8 CC - CDigests - Legal and Judicial Ethics PDF

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COVEREDCASESAND
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BERNABE
CASEDOCTRI
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CASEDI
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Gabrielle Anne S. Endona Paulo O. Hernandez
Joelle Mae J. Garcia Teresa Katherine R. Kua
Micah Regina A. Gonzales Ma. Lourdes M. Santos
Zennia S. Turrecha
Nestor J. Porlucas, Jr.
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SUBJECT HEADS
Legal Ethics JARED RUIZ A. LIBIRAN
Judicial Ethics ANNE CHRISTELLE A. SANTIAGO
Legal Forms GERARD ANGELO T. DE JESUS
SUBJECT MEMBERS
CHARMAINE KEY C. AUREA KRISTOFFER MONICO S. NG
MONIQUE G. BUGNOSEN JUNNA LYNNE R. PANTINO
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PREFACE
The COVERED CASES AND J. PERLAS-BERNABE CASE DOCTRINES was
crafted as an apt response for the need to provide a comprehensive compilation of
jurisprudence, promulgated by the Supreme Court, covered for this year’s Bar
Examinations. This complement significantly the other bar review materials in the
repository of the San Beda Centralized Bar Operations.
On this year’s edition, the COVERED CASES is in two forms: a printed copy of
the Covered Cases: Case Doctrines, and a digital copy of the Covered Cases: Case
Digests which include the Supreme Court decisions released from July 1, 2017 to June
30, 2018; while the J. PERLAS-BERNABE CASE DOCTRINES includes the
summary of the rulings pronounced by the 2019 Bar Examination Chairperson, the
Honorable Justice Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe, from September 16, 2011 to December
31, 2018.
In addition to that, the cases herein are categorized and arranged based on the
2019 Supreme Court Bar Exam Syllabus in order to guide its readers in their
appreciation and understanding of the court decisions.
With this material, the San Beda Centralized Bar Operations seeks to uphold
its legacy of service and excellence in helping the examinees achieve their goal of
becoming worthy members of the legal profession.
UT IN OMNIBUS GLORIFICETUR DEUS!
THIS IS THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OF THE

SAN BEDA UNIVERSITY COLLEGE OF LAW
CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS.
THE UNAUTHORIZED COPYING, REPRODUCTION,

MODIFICATION OR DISTRIBUTION
OF ANY OF THE CONTENTS OF THIS BOOK IS
STRICTLY PROHIBITED.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS
Page
Number
Joaquin G. Bonifacio vs. Atty. Edgardo O. Era and ……………………………………… 1

Atty. Diane Karen B. Bragas
A.C. No. 11754; October 3, 2017
Gizale O. Tumbaga vs. Atty. Manuel P. Teoxon …………………………………………… 2
A.C. No. 5573; November 21, 2017
Heirs of Juan de Dios E. Carlos vs. Atty. Jaime S. Linsangan …………………………… 3

A.C. No. 11494; July 24, 2017
Roman Dela Rosa Verano vs. Atty. Luis Fernan Diores, Jr. ……………………………… 4
A.C. No. 8887; November 7, 2017
Manuel L. Valin vs. Atty. Rolando T. Ruiz …………………………………………………… 5
A.C. No. 10564; November 7, 2017
Marjorie A. Apolinar-Petilo vs. Atty. Aristedes A. Maramot ……………………………. 6
A.C. No. 9067; January 31, 2018
Freddie Guillen vs. Atty. Audie Arnado …………………………………………………….. 7
A.C. No. 10547; November 8, 2017
Ma. Vilma F. Maniquiz vs. Atty. Danilo C. Emelo ………………………………………….. 8
A.C. No. 8968, September 26, 2017
Luzviminda S. Cerilla vs. Atty. Samuel SM. Lezama …………………………………….. 9
A.C. No. 11483; October 3, 2017
Lito V. Buenviaje vs. Atty. Melchor G. Magdamo …………………………………………. 10
A.C. No. 11616; August 23, 2017
Atty. Rosita L. Dela Fuente Torres vs. Atty. Bayani P. Dalangin ………………………. 11
A.C. No. 10758; December 5, 2017
Oliver Fabugais vs. Atty. Berardo C. Faundo Jr. ………………………………………….. 12
A.C. No. 10145; June 11, 2018
Manuel B. Trovela vs. Michael B. Robles, ………………………………………………….. 13
as Assistant City Prosecutor, et al.
A.C. No. 11550; June 4, 2018
Dr. Eduardo R. Alicias, Jr. vs. Atty. Vivencio S. Baclig …………………………………. 14
A.C. No. 9919; July 19, 2017
Carlina P. Robiñol vs. Atty. Edilberto P. Bassig ………………………………………….. 15
A.C. No. 11836; November 21, 2017
Ret. Judge Virgilio Alpajora vs. Atty. Ronaldo Antonio V. Calayan ……………………… 16
A.C. No. 8208; January 10, 2018
In Re: G.R. No. 157659 “Eligio P. Mallari vs. ……………………………………………….. 17
Government Service Insurance System and the Provincial Sheriff of Pampanga
A.C. No. 11111; January 10, 2018
Romeo A. Zarcilla and Marita Bumanglag vs. ……………………………………………… 18
Atty. Jose C. Quesada, Jr.
A.C. No. 7186; March 13, 2018
In Re: CA-G.R. CV No. 96282 vs. Atty. Claro Jordan M. Santamaria …………………… 19
A.C. No. 11173; June 11, 2018
Security and Sheriff Division of Sandiganbayan vs. …………………………….….……… 20
Ronald Allan Gole Cruz
A.M. No. SB-17-24-P; July 11, 2017
Gregorio V. Capinpin, Jr. vs. Atty. Estanislao L. Cesa, Jr. ……………………………..….. 21
A.C. No. 6933; July 5, 2017
Filipinas O. Celedonio vs. Atty. Jaime F. Estrabillo ……………………………………… 22
A.C. No. 10553; July 5, 2017
Paces Industrial Corporation vs. Atty. Edgardo M. Salandanan ………………………. 23
A.C. No. 1346; July 25, 2017
Ariel G. Palacios, for and in behalf of the AFP Retirement …………………………….. 24
and Separation Benefits Systems, vs. Atty. Bienvenido Braulio M. Amora, Jr.
A.C. No. 11504; August 1, 2017
Mario Romero vs. Atty Geronimo R. Evangelista, Jr. …………………………………..…… 25
A.C. No. 11829; February 26, 2018
Rodolfo M. Yumang et. al. vs. Atty. Edwin M. Alaestante ……………………………….. 26
A.C. No. 10992; June 19, 2018
BSA Tower Condominium Corporation vs. ………………………………………………… 27
Atty. Albert Celestino B. Reyes II
A.C. No. 11944; June 20, 2018
Nanette B. Sison vs. Atty. Sherdale M. Valdez ……………………………………………. 28
A.C. No. 11663; July 31, 2017
Susan Basiyo and Andrew William Simmons vs. ………………………………………… 29
Atty. Joselito C. Alisuag
A. C. No. 11543; September 26, 2017
Vicka Marie D. Isalos vs. Atty. Ana Luz B. Cristal ……………………………………….. 30
A.C. No. 11822; November 22, 2017
Iluminada D. Yuzon vs. Atty. Arnulfo M. Agleron ……………………………….…………. 31
A.C. No. 10684; January 24, 2018
Maria Eva De Mesa vs. Atty. Oliver O. Olaybal …………………………………………….. 32
A.C. No. 9129; January 31, 2018
Remigio P. Segovia, Jr., Francisco Rizabal, Pablito Rizabal, …………………………… 33
Marcial Rizabal Romines, Pelagio Rizabal Aryap and Renato Rizabal vs.
Atty. Rolando S. Javier
A.C. No. 10244; March 12, 2018
Dario Tangcay vs. Honesto Ancheta Cabarroguis ……………………………………….. 34
A.C. No. 11821; April 2, 2018
Kimeldes Gonzales vs. Atty. Prisco B. Santos ……………………………………………. 35
A.C. No. 10178; June 19, 2018
Pelagio Vicencio Sorongon, Jr. vs. Atty. Ramon Y. Gargantos, Sr. ……………………… 36
A.C. No. 11326; June 27, 2018
Joy T. Samonte vs. Atty. Vivencio V. Jumamil ……………………………………………. 37
A.C. No. 11668; July 17, 2017
Elibena A. Cabiles vs. Atty. Leandro S. Cedo ……………………………………………… 38
A.C. No. 10245; August 16, 2017
Rafael Padilla vs. Atty. Glenn Samson ……………………………………………………… 39
A.C. No. 10253; August 22, 2017
Edigardo Bondoc vs. Atty. Olimpio Datu …………………………………………………… 40
A.C. No. 8903; August 30, 2017
Laurence D. Punla and Marilyn Santos vs. Atty. Eleonor Maravilla – Ona ……………… 41
A.C. No. 11149; August 15, 2017
Reynaldo A. Cabuello vs. Atty. Editha P. Talaboc ……………………………………….. 42
A.C. No. 10532; November 7, 2017
Atty. Juan Paolo Villonco vs. Atty. Romeo G. Roxas …………………………………….. 43
A.C. No. 9186; April 11, 2018
Lolita R. Martin vs. Atty. Jesus M. Dela Cruz ………………………………………………. 44
A.C. No. 9832 (Resolution); September 4, 2017
Myrna Ojales vs. Atty. Obdulio Guy D. Villahermosa III …………………………………… 45
A.C No. 10243; October 2, 2017
Susan T. De Leon vs. Atty. Antonio A. Geronimo ………………………………………… 46
A.C. No. 10441; February 14, 2018
United Coconut Planters Bank vs. Atty. Lauro G. Noel ………………………………….. 47
A.C. No. 3951; June 19, 2018
Edmund Balmaceda vs. Atty. Romeo Z. Uson ……………………………………………… 48
A.C. No. 12025; June 20, 2018
Spouses Vicente and Precywinda Gimena vs. Atty. Jojo S. Vijiga ……………………… 49
A.C. No. 11828; November 22, 2017
Junielito R. Espanto vs. Atty. Erwin V. Belleza ……………………………………………. 50
A.C. No. 10756; February 21, 2018
Potenciano Malvar vs. Atty. Freddie B. Feir ………………………………………………… 51
A.C. No. 11871; March 5, 2018
Kimeldes Gonzales vs. Atty. Prisco B. Santos …………………………………………….. 52
A.C. No. 10178; June 19, 2018
Eugenio Cortez vs. Atty. Hernando Cortes ………………………………………………… 53
A.C. No. 9119; March 12, 2018
Jocelyn Ignacio vs. Atty. Daniel T. Alviar …………………………………………………… 54
A.C. No. 11482; July 17, 2017
Cesar Sta. Ana vs. Atty. Antonio Cortes ……………………………………………………. 55

A.C. No. 6980; August 30, 2017
Gene M. Domingo vs. Atty. Anastacio E. Revilla, Jr. ……………………………………… 56
A.C. No. 5473; January 23, 2018
Paulino Lim vs. Atty. Socrates R. Rivera …………………………………………………… 57
A.C. No. 12156; June 20, 2018
Helen Gradiola vs. Atty. Romulo A. Deles ………………………………………………….. 58
A.C. No. 10267; June 18, 2018
Edgar M. Rico vs. Atty. Reynaldo G. Salutan ……………………………………………….. 59
A.C. No. 9257; March 5, 2018
Cornerlio V. Yagong vs. City Prosecutor Neopito Ed G. Magno ……………………….. 60
A.C. No. 10333; November 6, 2017
Eliezer F. Castro and Bethulia C. Casafrancisco vs. Atty. John Bigay, Jr. …………… 61
and Atty. Juan Siapno
A.C. No. 7824; July 19, 2017
Delfina Santiago vs. Atty. Zosimo Santiago and …………………………………………… 62
Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino
A.C. No. 3921; June 11, 2018
Ready Form, Inc. vs. Atty. Egmedio J. Castillon, Jr. ………………………………………. 63
A.C. No. 11774; March 21, 2018
Michelle Yap vs. Atty. Grace C. Buri ………………………………………………………… 64
A.C. No. 11156; Mar. 19, 2018
Tomas P. Tan, Jr. vs. Atty. Haide V. Gumba ………………………………………………… 65
A.C. No. 9000; January 10, 2018
Spouses Geraldy and Victory vs. Atty. Marian Mercado …………………………………. 66
A.C. No. 10580; July 12, 2017
Office of the Court Administrator vs. Eduardo Umblas and ……………………………. 67
Atty. Rizalina G. Baltazar-Aquino
A.M. No. 9-09-2749; August 1, 2017
Re: In the Matter of the Petition for Reinstatement of Rolando S. Torres ……………. 68
as a Member of the Philippine Bar
A.C. No. 5161; August 25, 2015
Elibena A. Cabiles vs. Atty. Leandro S. Cedo …………………………………………….. 69

A.C. No. 10245; August 16, 2017
Office of the Court Administrator vs. Saguyod …………………………………………… 70
A.M. No. P-17-3705; February 6, 2018
Roberto Mabini vs. Atty. Vitto Kintanar …………………………………………………….. 71
A.C. No. 9512; February 5, 2018
In Re: Diuyan …………………………………………………………………………………….. 72
A.C. No. 9676; 2 April 2018
Spouses Andre and Maria Fatima Chambon vs. …………………………………………… 73
Atty. Christopher Ruiz
A.C. No. 11478; September 5, 2017
Romeo A. Almario vs. Atty. Dominica Llera-Agno ………………………………………… 74
A.C. No. 10689; January 8, 2018
Tomas N. Orola vs. Atty. Archie S. Baribar …………………………………………………. 75
A.C. No. 6927; March 14, 2018
Hernanie P. Dandoy vs. Atty. Roland G. Edayan …………………………………………… 76
A.C. No. 12084; June 6, 2018
Franco B. Gonzales vs. Atty. Danilo B. Bañares …………………………………………… 77
A.C. No. 11396; June 20, 2018
Nicanor D. Triol vs. Atty. Delfin R. Agcaoili Jr. …………………………………………… 78
A.C. No. 12011; June 26, 2018
Jean Marie Boers vs. Atty. Calubaquib ………………………..…………………………… 79
A.C. No. 10562; August 1, 2017
Carmelo Iringan vs. Atty. Clayton B. Gumangan ………………………………………….. 80
A.C. No. 8574; August 16, 2017
Atty. Benigno T. Bartolome vs. Atty. Christopher A. Basilio …………………………… 81
A.C. No. 10783; January 31, 2018
Spouses Felix and Fe Navarro vs. Atty Margarito G. Ygona …………………………… 82
A.C. No. 8450; July 26, 2017
Office of the Court Administrator vs. Presiding Judge Bill Buyucan …………………. 83
A.M. No. MTJ-15-1854; July 11, 2017
Anonymous Complaint vs. Presiding Judge Exequil Dagala …………………………… 84
A.M. No. MTJ-16-1886; July 25, 2017
Office of the Court Administrator vs. Judge Winlove M. Dumayas …………………… 85
A.M. No. RTJ-15-2435; March 6, 2018
Office of the Court Administrator vs. Walter Inocencio V. Arreza …………………….. 86
A.M. No. MTJ-18-1911; April 16, 2018
Arnel Mendoza vs. Hon. Marcos C. Diasen, Jr. …………………………………………….. 87
A.M. No. MTJ-17-1900; August 09, 2017
Florita Palma and Filipina Mercado vs. Judge George E. Omelio, et. al. ……………… 88
A.M. No. RTJ-10-2223; August 30, 2017
Atty. Pablo B. Magno vs. Judge Jorge Emmanuel M. Lorredo …………….…………… 89
A.M. No. MTJ-17-1905; August 30, 2017
Office of the Court Administrator vs. Judge Hector Salise ……………………………… 90
A.M No. RTJ-18-2514; January 30, 2018
Re: Requests for Survivorship Pension Benefits of Spouses of Justices …………… 91
and Judges who Died Prior to the Effectivity of Republic Act No, 9946
A.M. No. 17-08-01-SC; September 19, 2017
Melvin Miranda vs. Judge Wilfredo Oca ……………………………………………………. 92
A.M. No. MTJ-17-1899; March 7, 2018
Extra Excel International Philippines, Inc. vs. Hon. Afable E. Cajigal ………………… 93
A.M. No. RTJ-18-2523; June 6, 2018
Hon. Philip Aguinaldo vs. President Benigno Simeon Aquino, III ……………………… 94
G.R. No. 224302 (Resolution); August 8, 2017
Atty. Eddie U. Tamondong vs. Judge Emmanuel P. Pasal ………………………………. 95
A.M. No. RTJ-16-2467, October 18, 2017
Philip See vs. Judge Rolando G. Mislang …………………………………………………… 96
A.M. No. RTJ-16-2454; June 6, 2018
Re: Anonymous Letter-Complaint Against Associate Justice ………………………… 97
Normandie Pizarro
A.M. No. 17-11-06-CA; March 13, 2018
Emma Alfelor vs. Hon. Augustus Diaz ……………………………………………………… 98
A.M. No. MTJ-16-1883; July 11, 2017
Office of the Court Administrator vs. Retired Judge Pablo R. Chavez ……………….. 99
A.M. No. RTJ-10-2219 & 12-7-130-RTC; August 1, 2017
Samuel N. Rodriguez vs. Hon. Oscar P. Noel, Jr. …………………………………………. 100
A.M. No. RTJ-18-2525; June 25, 2018
Atty. Jerome Norman L. Tacorda vs. Judge Perla V. Cabrera-Faller …………………. 101
A.M. No. RTJ-16-2460; June 27, 2018
Office of the Court Administrator vs. Judge Conrado O. Alinea ………………………. 102
A.M. No. MTJ-05-1574; November 7, 2017
Hon. Dennis Patrick Z. Perez vs. Almira L. Roxas ………………………………………… 103
A.M. No. P-16-3595; June 26, 2018
Hon. Maria Cristina C. Botigan-Santos et. al., vs. Leticia C. Gener …………………… 104
A.M. No. P-16-3521; September 4, 2017
Ma. Asuncion SJ. Samonte vs. Rey P. Roden ……………………………………………… 105
A.M. No. P-13-3170; September 18, 2017
Maria Magdalena R. Joven, et. al. vs. Lourdes G. Caoili …………………………………. 106
A.M. No. P-17-3754; September 26, 2017
Prosecutor Filipina C. Cabauatan vs. Domingo B. Uvero ……………………………….. 107
A.M. No. P-15-3329; November 6, 2017
The Office of the Court Administrator vs. Mr. Crispin C. Egipto ……………………….. 108
A.M. No. P-05-1938; November 7, 2017
Ferdinand E. Tauro vs. Racquel O. Arce ……………………………………………….…… 109
A.M. No. P-17-3731; November 8, 2017
In Re: Habitual Absenteeism of Rabindranath A. Tuzon ……………………………….. 110
A.M. No. 14-10-322-RTC; December 5, 2017
Isagani Rubio vs. Igmedio J. Basada ……………………………………………………….. 111
O.C.A. IPI No. 15-4429-P; December 6, 2017
Atty. Ma. Jasmine P. Lood et al., vs. Ruel V. Delicana …………………………………… 112
A.M. No. P-18-3796; January 22, 2018
Ma. Cecilia Fermina T. Roxas vs. Allen Fransisco S. Sicat ………………………………. 113
A.M. No. P-17-3639; January 23, 2018
Re: Dropping from the Rolls of Lemeuel H. Vendiola, Sheriff IV, ………………………. 114
Office of the Clerk of Court
A.M. No. 17-11-272-RTC; January 31, 2018
Office of the Court Administrator vs. Alma P. Licay ……………………………………… 115
A.M. No. P-11-2959; February 6, 2018
In Re: Janice C. Millare ………………………………………………………………………… 116
A. M. No. 17-11-131-MeTC; February 7, 2018
Re: Marissa M. Nudo …………………………………………………………………………… 117
A.M. No. 17-08-191-RTC; February 7, 2018
In Re: Camay, Jr. ……………………………………………………………………………….. 118
A.M. No. P-17-3659; March 20, 2018
Ruth Nadia N. De Los Santos vs. Jose Rene C. Vasquez ……………………………….. 119
A.M. No. P-18-3792; February 20, 2018
Office of the Court Administrator vs. Gilbert T. Inmenzo ………………………………. 120
A.M. No. P-16-3617; June 6, 2018
Office of Court Administrator vs. Tengco …………………………………………………. 121
A.M. No. P-07-23609; July 12, 2017
Gloria Serdoncillo vs. Sheriff Nestor M. Lanzaderas …………………………………….. 122
A.M. No. P-16-3424; August 07, 2017
Judge Ramon V. Efondo vs. Eden D. Favorito ……………………………………………… 123
OCA IPI No. 10-3423-P; August 22, 2017
Re: Report on the Preliminary Results of the Spot Audit …………………………….… 124
in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 170, Malabon City
A.M. No. 16-05-142-RTC; September 5, 2017
Prosecutor Ivy A. Tejano vs. Presiding Judge Antonio D. Marigomen ………………. 125
A.M. No. RTJ-17-2492; September 26, 2017
Re: Anonymous Complaints Against Hon. Dinah Evangeline B. Bandong ………….. 126
A.M. No. RTJ-17-2507; October 9, 2017
Leo T. Cahanap vs. Judge Leonor S. Quiñones …………………………………………… 127
A.M. No. RTJ-16-2470; October 1, 2017
Atty. Berteni Causing and Percival Mabasa vs. ………………………………………….. 128
Presiding Judge Jose Lorenzo Dela Rosa
OCA IPI No. 17-4663-RTJ; March 7, 2018
Marie Roxanne G. Recto vs. Hon. Henry J. Trocino ……………………………………… 129
A.M. No. RTJ-17-2508; November 07, 2017
Re: Judicial Audit Conducted in the Regional Trial Court, …………………………….. 130
Branch 20, Cagayan De Oro City, Misamis Oriental
Daniel Fajardo vs. Judge Antonio M. Natino ………………………………………………. 131
A.M. No. RTJ-16-2479; December 13, 2017
Darwin Azuel Reci vs. Atty. Emmanuel Villanueva ……………………………………….. 132
A.M. No. P-17-3763; November 21, 2017
Judge Lita S. Tolentino-Genilo vs. Rolando S. Pineda …………………………………… 133
A.M. No. P-17-3756; October 10, 2017
Office of The Court Administrator vs. Michael S. Calija …………………………………. 134
A.M. No. P-16-3586; June 5, 2018
Rube K. Gamolo, Jr. vs. Reba A. Beligolo …………………………………………………. 135
A.M. No. P-13-3154; March 7, 2018
Atty. Makilito B. Mahinay vs. Hon. Ramon B. Daomilas …………………………………. 136
A.M. No. RTJ-18-2527; June 18, 2018
Office of the Court Administrator vs. Rolando C. Tomas ……………………………….. 137
and Angelina C. Rillorta
A.M. No. P-09-2633; January 30, 2018
Atty. Plaridel C. Nava II vs. Judge Ofelia M. D. Artuz …………………………………….. 138
A.M. No. MTJ-08-1717; August 29, 2017
Dominador I. Ferrer, Jr. vs. Judge Arniel A. Dating ………………………………………. 139
Edgar R. Erice vs. Presiding Judge Dionisio C. Sison ………………………………….. 140
Office of the Court Administrator vs. Judge Perla Cabrera-Faller ……………………… 141
A.M. Nos. RTJ-11-2301, RTJ-11-2302 & 12-9-188-RTC; January 1, 2018
Bernardita F. Antiporda vs. Francisco A. Ante …………………………………………… 142
A.M. No. MTJ-18-1908; January 16, 2018
Re: Verified Complaint of Fernando Castillo Against ……………………………………. 143
Associate Justice Mariflor Punzalan-Castillo
I.P.I. No. 17-267-CA-J; April 24, 2018
Office of the Court Administrator vs. Cobarrubias ……………………………………….. 144
A.M. No. P-15-3379; November 22, 2017
Re: Deceitful Conduct of Ignacio S. Del Rosario …………………………………………. 145
A.M. No. 2011-05-SC; June 19, 2018
The Office of the Court Administrator vs. Crispin Egipto ……………………………….. 146
A.M. No. P-05-1938; January 30, 2018
Re: Martin S. Villarama …………………………………………………………………………. 147
A.M. No. 15-11-01-SC; March 6, 2018
COVERED CASES (JULY 01, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS
LAWYER’S ACTIONS AS AN ATTORNEY-IN-FACT PURSUANT TO A SPECIAL POWER

OF ATTORNEY FOR AN AUCTION SALE CONSTITUTE PRACTICE OF LAW
Joaquin G. Bonifacio vs. Atty. Edgardo O. Era and Atty. Diane Karen B. Bragas
A.C. No. 11754; October 3, 2017
Tijam, J.
FACTS:
This is an administrative complaint filed by Joaquin Bonifacio against Atty. Edgardo Era
and Atty. Karen Bragas for violating the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Bonifacio and his company were respondents in an illegal dismissal case wherein the
complainants of the labor case were represented by Era Associates Law Office through respondent
Atty. Era, with Atty. Bragas as his associate. The labor case was decided against Bonifacio.
Meanwhile, he was found guilty of representing conflicting interests in a previous case and was
imposed the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for 2 years. While being suspended to
practice law, Atty. Era’s name continued to appear in pleadings filed before the NLRC. It was also
alleged that Atty. Era and Atty. Bragas forced open Bonifacio’s establishment to pull out auctioned
properties pursuant to the execution of the judgment against Bonifacio. Atty. Era also participated
in the public auction of the said properties.
In their answers, Atty. Era and Atty. Bragas alleged that Bonifacio has no personal
knowledge as to what transpired during the scheduled auction and as such, allegations of force,
threat, and intimidation in the execution of the judgment is baseless. Atty. Era further argued that
he did not violate the Curt’s order of suspension from the practice of law as he merely acted as his
client’s attorney-in-fact pursuant to a SPA. He avers that he is not engaged in the practice of law
in representing his clients in the implementation of the alias writ, and he also never signed any
document or pleading on behalf of his clients during his suspension. For Atty. Bragas, she averred
that she was merely representing their clients.
ISSUES:
1. Is acting as the client’s attorney-in-fact pursuant to a SPA considered as practice of law,
which would be in violation of his suspension?
2. Was Atty. Bragas in violation of the CPR when she assisted Atty. Era?
RULING:
1. Yes. The acts of Atty. Era in acting as his client’s attorney-in-fact constitute practice of
law. The Court ruled that the term practice of law implies customarily or habitually holding oneself
out to the public as a lawyer for compensation as a source of livelihood or in consideration of
services. In this case, it is undisputed that Atty. Era committed the following acts: (1) appeared on
behalf of his winning clients in the public auction of the condemned properties; (2) tendered bid in
the auction for his clients; (3) secured certificate of sale and presented said documents to the
corporation’s officers and employees present in the premises at that time; (4) insisted that his
clients are now the new owners of the subject properties, hence should be allowed entry in the
premises; (5) initiated the pull out of the properties; and (6) negotiated with Bonifacio’s children in
his law office as regards the payment of the judgment award with interest instead of pulling out the
properties. Atty. Era’s acts clearly involved the determination by a trained legal mind of the legal
effects and consequences of each course of action in the satisfaction of the judgment award.
2. Yes. Canon 9 states that a lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, assist in the
unauthorized practice of law. As correctly observed by the Board, Atty. Bragas ought to know that
Atty. Era’s acts constitutive of law practice could be performed only by a member of the Bar in
good standing, which Atty. Era was not at the time.
|1
GOOD MORAL CHARACTER OF A LAWYER IS A CONTINUING REQUIREMENT UNTIL

RETIREMENT FROM THE PRACTICE OF LAW
Gizale O. Tumbaga vs. Atty. Manuel P. Teoxon

A.C. No. 5573; November 21, 2017
Leonardo-De Castro, J.
FACTS:
This is an administrative complaint filed by Gizale O. Tumbaga against respondent Atty.
Manuel P. Teoxon for disbarment with the Supreme Court, charging the latter with gross
immorality, deceitful and fraudulent conduct, and gross misconduct.
According to Tumbaga, sometime September 1999, she met Atty. Teoxon who was then
the City Legal Officer of Naga City from whom complainant sought legal advice. Thereafter,
respondent visited her often at her residence. In one of his visits, respondent represented that
although he was already previously married, his marriage was a sham and the marriage contract
was not registered. In view of respondent's persistence and generosity to her and her son,
complainant believed his representation that he was eligible to marry her. In December 1999, she
moved in with respondent and later had a son with him. Thereafter, complainant related that
respondent rarely visited them. In 2001, an affidavit of support was given by respondent but he
again reneged on his promise of support. In support of his allegations, Tumbaga presented pictures
of the respondent and his alleged son, Certificate of Live Birth of the child containing an Affidavit
of Acknowledgment of Paternity and the affidavit of support signed by the respondent.
In his answer, respondent denied the allegations in the complaint. He asserted that
complainant merely wanted to exact money from him.
ISSUE:
Does having an illicit affair tantamount to gross immorality which warrants the imposition
of the penalty of disbarment or suspension?
RULING:
Yes, having an illicit affair tantamount to gross immorality which warrants disbarment.
The good moral conduct or character must be possessed by lawyers at the time of their
application for admission to the Bar, and must be maintained until retirement from the practice of
law. Accordingly, it is expected that every lawyer, being an officer of the Court, must not only be
in fact of good moral character, but must also be seen to be of good moral character and leading
lives in accordance with the highest moral standards of the community. More specifically, a
member of the Bar and officer of the Court is required not only to refrain from adulterous
relationships or keeping mistresses but also to conduct himself as to avoid scandalizing the public
by creating the belief that he is flouting those moral standards. Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules
of Court provides for the imposition of the penalty of disbarment or suspension if a member of the
Bar is found guilty of committing grossly immoral conduct.
A perusal of the evidence revealed that Atty. Teoxon was indeed having an illicit affair with
complainant Tumbaga as proven by pictures taken of them together intimately and that a child was
begotten as a result of the affair proven by the Certificate of Live Birth of the child containing an
Affidavit of Acknowledgment of Paternity and the affidavit of support. Hence, the Court finds Atty.
Teoxon guilty of gross immorality and suspends him from the practice of law for 3 years.
2|
THE PROSCRIPTION ON NON-PURCHASE OF INTEREST IN THE SUBJECT MATTER OF

LITIGATION STILL APPLIES IN CANON 1 IN RELATION TO ART. 1941(5) OF THE CIVIL
CODE
Heirs of Juan de Dios E. Carlos vs. Atty. Jaime S. Linsangan

