Lesson 1

The Early Philosophers

While moral theory does not invent morality or even reflection on it, it does not try to
bring systematic thinking to bear on phenomenon, Ancient moral theory, however, does not
attempt to be comprehensive account of all the phenomena that fall under the heading of
morality. Rather, assuming piecemeal opinions and practices, it tries to capture its underlying
essence.

ARISTOTLE on Ethics

The most famous and thorough of Aristotle’s ethical works is his Nicomachean Ethics.
This work is an inquiry into the best life for human beings to live. The life of human flourishing
or happiness (eudaimonia) is the best life. It is important to note that what we translate as
“happiness” is quite different for Aristotle than it is for us. We often consider happiness to be a
mood or an emotion, but Aristotle considers it to be an activity- a way of living one’s life. Thus
it is possible for one to have an overall happy life, even if that life has its moments of sadness
and pain (Barnes, 1984).

Happiness is the practice of virtue or excellence (arête), and so it is important to know the
two types of virtue; character virtue, the discussion of which makes up the bulk of the Ethics,
and intellectual virtue. Character excellence comes about through habit- one habituates himself
oneself to perform an excellent action accidentally or without knowledge, but doing so would not
make for an excellent person, just as accidentally writing in a grammatically correct way does
not mal for a grammarian. One must be aware that one is practicing the life of virtue (Broadie,
1991).

Aristotle arrives the idea that “the activity of the soul in accordance with virtue” is the
best life for human beings through the human function” argument. If, says Aristotle, human
beings have a function of work (ergon) to perform, then we can know that performing that
function well will result in the best sort of life. The work or function of an eye is to see and to
see well. Just as each part of the body has a function says Aristotle, so too must the human being
as a whole have a function. This is argument in analogy. The function of th human beings is
logos or reason, and the more thoroughly one lives the life of reason, the happier one’s life will
be (Kraut, 2014).

So the happiest life is a practice of virtue, and this is practiced under the guidance of
reason. Examples of Character virtues would be courage, temperance, liberality and
magnanimity (Rorty, 1984). One must habitually practice these virtues in order to be courageous,
temperate and so forth. For example, the courageous person knows when to be courageous, and
acts on that knowledge whenever it is appropriate to do. Each activity of any particular character
virtue has a rlated excessive or deficient action. The excess related to courage, for example, is
rashness and the deficiency is cowardice. Since excellence is rare, most people will tend more
towards an excess or deficiency than towards the excellent action. Aristotle’s advice here is to
aim for the opposite of one typical tendency and that eventually this will lead one closer to the
excellence. For example, if one tends towards the excess of self-indulgence, it might be best to
aim for insensibility, which will eventually lead the agent closer to temperance.
Friendship is also a necessary part of the happy life. There are three types of friendship,
none of which is exclusive of the other: a friendship of excellence, a friendship of pleasure, and
friendship of utility. A friendship of excellence is based upon the virtue and each friend enjoys
and contemplates the excellence of his/her friends. Since the friend is another self, contemplating
a friend’s virtue will help us in the practice of virtue for ourselves. A mark of good friendship is
that friends “live together”, that is that friends spend a substantial amount of time together, since
a substantial time apart will likely to weaken the bond of friendship. Also, since the excellent
person has been habituated to a life of excellence is the least changeable and most lasting form of
friendship.

The friendships of pleasure and use are the most changeable forms friendship since the
things we find pleasurable or useful tend to change over a lifetime. For example, if a friendshiop
forms out mutual love for beer, but the interest of one of the friends later turns towards win, the
friendship would likely to dissolve. Again, if a friend is merely one of utility, then that friendship
will likely dissolve when it is no longer useful.

