not, thus, be applied
and the supreme penalty of death could not be validly imposed. 20
Rule 110 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure is clear and unequivocal
that both qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be alleged with
specificity in the information.
The Court also observes that there is duplicity 21 of the offenses charged in
the information, which is a ground for a motion to quash. 22 Three (3)
separate acts of rape were charged in one information only. But the failure
of appellant to interpose an objection on this ground constitutes waiver. 23
We turn to the second issue. While the Court affirms that appellant is
guilty of simple rape, we nonetheless find that only the first rape was
conclusively proven. The second and third rapes of which appellant was
charged and found guilty, were not proven beyond reasonable doubt.
Our courts have been traditionally guided by three settled principles in the
prosecution of the crime of rape: (1) an accusation for rape is easy to
make, difficult to prove and even more difficult to disprove; (2) in view of
the intrinsic nature of the crime, the testimony of the complainant must be
scrutinized with utmost caution; and (3) the evidence of the prosecution
must stand on its own merits and cannot draw strength from the weakness
of the evidence of the defense.24 In a prosecution for rape, the
complainant’s candor is the single most important issue. If a complainant’s
testimony meets the test of credibility, the accused may be convicted on
the sole basis thereof. 25
We have thoroughly examined AAA’s testimony and found nothing that
would cast doubt on the credibility of her account of the first rape. We
quote the pertinent portion of her testimony:
PROS. RONQUILLO:     to the witness
xxx
Q     Did you have any occasion to see Jimmy inside your house in June
2002?
A     Yes, Sir.
Q     What time was that?
A     Night time, Sir.
xxx
Q     You said that Jimmy went inside your house. What did he do there?
A     He fondled my breast, Sir.
Q     Did you have your clothes on when Jimmy Tabio went to your house?
A     Yes, sir.
xxx
Q     Don’t be ashamed. You said that you have your clothes on. When
Jimmy saw you what did he do with your clothes, if any?
A     He removed my dress, Sir.
xxx
Q     So you are now without clothes because you said Jimmy removed
your clothes. What did he do after removing your clothes?
A     He placed himself on top of me. Q     Why did you notice that? What did you do?
COURT: to the witness A     I watched my vagina, Sir.
Q     Was he standing when Jimmy mounted on you? Q     That is why you saw that thing which looks like milk?
A     I was sitting, Sir. A     Yes, Sir.
PROS. RONQUILLO:     to the witness Q     Now, it was night time when Jimmy went into your house, is it not?
Q     When Jimmy placed himself on top of you was he dressed or nude? A     Yes, Sir.
A     He was naked, Sir. Q     How were you able to see Jimmy while it was night time?
Q     You said that he placed himself on top of you. What did Jimmy do A     I have a light, Sir.
while he was on top of you? Q     What kind of light was that?
A     He pressed a knife on me. A     Gas l[a]mp, Sir. 26 (Emphasis supplied.)
Q     On what part of your body did he press the knife?
A     Here, Sir. (Witness indicated the upper part of her left breast) AAA never wavered in her assertion that appellant raped her. AAA’s
Q     What else did Jimmy do aside from pressing the knife near your testimony is distinctively clear, frank and definite without any pretension
breast? or hint of a concocted story despite her low intelligence as can be gleaned
A     Jimmy was in our house, Sir. from her answers in the direct examination. The fact of her mental
Q     Do you know what penis is? retardation does not impair the credibility of her unequivocal testimony.
A     Yes, Sir. AAA’s mental deficiency lends greater credence to her testimony for
Q     Do you know what Jimmy did with hs penis? someone as feeble-minded and guileless as her could not speak so
A     Yes, Sir. tenaciously and explicitly on the details of the rape if she has not in fact
Q     What did he do with his penis? suffered such crime at the hands of the appellant. 27
A     He placed his penis to my vagina.
Q     What did you feel when Jimmy did that? Appellant’s denials and alibi, which are merely self-serving evidence,
A     I felt pain, Sir. cannot prevail over the positive, consistent and straightforward testimony
Q     After Jimmy inserted his penis in your vagina, what else did he do? of AAA. Alibi is an inherently weak defense because it is easy to fabricate
A     Nothing more, Sir. and highly unreliable. To merit approbation, the accused must adduce
Q     Did he move while he was on top of you? clear and convincing evidence that he was in a place other than the situs
A     Yes, Sir. criminis at the time the crime was committed, such that it was physically
Q     Can you demonstrate his movement while he was on top of you? impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime when it was
A     (Witness indicated the movement by moving her body.) committed.28 We have meticulously reviewed the records and found no
xxx justification to deviate from the findings of fact of the trial court that—
PROS. RONQUILLO:     to the witness
Q     What else did you notice while the penis of Jimmy was in your
Accused’s alibi that he was in the mountain gathering woods
vagina?
during the period when [AAA] was raped deserves no
A     There was some kind of milk, Sir.
consideration. When the accused took the witness stand, he gave
COURT:     to the witness
an evasive, confused and vague account of his whereabouts at the
Q     Where?
time the crime was committed as well as with respect to the
A     In my vagina, Sir.
distance of his whereabouts from the locus criminis. Accused’s
PROS. RONQUILLO: to the witness
 wife and his brother-in-law tried to corroborate his (accused’s)
testimony that he was in the mountain during the commission of
rape but to no avail.
xxx
In the instant case, the distance of the place where the accused
allegedly was is less than half a kilometer (200 meters) which
could be negotiated in less than an hour. x x x 29
However, as to the alleged second and third rape, we find that the
prosecution failed to establish beyond reasonable doubt the elements of
the offense e.g., carnal knowledge and force or intimidation. The only
evidence presented to prove the two other charges were AAA’s
monosyllabic affirmative answers to two leading questions if appellant
repeated during the second and third times he was in her house what he
had done during the first time. We quote that only portion of AAA’s
testimony relating to the second and third alleged rapes, to wit:
PROS. RONQUILLO:     to the witness
Q     You said that Jimmy went to your house three times. What did he do
during the second time?
A     He entered our house, Sir.
Q     Yes, he entered your house. Did he repeat what he did during the first
time.
A     Yes, Sir.
Q     How about the third time? What did he do?
A     He has a knife, Sir.
Q     Yes. Did he repeat what he did during the first time?
A     Yes, Sir.30 (Emphasis supplied)
AAA’s testimony on these two later rapes was overly generalized and
lacked many specific details on how they were committed. Her bare
statement that appellant repeated what he had done to her the first time
is inadequate to establish beyond reasonable doubt the alleged second
and third rapes. Whether or not he raped her is the fact in issue which the
court must determine31 based on the evidence offered. The prosecution
must demonstrate in sufficient detail the manner by which the crime was
perpetrated. Certainly, the testimony of AAA to the effect that the
appellant repeated what he did in the first rape would not be enough to
warrant the conclusion that the second and third rape had indeed been
committed. Each and every charge of rape is a separate and distinct crime
so that each of them should be proven beyond reasonable doubt. The
quantum of evidence in criminal cases requires more than that.
In the case of People v. Garcia,32 wherein the appellant was charged with
183 counts of rape, we held that:
x x x Be that as it may, however, on the bases of the evidence adduced by
the prosecution, appellant can be convicted only of the two rapes
committed in November, [sic] 1990 and on July 21, 1994 as testified to by
complainant, and for the eight counts of rape committed in May and June
and on July 16, 1994 as admitted in appellants aforementioned letter of
August 24, 1994. We cannot agree with the trial court that appellant is
guilty of 183 counts of rape because, as correctly asserted by the
defense, each and every charge of rape is a separate and distinct crime so
that each of them should be proven beyond reasonable doubt. On that
score alone, the indefinite testimonial evidence that complainant was
raped every week is decidedly inadequate and grossly insufficient to
establish the guilt of appellant therefor with the required quantum of
evidence. So much of such indefinite imputations of rape, which are
uncorroborated by any other evidence, fall within this
category.33 (Emphasis supplied)
We must uphold the primacy of the presumption of innocence in favor of
the accused when the evidence at hand falls short of the quantum
required to support conviction.
As to the civil liability of appellant, we affirm the reduction by the appellate
court of the civil indemnity to P50,000.00 only, as well as the additional
award of P25,000.00 as exemplary damages, but on rather different
premises, considering our conclusion that he is only guilty of one, not three
counts of rape.
The civil indemnity awarded to the victims of qualified rape shall not be
less than seventy-five thousand pesos (P75,000.00),34 and P50,000.00 for
simple rape.35 This civil indemnity is awarded for each and every count of
rape, such that one found guilty of two counts of simple rape would be
liable to pay P50,000.00 for each count, or P100,000.00 in all.

We note that the appellate court implicitly awarded P50,000.00 as civil

indemnity for all three counts of simple rape. Such award would have been
improper for a conviction for three counts of simple rape. 36 Still, because
appellant is guilty of one count of simple rape, P50,000.00 still emerges as
the appropriate amount of civil indemnity.

In addition, the victim or heirs, as the case may be, can also recover moral
damages pursuant to Article 2219 of the Civil Code. In rape cases, moral
damages are awarded without need of proof other than the fact of rape
because it is assumed that the victim has suffered moral injuries entitling
her to such an award. 37 In this respect, we agree with the appellate court in
the award of P50,000.00 as moral damages. The appellate court’s award
of P25,000.00 as exemplary damages by way of public example is also
proper.38

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No.

01301 is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. Appellant is found GUILTY of
only ONE count of simple rape and ACQUITTED of the TWO other counts of
qualified rape. Appellant is sentenced to suffer the penalty reclusion
perpetua, and ordered to pay to the victim P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages and P25,000.00 as exemplary
damages.

SO ORDERED.
 filed and docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 9108 and 9109. 7 The Information
in Criminal Case No. 9108 reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

That on or about July 6, 2002 in Morong, Bataan, Philippines, and within

the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused with malicious
intent to besmirch the honor, integrity and reputation of Timothy
Desmond, Chairman and Chief Executive Office of Subic Bay Marine
Exploratorium, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously
send electronic messages to the offended party and to other persons
namely: Atty. Winston Ginez, John Corcoran, and Terry Nichoson which
read as follows:

'NOW THAT WE ARE SET TO BUILD THE HOTEL SO THAT YOU COULD
SECOND DIVISION SURVIVED, (sic) YOU SHOULD STOP YOUR NONSENSE THREAT BECAUSE
G.R. No. 208146, June 08, 2016 YOU COULD NOT EVEN FEED YOUR OWN SELF UNLESS WE PAY YOUR
VIRGINIA DIO, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND EXHORBITANT (sic) SALARY, HOUSE YOU ADN (sic) SUPPORT ALL YOUR
TIMOTHY DESMOND, Respondents. PERSONAL NEEDS. YOU SHOULD BE ASHAMED IN DOING THIS. AS FAR AS
DECISION WE ARE CONCERNED, YOU ARE NOTHING EXCEPT A PERSON WHO IS
LEONEN, J.: TRYING TO SURVIVED (sic) AT THE PRETEXT OF ENVIRONMENTAL AND
ANIMAL PROTECTOR [sic]. YOU ARE PADI (sic) TO THE LAST CENTS ON ALL
YOUR WORK IN THE WORK (sic). AT THE SAME TIME, YOU BLOATED THE
When a motion to quash an information is based on a defect that may be
PRICE OF EACH ANIMAL YOU BROUGHT TO THE PHILIPPINES from
cured by amendment, courts must provide the prosecution with the
US$500,000.00 to US$750,000.00 each so that you could owned (sic) more
opportunity to amend the information.
shares that you should. Please look into this deeply.

This resolves a Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 assailing the Court of IF YOU INSISTS (sic) TO BE CALLED AN ENVIRONMENTAL AND ANIMAL
Appeals Decision2 dated January 8, 2013 and Resolution 3 dated July 10, PROTECTOR IN OUR COUNTRY, THEN YOU AND YOUR WIFE SHOULD STOP
2013. The Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the Regional Trial Court BLEEDING THE COMPANY WITH YOUR MONTHLY PAYROLL OF ALMOST P1
Order that quashed the Informations charging petitioner Virginia Dio (Dio) MILLION A MONTH.'
with libel because these Informations failed to allege The above-quoted electronic message being defamatory or constituting an
publication.4ChanRoblesVirtualaw act causing or tending to cause dishonor, discredit or contempt against the
person of the said Timothy Desmond, to the damage and prejudice of the
Private respondent Timothy Desmond (Desmond) is the Chair and Chief said offended party.
Executive Officer of Subic Bay Marine Exploratorium, of which Dio is
Treasurer and Member of the Board of Directors. 5ChanR
CONTRARY TO LAW.8cralawred
On December 9, 2002, Desmond filed a complaint against Dio for The Information in Criminal Case No. 9109
libel.6 Two (2) separate Informations, both dated February 26, 2003, were reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
That on or about July 13, 2002 in Morong, Bataan, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, with malicious
intent to besmirch the honor, integrity and reputation of Timothy
Desmond, Chairman and Chief Executive Office of Subic Bay Marine
Exploratorium, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously
send electronic messages to the [sic] Atty. Winston Ginez and Fatima
Paglicawan, to the offended party, Timothy Desmond and to other persons
namely: Hon. Felicito Payumo, SBMA Chariman [sic], Terry Nichoson, John
Corcoran, and Gail Laule which read as
follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
'Dear Winston and Fatima:
UNDER THE LEADERSHIP OF TIM DESMOND AS CHAIRMAN AND CHIEF
EXECUTIVE OFFICER OF SBME, AS OF THIS DATE THE COMPANY HAD
INCURRED A LOSS OF MORE THAN ONE HUNDRED MILLION. A BALANCE
SHEET SUBMITTED TODAY BY THEIR ACCOUNTANT JULIET REFLECT AND
(sic) ASSETS OF MORE THAN THREE HUNDRED MILLION PESOS, 50% OF
WHICH IS OVERVALUED AND NON-EXISTENT. TIM DESMOND AND FAMILY
HAD ACCUMULATED A (sic) SHARES OF MORE THAN 70% OF THE
RECORDED PAID UP CAPITAL BY OVERVALUING OF THE ASSETS
CONTRIBUTION, PAYMENT TO THEIR OWN COMPANY IN THE USA, ETC. AT
THE SAME TIME, TIM DESMOND AND FAMILY BLEED THE COMPANY FROM
DATE OF INCORPORATION TO PRESENT FOR AN AVERAGE OF ONE MILLION
PER MONTH FOR THEIR PERSONAL GAIN, LIKE SALARY, CAR, ET, [sic]
ETC.'cralawred
The above-quoted electronic message being defamatory or constituting an
act causing or tending to cause dishonor, discredit or contempt against the
person of the said Timothy Desmond, to the damage and prejudice of the
said offended party.
CONTRARY TO LAW.9cralawred
On April 22, 2003, Dio filed a Petition to suspend the criminal
proceedings,10 but it was denied in the Order dated February 6,
2004.11ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Dio moved for reconsideration of the February 6, 2004 Order. 12 She also
moved to quash the Informations, arguing that the "facts charged do not
constitute an offense."13 In its Order14 dated July 13, 2004, the trial court
denied both Motions. The dispositive portion of the Order
reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Premises considered, the Motion For Reconsideration of the Order dated
February 6, 2004 and the Motion To Quash, both filed for accused, as well
as the Motion For Issuance of a Hold Departure Order filed by the
Prosecution, are hereby DENIED.
Arraignment will proceed as previously set on July 20, 2005 at 9:00 a.m.
SO ORDERED.15cralawred
Dio moved for partial reconsideration of the July 13, 2004 Order, but the
Motion was denied in the trial court's Order dated September 13,
2005.16ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
On October 11, 2005, Dio filed a Motion for leave of court to file a second
motion for reconsideration.17 She also filed an Omnibus Motion to quash
the Informations for failure to allege publication and lack of jurisdiction,
and for second reconsideration with leave of
court.18ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The trial court's Order dated February 7, 2006 denied both Motions and
scheduled Dio's arraignment on March 9, 2006. 19 Dio moved for partial
reconsideration.20ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The trial court granted Dio's Motion for Partial Reconsideration in its
February 12, 2009 Order,21 the dispositive portion of which
reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, the Motion For Partial Reconsideration filed by the accused
in Criminal Cases (sic) Nos. 9108 and 9109, on the ground that the
Informations in the said cases fail (sic) to allege publication, is GRANTED
and, accordingly, the Informations filed against the accused are thereby
QUASHED and DISMISSED.
No finding as to costs. SO ORDERED.22cralawred
After filing a Notice of Appeal on March 5, 2009, 23 Desmond raised before
the Court of Appeals the following issues:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
I