A.C. No. 11494; July 24, 2017
Tijam, J.
FACTS:
The present case is a disbarment complaint filed by the Heirs of Juan de Dios E. Carlos
against Atty. Jaime S. Linsangan for allegedly forcing them to sign pleadings and documents, for
selling their parcel of land without authorization, and for evasion of income taxes.
Linsangan was the counsel for the complainants’ late father in several cases involving a
certain parcel of land. During the pendency of the cases, Linsangan and Juan Carlos entered into
a contract, which stipulated that the latter bounds himself to pay the former a fee amounting to
50% of what they would be able to recover. Linsangan and the heirs of Juan Carlos, despite the
pendency of the other cases, subsequently submitted a supplemental compromise agreement
equally dividing between them the latters’ portion in the previous compromise agreement earlier
approved by the court. Thereafter, Linsangan executed a Deed of Absolute Sale conveying the
entire parcel of land to a certain Perez purportedly on the strength of the special power of attorney
executed by the individual owners in the agreements. Respondent refused to remit to the parties
their individual shares.
Complainants averred, among other things, that Linsangan connived with their mother, in
submitting the compromise agreement and in selling the subject property. The Heirs of Juan de
Dios also assailed the supplemental compromise agreement and proposed that the respondent be
paid based on quantum meruit instead of the 50% stipulated in the contract. By way of comment,
Atty. Linsangan averred that the supplemental compromise agreement was never questioned by
the complainants until now. He also admitted that the subject of the sale is property, which is under
litigation.
ISSUE:
Does the supplemental compromise agreement, which conveyed a portion of the subject
property to the respondent while still under litigation in other cases, violate the Lawyer’s Oath?
RULING:
Yes. The supplemental compromise agreement is a breach of the Lawyer’s Oath.
While Canon 10 of the old Canons of Professional Ethics is no longer reproduced in the
new CPR, such proscription still applies in Canon 1, which clearly requires that “a lawyer shall
uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land…”, in relation to Art. 1491(5) of the Civil Code,
which forbids lawyers from acquiring, by purchase or assignment, the property that has been the
subject of litigation in which they have taken part by virtue of their profession.
In the present case, Linsangan violated Art. 1491(5) of the CC, which, in turn, is a
transgression of his oath to uphold the laws of the land. The facts reveal that the transfer to
Linsangan was made while the subject property was still under litigation in other cases.
Therefore, in view of this, respondent violated the Lawyer’s Oath by conveying to himself
through the supplemental compromise agreement a portion of the subject lot under litigation.
|3
A LAWYER HAS THE DUTY TO OBEY LAWFUL ORDERS OF THE COURTS AND THE
IBP
Roman Dela Rosa Verano vs. Atty. Luis Fernan Diores, Jr.
A.C. No. 8887; November 7, 2017
Per Curiam
FACTS:
Complainant Roman Dela Rosa Verano filed a letter-complaint against respondent Atty.
Luis Fernan Diores, Jr., for deceit, malpractice, gross ignorance of the law for surreptitiously using
the former's parcel of land to secure bail bonds in connection with latter’s 61 cases of Estafa and
violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (BP Blg. 22).
Verano executed a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) in favor of Atty. Diores authorizing the
latter to use his land as guaranty to obtain a bail bond for particular criminal cases that had been
filed against Verano. However, Verano discovered that Atty. Diores used the land as guarantee to
obtain bail bonds for at least 61 cases of Estafa and Violation of BP Blg. 22, causing great loss
and damage to Verano. Further, Verano claimed that he did not authorize such transaction, but
only to use the land as collateral to those he authorized under the SPA and not to all 61 cases of
Estafa. Thereafter, the Court directed Atty. Diores to file his comment on the letter-complaint.
However, Atty. Diores failed to file any comment despite notice and he also failed to appear at the
scheduled mandatory conference despite notice.
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) recommended the disbarment of Atty. Diores
for violating the Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and failure to obey court orders
under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.
ISSUE:
Did Atty. Diores violate the CPR and Rule 138 of the ROC for his failure to file a comment
and to appear at the scheduled mandatory conference despite notices for both and for his use of
the subject land as guaranty to obtain bail bonds in the said cases?
RULING:
Yes, Atty Diores violated the CPR and Section 27, Rule 138 of ROC.
Lawyers are expected to observe the highest degree of good faith, fairness and candor,
both in their private and professional capacities. Thus, any form of deception or fraudulent act
committed by a lawyer in either capacity is not only disgraceful and dishonorable, but also severely
undermines the trust and confidence of people in the legal profession, violates Canon 1, Rule 1.01
of the CPR, and puts the lawyer's moral character into serious doubt as a member of the Bar,
rendering him unfit to continue his practice of law. Moreover, a lawyer has the duty to obey lawful
orders of a superior court and the IBP. Willful disobedience to such orders, especially to those
issued by this Court, is a sufficient ground to disbar a lawyer or suspend him from the practice of
law under Section 27, Rule 138 of the ROC.
In this case, the IBP observed that while there was a SPA executed by Verano in favor of
Atty. Diores, Verano did not allow its use for other criminal cases. This, together with his willful
disobedience of court orders and his act of using Verano's subject property as guaranty for his bail
bond outside the criminal cases wherein he was authorized, cements his utter unfitness to continue
exercising his duties as a lawyer.
Thus, Atty. Diores is guilty of violating the CPR and ROC warranting his disbarment from
the practice of law.
4|
FALSIFICATION IS AN ACT OF FALSEHOOD, REPREHENSIBLE UNDER THE CODE OF

PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY AND LAWYER’S OATH
Manuel L. Valin vs. Atty. Rolando T. Ruiz

A.C. No. 10564; November 7, 2017
Gesmundo, J.
FACTS:
Complainants Manuel and Honorio Valin filed an administrative case against respondent
Atty. Rolando Ruiz with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for committing forgery and
falsification of a deed of absolute sale, in breach of his lawyer's oath and in violation of the laws.
The complainants averred that they are two of the surviving children of their deceased
parents, spouses Pedro F. Valin and Cecilia Lagadon. Pedro was the original registered owner of
a parcel of land. Pedro died while he was in Hawaii. Several years later, complainant Honorio
discovered that the land has been transferred to Atty. Ruiz, the godson of Pedro. He learned from
the Register of Deeds that the subject land was conveyed to respondent by virtue of a Deed of
Absolute Sale, and executed in Cagayan purportedly by Pedro with the alleged consent of his
spouse, Cecilia. Complainants alleged that the subject deed was falsified and the signatures
therein of Pedro and Cecilia were forgeries because Pedro was already dead and Cecilia was in
Hawaii at that time. The complainants pointed to respondent as the author of the falsifications and
forgeries because he was the one who benefited from the same. Respondent denied having
knowledge regarding the execution of the document. He insisted that he neither falsified the said
deed and nor forged the signatures of Pedro and Cecilia.
The IBP found respondent to be unfit to be entrusted with the powers of an attorney. It
reasoned that as the beneficiary of the falsified deed, respondent was presumed to be the author
thereof.
ISSUE:
Is respondent Atty. Ruiz unfit to be a lawyer for being a beneficiary of a falsified deed?
RULING:
Yes, Atty. Ruiz is unfit for the practice of law for violating the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR) and the Lawyer’s Oath.
Rule 1.01 of the CPR states that "a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral
or deceitful conduct." Further, the lawyer's oath enjoins every lawyer not only to obey the laws of
the land but also to refrain from doing any falsehood in or out of court or from consenting to the
doing of any in court, and to conduct himself according to the best of his knowledge and discretion
with all good fidelity to the courts as well as to his clients.
The Court is convinced that respondent was the author or, at the very least, has connived
with the author of the subject deed and Pedro's CTC for his personal benefits. Respondent
incessantly closed his eyes until he became blind to the anomalies surrounding the sale of the
subject land.
Thus, Atty. Ruiz is guilty of violating the CPR and Lawyer’s Oath warranting his suspension
from the practice of law.
|5
A LAWYER MUST BE A DISCIPLE OF TRUTH OTHERWISE HIS COMMISSION OF

FALSEHOOD CAN BE CONDINGLY SANCTIONED
Marjorie A. Apolinar-Petilo vs. Atty. Aristedes A. Maramot

A.C. No. 9067; January 31, 2018
Bersamin, J.
FACTS:
This is an administrative complaint filed by Marjorie A. Apolinar-Petilo against Atty.
Aristeredes A. Maramot.
According to Atty. Maramot, Margarita wanted to donate her property in favor of her two
grandnieces who were only 12 years old and 16 1/2 years old, at the time of its execution. Upon
learning of their minority, Atty. Maramot advised Margarita that they had to be represented by their
parents. However, Margarita persisted and prevailed over him, so he prepared a deed of donation
but left the date, document number, and page number in blank, and reserved the notarization for
later after the parties had signed the document. Atty. Maramot adverted to Margarita's assurance
that she would herself procure the signatures of the parents of Princess Anne on the document.
Atty. Maramot further alleged that there was nothing illegal in the said deed of donation as
Margarita had the right to dispose her property by donation.
Complainant alleged that Atty. Maramot consented to, abetted and participated in the
illegal act of falsifying a deed of donation executed by her aunt, Margarita Apolinar, in favor of
Margarita’s grandnieces, by preparing a deed of donation, and indicating that the donees were of
legal age despite knowing that they are minors.
ISSUE:
Did Atty. Maramot, commit an act of dishonesty, in violation of the Lawyer’s Oath and the
Code of Professional Responsibility, when he falsified the age of the donees in the Deed of
Donation?
RULING:
Yes. Atty. Maramot committed dishonesty when he prepared such Deed of Donation, and
thereby violating his Oath and the CPR.
A lawyer must be a disciple of truth. He swore upon his admission to the Bar that he will
do no falsehood nor consent to the doing of any in court and he shall conduct himself as a lawyer
according to the best of his knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as
to his clients. He should bear in mind that as an officer of the court his high vocation is to correctly
inform the court upon the law and the facts of the case and to aid it in doing justice and arriving at
correct conclusion.
Here, Atty. Maramot prepared the deed of donation and at the time of his preparation of
the document, he actually knew that Princess Anne and Mommayda were minors. His doing so,
being undeniably dishonest, was contrary to his oath as a lawyer not to utter a falsehood. He
thereby consciously engaged in an unlawful and dishonest conduct, defying the law and
contributing to the erosion of confidence in the Law Profession.
Hence, Atty. Maramot committed dishonesty when he prepared the Deed of Donation
knowing fully well that the donees were minors.
6|
A LAWYER SHALL NOT ENGAGE IN UNLAWFUL, DISHONEST, IMMORAL, OR

DECEITFUL CONDUCT ELSE HE SHALL BE HELD LIABLE FOR VIOLATING HIS OATH
AND THE CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
Freddie A. Guillen vs. Atty. Audie Arnado

A.C. No. 10547; November 8, 2017
Peralta, J.
FACTS:
This is an administrative case filed by Freddie Guillen against his former business partner,
Atty. Audie Arnado, for alleged violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).
Complainant Guillen is the registered owner of the City Grill Restaurant. He then invited
Atty. Arnado and a certain Cedric Ebo to join the restaurant business wherein each of them had to
shell out P200,000.00. A Memorandum of Agreement was therefore executed and the business
was formally launched. Guillen alleged that Arnado’s sister in law and Ebo’s son caused
complications in the business operations which forced Guillen and his wife to step down as general
manager and operations manager, respectively. Consequently, Guillen offered to waive his claims
for profits provided that Arnado would return the P200,000.00 that he paid as capital. Thereafter,
Guillen was surprised to find out that Arnado had already caused the incorporation of the restaurant
with the SEC as City Grill-Sutukill Food Corporation. Guillen was likewise excluded from the
business without the refund of his capital. Thus, Guillen initiated the present administrative case.
For his part, Arnado admitted the existence and the contents of the MOA and that he
caused the incorporation of City Grill-Sutukil Food Corporation. However, he insisted that the same
was done in accordance with the requirements under the law. Guillen could not validly claim for a
refund, and if he was really entitled, he should simply file an action to that effect.
ISSUE:
Did Atty. Arnado engage in an unlawful or deceitful conduct in incorporating the restaurant
business?
RULING:
Yes. Atty. Arnado engaged in an unlawful and deceitful conduct when it incorporated the
restaurant business.
Rule 1.01 of the CPR prohibits a lawyer from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or deceitful
conduct.||The Court has repeatedly emphasized that the practice of law is imbued with public
interest and that a lawyer owes substantial duties, not only to his client, but also to his brethren in
the profession, to the courts, and to the public, and takes part in the administration of justice, one
of the most important functions of the State, as an officer of the court. Accordingly, lawyers are
bound to maintain, not only a high standard of legal proficiency, but also of morality, honesty,
integrity, and fair dealing.
In this case, Arnado is guilty of taking advantage of his knowledge of the law and of surreptitiously
easing out Guillen from their restaurant business partnership by registering a corporation under a
different but similar name and style, in the same line of business, and using the same trade secrets.
Arnado, although not reflected as one of the incorporators of City Grill-Sutukil Food Corporation,
has deceived the public into believing that City Grill Restaurant and City Grill-Sutukil Food
Corporation are one and the same.
Here, Arnado has certainly fallen short of the high standard of morality, honesty, integrity, and fair
dealing required of him. On the contrary, he employed his knowledge and skill of the law as well
as took advantage of Guillen to secure undue gains for himself and to inflict serious damage on
others. Atty. Arnado is suspended from the practice of law for a period of one year.
|7
A LAWYER’S FAILURE TO FULFILL THE BASIC UNDERTAKING IN FOLLOWING THE

NOTARIAL LAW CONSTITUTES A VIOLATION OF HIS DUTY NOT TO ENGAGE IN
UNLAWFUL AND DECEITFUL CONDUCT
Ma. Vilma F. Maniquiz vs. Atty. Danilo C. Emelo

A.C. No. 8968; September 26, 2017
Peralta, J.
FACTS:
This is an administrative complaint filed by Ma. Vilma Maniquiz against Atty. Danilo C.
Emelo for notarizing a fictitious Deed of Absolute Sale and in the absence of the required notarial
commission.
Complainant Maniquiz alleged that Atty. Emelo violated his lawyer’s oath and the CPR
when he willfully notarized a fictitious Deed of Absolute Sale containing a falsified signature of her
sister-in-law, Mergelita Sindanom-Maniquiz, as vendor of a parcel of land in favor of Spouses
Torres, as the vendees. Even worse, Atty. Emelo notarized said document without being
authorized to act as a notary public for Cavite.
Respondent Atty. Emelo denied the accusations against him. He argued that he was not
remiss in his obligations as a notary public when he notarized the subject deed of absolute sale
since the parties appeared before him. He likewise attested that a woman introduced herself to
him as Mergelita Maniquiz, as evidenced by her passport. As for his notarial commission, he
explained that for the year 2007, he could not retrieve orders of his commission as they may have
been destroyed when his residential house was inundated by the typhoon Milenyo.
ISSUE:
Did Atty. Emelo commit deceit, gross misconduct, and dishonesty for willfully notarizing a
fictitious deed of absolute sale?
RULING:
Yes, Atty. Emelo committed deceit, gross misconduct, and dishonesty.
Canon 1 of the CPR states that a lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of
the land and promote respect for law and legal processes. In support, Rule 1.0 states that a lawyer
shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or deceitful conduct.
When the notarization of a document is done by a member of the Philippine Bar at a time
when he has no authorization or commission to do so, the offender may be subjected to disciplinary
action. For one, performing a notarial act without such commission is a violation of the lawyer’s
oath to obey the laws, more specifically, the Notarial Law. Then, too, by making it appear that he
is duly commissioned when he is not, he is, for all legal intents and purposes, indulging in deliberate
falsehood, which the lawyer’s oath similarly proscribes. Atty. Emelo’s failure to fulfill this basic
undertaking constitutes a violation of his duty to observe fairness and honesty in all his dealings
and transactions. Considering the crucial importance of his role in the administration of justice, his
misconduct certainly diminished the confidence of the public in the integrity and dignity of the legal
profession.
Hence, Atty. Emelo committed deceit, gross misconduct, and dishonesty in violation of
Canon 1 of the CPR.
8|
A LAWYER MUST BE CONVERSANT WITH BASIC LEGAL PRINCIPLES IN ORDER NOT

TO PREJUDICE THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT
Luzviminda S. Cerilla vs. Atty. Samuel SM. Lezama

A.C. No. 11483; October 3, 2017
Peralta, J.
FACTS:
This is an administrative complaint filed by complainant Luzviminda S. Cerilla for gross
misconduct against respondent Atty. Samuel SM. Lezema with the IBP.
Cerilla is one of the co-owners of a parcel of land located at Sibulan, Negros Oriental. She
engaged the services of respondent to file an unlawful detainer case against Carmelita Garlito.
Because she was working at Camp Aguinaldo, she executed a Special Power of Attorney in favor
of respondent to perform acts in relation to the filing of the ejectment case. However, based on the
SPA, respondent entered into a compromise agreement with the defendant Garlito to sell the
property without her consent or a special authority from her.
Cerilla contended that respondent misinterpreted the Compromise Agreement; that she
did not authorize the respondent to sell the property and she is not willing to sell the same
considering that there are other co-owners. Atty. Lezama denied complainant’s allegation that he
misrepresented that complainant was willing to sell the property since he was duly armed with a
SPA to enter into compromise agreement. According to him, he entered into the compromise
agreement under the honest and sincere belief that it was the fairest and most equitable
arrangement.
ISSUE:
Did Atty. Lezama commit grave misconduct when he entered into the Compromise
Agreement without the consent or special authority?
RULING:
Yes, Atty. Lezama committed grave misconduct in entering into the Compromise
Agreement.
It must be emphasized that the primary duty of lawyers is to obey the laws of the land and
promote respect for the law and legal processes. This duty carries with it the obligation to be well-
informed of the existing laws and to keep abreast with legal developments, recent enactments and
jurisprudence. It is imperative that they be conversant with basic legal principles. Unless they
faithfully comply with such duty, they may not be able to discharge competently and diligently their
obligations as members of the bar. Worse, they may become susceptible to committing mistakes.
The SPA authorized respondent to represent complainant in filing the ejectment case and
to appear on her behalf during the preliminary conference and to make stipulations of fact,
admissions, and other matters for the early resolution of the case, including amicable settlement.
Nowhere is it expressly stated that respondent is authorized to compromise on the sale of the
property. Respondent’s justification that he was serving both the interest of his client and the policy
of the law to settle cases amicably is not persuading because his honest belief prejudiced his client.
Hence, Atty. Lezema committed grave misconduct in entering into the Compromise
Agreement without having the authority to do so.
|9
A LAWYER SHALL NOT USE INTEMPERATE LANGUAGE IN HIS PROFESSIONAL

DEALINGS
Lito V. Buenviaje vs. Atty. Melchor G. Magdamo

A.C. No. 11616 (Formerly CBD Case No. 08-2141); August 23, 2017
Peralta, J.
FACTS:
This is an administrative complaint filed by petitioner Lito Buenviaje against respondent,
Atty. Melchor Magdamo, for violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
In order to protect the rights of his clients to the money of their sister, Fe Solis Gonzalo,
respondent sent a Notice of Death of Depositor to BPI alleging that while Gonzalo was terminally
ill. Buenviaje allegedly falsified documents of Gonzalo stating that he is her husband, when in fact
he is married to another woman. In the pleadings, respondent indicated that petitioner is a
“swindler” and “a fugitive from justice.”
Petitioner denied all the allegations. He averred that respondent employed dirty and
dishonest means by calling him a “swindler” and “a fugitive from justice” to ensure that BPI would
prevent him from withdrawing money from his joint account with wife, Gonzalo.
IBP-CBD recommended that responded be reprimanded. IBP-Board of Governors raised

this penalty to suspension for 3 months.
ISSUE:
Does the act of calling petitioner a “swindler” and “a fugitive from justice” in the pleading
warrant administrative liability?”
RULING:
Yes. Respondent’s acts warrant administrative liability.
Under Canon 8 of the CPR, a lawyer should conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and
candor towards his professional colleagues and shall avoid harassing tactics against opposing
counsel. Under the said Canon, Rule 8.01 states that a lawyer shall not use abusive, offensive and
improper language in his professional dealings.
In this case, respondent referred to petitioner as a “swindler” and “a fugitive from justice”
without any evidence of the latter being such. Such acts are disrespectful, intemperate, manifestly
baseless, and malicious which warrants violations to the lawyer’s oath and the CPR. These words
also led BPI to believe that petitioner is a “swindler” and “a fugitive from justice.”
Thus, by using intemperate language, respondent is administratively liable and is

suspended for three months.
10 |
A LAWYER HAS A DUTY TO MAINTAIN THE HONOR DUE TO THE LEGAL

PROFESSION
Atty. Rosita L. Dela Fuente Torres vs. Atty. Bayani P. Dalangin

A.C. No. 10758; December 5, 2017
Reyes, Jr., J.
FACTS:
Four administrative complaints were filed with the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) by and against the same parties, particularly, Atty. Rosita
L. Dela Fuente Torres and Atty. Bayani P. Dalangin.
The first complaint was against Atty. Dalangin for gross immorality, malpractice and gross
misconduct. It was alleged that Atty. Dalangin filed against the employees of the judiciary and a
fellow lawyer groundless suits, which were merely prompted by his loss in a case and intended to
cover up his negligence as counsel. Atty. Dalangin was also accused of maintaining illicit and
immoral affair with one Julita Pascual, a clerk at the Public Attorney’s Office. The second complaint
was for gross misconduct and avers that Atty. Dalangin allegedly hurled slanderous and
defamatory remarks against another complainant Alvaro, as he spoke at the top of his voice and
referred her as a "certified swindler." On the other hand, the third and fourth complaints, Atty.
Dalangin filed a complaint against Atty. Torres. He alleges that Atty. Torres and Atty. Avelino
Andres conspired with their clients in filing a case which contained a transcript of a recorded
telephone conversation in violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Act.
The IBP dismissed the case against Atty. Torres but found Atty. Dalangin guilty of violating
the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) and Lawyer’s Oath on gross immorality and gross
misconduct.
ISSUE:
Is Atty. Dalangin guilty of violating the CPR?
RULING:
Yes. Atty. Dalangin is guilty of violating the CPR but only on the second complaint.
Canon 7 of CPR provides that “a lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity
of the legal profession” and Rule 7.03 states that “a lawyer shall not engage in conduct that
adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life,
behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.”
Atty. Dalangin erred in his conduct subject of the complaint, especially since his outburst
was carried out within the court premises and in the presence of several persons who readily
witnessed his fit of anger. Part of Atty. Dalangin’s duties as a lawyer is to maintain the honor that
is due the profession.
The Court found no sufficient basis for the three other cases filed against Atty. Dalangin.
| 11
LAWYERS MUST NOT ENGAGE IN CONDUCT WHICH TENDS TO LESSEN IN ANY

DEGREE THE CONFIDENCE OF THE PUBLIC IN THE FIDELITY, HONESTY, AND THE
INTEGRITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION
Oliver Fabugais vs. Atty. Berardo C. Faundo Jr.

A.C. No. 10145; June 11, 2018
Del Castillo, J.
FACTS:
This is a complaint filed by Oliver Fabugais against respondent Atty. Berardo C. Faundo,
Jr. for gross misconduct and conduct unbecoming of a lawyer for having allegedly engaging in illicit
and immoral relations with his wife, Annaliza Lizel B. Fabugais.
In her Sinumpaang Salaysay, the 10-year-old daughter of Oliver, alleged that she, along
with her mother Annaliza, and two others, stayed in a house in Ipil, Zamboanga-Sibugay which
belonged to Atty. Faundo, who she calls “Tito Attorney.” When nighttime fell, Atty. Faundo slept in
the same bed with her and her mother, and that she saw him embracing her mother while they
were sleeping. She further recounted Atty. Faundo entering the room clad only with a towel, and
told her and her two other companions to leave the room while he remained inside with Annaliza.
Oliver further narrated that while driving his motorcycle along San Jose Road in Baliwasan,
Zamboanga City, Atty. Faundo who was then riding in another motorcycle slowed down next to
him, yelled at him, challenged him to a fistfight and threatened to kill him. He also alleged that Atty.
Faundo harassed his sister.
Atty. Faundo denied having immoral relations with Annaliza. He claimed that he was
merely assisting Annaliza in her court battle for custody of her children. He insisted that he was
incapable of the misconduct imputed to him. The IBP Commissioner found Atty. Faundo guilty of
violating Rule 1.01 of the CPR and recommended his suspension from the practice of law for 1
month. The IBP Board of Governors adopted the findings of the Commissioner.
ISSUE:
Did Atty. Faundo commit acts that are grossly immoral that would warrant or call for his
disbarment or suspension from the practice of law?
RULING:
No, Atty. Faundo did not commit grossly immoral acts, but is still administratively liable for
acting inappropriately.
As officers of the court, lawyers must in fact and in truth be of good moral character. They
must be seen or appear to be of good moral character. Members of the bar cannot exhibit any
conduct which tends to lessen in any degree the confidence of the public in the fidelity, honesty,
and the integrity of the legal profession.
The acts complained of in this case might not be grossly or starkly immoral, but they were
without doubt condemnable. Atty. Faundo had no qualms about being seen sleeping in his own
bed with another man’s wife, and her 10-year old daughter to sleep with him on the same bed. He
also had no qualms about exploding into the room occupied by Annaliza, Marie Nicole, and two
other women, clad with nothing else but a towel. A modicum of decency should have impelled him
to behave more sensitively, as Marie Nicole could be forming her impressions of lawyers and the
legal profession by his actions.
Thus, Atty. Faundo is administratively liable for inappropriate behavior, and is suspended
from the practice of law for 1 month.
12 |
IBP HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER ADMINISTRATIVE OFFENSES INVOLVING

PERFORMANCE OF OFFICAL DUTIES OF PROSECUTORS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE
Manuel B. Trovela vs. Michael B. Robles, as Assistant City Prosecutor, et al.,

A.C. No. 11550; June 4, 2018
Bersamin, J.
FACTS:
The complainant Manuel B. Trovela (Trovela) initiated this disbarment complaint against
Pasig City Assistant Prosecutor Michael B. Robles (Robles) for issuing a resolution recommending
the dismissal of his complaint for estafa.
Subsequently, the complainant criminally charged several persons with estafa under
Article 315(1)(b) of the Revised Penal Code. In his resolution, Robles recommended the dismissal
of the complaint for insufficiency of evidence.
Consequently, Trovela initiated disbarment proceedings against the respondents. In his

complaint-affidavit, Trovela has posited that Robles, and the others, committed grave errors of
facts and law that require an inquiry into their mental and moral fitness as members of the Bar;
and that former Prosecutor General Claro A. Arellano and former Justice Secretary De Lima be
declared guilty of dereliction of duty or gross inexcusable negligence for belatedly resolving his
petition for review and motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE:
Should the respondents be administratively disciplined based on the allegations of the
complainant that they committed grave errors of facts and law that require an inquiry into their
mental and moral fitness as members of the Bar?
RULING:
No, the respondents should not be administratively disciplined by IBP.
The acts complained of undoubtedly arose from the respondents' performance or

discharge of official duties as prosecutors of the Department of Justice. Hence, the authority to
discipline respondents Robles and the others exclusively pertained to their superior, the Secretary
of Justice. In the case of Secretary De Lima, the authority to discipline pertained to the President.
In either case, the authority may also pertain to the Office of the Ombudsman, which similarly
exercises disciplinary jurisdiction over them as public officials pursuant to Section 15, paragraph
1, of Republic Act No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989). Indeed, the accountability of respondents
as officials performing or discharging their official duties as lawyers of the Government is always
to be differentiated from their accountability as members of the Philippine Bar. The IBP has no
jurisdiction to investigate them as such lawyers.
Thus, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) has no jurisdiction to investigate
government lawyers charged with administrative offenses involving the performance of their official
duties.
| 13
FORUM SHOPPING AMOUNTS TO ABUSE OF THE COURT’S PROCESSES AND WILL BE

PUNISHED AS CONTEMPT OF COURT
Dr. Eduardo R. Alicias, Jr. vs. Atty. Vivencio S. Baclig

A.C. No. 9919; July 19, 2017
Tijam, J.
FACTS:
The present case is a disbarment complaint filed by Dr. Eduardo Alicias, Jr., against Atty.
Vivencio Baclig for alleged violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility and/or the Lawyer’s
Oath.
Atty. Baclig was the counsel of Eleuterio Lamorena, et al. in another case against Alicias
before the RTC of Vigan City. Lamorena, et al. questioned the occupancy of the complainant of a
certain parcel of land. It appears, however, that prior to the filing of the said case, an amended
complaint for reconveyance, annulment of deeds, and quieting of title was already filed by the
Lamorenas against Alicias before the MTCC of Vigan City. However, it was not Atty. Baclig who
represented Lamorena in that case.
In the present administrative case, the complainant averred that, among others, Baclig
consented to the filing of a complaint when a similar case, which seeks a similar relief was already
filed before the MTCC.
ISSUE:
Is Atty. Baclig’s act of consenting to the filing of another complaint before another forum
while a case is pending before the MTCC made him administratively liable for forum shopping?
RULING:
Yes, Atty. Baclig’s act of consenting to the filing of another complaint before another forum
while a case is pending before the MTCC made him administratively liable for forum shopping.
Forum shopping amounts to abuse of the court’s processes and improper conduct that
tends to impede, obstruct, and degrade the administration of justice and thus should be punished
as contempt of court. Forum shopping, through the act of filing of another action concerning the
same subject matter, runs contrary to Canon 1, which requires a lawyer to exert every effort to
consider it his duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice, and Rule 12.04,
Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which prohibits undue delay of a case by
misusing the court processes.
In the present case, the Court held that there was forum shopping for while the case before
the MTCC was pending, Atty. Baclig consented to the filing of another complaint before another
forum – the RTC. Both the subject cases concern the same parties and same reliefs. Verily, a
ruling in the MTCC would resolve the case in the RTC, and vice versa. That Atty. Baclig did not
act as counsel in the case before the MTCC would not exempt him from culpability. The Court,
therefore, found respondent guilty of forum shopping.
14 |
LAWYERS SHALL OBSERVE AND MAINTAIN RESPECT TO COURT AND COURT

ORDERS AND PROCESSES
Carlina P. Robiñol vs. Atty. Edilberto P. Bassig

A.C. No. 11836; November 21, 2017
Tijam, J.
FACTS:
This is a disbarment case filed by Carlina Robiñol against respondent Atty. Edilberto P.
Bassig for violation of Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) and Lawyer's Oath.
Robiñol alleged that the Atty. Bassig rented a house from her, without any contract, for a
period of two years starting June 2010. It was agreed that Atty. Bassig will pay a one-month
advance and another one-month deposit. However, Atty. Bassig did not comply with the same.
Atty. Bassig instead paid the monthly rentals belatedly for 8 months. Thereafter, he stopped
making any payment. After several promises to pay, Atty. Bassig still reneged on his obligation to
pay the rent. Based on these incidents, Robiñol was constrained to hire a counsel to protect her
interests and sent a demand letter to Atty. Basig. Moreover, Atty. Bassig filed an unverified answer
and failed to appear on the mandatory conference despite notice.
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Board of Governors ruled that Atty. Bassig's
failure to file his answer despite due notice and to appear on the scheduled hearings showed his
resistance to lawful orders and illustrated his despiciency for his oath of office as a lawyer, which
deserves disciplinary sanction.
ISSUE:
Does the respondent’s failure to file an answer and to appear on the scheduled hearings
constitute a violation of the CPR?
RULING:
Yes. Atty. Bassig’s failure to file an answer and to appear on the scheduled hearings are
in violation of the CPR.
Atty. Bassig committed an act in violation of Canon 11 of the CPR: A lawyer shall observe
and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial officers and should insist on similar
conduct by others. It must be noted that Atty. Bassig, despite due notice, repeatedly failed to abide
by the orders of the IBP, i.e. filing a verified answer, appearing in two mandatory conferences and
filing of position paper. In fact, when the IBP ordered him to file a position paper, it is in view of the
expunction of his answer. Verily, Atty. Bassig's conduct is unbecoming of a lawyer, for lawyers are
particularly called upon to obey court orders and processes and are expected to stand foremost in
complying with court directives being themselves officers of the court. In disregarding the orders
of the IBP, he exhibited a conduct which runs contrary to his sworn duty as an officer of the court.
Thus, Atty. Bassig was held liable for violation of the CPR for failing to file an answer and
to appear on the scheduled hearings.
| 15
A LAWYER DOES NOT HAVE AN UNBRIDLED RIGHT TO FILE PLEADINGS, MOTIONS