Since the best life is a life of virtue or excellence and since we are closer to excellence
the more thoroughly we fulfill our function the best life is the life of theoria or contemplation.
This is the most divine life, since one comes closest to the pure activity of thought. It is the most
sufficient life since one can think even when one is alone. What does one contemplate ot theorize
about? One contemplates one’s knowledge of unchanging things. Some have criticized Aristotle
saying that this sort of life seems uninteresting, since we seem to enjoy the pursuit of knowledge
more than just having knowledge. For Aristotle, however the contemplation of unchanging
things is an activity full of wonder. Seeking knowledge might be good, but it is done for the sake
of greater end, namely having knowledge and contemplating what one knows. For example,
Aristotle considered the cosmos to b eternal and unchanging. So, one might have knowledge of
astronomy, but it is the contemplation of what this knowledge is about that is most wonderful.
The Greek word theoria is rooted iin the verb for seeing , hence our word “theatre” so, iin
contemplation or theorizing, one comes face to face with what one knows (Barnes, 1991).

The way Aristotle sketches the highest good for man as involving both a practical and
theoretical side, with the two sides necessary for each other, is also in the tradition of Socrates
and Plato – as opposed to the pre – Socratic philosophy. As Burger (2008) points out “The Ethics
does not end at its apparent peak, identifying perfect happiness with the life devoted to theoria;
instead it goes on to introduce the need for a study of legislation, on the grounds that it is not
sufficient only to know about virtue, but one should try to put that knowledge to use”. At the end
of thee book, according to Burger, the thoughtful reader is led to understand that “the end we are
seeking is what we have been doing” while engaging with the Ethics”.

Aristotle also made mention to telos. A telos, is derived from the Greek word for “end”,
“purpose”, or “goal.” It is an end or purpose, in a fairly constrained sense used by philosophers
such as Aristotle. It is the root of the term “teleology”, roughly the study of purposiveness, or the
study of objects with a view to their aims, purposes or intentions. Teleology figures centrally in
Aristotle’s biology and in his theory of causes. It is central to nearly all philosophical theories of
history, such as those of Hegel and Marx. One running debate in modern philosophy of biology
is to what extent teleological language (as in the “purposes” of various organs or life-processes)
is unavoidable, or simply a shorthand for ideas can be ultimately be spelled out non-
teleologically. Philosophy of action, am action also makes essential use teleological vocabulary;
on Davidson’s account , an action is just something an gent does with an intention – that is ,
looking forward to some end to b achieved by the action.

Thomas Aquinas on Virtue

Thomas’ broad account of virtues as excellence on perections of the various human

powers formally echoes Aristotle, both with regard to the nature of a virtue and many specific
virtues.

The moral philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274) involves a merger of at least
two apparently disparate traditions. Aristotelian eudaimonism and Christian Theology. On the
other hand, Aquinas follows Aristotle in thinking that an act is good or bad depending on
whether it contributes to or deters us from our proper human end-the telas or final goal at which
all human actions aim. That telas is eudaimonia, or happiness, where happiness is understood in
terms of completion, perfection, or well-being. Achieving happiness , however, requires a rnge
of intellectual and moral virtues that enable us to understand the nature of happiness and
motivate us to seek it in a reliable and consistent way.

On the other hand, Aquinas believes that we can never achieve complete or final
happiness in this life. For him, final happiness consists of beatitude, or supernatural union with
God. Such an end lies far beyond what we through our natural human capacities can attain. For
this reason, we not only need the virtues, we also need God to transform our nature- to perfect or
“deify” it – so that we might be suited to participate in divine beatitude. Moreover, Aquinas
believes that we inherited a propensity to sin from our first parent, Adam. While our nature is not
wholly corrupted by sin, it is nevertheless diminished by sin’s stain, as evidenced by the fact that
our wills are at enmity with God’s. Thus we need God’s help in order to restore the good of our
nature and bring us into conformity with his will. To this end, God imbues us with his grace
which comes in the form of divinely instantiated virtues and gifts.

However, even though this beatitudo is brought about supernaturally by the power of
God, it is not utterly foreign to human nature. In effect , the supernatural power of God elevates
or expands the powers of intellect and intellect and will to a kind of completion beyond
themselves and yet not foreign to them. So this distinction of a “two-fold happiness” should not
be thought of as involving two fundamentally distinct goals or ends of human life. The second
supernatural happiness is seen as kind of surpassing perfection of the first (Bradley, 1997).