WHETHER OR NOT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE
ACCUSED'S ARGUMENT THAT THE PRESENT CHARGES SHOULD BE
QUASHED FOR FAILURE OF THE INFORMATIONS TO ALLEGE PUBLICATION.
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE CASE
AND QUASHING THE INFORMATIONS WITHOUT GIVING THE PROSECUTOR
THE OPPORTUNITY TO AMEND THE INFORMATIONS. 24cralawred
In its January 8, 2013 Decision, the Court of Appeals sustained that the
Informations did not substantially constitute the offense charged. 25 It
found that the Informations did not contain any allegation that the emails
allegedly sent by Dio to Desmond had been accessed. 26 However, it found
that the trial court erred in quashing the Informations without giving the
prosecution a chance to amend them pursuant to Rule 117, Section 4 of
the Rules of Court:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Although we agree with the trial court that the facts alleged in the
Informations do not substantially constitute the offense charged, the most
prudent thing to do for the trial court is to give the prosecution the
opportunity to amend it and make the necessary corrections. Indeed, an
Information may be defective because the facts charged do not constitute
an offense, however, the dismissal of the case will not necessarily follow.
The Rules specifically require that the prosecution should be given a
chance to correct the defect; the court can order the dismissal only upon
the prosecution's failure to do so. The trial court's failure to provide the
prosecution with this opportunity constitutes an arbitrary exercise of
power.27cralawred
The dispositive portion reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is GRANTED. The order of
the Regional Trial Court of Balanga City, Branch 3 dated February 12, 2009
in Criminal Case Nos. 9108 and 9109 is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The case
is remanded to the trial court and the Public Prosecutor of Balanga City is
hereby DIRECTED to amend the Informations.
SO ORDERED.28cralawred
Dio moved for reconsideration,29 but the Court of Appeals denied the
Motion in its July 10, 2013 Resolution.30ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Hence, this Petition was filed.
Desmond and the Office of the Solicitor General filed their Comments, 31 to
which Dio filed her Reply. 32 On April 2, 2014, this Court gave due course to
the Petition and required the parties to submit their respective
memoranda.33ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The Office of the Solicitor General filed on June 11, 2014 a Manifestation
and Motion34 adopting its Comment. Desmond and Dio filed their
memoranda on June 19, 2014 35 and July 10, 2014,36 respectively.
Dio stresses that "venue is jurisdictional in criminal cases." 37 Considering
that libel is limited as to the venue of the case, failure to allege "where the
libelous article was printed and first published" 38 or "where the offended
party actually resided at the time of the commission of the offense" 39 is a
jurisdictional defect. She argues that jurisdictional defects in an
Information are not curable by amendment, even before arraignment. To
support this position, she cites Agustin v. Pamintuan:40
We do not agree with the ruling of the CA that the defects in the
Informations are merely formal. Indeed, the absence of any allegations in
the Informations that the offended party was actually residing in Baguio
City, where the crimes charged were allegedly committed, is a substantial
defect. Indeed, the amendments of the Informations to vest jurisdiction
upon the court cannot be allowed.41 (Citations omitted)cralawred
Dio also cites Leviste v. Hon. Alameda,42 where this Court has stated that
not all defects in an Information are curable by amendment prior to
arraignment:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
It must be clarified though that not all defects in an information are
curable by amendment prior to entry of plea. An information which is
void ab initio cannot be amended to obviate a ground for quashal. An
amendment which operates to vest jurisdiction upon the trial court is
likewise impermissible.43 (Citations omitted)cralawred
Dio argues that the Informations were void as the prosecutor of Morong,
Bataan had no authority to conduct the preliminary investigation of the
offenses charged.44 The complaint filed before the prosecutor did not
allege that the emails were printed and first published in Morong Bataan,
or that Desmond resided in Morong, Bataan at the time of the offense. 45 In
the absence of these allegations, the prosecutor did not have the authority
to conduct the preliminary investigation or to file the
information.46ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Dio further argues that publication, one of the elements of libel, was not
present in the case. She asserts that emailing does not constitute
publication under Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code. As there was no
allegation in the Informations that the emails were received, accessed, and
read by third persons other than Desmond, there could be no
publication.47 Further, emails are not covered under Article 355 of the
Revised Penal Code. Thus, at the time the allegedly libelous emails were
sent, there was no law punishing this act. 48ChanRoblesVirtualawlib
Finally, Dio argues that she sent the emails as private communication to
the officers of the corporation, who were in the position to act on her
grievances.49 The emails were sent in good faith, with justifiable ends, and
in the performance of a legal duty. 50ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The primordial issue for resolution is whether an information's failure to
establish venue is a defect that can be cured by amendment before
arraignment.
The Petition is denied.
I In this case, petitioner Virginia Dio has not yet been arraigned; thus, Rule
If a motion to quash is based on a defect in the information that can be
cured by amendment, the court shall order that an amendment be made.
Rule 117, Section 4 of the Rules of Court
states:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
SEC. 4. Amendment of complaint or information. - If the motion to quash is
based on an alleged defect of the complaint or information which can be
cured by amendment, the court shall order that an amendment be made.
If it is based on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an
offense, the prosecution shall be given by the court an opportunity to
correct the defect by amendment. The motion shall be granted if the
prosecution fails to make the amendment, or the complaint or information
still suffers from the same defect despite the amendment.cralawred
This Court has held that failure to provide the prosecution with the
opportunity to amend is an arbitrary exercise of power. 51 In People v.
Sandiganbayan:52
When a motion to quash is filed challenging the validity and sufficiency of
an Information, and the defect may be cured by amendment, courts must
deny the motion to quash and order the prosecution to file an amended
Information. Generally, a defect pertaining to the failure of an Information
to charge facts constituting an offense is one that may be corrected by an
amendment. In such instances, courts are mandated not to automatically
quash the Information; rather, it should grant the prosecution the
opportunity to cure the defect through an amendment. This rule allows a
case to proceed without undue delay. By allowing the defect to be cured
by simple amendment, unnecessary appeals based on technical grounds,
which only result to prolonging the proceedings, are avoided.
More than this practical consideration, however, is the due process
underpinnings of this rule. As explained by this Court in People v. Andrade,
the State, just like any other litigant, is entitled to its day in court. Thus, a
court's refusal to grant the prosecution the opportunity to amend an
Information, where such right is expressly granted under the Rules of Court
and affirmed time and again in a string of Supreme Court decisions,
effectively curtails the State's right to due process.53cralawred
117, Section 4 of the Rules of Court applies. If the information is defective,
the prosecution must be given the opportunity to amend it before it may
be quashed.
Petitioner claims that Rule 117, Section 4 of the Rules of Court applies only
to informations that can be cured by amendment. She argues that before a
court orders that an amendment be made, or otherwise gives the
prosecution an opportunity to amend an information, it must first establish
that the defective information can be cured by amendment.
Petitioner relies on Agustin to argue the proscription of an amendment of
an information in order to vest jurisdiction in the court. This is misplaced.
In Agustin, the accused in the criminal case was already arraigned under a
defective information that failed to establish venue. 54 The Court of Appeals
held that the defect in the information was merely formal and,
consequently, could be amended even after plea, with leave of court. Thus,
this Court held:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
We do not agree with the ruling of the CA that the defects in the
Informations are merely formal. Indeed, the absence of any allegations in
the Informations that the offended party was actually residing in Baguio
City, where the crimes charged were allegedly committed, is a substantial
defect. Indeed, the amendments of the Informations to vest jurisdiction
upon the court cannot be allowed.55cralawred
In turn, Agustin cited Agbayani v. Sayo.56 However, Agbayani does not
involve the amendment of a defective information before or after
arraignment. Subsequent cases have cited Agustin as basis that
amendment of an information to vest jurisdiction in the trial court is
impermissible. Thus, in Leviste, this Court cited Agustin and stated that
certain amendments are impermissible even before
arraignment:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
It must be clarified though that not all defects in an information are
curable by amendment prior to entry of plea. An information which is
void ab initio cannot be amended to obviate a ground for quashal. An
amendment which operates to vest jurisdiction upon the trial court is
likewise impermissible.57cralawred
It may appear that Leviste supports petitioner's contention that an
amendment operating to vest jurisdiction in the trial court is
impermissible. However, the statement in Leviste was obiter dictum. It
cites only Agustin, which did not involve the amendment of an
information before arraignment.
Aside from obiter dictum in jurisprudence, petitioner provides no legal
basis to reverse the Court of Appeals' determination that the defective
informations may be amended before arraignment. Although the cases
petitioner cited involved defective informations that failed to establish the
jurisdiction of the court over the libel charges, none involved the
amendment of an information before arraignment. Thus, these cannot be
controlling over the facts of this case.
II
A defect in the complaint filed before the fiscal is not a ground to quash an
information. In Sasot v. People:58
Section 3, Rule 117 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, which was
then in force at the time the alleged criminal acts were committed,
enumerates the grounds for quashing an information, to
wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
a) That the facts charged do not constitute an offense;
b) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense
charged or the person of the accused;
c) That the officer who filed the information had no authority to do so;
d) That it does not conform substantially to the prescribed form;
e) That more than one offense is charged except in those cases in
which existing laws prescribe a single punishment for various
offenses;
f) That the criminal action or liability has been extinguished;
g) That it contains averments which, if true, would constitute a legal
excuse or justification; and
h) That the accused has been previously convicted or in jeopardy of
being convicted, or acquitted of the offense charged.
Nowhere in the foregoing provision is there any mention of the defect in
the complaint filed before the fiscal and the complainant's capacity to sue
as grounds for a motion to quash.59cralawred
On the other hand, lack of authority to file an information is a proper
ground. In Cudia v. Court of Appeals:60
With respect to the second requisite, however, it is plainly apparent that
the City Prosecutor of Angeles City had no authority to file the first
information, the offense having been committed in the Municipality of
Mabalacat, which is beyond his jurisdiction. Presidential Decree No. 1275,
in relation to Section 9 of the Administrative Code of 1987, pertinently
provides that:
"Section 11. The provincial or the city fiscal
shall:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
. . . .
(b) Investigate and/or cause to be investigated all charges of crimes,
misdemeanors and violations of all penal laws and ordinances within their
respective jurisdictions and have the necessary information or complaint
prepared or made against the persons accused. In the conduct of such
investigations he or his assistants shall receive the sworn statements or
take oral evidence of witnesses summoned by subpoena for the purpose.
. . . .cralawred
It is thus the Provincial Prosecutor of Pampanga, not the City Prosecutor,
who should prepare informations for offenses committed within Pampanga
but outside of Angeles City. An information, when required to be filed by a
public prosecuting officer, cannot be filed by another. It must be exhibited
or presented by the prosecuting attorney or someone authorized by law. If
not, the court does not acquire jurisdiction.
Petitioner, however, insists that his failure to assert the lack of authority of
the City Prosecutor in filing the information in question is deemed a waiver
thereof. As correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, petitioner's plea
to an information before he filed a motion to quash may be a waiver of all
objections to it insofar as formal objections to the pleadings are
concerned. But by clear implication, if not by express provision of the Rules
of Court, and by a long line of uniform decisions, questions relating to want
of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceeding. It is a valid
information signed by a competent officer which, among other requisites,
confers jurisdiction on the court over the person of the accused (herein
petitioner) and the subject matter of the accusation. In consonance with
this view, an infirmity in the information, such as lack of authority of the
officer signing it, cannot be cured by silence, acquiescence, or even by
express consent.
In fine, there must have been a valid and sufficient complaint or
information in the former prosecution. If, therefore, the complaint or
information was insufficient because it was so defective in form or
substance that the conviction upon it could not have been sustained, its
dismissal without the consent of the accused cannot be pleaded. As the
fiscal had no authority to file the information, the dismissal of the first
information would not be a bar to petitioner's subsequent prosecution.
Jeopardy does not attach where a defendant pleads guilty to a defective
indictment that is voluntarily dismissed by the prosecution.
Petitioner next claims that the lack of authority of the City Prosecutor was
the error of the investigating panel and the same should not be used to
prejudice and penalize him. It is an all too familiar maxim that the State is
not bound or estopped by the mistakes or inadvertence of its officials and
employees. To rule otherwise could very well result in setting felons free,
deny proper protection to the community, and give rise to the possibility of
connivance between the prosecutor and the accused.
Finally, petitioner avers that an amendment of the first information, and
not its dismissal, should have been the remedy sought by the prosecution.
Suffice it to say that this Court, in Galvez vs. Court of Appeals has ruled that
even if amendment is proper, pursuant to Section 14 of Rule 110, it is also
quite plausible under the same provision that, instead of an amendment,
an information may be dismissed to give way to the filing of a new
information.61 (Emphasis in the original, citations omitted)cralawred
However, for quashal of an information to be sustained, the defect of the
information must be evident on its face. In Santos v. People:62
First, a motion to quash should be based on a defect in the information
which is evident on its face. The same cannot be said herein. The
Information against petitioner appears valid on its face; and that it was
filed in violation of her constitutional rights to due process and equal
protection of the laws is not evident on the face thereof. As pointed out by
the CTA First Division in its 11 May 2006 Resolution, the more appropriate
recourse petitioner should have taken, given the dismissal of similar
charges against Velasquez, was to appeal the Resolution dated 21 October
2005 of the Office of the State Prosecutor recommending the filing of an
information against her with the DOJ Secretary. 63cralawred
For an information to be quashed based on the prosecutor's lack of
authority to file it, the lack of the authority must be evident on the face of
the information.
The Informations here do not allege that the venue of the offense was
other than Morong, Bataan. Thus, it is not apparent on the face of the
Informations that the prosecutor did not have the authority to file them.
The proper remedy is to give the prosecution the opportunity to amend
the Informations. If the proper venue appears not to be Morong, Bataan
after the Informations have been amended, then the trial court may
dismiss the case due to lack of jurisdiction, as well as lack of authority of
the prosecutor to file the information.
III
Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code
provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Article 355. Libel by means of writings or similar means. - A libel committed
by means of writing, printing, lithography, engraving, radio, phonograph,
painting, theatrical exhibition, cinematographic exhibition, or any similar
means, shall be punished by prision correccional in its minimum and
medium periods or a fine ranging from 200 to 6,000 pesos, or both, in
addition to civil action which may be brought by the offended
party.cralawred
Petitioner argues that at the time of the offense, emails were not covered
under Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code. Petitioner claims this is
bolstered by the enactment of Republic Act No. 10175, otherwise known
as the Anti-Cybercrime Law, which widened the scope of libel to include
libel committed through email, among others.64ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Whether emailing or, as in this case, sending emails to the persons named
in the Informations—who appear to be officials of Subic Bay Metropolitan
Authority where Subic Bay Marine Exploratorium is found—is sufficiently
"public," as required by Articles 353 and 355 of the Revised Penal Code and
by the Anti-Cybercrime Law, is a matter of defense that should be properly
raised during trial.
Passionate and emphatic grievance, channelled through proper public
authorities, partakes of a degree of protected freedom of
expression.65ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Certainly, if we remain faithful to the dictum that public office is a public
trust,66 some leeway should be given to the public to express disgust. The
scope and extent of that protection cannot be grounded in abstractions.
The facts of this case need to be proven by evidence; otherwise, this Court
exercises barren abstractions that may wander into situations only
imagined, not real.
IV
Good faith is not among the grounds for quashing an information as
enumerated in Rule 117, Section 3 of the Rules of Court. It is not apparent
on the face of the Informations, and what is not apparent cannot be the
basis for quashing them. In Danguilan-Vitug v. Court of Appeals:67
We find no reason to depart from said conclusion. Section 3, Rule 117 of
the Revised Rules of Court enumerates the grounds for quashing an
information. Specifically, paragraph (g) of said provision states that the
accused may move to quash the complaint or information where it
contains averments which, if true, would constitute a legal excuse or
justification. Hence, for the alleged privilege to be a ground for quashing
the information, the same should have been averred in the information
itself and secondly, the privilege should be absolute, not only qualified.
Where, however, these circumstances are not alleged in the information,
quashal is not proper as they should be raised and proved as defenses.
With more reason is it true in the case of merely qualifiedly privileged
communications because such cases remain actionable since the
defamatory communication is simply presumed to be not malicious,
thereby relieving the defendant of the burden of proving good intention
and justifiable motive. The burden is on the prosecution to prove malice.
Thus, even if the qualifiedly privileged nature of the communication is
alleged in the information, it cannot be quashed especially where
prosecution opposes the same so as not to deprive the latter of its day in
court, but prosecution can only prove its case after trial on the merits.
In People v. Gomez we held, inter alia:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
"The claim of the accused . . . that the letter is privileged communication is
not a ground for a motion to quash. It is a matter of defense which must be
proved after trial of the case on the merits." 68 (Citations omitted)cralawred
Thus, the Court of Appeals did not err in disregarding petitioner's
purported good faith. This should be a matter of defense properly raised
during trial.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari dated July 29, 2013
is DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated January 8, 2013 and
Resolution dated July 10, 2013 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
 EN BANC
G.R. No. 140406            April 17, 2002
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ANTONIO DESUYO alias "TONY," accused-appellant.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
MARICEL PERU DESUYO was sleeping beside her younger sister
Aisalyn one late night in September 1996 when she was awakened
by someone caressing her breasts. She opened her eyes and saw
her father, accused Antonio Desuyo, crouching before her. He was
naked except for his underpants to cover his private parts.
Instinctively, she begged her father not to touch her, reminding him
that she was his daughter. But he paid no heed; instead, he
removed her underwear while threatening to kill her should she
make any noise. He mounted her, forced his penis into her vagina
and gyrated his hips against hers. She wept as she continued to beg
him to desist from his fiendish assault on her virtue. Meanwhile,
Maricel did not tell her mother about the incident; instead, she kept
the ignominy and pain to herself.
Maricel's mother worked as a housekeeper in a faraway town and
she did not want to give her any trouble. Neither did she inform her
relatives who lived nearby. She feared for her life as her father had
threatened to kill her should she speak to anyone about what he
had done to her.
The accused would repeat his sexual molestation of Maricel almost
everyday from September 1996 to August 1997. His assaults on her
virtue were always followed by threats on her that she would be
killed should she report these to her mother. The sexual abuses of
her father were so often that Maricel lost count.
On 14 August 1997, early dawn, as Maricel had been already
accustomed to, she would be roused from her sleep by her father
fondling her private parts. Again, he undressed her and unleashed
his lechery on her. It was meant to be the last. In her young and
impressionable mind, Maricel vowed that it would not happen to
her again.
On 18 August 1997 Maricel summoned enough courage to relate
her ordeal to a police officer who lived nearby. She bravely narrated
to Police Officer Tito Ganggalang and his wife Riza her sordid tale
which was actually a confirmation of what was already circulating
around their neighborhood. She admitted that her father had been
sexually abusing her for close to a year already. Emboldened by the
encouragement she received from sympathetic neighbors, she next
confided to Luisa Galit, Maricel's maternal aunt, who could only
commiserate with her.1âwphi1.nêt
Forthwith, Luisa Galit accompanied Maricel to a doctor who upon
examination found Maricel to have several old hymenal lacerations
in her vaginal area. Thereafter, they repaired to the municipal hall
where Maricel instituted a complaint against her father, accused
Antonio Desuyo, for having repeatedly raped her.
In the course of the preliminary examination conducted by the
municipal trial court judge, accused Antonio Desuyo asked
forgiveness from his daughter and promised to leave her alone
should she withdraw the charge she filed against him. Maricel
vehemently refused as her father grovelled for forgiveness. 1 As a
consequence, an Information  was filed against the accused Antonio
Desuyo alias  "Tony" for raping his fifteen (15)-year old daughter
Maricel.
Maricel attested in court to the truth of her accusations. According
to her, ever since her mother worked in a faraway town, her father
was dauntless and unrelenting in sexually abusing her night after
night within the confines of their home. She felt pain and cried
everytime her father would forcibly insert his penis into her vagina;
however she kept her ordeal to herself as she was afraid of him.
After having her first menstruation she became apprehensive that
she might get pregnant. Her father however was unperturbed and
simply dismissed her fears by telling her not to worry. A year after
the first forced coition, Maricel decided to end her tribulation by
unburdening her grief to neighbors who readily sympathized with
