Z5ETHICS AS THE ART OF LIVING WELL: ARISTOTLE

EUDAIMONIA
In its simplest (translated) form, eudaimonia is often taken to mean happiness (Deci & Ryan, 2006;
Huta & Waterman, 2014; Heintzelman, 2018). Sometimes it is translated from the original ancient Greek
as welfare, sometimes flourishing, and sometimes as wellbeing (Kraut, 2018). The concept of Eudaimonia
comes from Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, his philosophical work on the ‘science of happiness. (Irwin,
2012).

Socrates on Eudaimonia
Socrates, like Plato, believed that virtue (or arête, the very idea of virtue) was a form of knowledge—
specifically, a knowledge of good and evil (Bobonich, 2010). That is, he saw numerous virtues—justice, piety,
courage as united. That is, all were one, and they were all knowledge.

Socrates viewed this knowledge as required for us as humans to achieve the ‘ultimate good’, which
was eudaimonia. And by ‘us’, Socrates meant the individual (Waterman, 1993; Deci & Ryan, 2006).

Plato and Eudaimonism

In a somewhat similar vein, Plato believed that individuals naturally feel unhappiness when they do
something they know and acknowledge to be wrong (Price, 2011). Eudaimonia, according to Plato, was the
highest and ultimate aim of both moral thought and behavior.

Nonetheless, while Plato was believed somewhat to have refined the concept, he offered no direct
definition for it. As with Socrates, he saw virtue as integral to eudaimonia.

One thing is worth noting at this point. If this idea of an ‘ultimate goal’ for individuals is beginning to
sound familiar, rest assured that there is good reason for thinking so. The similarities between eudaimonia and
concepts such as Maslow’s self-actualization (1968) are indeed widely accepted in the psychological literature
(Heintzelman, 2018).

Aristotlean Eudaimonia
Numerous interpretations have been offered for Aristotle’s eudaimonia, with a general consensus on the
idea that eudaimonia reflects “pursuit of virtue, excellence, and the best within us” (Huta & Waterman, 2014:
1426). That is, he believed eudaimonia was rational activity aimed at pursuing ‘what is worthwhile in life’.

Where Aristotle diverged from Plato and some other thinkers is in his belief about what is ‘enough’
(roughly) for eudaimonia. For the latter, virtue was enough for the ultimate good that is eudaimonia. For
Aristotle, virtue was required, but not sufficient (Annas, 1993). In layperson’s terms, we can’t just act with
virtuous, but we have also to intend to be virtuous, too. A lot of Nichomacean Ethics is about what
happiness isn’t. ‘Satisfying appetites’, Ryan and Singer argue is akin to “life suitable to beasts”, according to
the philosopher (2006: 16). The pursuit of political power, material wealth, even fun and leisure, he saw as
“laughable things”, inferior to “serious things” (Ryff & Singer, 2008: 16).

Instead, happiness is an ‘intermediate’ or a ‘golden mean’ between deficiency and excess (Ryff &
Singer, 2008). One example of virtue as a mean between two extremes is courage – as a virtue, it’s halfway
between recklessness and cowardice (Kings College London, 2012).

THE SOUL
 The word “soul” is “nephesh” in Hebrew and refers to the inner self of each person — the mind, will, and
emotions. When Jesus warned about losing one’s soul in pursuit of other physical benefits such as accumulating
wealth, it was this notion of the soul as the authentic self or real person.

Long ago the care of the soul was essential to well-being. Plato and Socrates believed that this effort was
the most essential need of human beings. Socrates believed that the practice of doing philosophy —
questioning and seeking truth — was taking care of our souls, a kind of therapy to promote healing and
wholeness.

Plato argues that the soul comprises of three parts namely rational, appetitive, and the spirited. These
parts also match up the three ranks of a just community. Personal justice involves maintaining the three parts in
the proper balance, where reason rules while appetite obeys. According to Plato, the appetitive part of the soul
is the one that is accountable for the desires in people. It is accountable for the effortless cravings required to
stay alive like hunger, thirst, and for pointless cravings like desire to over feed. The desires for
essential things should be limited by other sections of the soul, while illegitimate desires ought to be limited
entirely by other elements of soul. The rational soul on the other hand is the thinking element in every human
being, which decided what is factual and merely obvious, judges what is factual and what is untrue, and
intelligently makes sensible decisions. Finally, the spirited soul produces the desires that love victory and
honor. In the just soul, the spirit acts as an implementer of the rational soul, making sure that the rules of reason
are adhered to. Emotions like indignation and anger are the impact of the disappointment of the spirit. Someone
might respond to the claim that the soul comprises of three parts.