The distinction of a two-fold happiness in human life leads to a distinction between the
natural virtues and the theological virtues. Natural virtues are virtues that pertain to the happiness
of this life that is “proportionate” to human nature. Theological virtues pertain to the beatitude
tha is not proportionate to human nature, the supernatural good of life with God. Natural virtues
are divided into moral virtues and intellectual virtues. The intellectual virtues perfect the intellect
and confer an aptness for the good work of the intellect which is the apprehension of truth. The
moral virtues are the habits that perfect the various powers concerned with human appetites,
including rational appetite, conferring upon them an aptness for the right use of those appetites
(Hankley, 1997).
The cardinal natural virtues are Prudence, Justice, Courage and Temperance. Prudence is
an intellectual virtue since it bears upon the goal of truth in the good ordering of action. In
addition, because there are two specific powers of the generic sensitive appetite the concupiscent
and irascible, there are two cardinal virtues that pertain to them The concupiscent appetite
inclines one toward what is suitable and away from what is harmful to human bodily life.
Temperance is the cardinal virtue pertains to it. The irascible appetite inclines one toward
resisting those things that attack human bodily life. Courage is the cardinal virtue that pertains to
it. Finally, Justice is a virtue of the rational appetite or will. These virtues are called “cardinal”
both because of their specific importance, but also as general headings under which the wide
array of particular virtues are classed. Temperance and Courage are ordered toward and perfect
the good of the individual as such, while Justice is ordered toward and perfects the good of
others in relation to the individual.

The theological virtues are Faith, Hope and Love. They bear upon eternal beatitude and
are simply infused by Gods gift of grace. They cannot be acquired by human effort. However, as
noted above the “second” supernatural happiness is not foreign to the first natural happiness but
a kind of surpassing perfection of it. So along with the infusion of the theological virtues.
Thomas holds that natural virtues are infused with them. Thus there is a distinction between
“infused natural virtues” and “acquired natural virtues”. As infused, the natural virtues cannot be
acquired by human efforts, although they may be strengthened by it. Acquired natural virtues, on
the other hand are the corresponding virtues that can be acquired by human effort without the gift
of divine grace. While Thomas acknowledges that these acquired natural virtues can in principle
be developed by human effort without grace, he thinks that their actual acquisition by human
effort is very difficult due to the influence of sin (De Young et.al, 2009).

In addition, the infused natural virtues spring from charity as it effects and thus upon bear
its object, which is the love of God and the love of neighbour in God. A primary example for
Thomas is Misericordia which is the virtues that pertains to suffering with others and acting to
alleviate their suffering. It looks like Justice because it bears upon the good of another. And yet it
is different from Justice because it springs from natural friendship that all human beings bear to
one another, and requires that one take upon oneself the sufferings of other human beings.
Thomas explicitly but unconvincingly claims that Aristotle recognized it. And yet in the Summa
Theologiae he says that it is an effect of Charity. In tht case there is an acquired form of it and an
infused form of it. As infused it is informed by the love of God and the love of neighbors of God
which is beatitude.

The influential natural virtues differ in important respects from the corresponding
acquired virtues because as infused they point toward the supernatural end, and the result in
acquired virtues is fixed by human reason while the mean in the infused virtue is according to
divine rule. Thomas gives us an example the difference between acquired and infused
Temperance. Acquired Temperance is a mean inclining a human being to eat enough food to
sustain his or her health and not to harm the body. Infused Temperance is a mean inclining a
human body through abstinence to castigate and subject the body.
Even one mortal or grave sin destroys both Charity and all the infused moral virtues that
proceed from it, while leaving. Hope and Faith is lifeless habits that are no longer a virtues. On
the other hand, a single sin, whether venial or mortal, does not destroy the acquired natural
virtues.
Charity, as we’ve seen, is the love of God and neighbour in God. It resides in the will.
Hope is the desire for the difficult but attainable good of eternal happiness supernatural truths
that are not evident in themselves or through demonstrations from truths evident in themselves.
So it resides in the intellect. It is divided into believing that there is a God and other truths
pertaining to that truth, believing God, and believing “in” God. The distinction between the last
two is subtle. It is one thing to say you believe me. It is a different thing to say you believe in
me. The latter connotes the relation of your intellect to the will’s desire to direct yourself to me
in love. Thus believing in God goes well beyond believing that there is a God. It suggests the
other theological virtues of Charity and Hope.