her. She felt relieved after seeing her father locked up behind bars. 2
The accused denied having raped Maricel. He affirmed however that
he raised singlehandedly his two (2) daughters Maricel and Aisalyn
as his wife was serving another household in a distant town.
According to him, despite his guidance, Maricel turned out to be a
wayward daughter who entertained suitors at an early age. Once,
his daughter Aisalyn confided to him that Maricel was
corresponding with a boy from another barrio. He immediately
searched through her bag and found a letter intended for a certain
Jerry. Incensed by his daughter's behavior he mauled her expecting
that she would atone for her mistakes. However, instead of
mending her ways, Maricel ran away from home and instituted this
unfounded charge for rape against him. He presented in evidence
Maricel's supposed letter to Jerry as well as a letter from his wife
pledging her love and support. He averred that Maricel was being
inveigled by his sister-in-law Luisa and the latter's boyfriend Boy
into tormenting him for reasons which he could not fathom. 3
The trial court did not give credence to the bare denials of the
accused. Solely on account of Maricel's testimony, the court a
quo found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of "multiple incestuous rape" and sentenced him to suffer the
supreme penalty of death, and to indemnify the offended party
₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity.4
Accused Antonio Desuyo assails in his brief his conviction for
"multiple rape" essentially on two (2) grounds, namely, that the
Information is defective and that the court a quo erred in imposing
upon him the penalty of death despite the failure of the prosecution
to establish the age of Maricel with certainty. 5
Accused avers that the Information for "multiple rape" filed against
him is deficient since by merely stating that the sexual assaults were
repeated "within the month of September 1996 up to August 18,
1997,"6 it failed to state the exact dates when the alleged rapes
were committed. Quoting heavily from the early case of US v.
Diacho,7 accused asserts that unless he is informed of the precise
"day, or about the day, he may be, to an extent deprived of the
opportunity to defend himself."8
At the outset, it must be emphasized that the remedy against an
indictment that fails to allege the time of commission of the offense
with sufficient definiteness is a motion for bill of particulars. The
records show that the accused never asked for a bill of particulars in
accordance with the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.9
The failure of the accused to move for the specification of the date
when the alleged crime was committed or for the quashal of the
Information on the ground that it does not conform substantially to
the prescribed form10 deprives him of the right to object to evidence
which could lawfully be introduced and admitted under an
information of more or less general terms but which sufficiently
charges the accused with a definite crime. 11 It is indeed too late in
the day for the accused to raise this issue because objections to
matters of form or substance in the information cannot be made for
the first time on appeal. At any rate, it is settled that the exact
date of the commission of rape is not an essential element thereof
and need not be stated in the information. 12 The Court has sustained
the following dates alleged in an information for rape as sufficient
for purposes of complying with the provisions of the Rules of Court,
to wit: "from November 1990 up to July 21, 1994," 13 "sometime in
November 1995, and some occasions prior and/or subsequent
thereto,"14 "on or about and sometime in the year
1988,"15 "sometime in the year 1987"16 and "before and until
October 15, 1994."17 In any event, a review of the evidence
presented by the prosecution more than establishes the guilt of the
accused for the rape of his daughter. 1âwphi1.nêt
For one, it is highly inconceivable, if not completely preposterous,
that Maricel, a guileless barrio lass, would concoct a story of rape
against her very own father, taking into mind the societal
humiliation and personal devastation which such a charge entails.
More so, no serious motive, apart from the beatings which she
supposedly suffered in the hands of the accused, was offered to
satisfactorily explain why Maricel would come out and undergo
legal scrutiny of the unfortunate encounters with her father. Thus, if
her testimony meets the test of credibility, the accused may be
convicted on the basis thereof.
An analysis of the records reveals that Maricel testified in a
straightforward, spontaneous and consistent manner. Although
Maricel expounded only on the first and last instances of rape,
failing thus to give an accurate account of the other sexual
violations, her testimony in its entirety was forthright, clear and free
from any contradictions.
Maricel's failure to immediately inform her mother as well as her
relatives about her ordeal is consistent with reason. It must be
remembered that Maricel depended on the accused for existence
and protection as her mother lived far. As to her total obedience to
her father and the stoic silence she kept about her sufferings, these
were all brought about by her genuine fear of a man who on
account of his moral ascendancy needed no weapon to instill such
terror in her.18 Maricel was convinced of a potential yet real danger
posed by a beast masquerading as the family's paladin.
Finally, we take into consideration Antonio's admission before the
trial court that he wrote his parents-in-law sometime in March 1998
to ask for their forgiveness. Antonio likewise acknowledged when
cross-examined that he begged for Maricel's mercy before the
municipal trial judge in the course of the preliminary examination.
No compelling reason was offered by the defense to explain
Antonio's incriminating declarations. Verily, these are judicial
admissions which no man in his right mind would make unless they
were true.
The court a quo  convicted the accused of "multiple rape" without
stating the counts of rape involved. The records however show that
the prosecution established beyond doubt that accused was guilty
of two (2) counts of rape. Although Maricel insists that she had
been raped almost everyday from September 1996 to August 1997
she was only able to relate with clarity two (2) of the rapes, the first
forced coition sometime in September 1996, and the last on 14
August 1997. She positively narrated in detail the surrounding
circumstances of the sexual assaults committed against her on
those two (2) occasions. Indeed, her recollection of these two (2)
rapes was very vivid, leaving no doubt about its credibility and
truthfulness.
Prescinding from the foregoing, the guilt of the accused for two (2)
counts of rape has been conclusively established; however, the
death penalty was erroneously imposed. Under Sec. 11 of RA 7659,
death shall be imposed if "the victim is under eighteen (18) years of
age and the offender is a parent x x x of the victim."
In the instant case, the Information charging the accused with rape
alleges that Maricel is the fourteen (14)-year old daughter of the
accused. However, it is significant to note that other than the
testimony of Maricel, no independent proof was presented to show
that she was a minor and that she was the daughter of the accused.
Although Maricel's relationship with the accused was not contested,
nor her age refuted, proof of age and relationship is critical
considering the gravity of the penalty to be imposed upon the
accused.19
It bears emphasis that the minority of the victim and her filiation to
the accused when properly alleged in the information and proved
beyond reasonable doubt during trial elevate the crime of simple
rape to qualified rape and warrant the imposition of the extreme
penalty of death. As such, nothing but proof beyond reasonable
doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which the
accused is charged must be established by the prosecution in order
for the penalty of death to be upheld. In fine, the minority of the
victim as well as her relationship with the accused must be proved
with equal certainty and clarity as the crime itself; contrarily, the
failure of the prosecution to sufficiently establish the victim's age
and relationship with the accused is fatal and consequently bars
conviction for qualified rape.20
Perforce, in the present case, the death penalty imposed by the trial
court should be reduced to reclusion perpetua. Likewise, the award
of ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity should be modified and adjusted to
₱50,000.00 since the penalty is likewise lowered to reclusion
perpetua. Consistent with prevailing jurisprudence, accused Antonio
Desuyo should also be ordered to pay Maricel Desuyo ₱50,000.00 as
moral damages even if there was no proof presented as basis
therefor since the anguish and pain that complaining witness
endured are plainly evident.21
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Br. 26, San
Jose, Southern Leyte, finding accused Antonio Desuyo alias "Tony"
guilty of "multiple rape" in its qualified form and ordering him to
pay complaining witness Maricel Peru Desuyo ₱75,000.00 as civil
indemnity, is MODIFIED. The accused is instead found guilty of two
(2) counts of simple rape and, accordingly, sentences him
to reclusion perpetua for each count. In addition to paying Maricel
Peru Desuyo civil indemnity in the amount of ₱50,000.00, instead of
₱75,000.00, for each count of rape, accused is further ordered to
pay moral damages in the amount of ₱50,000.00 also for each
count. Costs de oficio. SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 214925, April 26, 2017
JOHN LABSKY P. MAXIMO AND ROBERT M.
PANGANIBAN, Petitioners, v. FRANCISCO Z. VILLAPANDO,
JR., Respondents.
G.R. No. 214965, April 26, 2017
FRANCISCO Z. VILLAPANDO, JR., Petitioners, v. MAKATI CITY
PROSECUTION OFFICE, JOHN LABSKY P. MAXIMO AND ROBERT M.
PANGANIBAN, Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before us are consolidated petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court assailing the Decision 1 dated June 13, 2014, and
Resolution2 dated October 16, 2014 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
SP No. 131085 which reversed the Decision 3 dated May 30, 2013 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 150, Makati City in Special Civil Action
No. 13-473. The RTC affirmed the Order 4 of the Metropolitan Trial Court
(METC), Branch 67, Makati City denying the Motion to Quash filed by
petitioner Francisco Z. Villapando, Jr. (Villapando).
The factual antecedents are as follows:
Villapando is the assignee of Enhanced Electronics and Communications
Services, Inc. of Condominium Unit No. 2821 and parking slot at the
Legazpi Place in Makati City. Petitioners John Labsky P. Maximo (Maximo)
and Robert M. Panganiban (Panganiban) are Directors of ASB Realty
Corporation (now, St. Francis Square Realty Corp.), the developer of the
said condominium unit.5
On November 23, 2010, Villapando filed before the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Makati City (OCP-Makati), a complaint6 against Maximo and
Panganiban and other directors/officers of ASB Realty Corp. (ASB) for
Violation of Sections 17,7 208 and 259 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 957,
otherwise known as the Subdivision and Condominium Buyer's Protective
Decree.
Villapando alleged in his complaint that there was failure on the part of
Maximo and Panganiban and the other directors/officers of ASB to comply
with PD No. 957 relative to the registration of contracts to sell and deeds
of sale (Sec. 17), time of completion (Sec. 20) and issuance of title (Sec. 25)
with respect to the aforementioned condominium unit.
The said criminal complaint for Violation of Sections 17, 20 and 25 was
dismissed by the OCP-Makati in its Resolution 10 dated July 12, 2011 on the
ground that prior to the estimated date of completion of the condominium
unit, ASB encountered liquidity problems and instituted a petition for
rehabilitation with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) which
showed good faith on the part of ASB.11
On February 24, 2011, Maximo instituted a Complaint 12 for Perjury,
Incriminating Innocent Person and Unjust Vexation against Villapando
docketed as NPS-No. XV-05-INV-11-B-00509. The complaint was assigned
to Assistant City Prosecutor (ACP) Evangeline Viudez-Canobas.13
On October 10, 2011, Panganiban also filed a Complaint 14 for  Perjury and
Unjust Vexation against Villapando docketed as NPS-No. XV-05-INV-11-C-
00601. The complaint was assigned to ACP Benjamin S. Vermug, Jr. 15
The common allegation in the complaints of Maximo and Panganiban was
that Villapando committed perjury when the latter alleged in the complaint
he filed against them that they were officers and directors of ASB at the
time the Deed of Sale was executed between ASB and Enhanced
Electronics on February 28, 1997. They claimed that they were not even
employees of ASB in 1997 as they were both minors at that time.
After the filing of the Counter-Affidavit,16 Reply-Affidavit,17 and Rejoinder-
Affidavit,18 ACP Canobas issued a Resolution 19 (Canobas Resolution) on
August 3, 2011 finding probable cause against Villapando for the crime of
perjury but dismissed the complaints for unjust vexation and incriminating
innocent person. The Resolution was approved 20 by Senior Assistant City
Prosecutor (SACP) Christopher Garvida.
Accordingly, on August 15, 2011, an Information 21 dated July 26, 2011 for
Perjury was filed against Villapando before Branch 67 of the METC, Makati
City. The Information was signed by ACP Canobas and sworn to before ACP
Benjamin S. Vermug, Jr.
Meanwhile, on August 31, 2011,Villapando filed a Motion for Partial
Reconsideration22 of the Canobas Resolution before the OCP-Makati
alleging that the Information was filed without the prior written authority
of the City Prosecutor. He also stated that violations of Sections 17, 20 and
25 are committed not at the time of the execution of the contract to sell
but after the execution of the contract, and that there is no allegation in
his complaint-affidavit that Maximo was part of the "scheme in the
execution of the contract to sell."
Pending resolution of the aforesaid motion for partial reconsideration, a
warrant of arrest against Villapando was issued by the METC. 23 On October
14, 2011, Villapando filed a Motion to Quash Information 24 alleging that
the person who filed the Information had no authority to do so. He
asserted that the Information, as well as the Resolution finding probable
cause against him, did not bear the approval of the City Prosecutor of
Makati, Feliciano Aspi, which is contrary to Section 4 of Rule 112 of the
Rules of Court.
On October 20, 2011, Villapando filed a Supplemental Motion to Quash
Information25 on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an
offense. According to Villapando, violations of Sections 17, 20 and 25 of
P.D. No. 957 are continuing crimes, hence, the allegations in the
Information do not constitute an offense and a quashal of the same is
warranted.
After the filing of the Consolidated Opposition 26 by Maximo and
Panganiban, as well as the Reply27 thereto filed by Villapando, the METC
denied the Motion to Quash in an Order 28 dated November 11, 2011. The
METC ruled that the presumption of regularity in the performance of
official functions should be appreciated in favor of the public prosecutors.
It found that the certification by ACP Canobas in the Information stating
that the filing of the Information was with the prior authority of the City
Prosecutor constitutes substantial compliance with the rules. As to the
allegation that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, the METC
held that the elements of the crime of perjury were sufficiently alleged in
the Information. The  decretal  portion of the METC Decision states:
WHEREFORE, considering that this case can still be heard and threshed out
in a full blown trial, the Court DENIES the Motion to Quash the Information
dated October 14, 2011 and its Supplements (to Motion to Quash
Information) dated October 19, 2011.
SO ORDERED.29
Villapando moved for reconsideration 30of the Order of the METC dated
November 11, 2011. Maximo and Panganiban opposed 31 the motion and
Villapando replied32 thereto. Also, a supplement33 to the motion was filed
on June 14, 2012.
Meanwhile, after an exchange of pleadings - counter-affidavit, 34 reply-
affidavit,35 and rejoinder-affidavit,36 ACP Vermug, Jr. issued a
Resolution37 (Vermug Resolution) in NPS-No. XV-05-INV-11-C-00601 on
January 13, 2012 finding probable cause against Villapando for the crime of
perjury but dismissed the complaint for unjust vexation. The Resolution
was approved38 by Senior Assistant City Prosecutor (SACP) Christopher
Garvida who recommended for the filing of an Amended Information
before the METC to include Panganiban as one of the complainants.
Thus, on January 19, 2012, the prosecution filed a Motion to Amend the
Information and to Admit Attached Information 39 to include Panganiban as
one of the complainants in the case.
At this point, for a clear reading of the subsequent procedural incidents,
We separately state the proceedings before the Department of Justice
(DOJ) from the proceedings before the courts.
Proceedings before the DOJ:
As earlier stated, the Canobas Resolution pertains to the complaint for
perjury filed by Maximo against Villapando which gave rise to the filing of
the Information before the MeTC, but a motion to partially reconsider the
said resolution was filed by Villapando.
On the other hand, the Vermug Resolution pertains to the complaint for
perjury filed by Panganiban against Villapando which gave rise to the filing
of an Amended Information. On February 13, 2012, Villapando filed a
Motion for Partial Reconsideration40 of the Vermug Resolution before the
OCP-Makati.
On February, 21, 2012, the OCP-Makati issued an Order 41 denying
Villapando's Motion for Partial Reconsideration of the Canobas Resolution.
The Order stated that there was prior written authority for the City
Prosecutor in filing the Information by virtue of Office Order No. 32 dated
July 29, 2011. The finding of probable cause was also affirmed. The Order
was approved by City Prosecutor Feliciano Aspi.
Likewise, on March 20, 2012, the OCP-Makati issued an Order 42 denying
Villapando's Motion for Partial Reconsideration 43 of the Vermug
Resolution. The said Order merely reiterated the ruling in the Order dated
February 21, 2012 denying the Motion for Partial Reconsideration of the
Canobas Resolution. The said Order was also approved by City Prosecutor
Feliciano Aspi.
Aggrieved, Villapando filed separate petitions for review of the Canobas
Resolution and the Vermug Resolution dated March 31, 2012 44and May 7,
2012,45 respectively, before the DOJ. He stated in the petitions the same
allegations in his motions for partial reconsideration. In addition, he
contended that there was even no proof that Maximo and Panganiban
were still minors at the time of the execution of the contract to sell
because they did not submit any birth certificate.
On November 28, 2013, a Resolution46 was issued by Prosecutor General
Claro A. Arellano denying the petitions for review filed by Villapando for
failure to append to the petitions proof that a motion to suspend
proceedings has been filed in court. The copies of the resolution and the
complaint affidavit were likewise declared not verified.
Proceedings before the courts:
As previously mentioned, Villapando moved to reconsider the denial of his
motion to quash the Information before the METC. In an Order 47 dated
February 11, 2013, the METC denied Villapando's motion for
reconsideration thereby affirming the validity of the information, and at
the same time, granted the prosecution's Motion to Amend the
Information.
The Amended Information48 was signed by ACP Evangeline P. Viudez-
Canobas and sworn to before ACP Benjamin S. Vermug, Jr.
On April 25, 2013, Villapando elevated the case to the RTC of Makati City
via a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition (with Prayer for Issuance of
Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary
Injunction)49 assailing the Orders of the METC dated November 11, 2011
and February 11, 2013. A Comment 50 thereto was filed by Maximo and
Panganiban, and a Reply to Comment51 was filed by Villapando.
Subsequently, on May 30, 2013, the RTC issued a Decision, the dispositive
portion of which states, thus:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed 11 November 2011 order
of respondent Judge in Crim. Case No. 36741 which denied petitioner's
Motion to Quash the Information with supplement and the order dated
February 11, 2013 which denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration
and granted the Public Prosecutor's motion to amend Information and
admit attached amended Information are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.52
The RTC ratiocinated that from the denial of the motion to quash,
Villapando should have gone to trial without prejudice to reiterating his
special defenses invoked in his motion. In the event that an adverse
decision is rendered, an appeal therefrom should be the next legal step.
Nonetheless, it found that the presumption of regularity exists in the filing
of the information on the basis of the certification of ACP Canobas and ACP
Vermug, Jr., coupled with the approval of the resolution by Garvida, stating
that the filing of the Information was with the prior authority of the City
Prosecutor. The RTC posited that the presumption has not been disputed
by the City Prosecutor.
Undaunted, a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition53 dated July 31, 2013
was filed by Villapando before the CA. He raised before the CA the same
issues: a) that the Information was filed without the prior written authority
of the City Prosecutor; b) that the facts charged do not constitute an
offense. A comment54 on the petition was filed by Maximo and Panganiban
and a Reply55 thereto was filed by Villapando.
Before the CA, the parties filed their respective Formal Offer of Exhibits
dated January 10, 2014 and January 14, 2014 56 for Villapando and Maximo
and Panganiban, respectively.57 The parties also filed their respective
memoranda.58
On June 13, 2014, the CA rendered a Decision reversing the RTC Decision.
The fallo of the CA Decision states:
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 150, in Special Civil Action No.
13-473 is hereby REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. Criminal Case No. 367041
pending in Branch 67, Metropolitan Trial Court, Makati City is
hereby DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE to the filing of new Information
by an authorized officer.
SO ORDERED.59
Despite the dismissal of the case for perjury filed against him, and
considering that the dismissal was without prejudice to the filing of a new
information against him, Villapando moved for a partial
reconsideration60 of the CA Decision. Villapando argued that the CA did not
resolve the second issue he brought before it, that is, that the facts
charged do not constitute an offense. A Comment 61 to the motion was filed
by Maximo and Panganiban. Villapando62 replied to the comment.
On the other hand, Maximo and Panganiban, as the private complainants
in the aforesaid case for perjury, filed against Villapando also moved for
reconsideration63 on the dismissal of the case by the CA. An
Opposition64 thereto was filed by Villapando.
On October 16, 2014, the motions for reconsideration filed by both parties
were denied by the CA.
Subsequently, Maximo and Panganiban filed a petition for review
on certiorari65 before this Court docketed as G.R. No. 214925. Villapando
followed suit and its petition66 was docketed as G.R. No. 214965.
A Motion to Consolidate67 the two cases was filed by Villapando on April
29, 2015. In this Court's Resolution 68 dated July 13, 2015, We ordered the
consolidation considering that the two cases "have common facts and are
rooted in the same issues."
G.R. No. 214925
We first resolve the petition filed by Maximo and Panganiban which is
anchored on the following assigned errors:
First Reason
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED ERROR WHEN IT TOOK COGNIZANCE
OF RESPONDENT'S PETITION FOR CERTIORARI FILED UNDER RULE 65
BECAUSE -
a. IT IS A WRONG REMEDY;
 b. THE RESPONDENT'S FAILURE TO IMPLEAD THE PEOPLE be dismissed for failure to implead the People in the petition before the
OF THE PHILIPPINES, BEING AN INDISPENSABLE PARTY, RTC and the CA.
WARRANTED THE DISMISSAL OF THE PETITION:
Maximo and Panganiban further averred that Villapando committed forum
c. THE PETITION WAS ACCOMPANIED BY A FALSE shopping because the issues raised before the CA were the same issues
VERIFICATION. brought before the DOJ on a petition for review. They also pointed out that
the petition filed with the CA was prepared only on July 31, 2013, but the
Second Reason verification was executed on June 20, 2013, or forty-one (41) days prior to
the preparation of the petition.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT HELD THAT THE RESPONDENT'S
PETITION FOR CERTIORARI FILED BEFORE THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT Maximo and Panaganiban also contended that the Information bears
WAS PROPERLY FILED; the certification that the filing of the same has the prior authority or
approval of the City Prosecutor. The non-presentation of DOJ Office Order
Third Reason No. 32 which was the basis of the authority in filing the Information is
immaterial on the ground that public officers enjoy the presumption of
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT HELD THAT THE RESPONDENT regularity in the performance of their functions. They also pointed out that
DID NOT COMMIT FORUM SHOPPING DESPITE HIS FILING OF A PETITION the issuance of the Order of the City Prosecutor himself denying
FOR REVIEW BEFORE THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE INVOLVING THE SAME Villapando's Partial Motion for Reconsideration, in effect, affirmed the
PARTIES, FACTS, ISSUES AND RELIEFS; and validity of the Information filed.70