VIRTUE, THE MEAN AND PRACTICAL WISDOM

While virtue makes man choose the right ends, practical wisdom makes him choose the right means,
but practical wisdom cannot exist independently of virtue. The power to attain an end, whether good or bad, is
mere talent or cleverness, and is raised above the level of roguery only by the presence of virtue. Just as
practical wisdom implies moral virtue, moral virtue in the proper sense implies practical wisdom, and it is
impossible to develop moral virtue without thorough training in practical wisdom.

A man may start life with a natural virtue (e.g.. a disposition to be just or temperate), but if this is
unaccompanied by knowledge of the effects that various kinds of action are likely to have, this disposition can
never become genuine moral virtue and remains wasteful or even dangerous. Thus, in its true sense, virtue
cannot be complete without the possession of practical wisdom. Socrates was wrong when he said that virtue
was only wisdom, but he was right to see that virtue is a form of knowledge.

Though the natural virtues can exist in isolation from each other, the moral virtues are
interdependent, for possession of any moral virtue implies possession of practical wisdom, and possession of
practical wisdom implies possession of all the moral virtues. A man with practical wisdom controls his
instinctive tendencies and directs his own life to the highest good — balanced development of his moral
character (i.e., virtue).

As a final point, it may be mentioned that practical wisdom is subordinate to theoretical wisdom, but
since practical wisdom determines what studies are pursued in any state, it acts in the interests of theoretical
wisdom.

To sum up, practical wisdom or prudence is excellence of the deliberative faculty of the soul and
enables one to exercise right choice. It enables us to choose the right means for attaining the right ends as
determined by virtue. While not the same as virtue, practical wisdom makes the existence of virtue possible.
The right rule reached by the deliberative analysis of a man with practical wisdom tells him that the end of
human life is attained by certain actions that are intermediate between extremes. Moral virtue can be defined as
obedience to this rule.
CONTEMPLATION AND PHILOSOPHICAL KNOWLEDGE

With happiness now disassociated from pleasant amusements and placed instead in accord with virtue,
Aristotle argues that happiness must be in accord with the highest virtue.
The highest virtue must involve the element that is best in us. What is best in us—what is most divine—
according to Aristotle, is the understanding, or reason. It is the understanding that distinguishes human
beings from other animals. The understanding may either be considered divine or as being the most divine
thing within us. In either case, “the activity of it, when in accord with the virtue that properly belongs to it,
will be complete happiness.” And this activity, according to Aristotle, is contemplative activity.
Aristotle’s argument as to why the activity of the understanding—contemplative activity—will be
complete happiness, is because the attributes assigned to happiness are the same attributes assigned to
contemplative activity.
Like happiness, contemplative activity is the most excellent, the most continuous, the most pleasant,
and the most self-sufficient activity. Furthermore, contemplative activity, like happiness, is loved for its own
sake and involves leisure.
Contemplative activity is the most excellent because the understanding is the most excellent element in
us and because, “of knowable objects, the ones the understanding is concerned with are the most excellent
ones.”
It is the most continuous activity because we can pass our time in contemplation more continuously
than in other activities.
It is the most pleasant activity because the pleasures it entails, those that are derived from philosophy
and theoretical wisdom, are of a pure and enduring nature and because “those who have attained knowledge
should pass their time more pleasantly than those who are looking for it.”
It is the most self-sufficient activity because, though even the philosopher or “theoretically-wise
person” requires the necessaries of life, he/she does not need others in order to engage in contemplation;
though they may of course benefit from the company of others, one can contemplate in solitude.
Contemplative activity is i, “For nothing arises from it beyond having contemplated.”
Finally, contemplation, like happiness, involves leisure. However, not leisure in the sense of lounging
around. It is serious, it involves activity, it involves a rigorous dedication of the mind to study.