AND CASES AS HE PLEASES
Ret. Judge Virgilio Alpajora vs. Atty. Ronaldo Antonio V. Calayan

A.C. No. 8208; January 10, 2018
Gesmundo, J.
FACTS:
This is a Counter-Complaint filed by complainant Retired Judge Alpajora (Judge Alpajora)
against respondent Atty. Ronaldo Antonio Calayan (Atty. Calayan), which origingated from an
administrative complained filed by respondent against the complainant before the OCA for
ignorance of the law and/or issuance of undue order.
An intra-corporate dispute involving Calayan Educational Foundation Inc. (CEFI) was filed
in court where Atty Ronaldo Calayan was the President and Chairman of the Board of Trustees of
the said corporation. He signed and filed the pleadings as “Special Counsel pro se” for himself.
Court proceedings ensued despite several inhibitions by judges to whom the case was re-raffled
until it was finally re-raffled to Judge Virgilio Alpajora. Thereafter, Judge Alpajora issued an
Omnibus Order for the creation of a management committee and the appointment of its members
for the corporation. The said Order prompted the filing of the administrative case against the Judge
Alpajora by Atty.Calayan.
Complainant acclaimed that respondent filed 18 repetitious and prohibited pleadings. Atty.
Calayan avers that there is no law or rule that limits the number of motions, pleadings and even
cases so long as they are sufficient in form and substance and not violative of the prohibition
against forum shopping.
ISSUE:
Did Atty. Calayan’s act of filing of numerous pleadings, motions, civil, criminal and
administrative cases violate his duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice?
RULING:
Yes. Atty. Calayan's indiscriminate filing of pleadings, motions, and cases frustrates the
speedy disposition of cases.
A lawyer does not have an unbridled right to file pleadings, motions and cases as he
pleases. The Code of Professional Responsibility provides: (a) Canon 1 - A lawyer shall uphold
the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and for legal processes; (b)
Canon 10, Rule 10.03- A lawyer shall observe the rules of procedure and shall not misuse them to
defeat the ends of justice; (c) Canon 12- A lawyer shall exert every effort and consider it his duty
to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice; and (d) Canon 12, Rule 12.04- A
lawyer shall not unduly delay a case, impede the execution of a Judgment or misuse Court
processes.
Here, Atty. Calayan's indiscriminate filing of pleadings, motions, civil and criminal cases,
and even administrative cases against different trial court judges relating to controversies involving
CEFI, in fact, runs counter to the speedy disposition of cases. It frustrates the administration of
justice. It degrades the dignity and integrity of the courts. Therefore, the Atty. Calayan’s acts act of
filing of numerous pleadings, motions, civil, criminal and administrative cases violate the duty of a
lawyer to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice.
16 |
THE FILING OF MULTIPLE PETITIONS CONSTITUTES ABUSE OF THE COURT'S

PROCESSES AND IMPROPER CONDUCT
In Re: G.R. No. 157659 "Eligio P. Mallari vs. Government Service Insurance System and the
Provincial Sheriff of Pampanga."
A.C. No. 11111; January 10, 2018
Jardeleza, J.
FACTS:
This is an administrative case involving Atty. Eligio P. Mallari, wherein the Supreme Court
directed the Committee on Bar Discipline of the IBP to investigate Atty. Mallari to investigate Atty.
Mallari for violations of the Lawyer's Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Atty. Mallari obtained two loans, which were secured by two mortgages over two parcels
of land registered under his and his wife's name, from GSIS. Despite repeated demands, Atty.
Mallari failed to settle his account. This prompted GSIS to commence the extrajudicial foreclosure
proceedings against him. In turn, the validity of the extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings was
upheld by the Court, and the issuance of titles in the name of the GSIS was proper. Upon
application of GSIS, the RTC issued a writ of execution cum writ of possession in its favor. The
Sheriff failed to serve the writ, because Atty. Mallari requested him for an extension of time to
vacate the premises. However, Atty. Mallari filed a motion for reconsideration and/or to quash the
writ of execution. This case was dismissed on the ground of res judicata.
Subsequently, Atty. Mallari filed two motions to hold GSIS in contempt of court for painting
the fence and for cutting off electric services on the properties. The RTC denied the motions for
contempt of court, and ordered the re-implementation of the writ of execution. The Court then
directed the Committee on Bar Discipline for alleged infractions of Atty. Mallari in violation of the
Lawyer’s Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility. In his answer, Atty. Mallari claims that
as lawful owner of the said properties, he has the right to exclude other persons from his properties.
ISSUE:
Is the act of stalling the execution of the decision of the court by employing dilatory tactics
constitute as a violation of the duty of fidelity to the courts?
RULING:
Yes. Atty. Mallari’s acts of stalling the execution of the decision of the court by employing
dilatory tactics is a violation of the duty of fidelity to the courts. He deliberately abused court
procedures and processes, in order to enable himself to obstruct and stifle the fair and quick
administration of justice in favor of mortgagee and GSIS.
A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client, but not at the expense of truth and the
administration of justice. The filing of multiple petitions constitutes abuse of the court's processes
and improper conduct that tends to impede, obstruct and degrade the administration of justice and
will be punished as contempt of court. The Code of Professional Responsibility provides that
Canon 10 – A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court; Rule 10.03- A lawyer shall
observe the rules of procedure and shall not misuse them to defeat the ends of justice; Rule 12.02
– A lawyer shall not file multiple actions arising from the same cause; and Rule 12.04 – A lawyer
shall not unduly delay a case, impede the execution of a judgment or misuse court processes.
In this case, the judgment in favor of the GSIS concerning the validity of the extrajudicial
foreclosure proceedings had long became final and executory. Despite this, Atty. Mallari, with the
purpose of delaying the execution of the judgment by the winning party, took the series of actions
which effectively obstructed the execution of a final and executory judgment. Hence, Atty. Mallari’s
acts of stalling the execution of the decision of the Court by employing dilatory tactics constitutes
a violation of his duty of fidelity to the Courts.
| 17
REPETITIVE DISREGARD OF THE COURT’S DIRECTIVES CONTRAVENES A

LAWYER’S DUTY TO UPHOLD THE DIGNITY AND AUTHORITY OF THE COURT.
Romeo A. Zarcilla and Marita Bumanglag vs. Atty. Jose C. Quesada, Jr.
A.C. No. 7186, March 13, 2018
Per Curiam
FACTS:
This is a Petition for Disbarment filed by Complainants Romeo A. Zarcilla (Zarcialla) and
Marita Bumanglag (Bumanglag) against respondent Atty. Jose C. Quesada, Jr. (Atty. Quesada).
Zarcilla executed an Affidavit-Complaint against Atty. Quesada and Bumanglag for

falsification of public documents. Zarcilla alleged that Bumanglag conspired with spouses Maximo
and Gloria Quezada and Atty. Quesada to falsify a Deed of Sale by making it appear that Zarcilla’s
parents sold a parcel of land in favor of the Spouses Quezada despite knowledge that his parents
were already deceased since March 4, 2001.
However, Bumanglag executed a Counter-affidavit in the same case where she claimed to
be the real owner of the property after Zarcilla’s father sold the same to her mother. Bumanglag
also stated therein that she facilitated the sale transaction to the Spouses Quezada. Zarcilla later
withdrew said cases when he found out that Bumanglag was deceived by Spouses Quezada and
Atty. Quesada.
It appearing that Atty. Quesada failed to comply with the numerous Resolutions of the
Court to pay the fine imposed upon him and submit comment on the complaint against him. The
Court ordered the arrest of Atty. Quesada. After five (5) years, Atty. Quesada filed his Comment
in compliance with Resolution. Regional Director of the NBI, informed the Court that Atty. Quesada
voluntarily surrendered before the agents of the NBI.
ISSUE:
Does Atty. Quesada’s repetitive disregard of Court’s directives constitute a defiant stance
against the Court?
RULING:
Yes. The Court finds that Atty. Quesada’s defiant stance against the Court is demonstrated
by his repetitive disregard of the Court's directives to file his comment on the complaint. Despite
several Court resolutions, notices, directives and imposition of fines for Atty. Quesada's
compliance and payment, he ignored the same for more than five years. Consequently, this case
has dragged on for an unnecessary length of time while the Court has been tolerant of his obstinate
refusal to comply with its directives, he shamelessly ignored the same and wasted the Court's time
and resources.
Atty. Quesada's acts constitute willful disobedience of the lawful orders of this Court, which
under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court is in itself alone is a sufficient cause for
suspension or disbarment. His cavalier attitude in repeatedly ignoring the orders of the Supreme
Court constitutes utter disrespect to the judicial institution. His conduct indicates a high degree of
irresponsibility. As an officer of the court, it is a lawyer's duty to uphold the dignity and authority of
the court. The highest form of respect for judicial authority is shown by a lawyer's obedience to
court orders and processes. Considering Atty. Quesada's predisposition to disregard not only the
laws of the land but also the lawful orders of the Court, it only shows him to be wanting in moral
character, honesty, probity and good demeanor.
Thus, with his repeated disobedience to the Court's orders, Atty. Quesada displayed no
remorse as to his misconduct which proved himself unworthy of membership in the Philippine Bar.
18 |
THE FIRST AND PRIMARY DUTY OF LAWYERS IS TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF

JUSTICE
In Re: CA-G.R. CV No. 96282 vs. Atty. Claro Jordan M. Santamaria

A.C. No. 11173; June 11, 2018
Del Castillo, J.
FACTS:
This administrative action stems from a civil action filed by Spouses Partoza against Lilia
B. Montano and Amelia T. Solomon.
When the original compliant was dismissed, the counsel on record, Atty. Samson D.
Villanueva, filed a Notice of Appeal. However, Atty. Villanueva filed his Withdrawal of Appearance.
Thereafter, respondent Atty. Claro Jordan M. Santamaria (respondent) submitted an Appellant's
Brief. In a Resolution, the CA, among other orders, directed the respondent to submit his formal
Entry of Appearance.
On March 20, 2012, the CA issued a Resolution ordering Atty. Santamaria to show cause,
within 10 days from notice, why he should not be cited in contempt for his failure to comply with
the CA's previous Resolution and why the Appellant's Brief he filed should not be expunged from
the rollo of the case resulting in the dismissal of the appeal. All these directives by the CA were
ignored by the respondent. Thus, the CA expunged the Appellant’s Brief, dismissed the appeal
and directed Atty. Santamaria to explain why he should not be suspended from the practice of law
for willful disobedience to the orders of the court. Respondent still paid no heed to the Court.
In his Answer, Atty. Santamaria contended that he believed that he had no personality to
represent Spouses Partoza and that Atty. Villanueva remained as the spouses’ counsel.
ISSUE:
Should the respondent be disciplined for ignoring the directives of the CA?
RULING:
Yes. Atty. Santamaria should be disciplined.
It cannot he emphasized enough that the first and primary duty of a lawyer is not to the
client but to the administration or justice. Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
states that “A lawyer shall exert every effort and consider it his duty to assist in the speedy and
efficient administration of justice.” Because a lawyer is an officer of the court called upon to assist
in the administration of justice, any act of a lawyer that obstructs, perverts, or impedes the
administration of justice constitutes misconduct and justifies disciplinary action against him.
A lawyer's obstinate refusal to comply with the Court's orders not only betrays a recalcitrant
flaw in his character; it also underscored his disrespect towards the Court's lawful orders which
was only too deserving of reproof.
There is no dispute that respondent did not comply with five Resolutions of the CA. His
actions were definitely contumacious. By his repeated failure, refusal, or inability to comply with
the CA resolutions, respondent displayed not only reprehensible conduct but showed an utter lack
of respect for the CA and its orders. Respondent is hereby suspended for 6 months from the
practice of law.
| 19
THE SUPREME COURT MAY TAKE NOTICE OF A LAWYER WHO IS NOT A

RESPONDENT IN ANOTHER ADMINISTRATIVE COMPLAINT IN ORDER TO SHED
LIGHT ON THE TRUTH OR FALSITY OF A CONTROVERSY
Security and Sheriff Division of Sandiganbayan vs. Ronald Allan Gole Cruz
A.M. No. SB-17-24-P; July 11, 2017
Per Curiam
FACTS:
This is an administrative case against respondent Ronald Allan Gole Cruz, Security Guard
I of the Sandiganbayan, for improper solicitation filed by the Sandiganbayan directly with the
Supreme Court.
Several co-workers of respondent Cruz had indicted him for receiving solicitations from
Atty. Stephen David, the lawyer of Janet Lim Napoles in her PDAF case in the Sandiganbayan.
The said solicitation was allegedly for their upcoming Christmas party. Thereafter, a clarificatory
hearing was conducted where the Court required Atty. David to testify.
However, during the clarificatory hearing, Atty. Stephen David did not give any statement
on the matter.
ISSUE:
May the Court take note of the non-participation of Atty. David in the clarificatory hearing
although he is not a respondent in this administrative case?
RULING:
Yes. The Court may take note the non-participation of Atty. David in the clarificatory hearing
although he is not a respondent this administrative case.
The Supreme Court ruled in previous cases that although the administrative complaint was
against a judge, it may nevertheless take note of the participation of the private lawyer involved.
In the present case, although Atty. David is not a respondent, his involvement in the
controversy is nonetheless a matter of concern for this Court. He was in the best position to state
whether respondent Cruz received money from him through improper solicitation, but has chosen
to remain silent and refused to give his statement. He is therefore under an obligation to shed light
on the truth or falsity of the issue, considering that he is at the center of the controversy.
Thus, the Court in this case referred to the Office of the Bar Confidant for evaluation and
recommendation the apparent obstinacy and refusal of Atty. Stephen David to cooperate in the
investigation regarding the solicitation of respondent Cruz.
20 |
THERE IS CONFLICT OF INTEREST WHEN A LAWYER REPRESENTS INCONSISTENT

INTERESTS OF OPPOSING PARTIES
Gregorio V. Capinpin, Jr. vs. Atty. Estanislao L. Cesa, Jr.

A.C. No. 6933; July 5, 2017
Tijam, J.
FACTS:
An administrative complaint was filed by complainant Gregorio Capinpin, Jr., praying for
the suspension from the practice of law or disbarment of respondent Atty. Estanislao L. Cesa, Jr.,
for violating the Canons of Professional Ethics in connection with the foreclosure of complainant’s
properties.
The complaint alleges that during the proceedings, Atty. Cesa, without the knowledge of
his client FLC, approached Capinpin to negotiate the deferment of the auction sale and the
possible settlement of the loan obligation at a reduced amount without resorting to the auction sale.
Capinpin further alleges that Atty. Cesa demanded payment of professional fees. On the other
hand, respondent denies that he was the one who approached complainant for negotiation, the
truth being that it was complainant who asked for his help to be given more time to raise funds to
pay the loan obligation.
ISSUE:
Does negotiating with the opposing party, without the client’s consent, result in a conflict
of interest?
RULING:
Yes. Negotiating with the opposing party, without the client’s consent, results in conflict of
interests. This very act would result in representing conflicting interests because if a counsel
argues for one client, this argument will be opposed by the same counsel when he argues for the
other client.
The relationship between the lawyer and his client should ideally be imbued with the
highest level of trust and confidence, as justified by necessity and public interest. Part of the
lawyer’s duty to his client is to avoid representing conflicting interests. It behooves lawyers not only
to keep inviolate the client’s confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of treachery and double-
dealing for only then can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their lawyers, which is
of paramount importance in the administration of justice.
The Court finds substantial evidence to hold the Atty. Cesa liable for violating Canon 15,
Rule 15.03 of the CPR. It must be stressed that FLC engaged respondent’s legal services to
represent it in opposing complainant’s actions to forestall the foreclosure proceedings. As can be
gleaned from Atty. Cesa’s position paper, however, it is admitted that he extended help to Capinpin
in negotiating with FLC for the reduction of the loan payment and cessation of the foreclosure
proceedings.
Therefore, the act of Atty. Cesa in negotiating with Capinpin resulted in a conflict of interest.
| 21
LAWYERS ARE DEEMED TO REPRESENT CONFLICTING INTERESTS WHEN IT IS

THEIR DUTY TO CONTEND FOR ONE CLIENT AND OPPOSE FOR ANOTHER
Filipinas O. Celedonio vs. Atty. Jaime F. Estrabillo

A.C. No. 10553; July 5, 2017
Tijam, J.
FACTS:
For the SC’s resolution is complainant Filipinas O. Celedonio’s disbarment complaint
against respondent Atty. Jaime F. Estrabillo for allegedly violating Canon 15, Rules 15.03 and
15.04, Canon 17, among others, of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).
This case stemmed from a criminal case of Estafa filed by Alfrito Mah against Celedonio’s
husband in 2006, embezzling a substantial amount from Mah’s company where Atty. Estrabillo
acted as Mah’s counsel.
The disbarment complaint alleged that Atty. Estrabillo employed deceit and was double-
dealing with Celedonio and her husband to their prejudice, particularly because he was serving
conflicting interests when he instructed his secretary to draft the motions for extension of time and
postponement for the Celedonios.
ISSUE:
Is there conflict of interest when the lawyer instructed his secretary to draft the motions for
the adverse party?
RULING:
Yes. Respondent’s preparation and filing of motions on behalf of the adverse party in the
case filed by him for his client, conflicts his client’s interest.
In broad terms, lawyers are deemed to represent conflicting interests when, in behalf of
one client, it is their duty to contend for that which duty to another client requires them to oppose.
Moreover, Rule 15.03 of the CPR expressly requires a written consent of all parties concerted after
full disclosure of the facts if ever, for whatever reason, a lawyer will be involved in conflicting
interests. Corollary to this, Rule 15.04 of the CPR substantially states that if a lawyer would act as
a mediator for that matter, a written consent of all concerned is also required. The relationship
between a lawyer and his/her client should ideally be imbued with the highest level of trust and
confidence. The legal profession dictates that it is not a mere duty, but an obligation, of a lawyer
to accord the highest degree of fidelity, zeal and fervor in the protection of the client’s interest.
Thus, part of the lawyer’s duty in this regard is to avoid representing, conflicting interests.
Jurisprudence is to the effect that a lawyer’s act which invites suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-
dealing in the performance of his duty already evinces inconsistency of interests. In broad terms,
lawyers are deemed to represent conflicting interests when, in behalf of one client, it is their duty
to contend for that which duty to another client requires them to oppose
Indeed, a motion for extension to file an answer would not be favorable to his client’s cause
as the same would merely delay the judgment sought by his client in filing the case. More so, the
motion for postponement of the TRO hearing would definitely run counter with the interest of his
client. Finally, if he was acting merely as a negotiator between parties, there was however no
record of any written consent from any of the parties involved in this case.
Therefore, the act of Atty. Estrabillo in preparing and filing motions on behalf of the adverse
party in a case filed by him for his client constitutes conflict of interest.
22 |
THE TERMINATION OF THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP DOES NOT JUSTIFY

A LAWYER TO REPRESENT AN ADVERSE INTEREST
Paces Industrial Corporation vs. Atty. Edgardo M. Salandanan

A.C. No. 1346; July 25, 2017
Peralta, J.
FACTS:
This is a review of the resolution issued by the IBP Board of Governors, which adopted
IBP-CBD’s report and recommendation finding herein respondent Atty. Edgardo Salandanan
administratively liable for violating Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of CPR, and for which the IBP
recommended that he be suspended from the practice of law for a period of three years. The case
stemmed from the complaint filed by Paces Industrial Corporation.
Salandanan was a stockholder and counsel of Paces Corporation. As counsel, he

appeared for it in several cases including one that involved enforcement of obligations Paces owed
to E.E. Black Ltd. Meanwhile, disagreements on various management prerogatives ensued, which
eventually led him to sell his shares and depart the corporation. Shortly thereafter, he started to
appear on behalf of E.E. Black. Thus, the present complaint against Salandanan.
Paces argued that when the respondent acted as counsel for E.E. Black, he represented
conflicting interests and utilized to the full extent all the information he had acquired as the
company’s former counsel. Salandanan, on the other hand, argued that he was never employed
as Paces’ counsel and that there was no client-lawyer contract between them. He maintained that
the fact that he is a lawyer was merely coincidental to his being a stockholder-officer in the
company and did not make him automatically the counsel of the corporation.
ISSUE:
Did the respondent represent conflicting interests when he acted as counsel for E.E. Black
despite being Paces Industrial Corporation’s former counsel?
RULING:
Yes. Atty. Paces represented conflicting interests.
The termination of attorney-client relationship does not justify a lawyer to represent an

interest averse to that of his former client. The reason behind this prohibition is that the client’s
trust, once given, should not be violated by the mere expiration of the lawyer-client employment.
Thus, even after the severance of the professional employment, a lawyer should not do anything
that will injuriously affect his former client in any matter in which he previously represented him.
This protection, as embodied in Canon 17, is perpetual and does not cease with the termination of
litigation nor of the employment.
In the present case, respondent sufficiently represented Paces in its negotiations for the
payment of its obligation to E.E. Black. It is undisputed that the respondent, as a former counsel,
obtained knowledge of matters affecting the obligations and rights of Paces, which were placed in
him in unrestricted confidence. With knowledge of these, he eventually opposed the very same
defenses that he prepared for Paces.
Therefore, premises considered, the Court found that respondent represented conflicting
interests and affirmed the IBP.
| 23
IN CONFERRING WITH A PROSPECTIVE CLIENT, A LAWYER MUST DISCLOSE ANY

CONFLICT OF INTEREST WITH ANOTHER CLIENT AND SECURE CONSENT FROM
BOTH
Ariel G. Palacios, for and in behalf of the AFP Retirement and Separation Benefits Systems, vs.
Atty. Bienvenido Braulio M. Amora, Jr.
A.C. No. 11504; August 1, 2017
Per curiam
FACTS:
The present case is a review of the resolution issued by the IBP Board of Governors finding
herein respondent Atty. Bienvenido Braulio Amora, Jr. (Atty. Amora), administratively liable for the
violation of Rule 15.01 and 15.03, Canon 15 of the CPR. The case stemmed from the complaint
filed by Ariel G. Palacios (Palacios) acting for and in behalf of the AFP Retirement and Separation
Benefits.
Complainant is the owner-developer of a parcel of land being developed into a residential

subdivision, community club house, and a world-class championship golf course. To fund the
project, Palacios entered into purchase agreement with several investors and it is because of these
contracts that it acquired the services of herein respondent. Years thereafter, complainant retained
again the services of the respondent in relation to the issuance of license to sell by the Housing
and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB). The system eventually terminated the respondent and
after such termination respondent became Phil Golf’s representative and assignee. Atty. Amora
then began pushing for the swapping of Phil Golf’s properties with that of the complainant, this
time in his capacity as Phil Golf’s representative and assignee. These proposals, however, were
rejected by the complainant for being grossly disadvantageous. After the rejection, respondent
filed a case against herein complainant in behalf of Phil Golf before the HLURB for alleged breach
of contract. Due to this actuation, complainant filed the present action for disbarment.
The respondent failed to present any document evincing the requirement laid down in Rule
15.03. Amora pointed to the fact that complainant approved several transactions between him and
the complainant, implying that there was consent on the part of the system
ISSUE:
Is the respondent guilty of representing conflicting interests?
RULING:
Yes. Amora is guilty of representing conflicting interests.
The requirement under Rule 15.03 in relation to 15.01 is clear: a lawyer must secure the
written consent of all concerned parties after a full disclosure of the facts. The Court ruled in a line
of cases that a lawyer’s failure to acquire a written consent from both clients after such disclosure
would subject him to disciplinary action. Jurisprudence provides that in conferring with a
prospective client, a lawyer must observe the requirements laid down in Canon 15 by ascertaining
as soon as practicable whether representing said client would involve a conflict with another then
seek the written consent of all concerned after a full disclosure of the facts. Failure to do so would
lead to the charge of double-dealing.
In the present case, the respondent failed to present any such document evincing the
requirement laid down in Rule 15.03. Amora pointed to the fact that complainant approved several
transactions between him and the complainant, implying that there was consent on the part of the
system, but this purported approval, however, is not the consent that the CPR demands.
Hence, absent such written consent, respondent is guilty of representing conflicting

interests.
24 |
THERE IS CONFLICT OF INTEREST WHEN A LAWYER SUBSEQUENTLY HANDLES A

CASE AGAINST HIS FORMER CLIENT
Mario Romero vs. Atty Geronimo R. Evangelista, Jr

A.C. No. 11829; February 26, 2018
Reyes, Jr., J.
FACTS:
This is a Complaint for disbarment filed by complainant Maria Romero (Romero) with the
IBP against respondent Atty. Geronimo R. Evangelista Jr. (Atty. Evangelista), for his alleged
violation of several provisions of the CPR.
Romero alleged that in several cases, Atty. Evangelista represented her and her aunt
Adela, in their individual capacities and as Heirs of the Late Adela Aguinaldo Vda. De Romero.
However, Atty. Evangelista subsequently represented the Spouses Valles in suits against Adela.
In his Answer, Atty. Evangelista admitted that he had handled cases involving the
properties of the Romero clan, but not a single case for Maria. He explained that: a) there was
never a lawyer-client relationship between him and Maria; b) his professional services were never
retained by Maria nor did he receive any privileged information regarding Maria’s cases; and c)
Maria never paid him any legal fee. However, Atty. Evangelista’s admits that he retained clients
who have cases against Adela without all the parties’ written consent.
ISSUE:
Is there a conflict of interest when the lawyer subsequently handles a case against his
former client?
RULING:
Yes, Atty. Evangelista is guilty of representing conflicting interests.
The relationship between a lawyer and his client should ideally be imbued with the highest
level of trust and confidence. Necessity and public interest require that this be so. Part of the
lawyer’s duty to his client is to avoid representing conflicting interests.
There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two or more
opposing parties. The test is whether or not in behalf of one client, it is the lawyer’s duty to fight for
an issue or claim, but it is his duty to oppose it for the other client. In brief, if he argues for one
client, this argument will be opposed by him when he argues for the other client. This rule covers
not only cases in which confidential communications have been confided, but also those in which
no confidence has been bestowed or will be used. Also, there is conflict of interests if the
acceptance of the new retainer will require the attorney to perform an act which will injuriously
affect his first client in any matter in which he represents him and also whether he will be called
upon in his new relation to use against his first client any knowledge acquired through their
connection. Another test of the inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a new
relation will prevent an attorney from the full discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty
to his client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double dealing in the performance thereof.
The only exception is provided under Canon 15, Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR) which provides a lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by
written consent from all the parties after full disclosure.
Here, Atty. Evangelista’s admits that he retained clients who have cases against Adela
without all the parties’ written consent, therefore, it is clear that he has violated Canon 15, Rule
15.03 of the CPR.
| 25
ASSISTANCE IN FILING A COMPLAINT OF ONE CLIENT AGAINST ANOTHER CLIENT

CONSTITUTES CONFLICT OF INTEREST AND DOUBLE DEALING
Rodolfo M. Yumang et al. vs. Atty. Edwin M. Alaestante

A.C. No. 10992; June 19, 2018
Del Castillo, J.
FACTS:
Atty. Alaestante wrote to the Justice Secretary, requesting for the conduct of preliminary
investigation and/or prosecution of herein complainants, including Berlin and Higino, for the crimes
of syndicated Estafa, Qualified Theft, and Grave Threats, submitting therewith the alleged
complaint affidavits of Ernesto S. Mallari and Danilo A. Rustia, Jr.
Claiming that Atty. Alaestante’s letter contained scurrilous statements intended to malign
and besmirch reputation and business standing of complainants, a libel complaint was filed by the
Yumanga, et al. against Atty. Alaestante, Mallari, and Rustia. In the meantime, in a Resolution, the
DOJ dismissed for lack of merit, the complaint filed by Atty. Alaestante on behalf of Mallari and
Rustia against herein complainants. On this basis, complainants filed this disbarment case.
Moreover, it was alleged that Atty. Alaestante had performed legal services to Berlin and
Higino in prior cases. Thus, when Berlin and Higino were named as respondents in the DOJ
complaint filed by Alaestante, they approached their former lawyer to ask why he is now handling
a case against them—indicating the representation of conflicting interest.
In his Answer, respondent denied that he was legal counsel for Berlin and Higino in prior
cases. He pointed out that no retainer contract was executed between them and that the P50,000
he had received from Berlin and Higino constituted part of some amount of money he had entrusted
to Berlin and Higino long before the DOJ case.
ISSUE:
Did Atty Alaestante represent conflicting interests when he filed the DOJ case against his
former clients Berlin and Higino?
RULING:
Yes. Atty. Alaestante represented conflicting interests.
The absence of a written contract will not preclude the finding that there was a professional
relationship between the parties. To establish the relation, it is sufficient that the advice and
assistance of an attorney is sought and received in any matter pertinent to his profession. Guided
by the tenor of a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) constituted between or amongst, Berlin,
respondent lawyer, and two other persons, it can hardly be doubted that Berlin and respondent
lawyer had a close relationship, and that he offered his legal expertise to the said parties. That no
fees were paid is immaterial. A lawyer is forbidden “from representing conflicting interests except
by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts” because of public
policy, good taste, and the fiduciary relation between lawyers and their clients. Lawyers are
expected not only to keep inviolate the client’s confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of
impropriety and double-dealing for only then can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to
their lawyers, which is of paramount importance in the administration of justice.
Therefore, by representing Berlin and Higino in previous cases and by subsequently filing
a complaint against them, Atty. Alaestante is guilty of representing conflicting interests in the
present case.
26 |
THERE IS CONFLICT OF INTEREST ONLY WHEN THE LAWYER WOULD BE CALLED

UPON IN THE NEW RELATION TO USE AGAINST A FORMER CLIENT ANY
CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION ACQUIRED THROUGH THEIR CONNECTION OR
PREVIOUS EMPLOYMENT
BSA Tower Condominium Corporation vs. Atty. Albert Celestino B. Reyes II