Fourth Reason In the Comment71 to the Petition filed by Villapando, he countered that
under the circumstances of the case, appeal is not the plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary cause of law, hence, certiorari may
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT HELD THAT THE TWO
validly lie. He explained that this case stemmed from a complaint that he
INFORMATIONS WERE NOT PROPERLY FILED DESPITE THE FACT THAT
filed with the OCP Makati City against Maximo and Panganiban as directors
THEIR FILING AS WELL AS THE RESOLUTIONS RECOMMENDING THEIR
of ASB for violations of Sections 17, 20 and 25 of P.D. No. 957. He believed
FILING WERE MADE WITH PRIOR AUTHORITY OF THE CITY PROSECUTOR
that the instant complaint was merely filed in retaliation to his earlier
AND AFFIRMED BY THE CITY PROSECUTOR WHEN HE SUBSEQUENTLY
complaint.
DENIED THE RESPONDENT'S MOTIONS FOR PARTIAL RECONSIDERATION
ON THE ASSAILED RESOLUTIONS.69
Villapando declared that the petition was properly verified. He stated that
during the Oral Argument before the CA on January 7, 2014, he narrated
Maximo and Panganiban asserted in their petition that the denial of a
that his counsel explained to him the contents of the draft of the petition,
petition for certiorari  is a final order, such that, the remedy of the
and the original of the verification page was earlier sent to him for his
aggrieved party on a final order is to appeal the same. Even assuming
perusal and signature. After reading the draft, he immediately signed the
that certiorari is available, the petition with the CA should have not been
final form/original of the verification because he had then a scheduled trip
allowed for failure to file the requisite motion for reconsideration with the
abroad. He also emphasized that the People was represented by the
RTC prior to the filing of the petition. They also argued that since an action
Makati City Prosecution Office before the RTC and by the Office of the
must be brought against indispensable parties, the instant petition should
Solicitor General (OSG) before the CA, and were duly furnished with copies
of all the pleadings.
In the Reply72 of Maximo and Panganiban, they insisted that for failure to
implead the People in the petition with the CA, the CA did not acquire
jurisdiction over the parties.
In the petition filed by Maximo and Villapando, the core issue for this
Court's resolution relates to the validity of the Amended Information at
bar.
Section 4, Rule 112 of the 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure states
that the filing of a complaint or information requires a prior written
authority or approval of the named officers therein before a complaint or
information may be filed before the courts, viz.:
Section 4. Resolution of investigating prosecutor and its review. - If the
investigating prosecutor finds cause to hold the respondent for trial, he
shall prepare the resolution and information. He shall certify under oath in
the information that he, or as shown by the record, an authorized officer,
has personally examined the complainant and his witnesses; that there is
reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been committed and that
the accused is probably guilty thereof; that the accused was informed of
the complaint and of the evidence submitted against him; and that he was
given an opportunity to submit controverting evidence. Otherwise, he shall
recommend the dismissal of the complaint.
Within five (5) days from his resolution, he shall forward the record of the
case to the provincial or city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor, or to the
Ombudsman or his deputy in cases of offenses cognizable by
the Sandiganbayan in the exercise of its original jurisdiction. They shall act
on the resolution within ten (10) days from their receipt thereof and shall
immediately inform the parties of such action.
No complaint or information may be filed or dismissed by an investigating
prosecutor without the prior written authority or approval of
the provincial or city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor or the
Ombudsman or his deputy.
x x x73
Thus, as a general rule, complaints or informations filed before the courts
without the prior written authority or approval of the foregoing authorized
officers render the same defective and, therefore, subject to quashal
pursuant to Section 3 (d), Rule 117 of the same Rules, to wit:
Section 3. Grounds. The accused may move to quash the complaint or
information on any of the following grounds:
(a) That the facts charged do not constitute an offense;
(b) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense
charged;
(c) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the person of the
accused;
(d) That the officer who filed the information had no authority to do so;
(e) That it does not conform substantially to the prescribed form;
(f) That more than one offense is charged except when a single
punishment for various offenses is prescribed by law;
(g) That the criminal action or liability has been extinguished;
(h) That it contains averments which, if true, would constitute a legal
excuse or justification; and
(i) That the accused has been previously convicted or acquitted of the
offense charged, or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise
terminated without his express consent.74
In the case at bar, Villapando is charged in the Amended Information which
reads:
AMENDED INFORMATION
The undersigned Prosecutor accuses FRANCISCO Z. VILLAPANDO of the
crime of perjury under THE REVISED PENAL CODE art. 183, committed as
follows:
On or about the 23rd of November 2010, in the city of Makati, the
Philippines, accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously
and falsely subscribe and swear to a complaint-affidavit docketed as NPS
No. XV-05-INV-10K-03327 before Assistant City Prosecutor Andres N.
Marcos of the Office of the City Prosecutor at Makati, a duly appointed,
qualified, and acting as such, and in which complaint, said accused
subscribed and swore to, among other things, facts known to him to be
untrue, that is: complainants John Labsky P. Maximo and Robert M.
Panganiban were one of the officers of ASB Realty Corporation and/or St.
Francis Square Realty Corporation conspired with the other officers in the
commission of the crime of violation of P.D 957 for entering into the
contract to sell with Enhanced Electronics & Communication Services, Inc.
involving the condominium unit and failure to register the sale and to
complete the project and to deliver the title over the unit, when in truth
and in fact as the said accused very well knew at the time he swore to and
signed the said complaint that said statement appearing therein were false
and untrue because at the time when the contract to sell was made
between the parties, complainants were not even an employee/officers of
the ASB Realty Corporation and was still under age, and the above false
statements were made in order to impute complainants to a crime they
did not commit, to their damage and prejudice.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
(signed)
  BENJAMIN S. VERMUG, JR.
Assistant City Prosecutor
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have conducted a preliminary investigation in this
case in accordance with law; that I have, or as shown by the record, an
authorized officer has personally examined complainant and witnesses,
that on the basis of sworn statements and other evidence submitted
before me there is reasonable ground to believe that the crime has been
committed and that accused is probably guilty thereof, that accused was
informed of the complaint and of the evidence submitted against him and
was given the opportunity to submit controverting evidence. I further
certify that the filing of this Information is with the prior authority or
approval of the City Prosecutor.
(signed)
  BENJAMIN S. VERMUG, JR.
Assistant City Prosecutor
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 26th day of July 2011 in the
City of Makati.
(signed)
  EVANGELINE P. VIUDEZ-CANOBAS
Assistant City Prosecutor
Maximo and Panganiban argued in their petition that the CA erred in
holding that the Information did not comply with the rule requiring prior
written authority or approval of the City or Provincial Prosecutor. They
pointed out that the Information bears the certification that the filing of
the same had the prior authority or approval of the City Prosecutor who is
the officer authorized to file information in court. According to them, there
is a presumption that prior written authority or approval of the City
Prosecutor was obtained in the filing of the Information, such that, the
non-presentation of Office Order No. 32, which was the alleged basis of the
authority in filing the Information, is immaterial.
In the cases of People v. Garfin,75Turingan v. Garfin,76 and Tolentino v.
Paqueo,77 this Court had already rejected similarly-worded certifications
uniformly holding that, despite such certifications, the Informations were
defective as it was shown that the officers filing the same in court either
lacked the authority to do so or failed to show that they obtained prior
written authority from any of those authorized officers enumerated in
Section 4, Rule 112 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. 78
Therefore, there must be a demonstration that prior written delegation or
authority was given by the city prosecutor to the assistant city prosecutor
to approve the filing of the information. We have recognized this valid
delegation of authority in the case of Quisay v. People,79viz.:
In the case at bar, the CA affirmed the denial of petitioner's motion to
quash on the grounds that: (a) the City Prosecutor of Makati may delegate
its authority to approve the filing of the Pabatid Sakdal pursuant to Section
9 of RA 10071, as well as OCP-Makati Office Order No. 32; and (b)
the Pabatid Sakdal contained a Certification stating that its filing before
the RTC was with the prior written authority or approval from the City
Prosecutor.
The CA correctly held that based on the wordings of Section 9 of RA 10071,
which gave the City Prosecutor the power to "[investigate and/or cause to
be investigated all charges of crimes, misdemeanors and violations of
penal laws and ordinances within their respective jurisdictions, and have
the necessary information or complaint prepared or made and
filed against the persons accused," he may indeed delegate his power to
his subordinates as he may deem necessary in the interest of the
prosecution service. The CA also correctly stressed that it is under the
auspice of this provision that the City Prosecutor of Makati issued OCP-
Makati Office Order No. 32, which gave division chiefs or review
prosecutors "authority to approve or act on any resolution, order,
issuance, other action, and any information recommended by any
prosecutor for approval," without necessarily diminishing the City
Prosecutor's authority to act directly in appropriate cases. By virtue of the
foregoing issuances, the City Prosecutor validly designated SACP Hirang,
Deputy City Prosecutor Emmanuel D. Medina, and Senior Assistant City
Prosecutor William Celestino T. Uy as review prosecutors for the OCP-
Makati.
In this light, the Pasiya or Resolution finding probable cause to indict
petitioner of the crime charged, was validly made as it bore the approval of
one of the designated review prosecutors for OCP-Makati, SACP Hirang, as
evidenced by his signature therein.
In the case at bar, if indeed there was no proof of valid delegation of
authority as found by the CA, We are constrained not to accord the
presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions in the
filing of the Amended Information. The CA ruling states:
x x x We scoured the records of the case and We did not find a copy of the
purported Office Order No, 32 allegedly authorizing the Assistant City
Prosecutor to sign in behalf of the city prosecutor. While We, too, are not
oblivious of the enormous responsibility and the heavy volume of work by
our prosecutors, We believe that such reality does not excuse them to
comply with the mandatory requirement stated in our rules of procedure.
Moreover, the said Office Order No. 32 is not a matter of judicial notice,
hence, a copy of the same must be presented in order for the court to have
knowledge of the contents of which. In the absence thereof, We find that
there was no valid delegation of the authority by the City Prosecutor to its
Assistant Prosecutor.80
xxxx
Applying the foregoing lessons from our jurisprudence, We certainly
cannot equate the approval of the Assistant City Prosecutor to that of his
superior. Clearly, we see nothing in the record which demonstrates the
prior written delegation or authority given by the city prosecutor to the
assistant city prosecutor to approve the filing of the information.
For the lack of such prior written authority, the inescapable result is that
the court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case because there is a
defect in the Information. It is for the same reason that there is no point in
compelling petitioner to undergo trial under a defective information that
could never be the basis of a valid conviction.81
Furthermore, We find untenable the argument of Maximo and Panganiban
that the issuance of the Order dated February 21, 2012, bearing the
signature of the City Prosecutor, denying Villapando's Partial Motion for
Reconsideration, in effect, affirmed the validity of the Information filed. 82
The case of People v. Garfin,83firmly instructs that the filing of an
Information by an officer without the requisite authority to file the same
constitutes a jurisdictional infirmity which cannot be cured by silence,
waiver, acquiescence, or even by express consent. In the said case, We lift
the ruling in Villa v. Ibañez, et al.:84
x x x Now, the objection to the respondent's actuations goes to the very
foundation of the jurisdiction. It is avalid information signed by a
competent officer which, among other requisites, confers jurisdiction on
the court over the person of the accused and the subject matter of the
accusation. In consonance with this view, an infirmity in the information
cannot be cured by silence, acquiescence, or even by express consent. 85
An Information, when required by law to be filed by a public prosecuting
officer, cannot be filed by another. The court does not acquire jurisdiction
over the case because there is a defect in the Information. 86 There is no
point in proceeding under a defective Information that could never be the
basis of a valid conviction.87
As to the issue raised by Maximo and Panganiban which relates to the
propriety of the chosen legal remedies availed of by Villapando in the
lower courts to question the denial of his motion to quash, We find the
same untenable.
In the usual course of procedure, a denial of a motion to quash filed by the
accused results in the continuation of the trial and the determination of
the guilt or innocence of the accused. If a judgment of conviction is
rendered and the lower courts' decision of conviction is appealed, the
accused can then raise the denial of his motion to quash not only as an
error committed by the trial court but as an added ground to overturn the
latter's ruling.88
In this case, Villapando did not proceed to trial but opted to immediately
question the denial of his motion to quash via a special civil action
for certiorari  under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
It is also settled that a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition is
not the proper remedy to assail the denial of a motion to quash an
information. The established rule is that when such an adverse
interlocutory order is rendered, the remedy is not to resort forthwith
to certiorari or prohibition, but to continue with the case in due course
and, when an unfavorable verdict is handed down, to take an appeal in the
manner authorized by law.89
As a rule, the denial of a motion to quash is an interlocutory order and is
not appealable; an appeal from an interlocutory order is not allowed under
Section 1(c), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court. 90 Neither can it be a proper
subject of a petition for certiorari which can be used only in the absence of
an appeal or any other adequate, plain and speedy remedy. The plain and
speedy remedy upon denial of an interlocutory order is to proceed to trial
as discussed above.91
Thus, a direct resort to a special civil action for certiorari is an exception
rather than the general rule, and is a recourse that must be firmly
grounded on compelling reasons.92
However, on a number of occasions, We have recognized that in certain
situations, certiorari is considered an appropriate remedy to assail an
interlocutory order, specifically the denial of a motion to quash. We have
recognized the propriety of the following exceptions: (a) when the court
issued the order without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion; (b) when the interlocutory order is patently erroneous and the
remedy of appeal would not afford adequate and expeditious relief; (c) in
the interest of a more enlightened and substantial justice; (d) to promote
public welfare and public policy; and (e) when the cases have attracted
nationwide attention, making it essential to proceed with dispatch in the
consideration thereof.93
In grave abuse of discretion cases, certiorari is appropriate if the petitioner
can establish that the lower court issued the judgment or order without or
in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, and the remedy