In beatitude and felicity, the fulfilment of intellect and will respectively, the virtues of
Faith and Hope fall away, and do not exist, for one now sees with the intellect what one believed,
amd has attained what one hoped for with the will. Only Charity abides.

Kant on Good Will

To act out of a “good will” for Kant means to act out of a sense of moral obligation or
“duty”. In other words, the moral agent does a particular action not because of what it produces
(its consequences) in temrs of human experience, but because he or she recognizes by reasoning
that it is morality the right thing to do and thus regards him or herself as having a moral duty or
obligation to do that action. One may, of course, as an added fact get some pleasure or other gain
from doing the right thing, but to act morally, one does not do it for the sake of desirable
consequences, but rather because one understands that it is morally the right thing to do. In this
respect Kant’s view towards morally parallels the Christian’s view concerning obedience to
God’s commandments, according to which the Christian obeys God’s commandments simply
because God commands them not for the sake of rewards in heaven after death or freedom
_________ hell. In a similar way, for Kant the rational being does what is wilfully rights because
he recognizes himself as having a moral duty to do rather than do anything he or she may get out
of it.
Kant’s analysis common _______________ begins with the thought that the only thing
good without qualification is a “goodwill”. The idea of a goodwill is clearer to the idea of a
“good person” at more archaically, a “person of good will”. This use of the term “will” early on
in analysing ordinary moral thought_________________. Later and more technical discussion
concerning the nature or rational agency. Nevertheless, this idea of a goodwill is an important
common sense touch_______? to which Kant returns throughout his works. The basic idea as
Kant describes it in the Groundwork, is that what makes a good person good is his possession of
a will that is in a certain way “determined” by or make its decision on the basis of the moral law.
The idea of a good will is supposed to be the idea of one who is committed only to make
decision that builds to be morally worthy and who takes moral consideration in themselves to be
conclusive reasons for guiding her behavior. This sort of disposition or character is something
we all highly value. Kant thought. He believes we value it without limitation or qualification. By
that, we believe, he mourns primarily two things.
In Kant’s terms, a good will is a will whose discussions are wholly determined by moral
demands or as he often to this by the Moral Law. Human beings inevitably fell this Law as a
constraint on their natural desires, which is why such Laws, as applied to human beings are
imperatives and duties. A human will in which the Moral Law is decisive is motivated by the
thought of duty.
Kant’s pointed out that to be universally and absolutely good, something must be goo in
every instance of its occurrence. He argues that all those things which people call “good”,
including intelligence, wit, judgment, courage, resolution, perseverance, power, riches, honor,
health, and even happiness itself can become “extremely bad and mischievous if the will which
is to make use of them …. Is not good”. In other words, if we imagine a bad person example, one
who willed or wanted to do evil, who had all of these so-called ‘goods”, intelligence, wit, etc.,
these very traits would make only that much worse his will to do what is wrong.

Kant on Rights
Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) examined the idea of human rights within politics in such a
way that it “is only a legitimate government that guarantees our natural right to freedom, and
from this freedom we derive other rights”. From this basis it can be assumed that Kant looks at
the development, creation and implementation of rights as primarily dependent on the state and
how the government within the state functions. Furthermore, Kant stresses that a society can only
function politically in the relation to the state, if fundamental rights, laws and entitlements are
given and enhanced by the state. As Kant teaches, these “righteous laws” are founded upon three
rational principles:

1. The liberty of every member of the society as a man.

2. The equality of every member of the society with every other, as a subject
3. The independence of every member of the commonwealth as a citizen.