A.C. No. 11944; June 20, 2018
Peralta, J.
FACTS:
This case is a disbarment complaint which the complainant BSA Tower filed against
respondent Atty. Reyes II in which the former claims that the latter violated rules on conflict of
interest.
BSA Tower alleged that it had previously hired respondent Atty. Reyes II to settle its real
estate tax problems. Reyes obtained P25 million from BSA Tower, from which he may draw
amounts for legitimate expenses in carrying out his official duties. Years after, however, Reyes
entered his appearance as counsel for a certain Ilusorio in a civil action for reimbursement by
Ilusorio against BSA Tower. Reyes even took the witness stand and testified against BSA Tower.
During his testimony, Reyes admitted that at the time Ilusorio’s purported advances were made,
he was BSA Tower’s Corporate Secretary.
Thus, BSA Tower filed a Motion to Expunge the Testimony against Reyes. It contended
that although the subject matter of the civil case did not involve information which Reyes had
acquired by virtue of his former professional relationship with BSA Tower, Reyes never obtained
its written consent or waiver in the matter of him representing Ilusorio in said case. Accordingly, he
violated Rules 15.03 and 21.02 of the CPR on conflict of interest.
Reyes claimed that he had asked BSA Tower’s authorized representative if she or the
corporation had any objection to his appearance as Ilusorio’s counsel. The representative said that
she had none. Likewise, when he formally entered his appearance in said civil case, BSA Tower
did not object. The IBP recommended the dismissal of the disbarment complaint against Reyes
and the IBP of Governors affirmed.
ISSUE:
Did BSA Tower sufficiently prove the existence of conflict of interest?
RULING:
No. BSA failed to sufficiently prove conflict of interest.
In Aniñon vs. Atty. Sabitsana, Jr., the Court laid down the tests to determine if a lawyer is
guilty of representing conflicting interests between and among his clients. One test is whether a
lawyer would be called upon in the new relation to use against a former client any confidential
information acquired through their connection or previous employment.
In this case, there was no conflict of interest in his appearance as counsel of Ilusorio. There
was no convincing evidence that would show that, at the time that he was acting as Ilusorio’s
counsel, Reyes indeed used any confidential information that he had obtained from BSA Tower
when he was still the corporation’s Corporate Secretary. The dispute between Ilusorio and BSA
Tower was contractual in nature such that his new relationship with Ilusorio would not require him
to disclose such matters obtained.
| 27
MONEY ENTRUSTED TO A LAWYER INTENDED FOR A SPECIFIC PURPOSE, IF NOT

USED, MUST BE RESTITUTED IMMEDIATELY UPON DEMAND
Nanette B. Sison vs. Atty. Sherdale M. Valdez

A.C. No. 11663; July 31, 2017
Perlas-Bernabe, J.
FACTS:
The present case is a review of the resolution issued by the IBP Board of Governors, which
adopted IBP-CBD’s report and recommendation finding herein respondent Atty. Sherdale Valdez
administratively liable for violating Rule 16.01, Canon 16 of the CPR.
The complainant, an overseas Filipino worker, engaged the services of the respondent to
file an action against one Pua for failing to construct the complainant’s house. Although no contract
was written between the parties, respondent received a total amount of P215,000. Atty. Valdez
acknowledged receipt of the said amount in a handwritten note, stating that the fund will be used
for litigation services. Shortly thereafter, the complainant terminated respondent’s legal services
via e-mail, accompanied with a demand to return the amount given, alleging among others that the
respondent failed to comply with her duties. Respondent refused to return the amount, thus, the
present administrative case.
In his defense, the respondent claimed that he reported the status of the case to the
complainant through phone and e-mail. Moreover, allegedly without knowledge of his termination,
he sent various demand letters to the old contract to enforce repayment. The planned case against
Engr. Pua, however, remains unfiled.
ISSUE:
Should a lawyer be held administratively liable for failure to render an account for the
money he received from the client?
RULING:
Yes. The respondent is liable for failure to render account.
The fiduciary nature of attorney-client relationship demands from the lawyer to account for
the money or property collected or received for or from his client. Money entrusted to a lawyer
intended for a specific purpose, such as for the filing and processing of a case, if not used, must
be restituted immediately upon demand. The lawyer’s failure to return the same gives rise to the
presumption that he has misappropriated the fund for his own use, and this conversion of funds
constitutes a gross violation of his professional obligation under Canon 16 of the CPR.
In the instant case, the respondent failed to account for the money he received from the
complainant. When complainant terminated his legal services, the mere fact that no case has been
filed in court should have prompted him to immediately return to the complainant the amounts
reserved for filing and bond fees for the simple reason that the same remain unutilized.
Therefore, in light of the foregoing, respondent’s persistent refusal to return the money
despite demand rendered him administratively liable.
28 |
INORDINATE REFUSAL AND FAILURE TO RETURN FUNDS FROM THE CLIENT

DESPITE DEMANDS GIVES RISE TO THE PRESUMPTION THAT THE LAWYER
MISAPPROPRIATED THE SAME FOR HIS OWN USE
Susan Basiyo and Andrew William Simmons vs. Atty. Joselito C. Alisuag
A.C. No. 11543; September 26, 2017
Peralta, J.
FACTS:
The instant case is a complaint filed by Susan Basiyo and Andrew William Simmons
against respondent Atty. Joselito C. Alisuag, for alleged deceit, falsification, and malpractice, in
violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Complainants are common-law husband and wife met Atty. Alisuag while looking for a
piece of land. Atty. Alisuag recommended a lot in Bacungan and told complainants that the vendors
had the full right to dispose of the same although the property was in the name of one Acastillo.
Atty. Alisuag prepared two sets of documents – a notarized a Deed of Absolute Sale which Basiyo
signed as the vendee and an Agreement which was not duly notarized. Basiyo and Simmons gave
Alisuag his part on brokering the sale and the payments necessary for the processing and transfer
of title to their names. However, complainants were still unable to acquire the title and fence the
purchased lot. Upon consultation with another lawyer, they discovered that no estate tax was paid
and that the amount of CGT paid was only P25,001.00 for a purchase price of P120,000.00. They
also learned that the vendors only received P300,000.00 as purchase price in contrast to the
agreed amount of P1,973,820.00.
Alisuag denied the accusations and argued that he was not part of the group of brokers
who convinced Simmons to purchase the property and that payment of the required taxes was
handled by the same group. He also argued that he had been actively handling the cases and
proceedings covering the lot until the complainants terminated his services as their counsel.
ISSUE:
Did the lawyer violate the Code of Professional Responsibility when he failed to pay and
account for the unpaid taxes and purchase price which should have been paid by his clients?
RULING:
Yes, Atty. Alisuag violated the Code of Professional Responsibility when he failed to pay
and account for the unpaid taxes and purchase price which should have been paid by his clients.
Canon 16 of the CPR provides that a lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties
of his client that may come into his possession. Furthermore, Canon 17 provides that a lawyer
owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed
in him.
Alisuag’s failure and inordinate refusal to render an accounting and return the remaining
money after numerous demands raises the reasonable presumption that he had converted it to his
own use. By notarizing another deed of sale with a much lower purchase price, which was later
submitted to the BIR for the purpose of paying the capital gains tax, Alisuag clearly violated his
duty of upholding the respect for the law and protecting the integrity and dignity of the legal
profession. Additionally, he indubitably violated Canons 16, 17, and 18 of the CPR.
Hence, Alisuag clearly violated the CPR and is suspended for the practice of law for 2 years. His
notarial commission is also revoked and is perpetually disqualified from being commissioned as
a notary public.
| 29
FAILURE TO ACCOUNT FUNDS HELD ON BEHALF OF THE CLIENT GIVES RISE TO THE
PRESUMPTION THAT THE LAWYER MISAPPROPRIATED THE SAME FOR HIS OWN
USE
Vicka Marie D. Isalos vs. Atty. Ana Luz B. Cristal

A.C. No. 11822; November 22, 2017
Perlas-Bernabe, J.
FACTS:
Vicka Marie Isalos filed an administrative case against Atty. Ana Luz B. Cristal for violating
the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).
Atty. Cristal was the Corporate Secretary and Legal Counsel of C Five Holdings,
Management, and Consultancy, Inc. (C Five), and Isalos was the Director and Treasurer. When C
Five was exploring investment options, Atty. Cristal recommended the purchase of a resort,
assuring that the title covering the property was clean and the taxes were fully paid. C Five agreed
to acquire the property and paid the full amount. Thereafter, Atty. Cristal volunteered to facilitate
the transfer and registration of the title of the property to C Five’s name. C Five delivered the
amount of ₱1.2 Million to Atty. Cristal to cover the expenses of transferring the property to its name.
However, after more than a year, no title was transferred to C Five’s name and it was discovered
that the title covering the property is a Free Patent. A formal demand was made to Atty. Cristal to
return the sum entrusted which remained unheeded, prompting C Five to file a criminal complaint
for Estafa as well as a case for disbarment against Atty. Cristal.
In her defense, Atty. Cristal pointed out that the criminal case for Estafa filed against her
by C Five had already been dismissed for lack of probable cause. As such, she prayed that the
disbarment case against her be likewise dismissed for lack of merit.
ISSUE:
Does the lawyer’s failure to return the money entrusted to him constitute a violation of the
CPR?
RULING:
Yes, Atty. Cristal is guilty of violating Canon 16, Rules 16.01 and 16.03 of the CPR for
failing to return the money entrusted to him.
Under Canon 16 of the CPR, a lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his
client that may come into his possession. Rule 16.01 and 16.3 states that “a lawyer shall account
for all money or property collected or received for or from the client” and “a lawyer shall deliver the
funds and property of his client when due or upon demand”, respectively. Money entrusted to a
lawyer for a specific purpose, such as for the processing of transfer of land title, but not used for
the purpose, should be immediately returned. A lawyer’s failure to return upon demand the funds
held by him on behalf of his client gives rise to the presumption that he has appropriated the same
for his own use in violation of the trust reposed to him by his client. Such act is a gross violation of
general morality, as well as of professional ethics. It impairs public confidence in the legal
profession and deserves punishment.
In this case, it is indubitable that respondent received the amount of P1.2 Million from C
Five to be used to cover the expenses for the transfer of title of the subject property under C Five’s
name did not materialize as the subject property was covered by a Free Patent. Thus, there was
no longer any reason for respondent to retain the money and the failure to return the money
entrusted despite the opportunity is violation of the CPR.
Thus, Atty. Cristal should be held administratively liable for violating the CPR.
30 |
FAILURE TO RETURN UPON DEMAND THE FUNDS ON BEHALF OF HIS CLIENT GIVES
RISE TO THE PRESUMPTION THAT THE LAWYER HAS APPROPRIATED THE SAME
FOR HIS OWN USE
Iluminada D. Yuzon vs. Atty. Arnulfo M. Agleron

A.C. No. 10684; January 24, 2018
Peralta, J.
FACTS
Iluminada Yuzon filed an administrative complaint against Atty. Atty. Arnulfo M. Agleron, in
which Yuzon alleged that she gave two post-dated checks amounting to a total of 1 million pesos
to Atty. Agleron for the purchase of a house and lot. However, it did not materialize so Yuzon
demanded the return of the amounts entrusted to Atty. Agleron, which the latter failed to return.
Eventually, Yuzon was able to recover P418,000.
In his defense, Atty. Agleron claims that these monies were all deposited to Philippine
National Bank for safekeeping and that P418,000 was delivered to Yuzon as per her request.
Furthermore, the balance of P582,000 was never misappropriated and/or converted to the
personal use and benefit of Atty. Agleron as the said amount was borrowed for the emergency
operation of a client who, at that time has nobody to turn to for help.
ISSUE:
Does Atty. Agleron’s act of borrowing money from the funds entrusted by Yuzon, violate a
lawyer’s fiduciary duty to his client?
RULING:
Yes. Atty. Agleron’s act clearly violated his fiduciary duty to his client and the CPR.
Verily, the relationship between a lawyer and his client is highly fiduciary and prescribes
on a lawyer a great fidelity and good faith. The highly fiduciary nature of this relationship imposes
upon the lawyer the duty to account for the money or property collected or received for or from his
client. Thus, a lawyer’s failure to return upon demand the funds held by him on behalf of his client,
as in this case, gives rise to the presumption that he has appropriated the same for his own use in
violation of the trust reposed in him by his client.
Here, there is no question as to whether or not the respondent lawyer misappropriated the
amount of money the complainant entrusted to him, since Atty. Agleron already admitted the same,
in clear violation of his fiduciary duty to his client. Proceeding from the premise that indeed Atty.
Agleron merely wanted to help another client who is going through financial woes, he,
nevertheless, acted in disregard of his duty as a lawyer with respect to Yuzon. Such act is a gross
violation of general morality, as well as of professional ethics. Furthermore, for failure to return
upon demand the amount entrusted to him, he has violated Rules 16.01 and 16.03, Canon 16 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).
Hence, Atty. Agleron’s act of misappropriating the funds entrusted by Yuzon and for failing
to return the same upon demand, constitutes a violation of a lawyer’s fiduciary duty to a client and
of Rules 16.01 and 16.03, Canon 16 of the CPR.
| 31
A LAWYER WHO RECEIVED MONEY OR PROPERTY FROM HIS CLIENT FOR

DELIVERY TO ANOTHER ONLY HOLDS THE SAME IN TRUST AND SHOULD NOT BE
APPROPRIATED FOR HIS OWN BENEFIT
Maria Eva De Mesa vs. Atty. Oliver O. Olaybal

A.C. No. 9129; January 31, 2018
Bersamin, J.
FACTS:
Maria Eva De Mesa filed an administrative complaint against Atty. Oliver O. Olaybal for
misappropriation of two crossed checks.
De Mesa alleged that Atty. Olaybal was her counsel in her criminal cases for violation of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22. Atty. Olaybal advised De Mesa to settle amicably for P78,640.00; that
following his advice, she procured two Manager’s Checks for the amounts of P74,400.00 and
P4,240.00. Both checks were crossed and payable to Asialink Finance Corporation (Asialink) in
payment of the settlement agreed upon. According to De Mesa, she handed the checks to Atty.
Olaybal for the delivery of the checks to Asialink, but he did not deliver the checks, instead he
successfully deposited such checks to his account through his son.
In his answer and position paper, the Atty. Olaybal counters that his son erroneously
deposited the manager’s checks to his account for safekeeping, without his knowledge and
consent, in order to prevent the checks from being stale.
ISSUE:
Does Atty. Olaybal’s act of depositing a client’s check to his own account constitute a
violation of a lawyer’s fiduciary duties to his client?
RULING:
Yes. Atty. Olaybal’s act of depositing the checks payable to Asialink to his own account
constitutes a violation of a lawyer’s fiduciary duties to his client, De Mesa.
The relationship between a lawyer and his client is highly fiduciary, and imposes on the
former a great degree of fidelity and good faith. Thus, any money or property received by him from
his client for delivery to another in the context of the relationship is merely held by him in trust and
should not be appropriated for his own benefit. For him to do otherwise is a violation of his oath as
an attorney and officer of the Court. Atty. Olaybal’s act of depositing a client’s check to his own
account constitutes violation of the Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Here, instead of immediately transmitting the checks to Asialink, Atty. Olaybal managed to
deposit the same to his personal account. The subject checks were not only payable to Asialink,
but were duly crossed. Hence, under existing banking rules and regulations and common
commercial practice, these checks can only be deposited to the account of Asialink and to no
other. Atty. Olaybal’s claim that the checks were deposited so that these checks would not become
stale is without merit because the said checks were deposited to his account two weeks from the
date he received it from De Mesa.
Hence, Atty. Olaybal’s failure to deliver the checks to Asialink and depositing the checks
in his account and thereafter misappropriating the funds thereof for his personal benefit constituted
a serious breach of his fiduciary.
32 |
WHENEVER A LAWYER RECEIVES MONEY FROM THE CLIENT FOR A PARTICULAR

PURPOSE, HE IS BOUND TO RENDER AN ACCOUNTING TO THE CLIENT SHOWING
THAT THE MONEY WAS SPENT FOR THE INTENDED PURPOSE
Remigio P. Segovia, Jr., Francisco Rizabal, Pablito Rizabal, Marcial Rizabal Romines, Pelagio
Rizabal Aryap and Renato Rizabal vs. Atty. Rolando S. Javier
A.C. No. 10244 (Formerly CBD Case No. 07-2085); March 12, 2018
Peralta, J.
FACTS:
This case stemmed from a letter-complaint filed by the complainants with the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP) against respondent Atty. Rolando S. Javier, for allegedly abandoning
them by failing to file the case on their behalf after collecting the amount of P57,000.00 for litigation
fees.
Remigio P. Segovia Jr., et al., alleged that they engaged the services of Atty. Rolando S.
Javier as their counsel in a case involving falsification of documents and recovery of property.
During the existence of attorney-client relationship, Atty. Javier asked them the amount of P30,000
as filing fee, which they have dutifully paid. Segovia, et al discovered that Atty. Javier also
demanded from one Riza Rizabal Tesalona the amount of P27,000.00 in connection with the case.
Whenever they followed-up on the case, they always received a response from Atty. Javier to not
worry as he would file the case within the week, and an assurance that the case will be resolved
in their favor. However, Atty. Javier never filed the case.
Atty. Javier filed no answer to the complaint against him. The IBP Board of Governors then
adopted the decision of the IBP Commissioner, suspending Atty. Javier for a period of one year.
ISSUE:
Did Atty. Javier breach his client’s trust when he failed to file the case after collecting the
filing fees?
RULING:
Yes. Atty. Javier’s inaction despite repeated follow-ups and his promise that the case will
be resolved in complainants’ favor demonstrated his cavalier attitude and appalling indifference to
his clients’ cause.
Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) states that “a lawyer shall hold
in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may come into his possession.” When a lawyer
receives money from the client for a particular purpose, the lawyer is bound to render an accounting
to the client showing that the money was spent for the intended purpose. Conversely, if the lawyer
does not use the money for the intended purpose, he must immediately return the money to the
client.
Here, Segovia, et al alleged that Atty. Javier specifically received P57,000.00 for filing fees,
but only the amount of P30,000.00 was supported by evidence. Atty. Javier failed to render any
legal service to Segovia, et al for failing to file the said case, he should have promptly accounted
for and returned the money to complainants.
Hence, Atty. Javier’s unjustified withholding of money belonging to the Segovia, et al

warrants the imposition of disciplinary action.
| 33
EXCEPT FOR NECESSARY EXPENSES IN CASES HANDLED BY HIM, A LAWYER IS

PROHIBITED FROM LENDING MONEY TO HIS CLIENT
Dario Tangcay vs. Honesto Ancheta Cabarroguis

A.C. No. 11821; April 2, 2018
Del Castillo, J.
FACTS:
This case involves an Affidavit-Complaint filed by complainant Dario Tangcay for
impropriety against respondent Atty. Honesto A. Cabarroguis before the IBP-CBD.
Tangcay averred in his complaint that he inherited a parcel of land from his father, which
was registered in his name. One Emilia S. Solicar filed a Petition for Probate of a purported Last
Will and Testament of Tangcay’s father. Tangcay engaged the services of Atty. Cabarroguis to
represent him in the probate case. After learning that the property was mortgaged with the First
Davao Lending Corporation for P100,000, Atty. Cabarroguis offered Tangcay a loan of P200,000
with an interest lower than what the lending corporation imposed. Tangcay accepted the loan.
When he defaulted in payment, Atty. Cabarroguis instituted a Judicial Foreclosure of the real estate
mortgage.
Tangcay argued that when he accepted the loan and signed the real estate mortgage, he
was unaware of the illegality and impropriety of a lawyer lending money to a client. Atty.
Cabarroguis claimed that, despite his generosity and liberality in the collection of his professional
legal fees, he was still not fully paid for the cases he won for Tangcay. The IBP Commissioner
found Atty. Cabarroguis administratively liable under Canon 16, Rule 16.04 of the CPR, and
recommended that he be suspended from the practice of law for 3 months. The IBP Board of
Governors adopted the Commissioner’s recommendation.
ISSUE:
Does lending money to the client make a lawyer administratively liable?
RULING:
Yes. Atty. Cabbarroguis is found to be administratively liable for lending money to his client.
The rule is that a lawyer shall not lend money to his client, except when, in the interest of
justice, he has to advance necessary expenses for a matter that he is handling for the client. The
rule is intended to safeguard the lawyer’s independence of mind so that the free exercise of his
judgment may not be adversely affected. If the lawyer lends money to his client in connection with
the client’s case, the lawyer in effect acquires an interest in the subject matter of the case or an
additional stake in its outcome. Lawyers who obtain an interest in the subject matter of litigation
create a conflict-of-interest situation with their clients and thereby directly violate the fiduciary
duties they own them.
In this case, Atty. Cabarroguis clearly violated the prohibition against lawyers lending
money to the clients. There is no doubt that he lent money to his client, Tangcay. This was
evidenced by a real estate mortgage which the latter signed and executed in favor of the former.
Atty. Cabarroguis did not even deny the existence of the mortgage in his favor.
Thus, he is administratively liable and is suspended from the practice of law for 3 months.
34 |
A LAWYER MUST DELIVER THE FUNDS AND PROPERTY OF HIS CLIENTS, IN HIS
CUSTODY, WHEN DUE OR UPON DEMAND
Kimeldes Gonzales vs. Atty. Prisco B. Santos

A.C. No. 10178; June 19, 2018
Jardeleza, J.
FACTS:
This is a petition filed by Kimeldes Gonzales against Atty. Prisco B. Santos before the IBP
for dishonesty and abuse of trust and confidence of his client.
Gonzales bought a parcel of land in Zamboanga City. She appointed her sister, Josephine
Gonzales, to act as her representative in matters concerning the property since she was then living
in Q.C. Josephine thereafter engaged the services of Atty. Santos to register the title in Gonazales’
name and commence an ejectment suit against the occupants of the property. Josephine gave a
total of P60,000 as fees to the respondent.
Atty. Santos was entrusted the owner’s duplicate copy of the TCT for its cancellation and
a new title was subsequently issued in Gonzales’ name. The new title however was never
surrendered to Josephine despite her efforts to claim it. Gonzales then discovered that her property
had been mortgaged to a credit corporation by a certain Norena Bagui who was Atty. Santos’
relative. Gonzales also learned that Atty. Santos never filed the ejectment case against the
occupants of her property despite receiving payment for its filing.
Atty. Santos denies any participation in Norena’s act. He claims that he instructed his niece
to deliver the new TCT to Josephine and was surprised to learn that it had not been delivered and
had been mortaged by Norena. Furthermore, he insisted that he never agreed to file an ejectment
suit, citing the fact that some of the occupants were his friends.
ISSUE:
Is the lawyer administratively liable for failing to deliver within a reasonable time the title to
complainant or her sister?
RULING:
Yes. Atty. Santos is administratively liable for failing to deliver the title within a reasonable
time.
Rule 16. 01 of the CPR requires lawyers to account for all money and property collected
or received for and from their clients. In addition, Rule 16.03 mandates that a lawyer shall deliver
the funds and property of his client when due or upon demand.
Accordingly, and upon demand by complainant’s representative, Josephine, respondent

was expected to timely deliver the title to her. This, respondent failed to do. Respondent’s failure
to ensure the timely turnover of the title to complainant and/or her representative led to, if not
facilitated, the constitution of the fraudulent mortgage. Neither does it appear that respondent took
steps to verify his niece’s claim. The Court believed that the respondent’s nieces are used here as
mere scapegoats and that respondent had a hand in the fraudulent mortgage.
Thus, Atty. Santos is administratively liable.
| 35
EXTORTION OF “POCKET MONEY” FROM ONE’S CLIENT UNDER THREAT OF

ABANDONING THE CLIENT’S CASE IS A CLEAR VIOLATION OF A LAWYER’S
ETHICAL DUTY UNDER CANON 16 AND RULE 16.01
Pelagio Vicencio Sorongon Jr. vs. Atty. Ramon y. Gargantos Sr.

A.C. No. 11326; June 27, 2018
Caguioa, J.
FACTS:
This is an affidavit complaint filed before the IBP CBD by complainant Pelagio Vicencio
Sorongon, Jr. against Atty. Ramon Y. Gargantos, Sr. for abandoning complainant in the middle of
his case and for respondent’s failure to return the documents to complainant.
Sorongon was charged before the Sandiganbayan for violation of Section 3 I of Republic
Act No. 3019. He engaged respondent’s legal services to represent him in the said cases.
Sorongon gave Atty. Gargantos the amount of P200,000 as full payment for the latter’s legal
services, which, as agreed upon, would cover the acceptance fee, appearance fees, and other
fees until resolution of the cases. Atty. Gargantos, however, did not issue a receipt nor execute a
formal MOA between him and complainant. After one hearing, Atty. Gargantos extorted “pocket
money” from complainant under the threat of abandoning his case. When Sorongon told
respondent that he did not have money, respondent intimidated him, making threats to abandon
his case and have him imprisoned. He refused to appear in court. Sorongon thus appeared before
the court alone in the next meeting and related the Atty. Gargantos’ behavior in court. On the same
day, Atty. Gargantos filed a letter informing the SB of his withdrawal as complainant’s counsel.
Sorongon thus prays for the refund of a portion of the amount paid to respondent in order
that he might be able to hire a new counsel. The respondent failed to file any pleadings, or to
participate in the disciplinary proceedings before the IBP-CBD. The IBP thus recommended
respondent’s suspension for 1 year and an order for respondent to return the fees and papers
given to him.
ISSUE:
Does extortion of “pocket money” from one’s client under threat of abandoning the client’s
case a violation of a lawyer’s ethical duty?
RULING:
Yes. The acts of respondent are a violation of Canon 16, Rule 16.01 of the CPR which
provides that a lawyer shall account for and hold in trust the money or property from the client.
The respondent failed to return, despite demand, the complainant’s documents after he
withdrew as his counsel. Moreover, although respondent was paid P200,000 to cover his
acceptance fee, appearance fees, and other fees until the resolution of the cases, he abandoned
his client when the latter was not able to give him the “pocket money” he had demanded.
Hence, Atty. Gargantos is guilty of violating a lawyer’s ethical duty when he extorted pocket
money and abandoned his client’s case.
36 |
A CLIENT’S FAILURE TO PRODUCE A CREDIBLE WITNESS IS NOT A VALID

JUSTIFICATION TO ABANDON HIS CAUSE
Joy. T. Samonte vs. Atty. Vivencio V. Jumamil

A.C. No. 11668; July 17, 2017
Perlas-Bernabe, J.
FACTS:
IBP-CBD’s report and recommendation finding herein respondent Atty. Vivencio Jumamil
administratively liable for violation of Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR), and for which the IBP recommended his suspension for a period of one year.
The case stemmed from the complaint filed by his client Joy Samonte.
The complainant engaged the services of the respondent to prepare her position paper
relative to an illegal dismissal case filed against her before the NLRC. According to Samonte,
despite constantly reminding Jumamil of the deadline for the submission of her position paper,
respondent nevertheless failed to file the same. As such, the labor arbiter rendered a decision
solely based on the evidence on record and found the complainant liable to her workers in the said
case.
In his answer, while the respondent admitted that he indeed failed to file a position paper
on behalf of the complainant, he, however, maintained that said omission was primarily due to
complainant’s own failure to adduce credible witnesses to testify in her favor.
ISSUE:
Is the failure to produce a credible witness a valid justification to abandon a client’s cause?
RULING:
No, the failure to name a witness does not justify abandonment of a cause.
A lawyer-client relationship is imbued with utmost trust and confidence. In this regard,
clients are led to expect that lawyers would be ever mindful of their cause, and accordingly,
exercise the required degree of diligence in handling their affairs. Accordingly, lawyers are required
to maintain, at all times a high standard of legal proficiency, and to devote their full attention, skill,
and competence to their cases, regardless of their importance, and whether they accept them for
a fee or not.
In the present case, it is apparent that respondent breached this duty when he admittedly
failed to file the necessary position paper before the NLRC. The Court explained that by voluntarily
taking up Samonte’s case, Jumamil gave his unqualified commitment to protect the former’s
interest. From that moment on, he owes fidelity to such cause, and thus Samonte is justified in
demanding that he would be ever-mindful of her cause, and, accordingly, exercise the required
degree of diligence in handling her affairs. It is of no moment that complainant failed to produce
any credible witnesses in support of her position paper.
Therefore, in view of the foregoing and notwithstanding the complainant’s alleged failure
to produce a credible witness, the Court affirmed the IBP’s resolution holding respondent
administratively liable for violation of Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the CPR and meted the penalty of
suspension for a period of one year.
| 37
UPON ACCEPTANCE OF LEGAL FEES, THE ATTORNEY’S FAILURE TO RENDER

SERVICES VIOLATES THE CANONS
Elibena A. Cabiles vs. Atty. Leandro S. Cedo

A.C. No. 10245; August 16, 2017
Del Castillo, J.
FACTS:
This is disbarment case filed before the IBP by petitioner, Elibena Cabiles against
respondent Atty. Leandro Cedo for neglect in the two cases she referred to him to handle.
According to petitioner, she engaged the services of respondent in an illegal dismissal case
and unjust vexation case and paid for appearance fees for both. Regarding the illegal dismissal
case, respondent failed to file a Reply for his clients and failed to post the required case or surety
bond in the appeal. He also delivered the memorandum to his clients at the last day of the period
for appeal. On the unjust vexation case, he failed to file the complaint which led to its dismissal
due to prescription. He also did not include his MCLE compliance in the pleadings.
The IBP found respondent to have violated Canons, 5, 17, and 18 of the CPR and
recommended the suspension from the practice of law for two years.
ISSUE:
Does the lawyer’s improper handling of the pleadings, failure to attend the hearing, and
failure to seasonably file the complaint constitute violations of the CPR?
RULING:
Yes. Respondent violated the CPR with regard to his handling of the pleadings and
hearing.
According to Canons 17 and 18 of the CPR, a lawyer must exert his utmost effort in
prosecuting and defending the interest of his client in relation to the trust and confidence reposed
on him. In receiving an acceptance fee for legal services only to fail to render such service timely
is a clear violation of such Canons.
Conversely, a lawyer’s negligence in fulfilling his duties subjects him to disciplinary action.
While such negligence or carelessness is incapable of exact formulation, the Court has
consistently held that the lawyer’s mere failure to perform the obligations due his client is per se a
violation.
In this case, despite the petitioner paying appearance fees to the client for both cases, the
respondent still failed to file the complaint for unjust vexation which led to its dismissal. He also
failed to deliver the pleading on time and advise his clients on the appeal bond in the labor case.
38 |
EVERY CASE THAT A LAWYER ACCEPTS DESERVES FULL ATTENTION, DILIGENCE,