of appeal would not afford adequate and expeditious relief. The petitioner
carries the burden of showing that the attendant facts and circumstances
fall within any of the cited instances.94
In the case at bar, We find that there was a compelling reason to justify a
resort to a petition for certiorari against the Order of the METC. Villapando
was able to show that the factual circumstances of his case fall under any
of the above exceptional circumstances. The METC committed grave abuse
of discretion in denying the motion to quash filed by Villapando. We adopt
the ruling of the CA on this matter:
In this petition, petitioner insists that the RTC committed grave abuse of
discretion in dismissing his Petition for Certiorari despite the lack of
authority to file the information from the City Prosecutor, on the basis of
the principle of "presumption of regularity". Verily, the issue raised in this
Petition goes into the very authority of the court over the case. This is
because a finding of the lack of authority for the assistant prosecutor in
approving the probable cause resolution necessarily invalidates the
information, and thereby ousts the court of jurisdiction to try and decide
the case.95 As will be discussed later, petitioner was able to establish the
merit of his contention.
Likewise, We cannot ignore the fact, as admitted by the private
respondents, that this case stemmed from a complaint filed by Petitioner
with the Makati City Prosecution Office against private respondents, as
directors of ASB for violations of Secs. 17, 20 and 25 of PD No. 957 or the
Subdivision and Condominium Buyer's Protective Decree. Petitioner since
the inception of this case, has been insistent that the criminal complaints
filed by private respondents were merely filed in retaliation of his earlier
complaint.
Thus, to deny petitioner the relief of a writ of certiorari and force him to go
to trial would be self-defeating. To require Petitioner to go to the
prescribed route of undergoing trial and filing an appeal thereafter, will
undoubtly expose him to the injuries which he seeks to promptly avoid by
filing the instant Petition.96
As correctly held by the CA, the METC committed an error of jurisdiction,
not simply an error of judgment, in denying Villapando's motion to quash
the Information as will be shown in the succeeding discussion.
Moreover, We recognize that the petition for certiorari filed by Villapando
before the RTC was an original action whose resulting decision is a final
order that completely disposed of the petition. Section 2, Rule 41 of the
Rules of Court,97 states that cases decided by the RTC in the exercise of its
original jurisdiction must be appealed to the CA. Nonetheless, We have
allowed exceptions for good cause that could warrant the relaxation of the
rule as in this case.98 As discussed above, the RTC gravely abuse its
discretion in dismissing the petition of Villapando thereby affirming the
denial of his motion to quash before the METC. We note that Villapando's
liberty was already in jeopardy with the continuation of the criminal
proceedings against him such that a resort to a petition for  certiorari is
recognized.
As a rule, certiorari lies when: (1) a tribunal, board, or officer exercises
judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (2) the tribunal, board, or officer has
acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there is no
appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law.99
The writ of certiorari serves to keep an inferior court within the bounds of
its jurisdiction or to prevent it from committing such a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction, or to relieve parties
from arbitrary acts of courts which courts have no power or authority in
law to perform.100
Anent the issue on forum shopping, We held in the case of Flores v.
Secretary Gonzales, et al.101 that there is no forum shopping when a
petition is filed with the CA while another petition is pending with the DOJ
Secretary, thus:
We wish to point out that, notwithstanding the pendency of the
Information before the MTCC, especially considering the reversal by the
Secretary of Justice of his May 31, 2006 Resolution, a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, anchored on the alleged
grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction on the
part of Secretary of Justice, was an available remedy to Flores as an
aggrieved party.
In the petition for certiorari, the Court of Appeals is not being asked to
cause the dismissal of the case in the trial court, but only to resolve the
issue of whether the Secretary of Justice acted with grave abuse of
discretion in either affirming or reversing the finding of probable cause
against the accused. But still the rule stands the decision whether to
dismiss the case or not rests on the sound discretion of the trial court
where the Information was filed. As jurisdiction was already acquired by
the MTCC, this jurisdiction is not lost despite a resolution by the Secretary
of Justice to withdraw the information or to dismiss the case,
notwithstanding the deferment or suspension of the arraignment of the
accused and further proceedings, and not even if the Secretary of Justice is
affirmed by the higher courts.
Verily, it bears stressing that the trial court is not bound to adopt the
resolution of the Secretary of Justice, in spite of being affirmed by the
appellate courts, since it is mandated to independently evaluate or assess
the merits of the case and it may either agree or disagree with the
recommendation of the Secretary of Justice. Reliance on the resolution of
the Secretary of Justice alone would be an abdication of the trial courts
duty and jurisdiction to determine a prima facie case. Thus, the trial court
may make an independent assessment of the merits of the case based on
the affidavits and counter-affidavits, documents, or evidence appended to
the Information; the records of the public prosecutor which the court may
order the latter to produce before it; or any evidence already adduced
before the court by the accused at the time the motion is filed by the
public prosecutor. The trial court should make its assessment separately
and independently of the evaluation of the prosecution or of the Secretary
of Justice.102
The filing of an appeal with the DOJ as well as the filing of the petition with
the CA would not constitute forum shopping for the reason that the finding
of the DOJ would not be binding upon the courts. In other words, even if
the DOJ recommends dismissal of the criminal case against petitioner, such
resolution would merely be advisory, and not binding upon the courts. The
DOJ ruling on the petition for review would not constitute as res
judicata on the case at bar, neither can it conflict with resolution of the
court on the propriety of dismissing the case.
Forum shopping is the act of a party against whom an adverse judgment
has been rendered in one forum, of seeking another and possibly favorable
opinion in another forum other than by appeal or the special civil action
of certiorari. There can also be forum shopping when a party institutes two
or more suits in different courts, either simultaneously or successively, in
order to ask the courts to rule on the same and related causes and/or to
grant the same or substantially the same reliefs on the supposition that
one or the other court would make a favorable disposition or increase a
party's chances of obtaining a favorable decision or action. 103
Maximo and Panganiban additionally raised the issue that the People of
the Philippines was not impleaded as a respondent in the case nor was the
Office of the Solicitor General furnished a copy of the petition.
Section 5,104 Rule 110 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure states that all
criminal actions are prosecuted under the direction and control of the
public prosecutor. The prosecution of offenses is thus the concern of the
government prosecutors. The purpose in impleading the People of the
Philippines as respondent in the RTC and in the CA is to enable the public
prosecutor or Solicitor General, as the case may be, to comment on the
petitions.105 Evidently, in this case, the People was represented by the
Makati City Prosecution Office before the RTC and by the Office of the
Solicitor General before the CA and were duly furnished with copies of all
the pleadings.
Lastly, We find in the negative the issue of whether the non-filing by
Villapando of a motion for reconsideration of the RTC Decision is fatal to
his petition for certiorari,106 While a motion for reconsideration is a
condition precedent to the filing of a petition for certiorari, this Court has
recognized exceptions to the requirement and cannot unduly uphold
technicalities at the expense of a just resolution of the case. 107
In addition, Section 6, Rule 1 of the Rules of Court provides that rules shall
be liberally construed in order to promote their objective of securing a just,
speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding. Thus,
in several cases, this Court has ruled against the dismissal of petitions or
appeals based solely on technicalities. Technicalities may be set aside
when the strict and rigid application of the rules will frustrate rather than
promote justice.108
The foregoing considered, We deny the petition filed by Maximo and
Panganiban on the ground that, as found by the CA, the records of the case
is bereft of any showing that the City Prosecutor of Makati had authorized
ACP Benjamin S. Vermug, Jr. to file the subject Amended Information.
Thus, the instant defective Amended Information must be quashed. The CA
did not err in finding grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC in
affirming the denial of Villapando's motion to quash the Amended
Information.
G.R. No. 214965
We now turn to the petition filed by Villapando which raised the following
arguments:109
I. Violations of Section 17, 20 and 25 of P.D. 957 are committed not
upon the execution of the Contract to Sell between the Developer
and Buyer, but thereafter. They continue to be committed until
full compliance of the requirements and mandate of law.
II. Violations of Sections 17, 20 and 25 of P.D. 957 are continuing
offenses.
III. Violations of Section 17, 20 and 25 of P.D. 957 are continuing
offenses, hence, the allegations of the Information and amended
Information against petitioner do not constitute the offense
charged (perjury).
IV. The CA should not have skirted but resolved the foregoing
substantial legal issues.
Villapando asserted in his petition that it was necessary for the CA to have
resolved the nature of the violation of Sections 17, 20 and 25 of P.D. No.
957 to determine whether he could be held liable for the crime of perjury.
He stated that nothing in P.D. No. 957 would suggest that violation of its
provisions is committed at the time of the execution of the contract to sell
between the developer and the buyer. According to him, there can be no
violation at the time of the execution of the contract because it could not
yet be determined if the developer will not comply with the law. Violations
occur from the time the developer fails to comply with the law, and
continue to be committed until the developer shall have fully complied
with the law.
Villapando argued in his petition that assuming arguendo that Maximo and
Panganiban were not employees/officers of ASB at the time of the
execution of the contract to sell between ASB and Enhanced, they may still
be held liable being undisputedly directors of ASB at the time the
complaint was filed against them, during which, there was alleged
continued non-compliance with Sections 17, 20 and 25 of P.D. No. 957.
Nonetheless, Villapando insisted that he never alleged in his complaint that
Maximo and Panganiban were employees/officers of ASB at the time of the
execution of the contract to sell. Instead, the two became officers only in
2010 as evidenced by the Articles of Incorporation he attached to his
complaint. He further argued that the said issue is not material to the
charge for violation of P.D. No. 957, and thus, no crime of perjury was
committed.
In the Comment110 of Maximo and Panganiban, they argued that
Villapando misconstrued the concept of continuing crimes. A continuing
crime requires a series of acts which stems from a single criminal
resolution. The alleged violations of Sections 17, 20 and 25 of P.D. No. 957
consist of omissions such that the non-compliance thereof cannot
constitute a continuing crime. They stated that the issue as to whether the
violations of Sections 17, 20 and 25 of P.D. No. 957 are continuing offenses
is a matter of defense which cannot be raised in a motion to quash. They
also stressed that the complaint of Villapando against the ASB had already
prescribed as ruled by the DOJ in its Resolution dated. December 12,
2014.111
In Reply112 to the Comment of Maximo and Panganiban, Villapando insisted
that violation of Sections 17, 20 and 25 of P.D. No. 957 has not yet
prescribed. He learned that there was violation of Section 17 of P.D. No.
957 only when he received the certification of the Makati City Register of
Deeds dated May 12, 2010 stating that the contract to sell has not been
registered with its office. He also stated that the DOJ Resolution dated
December 12, 2014 was brought before this Court on February 18, 2015
via a petition for certiorari docketed as G.R. No. 216546 entitled Francisco
Z. Villapando, Jr. v. Hon Leila de Lima.113
In the Comment114 filed by the OSG, it contended that unless and until the
City Prosecutor files a new information for Perjury against Villapando,
there would be no actual case to speak of and there would be no need for
the court to resolve the issue regarding the nature of the violation of the
provisions of P.D. No. 957.
In the Reply115 to the Comment of the OSG, Villapando averred that it is
proper for this Court that the legal issue be resolved to avoid a circuitous
and vexatious litigation.
Basically, the petition of Villapando imputes grave error on the part of the
CA in not resolving the substantive issue as to whether violations of
Sections 17, 20 and 25 of P.D. No. 957 are continuing offenses.
The argument need not detain Us. This Court's power of review may be
awesome, but it is limited to actual cases and controversies dealing with
parties having adversely legal claims, to be exercised after full opportunity
of argument by the parties, and limited further to the constitutional
question raised or the very lis mota presented.116
An actual case or controversy involves a conflict of legal right, an opposite
legal claim susceptible of judicial resolution. It is definite and concrete,
touching the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interest; a real
and substantial controversy admitting of specific relief.117
We agree with the argument proffered by the OSG that unless and until
the City Prosecutor files a new information for perjury against Villapando,
there would be no actual case to speak of and there would be no need for
the court to resolve the issue regarding the nature of the violation of the
provisions of P.D. No. 957. The resolution on whether Sections 17, 20 and
25 of P.D. No. 957 are continuing offenses would necessarily pre-empt the
outcome of the trial before the proper court should an information be re-
filed by the City Prosecutor.
Quite notable is the statement of Villapando in his Reply that he filed a
petition for certiorari before this Court docketed as G.R. No. 216546
questioning the ruling of the DOJ Secretary in sustaining the denial of his
complaint for violations of Sections 17, 20 and 25 of P.D. No. 957.
Apparently, the arguments he raised in G.R. No. 216546 as to the nature of
the violations of Sections 17, 20 and 25 of P.D. No. 957 are the same
arguments he is raising in the instant petition.
Based on the foregoing, We deny the petition filed by Villapando and
imputes no grave error on the part of the CA in not resolving the
substantive issue as to whether violations of Sections 17, 20 and 25 of P.D.
No. 957 are continuing offenses. We, therefore, uphold the ruling of the CA
that since the Amended Information was defective on its face for having
been filed by an unauthorized person, there was no need to resolve
whether Sections 17, 20 and 25 of P.D. No. 957 are continuing offenses
without pre-empting the trial court should an Information be filed by the
prosecution.
As a final note, We need to state that had the prosecutor and the MeTC
presiding judge been aware of the pertinent provisions of the Rules of
Court on the matter, the defect in the Information could have been cured
before the arraignment of the accused by a simple motion of the public
prosecution to amend the Information; the amendment at this stage of the
proceedings being a matter of right on the part of the prosecution, or for
the court to direct the amendment thereof to show the signature or
approval of the City Prosecutor in filing the Information. Section 4, Rule
117 of the Rules of Court mandates that if the motion to quash is based on
the alleged defect of the complaint or information which can be cured by
amendment, the court shall order that an amendment be made. Had
either of these two been done, this case should have not unnecessarily
reached this Court.
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated June 13, 2014, and Resolution dated Petitioners Hilario P. Soriano and Rosalinda Ilagan (petitioners) appeal by
October 16, 2014 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 131085 are certiorari the August 5, 2003 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in the
hereby AFFIRMED. consolidated cases CA-G.R. SP. Nos. 64648 and 64649.