An interesting aspects of these principles is that they are not given by the state, but are
fundamental in the creation and acceptance of a state by the people of the state. In this sense
Kant believes that these principles are necessary above all, not only for the founding of
“righteous laws” but for the state to function in the first place. This is so because without the
acceptance of people a state would not exist therefore right are necessary within states to keep
the support of the people of the state.
The book Metaphysics of Morals has two distinct parts the “Doctrine of Right” and the
“Doctrine of Virtue”. Kant sought to separate political rights and duties from what we might
call morals in the narrow sense. He limits rights by stating three conditions that have to be met
for something to be enforceable as right (Byrd, 2010):
1. Right concerns only actions that have influence on other persons, directly or indirectly
meaning duties to the self are excluded.

2. Right does not concern the wish but only the choice of others, meaning that not mere desires
but only decisions which bring about actions are at stake and

3. Right does not concern the matter of the other’s act but only the form, meaning no particular
desires or ends are assumed on the part of the agents. As an example of the latter he
considers trades, which for right must have the form of being freely agreed by both parties
but can have any matter or purpose the agents want.

These criteria appear to be less rigid than Kant ultimately intends, for the term
“influence”
is vague enough that it might include far-reaching minor effects. They would also include ender
right actions even those imperfect duties that “influence” others by improving their lot, such as
beneficent (humanitarian) acts of charity. While Kant must include consideration of beneficent
action as part of right, he does not conclude that beneficent actions are required by right but only
that most are permitted by right and other violate right. His focus on free individual choice
entails that any beneficent action that interferes with or usurps the recipient’s free choice is
wrong, for example, improving the recipient’s property without permission as opposed to merely
donating money to a fund made available to the recipient at the recipient’s discretion (Follesdal
et.al, 2014).

In addition to these conditions for right, Kant also offers direct contrast between right or
wrong virtue. He thinks both relate to freedom but in difference ways, right concerns outer
freedom and virtue concerns inner freedom being master of one’s own passions. Right concerns
act themselves independent of the motive an agent may have for performing them, virtue
concerns the proper motive for dutiful actions. In another formulation he says that right concerns
universally as a formal condition of freedom while virtue concerns a necessary end beyond the
mere formality of universality, thus appearing to tie the distinction to the first two formulas of
the categorical imperative in the Groundwork. In yet another he says that the right concerns
narrow duties and virtue wide duties.

In the Feyerabend lectures, Kant notes that right is the subset of morally correct actions
that are also coercible. These various alternative formulations of the distinction would exclude
imperfect duties not because imperfect duties do not “influence” other but because, as imperfect,
they cannot be coerced in particular instances, since imperfect duties always allow the
moderating role of an individual inclinations. While these various formulations of the distinction
appear to be quite different, they can in general summarized by saying that right concerns outer
action corresponding to perfect duty that affects others regardless of the individual’s internal
motivation or goals (Ellis, 2012).

Cosmopolitan Rights. Relations among the states of the world, covered above are not the
same as relations among the people (nations, Volk) of the world. Individuals can relate to states
of which they are not members and to other individuals who are members of other states. In this
they are considered “citizens of a universal state of human beings” with corresponding “rights of
citizens of the world”. Despite these lofty sounding pronouncements, Kant’s particular
discussion of cosmopolitan right is restricted to the right of hospitality. Since all peoples share a
limited amount of living space due to spherical shape of the earth, the totality of which they must
be understood to have originally shared in common, they must be understood to have a right to
possible interaction with one another. Tis cosmopolitan right is limited to a right to offer to
engage in commerce, not a right to actual commerce itself, which must always be voluntary
trade. A citizen of one state may try to establish links with other peoples; no state is allowed to
deny foreign citizens a right to travel in its land (Flikschuh, 2014).

Cosmopolitan right is an important component of perpetual peace. Interaction among the

peoples of the world, Kant notes, has increased in recent times. Now “a violation of right on one
place on earth is felt in all” as people depend upon one another and know about one another
more and more (8:360). Violations of cosmopolitan right would make more difficult the trust and
cooperation necessary for perpetual peace among states (Hoffie, 2006).