SKILL AND COMPETENCE
Rafael Padilla vs. Atty. Glenn Samson

A.C. No. 10253; August 22, 2017
Peralta, J.
FACTS:
This is a complaint filed by petitioner Rafael Padilla against his former lawyer, respondent
Atty. Glenn Samson, for behavior unbecoming of a lawyer.
Respondent represented petitioner in a case. However, pending such case, respondent

suddenly cut all communications with petitioner which almost caused the Atty. Samson to miss the
due date for filing the pleadings required. Petitioner also demanded that respondent withdraw from
the case and refund his overpaid fees but respondent ignored him. When the Court and the IBP
asked respondent to refute the petitioner’s statement, the respondent refused to do so.
The CBD-IBP recommended respondent’s suspension for 6 months.
ISSUE:
Does the respondent’s inaction in petitioner’s case warrant administrative liability?
RULING:
Yes. Respondent’s inaction in petitioner’s case warrants administrative liability.
Under Canons 15, 17, 18, and 19 of the CPR, the lawyer should handle the case with zeal,
care, and utmost devotion. Every case which the lawyer accepts deserves full attention, diligence,
skill and competence regardless of importance.
In this case, despite being the counsel of petitioner, respondent cut off communications
with him which almost caused the pleadings to be filed out of time. He also ignored the demands
of the petitioner to withdraw from the case and refund his overpaid fees. Such acts amount to lack
of integrity and moral soundness.
Therefore, respondent is found guilty of violating several Canons of the CPR and is thereby
suspended for 2 years.
| 39
LAWYERS MUST EXERT THEIR BEST EFFORTS TO PRESERVE THEIR CLIENTS’ CAUSE
Edigardo Bondoc vs. Atty. Olimpio Datu

A.C. No. 8903; August 30, 2017
Jardeleza, J.
FACTS:
This is an administrative case filed by complainant Edigardo V. Bondoc, seeking the
disbarment of respondent Atty. Olimpio R. Datu for alleged violations of the Code of Professional
Conduct.
Bondoc engaged the services of Atty. Datu in filing the civil case for damages against John
Paul Mercado. Bondoc claimed that he figured in a vehicular accident caused by Mercado and
spent P100,000 in medical expenses but was only paid the amount of P30,000. Atty. Datu then
agreed to handle the filing of the case with P25,000 as attorney’s fees. Bondoc complied with his
obligation. More than a year later, Bondoc inquired about the status of the case and he discovered
that no civil suit was filed against Mercado. When Bondoc returned, Atty. Datu informed Bondoc
that he sent a letter to Mercado inviting the latter to discuss a possible settlement of the case.
However, the meeting never took place.
Atty. Datu denied all the allegations. He claimed that he performed his obligation as
Bondoc’s lawyer when he made a letter to Mercado 18 months from the time that Bondoc obtained
his services. He also alleged that the meeting did not push through as he was informed by
Mercado’s counsel that Mercado had already settled the matter by paying Bondoc P500,000.
ISSUE:
Did Datu breach his duty of fidelity and diligence to his client Bondoc when he failed to file
the complaint on behalf of Bondoc?
RULING:
Yes. Datu has breached his duty of fidelity and diligence to Bondoc.
Canon 17 of the CPR reminds lawyers that they owe fidelity to the cause of their client.
Inextricably linked to this duty is Rule 18.03 of Canon 18 which impresses upon lawyers not to
neglect a legal matter entrusted to them. In Camara vs. Reyes, the Court ruled that the duty of
fidelity and the obligation not to neglect a legal matter entrusted by the client mean nothing short
of entire devotion to the client’s genuine interest and warm zeal in the defense of his or her rights.
Lawyers must exert their best efforts to preserve their clients’ cause.
In this case, Datu failed to protect Bondoc’s interest by: (1) not acting on the complaint he
promised to file on behalf of Bondoc; (2) acting on the matter only after 18 months and after
Bondoc’s persistent inquiries; and (3) by believing Mercado’s alleged payment to Bondoc without
as much as demanding any proof of this payment. Rather than securing Bondoc’s interest, Datu
chose to side with Mercado.
Hence, the court finds that Datu fell short of the fidelity and diligence that he owed his client
Bondoc.
40 |
A LAWYER SHOULD ALWAYS TAKE UP THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT WITH ZEAL AND
FIDELITY ESPECIALLY IF IT IS FOR A FEE
Laurence D. Punla and Marilyn Santos vs. Atty. Eleonor Maravilla- Ona
A.C. No. 11149 (Formerly CBD Case No. 13-3709); August 15, 2017
Per Curiam
FACTS:
This is an administrative case in the IBP-CBD against respondent Atty. Eleonor Maravilla-
Ona by petitioners Laurence Punla and Marilyn Santos for violation of the lawyer’s oath and for
neglecting her clients’ interests.
Petitioners engaged respondent to finish the two annulment cases within six months from
full payment of the agreed lawyer’s fee of P350,000, which was paid in full by petitioners. However,
when petitioners followed up on the case, respondent ignored them. The former asked to refund
the money but none was made by the latter.
The Investigating Commissioner opined that the respondent is guilty of Canons 17 and 18
of the CPR and hence, should be disbarred. However, the IC found that respondent had already
been disbarred prior in relation to one of the many administrative cases filed against her.
ISSUE:
Should the respondent be disbarred for her acts of disregard in the client’s case and failure
to refund the money?
RULING:
Yes. Respondent should be disbarred for her acts of disregard in the client’s case and
failure to refund the money, however, in this case, she could no longer be disbarred because she
had already been disbarred.
Under Rule 138, Sec. 27, disbarment or suspension of a lawyer may be warranted if he or
she committed deceit, malpractice or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral
conduct, or by reason of conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the
oath or willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court or for corruptly or willfully
appearing as an attorney without authority. Once a lawyer takes up the cause of his client, he or
she must handle the case with zeal and fidelity especially if it is for a fee, considering the trust and
confidence reposed upon him or her. A lawyer’s failure to refund the money paid by the client upon
demand raises the presumption that the lawyer had already used the money for his or her personal
use.
In this case, respondent failed to render the necessary legal services towards her client
and ignored them when they asked about the case. She also failed to refund the money paid by
her clients upon demand. Such acts warrant the penalty of disbarment however the Court, noting
that she had already been disbarred by one of the administrative cases filed against her, stated
that they could no longer disbar her again because double disbarment is not applicable in the
Philippines.
| 41
A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT
Reynaldo A. Cabuello vs. Atty. Editha P. Talaboc

A.C. No. 10532; November 7, 2017
Per Curiam
FACTS:
Complainant Reynaldo A. Cabuello filed an administrative complaint against respondent
Atty. Editha P. Talaboc with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP).
Cabuello engaged the services of Atty. Talaboc to represent his parents who were
the.accused in a Criminal Case pending before the RTC. They were charged with the crime of
qualified theft of coconuts. Complainant alleged that respondent neglected the said case despite
payment of legal services. Respondent Atty. Talaboc did not attend any hearing, and failed to file
the necessary complaint against the policemen who arrested complainant’s parents.
Atty. Talaboc apologized for her failure to appear during the proceedings of this case, and
reiterated that she was then in New York, U.S.A., as she was being considered as a bone marrow
donor for her brother who was afflicted with cancer.
The IBP found respondent Atty. Talaboc to have violated Canons 17 and 18 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility and sanctioned with suspension of practice of law for 6 months.
ISSUE:
Did the respondent violate the CPR when she failed to appear during the proceedings of
her client’s case?
RULING:
Yes, Atty. Talaboc violated the CPR when she failed to appear during the proceeding of
her client’s case.
A member of the legal profession owes his/her client entire devotion to the latter’s genuine
interest, and warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his/her rights. An attorney is expected
to exert his/her best efforts and ability to preserve his/her client’s cause, for the unwavering loyalty
displayed to his/her client, likewise, serves the ends of justice. Verily, the entrusted privilege to
practice law carries with it the corresponding duties, not only to the client, but also to the court, to
the bar and to the public.
The records show that as counsel of the complainant’s parents, respondent was remiss in
her duty toward them by never appearing in the hearings of the criminal case, which contributed
to the delay of the pre-trial of the case for eleven months or almost a year until the trial court finally
appointed a counsel de oficio for respondent’s clients so the pre-trial and trial on the merits could
proceed.
Thus, Atty. Talaboc is guilty of neglecting her client’s case.
42 |
PURSUIT OF A CLIENT’S CAUSE WITHOUT THE LATTER’S CONSENT OR AUTHORITY

CONSTITUTES INFIDELITY AND ABUSE OF TRUST AND CONFIDENCE
Atty. Juan Paolo Villonco vs. Atty. Romeo G. Roxas

A.C. No. 9186; April 11, 2018
Peralta, J.
FACTS:
The present case stemmed from the complaint of Atty. Juan Paolo T. Villonco against Atty.
Romeo G. Roxas for gross misconduct and for violating the Code of Professional Responsibility
(CPR).
Republic Real Estate Corporation (RREC), with Atty. Villonco, hired Atty. Roxas as its
counsel on a contingent basis in its case against the Republic of the Philippines with respect to a
piece of reclaimed land. RREC was awarded an amount of money representing the sum spent for
reclamation efforts. The case was later remanded to the RTC for execution. RREC’s Board of
Directors specifically instructed Atty. Roxas to postpone the filing of the motion for the issuance of
a Writ of Execution until further notice, but he defied the same and still filed the motion. He then
filed a Motion for Reconsideration and a Motion for Inhibition with the CA without first securing
RREC’s consent and authority. Again, without being authorized, he likewise filed an administrative
complaint against several CA Justices on RREC’s behalf. Said unauthorized acts caused RREC’s
Board to request Atty. Roxas to voluntarily withdraw as counsel for the corporation and to finally
terminate its retainer agreement with him when he refused. Even after he was terminated, Atty.
Roxas still continued to appear and argue for RREC. Worse, he also threatened to sue the
members of the RREC Board unless they reinstated him as the company’s counsel.
For his part, Atty. Roxas denied all the allegations against him. He averred that he has
been serving RREC as his client for 21 years and that he does not need the approval of the RREC
board since he had been explicitly given a blanket authority to act on RREC’s behalf.
ISSUE:
Does the pursuit of a client’s cause without his consent or authority constitute infidelity and
abuse of trust and confidence?
RULING:
Yes, by acting without the approval and authorization of his client, Atty. Roxas violated
Canon 17 of the CPR.
Canon 17 states that “A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and shall be mindful
of the trust and confidence reposed in him.” In engaging the services of an attorney, the client
reposes on him special powers of trust and confidence. Their relationship is strictly personal and
highly confidential and fiduciary. Public policy requires the Court and lawyers to preserve and
protect the sanctity of the relation in order that clients be encouraged to entrust their legal problems
to an attorney.
In the instant case, respondent’s defiant attitude ultimately caused his client to lose its trust
in him. He intentionally denied his client’s requests for advice on how to proceed with the case and
insisted on doing it his own way. He could not possibly use the supposed blanket authority given
to him as a valid justification, especially on non-procedural matters, if he would be contradicting
his client’s trust and confidence in the process. Moreover, it was found that respondent was
principally moved by his desire to be compensated for the advanced expenses of litigation and his
professional fees so he proceeded with the filing of the motion for the issuance of a Writ of
Execution against the express advice of his client.
Thus, Atty. Roxas’s acts constitute infidelity and abuse of trust and confidence warranting
the termination of his retainer proper.
| 43
A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE
Lolita R. Martin vs. Atty. Jesus M. Dela Cruz

A.C. No. 9832; September 4, 2017
Perlas-Bernabe, J.
FACTS:
This administrative case stemmed from a letter-complaint filed by complainant Lolita R.
Martin against respondent Atty. Jesus M. Dela Cruz for the latter’s failure to return the acceptance
fee in the amount of P60,000.00 he received from complainant, despite several demands.
Martin alleged that Atty. Dela Cruz failed to render any legal service despite his
engagement and receipt of P60,000.00 as acceptance fee; appear in two (2) preliminary
investigation hearings before the OCP-QC; and return the money complainant paid him despite
written and verbal demands.
Atty. Dela Cruz averred that, during their first meeting, he and complainant only discussed
six (6) administrative cases, which did not include the pending criminal investigation case before
the OCP-QC. Nevertheless, Atty. Dela Cruz admitted that Martin had asked him to attend an on-
going investigation in the prosecutor’s office, for which he requested for the case documents, which
were, however, not given to him.
ISSUE:
Does the lawyer’s neglect of a legal matter entrusted to him amount to inexcusable
negligence?
RULING:
Yes. The act of the lawyer in neglecting a legal matter entrusted to him amounts to
inexcusable negligence.
Under Canon 18 of the CPR, a lawyer is duty-bound to competently and diligently serve
his client once the former takes up the latter’s cause. The lawyer owes fidelity to such cause and
must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed upon him.
Hence, his neglect of a legal matter entrusted to him amounts to inexcusable negligence
for which he must be administratively liable, as in this case. The Court finds no credence to
respondent’s defense that he prepared pleadings for complainant given that he failed to provide
any proof to substantiate his claim.
44 |
IT IS THE LAWYER’S DUTY TO SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND

DILIGENCE AND TO HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENT
THAT MAY COME INTO HIS POSSESSION
Myrna Ojales vs. Atty. Obdulio Guy D. Villahermosa III

A.C. No. 10243; October 2, 2017
Peralta, J.
FACTS:
This is a complaint filed by complainant Myrna Ojales against respondent Atty. Obdulio
Guy Villahermosa III with the IBP praying for the refund of the money she gave to respondent and
that the appropriate disciplinary action be imposed on the respondent.
Ojales bought a parcel of land in Negros Occidental as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute

Sale notarized by respondent Atty. Villahermosa. Atty. Villahermosa volunteered to process the
issuance of the title in Ojales name and assured her that the title would come out in two to three
months. Atty. Villahermosa then received payment for the lawyer’s processing fee and payment of
capital gains tax evidenced by two receipts. After five months, Ojales went to the BIR to inquire if
the capital gains tax on the sale of the property was paid but was told that no document pertaining
to the deed of sale in her favor was submitted to the BIR. Confronting the Atty. Villahermosa, she
was assured that it will be available on September 4, 2010. Again, she went to the BIR but was
again informed that no document was submitted in relation to her transaction.
Atty. Villahermosa failed to answer the complaint filed against him. He also failed to attend
the mandatory conference despite due notice.
ISSUE:
Was Atty. Villahermosa guilty of failure to perform legal matter entrusted to him for failing
to answer and to attend the mandatory conference?
RULING:
Yes, Atty. Villahermosa is guilty of failure to perform legal matter entrusted to him.
Canon 18 of the CPR states that a lawyer shall serve his client with competence and
diligence. Rule 18.03 further states that a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him,
and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.
The Court agrees with the recommendation of the IBP of respondent’s suspension to
practice law for six months. The records show that respondent notarized the Deed of Absolute
Sale of a Portion of Real Property. In two receipts, respondent acknowledge that complainant gave
him money for the payment of capital gains tax and lawyer’s processing fee. As Atty. Villahermosa,
failed to comply with his obligation at the promised time, Ojales went to the BIR to inquire the
capital gains tax had been paid but learned that no document of her transaction was submitted,
and Atty. Villahermosa could not even produce the claim slip from the BIR. These circumstances
showed that Atty. Villahermosa did not fulfill the legal matter entrusted to him by Ojales and his
omission is violative of Canon 18 and Rule 18.03.
Hence, Atty. Villahermosa is guilty of failure to perform legal matter entrusted to him.
| 45
IT IS THE LAWYER THAT RECEIVES THE NOTICES AND MUST DECIDE THE MODE
OF APPEAL TO PROTECT THE INTEREST OF HIS OR HER CLIENT
Susan T. De Leon vs. Atty. Antonio A. Geronimo

A.C. No. 10441; February 14, 2018
Peralta, J.
FACTS:
This case is pursuant to a disbarment complaint which Susan T. De Leon filed against Atty.
Antonio A. Geronimo, for purportedly committing acts in violation of the Lawyer’s Oath and the
Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).
Susan De Leon engaged the services of Atty. Antonio Geronimo to represent her in a labor
case, where De Leon’s employees filed complaints for illegal dismissal and violations of labor
standards against her. The Labor Arbiter (LA) dismissed the complaints against De Leon. Without
being informed by Atty. Geronimo, the said employees filed an appeal before the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC). The NLRC reversed the LA decision.
De Leon decided to call Atty. Geronimo to follow up on the status of the case. To her
surprise, Atty. Geronimo informed her that it was denied by the NLRC. When De Leon asked him
if he elevated the case to the CA, Atty. Geronimo said that he did not. When she asked why he did
not elevate the case to the CA and why he did not inform her of his receipt of the copy of the
Resolution, Atty. Geronimo replied that it did not matter anyway since she did not have any money.
At that point, De Leon told him that she’s terminating his services as her counsel. Meanwhile, Atty.
Geronimo claims that De Leon filed the complaint against him for his perceived negligence even
when he exerted his best defending her before the LA by filing the mandatory pleadings and
supporting documents.
ISSUE:
Was there failure to exhaust all remedies available to protect the client’s cause when the
lawyer failed to inform the client about the adverse ruling?
RULING:
Yes. Atty. Geronimo’s failure to inform his client about the adverse ruling of the NLRC
resulted to his failure to inquire with and discuss to the client the possible recourse that they might
take in order to protect his client’s interest.
A lawyer’s duty of competence and diligence includes not merely reviewing the cases
entrusted to the counsel’s care or giving sound legal advice, but also consists of properly
representing the client before any court or tribunal, attending scheduled hearings or conferences,
preparing and filing the required pleadings, prosecuting the handled cases with reasonable
dispatch, and urging their termination without waiting for the client or the court to prod him or her
to do so. A problem arises whenever agents, entrusted to manage the interests of another, use
their authority or power for their benefit or fail to discharge their duties. In many agencies, there is
information asymmetry between the principal and the entrusted agent. That is, there are facts and
events that the agent must attend to that may not be known by the principal. This information
asymmetry is even more pronounced in an attorney-client relationship. Lawyers are expected, not
only to be familiar with the minute facts of their cases, but also to see their relevance in relation to
their causes of action or their defenses. It is the lawyer that receives the notices and must decide
the mode of appeal to protect the interest of his or her client.
Here, Atty. Geronimo’s negligence cost De Leon her entire case and left her with no
appellate remedies. Her legal cause was orphaned, not because a court of law ruled on the merits
of her case, but because a person privileged to act as her counsel failed to discharge his duties
with the requisite diligence.
Hence, Atty. Geronimo failed to exhaust all possible means to protect his client’s interest,
which is contrary to what he had sworn to do as a member of the legal profession.
46 |
INEXCUSABLE NEGLIGENCE IN HANDLING CASES COUPLED WITH LACK OF

REMORSE FOR CAUSING PREJUDICE TO HIS CLIENT WARRANTS DISCIPLINARY
ACT
United Coconut Planters Bank, vs. Atty. Lauro G. Noel

A.C. No. 3951; June 19, 2018
Gesmundo, J.
FACTS:
This is a petition filed by United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) seeking the disbarment
and/or suspension of Atty. Lauro Noel (respondent) for the violation of the Lawyer’s Oath.
UCPB retained the legal services of Atty. Noel in the LMWD case. After a hearing in
connection to the case, Atty. Noel failed to file a comment despite being ordered by the Court.
Thereafter, UCPB was declared in default and judgment was rendered it. Finally, the judgement
was executed against UCPB. All this time, Atty. Noel was fully aware of the developments of the
case but merely reassured that he would take care of everything. However, despite all, Atty. Noel
did not take steps to remedy the consequences of his error. Thus, UCPB filed ta disbarment case
against him. Thereafter, Atty. Noel has failed numerous times to comply with resolutions of the SC
and the Commission on Bar Discipline regarding the disbarment case filed against him by UCPB,
delaying the proceedings.
In its Report and Recommendation, the IBD-CBD recommended Atty. Noel’s disbarment
noting that records show a history of dishonesty and lack of respect for the orders of the duly
constituted authorities for a period of twenty-five years, as well as inexcusable negligence resulting
in prejudice against his client. What is worse is that he has not shown any remorse for his mistake
or any vigilance to remedy the same.
ISSUE:
Is Atty. Noel’s culpable negligence in handling his client’s case sufficient to warrant
discipline?
RULING:
Yes. Atty. Noel’s failure to file an answer on behalf of UCPB in the LMWD case constitutes
culpable negligence sufficient to warrant discipline.
Canon 17 requires fidelity to the client’s cause while Canon 18 enjoins competence and
diligence. This simply means that his client is entitled to the benefit of any and every remedy and
defense that is authorized by the law of the land and he may expect his lawyer to assert every
such remedy or defense. If much is demanded from an attorney, it is because the entrusted
privilege to practice law carries with it the correlative duties not only to the client but also to the
court, to the bar, and to the public.
Atty. Noel’s conduct constitutes inexcusable negligence. He grossly neglected his duty as
counsel to the extreme detriment of his client. He willingly and knowingly allowed the default order
to attain finality, for judgment to be rendered against his client, and did not even take steps to
assert any defense. In addition, his evident and willful disregard of court processes constitutes
further reason to discipline him. During these proceedings, he requested an additional 20 days to
file his comment. After 25 years, no such comment has been filed.
Undoubtedly, Atty. Noel’s gross misconduct and willful disobedience have resulted in the
extreme and inordinate delay of the instant proceedings. Thus, he should be disciplined for his
culpable negligence.
| 47
WHEN A LAWYER AGREES TO BE ENGAGED AS A COUNSEL, HE IS OBLIGED TO

HANDLE THE SAME WITH UTMOST DILIGENCE UNTIL THE CONCLUSION OF THE
CASE
Edmund Balmaceda vs. Atty. Romeo Z. Uson

A.C. No. 12025; June 20, 2018
Reyes Jr., J.
FACTS:
This is an administrative complaint for disbarment filed by Edmund Balmaceda against
Atty. Uson for violating Rules 16 and 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Balmaceda alleged that he and a certain Agapito went to the office of Atty. Uson to seek
legal advice, concerning the supposed intrusion of his brother, over a property he owned, which
he subsequently sold to Agapito. They engaged the services of Atty. Uson as counsel for a fee of
P75,000.00 in order to pursue an ejectment case against Balmaceda’s brother. After two years
however, no ejectment case was ever filed by Atty. Uson. Thus, he sent the respondent a demand
letter for the return of the P75,000.00 but the respondent refused to return the amount paid.
In his answer, Atty. Uson denied and alleged that upon receipt of the attorney’s fees, he
immediately sent a demand letter to Balmaceda’s brother, asking him to vacate the subject
property. He then alleged that the brother threatened legal action in response so he immediately
informed Balmaceda of the incident. He alleged that he offered to return the attorney’s fees but
Balmaceda refused to accept the amount and insisted on the filing of the ejectment case. IBP-CBD
recommended the dismissal of the disbarment complaint. The Board of Governors of IBP,
however, reversed the recommendation and imposed a penalty of 6 months suspension against
Atty. Uson.
ISSUE:
Does the failure to file a case after the payment of attorney’s fees render a lawyer in
violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility?
RULING:
Yes. Atty. Uson should be held liable for failing to file the case for ejectment.
Neglecting a legal cause renders a lawyer accountable under Rule 18.03 of CPR which
states that “A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable.”
In the instant case, Atty. Uson failed to file the ejectment case despite full payment of his
attorney’s fees. His negligence caused his client to lose his cause of action since the prescriptive
period of one year to file the ejectment case had already lapsed. Before he was engaged as
counsel, he had a good opportunity to examine the documents presented to him by his prospective
client. When he agreed to be the counsel of the complainant, it only means that, based on the
discussion and documents, he believed that complainant had a cause of action to file an ejectment
case. That the occupants of the property claimed that they also have a right to possess the same
and that they intend to bring the matter to court are not compelling reasons to prevent the
respondent from filing the ejectment case.
Hence, Atty. Uson is deemed to have violated the CPR.
48 |
FAILURE TO FILE APPELANT’S BRIEF RESULTING TO THE APPEAL’S DISMISSAL

CONSTITUTE NEGLECT OF DUTY
Spouses Vicente and Precywinda Gimena vs. Atty. Jojo S. Vijiga

A.C. No. 11828; November 22, 2017
Tijam, J.
FACTS:
Complainant Spouses Vicente and Precywinda Gimena filed an administrative case
against respondent Atty. Jojo S. Vijiga for failure to file their appellant’s brief, resulting in the
dismissal of their appeal in the Court of Appeals (CA).
Sps. Gimena alleged that they hired the Atty. Vijiga to represent them in a civil case for
nullity of foreclosure proceedings and voidance of loan documents filed against Metropolitan Bank
and Trust Company. The RTC dismissed the case. Sps. Gimena filed an appeal to the CA which
required them to file an appellants’ brief. Atty. Vijiga failed to file the brief despite the CA’s grant of
motion for reconsideration. Hence, the dismissal became final and executory.
Atty. Vijiga denied that he abandoned and neglected the appeal and alleged complainants
told him not to pursue the appeal considering that the subject properties are already in the
possession of the bank.
ISSUE:
Does failure to file their appellant’s brief, resulting in the dismissal of their appeal, constitute
neglect of duty?
RULING:
Yes, failure to file the appellant’s brief is neglect of the lawyer’s duty.
A lawyer owes his client competent and zealous legal representation. When a lawyer
agrees to act as a counsel, he guarantees that he will exercise that reasonable degree of care and
skill demanded by the character of the business he undertakes to do, to protect the clients’ interests
and take all steps or do all acts necessary therefor.
In this case, respondent’s failure to submit the appellants’ brief and update his clients,
complainants herein, of the status of their appeal falls short of the ethical requirements set forth
under the CPR. His failure to file the appellants’ brief, despite the CA’s grant of leniency in
reconsidering its initial dismissal of the appeal further compounds respondent’s inadequacies. In
this case, respondent’s neglect of his professional duties led to the loss of complainants’ properties
and has left them bereft of legal remedies. They lost their case not because of merits but because
of technicalities, specifically the respondent’s failure to file the required pleadings. Certainly, the
situation in the case at bar, is one such evil that the CPR intended to avoid.
Hence, Atty. Vijiga is guilty of neglect of duty and is suspended from the practice of law for
six (6) months.
| 49
LAWYERS MUST REPRESENT THEIR CLIENTS WITH ZEAL BUT WITHIN THE
BOUNDS OF LAW
Junielito R. Espanto vs. Atty. Erwin V. Belleza

A.C. No. 10756 (Formerly CBD Case No. 11-3218); February 21, 2018
Peralta, J.
FACTS:
The present case stemmed from the complaint of Junielito R. Espanto against Atty. Erwin
VS. Belleza for grave misconduct, malpractice, deliberate falsehood, violation of oath of office and
violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Espanto is the owner of a two-storey concrete residential house. While he was working
abroad, he was informed that Nelia Alibangbang-Miller was claiming that his house was
encroaching on a portion of the adjoining lot she bought. When he went back to the Philippines,
Nelia would always harass him to pay the portion of the land allegedly being encroached upon by
his house. While an action was pending before the court, Atty. Belleza went to his house and
threatened him that they will file a writ to demolish his house if he will not agree to sell and vacate
it. Espanto gave in but he was informed that his house was already being demolished. Espanto
then alleged that when he got hold of the Deed of Absolute Sale prepared and notarized by Atty.
Belleza, he realized that the lawyer defrauded him as shown by the fact that he facilitated the sale
without his knowledge. Atty. Belleza also had his house demolished without his knowledge and
consent, and without permit from the municipal government.
Atty. Belleza denied the allegations against him. He averred that there was a compromise
between the parties and that he did not participate in the demolition of Espanto’s property.
ISSUE:
Did Atty. Belleza disregard his duties as a lawyer to pursue solely his client’s interest?
RULING:
Yes. Atty. Belleza disregard his duties as a lawyer to pursue solely his client’s interest.
Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates lawyers to represent their

clients with zeal but within the bounds of the law. They should not, therefore, misuse the rules of
procedure to defeat the ends of justice or unduly delay a case, impede the execution of a judgment
or misuse court processes. While a lawyer owes absolute fidelity to the cause of his client, full
devotion to his genuine interest, and warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his rights, as
well as the exertion of his utmost learning and ability, he must do so only within the bounds of the
law. His responsibility to protect and advance the interests of his client does not warrant a course
of action propelled by ill motives and malicious intentions.
Here, the acts of Atty. Belleza in: (1) issuing the notice to vacate to Espanto while the case
was still pending litigation; (2) failing to inform Espanto of the sale of Nelia’s property in
contravention to the stipulation in the acknowledgment receipt; and (3) facilitating, drafting and
notarizing the deed of sale in violation of the compromise agreement, constitute irregular practice
for failure to comply with the compromise agreement and in violation of Espanto’s rights.
Hence, Atty. Belleza failed to observe his duties as a lawyer and must be disciplined for
his acts.
50 |
WRITING DEMAND LETTERS TO ENFORCE A CLIENT’S LEGAL CLAIM DOES NOT

CONSTITUTE MISCONDUCT
Potenciano Malvar vs. Atty. Freddie B. Feir

A.C. No. 11871; March 5, 2018
Peralta, J.
FACTS:
This is a petition for disbarment filed by Potenciano R. Malvar against Atty. Freddie B. Feir
for violation of Canori 19, Rule 19.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Lawyer’s
Oath.
Malvar alleged that he received threatening letters from Feir ordering him to pay Feir’s
client, Rogelio Amurao. In case of his failure to do so, a criminal complaint and an administrative
complaint for the revocation of his license as a physician would be filed against him. According to
Malvar, Atty. Feir’s demands were tantamount to blackmail or extortion due to the fact that Feir
tried to obtain something of value by means of threats of filing complaints.
For his part, Atty. Feir narrated that Amurao was tasked by his co-owners to sell their
properties consisting of three (3) parcels of land. The buyer of said properties was Malvar, who
initially paid the purchase price of the land. Malvar then borrowed the original copies of said titles
from Amurao for the purpose of verification of the authenticity of the owner’s title to the properties.
Malvar, however, failed to return the said title despite several demands. To his surprise, Amurao
later learned that the subject properties were already transferred in Malvar’s name even though
he never executed the necessary Deed of Absolute Sale nor received the balance of the purchase
price. The threat to sue Malvar based on the facts presented to Atty. Feir as a lawyer was not
groundless as Amurao stands to lose his property while· Malvar enriches himself at Amurao’s
expense.
ISSUE:
Were Atty. Feir’s demands maliciously made with the intention to extort money from the
opposing party?
RULING:
No. Atty. Feir was simply acting in compliance with his lawyer’s oath to protect and
preserve the rights of his client.
Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer shall represent
his client. Moreover, under Rule 19.01, a lawyer should not file or threaten to file any unfounded
or baseless criminal case or cases against the adversaries of his client designed to secure a
leverage to compel the adversaries to yield or withdraw their own cases against the lawyer’s client.
Indeed, the writing of demand letters is a standard practice and tradition in this jurisdiction. It is
usually done by a lawyer pursuant to the principal-agent relationship that he has with his client, the
principal. Thus, in the performance of his role as agent, the lawyer may be tasked to enforce his
client’s claim and to take all the steps necessary to collect it, such as writing a letter of demand
requiring payment within a specified period.
In the instant case, Amurao, has yet to receive the remaining balance of purchase price on
the contract of sale. This fact alone is enough reason for Amurao to seek the legal advice of Atty.
Feir and for Atty. Feir to send the demand letters to Malvar. These demand letters were based on
a legitimate cause or issue, which is the alleged failure of Malvar to pay the full amount of the
consideration in the sale transaction as well as the alleged falsified Deed of Sale used to transfer
ownership over the lots subject of the instant case.
Therefore, Atty. Feir did not commit any acts of extortion that would warrant his disbarment.
| 51
RECEIVING FEES FROM A CLIENT DESPITE KNOWING THAT A CASE CANNOT BE