SO ORDERED. The antecedents.

Hilario P. Soriano (Soriano) and Rosalinda Ilagan (Ilagan) were the

President and General Manager, respectively, of the Rural Bank of San
Miguel (Bulacan), Inc. (RBSM). Allegedly, on June 27, 1997 and August 21,
1997, during their incumbency as president and manager of the bank,
petitioners indirectly obtained loans from RBSM. They falsified the loan
applications and other bank records, and made it appear that Virgilio J.
Malang and Rogelio Mañaol obtained loans of ₱15,000,000.00 each, when
in fact they did not.

Accordingly, on May 4, 2000, State Prosecutor Josefino A. Subia charged

Soriano in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan, with violation
of Section 83 of Republic Act No. 337 (R.A. No. 337) or the General Banking
Act, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1795, or Violation of the
Director, Officer, Stockholder or Related Interest (DOSRI) Rules (DOSRI
Rules). The inculpatory portion of the Information reads:

That on or about June 27, 1997 and thereafter, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the said accused, in his capacity as President of
Republic of the Philippines the Rural Bank of San Miguel (Bulacan), Inc. did then and there, unlawfully,
SUPREME COURT feloniously, and indirectly borrow or secure a loan with Rural Bank of San
Manila Miguel-San Miguel Branch amounting to Php15 million, without the
THIRD DIVISION consent and written approval of the majority of the directors of the bank,
by using the name of one depositor VIRGILIO J. MALANG of San Miguel
G.R. No. 159517-18               June 30, 2009
Bulacan who have no knowledge of the said loan, and once in possession
HILARIO P. SORIANO and ROSALINDA ILAGAN, Petitioners, of the said amount of Php14,775,000.00, net of interest converted the
vs. same to his own personal use and benefit, in flagrant violation of the said
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS law.2
(BSP), and PHILIPPINE DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION
(PDIC), Respondents. On the same date, an information for estafa thru falsification of
DECISION commercial document was also filed against Soriano and Ilagan, viz.:
NACHURA, J.:
That on or about June 27, 1997 and thereafter, in San Miguel, Bulacan and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused HILARIO P.
SORIANO and ROSALINDA ILAGAN, as principals by direct participation,
with unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence and taking advantage of their
position as President of Rural Bank of San Miguel (Bulacan), Inc. and
Manager of Rural Bank of San Miguel-San Miguel Branch, a duly organized
banking institutions under Philippine Laws, conspiring, confederating and
mutually helping one another, did then and there, willfully and feloniously
falsify loan documents consisting of loan application/information sheet,
and promissory note dated June 27, 1997, disclosure statement on
loan/credit transaction, credit proposal report, manager’s check no. 06514
dated June 27, 1997 and undated RBSM-San Miguel Branch check voucher,
by making it appear that one VIRGILIO J. MALANG filed the
aforementioned documents when in truth and in fact, VIRGILIO J. MALANG
did not participate in the execution of said loan document and that by
virtue of said falsification and with deceit and intent to cause damage, the
accused credited the loan proceeds of the loan amounting to
Php14,775,000.00, net of interest, to the account of VIRGILIO J. MALANG
with the RBSM and thereafter converted the same amount to their own
personal gain and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of the Rural Bank
of San Miguel-San Miguel Branch, its creditors and the Bangko Sentral Ng
Pilipinas in the amount of Php14,775,000.00.
CONTRARY TO LAW.3
The informations were docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 1719-M-2000 and
1720-M-2000, respectively, and were raffled to Branch 14, presided by
Judge Petrita Braga Dime.
Another information for violation of Section 83 of R.A. No. 337, as
amended, was filed against Soriano, this time, covering the ₱15,000,000.00
loan obtained in the name of Rogelio Mañaol. The information reads:
That on or about August 21, 1997 and thereafter, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, in his capacity as
President of the Rural Bank of San Miguel (Bulacan), Inc. did then and
there, unlawfully, feloniously, and indirectly borrow or secure a loan with
Rural Bank of San Miguel-San Miguel Branch, a domestic rural ba[n]king
institution created, organized and existing under Philippine laws,
amounting to Php15.0 million, knowing fully well that the same has been
done by him without the written approval of the majority of [the] board of
directors of the said bank and which consent and approval the said
accused deliberately failed to obtain and enter the same upon the record
of said banking institution and to transmit a copy of which to the
supervising department of the said bank, as required by the General
Banking Act, by using the name of one depositor ROGELIO MAÑAOL of San
Jose, San Miguel Bulacan who have no knowledge of the said loan, and
once in possession of the said amount of Php 15.0 million, converted the
same to his own personal use and benefit, in flagrant violation of the said
law.4
Soriano and Ilagan were also indicted for estafa thru falsification of
commercial document for obtaining said loan. Thus:
That on or about August 21, 1997 and thereafter, in San Miguel, Bulacan
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused
HILARIO P. SORIANO and ROSALINDA ILAGAN, as principals by direct
participation, with unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence and taking
advantage of their position as President of Rural Bank of San Miguel
(Bulacan), Inc. and Manager of Rural Bank of San Miguel-San Miguel
Branch, a duly organized banking institutions under Philippine Laws,
conspiring confederating and mutually helping one another, did then and
there, willfully and feloniously falsify loan documents consisting of loan
application/information sheet and promissory note dated August 21, 1997,
by making it appear that one ROGELIO MAÑAOL filled up the
application/information sheet and filed the aforementioned loan
documents when in truth and in fact, ROGELIO MAÑAOL did not
participate in the execution of said loan document and that by virtue of
said falsification and with deceit and intent to cause damage, the accused
succeeded in securing a loan in the amount of Php15.0 million, from Rural
Bank of San Miguel-San Miguel Branch in the name of ROGELIO MAÑAOL,
which amount of Php 15.0 million representing loan proceeds the accused
deposited to the account of ROGELIO MAÑAOL maintained with Rural Bank
of San Miguel and thereafter converted the same amount to their own
personal gain and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of the Rural Bank
of San Miguel-San Miguel Branch, its creditors, the Bangko Sentral Ng
Pilipinas and the Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation in the amount
of Php 15.0 million.
CONTRARY TO LAW.5
The cases were docketed as 1980-M-2000 and 1981-M-2000, respectively,
and were raffled to Branch 77, presided by Judge Aurora Santiago-Lagman.
Petitioners moved to quash the informations in Criminal Case Nos. 1719-
M-2000 and 1720-M-2000 (pending before Branch 14), and also in Criminal
Case Nos. 1980-M-2000 and 1981-M-2000 (pending with Branch 77), on
grounds that: (i) more than one (1) offense is charged; and (ii) the facts
charged do not constitute an offense. Specifically, petitioners argued that
the prosecutor charged more than one offense for a single act. Soriano was
charged with violation of DOSRI rules and estafa thru falsification of
commercial document for allegedly securing fictitious loans. They further
argued that the facts as alleged in the information do not constitute an
offense.
In an Order6 dated November 15, 2000, RTC Branch 77 denied the motion
to quash. Rejecting petitioners’ arguments, it held:
Section 13 of Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides
that the complaint or information must charge but only one offense,
except only in those cases in which existing laws prescribe a single
punishment for various offenses. Under this Rule, the Information is
defective when it charges two (2) or more offenses. The rule enjoining the
charging of two (2) or more offenses in one information has for its aim to
give the defendant the necessary knowledge of the charge to enable him
to prove his defense (People vs. Ferrer, 101 Phil. 234, cited in Herrera
Remedial Law IV., p. 72). While Section 3 (e) of Rule 117 of the Revised
Rules of Court provides as one of the grounds where the accused may
move to quash the complaint or information, considering Sec. 13 of Rule
110 of the Rules as aforestated, it is apparent that the said ground refers
to a situation where the accused is being charged in one information or
criminal complaint for more than one offense. The record shows that two
(2) Informations were filed against the herein accused, one in Criminal
Case No. 1980-M-2000 against accused Hilario P. Soriano for Violation of
Sec. 83 of R.A. No. 337, as amended by PD 1795, and another one in
Criminal Case No. 1981-M-2000 against accused Hilario P. Soriano and
Rosalinda Ilagan for Estafa Thru Falsification of Commercial Documents.
Thus, each Information charges only one offense.
Even assuming that the two (2) cases arose from the same facts, if they
violate two (2) or more provisions of the law, a prosecution under one will
not bar a prosecution under another (Pp. vs. Tac-an, 182 SCRA 601; Lamera
v. Court of Appeals, 198 SCRA 186, cited in Herrera Criminal Procedure,
Vol. 4, p. 453).
Upon the foregoing, this Court finds that there is no basis to quash the
Informations filed in these two (2) cases as the accused are being charged
therein with only one offense in each Information. As to the assertion of
the accused that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, this Court
finds that the allegations of both parties are evidentiary and the same can
only be determined after a full blown trial on the merits of these cases
where both parties will be given a chance to present their evidence in
support of their respective positions.
WHEREFORE, the instant motion is DISMISSED and the arraignment of both
accused and the pre-trial of these cases scheduled on December 4, 2000 at
10:00 o’ clock in the morning, shall proceed as scheduled. 7
Petitioners’ motion to quash informations in Criminal Case Nos. 1719-M-
2000 and 1720-M-2000 before Branch 14 likewise suffered the same fate,
as Judge Braga Dime denied the same in an Order 8 dated November 27,
2000, holding that:
Duplicity in criminal pleading is the joinder of two or more distinct and
separate offenses in the same court of an indictment or information. (41
Am. Jur. 2d 1011). Whether two offenses are charged in an information, or
otherwise, must not be made to depend upon the evidence presented at
the trial court but upon the facts alleged in the information (Provincial
Fiscal of Nueva Ecija vs. CFI, 79 Phil. 165). Where an offense may be
committed in any of the different modes provided by law and the offense
is alleged to have been committed in two or more modes specified, the
indictment is sufficient. The allegations in the information of the various
ways of committing the offense should be considered as a description of
only one offense and the information cannot be dismissed on the ground
of multifariousness (Jurado v. Suy Yan, L-30714, April 30, 1971)
A perusal of the criminal information filed in the above-entitled cases
indubitably show that each information charges only but one offense.
Thus, in Criminal Case No. 1719-M-2000, Accused Hilario P. Soriano is
charged only with violation of Sec. 83 of RA 337, as amended by PD 1796,
while in Criminal Case No. 1720-M-2000, Accused Hilario P. Soriano and
Rosalinda Ilagan are charged only with Estafa thru falsification of
commercial document.
On the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense xxx xxx
xxx
[b]y simply reading the information filed against the Accused Hilario P.
Soriano, in Crim. Case No. 1719-M-2000 it is clear that the allegations,
which is hypothetically admitted by said accused, in the same information
set out an offense for violation of Sec. 83 of RA 337 as amended by PD No.
1795.
Finally, Accused, in addition to the two (2) grounds aforesaid, cited
prematurity and lack of probable cause which would warrant the quashal
of the two (2) informations.
These additional grounds relied upon by the Accused for the quashal of the
two (2) informations must necessarily fail because they are not one of the
grounds enumerated in Sec. 3, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Court
which this Court shall not consider, in accordance with Sec. 2, Rule 117 of
the Revised Rules of Court.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion to Quash, dated September
1, 2000 filed by both Accused is hereby DENIED, for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.9
Petitioners went up to the Court of Appeals via certiorari, assailing the
Orders of Branch 77 and Branch 14. The petitions were docketed as CA-
G.R. SP. Nos. 64648 and 64649. By decision 10 of August 5, 2003, the CA,
which priorly consolidated the petitions, sustained the denial of
petitioners’ separate motions to quash:
WHEREFORE, FOREGOING PREMISES CONSIDERED, these petitions are
DENIED DUE COURSE and accordingly DISMISSED. The assailed Orders
dated November 15, 2000 and February 12, 2001 of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 77, Malolos, Bulacan in Criminal Case Nos. 1980-M-2000 and
1981-M-2000, entitled, "People of the Philippines vs. Hilario P. Soriano and
People of the Philippines vs. Hilario P. Soriano and Rosalinda Ilagan",
respectively, in CA-G.R. SP. No. 64648 and the Orders dated November 27,
2000 and March 9, 2001 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14, Malolos,
Bulacan in Criminal Case Nos. 1719-M-2000 and 1720-M-2000, entitled
"People of the Philippines vs. Hilario P. Soriano and People of the
Philippines vs. Hilario P. Soriano and Rosalinda Ilagan", respectively, in CA-
G.R. SP. No. 64649 are affirmed.11
Petitioners are now before this Court, submitting for resolution the same
matters argued before the RTC and the CA. They insist that RTC Branch 14
and Branch 77 abused their discretion in denying their motions to quash
informations. Thus, they posit that the CA committed reversible error in
dismissing their petitions for certiorari.
The appeal should be denied.
The term grave abuse of discretion, in its juridical sense, connotes
capricious, despotic, oppressive or whimsical exercise of judgment as is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse must be of such degree as to
amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty
enjoined by law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and
capricious manner by reason of passion and hostility. The word capricious,
usually used in tandem with the term arbitrary, conveys the notion of
willful and unreasoning action. Thus, when seeking the corrective hand of
certiorari, a clear showing of caprice and arbitrariness in the exercise of
discretion is imperative.12
We reviewed the records before us, and we discerned no caprice or
arbitrariness on the part of the RTC in denying the motions.
Petitioners assail the validity of the informations against them on the
ground that more than one (1) offense is charged. They point that Soriano
was charged with violation of DOSRI Rules and with estafa thru falsification
of commercial document for allegedly obtaining loans from RBSM. Thus,
they claim that the informations were duplicitous; hence, they should be
quashed.1avvphi1
Indisputably, duplicity of offenses in a single information is a ground to
quash the Information under Section 3(e), Rule 117 13 of the 1985 Rules of
Criminal Procedure. The Rules prohibit the filing of a duplicitous
information to avoid confusing the accused in preparing his defense. 14
By duplicity of charges is meant a single complaint or information that
charges more than one offense. 15 Section 13 of Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules
on Criminal Procedure clearly states:
Duplicity of Offense. – A complaint or information must charge but one
offense, except only in those cases in which existing laws prescribe a single
punishment for various offenses.
Otherwise stated, there is duplicity (or multiplicity) of charges when a
single Information charges more than one offense.16
In this case, however, Soriano was faced not with one information charging
more than one offense, but with more than one information, each charging
a different offense - violation of DOSRI rules in one, and estafa thru
falsification of commercial documents in the others. Ilagan, on the other
hand, was charged with estafa thru falsification of commercial documents
in separate informations. Thus, petitioners erroneously invoke duplicity of
charges as a ground to quash the Informations.
Petitioners also contend that Soriano should be charged with one offense
only, because all the charges filed against him proceed from and are based
on a single act of obtaining fictitious loans. Thus, Soriano argues that he
cannot be charged with estafa thru falsification of commercial document,
considering that he is already being prosecuted for obtaining a DOSRI loan.
The contention has no merit.
Jurisprudence teems with pronouncements that a single act or incident
might offend two or more entirely distinct and unrelated provisions
of law,17 thus justifying the filing of several charges against the accused.
In Loney v. People,18 this Court, in upholding the filing of multiple charges
against the accused, held:
As early as the start of the last century, this Court had ruled that a single
act or incident might offend against two or more entirely distinct and
unrelated provisions of law thus justifying the prosecution of the accused
for more than one offense. The only limit to this rule is the Constitutional
prohibition that no person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for
"the same offense." In People v. Doriquez, we held that two (or more)
offenses arising from the same act are not "the same" —
x x x if one provision [of law] requires proof of an additional fact or
element which the other does not, x x x. Phrased elsewise, where two
different laws (or articles of the same code) define two crimes, prior
jeopardy as to one of them is no obstacle to a prosecution of the other,
although both offenses arise from the same facts, if each crime involves
some important act which is not an essential element of the other.
xxx xxx xxx
Consequently, the filing of the multiple charges against petitioners,
although based on the same incident, is consistent with settled doctrine.
As aptly pointed out by the BSP in its memorandum, there are differences
between the two (2) offenses. A DOSRI violation consists in the failure to
observe and comply with procedural, reportorial or ceiling requirements
prescribed by law in the grant of a loan to a director, officer, stockholder
and other related interests in the bank, i.e. lack of written approval of the
majority of the directors of the bank and failure to enter such approval into
corporate records and to transmit a copy thereof to the BSP supervising
department. The elements of abuse of confidence, deceit, fraud or false
pretenses, and damage, which are essential to the prosecution for estafa,
are not elements of a DOSRI violation. The filing of several charges against
Soriano was, therefore, proper.
Petitioners next question the sufficiency of the allegations in the
informations, contending that the same do not constitute an offense.
The fundamental test in considering a motion to quash anchored on
Section 3 (a),19 Rule 117 of the1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, is the
sufficiency of the averments in the information; that is, whether the facts
alleged, if hypothetically admitted, would establish the essential elements
of the offense charged as defined by law. 20 The trial court may not consider
a situation contrary to that set forth in the criminal complaint or
information. Facts that constitute the defense of the petitioners against
the charge under the information must be proved by them during trial.
Such facts or circumstances do not constitute proper grounds for a motion
to quash the information on the ground that the material averments do
not constitute the offense.21
We have reviewed the informations and find that they contain material
allegations charging Soriano with violation of DOSRI rules and estafa thru
falsification of commercial documents.
In Criminal Case Nos. 1719 & 1980 for violation of DOSRI rules, the
informations alleged that Soriano was the president of RBSMI, while Ilagan
was then its general manager; that during their tenure, Soriano, with the
direct participation of Ilagan, and by using the names of Virgilio Malang
and Rogelio Mañaol, was able to indirectly obtain loans without complying
with the requisite board approval, reportorial and ceiling requirements, in
violation of Section 83 of R.A. No. 37722 as amended.
Similarly, the informations in Criminal Case Nos. 1720 & 1981 charge
petitioners with estafa thru falsification of commercial document. They
allege that petitioners made it appear that Virgilio J. Malang and Rogelio
Mañaol obtained loans and received the proceeds thereof when they did
not in fact secure said loans or receive the amounts reflected in the
promissory notes and other bank records.
The information in Criminal Case No. 1720 further alleges the elements of
estafa under Article 315 (1)(b)23 of the RPC to wit: (i) that money, goods or
other personal property be received by the offender in trust, or on
commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving
the duty to make delivery of or to return the same; (ii) that there be
misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the
offender, or denial on his part of such receipt; (iii) that such
misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another;
and (iv) that there is demand made by the offended party to the offender.
The information in Criminal Case No. 1981, on the other hand, further
alleged the following essential elements of estafa under Article 315 (2)
(a)24 of the RPC: (i) that there must be a false pretense, fraudulent act or
fraudulent means; (ii) that such false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent
means must be made or executed prior to or simultaneously with the
commission of the fraud; (iii) that the offended party must have relied on