Rights

A right is described as an entitlement or justified claim to a certain kind of positive and negative
treatment from others, to support from others or non-interference from others. In other words a
right is something to which every individual in the community is morally permitted, and for
which that community is entitled to disrespect or compulsorily remove anything that stands in
the way of evev a single individual getting it. Rights belong to individuals, and no organizations
has any rights not directly derived from those of its members as individuals; and just as an
individual’s rights cannot extend to where they will intrude on another individual’s rights,
similarly the rights of every organization whatever must yield to those of a single individual
whether inside or outside the organization. Rights are those important conditions of social life
without which heath of both the individual and his society. It is only when people get and enjoy
rights that they can develop their personalities and contribute their best services to the society.

Nature of Rights

Laski’s (1935) concepts on the nature of rights are enumerated as follows:

 1. Rights are the basic social conditions offered to the individual who is an indispensable
member of the society;

2. Rights enable man to fully enhance his personality; to achieve his best self, in the words
of Laski’s they are “those social conditions without which no man can seek to be his best
self;

3. Rights are inherently social because they are never against social welfare ; the rights did
not exist before the emergence of the society; they are those fundamental necessities that
which are very much social;

4. The state plays the role of recognizing and protecting the rights by providing for the full
maintenance and observance of the rights.

5. Rights are never absolute, the nature and extent for the fulfilment of the rights are
relative; as long men endeavour for the upliftment and betterment of the conditions of
life, rights continue to serve as means for the satisfaction and gratification of individual’s
needs; so there can be no rights which are absolute in nature because absolute rights are
contradiction in terms.

6. Rights are dynamic in nature because the essence and contents of rights very according to
change in place, time and conditions.

Kinds of Rights

Hereunder are the different kinds of rights, namely;

1. Natural Rights – Many researchers have faith in natural rights. They stated that people
inherit several rights from nature. Before they came to live in society and state, they used
to live in a state of nature. In it, they appreciated certain natural rights, like right to life,
right to liberty and right to property. Natural rights are parts of human nature and reason.
Political theory maintains that as individual enters into society with certain basic rights
and that no government can dent these rights.

John Locke (1632-1704), the most influential political philosophers of the

modern period, argued that people have rights, such as right to life, liberty and property
that have a foundation independent of the laws of any particular society. Locke claimed
that men are naturally free and equal as part of the justification for understanding
legitimate political government as the result of social contract where people in the state of
nature conditionally transfer some of their rights to the government in order to better
ensure the stable, comfortable enjoyment of their lives, liberty and property. Since
governments exist by the consent of the people in order to protect the rights of the people
 and promote the public good, government fail to do so can be resisted and replaced with
new governments.

2. Moral Rights – Moral rights are based on human consciousness. They are supported by
moral force of human mind. These are based on human sense of goodness and justice.
These are not assisted by the force of law. Sense of goodness and public opinion are the
sanctions behind moral rights.

If any person disrupts any moral right, no legal action can be taken against him. The
state does not enforce these rights. Its courts do not recognize these rights. Moral rights
include rules of good conduct, courtesy and of moral behaviour. These stand for moral
perfection of the people.

3. Legal Right – Legal rights are those which are accepted and enforced by the state. Any
defilement of any legal right is punished by law. Law courts of the state enforce legal
rights. These rights can be enforced against individuals and also against the government.
In this way, legal rights are different from moral rights. Legal rights are equally available
to all citizens. All citizens follow legal rights without any discrimination. They can go to
the courts for getting their rights enforced.

Distinction between Moral Rights and Legal Rights

Moral Rights are importantly distinct from Legal Rights.

MORAL RIGHTS LEGAL RIGHTS

Natural: Moral rights are discovered, not Created: Our legal rights are created by
created. (This is a form of Moral Realism) legislation.

Equal: Moral rights are equal rights; there is Can be unequal: There are many situations
no injustice in how they are distributed. in which the distribution of legal rights is
unjust.

Inalienable: Moral rights cannot be taken Alienable: Your legal rights can be taken
away from you without consent (although you away from you against your will.
can voluntarily surrender them).

Universal: Your moral rights are the same no Local: Your legal rights change when you
matter where you are. move from one jurisdiction to another.