JUSTLY PURSUED IS A VIOLATION OF FIDELITY TO ONE’S CLIENT
Kimeldes Gonzales vs. Atty. Prisco B. Santos

A.C. No. 10178; June 19, 2018
Jardeleza, J.
FACTS:
This is a petition filed by Kimeldes Gonzales against Atty. Prisco B. Santos before the IBP
for dishonesty and abuse of trust and confidence of his client.
Gonzales bought a parcel of land in Zamboanga City. She appointed her sister, Josephine
Gonzales, to act as her representative in matters concerning the property since she was then living
in Q.C. Josephine thereafter engaged the services of Atty. Santos to register the title in Gonzales’
name and commence an ejectment suit against the occupants of the property. Josephine gave
Atty. Santos P40,000 for the registration of title and P20,000 for the filing of the ejectment suit.
Atty. Santos was entrusted the owner’s duplicate copy of the TCT for its cancellation and
a new title was subsequently issued in Gonzales’ name. The new title however was never
surrendered to Josephine despite her efforts to claim it. Gonzales then discovered that her property
had been mortgaged to a credit corporation by a certain Norena Bagui who was Atty. Santos’
relative. Gonzales also learned that Atty. Santos never filed the ejectment case against the
occupants of her property despite receiving payment for its filing.
Atty. Santos denies any participation in Norena’s act. He claims that he instructed his niece
to deliver the new TCT to Josephine and was surprised to learn that it had not been delivered and
had been mortaged by Norena. Furthermore, he insisted that he never agreed to file an ejectment
suit, citing the fact that some of the occupants were his friends.
ISSUE:
Should respondent be held administratively liable for his failure to file the ejectment case
despite receiving fees from his client?
RULING:
Yes. Atty. Santos should be held administratively liable for his acts.
Canon 17 of the CPR provides that a lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and
must be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him.
Atty. Santos violated Canon 17 when he failed to file the necessary ejectment case despite
having received the payment for its fees. It is uncontested that Atty. Santos received an additional
P20,000 payment from Gonzales. Atty. Santos, however, denied that it is payment for the filing of
an ejectment suit against the occupants of complainant's property. Nonetheless, he does not
proffer any reason to explain why such amount was given him. Furthermore, Atty. Santos violated
his client's trust when he received said amount despite knowing that he could not file the ejectment
suit because some of the occupants of complainant's property are his friends. Indeed, he was not
able to file the case but without informing complainant of his reasons.
Hence, Atty. Santos is guilty of violating the CPR and should be held administratively liable.
52 |
A CONTINGENT FEE ARRANGEMENT MUST BE LAID DOWN IN AN EXPRESS

CONTRACT, IN ORDER FOR THE ARRANGEMENT TO BE VALID AND BINDING
Eugenio Cortez vs. Atty. Hernando Cortes

A.C. No. 9119; March 12, 2018
Tijam, J.
FACTS:
This case arose from a complaint filed by Eugenio Cortez against Atty. Hernando P. Cortes
for grave misconduct, and violation of the Lawyer's Oath and the Code for Professional
Responsibility.
Cortez alleged that he engaged the services of Atty. Cortes as his counsel in an illegal
dismissal case against Philippine Explosives Corporation (PEC). He further alleged that he and
Atty. Cortes had a handshake agreement on a 12% contingency fee. Atty. Cortes prosecuted his
claims for illegal dismissal which was decided in favor of Eugenio. The Court of Appeals affirmed
the decision of the National Labor Relations Commission ordering PEC to pay Eugenio.
Subsequently, Eugenio alleged that when he was about to withdraw the amount granted to him,
Atty. Cortes answered that 50% of the total awarded claims belongs to him as attorney's fees.
When Eugenio questioned Atty. Cortes, the lawyer became hysterical and imposingly maintained
that 50% of the total awarded claims belongs to him.
Atty. Cortes claimed he only accepted the case on a fifty-fifty sharing arrangement. Atty.
Cortes insisted that the alleged 12% agreement is false, being merely a concoction of
complainant's fertile and unstable mind. He also pointed out that the fifty-fifty sharing arrangement
is not unconscionably high because Cortez was given the option to hire other lawyers, but still
engaged his services.
ISSUE:
Is the contingency fee of 50% of the total awarded claims exorbitant?
RULING:
Yes. The 50% contingency fee that Atty. Cortes is insisting is exorbitant.
A contingent fee arrangement is valid in this jurisdiction and is generally recognized as

valid and binding but must be laid down in an express contract. The amount of contingent fee
agreed upon by the parties is subject to the stipulation that counsel will be paid for his legal
services only if the suit or litigation prospers. Generally, the amount of attorney's fees due is that
stipulated in the retainer agreement which is conclusive as to the amount of the lawyers’
compensation. In the absence thereof, the amount of attorney's fees is fixed on the basis
of quantum meruit, i.e., the reasonable worth of the attorneys’ services.
Here, the contingent fee claimed by Atty. Cortes was grossly excessive and
unconscionable. Considering that Eugenio was amenable only to a 12% contingency fee, and
which deems to be the reasonable worth of the attorney's services rendered by Atty. Cortes under
the circumstances, therefore, Atty. Cortes must return to Eugenio the amount he received in
excess of 12% of the total award.
| 53
COURTS MAY ORDER THE RETURN OF ACCEPTANCE FEES ON THE GROUND OF

NEGLIGENCE AND ON THE BASIS OF QUANTUM MERUIT
Jocelyn Ignacio vs. Atty. Daniel T. Alviar

A.C. No. 11482; July 17, 2017
Tijam, J.
FACTS:
This is a review of the resolution issued by the IBP Board of Governors, which adopted the
investigating commissioner’s report and recommendation finding Atty. Daniel Alviar
administratively liable for the complaint filed by his client Jocelyn Ignacio, and for which the IBP
recommended a penalty of stern warning.
Ignacio engaged the services of Atty. Alviar for purposes of handling the case of her son
who was then apprehended by PDEA. For a stipulated acceptance fee of P100,000, Atty. Alviar
agreed to handle the case, and such fee was paid in installments. After Atty. Alviar received the
initial payments, he conferred with the Ignacio’s son once, and then after receiving the balance,
he filed his notice of appearance, but from thereafter reneged from his responsibilities to the
Ignacios. This led Ignacio to write a letter to Atty. Alviar informing the latter that she had decided
to employ the services of another lawyer. She then requested that the respondent remit back to
her the acceptance fee that she paid the latter, but also asked him to retain a portion of what she
paid him to fairly compensate for the preparatory legal services he rendered, which respondent
refused to do.
In his defense, Atty. Alviar denied having received such letter and that he neglected his
duties to the complainant’s son.
ISSUE:
Is the complainant entitled to the restitution of the acceptance fees on the ground of
respondent lawyer’s negligence?
RULING:
Yes. The complainant is entitled to a partial restitution of the acceptance fees due to the
respondent’s negligence.
For the lawyer, the mere acceptance of a case amounts to opportunity cost, thus he must
be indemnified by the payment of an acceptance fee. As such, the said fee is not measured by the
nature and extent of the legal services rendered since the same compensates the lawyer only for
his lost opportunity. Notwithstanding this, however, the Court has ordered the return of
acceptances fees in cases wherein the lawyer was negligent in the handling of his client’s case. In
this regard, the principle of quantum meruit may serve as the basis for determining the reasonable
amount of attorney’s fees.
In this case, the respondent only conferred once with the complainant’s son for 20 minutes,
filed his entry of appearance, and inquired twice as to the status of the case.
Therefore, in view of the attaining circumstances, the Court ordered the restitution to the
complainant the amount of P97,000 of the full P100,000 acceptance fee.
54 |
DISMISSAL OF CRIMINAL CHARGES WILL NOT EXONERATE THE LAWYER FROM

THE ADMINISTRATIVE CHARGES AGAINST HIM
Cesar Sta. Ana vs. Atty. Antonio Cortes

A.C. No. 6980; August 30, 2017
Del Castillo, J.
FACTS:
This is a complaint for disbarment filed against Atty. Cortes for falsification of public
documents in the sale and donation of parcels of property of Atty. Casal and his wife.
Since the death of Atty. Casal, Atty. Cortes was left with the care and maintenance of
several properties owned and/or under his administration. Atty. Cortea abused his authority and
engineered the sale and transfer of the properties, by conspiring with four other people and causing
the execution of a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) to authorize a co-owner of the properties to
sell them. The said SPA was alleged to be forged or falsified. With this, criminal cases for Estafa
through Falsification of Public Document were filed against respondent and his co-conspirators.
In addition, Atty. Cortes allegedly notarized falsified Deeds of Donation, under which it was
made to appear that Atty. Casal purportedly donated pieces of property to one of Atty. Cortes’
conspirators. Said Deeds of Donation were signed outside Atty. Cortes’ jurisdiction as a notary
public. Also, upon investigation it concluded that the signatures appearing on the said questioned
documents are mere xerox copies which do not truly and clearly reflect the minute details of the
writing strokes and other aspects relative to the preparation of the questioned signatures.
Atty. Cortes asserted that all the criminal complaints against him had been dismissed, and
the criminal information/s instituted therefor had been withdrawn by the Department of Justice
(DOJ), hence, he had been exonerated of all the charges against him.
ISSUE:
Will the dismissal of criminal charges exonerate the lawyer from the administrative charges
against him?
RULING:
No. The dismissal of the criminal complaints against respondent did not change the sui
generis character of disbarment proceedings.
Administrative cases against lawyers are sui generis, or a class of their own. Disciplinary
proceedings involve no private interest and afford no redress for private grievance. Disbarment
cases are aimed at purging the legal profession of individuals who obdurately scorn and despise
the exalted standards of the noble profession of law.
In this case, the dismissal or withdrawal of the criminal complaints/information/s at the

instance of the DOJ, is of no moment. As a member of the Bar, Atty. Cortes should know that
administrative cases against lawyers are sui generis, or a class of their own.
Hence, the dismissal of the criminal complaints against Atty. Cortes will not exonerate him
from the administrative charges filed against him.
| 55
AMICABLE SETTLEMENT DOES NOT RESULT TO THE DISMISSAL OF THE

ADMINISTRATIVE CHARGES AGAINST LAWYERS
Gene M. Domingo vs. Atty. Anastacio E. Revilla, Jr.

A.C. No. 5473; January 23, 2018
Per Curiam
FACTS:
The present case is a complaint for disbarment filed by Gene M. Domingo against Atty.
Anastacio E. Revilla, Jr.,
In this complaint, Domingo alleged that he sought the services of Atty. Revilla, for the
settlement of the estate of his mother and the rescission of his adopted brother’s adoption. Atty.
Revilla accepted the case, on behalf of a law firm where he allegedly worked as an associate.
According to Domingo, Atty. Revilla represented that he had filed the annulment of
adoption and processed the transfer of titles of properties, but Domingo must release almost half
a million pesos on the pretense that this amount will be paid to the Judge, Bureau of Internal
Revenue, related agencies, actual expenses and legal fees for the favorable outcome of the case.
Domingo complied to Atty. Revilla’s request. Subsequently, Domingo repeatedly asked for the
original or the copies of court’s decision and orders, but Atty. Revilla did not comply with his
requests and kept making excuses.
Eventually, Atty. Revilla cut off communications prompting Domingo to hire a new law firm.
He was informed that Atty. Revilla was not an associate of the said law firm; and that no case was
ever filed; and that all the representations were a sham and intended to induce him to remit almost
half a million pesos. Atty. Revilla then filed a so-called Most Respectful Motion to Dismiss the
administrative complaint in which he adverted that he entered an amicable settlement with
Domingo and paid him P650,000.
ISSUE:
Does the amicable settlement entered into by Domingo and Atty. Revilla result to the
dismissal of the administrative complaint filed against the latter?
RULING:
No. The amicable settlement entered into by the parties will not result to the dismissal of
the administrative complaint against Atty. Revilla.
Although the amicable settlement obliterated the legal obligation to return to Domingo the
amounts obtained by deceit, Atty. Revilla was not entitled to demand the dismissal of the charges
against him for that reason. He ought to have known that his professional responsibilities as an
attorney were distinct from his other responsibilities. To be clear, the primary objective of
administrative cases against lawyers is not only to punish and discipline the erring individual
lawyers but also to safeguard the administration of justice by protecting the courts and the public
from the misconduct of lawyers, and to remove from the legal profession persons whose utter
disregard of their Lawyer's Oath has proven them unfit to continue discharging the trust reposed
in them as members of the Bar.
Here, Atty. Revilla misled Domingo into thinking that it would be his law firm that was to
take on the case. Second, he told the Domingo that he instituted the action for the annulment of
the adoption despite not having yet done so. Third, he kept on demanding more money from the
Domingo although the case was not actually even moving forward. Lastly, he continued to make
up excuses in order to avoid having to furnish to the complainant the requested copies of court
documents that, in the first place, he could not produce.
Hence, all the acts of Atty. Revilla, whether taken singly or together, manifested
dishonesty, deceit, and fraud on his client in which he must be directly answerable to the Court on
ethical, professional and legal grounds.
56 |
IN DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST A LAWYER, THE CIVIL LIABILITY OF A

LAWYER IS NOT IN ISSUE
Paulino Lim vs. Atty. Socrates R. Rivera

A.C. No. 12156; June 20, 2018
Perlas-Bernabe, J.
FACTS:
Before the Court is an administrative complaint filed by Paulino Lim against respondent
Atty. Rivera, praying that the latter be meted disciplinary sanctions for defrauding Lim by issuing a
worthless check.
Lim alleged that he met Atty. Rivera in the hallway of RTC Makati. The following month,
Atty. Rivera borrowed from Lim the amount of P75,000. Lim lent money to Atty. Rivera who then
issued a post-dated check to ensure payment of the loan. Subsequently, Atty. Rivera made several
other loans in huge amounts for which he no longer issued any guarantee checks. Lim claimed to
have been taken by Atty. Rivera’s promises of payment considering the millions he expects as
contingency fee as contingent fee in one of his cases. When Lim deposited the one guaranteed
check, it was dishonored. Thereafter, Atty. Rivera avoided Lim.
Lim then filed an administrative case before the IBP. The IBP directed respondent to submit
his answer to the complaint within a period of fifteen (15) days, but to no avail. The IBP
Investigating Commissioner found respondent administratively liable, and accordingly,
recommended that he be meted the penalty of suspension from the practice of law and be ordered
to return to complainant the amount of P75,000 with legal interest.
ISSUE:
May an erring lawyer be ordered to return the amount loaned to the lawyer in the same
administrative case filed against the latter?
RULING:
No. Atty. Rivera may not be ordered to return the amount he loaned from the complainant.
It is settled that in disciplinary proceedings against lawyers, the only issue is whether the
officer of the court is still fit to be allowed to continue as a member of the Bar. In Tria-Samonte vs.
Obias, the Court held that its "findings during administrative-disciplinary proceedings have no
bearing on the liabilities of the parties involved which are purely civil in nature – meaning, those
liabilities which have no intrinsic link to the lawyer's professional engagement – as the same should
be threshed out in a proper proceeding of such nature."
In this case, the Court found Atty. Rivera guilty of gross misconduct for his deliberate failure
to pay his debts and for issuance of worthless checks. For this, Atty. Rivera may be meted the
penalty of suspension from the practice of law, but he may not be ordered to return the amount
claimed.
Thus, the return of the P75,000.00 clearly lies beyond the ambit of this administrative case.
| 57
AN ATTORNEY ENJOYS THE LEGAL PRESUMPTION THAT HE IS INNOCENT OF

CHARGES AGAINST HIM UNTIL THE CONTRARY IS PROVED
Helen Gradiola vs. Atty. Romulo A. Deles

A.C. No. 10267; June 18, 2018
Del Castillo, J.
FACTS:
This is a complaint for disbarment filed by Helen Gradiola charging respondent lawyer Atty.
Romulo A. Deles with violating the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Gradiola claimed that Atty. Deles was her counsel in a civil case then pending before the
CA. Gradiola asserted that Atty. Deles abetted the unauthorized practice of law when he assigned
or delegated his professional duties as her lawyer to Atty. Ernesto Araneta. Gradiola alleged that
instead of attending full time to her case, Atty. Deles allowed Atty. Araneta to do the legal research
works and the preparation of various pleadings relative to the civil case. Gradiola further narrated
that she was told that the CA had reconsidered its decision in her and her husband’s favor, as she
was shown a photocopy of a resolution. However, she discovered that said Atty. Araneta was
disbarred from the practice of law, that the CA Resolution was a total fabrication, and that the
position paper that was supposedly filed with the Court was an utter simulation. Further, she found
out that she and her husband lost her case.
Unable to file an answer due to his medical condition, Atty. Mampang, a lawyer hired by
Atty. Deles’ son to represent his father, alleged that Atty. Deles was also a victim of the chicanery
perpetrated by Atty. Araneta, and that Atty. Deles was not Gradiola’s counsel. Atty. Deles’ counsel
further states that although respondent’s name appeared in the fictitious pleadings, the signature
appearing thereon were not by respondent lawyer.
ISSUE:
Is the proof that Atty. Araneta is not a lawyer sufficient to warrant administrative liability to
Atty. Deles in a disbarment case filed against the latter?
RULING:
No. Proof that Atty. Araneta is not a lawyer will not instantly lead to the conclusion that
Atty. Deles should be held administratively liable. He enjoys legal presumption of innocence until
contrary is proved.
This Court has consistently held that an attorney enjoys the legal presumption that he is
innocent of charges against him until the contrary is proved, and that as an officer of the court, he
is presumed to have performed his duties in accordance with his oath. For the Court to exercise
its disciplinary powers, the case against the lawyer must be established by clear, convincing and
satisfactory proof. Indeed, considering the serious consequences of disbarment or suspension of
a member of the Bar, the Court has consistently held that a clear preponderant evidence is
necessary to justify the imposition of the administrative penalty. The burden of proof in disbarment
and suspension proceedings always rests on the shoulders of the complainant.
In this case, with respondent lawyer not yet in a position to factually dispute the accusations
and defend himself, and considering that there was no established lawyer-client relationship at all
between him and Atty. Mampang, albeit the latter acted for respondent lawyer's best interest,
proceeding with the investigation of the administrative case against him would amount to a denial
of a fair and reasonable opportunity to be heard.
58 |
AN ATTORNEY ENJOYS THE LEGAL PRESUMPTION THAT HE IS INNOCENT OF THE

CHARGES AGAINST HIM UNTIL THE CONTRARY IS PROVED
Edgar M. Rico vs. Atty. Reynaldo G. Salutan

A.C. No. 9257; March 5, 2018
Peralta, J.
FACTS:
The present case was initiated through a letter complaint filed against respondent Atty.
Reynaldo G. Salutan for purportedly misleading the court and for contempt of court.
Edgar M. Rico alleged that his relatives were plaintiffs in a civil case for Forcible Entry
before the MTCC. The court had ordered the defendants in the said case to restore plaintiffs’
possession of the subject properties.
Villa Abrille, one of the defendants in the aforementioned case, filed a separate case for
Unlawful Detainer against Rico covering the same property. The MTCC ordered Rico to vacate the
property. The RTC affirmed the MTCC ruling and issued a Writ of Execution. Upon the issuance
of the writ of execution, the sheriff executed a return of service because he could not validly serve
the writ on Rico because the property subject of the case was different from the lot occupied by
Rico. Abrille, through her counsel, Atty. Reynaldo G. Salutan, filed another motion for issuance of
an Alias Writ of Execution which was denied by the court. They repeatedly filed the motion for
issuance of an Alias Writ of Execution but it was denied, until on the 4th attempt it was granted by
MTCC. The court sheriff issued a Final Notice to Vacate on Rico.
Consequently, the same sheriff led the demolition of the house and other improvements
on the property. Thus, Rico filed the administrative complaint against Atty. Salutan. On his part,
Atty. Salutan denied the charges and argued that he merely advocated for his client’s cause and
did the same within the bounds of the law and of the rules.
ISSUE:
Did Rico prove by substantial evidence that Atty. Salutan misled the court in the course of
championing his client’s cause?
RULING:
No. Despite the charges hurled against Atty. Salutan, Rico failed to show any badge of
deception on the lawyer’s part.
It was consistently held that an attorney enjoys the legal presumption that he is innocent
of the charges against him until the contrary is proved, and that as an officer of the court, he is
presumed to have performed his duties in accordance with his oath. Burden of proof, defined in
Section 1 of Rule 131 is the duty of a party to present evidence on the facts in issue necessary to
establish his claim or defense by the amount of evidence required by law. The quantum of proof
necessary for a finding of guilt is substantial evidence. The basic rule is that mere allegation is not
evidence and is not equivalent to proof. Likewise, charges based on mere suspicion and
speculation cannot be given credence.
In the case at bar, Rico seriously failed to prove that there is a court decision declaring that
Abrille’s title was fake or that it had encroached on Rico’s property. All that Atty. Salutan did was
to zealously advocate for the cause of his client. He was not shown to have misled or unduly
influenced the court through misinformation. While zeal or enthusiasm in championing a client's
cause is desirable, unprofessional conduct stemming from such zeal or enthusiasm is always
disfavored. Such undesirable conduct, however, is not shown to be extant in this case.
The complaint against Atty. Salutan is thus dismissed for lack of merit.
| 59
IN DISBARMENT PROCEEDINGS, THE BURDEN OF PROOF IS ON THE COMPLAINANT

TO PROVE ITS CASE BY CLEAR, CONVINCING, AND SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE
Cornerlio V. Yagong vs. City Prosecutor Neopito Ed G. Magno and

Assistant City Prosecutor Don S. Garcia
A.C. No. 10333; November 6, 2017
Peralta, J.
FACTS:
The present case is an administrative complaint filed by Cornelio V. Yagong against City
Prosecutor Neopito Ed G. Magno and Assistant City Prosecutor Don S. Garcia for alleged violation
of the Lawyer's Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Complainant Yagong was charged for violating P.D. No. 1612 and theft before the City
Prosecution Office assigned under respondents Magno and Garcia. Yagong claimed that when he
filed his Counter-Affidavit, respondent prosecutors had already come out with their Resolution
indicting them of the said criminal charges. Aggrieved, Yagong filed an administrative complaint
contending that respondents were bias and partial, and into the scheme of money-making for a
favorable resolution.
As defense, Magno and Garcia insisted that in resolving cases filed before their office, they
are only guided by the concepts of prevailing laws and jurisprudence in conducting Preliminary
Investigations. They filed the proper Information against Yagong in the performance of their official
functions.
The Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the

Philippines (IBP) recommended the dismissal of the administrative complaint against Magno and
Garcia.
ISSUE:
Did the complainant prove his case against the respondent by clear, convincing, and
satisfactory evidence?
RULING:
No, the complainant failed to prove his case by clear, convincing, and satisfactory
evidence.
As a rule, an attorney enjoys the legal presumption that he is innocent of the charges
proffered against him until the contrary is proved, and that, as an officer of the court, he has
performed his duties in accordance with his oath. In disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof
is upon the complainant and the Court will exercise its disciplinary power only if the former
establishes its case by clear, convincing, and satisfactory evidence.
Here, Yagong miserably failed to discharge said burden. Magno and Garcia were only
performing their official duties. A prosecutor merely determines the existence of probable cause,
and to file the corresponding information if he finds it to be so. A preliminary investigation is merely
inquisitorial. It is often the only means of discovering the persons who may be reasonably charged
with a crime, to enable the prosecutor to prepare his Complaint or Information.
Thus, the burden not discharge, the Court dismissed the complaint against the
respondents.
60 |
PREPONDERANT EVIDENCE IS NECESSARY TO JUSTIFY THE IMPOSITION OF THE

PENALTIES OF DISBARMENT OR SUSPENSION
Eliezer Castro and Bethulia Casafrancisco vs. Atty. John Bigay, Jr. and Atty. Juan Siapno
A.C. No. 7824; July 19, 2017
Tijam, J.
FACTS:
IBP-CBD’s report and recommendation finding herein respondent Atty. John Bigay, Jr.,
administratively liable for violation of the prohibition on engaging in the prohibited practice of
dealing with properties under litigation. The case stemmed from the complaint filed by his alleged
clients Eliezer Castro and Bethulia Casafrancisco.
Casafrancisco alleged that she engaged the services of Atty. Bigay for the settlement of
her late father’s estate, which includes a parcel of land. The complainants then, however,
discovered that Atty. Bigay, allegedly with the cooperation of Atty. Juan Siapno, was able to
transfer a portion of the subject lot to his and her wife’s name through a series of deeds of sales
notarized by his alleged conspirator.
In his answer, Atty. Bigay averred that the estate in question had long been settled and
that the subject property was apportioned to him. To show the complainant’s ownership prior to his
acquisition of the portion thereof, Atty. Bigay presented a Tax Declaration under Casafrancisco’s
name and deeds of sale and donation made under her name. For his part, Siapno denied having
notarized the documents and averred that his alleged signatures in the instruments were falsified.
ISSUE:
Does the evidence on record meet the quantum of proof of preponderance of evidence
necessary to support a penalty of suspension?
RULING:
No. The evidence submitted fell short of the required quantum of proof.
Considering the serious consequences of disbarment or suspension of a member of the

Bar, the Court has consistently held that preponderant evidence is necessary to justify its
imposition. Thus, read in relation to Sec. 3(a), Rule 131 of the ROC, which provides that every
person is presumed innocent of a crime or wrongdoing, in the absence of preponderant evidence,
the presumption of innocence of the lawyer subsists and the complaint against him must be
dismissed.
In the instant case, aside from the bare allegations of Casafrancisco and self-serving
claims and denial of Siapno, there is nothing on record that would show that the contracts were
simulated, much less that the same were forged or falsified. On the other hand, Atty. Bigay
presented sufficient documentary evidence against the accusations of forgery and engaging in the
practice of dealing with properties under litigation.
Thus, without such required proof to overcome the presumption of innocence in his favor,
the Court dismissed the administrative case against Atty. Bigay and reprimanded Siapno for his
dereliction of notarial duty.
| 61
TO JUSTIFY DISBARMENT OR SUSPENSION, THE CASE AGAINST THE LAWYER MUST

BE FREE FROM DOUBT, NOT ONLY TO THE ACT BUT AS TO HIS MOTIVE AS WELL
Delfina Santiago vs. Atty. Zosimo Santiago and Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino
A.C. No. 3921; June 11, 2018
Leonardo De-Castro, J.
FACTS:
This is a petition for review of an administrative case for disbarment where complainant
Judge Delfina Santiago seeks to reverse the decision of the IBP denying her complaint against
respondents.
Complainant was a City Personnel Officer while respondents were City Legal Officers in
the City Government of Caloocan. In 1988, complainant applied for, and was granted, a sick leave
of absence with commuted pay covering 240 days. Within the period, complainant received a
memorandum from then Mayor Asistio, Jr., cancelling all leaves of absence of city officials and
employees. She received a memorandum detailing her to the Office of the Secretary to the Mayor,
but she paid no heed to such. She was later directed to return to work in a letter signed by Atty.
Tolentino, but she did not return to work. At the end of her leave, she tendered her resignation.
She subsequently received a memorandum from Mayor Asistio terminating her employment.
Enclosed with the memorandum was a resolution signed by respondents, which recommend her
dismissal from service.
Complainant filed the present case, accusing the respondents of making deceitful
statements in said resolution, committing gross misconduct and violating their Attorney’s Oath for
recommending her dismissal without just cause and due process. In respondent Santiago’s
comment to the complaint, he argued that the allegedly deceitful statements in the resolution were
not malicious imputations of falsehood. The IBP recommended the dismissal of the complaint for
lack of merit.
ISSUE:
Did complainant present sufficient evidence to prove gross misconduct and violation of the
Lawyer’s Oath?
RULING:
No, the complainant failed to prove her allegations.
In Osop vs. Fontanilla, the Court ruled that charges meriting disciplinary action against a
lawyer generally involve the motives that induced him to commit the act charged and that, to justify
disbarment or suspension, the case against the lawyer must be clear and free from doubt, not only
as to the act charged but as to his motive.
In here, except for complainant's allegations, however, she failed to present sufficient
evidence to substantiate her complaint. Complainant has not proffered any evidence that tended
to show that respondents intentionally and deliberately made false statements in the Resolution in
order to deceive and induce Mayor Asistio to dismiss complainant from service. She neither offered
any documentary evidence to buttress her arguments nor presented any witness to corroborate
her claims. Complainant failed to discharge burden of proof to warrant the imposition of
administrative liability against respondents.
Hence, for insufficiency of evidence to prove the respondents’ alleged act of gross
misconduct and violation of the lawyer’s oath, the complaint is dismissed.
62 |
MEMBERS OF THE BAR ARE PROTECTED BY THE COURTS AGAINST UNJUST

ACCUSATIONS OF DISGRUNTLED LITIGANTS
Ready Form, Inc., vs. Atty. Egmedio J. Castillon, Jr.