the false pretense, fraudulent act, or fraudulent means—that is, he was
induced to part with his money or property because of the false pretense,
fraudulent act, or fraudulent means; and (iv) that, as a result thereof, the
offended party suffered damage. The informations in Criminal Case Nos.
1720 & 1981, thus, charge petitioners with the complex crime of estafa
thru falsification of commercial documents.
Verily, there is no justification for the quashal of the Information filed
against petitioners. The RTC committed no grave abuse of discretion in
denying the motions.
In fine, the Court has consistently held that a special civil action for
certiorari is not the proper remedy to assail the denial of a motion to
quash an information. The proper procedure in such a case is for the
accused to enter a plea, go to trial without prejudice on his part to present
the special defenses he had invoked in his motion to quash and if after trial
on the merits, an adverse decision is rendered, to appeal therefrom in the
manner authorized by law.25 Thus, petitioners should not have forthwith
filed a special civil action for certiorari with the CA and instead, they should
have gone to trial and reiterated the special defenses contained in their
motion to quash. There are no special or exceptional circumstances in the
present case that would justify immediate resort to a filing of a petition for
certiorari. Clearly, the CA did not commit any reversible error, much less,
grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the petition.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED and the assailed Decision
of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 143044. July 14, 2005
WILLIAM MADARANG and EVANS KHO, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, HON.
OFELIA ARELLANO-MARQUEZ, Presiding Judge of the METROPOLITAN
TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON CITY, BRANCH 32 and JANICE YOUNG-
CHUA, Respondents.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court which seeks the reversal of the Decision, 1 dated April 18, 2000, of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 58038 dismissing petitioners’
petition for certiorari.
The factual background of the case is as follows:
On February 11, 1994, private respondent Janice Young-Chua and her
husband, Eduardo Chan-Chua, filed a complaint for replevin and damages
against petitioners William Madarang and Evans Kho in the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-94-19266 and raffled to
Branch 84 (RTC, Branch 84). The complaint alleged that private respondent
is the owner of a 1990 dark gray Kia Pride car, evidenced by Certificate of
Registration No. 086058002 dated May 31, 1991; and that on January 29,
1994, petitioners, through force and intimidation, took possession of the
subject car by virtue of a falsified Deed of Sale dated December 3, 1993
allegedly executed by private respondent in favor of petitioner Madarang. 3
On May 12, 1994, upon complaint of private respondent, petitioner
Madarang was charged with Falsification of Public Document in the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City (MeTC) which was docketed as
Criminal Case No. 94-24930 and raffled to Branch 32. 4 On the same date,
petitioners were charged with Grave Coercion in the same MeTC which
was docketed as Criminal Case No. 94-24931, also raffled to Branch
32.5 The cases were consolidated and jointly tried.
On August 8, 1996, a Motion to Suspend Criminal Proceedings on the
ground of prejudicial question was filed by petitioner Madarang in the
MeTC, claiming that the issues presented in the replevin case pending in
RTC, Branch 84 are intimately related to the issues pending before the
MeTC, the resolution of which would necessarily determine the guilt of the
accused in the criminal case for falsification.6
On October 1, 1996, the MeTC denied petitioner Madarang’s motion to
suspend proceedings on the ground that the decision in the civil case for
replevin will not be determinative of the guilt of the accused in the criminal
charge for falsification.7
On March 7, 1997, RTC, Branch 84 dismissed the complaint for replevin
upon finding that the deed of sale is genuine and that private respondent
voluntarily surrendered possession of the car to the petitioners. 8 Private
respondent filed a timely appeal with the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No.
57597.
On June 13, 1997, petitioner Madarang filed a Motion to Dismiss the
falsification case on the ground that the decision dismissing the replevin
suit in RTC, Branch 84 involving the same parties absolved him of criminal
liability in the falsification case. 9 On January 22, 1998, the MeTC granted
the Motion to Dismiss of petitioner Madarang. 10 On February 27, 1998, a
Motion for Reconsideration was filed by the prosecution on the ground
that the dismissal was unwarranted since the decision dismissing the
replevin suit in RTC, Branch 84 is not yet final and executory, as it is
pending appeal before the CA and the accused deliberately omitted to
send the private prosecutor a copy of said Motion to Dismiss. 11 On July 27,
1998, the MeTC recalled the dismissal of the case for falsification. 12
Petitioners filed a Second Omnibus Motion to Quash Criminal Case Nos.
94-24930 and 94-24931 on the ground that the findings of RTC, Branch 84
that the signature of private respondent in the deed of sale is not falsified
and that private respondent voluntarily surrendered possession of the car
to the petitioners bar the prosecution for falsification and grave coercion.
Petitioners alleged that the findings of the RTC are binding and must be
given due respect by the MeTC notwithstanding the appeal taken by
private respondent.13
In its Opposition, the prosecution alleged that: the motion to quash is a
mere scrap of paper as it is contrary to Section 1, Rule 117 of the Rules of
Court that a Motion to Quash must be filed before arraignment of accused
and such failure to move to quash before entering his plea, accused is
deemed to have waived his right to file the same; and, the replevin suit is
an independent civil action, separate and distinct from these cases for
falsification of public document and grave coercion. 14
On March 26, 1999, the MeTC denied petitioners’ motion to quash, ruling
that the decision rendered by the RTC, Branch 84 in the replevin case
cannot absolve petitioners of the charges in the criminal cases as said
decision has not attained finality since it is pending appeal before the CA;
and that petitioners waived any grounds of a Motion to Quash pursuant to
Section 1, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court. 15
Petitioners then filed a petition for certiorari before the RTC, Branch 77,
Quezon City (RTC, Branch 77), docketed as Civil Case No. Q-99-37324. They
assailed the MeTC’s denial of their motion to quash the informations for
falsification of public document and grave coercion and alleged that the
MeTC should have adopted the factual findings of RTC, Branch 84 in the
Decision dated March 7, 1997 in the replevin case as res judicata.16
On October 8, 1999, the RTC, Branch 77 dismissed petitioners’ petition
for certiorari upon holding that: res judicata cannot be invoked considering
that the Decision dated March 7, 1997 of RTC, Branch 84 in the replevin
case is not yet a final and executory judgment, being on appeal; in any
event, a final judgment rendered in a civil action absolving the defendant
from civil liability is not a bar to criminal action; the issues of falsification
and coercion were not made the subject of a full-dressed hearing in the
replevin case; and, the motion to quash was filed only after their
arraignment in violation of the well-settled doctrine that a motion to quash
may be filed only before the accused has entered his plea to the
accusatory pleading.17
Petitioners’ filed a motion for reconsideration 18 but was denied in an Order
dated February 29, 2000.19
Undaunted, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari before the CA which,
on April 18, 2000, was dismissed. In dismissing the petition, the CA held
that the writ of certiorari is not the proper remedy where a motion to
quash an information is denied. It further held that the People of the
Philippines was not impleaded as a respondent in the case nor was the
Office of the Solicitor General furnished a copy of the petition when the
Informations were filed in the name of the People of the Philippines and
necessarily it is the party interested in sustaining the proceedings in the
court.20
Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari anchored on the
following grounds:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS HAS DECIDED THE ISSUES
PRESENTED PROBABLY NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW OR WITH THE
APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS HAS SO FAR DEPARTED FROM THE
ACCEPTED AND USUAL COURSE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS OR SO FAR
SANCTIONED SUCH DEPARTURE BY THE LOWER COURT AS TO CALL FOR AN
EXERCISE OF THE POWER OF SUPERVISION. 21
Petitioners claim that the MeTC Judge committed grave abuse of discretion
when she denied their motion to quash the Informations and refused to
dismiss the charges against them since the charges against them pending
before her court were "obliterated" by the positive factual findings of RTC,
Branch 84 in its Decision dated March 7, 1997 that the signature of private
respondent in the Deed of Sale dated December 3, 1993 is genuine and she
voluntarily surrendered the car to petitioners. They maintain that such
factual findings of RTC, Branch 84 in its Decision dated March 7, 1997 bar
their prosecution in the criminal cases for falsification of public document
and grave coercion. They submit that once a court of competent
jurisdiction puts to finish an issue of fact, it cannot be disturbed by the
lower court and, accordingly, the factual findings of RTC, Branch 84 cannot
be overturned by the MeTC.
The Solicitor General, on the other hand, avers that the decision in the
replevin suit cannot foreclose or suspend the prosecution of the criminal
cases for falsification and grave coercion as replevin is an entirely separate
and distinct remedy allowed by the rules. He states that res
judicata cannot apply for lack of the essential elements of identity of
parties and finality of the decision in the replevin suit.
As for private respondent, she argues that the decision of RTC, Branch 84
can not be conclusive upon the MeTC because it is not a final and
executory judgment, being on appeal in the CA, and, even if final, the rules
provide that such final decision does not foreclose prosecution of the
criminal action. She insists that the MeTC Judge did not act beyond her
jurisdiction as the denial of the motion to quash was in accordance with
law and jurisprudence and, thus, petitioners’ resort to certiorari was
improper and appropriately dismissed by the RTC and the CA.
At the outset, we observe that while the assigned errors appear to raise
errors of judgment committed by the CA, the arguments of the petitioners
purely dwell on the alleged grave abuse of discretion or error of
jurisdiction committed by the MeTC in denying the Motion to Quash, the
very issue they raised in the petition for certiorari before the RTC, when
the issues that should have been raised in the petition for review
on certiorari before us are the errors of judgment that the CA may have
committed in dismissing their petition for certiorari. Petitioners’ utter
failure to bring up the matter concerning the CA’s bases in dismissing their
petition shows that they are evading the issues.
Nonetheless, we find that the CA is correct in dismissing petitioners’
petition for certiorari.
First. We note that the petitions for certiorari in the RTC and CA are
defective since petitioners failed to implead the People of the Philippines
as respondent therein. As provided in Section 5, 22 Rule 110 of the Rules of
Criminal Procedure, all criminal actions are prosecuted under the direction
and control of the public prosecutor. The prosecution of offenses is thus
the concern of the government prosecutors. It behooved the petitioners to
implead the People of the Philippines as respondent in the RTC and in the
CA to enable the public prosecutor or Solicitor General, as the case may be,
to comment on the petitions. The failure to implead is fatal to petitioners’
cause.
Second. It is settled that a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition
is not the proper remedy to assail the denial of a motion to quash an
information. The established rule is that when such an adverse
interlocutory order is rendered, the remedy is not to resort forthwith
to certiorari or prohibition, but to continue with the case in due course
and, when an unfavorable verdict is handed down to take an appeal in the
manner authorized by law. 23 Only when the court issued such order
without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion and
when the assailed interlocutory order is patently erroneous and the
remedy of appeal would not afford adequate and expeditious relief
will certiorari be considered an appropriate remedy to assail an
interlocutory order.24 No such special circumstances are present in the case
at bar.
The declaration of RTC, Branch 84 in its Decision dated March 7, 1997 that
the signature of private respondent in the Deed of Sale dated December 3,
1993 is genuine and she voluntarily surrendered the car to petitioners is
not res judicata in the criminal cases for falsification and grave coercion
because there is no identity of parties as the People of the Philippines is
not a party in the replevin suit and cannot be bound by the factual findings
therein. Besides, the decision of RTC, Branch 84 is still pending appeal with
the CA. Hence, at the time the MeTC, the RTC and the CA rendered their
assailed order, decision and resolution, respectively, there existed no
special circumstance to warrant a dismissal of the cases pending in the
MeTC.
It is noted that during the pendency of the case before us, the CA has
rendered a Decision dated April 19, 2005 modifying the Decision dated
March 7, 1997 of RTC, Branch 84, in this wise:
WHEREFORE, the application for a Writ of Replevin is hereby DENIED, the
plaintiff Janice Chua having executed a Deed of Sale in favor of defendant
William Madarang.
The Deed of Sale is however, hereby declared as an equitable mortgage
and, therefore, plaintiff Janice Chua possesses the right of redemption
pursuant to Article 1606 of the New Civil Code.
SO ORDERED.
However, records before us do not show that this decision had become
final and executory. As a natural or inherent and inevitable consequence of
said declaration, a decision which has not become final and executory has
no conclusive effect.
Third. Section 3, Rule 117 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, the
governing law at the time of the filing of the indictments, provides the
grounds on which an accused can move to quash the complaint or
information. These are: (a) the facts charged do not constitute an offense;
(b) the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged;
(c) the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the person of the
accused; (d) the officer who filed the information had no authority to do
so; (e) the information does not conform substantially to the prescribed
form; (f) more than one offense is charged, except in those cases in which
existing laws prescribe a single punishment for various offenses; (g) the
criminal action or liability has been extinguished; (h) the information
contains averments which, if true, would constitute a legal excuse or
justification; and (i) the accused has been previously convicted or is in
jeopardy of being convicted or acquitted of the offense charged. 25
Section 8 of the same Rule specifically provides:
SEC. 8. Failure to move to quash or to allege any ground therefor. – The
failure of the accused to assert any ground of a motion to quash before he
pleads to the complaint or information, either because he did not file a
motion to quash or failed to allege the same in said motion, shall be
deemed a waiver of the grounds of a motion to quash, except the grounds
of no offense charged, lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged,
extinction of the offense or penalty and jeopardy, as provided for in
paragraphs (a), (b), (f) and (h) of Section 3 of this Rule. (10a)
Thus, a motion to quash may still be filed after pleading to the complaint or
information where the grounds are that no offense is charged, lack of
jurisdiction over the offense charged, extinction of the offense or penalty
and jeopardy. Nowhere in the enumerated excepted grounds is there any
mention of res judicata as a ground to quash an information.
Fourth. Section 4, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court explicitly recognizes that
"a final judgment rendered in a civil action absolving the defendant from
civil liability is no bar to a criminal action." 26
Fifth. Article 3327 of the Civil Code provides that in cases involving alleged
fraudulent acts, a civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct
from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil
action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution and shall
require only a preponderance of evidence. It is clear, therefore, that the
civil case for replevin may proceed independently of the criminal cases for
falsification and grave coercion, especially because while both cases are
based on the same facts, the quantum of proof required for holding the
parties liable therein differs.28
All told, the petitioners failed to show why the actions of the MeTC, RTC
and the CA which have passed upon the same issue should be reversed.
We are thus convinced that the CA committed no reversible error in its
challenged Decision.
WHEREFORE, the present petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision of the
Court of Appeals, dated April 18, 2000, is AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 173588               April 22, 2009
ARIEL M. LOS BAÑOS, on behalf of P/Supt. Victor Arevalo, SPO2 Marcial
Olympia, SPO1 Rocky Mercene and PO1 Raul Adlawan, and in his
personal capacity, Petitioner,
vs.
JOEL R. PEDRO, Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We review in this petition for review on certiorari 1 the September 19, 2005
decision2 and the July 6, 2006 resolution 3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. SP No. 80223. The petition seeks to revive the case against
respondent Joel R. Pedro (Pedro) for election gun ban violation after the
CA declared the case permanently dismissed pursuant to Section 8, Rule
117 of the Rules of Court.
THE ANTECEDENTS
Pedro was charged in court for carrying a loaded firearm without the
required written authorization from the Commission on Elections
(Comelec) a day before the May 14, 2001 national and local elections. The
Information reads:
That on or about the 13th day of May 2001 at about 4:00 o’clock in the
afternoon, in [S]itio Bantauyan, [B]arangay Bantad, Municipality of Boac,
Province of Marinduque, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously carry a Revolver Cal. 357, Magnum Ruger 100
loaded with six (6) ammunitions, with Serial No. 173-56836 outside his
residence during the election period, without authorization in writing from
the Commission on Election[s].
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
The accusation was based on Batas Pambansa Bilang 881 or the Omnibus
Election Code (Code) after the Marinduque Philippine National Police (PNP)
caught Pedro illegally carrying his firearm at a checkpoint at Boac,
Marinduque. The Boac checkpoint team was composed of Police Senior
Inspector Victor V. Arevalo, SPO2 Marshal Olympia, SPO1 Rocky Mercene,
and PO1 Raul Adlawan. The team stopped a silver-gray Toyota Hi-Ace with
plate number WHT-371 on the national highway, coming from the Boac
town proper. When Pedro (who was seated at the rear portion) opened
the window, Arevalo saw a gun carry case beside him. Pedro could not
show any COMELEC authority to carry a firearm when the checkpoint team
asked for one, but he opened the case when asked to do so. The
checkpoint team saw the following when the case was opened: 1) one
Revolver 357 Magnum Ruger GP100, serial number 173-56836, loaded
with six ammunitions; 2) one ammunition box containing 100 bullets; 3)
two pieces speed loader with six ammunitions each; and 4) one set ear
protector. Pedro was with three other men. The checkpoint team brought
all of them to the Boac police station for investigation.
The Boac election officer filed a criminal complaint against Pedro for
violating the election gun ban, i.e., for carrying a firearm outside of his
residence or place of business without any authority from the Comelec.
After an inquest, the Marinduque provincial prosecutor filed the above
Information against Pedro with the Marinduque Regional Trial Court (RTC)
for violation of the Code’s Article XXII, Section 261 (q), 5 in relation to
Section 264.6
Pedro filed a Motion for Preliminary Investigation, which the RTC
granted.7 The preliminary investigation, however, did not materialize.
Instead, Pedro filed with the RTC a Motion to Quash, arguing that the
Information "contains averments which, if true, would constitute a legal
excuse or justification8 and/or that the facts charged do not constitute an
offense."9 Pedro attached to his motion a Comelec Certification dated
September 24, 2001 that he was "exempted" from the gun ban. The
provincial prosecutor opposed the motion.
The RTC quashed the Information and ordered the police and the
prosecutors to return the seized articles to Pedro.10
The petitioner, private prosecutor Ariel Los Baños (Los Baños),
representing the checkpoint team, moved to reopen the case, as Pedro’s
Comelec Certification was a "falsification," and the prosecution was
"deprived of due process" when the judge quashed the information
without a hearing. Attached to Los Baños’ motion were two Comelec
certifications stating that: (1) Pedro was not exempted from the firearm
ban; and (2) the signatures in the Comelec Certification of September 24,
2001 were forged.
The RTC reopened the case for further proceedings, as Pedro did not
object to Los Baños’ motion.11 Pedro moved for the reconsideration of the
RTC’s order primarily based on Section 8 of Rule 117, 12 arguing that the
dismissal had become permanent. He likewise cited the public prosecutor’s
lack of express approval of the motion to reopen the case.
The public prosecutor, however, manifested his express conformity with
the motion to reopen the case. The trial court, for its part, rejected the