A.C. No. 11774; March 21, 2018
Caguioa, J.
FACTS:
This is an administrative complaint filed with the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP
(CBD-IBP) by complainant Ready Form, Inc. against respondent Atty. Egmedio J. Castillon Jr. for
his alleged violation of Rules 1.01, 1.02, and 1.03 of Canon 1 of the CPR.
In a public bidding conducted by the National Printing Office (NPO), the NPO Bids and
Award Committee (NPO-BAC) required all bidders to submit their eligibility documents, which
include the bidders’ past ITRs and financial documents stamp received by the BIR. Ready Form
was one of the bidders. After review, the NPO-BAC imposed a suspension of 1 year against Ready
Form due to misrepresentation and misdeclaration in submitting false ITRs and financial
statements for the year 2007. Atty. Castillon, as counsel for Eastland Printink Corporation
(Eastland), filed a Petition for Blacklisting against Ready Form with the NPO, alleging that the latter
committed other violations. The NPO suspended and blacklisted Ready Form for a period of 5
years. In 2014, Ready Form Inc., filed a Complaint-Affidavit before the CBD-IBP praying that Atty.
Castillon be disbarred.
Ready Form Inc., alleged that Atty. Castillon’s unlawful use of the former’s ITRs is in
violation of Sections 4 and 278 of the NIRC, which is then a ground for violation of the CPR. Atty.
Castillon stressed that he acquired Ready Form’s audited financial statements from the SEC, and
denied having acquired an ITR of the latter. The Commissioner recommended that Atty. Castillon
be absolved from the charges filed by Ready Form. The IBP Board of Governors resolved to adopt
the recommendation and the dismissal of the complaint.
ISSUE:
Did Atty. Castillon violate the provisions of the NIRC in allegedly using an ITR of Ready
Form in filing a Petition for Blacklisting, which in turn would make him administratively liable?
RULING:
No, Atty. Castillon did not violate the NIRC.
While courts will not hesitate to mete out proper disciplinary punishment upon lawyers who
fail to live up to their sworn duties, they will protect them from the unjust accusations of dissatisfied
litigants. The success of a lawyer in his profession depends on his reputation. Private persons,
particularly disgruntled opponents, may not, therefore, be permitted to use the courts as vehicles
through which to vent their rancor on members of the Bar.
In this case, there is no evidence that Atty. Castillon violated the NIRC by attaching Ready
Form’s ITR in Eastland’s Petition for Blacklisting. On the contrary, it was proven that only an
audited financial statement was attached by Atty. Castillon. Ready Form only wants the IBP and
the Court to penalize Atty. Castillon for using a publicly-available document to support allegations
in a pleading signed by him.
The complaint against Atty. Castillon is thus dismissed.
| 63
A LAWYER CAN BE DISCIPLINED NOT ONLY FOR MALPRACTICE IN HIS

PROFESSION, BUT ALSO FOR MISCONDUCT IN HIS PRIVATE DEALINGS
Michelle Yap vs. Atty. Grace C. Buri

A.C. No. 11156; March 19, 2018
Peralta, J.
FACTS:
This case involves an administrative complaint filed by Michelle Yap against respondent
Atty. Grace C. Buri for refusing to pay her monetary obligation and for filing a criminal case of
Estafa against Yap based on false accusations.
Atty. Buri made an offer to purchase a condominium unit from seller Yap. Atty. Buri asked
to reduce the price to P1.2M, to which Yap agreed. Though P200,000 of the purchase price
remains unpaid, and without the Deed of Absolute Sale, Yap gave Atty. Buri the full and immediate
possession of the unit. When Yap asked for the balance, Atty. Buri offered to pay on a monthly
installment of P5,000 until fully paid. Yap disagreed, thus Atty. Buri said she would cancel the sale.
Atty. Buri then started sending threatening messages, and later filed a case for estafa against Yap
when the latter failed to return the P1M initially paid. The criminal case was later dismissed.
Yap then filed an administrative case against Atty. Buri for the alleged false accusations
against her. Buri failed to submit her answer. The Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP
recommended Buri’s suspension from the practice of law for 3 years, and for her to pay Yap the
amount of P200,000. The IBP Board of Governors modified the recommendation to a penalty of
suspension for 1 year, and deleted the order to pay.
ISSUE:
Is the failure to pay her monetary obligation and filing a case based on false accusations,
done in private capacity, make a lawyer administratively liable?
RULING:
Yes. The said acts make a lawyer administratively liable.
A lawyer can be disciplined not only for a malpractice in his or her profession, but also for
any misconduct committed outside of his professional capacity. A lawyer is required to have an
enduring high sense of responsibility and good fidelity in all his or her dealings and emphasize the
high standard of honesty and fairness expected of him or her, not only in the practice of the legal
profession, but in his or her personal dealings as well.
Here, the fact that Atty. Buri’s act involved a private dealing is immaterial. As a lawyer, it is
Buri’s duty to conduct herself as a person of the highest moral and professional integrity and probity
in her dealings with others. Her unwarranted tenancy and persistent refusal to pay her obligation
reflects her lack of responsibility, integrity and moral soundness. She took advantage of her
knowledge of the law and resorted to threats and intimidation in order to get away with what she
wanted, constituting a gross violation of professional ethics and a betrayal of public confidence in
the legal profession.
Hence, Atty. Buri is administratively liable and is suspended from the practice of law for a
period of 1 year, however she is not ordered to return the P200,000.00 since the same is not
intrinsically linked to her professional engagement.
64 |
WHEN THE COURT ORDERS THE SUSPENSION OF A LAWYER FROM THE PRACTICE
OF LAW, THE LAWYER MUST DESIST FROM PERFORMING ALL FUNCTIONS WHICH
REQUIRE THE APPLICATION OF LEGAL KNOWLEDGE WITHIN THE PERIOD OF HIS
OR HER SUSPENSION
Tomas P. Tan, Jr. vs. Atty. Haide V. Gumba

A.C. No. 9000; January 10, 2018
Del Castillo, J.
FACTS:
This case is an offshoot of the administrative Complaint filed by Tomas P. Tan, Jr. against
Atty. Haide V. Gumba, and for which respondent was suspended from the practice of law for six
months. This present case is filed by Judge Margaret Armea with the Supreme Court.
Tan then filed an administrative complaint against Atty. for misrepresentation. The
Supreme Court issued a resolution dated October 5, 2011 suspending Atty. Gumba from the
practice of law for six months. The Supreme Court notified Atty. Gumba of her suspension through
a Resolution denying her motion for reconsideration on the October 5, 2011 Resolution. However,
she continued to engage in the practice law by filing pleadings and appearing as counsel in courts
during the period of her suspension by representing as counsel in a case in the Municipal Trial
Court presided by Judge Armea.
As a defense, Atty. Gumba claimed that she never received an authentic copy of Court’s
October 5, 2011 Resolution.
ISSUE:
Is Atty. Gumba administratively liable for filing pleadings and appearing before the court
during the period of her suspension and prior to an order of the Court lifting such suspension?
RULING:
Yes, Atty. Gumba’s act of filing pleadings and appearing before the court constitutes
“practice of law”, for which she cannot practice during the period of her suspension.
When the Court orders the suspension of a lawyer from the practice of law, the lawyer
must desist from performing all functions which require the application of legal knowledge within
the period of his or her suspension. To stress, by practice of law, we refer to "any activity, in or out
of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training, and
experience. It includes performing acts which are characteristic of the legal profession or rendering
any kind of service which requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill.'' In fine, it will
amount to unauthorized practice, and a violation of a lawful order of the Court if a suspended
lawyer engages in the practice of law during the pendency of his or her suspension.
In this case, the Court notified Atty. Gumba of her suspension through a Resolution denying
her motion for reconsideration on the October 5, 2011 Resolution. However, she continued to
engage in the practice law by filing pleadings and appearing as counsel in courts during the period
of her suspension.
Hence, Atty. Gumba engaged in unauthorized practice of law by filing pleadings and
appearing as counsel in courts during the period of her suspension.
| 65
THE ISSUANCE OF WORTHLESS CHECKS BY A LAWYER TO PAY INDEBTEDNESS

CONSTITUTES GROSS MISCONDUCT
Spouses Geraldy and Victory vs. Atty. Marian Mercado

A.C. No. 10580 July 12, 2017
Tijam, J.
FACTS:
This is a disbarment case against respondent Atty. Marian Mercado for violation of the
Code of Professional Responsibility and the Lawyer's Oath.
Petitioner Spouses Victory had invested money in the business scheme proposed by
respondent Atty. Marian Mercado. Said business transaction went well in the past 10 months until
the respondent became evasive to return the money of the spouses, and pay its interests. Spouses
Victory then filed a criminal complaint for estafa and violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 with the
Office of the City Prosecutor. Respondent met with Spouses Victory. Respondent issued three
postdated checks in the amount of PhP 300,000 each. However, said checks bounced.
Respondent alleged that she encountered financial difficulties in the course of her
investment deals. In an attempt to settle her obligations, respondent issued checks, which all
bounced.
ISSUE:
Was the respondent’s act of issuing worthless checks constitute gross misconduct
warranting her suspension?
RULING:
Yes. The act of respondent Mercado in issuing worthless checks constitute gross
misconduct warranting her suspension.
Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer shall
not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
In this case, it is clear that the respondent has an outstanding obligation with Spouses
Victory. The Spouses coursed through their investments with the respondent. However, it fell
through. To make matters worse, respondent engaged in an unlawful, dishonest and deceitful
conduct by issuing several worthless checks which bounced. The deliberate failure to pay just
debts and the issuance of worthless checks constitute gross misconduct, for which a lawyer may
be sanctioned with suspension from the practice of law. The Supreme Court cannot exempt
respondent from liability just because she encountered financial difficulties in the course of her
investment deals.
Therefore, the respondent’s act constitutes gross misconduct warranting her suspension.
66 |
DISHONESTY, GRAVE MISCONDUCT, AND GROSS NEGLECT OF DUTY CONSTITUTE

CONDUCT PREJUDICIAL TO THE BEST INTEREST OF THE SERVICES
Office of the Court Administrator vs. Eduardo Umblas and Atty. Rizalina G. Baltazar-Aquino
A.M No. P-09-2649; August 1, 2017
Per Curiam
FACTS:
The present case is a complaint filed by the Office of the Court Administrator against
Eduardo Umblas and Atty. Rizalina Baltazar-Aquino for alleged malversation of funds through
falsification of official documents.
The results of the audit and investigation conducted by the RTC of Cagayan revealed that
the respondents Umblas and Clerk of Court Atty. Baltazar-Aquino committed various irregularities
in the collections and deposits of the Judiciary Development Fund, General Fund, Sheriff’s Trust
Fund, among other court funds. It was likewise discovered that there have been cases of
uncollected fees, tampered official receipts, and collections without issuing official receipts.
Atty. Baltazar-Aquino, in her answer, voluntarily and unconditionally admitted to be the

author of and thus, guilty of the falsifications, tampering, and shortages of funds imputed against
her. In this regard, she expressed remorse over her actions and pleaded the Court to exercise
some degree of compassion. Umblas, on the other hand, despite the periods given to him file his
answer, never did so.
ISSUE:
Are the respondents guilty of dishonesty, grave misconduct, and gross neglect of duty,
through the commission of various irregularities in the collections and deposits in various court
funds?
RULING:
Yes. The respondents are guilty of dishonesty, grave misconduct, and were grossly
negligent in their duties.
Dishonesty is the disposition to lie, cheat, or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of integrity;

lack of honesty, probity, or integrity in principle. Misconduct, on the other hand, is a transgression
of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross
negligence by public office. To warrant dismissal from service, the misconduct must be grave,
serious, important, weighty, momentous, and not trifling. The misconduct must also imply wrongful
intention and not a mere error of judgment. Meanwhile, to be grossly negligent, the alleged errant
must be characterized by want of even the slightest care or by indifference to consequences.
These constitute Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Services as they violate the norm
of public accountability and diminish the people’s faith in the Judiciary.
In the present case case, Atty. Baltazar-Aquino, being the Clerk of Court, is considered to
be the chief administrative officer of the court to where she is a member. With respect to the
collection of legal fees, she performs a delicate function as the court officer entrusted with the
implementation of regulations thereon. Jurisprudence provides that any shortage in the amounts
to be remitted, as in the case, and the delay in the actual remittance constitute gross neglect of
duty, grave misconduct, and serious dishonesty. Such behavior should not be tolerated as they
denigrate the court’s image and integrity.
Therefore, the respondents are liable for dishonesty, grave misconduct and gross
negligence as correctly held by OCA.
| 67
IN RESOLVING REQUESTS FOR JUDICIAL CLEMENCY, CERTAIN GUIDELINES ARE

INDISPENSIBLE AND MUST BE COMPLIED WITH
RE: In the Matter of the Petition for Reinstatement of Rolando S. Torres

as a Member of the Philippine Bar
A.C. No. 5161; August 25, 2015
Per Curiam
FACTS:
This is a petition filed by respondent Rolando Torres, 68 years old, who seeks judicial
clemency in order to be reinstated in the Roll of Attorneys after he was disbarred more than 10
years ago.
Respondent was disbarred after the Supreme Court found him found him guilty of false
testimony and forgery in an administrative complaint filed by her sister in law. The court held
respondent guilty of gross misconduct and of violating the lawyer's oath, as well as Canons 1 and
10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. A criminal case for Estafa and for Falsification of
documents were consequently filed against respondent but was dismissed.
In this case, respondent has presented a Certification from his church pastor evidencing
that he had been helping indigent persons before and after his disbarment and that he has been
active in spreading the words of God and testimonies of witnesses stating that the respondent is
humble, simple and respectful to fellow lawyers and that he used to give free legal advice to
indigent clients.
ISSUE:
Was the Certification from the respondent church’s pastor showing respondent’s character
and acts after his disbarment sufficient for him to be reinstated in the Roll of Attorneys?
RULING:
No. The evidence presented by the respondent were not sufficient for him to be reinstated
in the Roll of Attorneys.
In order to resolve requests for judicial clemency, the following guidelines must be satisfied,
1) there must be proof of remorse and reformation; (2) the age of the person asking for clemency
must show that he still has productive years ahead of him that can be put to good use by giving
him a chance to redeem himself (3) there must be a showing of promise, as well as potential for
public service; and (4) there must be other relevant factors and circumstances that may justify
clemency.
In this case, the first, third and fourth guidelines were not satisfied. The root cause of
respondent's disbarment was his fraudulent acts against his sister-in-law, the complainant herein.
However, no proof was presented to show that he had reconciled or even attempted to reconcile
with her so as to show remorse for his previous faults. To add, no other evidence was presented
in his Petition to demonstrate his potential for public service, or that he - now being 68 years of
age - still has productive years ahead of him that can be put to good use by giving him a chance
to redeem himself.
Therefore, the respondent should not be readmitted in the Bar.
68 |
MCLE COMPLIANCE MUST BE INDICATED IN PLEADINGS
Elibena A. Cabiles vs. Atty. Leandro S. Cedo

A.C. No. 10245; August 16, 2017
Del Castillo, J.
FACTS:
This is disbarment case filed before the IBP by petitioner, Elibena Cabiles against
respondent Atty. Leandro Cedo for neglect in the two cases she referred to him to handle.
According to petitioner, she engaged the services of respondent in an illegal dismissal case
and unjust vexation case, and paid for appearance fees for both. Regarding the illegal dismissal
case, respondent failed to file a Reply for his clients and failed to post the required case or surety
bond in the appeal. He also delivered the memorandum to his clients at the last day of the period
for appeal. On the unjust vexation case, he failed to file the complaint which led to its dismissal
due to prescription. He also did not include his MCLE compliance in the pleadings.
The IBP found respondent to have violated Canons, 5, 17, and 18 of the CPR and
recommended the suspension from the practice of law for two years.
ISSUE:
Is the non-inclusion of the MCLE compliance in the pleadings improper?
RULING:
Yes. The non-inclusion of the MCLE compliance in the pleadings is improper. Under Canon
5 of the CPR supplemented by Bar Matter 850, lawyers are required to have continuing legal
education to keep them abreast with the new law and jurisprudence.
In this case, it is proven that respondent failed to comply with the MCLE for three periods.
Therefore, respondent violated the CPR with regard to his handling of the pleadings and
hearing. Also, the non-inclusion of the MCLE compliance in the pleadings is improper.
| 69
REQUISITES FOR CLERK OF COURTS TO NOTARIZE DOCUMENTS
Office of the Court Administrator vs. Paulino I. Saguyod

A.M. No. P-17-3705; February 6, 2018
Perlas-Bernabe, J.
FACTS:
This is an administrative case filed by the complainant Office of the Court Administrator
(OCA), which adopted the Audit Team's Report recommending, inter alia, that respondent Branch
Clerk of Court Paulino I. Saguyod for notarizing several documents submitted to the court without
observing the provisions of the Rules of Notarial Practice.
The Audit Team examined 1,194 cases decided by former Judge Liberty O. Castañeda of
the RTC where BCC Saguyod was also stationed. After the investigation, they discovered that
BCC Saguyod had been notarizing a multitude of documents filed before the RTC in connection
with the various cases before it without properly observing the Court's appropriate guidelines. The
Audit Team observed that BCC Saguyod violated Section (f) of the Resolution dated August 15,
2006 in A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC as he notarized said documents without any certification that there
are no available notaries public within the Municipality of Paniqui, Tarlac.
BCC Saguyod claimed that he only did so because: (a) there are no notaries public
available within the Municipality of Paniqui, Tarlac; and (b) he believed in good faith that he was
authorized to do so.
ISSUE:
Should BCC Saguyod’s defense be upheld in this case?
RULING:
No. BCC Saguyod’s defense should not be upheld in this case.
Under Section (f) of the Resolution dated August 15, 2006 in A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC, Clerks
of Courts of various RTC are authorized to notarize not only documents relating to their official
functions, but also private documents; provided, that: (a) the notarial fees received in connection
thereto shall be for the account of the Judiciary; and (b) they certify in said documents that there
are no available notaries public within the territorial jurisdiction of the RTC where they are
stationed.
In this case, Saguyod’s claim is belied by the fact that there are other documents filed
before the RTC which are duly subscribed by notaries public based in the same municipality.
Furthermore, BCC Saguyod cannot feign good faith in performing the aforesaid acts of
notarization, as he repeatedly did so even on those documents which were not completely
accomplished by the concerned parties.
Hence, the Court held BCC Saguyod to be administratively liable for inefficiency and
incompetence in the performance of official duties.
70 |
UNDER THE 1917 REVISED ADMINISTRATIVE CODE, A NOTARY PUBLIC IS NOT

PROHIBITED FROM NOTARIZING A DOCUMENT EXECUTED BY HIS OR HER SPOUSE
Roberto P. Mabini vs. Atty. Vitto A. Kintanar

A.C. No. 9512; February 8, 2018
Del Castillo, J.
FACTS:
This is an administrative Complaint filed by Roberto P. Mabini against Atty. Vitto
A. Kintanar for misconduct on the sole ground that he notarized a document executed by his wife,
Evangeline C. Kintanar.
Complainant stated that he and his wife, Mercedes M. Mabini, bought a parcel of land from
Regina Alamares. Complainant alleged that they were informed by Regina that said title was lost
and that its duplicate certificate may be secured from the Register of Deeds. Later, complainant
filed for the issuance of second owner's duplicate copy which was subsequently granted.
Complainant further averred that Evangeline filed a complaint against him for reconveyance and
annulment of title. Attached to said complaint was an Affidavit of Lost Owner's Duplicate Copy of
Title executed by Evangeline and notarized by respondent on April 25, 2002, and registered in his
notarial book.
Respondent countered that the subject Affidavit purportedly executed by his wife appeared
to have been notarized on April 25, 2002; as such, it was governed by Revised Administrative
Code of 1917, which did not prohibit a Notary Public from notarizing a document executed by one's
spouse. He likewise stated that, granting for argument's sake that he indeed notarized said
Affidavit, he did not violate the law as the document involved was a mere affidavit, not a bilateral
document or contract.
ISSUE:
Did respondent lawyer commit misconduct by notarizing his wife’s affidavit of loss in 2002?
RULING:
No, Kintanar is not liable for a violation of his duties as Notary Public when the law in effect
at the time of his complained act does not provide any prohibition to the same.
At the time of such notarization, it was the 1917 Revised Administrative Code that covered
notarial practice. As elucidated in Alilano vs. Atty. Examen, during the effectivity of said Code, a
Notary Public was not disallowed from notarizing a document executed by a relative. Neither was
there a prohibition for a Notary Public to notarize a document executed by his or her spouse.
Considering the foregoing, there is indeed no basis to hold respondent liable for
misconduct for notarizing his wife's Affidavit in 2002.
| 71
A LAWYER CANNOT BE HELD LIABLE FOR VIOLATION OF THE 2004 RULES OF

PRACTICE FOR NOTARIZATIONS OF DEEDS PRIOR TO THE EFFECTIVITY OF SUCH
RULES
In Re: Diuyan
A.C. NO. 9676; April 2, 2018
Del Castillo, J.
FACTS:
This is an administrative complaint against Respondent Diuyan, who was a lawyer for the
Public Attorney’s Office until his retirement in 2008.
In July 2003, Diuyan notarized a Deed of Partition in his capacity as District Public Attorney
of the PAO. This prompted the Supreme Court to refer the case to the IBP for investigation.
Diuyan explained that there was no irregularity in his notarization of the Deed, having
personally seen the Community Tax Certificates of the affiants. The IBP, however, found him guilty
of violating the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, being grossly negligent in the performance of his
functions, and thus revoked Diuyan’s notarial commission for 2 years and suspended him from law
practice for 6 months.
ISSUE:
May a lawyer be held administratively liable for notarizing a Deed of Partition based on the
Community Tax Certificates of the affiants?
RULING:
No. A lawyer may not be held administratively liable for notarizing a Deed of Partition based
on the Community Tax Certificates of the affiants.
At the time of Diuyan’s notarizing, the effective law was the Revised Administrative Code
which merely required that documents acknowledged before a notary public shall certify that the
parties thereto have presented their proper residence certificates or are exempt from the residence
tax. It was incorrect for the IBP to have applied the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice in holding
respondent liable for notarizing the Deed of Partition. To reiterate, the Deed was notarized on July
23, 2003.
Thus, the Court dismissed the complaint against Diuyan, finding no violations of his duties
as Notary Public when he notarized the Deed of Partition on July 2003.
72 |
NOTARY PUBLIC IS PERSONALLY ACCOUNTABLE TO THE ENTRIES IN NOTARIAL

REGISTER
Spouses Andre and Maria Fatima Chambon vs. Atty. Christopher S. Ruiz
A.C. No. 11478; September 5, 2017
Tijam, J.
FACTS:
This is an administrative case filed by complainant Spouses Andre and Maria Fatima
Chambon for gross violation of the Rules on Notarial Practice against respondent Atty. Christopher
S. Ruiz before the IBP.
Spouses Chambon were parties to a real estate mortgage executed between them and
Suzette Remoreras. Spouses Chambon were creditors of Remoreras and to secure such
obligation, she executed a REM over a parcel of land with improvements. As Remoreras failed to
pay her loan obligation, Spouses Chambon instituted an extra-judicial foreclosure proceeding on
the property. The counsel of Spouses Chambon learned that the RTC of Mandaue issued an Order
directing the issuance of a new Owner’s Duplicate Copy grounded on an alleged Notice of
Loss/Affidavit of Loss of the subject title filed by Remoreras.
Before public auction, Remoreras filed a complaint to enjoin the holding of the same based
on an alleged execution and delivery of a Release of Mortgage document purportedly executed by
Spouses Chambon. The Spouses discovered that the Notice of Loss/Affidavit of Loss and the
Release of Mortgage were notarized by the respondent in Cebu City and that certain defects were
found in said notarized documents like the jurat which was incomplete in that the competent proof
of identity of the executor, Remoreras, was left in blank. Also, the reference to the Notarial Register
indicates that the entries pertaining to said Notice were also left in blank. The title/description of
instrument, name and addresses of parties, competent evidence of identity, date and time of
notarization, and type of notarial act were not filled up.
Atty. Ruiz denied the existence and notarization of the Release of Mortgage but admitted
the existence of the Notice of Loss/Affidavit of Loss its entry in the Notarial Register but imputed
negligence on the part of his secretary as regards certain lapses in his Notarial Register.
ISSUE:
May Atty. Ruiz avoid liability as regards the anomalies in his notarial register by imputing
the negligent act to his secretary?
RULING:
No. Atty. Ruiz cannot avoid liability.
A notary public is personally accountable for all entries in his notarial register. He cannot
relieve himself of this responsibility by passing the buck to his secretary.
In this case, the subject Notice of Loss/Affidavit of Loss was undisputedly notarized by
respondent and entered in his Notarial Register. However, careful examination of said Notice
reveals that the jurat was incomplete in that the competent proof of identity of the executor,
Remoreras, was left in blank. Also, the reference to the Notarial Register indicates that the entries
pertaining to said Notice were also left in blank. The title/description of instrument, name and
addresses of parties, competent evidence of identity, date and time of notarization, and type of
notarial act were not filled up. The act of recording such entries in the Notarial Register is part and
parcel of the duties of a notary public. Keeping in mind the nature of a notary public's responsibility,
the respondent should not have shifted such responsibility to his office secretary and allowed her
to make such pertinent entries.
Thus, Atty. Ruiz is still liable for the lapses in his notarial register.
| 73
PHYSICAL PRESENCE OF EXECUTING PARTIES IS REQUIRED BEFORE

NOTARIZATION OF DOCUMENT
Romeo A. Almario vs. Atty. Dominica Llera-Agno

A.C. No. 10689; January 8, 2018
Del Castillo, J.
FACTS:
This is an administrative complaint filed by Romeo A. Almario before the Commission on
Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) seeking to disbar Atty. Dominica L.
Agno.
Relative to a civil case for judicial partition filed by complainant Almario, Atty. Agno, as
counsel for therein defendants, notarized and acknowledged a SPA. Complainant contends that
the SPA was falsified because one of the affiants therein, Francisca Mallari, could not possibly
have executed the same because she was in Japan at the time the SPA was executed, as certified
to by the Bureau of Immigration, and that therefore Atty. Agno violated Canons 1 and 10 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility.
On the other hand, Atty. Agno contends that Mallari was able to acknowledge the SPA
before the Philippine consulate in Tokyo, Japan.
ISSUE:
Did Atty. Agno violate the Rules on Notarial Practice for notarizing the document despite
the absence of one of the affiants therein?
RULING:
Yes, Atty. Agno violated the Rules on Notarial Practice.
The importance of the affiant's personal appearance when a document is notarized is

underscored in Section 1, Rule II, and Section 2(b), Rule IV of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice.
These provisions mandate the notary public to require the physical or personal presence of the
person/s who executed a document, before notarizing the same.
In the present case, the SPA in question was notarized by respondent lawyer despite the
absence of Mallari, one of the affiants therein. Mallari could not have personally appeared before
respondent lawyer in Muntinlupa City, because Mallari was in Japan at that time, as certified to by
the Bureau of Immigration.
Thus, Atty. Agno violated the Rules on Notarial Practice warranting suspension as Notary
Public.
74 |
FAMILIARITY WITH THE SIGNATURE OF A PERSON DOES NOT DISPENSE WITH THE
REQUIREMENT OF PERSONAL APPEARANCE BEFORE A NOTARY PUBLIC CAN
NOTARIZE A DOCUMENT SIGNED BY SUCH PERSON
Tomas N. Orola vs. Atty. Archie S. Baribar

A.C. No. 6927; March 14, 2018
Peralta, J.
FACTS:
This is a complaint filed before the SC by complainants Tomas N. Orola and Phil. Nippon
AOI Industry, Inc. (Phil. Nippon) against respondent Atty. Archie S. Baribar, for violation of the
lawyer’s oath and Rule 138, Sec. 20 (c), (d) and (g) of the Rules of Court.
In their complaint, Orola and Phil. Nippon alleged that Baribar filed a baseless labor case
against them, on behalf of 24 clients who were employees of Phil. Nippon. In the appeal filed before
the NLRC, Baribar included individuals who were not original complainants. They further alleged
that Baribar notarized the Motion for Reconsideration without the personal appearance of
Docufredo Claveria who was overseas at the time.
Baribar denied all the allegations against him. He confirmed the identity of his clients but
was only able to notarize the document in 2005 because of the renovation of their law office. He
averred that he committed a mistake in striking through the names of individuals in the documents.
He also claimed that although he asked some of his clients to secure the signature of Claveria, he
notarized the verification for the Motion for Reconsideration because he personally knew Claveria
and was familiar with the latter’s signature.
The IBP Commissioner recommended that Baribar be reprimanded, and that his notarial
commission be revoked, and that he be prohibited from being commissioned as a notary public for
3 years. The IBP-BOG modified the recommendation to suspension from the practice of law for 1
year and disqualification from being commissioned as notary public for 2 years.
ISSUE:
Is Atty. Baribar administratively liable for notarizing the Motion for Reconsideration without
the presence of his client, despite being familiar with the latter’s signature?
RULING:
Yes. Atty. Baribar should be held administratively liable.
A notary public should not notarize a document unless the persons who signed the same
are the very same persons who executed and personally appeared before him to attest to the
contents and truth of what are stated therein. The purposes of the requirement of personal
appearance by the acknowledging party before the notary public is to enable the latter to verify the
genuineness of the signature of the former, and so that the notary public can ascertain that the
instrument is the free act or deed of the acknowledging party. Lawyers who are commissioned as
notary public have a solemn oath under the CPR to obey the laws and to do not falsehood or
consent to the doing of any.
In this case, Atty. Baribar asked two of his clients to acquire Claveria’s signature in the
Verification of the Motion for Reconsideration and subsequently notarized the pre-signed
document upon receiving it. He did not intend to require Claveria’s personal appearance before
him. He also relied on the assurance of his client’s leaders of the authenticity of the others’
signatures despite failing to present proof of identity.
Clearly, Atty. Baribar failed to exercise due diligence in upholding his duty as notary public
and is administratively liable.
| 75
NOTARY PUBLIC SHOULD NOT NOTARIZE DOCUMENT UNLESS SIGNATORY IS

PRESENT
Hernanie P. Dandoy vs. Atty. Roland G. Edayan

A.C. No. 12084; June 6, 2018
Perlas-Bernabe, J.
FACTS:
This is a case that stemmed from a verified complaint made by petitioner Dandoy against
Atty. Edayan seeking to hold Edayan administrative liable for improper performance of notarial
acts.
On October 17, 2006, Atty. Edayan notarized (1) a SPA executed by petitioner Dandoy’s
father, in favor of a certain Garzo granting the latter authority to offer as collateral two parcels of
land located in Siquijor and (2) a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Real Estate owned by
petitioner’s late grandmother. Dandoy alleged that his father could not have been present before
the respondent on October 17, 2006 because he passed away on July 13, 1999. He added that,
through the SPA and the Deed, Garzo was able to mortgage the parcels of land as security for a
P400,000 loan. The mortgage was then foreclosed to the great prejudice of Dandoy and his co-
heirs.
In his Sworn Statement, Atty. Edavan admitted having notarized the documents, but
claimed that he verified the identities of the signatories thereto through their resident certificates.
He submitted that while residence certificates are not mentioned in the list of competent evidence
of identity enumerated under Section 12, Rule II of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, these are
still necessary for the proper execution of the notarial act as it is still prescribed in Commonwealth
Act No. 465, the Notarial Law, and the Local Government Code.
ISSUE:
Does the acceptance of the resident certificates as competent evidence of identity by a
lawyer render him liable for violation of the 2004 Notarial Rules?
RULING:
Yes. Atty. Edavan should be held liable.
Under the 2004 Rules, a notary public should not notarize a document unless the signatory
to the document is personally in the notary's presence at the time of the notarization, and
personally known to the notary public or otherwise identified through competent evidence of
identity. It bears noting that a cedula is no longer a competent evidence of identity.
In this case, respondent, as duly found by the IBP, was remiss in the faithful observance
of his duties as a notary public when he failed to confirm the identity of the person claiming to be
petitioner’s father through competent evidence of identity required by the 2004 Notarial Rules.
Moreover, as a lawyer, respondent is expected at all times to uphold the integrity and dignity of the
legal profession and refrain from any act or omission which might erode the trust and confidence
reposed by the public in the integrity of the legal profession. By notarizing the documents, he
engaged in unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or deceitful conduct which makes him liable as well for
violation of the CPR.
76 |
NOTARY PUBLIC SHOULD NOT NOTARIZE AN INSTRUMENT OR DOCUMENT UNLESS

THE PERSONS WHO SIGNED THE SAME ARE THE VERY SAME PERSONS WHO
PERSONALLY APPEARED AND SWORE BEFORE HIM
Franco B. Gonzales vs. Atty. Danilo B. Bañares