position that Section 8, Rule 117 applies, and explained that this provision
refers to situations where both the prosecution and the accused mutually
consented to the dismissal of the case, or where the prosecution or the
offended party failed to object to the dismissal of the case, and not to a
situation where the information was quashed upon motion of the accused
and over the objection of the prosecution. The RTC, thus, set Pedro’s
arraignment date.
Pedro filed with the CA a petition for certiorari and prohibition to nullify
the RTC’s mandated reopening.13 He argued that the RTC committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in ruling that
the dismissal contemplated under Section 8, Rule 117 refers to situations
where either the prosecution and the accused mutually consented to, or
where the prosecution alone moved for, the provisional dismissal of the
case; in rejecting his argument that the prescriptive periods under Article
90 of the Revised Penal Code14 or Act No. 332615 find no application to his
case as the filing of the Information against him stopped the running of the
prescriptive periods so that the prescription mandated by these laws
became irrelevant; and, in setting the case for arraignment and pre-trial
conference, despite being barred under Section 8 of Rule 117.
THE COURT OF APPEALS DECISION
The CA initially denied Pedro’s petition. For accuracy, we quote the
material portions of its ruling:
The petition lacks merit.
The trial court erred in ruling that Section 8, Rule 117 does not apply to
provisional dismissals on motion of the accused. The Rule merely provides
that a case shall not be provisionally dismissed, except with the express
consent of the accused and with notice to the offended party. Nothing in
the said rule proscribes its application to dismissal on motion of the
accused.
Nevertheless, we find no basis for issuing the extraordinary writs of
certiorari and prohibition, as there is no showing that the error was tainted
with grave abuse of discretion. Grave abuse of discretion implies capricious
and whimsical exercise of judgment amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The
grave abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion or refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law.
Before the petitioner may invoke the time-bar in Section 8, he must
establish the following:
1. the prosecution, with the express conformity of the accused or
the accused moves for a provisional (sin perjuicio) dismissal of the
case; or both the prosecution and the accused move for a
provisional dismissal of the case;
2. the offended party is notified of the motion for a provisional
dismissal of the case;
3. the court issues an order granting the motion and dismissing
the case provisionally;
4. the public prosecutor is served, with a copy of the order of
provisional dismissal of the case.
Although the second paragraph of Section 8 states that the order of
dismissal shall become permanent one year after the issuance thereof,
without the case having been revived, such provision should be construed
to mean that the dismissal shall become permanent one year after service
of the order of dismissal on the public prosecutor, as the public prosecutor
cannot be expected to comply with the timeliness requirement unless he is
served with a copy of the order of dismissal.
In the instant, case, the records are bereft of proof as to when the public
prosecutor was served the order of dismissal dated 22 November 2001.
Absent such proof, we cannot declare that the State is barred from reviving
the case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
In his motion for reconsideration, Pedro manifested the exact date and
time of the Marinduque provincial prosecutor’s receipt of the quashal
order to be "2:35 p.m., December 10, 2001," and argued that based on this
date, the provisional dismissal of the case became "permanent" on
December 10, 2002. Based on this information, the CA reversed itself,
ruling as follows:
On 9 September 2005, we ruled that Section 8, Rule 117 is applicable to a
dismissal on motion of the accused. However, we did not issue the writs of
certiorari and prohibition, because it was shown that the trial court
committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering the reopening of the case.
Moreover, we stated that we cannot rule on the issue of whether or not
the State is barred from reopening the case because it was not shown
when the public prosecutor was served the order of dismissal.
xxx
The arguments raised in the respondents’ motion for modification were
duly passed upon in arriving at the decision dated 9 September 2005, and
no new matters were raised which would warrant a reconsideration
thereof.
On the other hand, the petitioner was able to prove that the motion to
reopen the case was filed after the lapse of more than one year from the
time the public prosecutor was served the notice of dismissal. Therefore,
the state is barred from reopening the case.
WHEREFORE, petitioner Joel Pedro’s motion for partial reconsideration is
hereby GRANTED, and respondent Ariel Los Banos’ motion for modification
of judgment is, accordingly, DENIED.
To summarize this ruling, the appellate court, while initially saying that
there was an error of law but no grave abuse of discretion that would call
for the issuance of a writ, reversed itself on motion for reconsideration; it
then ruled that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion because it
failed to apply Section 8, Rule 17 and the time-bar under this provision.
THE PETITION
Los Baños prays in his petition that the case be remanded to the RTC for
arraignment and trial, or that a new charge sheet be filed against Pedro, or
that the old information be re-filed with the RTC. He contends that under
Section 6 of Rule 117, an order sustaining a motion to quash does not bar
another prosecution for the same offense, unless the motion was based on
the grounds specified in Section 3(g) 16 and (i)17 of Rule 117. Los Baños
argues that the dismissal under Section 8 of Rule 117 covers only situations
where both the prosecution and the accused either mutually consented or
agreed to, or where the prosecution alone moved for the provisional
dismissal of the case; it can also apply to instances of failure on the part of
the prosecution or the offended party to object, after having been
forewarned or cautioned that its case will be dismissed. It does not apply
where the information was quashed. He adds that although the trial court
granted the motion to quash, it did not categorically dismiss the case,
either provisionally or permanently, as the judge simply ordered the return
of the confiscated arms and ammunition to Pedro. The order was "open-
ended," and did not have the effect of provisionally dismissing the case
under Section 8 of Rule 117.
Los Baños also contends that the CA gravely erred when: (1) it ruled in
effect that the Order dated November 22, 2001 granting the motion to
quash is considered a provisional dismissal, which became permanent one
year from the prosecutor’s receipt of the order; the order to quash the
Information was based on Section 3 of Rule 117, not on Section 8 of this
Rule; (2) it granted Pedro’s motion for reconsideration and denied Los
Baños’ motion for modification of judgment, when Section 6 of Rule 117
clearly provides that an order granting a motion to quash is not a bar to
another prosecution for the same offense.
He notes that the grounds Pedro relied upon in his motion to quash are
not subsections (g) or (i) of Rule 117, but its subsections (a) – that the facts
charged do not constitute an offense, and (h) – that it contains averments
which if true would constitute a legal justification. Pedro’s cited grounds
are not the exceptions that would bar another prosecution for the same
offense.18 The dismissal of a criminal case upon the express application of
the accused (under subsections [a] and [h]) is not a bar to another
prosecution for the same offense, because his application is a waiver of his
constitutional prerogative against double jeopardy.
In response to all these, respondent Pedro insists and fully relies on the
application of Section 8 of Rule 117 to support his position that the RTC
should not have granted Los Banos’ motion to reopen the case.
THE ISSUES
The issue is ultimately reduced to whether Section 8, Rule 117 is applicable
to the case, as the CA found. If it applies, then the CA ruling effectively lays
the matter to rest. If it does not, then the revised RTC decision reopening
the case should prevail.
OUR RULING
We find the petition meritorious and hold that the case should be
remanded to the trial court for arraignment and trial.
Quashal v. Provisional Dismissal
a. Motion to Quash
A motion to quash is the mode by which an accused assails, before
entering his plea, the validity of the criminal complaint or the criminal
information filed against him for insufficiency on its face in point of law, or
for defect apparent on the face of the Information. 19 The motion, as a rule,
hypothetically admits the truth of the facts spelled out in the complaint or
information. The rules governing a motion to quash are found under Rule
117 of the Revised Rules of Court. Section 3 of this Rule enumerates the
grounds for the quashal of a complaint or information, as follows:
(a) That the facts charged do not constitute an offense;
(b) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense
charged;
(c) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the person of the
accused;
(d) That the officer who filed the information had no authority to do so;
(e) That it does not conform substantially to the prescribed form;
(f) That more than one offense is charged except when a single
punishment for various offenses is prescribed by law;
(g) That the criminal action or liability has been extinguished;
(h) That it contains averments which, if true, would constitute a legal
excuse or justification; and
(i) That the accused has been previously convicted or acquitted of the
offense charged, or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise
terminated without his express consent.
b. Provisional Dismissal
On the other hand, Section 8, Rule 117 that is at the center of the dispute
states that:
SEC.8. Provisional dismissal.  — A case shall not be provisionally dismissed
except with the express consent of the accused and with notice to the
offended party.
The provisional dismissal of offenses punishable by imprisonment not
exceeding six (6) years or a fine of any amount, or both, shall become
permanent one (1) year after issuance of the order without the case having
been revived. With respect to offenses punishable by imprisonment of
more than six (6) years, their provisional dismissal shall become permanent
two (2) years after issuance of the order without the case having been
revived.
A case is provisionally dismissed if the following requirements concur:
1) the prosecution with the express conformity of the accused, or the
accused, moves for a provisional dismissal (sin perjuicio) of his case; or
both the prosecution and the accused move for its provisional dismissal;
2) the offended party is notified of the motion for a provisional dismissal of
the case;
3) the court issues an order granting the motion and dismissing the case
provisionally; and
4) the public prosecutor is served with a copy of the order of provisional
dismissal of the case.20
In People v. Lacson,21 we ruled that there are sine quanon  requirements in
the application of the time-bar rule stated in the second paragraph of
Section 8 of Rule 117. We also ruled that the time-bar under the foregoing
provision is a special procedural limitation qualifying the right of the State
to prosecute, making the time-bar an essence of the given right or as an
inherent part thereof, so that the lapse of the time-bar operates to
extinguish the right of the State to prosecute the accused.
c. Their Comparison
An examination of the whole Rule tells us that a dismissal based on a
motion to quash and a provisional dismissal are far different from one
another as concepts, in their features, and legal consequences. While the
provision on provisional dismissal is found within Rule 117 (entitled Motion
to Quash), it does not follow that a motion to quash results in a provisional
dismissal to which Section 8, Rule 117 applies.
A first notable feature of Section 8, Rule 117 is that it does not exactly
state what a provisional dismissal is. The modifier "provisional" directly
suggests that the dismissals which Section 8 essentially refers to are those
that are temporary in character (i.e., to dismissals that are without
prejudice to the re-filing of the case), and not the dismissals that are
permanent (i.e., those that bar the re-filing of the case). Based on the law,
rules, and jurisprudence, permanent dismissals are those barred by the
principle of double jeopardy, 22 by the previous extinction of criminal
liability,23 by the rule on speedy trial, 24 and the dismissals after plea
without the express consent of the accused. 25 Section 8, by its own terms,
cannot cover these dismissals because they are not provisional.
A second feature is that Section 8 does not state the grounds that lead to a
provisional dismissal. This is in marked contrast with a motion to quash
whose grounds are specified under Section 3. The delimitation of the
grounds available in a motion to quash suggests that a motion to quash is a
class in itself, with specific and closely-defined characteristics under the
Rules of Court. A necessary consequence is that where the grounds cited
are those listed under Section 3, then the appropriate remedy is to file a
motion to quash, not any other remedy. Conversely, where a ground does
not appear under Section 3, then a motion to quash is not a proper
remedy. A motion for provisional dismissal may then apply if the
conditions required by Section 8 obtain.
A third feature, closely related to the second, focuses on the consequences
of a meritorious motion to quash. This feature also answers the question
of whether the quashal of an information can be treated as a provisional
dismissal. Sections 4, 5, 6, and 7 of Rule 117 unmistakably provide for the
consequences of a meritorious motion to quash. Section 4 speaks of an
amendment of the complaint or information, if the motion to quash relates
to a defect curable by amendment. Section 5 dwells on the effect of
sustaining the motion to quash - the complaint or information may be re-
filed, except for the instances mentioned under Section 6. The latter
section, on the other hand, specifies the limit of the re-filing that Section 5
allows – it cannot be done where the dismissal is based on extinction of
criminal liability or double jeopardy. Section 7 defines double jeopardy and
complements the ground provided under Section 3(i) and the exception
stated in Section 6.1awwphi1
Rather than going into specifics, Section 8 simply states when a provisional
dismissal can be made, i.e., when the accused expressly consents and the
offended party is given notice. The consent of the accused to a dismissal
relates directly to what Section 3(i) and Section 7 provide, i.e., the
conditions for dismissals that lead to double jeopardy. This immediately
suggests that a dismissal under Section 8 – i.e., one with the express
consent of the accused – is not intended to lead to double jeopardy as
provided under Section 7, but nevertheless creates a bar to further
prosecution under the special terms of Section 8.
This feature must be read with Section 6 which provides for the effects of
sustaining a motion to quash – the dismissal is not a bar to another
prosecution for the same offense – unless the basis for the dismissal is the
extinction of criminal liability and double jeopardy. These unique terms,
read in relation with Sections 3(i) and 7 and compared with the
consequences of Section 8, carry unavoidable implications that cannot but
lead to distinctions between a quashal and a provisional dismissal under
Section 8. They stress in no uncertain terms that, save only for what has
been provided under Sections 4 and 5, the governing rule when a motion
to quash is meritorious are the terms of Section 6. The failure of the Rules
to state under Section 6 that a Section 8 provisional dismissal is a bar to
further prosecution shows that the framers did not intend a dismissal
based on a motion to quash and a provisional dismissal to be confused
with one another; Section 8 operates in a world of its own separate from
motion to quash, and merely provides a time-bar that uniquely applies to
dismissals other than those grounded on Section 3. Conversely, when a
dismissal is pursuant to a motion to quash under Section 3, Section 8 and
its time-bar does not apply.
Other than the above, we note also the following differences stressing that
a motion to quash and its resulting dismissal is a unique class that should
not be confused with other dismissals:
First, a motion to quash is invariably filed by the accused to
question the efficacy of the complaint or information filed against
him or her (Sections 1 and 2, Rule 117); in contrast, a case may be
provisionally dismissed at the instance of either the prosecution
 or the accused, or both, subject to the conditions enumerated
under Section 8, Rule 117.26
Second, the form and content of a motion to quash are as stated
under Section 2 of Rule 117; these requirements do not apply to a
provisional dismissal.
Third, a motion to quash assails the validity of the criminal
complaint or the criminal information for defects or defenses
apparent on face of the information; a provisional dismissal may
be grounded on reasons other than the defects found in the
information.
Fourth, a motion to quash is allowed before the arraignment
(Section 1, Rule 117); there may be a provisional dismissal of the
case even when the trial proper of the case is already underway
provided that the required consents are present. 27
Fifth, a provisional dismissal is, by its own terms, impermanent
until the time-bar applies, at which time it becomes a permanent
dismissal. In contrast, an information that is quashed stays
quashed until revived; the grant of a motion to quash does not
per se carry any connotation of impermanence, and becomes so
only as provided by law or by the Rules. In re-filing the case, what
is important is the question of whether the action can still be
brought, i.e., whether the prescription of action or of the offense
has set in. In a provisional dismissal, there can be no re-filing after
the time-bar, and prescription is not an immediate consideration.
To recapitulate, quashal and provisional dismissal are different concepts
whose respective rules refer to different situations that should not be
confused with one another. If the problem relates to an intrinsic or
extrinsic deficiency of the complaint or information, as shown on its face,
the remedy is a motion to quash under the terms of Section 3, Rule 117. All
other reasons for seeking the dismissal of the complaint or information,
before arraignment and under the circumstances outlined in Section 8, fall
under provisional dismissal.
Thus, we conclude that Section 8, Rule 117 does not apply to the
reopening of the case that the RTC ordered and which the CA reversed; the
reversal of the CA’s order is legally proper.
Pedro’s Motion to Quash
The merits of the grant of the motion to quash that the RTC initially
ordered is not a matter that has been ruled upon in the subsequent
proceedings in the courts below, including the CA. We feel obliged to refer
back to this ruling, however, to determine the exact terms of the remand
of the case to the RTC that we shall order.
The grounds Pedro cited in his motion to quash are that the Information
contains averments which, if true, would constitute a legal excuse or
justification [Section 3(h), Rule 117], and that the facts charged do not
constitute an offense [Section 3(a), Rule 117]. We find from our
examination of the records that the Information duly charged a specific
offense and provides the details on how the offense was
committed.28 Thus, the cited Section 3(a) ground has no merit. On the
other hand, we do not see on the face or from the averments of the
Information any legal excuse or justification. The cited basis, in fact, for
Pedro’s motion to quash was a Comelec Certification (dated September 24,
2001, issued by Director Jose P. Balbuena, Sr. of the Law Department,
Committee on Firearms and Security Personnel of the Comelec, granting
him an exemption from the ban and a permit to carry firearms during the
election period)29 that Pedro attached to his motion to quash. This
COMELEC Certification is a matter aliunde that is not an appropriate
motion to raise in, and cannot support, a motion to quash grounded on
legal excuse or justification found on the face of the Information.
Significantly, no hearing was ever called to allow the prosecution to
contest the genuineness of the COMELEC certification.30
Thus, the RTC grossly erred in its initial ruling that a quashal of the
Information was in order. Pedro, on the other hand, also misappreciated
the true nature, function, and utility of a motion to quash. As a
consequence, a valid Information still stands, on the basis of which Pedro
should now be arraigned and stand trial.
One final observation: the Information was not rendered defective by the
fact that Pedro was charged of violating Section 261(q) of the Code,
instead of Section 32 of R.A. No. 7166, which amended Section 261(q);
these two sections aim to penalize among others, the carrying of firearms
(or other deadly weapons) in public places during the election period
without the authority of the Comelec. The established rule is that the
character of the crime is not determined by the caption or preamble of the
information or from the specification of the provision of law alleged to
have been violated; the crime committed is determined by the recital of
the ultimate facts and circumstances in the complaint or
information31 Further, in Abenes v. Court of Appeals, 32 we specifically
recognized that the amendment under Section 32 of R.A. No. 7166 does
not affect the prosecution of the accused who was charged under Section
261(q) of the Code.

WHEREFORE, we hereby GRANT the petition and accordingly declare the

assailed September 19, 2005 decision and the July 6, 2006 resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 80223 respectively MODIFIED and
REVERSED. The case is remanded to the Regional Trial Court of Boac,
Marinduque for the arraignment and trial of respondent Joel R. Pedro,
after reflecting in the Information the amendment introduced on Section
261(q) of the Code by Section 32 of Republic Act No. 7166.

SO ORDERED.