A.C. No. 11396; June 20, 2018.
Peralta, J.
FACTS:
This is an administrative complaint which Franco B. Gonzales filed against Atty. Danilo B.
Bañares for allegedly notarizing a Deed of Absolute Sale in violation of the legal requirements for
notarization.
Gonzales contends that a Deed of Absolute Sale covering 3 parcels of land was executed
between his mother, as the seller, and Flordeliza Soriano, as the buyer. To his surprise, the name
and signature of his father were found in the document even though he was not present at the time
of the supposed signing of the document. Gonzales likewise found out that his own name and
signature appeared as witness in the document even if he was also not present during the time of
the signing. Gonzales maintains that Bañares knew of these facts and still proceeded with the
notarization of the document.
For his part, Bañares denied the accusations against him.
ISSUE:
Did Atty. Bañares commit a violation of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice when he
notarized the document despite the absence one of the signatories?
RULING:
Yes. Atty. Bañares violated Rule IV, Section 2(b) of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice.
Under the said Rules, a document should not be notarized unless the persons who are
executing it are the very same ones who are personally appearing before the notary public. The
affiants should be present to attest to the truth of the contents of the document and to enable the
notary to verify the genuineness of their signature.
In this case, it is interesting to note that Atty. Bañares himself declared that Rodolfo merely
"pre-signed" the document." Such admission is contrary to his certification in the Acknowledgment
of the Deed that Rodolfo Gonzales "personally appeared before him on September 23, 2010,
known to him and to him known to be the same individual who executed the instrument…”
Thus, Atty. Bañares should be held liable for the violation of the 2004 Rules on Notarial
Practice.
| 77
A NOTARY PUBLIC CANNOT NOTARIZE A DOCUMENT UNLESS THE PARTIES WHO

EXECUTED THE SAME PERSONALLY APPEAR BEFORE HIM
Nicanor D. Triol vs. Atty. Delfin R. Agcaoili Jr.,

A.C. No. 12011; June 26, 2018
Perlas-Bernabe, J.
FACTS:
This is an administrative complaint filed by complainant Nicanor D. Triol against
respondent Atty. Delfin R. Agcaoili, praying for the latter’s disbarment.
Triol and his sister Grace decided to sell a land they own, situated in Quezon City, to
Leonardo P. Caparas. They were unable to do so as Grace was residing in the US that time.
Subsequently, Triol discovered a Deed of Absolute Sale dated March 11, 2011 executed and
notarized by Agcaoili conveying the land to a certain Fajardo. Triol then filed a disbarment
complaint against Agcaoili.
Triol averred that the conveyance was without the consent and authority of the owners, as
they did not personally appear before the latter when the deed was notarized. He also alleged that
their community tax certificates stated in the deed were fake. Agcaoili denied knowledge of the
execution and notarization of the deed, and that his signature was forged. He also asserted that
he could not have notarized the deed as he was not a commissioned notary public in Quezon City
in 2011.
The IBP Investigating Commissioner recommended the dismissal of the complaint. The
IBP Board of Governors reversed this recommendation and imposed the penalty of suspension
from the practice of law as well as disqualification from being commissioned as notary public for 2
years. Agcaoili’s motion for reconsideration was denied.
ISSUE:
Does the notarization of a Deed of Absolute Sale without the presence of the parties who
executed the same, render the lawyer administratively liable?
RULING:
Yes, Agcaoili is administratively liable for the notarization of the deed.
Sec. 2(b), Rule IV of the 2004 Notarial Rules does not allow a notary public to notarize a
document unless the persons who signed the same are the very same persons who executed and
personally appeared before him to attest the contents and truth of what are stated therein. A breach
of the said provision would constitute a violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).
Canon 1, Rule 1.01 provides “A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.” Canon 10, Rule 10.01 states “A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the
doing of any in court…”
In this case, Agcaoili violated the 2004 Notarial Rules when he notarized the deed without
Triol and Grace personally appearing before him, much more because he was not commissioned
as notary public in 2011. In the same breadth, he violated the provisions of the CPR. By
misrepresenting himself as a commissioned notary public at the time of the alleged notarization,
he undermined the integrity of the office of a notary public and degraded the function of
notarization. In so doing, his conduct falls miserably short of the high standards of morality,
honesty, integrity and fair dealing required from lawyers, and it is proper that he be sanctioned.
Thus, Agcaoili is administratively liable and is suspended from the practice of law for 2
years, along with the revocation of his commission as a notary public.
78 |
A NOTARY PUBLIC SHOULD NOT NOTARIZE ANY DOCUMENT BEFORE HIM UNLESS
THE PARTIES ARE PRESENT
Jean Marie Boers vs. Atty. Romeo Calubaquib

A.C. No. 10562; August 1, 2017
Per Curiam
FACTS:
This is an administrative complaint against Atty. Calubaquib for violation of the Rules on
Notarial Practice.
Boers learned that a certain individual annotated an adverse claim on their land in
Tuguegarao City. The adverse claim was based on a Deed of Sale in which complainant’s
signature appears as one of the sellers. The Deed of Sale was notarized by respondent.
Boers claims that she could not have signed the Deed of Sale and appear before
respondent for the notarization because she was in Canada at the time. She also points to the
absence of any residence certificate number under her name and signature in the notarization of
the Deed of Sale. Neither was there any other competent form of identification stated in it. Lastly,
she also discovered the said Deed of Sale was not recorded in the notarial file of respondent.
Atty. Calubaquib insists that complainant indeed signed the Deed of Sale and the
acknowledgement. He came up with a theory that complainant may have viewed the adverse claim
as a hindrance to a planned sale of the land and thus filed a claim against him.
ISSUE:
Did the notarization of the Deed of Sale by Atty. Calubaquib without the presence of the
parties to the document violate the Rules on Notarial Practice?
RULING:
Yes. Atty. Calubaquib violated the Rules on Notarial Practice.
The Rules on Notarial Practice governs the various notarial acts that a duly commissioned
notary public is authorized to perform. This includes acknowledgement, affirmation and oath, and
jurat. It is a rule in Notarial Practice that persons who signed the document must appear before
the notary public to ensure that the signature appearing on the document is genuine and that the
document itself is not spurious.
Atty. Calubquib also violated the mandatory recording requirements under the Rules. A
notary public must record in the notarial register every notarial act at the time of notarization. It the
document or instrument does not appear in the notarial records and there is not copy of it therein,
doubt is engendered that the document or instrument was not really notarized.
In this case, the facts clearly showed that Atty. Calubquib failed to adhere in those rules.
Thus, due to respondent’s failure to adhere to the Rules on Notarial Practice, he should be
held administratively liable.
| 79
NOTARIZATION REQUIRES COMPETENT EVIDENCE OF IDENTITY OF THE PARTIES
Carmelo Iringan vs. Atty. Clayton B. Gumangan

A.C. No. 8574; August 16, 2017
FACTS:
This is a case filed before the OBC by Carmelo Iringan against Atty. Clayton Gumangan in
relation to a notarized contract of lease which became a subject of an illegal detainer case.
Iringan alleged that respondent notarized a fraudulent contract of lease as he never

executed such instrument. He never appeared before respondent for its due subscription under
oath, as evidenced by the lack of his and his brother’s community tax certificates to prove their
identities. Also, such contract was never filed in the respondent’s notarial report to the Clerk of
Court. On the other hand, respondent averred that Iringan personally executed the contract before
him and in the presence of two witnesses.
The OBC referred the matter to the IBP which recommended the dismissal of the
disbarment case. Instead, the IBP recommended the revocation of the commission as notary
public, noting the lapses that respondent committed as notary when he notarized an instrument
without definite evidence of identity of the parties, violating the notarial law.
ISSUE:
Is the respondent liable for notarizing contracts without proper evidence of the identities of
the parties?
RULING:
Yes. Respondent is liable for notarizing contracts without proper evidence of the identities
of parties.
Under the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, the notary public is required when notarizing,
to have a competent evidence of identity of the parties if they are not personally known to him.
Competent evidence of identity can be a current identification document issued by an official
agency. Also, the same rules prescribe that when notarizing a contract, a duplicate must be given
to the Clerk of Court.
In this case, Atty. Gumangan violated the Rules by notarizing a contract of lease without
competent evidence of the identity of the parties. Petitioner never submitted his community tax
certificate and Renato only submitted after the execution of the contract. Besides, the CTC no
longer qualifies as a competent evidence to the parties’ identity considering the ease in which it
could be obtained these days. In addition, respondent also failed to submit to the Clerk of Court
the duplicate of the contract in his notarial record.
Therefore, by virtue of such acts, the Court found respondent guilty of violating notarial law
and was revoked of his commission as notary.
80 |
PENALTY OF SUSPENSION IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY UPON RECEIPT OF THE

DECISION
Atty. Benigno T. Bartolome vs. Atty. Christopher A. Basilio

A.C. No. 10783; January 31, 2018
Perlas-Bernabe, J.
FACTS:
This administrative case arose from a report of the Office of the Bar Confidant with the
recommendation that Atty. Basilio be meted with additional penalty of fine for his failure to
immediately comply with the Court's order of suspension from the practice of law.
The Supreme Court had previously suspended respondent from the practice of law for one
(1) years and revoked his incumbent commission as a notary public after finding him guilty of
violating the 2004 Rules of Notarial Practice and Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. It was indicated in the decision that the same is effective immediately. Respondent,
through his counsel, claimed to have received a copy of the Decision on December 2, 2015.
Respondent then filed a motion for reconsideration which is still pending. Respondent still
appeared before the MTC of Paniqui, Tarlac on April 26, 2016.
Respondent explained that he did not immediately comply with the suspension order
because he believed that his suspension was held in abeyance pending resolution of his motion
for reconsideration of the Decision.
ISSUE:
Is the suspension order against respondent held in abeyance pending resolution of his
motion for reconsideration?
RULING:
No, the suspension order is not held in abeyance pending the resolution of his motion for
reconsideration.
The clause "effective immediately" was placed at the end of the enumerated series of
penalties to indicate that the same pertained to and therefore, qualified all three (3) penalties,
which clearly include his suspension from the practice of law. The immediate effectivity of the order
of suspension — not just of the revocation and prohibition against his notarial practice — logically
proceeds from the fact that all three (3) penalties were imposed on respondent as a result of the
Court's finding that he failed to comply with his duties as a notary public and his sworn duties as a
lawyer.
Thus, with the Decision's explicit wording that the same was "effective immediately," it is
safe to conclude that respondent's compliance with the order should have commenced
immediately from his receipt of the Decision on December 2, 2015.
Hence, respondent Atty. Christopher A. Basilio shall be meted with additional penalty of
fine and shall be held liable for indirect contempt.
| 81
NOTARIZATION IS IMBUED WITH PUBLIC INTEREST THUS A NOTARY PUBLIC MUST

OBSERVE UTMOST CARE AND DILIGENCE IN PERFORMING HIS DUTIES
Spouses Felix and Fe Navarro vs. Atty. Margarito G. Ygoña

A.C. No. 8450; July 26, 2017
Caguioa, J.
FACTS:
IBP-CBD’s report and recommendation finding herein respondent Atty. Margarito administratively
liable for violating the Notarial Act. The case stemmed from the complaint filed by Spouses Felix
and Fe Navarro.
The complainants Spouses Navarro obtained a loan from one Mercy Grauel. As collateral,
Spouses Navarro executed and signed a Promissory Note and a Real Estate Mortgage over a
certain parcel of land. In a bid to further secure her position, Grauel proposed to the complainants
that they execute a Deed of Absolute Sale conveying the same property to her in the event that
they would default on their obligation. Thereafter, Atty. Ygoña notarized the Deed of Absolute Sale
which Grauel used to cause the transfer of the tax declaration over the subject property to her
name.
In their complaint, the Spouses Navarro alleged that the Deed of Absolute Sale was
fictitious as evidenced by the several irregularities attending it. For his part, Atty. Ygoña averred
that at the time the Deed of Absolute Sale was presented to him for notarization, it was complete
in all material particulars, and that the Spouses Navarro freely and voluntary executed and signed
the same. Atty. Ygoña also emphasized that the Spouses Navarro did not deny the genuineness
of their signatures in the Deed of Absolute Sale.
ISSUE:
Is the notarization of the Deed of Absolute Sale, which contains discrepancies in the CTCs,
valid?
RULING:
No. The Deed of Absolute Sale was invalidly notarized.
Notarization is not merely an empty or meaningless exercise. It is imbued with public

interest, such that only those who are qualified and authorized may serve as a notary public.
Notarization converts a private document into a public one, making it admissible in evidence
without the necessity to further prove its authenticity. A notarized document, therefore, is entitled
to full faith and credit upon its face, and the courts must be able to rely upon the acknowledgement
executed by a notary public. In view of this, a notary public must then observe utmost care and
diligence in the performance of their duties and functions.
In the present case, the Court averred that Atty. Ygona should have been more
circumspect in notarizing the subject Deed of Absolute Sale. Assuming that, indeed, Spouses
Navarro freely and voluntary signed and executed such instrument, the discrepancies in the CTCs
used in the said deed are too glaring to have escaped his scrutiny. Thus, serious doubt exists as
to whether the spouses did indeed appear before him to have the deed notarized.
In light of the foregoing, the Court therefore held that the Deed of Absolute Sale was
invalidly notarized and affirmed the IBP.
82 |
A JUDGE SHOULD EXERCISE JUDICIAL TEMPERAMENT IN ALL HIS DEALINGS AND

MUST MAINTAIN COMPOSURE AND EQUANIMITY AT ALL TIMES
Office of the Court Administrator vs. Presiding Judge Bill Buyucan

A.M. No. MTJ-15-1854; July 11, 2017
Per Curiam
FACTS:
This is an administrative case that stemmed from the financial audit conducted by the
Financial Monitoring Division of the OCA, which was prompted by an anonymous Letter-Complaint
from the auditors, who audited Clerk of Court Lindawan.
The audit team informed Lindawan and Judge Buyucan of the shortages incurred in the
Fiduciary Fund. Before leaving, Judge Buyucan confronted the team in an angry manner, and
asked what will happen to Mr. Lindawan in case he was not able to restitute the shortages. He also
kept on saying offensive words, while banging the table.
The team recommended that Judge Buyucan explain why he should not be administratively
dealt with for showing unbecoming conduct. For his part, Judge Buyucan offered his apologies to
the audit team. He explained that was merely taken aback by the results of the audit, and felt
betrayed by Lindawan.
ISSUE:
Did Judge Buyucan’s inappropriate actions and use of intemperate language make him
liable for conduct unbecoming of a judge?
RULING:
Yes, Judge Buyucan’s inappropriate actions and use of intemperate language make him
liable for conduct unbecoming of a judge.
The New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary requires judges to exemplify
propriety at all times in order to preserve public confidence in the judiciary. A judge must comport
himself irreproachably, not only while in the discharge of official duties but also in his personal
behavior every day. He should exercise judicial temperament in all his dealings and must maintain
composure and equanimity at all times.
In this case, the incident narrated by the audit team was never denied by Judge Buyucan
who offered his apologies to the audit team and begged for their understanding and forgiveness
for his outburst and rise in temper.
Hence, Judge Buyucan is liable for conduct unbecoming of a judge for his inappropriate
actions and for using intemperate language.
| 83
A JUDGE MUST BE FREE OF IMPROPRIETY NOT ONLY WITH HIS PERFORMANCE OF

HIS JUDICIAL DUTIES, BUT ALSO TO HIS BEHAVIOR AS A PRIVATE INDIVIDUAL
Anonymous Complaint vs. Presiding Judge Exequil Dagala

A.M. No. MTJ-16-1886; July 25, 2017
Per Curiam
FACTS:
This is an administrative case which arose from an anonymous letter-complaint filed
against Judge Exequil Dagala before the Office of the Ombudsman and indorsed to the OCA for
appropriate action.
It was reported in an anonymous letter-complaint that an altercation happened between

Judge Dagala and his neighbors. The complaint also recounted rumors of Judge Dagala’s
involvement in illicit activities, which among others includes having several mistresses.
The OCA requested the NBI to conduct an investigation, where it was found that Judge
Dagala had children with different women, which was admitted by respondent Judge. He even
admitted to the paternity of his son with B, who was born during the subsistence of his marriage
with A. The child’s certificate of live birth also listed him as the father, and bears his signature in
the affidavit of acknowledgment of paternity.
ISSUE:
Is Judge Dagala guilty of immorality for siring a child out of wedlock during the subsistence
of his marriage?
RULING:
Yes, Judge Dagala is guilty of immorality for siring a child out of wedlock during the
subsistence of his marriage.
The New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary requires judges to avoid
“impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all their activities”. Jurisprudence provides that
the doctrine of no dichotomy morality was laid down. It explained that the conduct of a judge must
be free of a whiff of impropriety not only with respect to his performance of his judicial duties, but
also to his behavior outside his sala and as a private individual. A judge's official life cannot simply
be detached or separated from his personal existence. In one case, the Court dismissed a judge
from service for siring a child outside of wedlock and for engaging in an extramarital affair.
In the present case, it is clear that the certificate of live birth of “B’s” male child indicates
that Judge Dagala is the father as shown by his signature in the affidavit of acknowledgment of
paternity. The date of birth is during the subsistence of Judge Dagala’s marriage to “A”. Judge
Dadala in fact admitted the truthfulness of the change in his comment.
Hence, Judge Dagala is guilty of immorality for having a child out of wedlock during the
subsistence of his marriage to “A”.
84 |
IGNORANCE OF THE EVIDENCE AND FAILURE TO HEAR THE CASE CONSTITUTES

IMPARTIALITY, IN VIOLATION OF THE NEW CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT
Office of the Court Administrator vs. Judge Winlove M. Dumayas

A.M. No. RTJ-15-2435 (Formerly A.M. No. 15-08-246-RTC); March 6, 2018
Per Curiam
FACTS:
In the July 7, 2015 issue of the Philippine Daily Inquirer, Ramon Tulfo wrote an article
wherein he raised certain issues involving Judge Dumayas for supposedly imposing a light
sentence against the accused in one criminal case, when he should have found them guilty of
committing murder instead. The Office of the Court Administrator found in their investigation that
Judge Dumayas ignored the positive testimony of the witness and the evidence consisting of
closed-circuit television (CCTV) video footages of the incident; also, he appreciated in favor of the
accused the ordinary mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender without any factual or legal
basis.
He explained in his comment that his ruling was based on the fact that the mortal wound
on victim's neck was inflicted when there was still unlawful aggression on his part against the
accused, which placed the latter in legitimate self-defense. Furthermore, he stressed that the
accused surrendered to the security guards who stopped them.
ISSUE:
Did the judge fail to hear and decide the case with impartiality through his act of ignoring
existing jurisprudence and in inappropriately appreciating the mitigating circumstances in favor of
the accused?
RULING:
Yes. Judge Dumayas failed to hear and decide the subject case with the cold neutrality of
an impartial judge.
Jurisprudence provides that the judge must not only be impartial but must also appear to
be impartial as an added assurance to the parties that his decision will be just. The litigants are
entitled to no less than that. They should be sure that when their rights are violated, they can go
to a judge who shall give them justice. They must trust the judge, otherwise they will not go to him
at all. They must believe in his sense of fairness, otherwise they will not seek his judgment. Without
such confidence, there would be no point in invoking his action for the justice they expect.
Under Canon 3 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct, impartiality applies not only to the
decision itself, but also to the process by which the decision is made. In this case, Judge Dumayas
chose to simply ignore all the evidence showing that the accused still pursued the victim, after the
latter had already run away, not even bothering to explain the irrelevance or lack of weight of the
same, such act necessarily put the integrity of his entire decision in question. Therefore, Judge
Dumayas failed to hear and decide the case with impartiality when he ignored all the evidence
pointing that the accused is guilty of committing the offense against the victim.
| 85
DELAY IN THE DISPOSITION OF CASES IS TANTAMOUNT TO GROSS INEFFICIENCY

ON THE PART OF A JUDGE
Office of the Court Administrator vs. Walter Inocencio V. Arreza

A.M. No. MTJ-18-1911; April 16, 2018
Del Castillo, J.
FACTS:
A judicial audit was conducted in Branches 61 and 62, of the RTC of Gumaca, Quezon,
and all the MTCs under its jurisdiction. It showed, that out of the 35 pending cases, there were
numerous undecided cases which had been overdue for several yearsAfter a judicial audit was
conducted in the branch presided by Judge Walter Inocencio V. Arreza (Judge Arreza), results
thereof showed, that out of the 35 pending cases in his sala, there were numerous undecided
cases which had been overdue for several years. In fact, the oldest case has been pending trial
for almost 9 years. In view of these, Judge Arrreza was made to immediately decide the pending
cases. He strictly complied and disposed of the cases within 3 months. Thereafter, Judge Arreza
admitted and explained his failure to decide cases. According to him, he and his wife were having
marital problems which led to his wife leaving him and their children; and that in 2012, he suffered
a stroke, was hospitalized for two weeks, and almost became paralyzed. All these, according to
Judge Arreza, took a toll in his performance as a judge.
The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) rejected Judge’s Arreza’s explanation. It. As
delay in the disposition of cases is tantamount to gross inefficiency on the part of a judge, he was
found guilty of gross inefficiency for his undue delay in rendering decisions and failure to act on
cases with dispatch.
ISSUE:
Is Judge Arreza guilty of gross inefficiency for his undue delay in rendering decisions and
failure to act on cases with dispatch?
RULING:
Yes. Judges must decide cases promptly and expeditiously under the time-honored
precept that justice delayed is justice denied. It is embodied in Rule 3.05, Canon 3 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct. No less that the Constitution requires that cases at the trial court level be resolved
within three (3) months from the date they are submitted for decision, that is, upon the filing of the
last pleading, brief, or memorandum required by the Rules of Court or by the court
itself. Furthermore, in cases of poor health, Judges need only to ask the SC for an extension of
time to decide cases, as soon as it becomes clear to him that there would be delay in the disposition
of his cases.
In this case, Judge Arreza never bothered to ask the SC for an extension after he suffered
a stroke. Given the foregoing, it is not difficult to see that the delay in Judge Arreza's disposition of
cases was the product of his apathy. This becomes even more apparent in light of the fact that
Judge Arreza was able to dispose of all the 23 cases overdue for decision within three (3) months
and act on the other cases after his attention was called by the OCA. As delay in the disposition of
cases is tantamount to gross inefficiency on the part of a judge, the OCA correctly found Judge
Arreza guilty of gross inefficiency for his undue delay in rendering decisions and failure to act on
cases with dispatch.
86 |
A JUDGE MUST NOT PARTICIPATE IN ANY SALE OR OTHER BUSINESS DEALINGS

CONSTITUTIVE OF CONDUCT UNBECOMING OF HIS OFFICE
Arnel Mendoza vs. Hon. Marcos C. Diasen, Jr.

A.M. No. MTJ-17-1900; August 09, 2017
Leonen, J.
FACTS:
This is an administrative case charging respondent Acting Presiding Judge Marcos Diasen,
Jr., with violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct.
Petitioner alleged that respondent engaged his services as a driver to look for a retailer
where he could purchase sacks of rice. Respondent paid using a post-dated check which was
dishonored for insufficiency of funds. On the other hand, respondent denied meeting petitioner and
argued that he loaned the money for the retail of the sacks of rice to the employees of the Makati
City Hall. However, in an investigation of the OCA, respondent admitted that he would have profited
if the sacks of rice were delivered since he actively participated in the sale.
ISSUE:
Does the participation in the sale by the respondent Judge constitute conduct unbecoming
of his office?
RULING:
Yes. The participation in the sale by the respondent constitutes conduct unbecoming of his
office.
Under Canon 5, Rule 5.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, a judge should refrain from
financial and business dealings that tend to adversely affect the court’s impartiality and interfere
with the proper performance of judicial activities or increase involvement with lawyers or persons
likely to come before the court. Judges must not be distracted from the performance of their judicial
duties by other lawful enterprises.
In this case, respondent’s act of attempting to sell rice to his employees and to those of
other branches was highly improper. He exercised moral ascendancy and supervision over the
employees. If the sale proceeded, he would have profited from the position.
Therefore, the participation in the sale by the respondent constitutes conduct unbecoming
of his office.
| 87
JUDGES HAVING AUTHORITY TO SOLEMNIZE MARRIAGE MUST NOT TRIFLE WITH

SUCH AUTHORITY
Florita Palma and Filipina Mercado vs. Judge George E. Omelio, et. al.
A.M. No. RTJ-10-2223; August 30, 2017
Del Castillo, J.
FACTS:
This is an administrative case which originated from an e-mail to the official e-mail address
of the Public Information Office of the Supreme Court, which alleged a “marriage scam” perpetrated
by MTCC Judges.
After an investigation conducted by the OCA, it was found that Judge George Omelio and
his wife, Clerk of Court Ma. Florida Omelio, and Judge Virgilio Murcia were all guilty of violating
A.O. 125-2007, which provided for the Guidelines on the Solemnization of Marriage by the
Members of the Judiciary.
Specifically, it was alleged that Judge Omelio solemnized the marriage of Julius Echevarria
and Khristine Duo without signing the Marriage Certificate; Judge Murcia affixed his signature in
the Marriage Certificate without actually performing the marriage; and COC Omelio failed to collect
the solemnization fee.
In his comment, Judge Omelio contended that the allegations were unfounded and meant
only to harass. While, COC Omelio countered that her only participation was to accompany her
husband to the dinner party, where the alleged marriage happened. On the other hand, Judge
Murcia insisted that his name was never mentioned in the complaint, and that he was impleaded
only because his signature appeared in the subject marriage contract.
ISSUE:
Did the acts of the judges in solemnizing marriage without signing the Marriage Certificate;
and signing the Marriage Certificate without actually performing the marriage amount to gross
misconduct constituting violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct?
RULING:
Yes. Both judges are guilty of gross misconduct for solemnizing such marriage.
As duly authorized solemnizing officers, they are expected to know that marriage should
not be trifled with, and its sanctity and inviolability should never be undermined. Marriage should
not be trivialized, especially by the solemnizing officers themselves since marriage is recognized
under the law as an inviolable social institution, which is the foundation of the family.
In this case, Judge Murcia affixed his signature in the Marriage Contract of Julius and
Khristine without actually solemnizing their marriage. Judge Murcia's claim that the contracting
parties personally appeared before him was belied by the groom himself, Julius, when he narrated
that it was in fact Judge Omelio, and not Judge Murcia, who acted as the solemnizing officer.
Although Judge Omelio acknowledged said "marriage" as a sham for being merely a re-enactment,
he insisted that it was not contrary to law as the same was conducted only for picture-taking
purposes because they were not able to do so in the sala of Judge Murcia.
Therefore, the following acts of the complained Judges constitute to gross misconduct,
amounting to violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct.
88 |
A JUDGE MUST CAREFULLY CHOOSE HIS WORDS, WRITTEN OR SPOKEN, WITH

UTMOST CARE AND SUFFICIENT CONTROL
Atty. Pablo B. Magno vs. Judge Jorge Emmanuel M. Lorredo

A.M. No. MTJ-17-1905; August 30, 2017
Tijam, J.
FACTS:
In a verified complaint, Atty. Pablo Magno charged respondent Judge Jorge Emmanuel
Lorredo with bias and partiality, arrogance and oppression, and violation of the Rules of Court and
the Code of Judicial Conduct (CJC).
Atty. Magno claimed that during the preliminary conference, Judge Lorredo insinuated that
Atty. Magno was able to get a favorable decision from the RTC which reversed Judge Lorredo’s
decision by committing unethical practice. To which, Judge Lorredo contended that the questions
thrown against Atty. Magno during the preliminary conference were merely made out of curiosity
considering that Atty. Magno's representation before the RTC was allegedly based on a lie.
ISSUE:
Did Judge Lorredo’s insulting statements amounted to a conduct unbecoming of a judge?
RULING:
Yes. Lorredo should be more circumspect in his language in the discharge of his duties.
A member of the bench "is the visible representation of the law." Thus, the law frowns upon
even any manifestation of impropriety in a magistrate's activities. Canon 4 of CJC mandates all
members of the bench to be models of propriety at all times. Particularly, Sections 1 and 6 thereof
provides that judges shall always conduct themselves in such a manner as to preserve the dignity
of the judicial office and the impartiality and independence of the judiciary.
In the present case, Judge Lorredo's insulting statements during the preliminary
conference and in his pleadings before the Court are obviously offensive, distasteful, and
inexcusable. Certainly, while Judge Lorredo's concern on the misrepresentation committed by Atty.
Magno before the RTC is understandable, he should not have disregarded the rules on proper
decorum at the expense of the integrity of the court.
Therefore, Respondent Judge Lorredo should be more circumspect in his language in the
discharge of his duties.
| 89
A JUDGE SHOULD ADHERE TO THE RULES OF PROCEDURE IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN

EFFICIENCY IN THE ADJUDICATION OF CASES
OCA vs. Judge Hector Salise

A.M No. RTJ-18-2514; January 30, 2018
Per Curiam
FACTS:
This is an administrative case filed pursuant to a judicial audit conducted in the RTC courts
in the Province of Agusan del Sur where Judge Salise was presiding.
The judicial audit discovered the Judge did not follow the rules and procedures in the cases
he was handling. Some of the lapses were allowing a substituted service of summons when it is
prohibited on the Rules on Declaration of Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages, and allowing a petition for bail or the reduction of bail, despite absence of a preliminary
hearing to prove that the evidence of guilt against the accused was strong
Respondent Judge explained that his actions were all done in good faith. He likewise
claimed that the reported irregularities were mostly due to inadvertence, but he did them in good
faith and without malice.
ISSUE:
Were respondent judge’s procedural lapses in allowing a prohibited service of summon
and reduction of bail warrant administrative liability?
RULING:
Yes. The Respondent judge’s procedural lapses warrant administrative liability.
Respondent judge violated the Code of Judicial Conduct ordering judges to ensure that his
or her conduct, both in and out of the court, maintains and enhances the confidence of the public,
the legal profession and litigants in the impartiality of the judge and of the judiciary. He simply used
oversight, inadvertence and honest mistake as convenient excuses. He acted with conscious
indifference to the possible undesirable consequences to the parties involved. Thus, Respondent
judge is guilty of serious misconduct.
90 |
R.A. 9946 COVERS JUSTICES AND JUDGES WHO DIED PRIOR TO ITS EFFECTIVITY
Re: Requests for Survivorship Pension Benefits of Spouses of Justices and Judges who Died
Prior to the Effectivity of Republic Act No, 9946
A.M. No. 17-08-01-SC; September 19, 2017
Martires, J.
FACTS:
For resolution are the applications for survivorship benefits of spouses of justices and
judges who died prior to the effectivity of Republic Act No. 9946 (R.A. No. 9964), which introduced
substantial amendments to the benefits provided in R.A. No. 910.
In a Memorandum, the Special Committee on Retirement and Civil Service Benefits (SC-
RCSB) submitted for this Court's consideration the respective positions of the members of the
Committee on the matter regarding the survivorship pension benefits. The first position paper,
labeled as Memorandum A, recommends the approval of the applications; whereas, the second
position paper, labeled as Memorandum B, recommends their denial. Memorandum B adopted the
position and arguments of the SC-RCSB Technical Working Group (TWG) contained in the latter's
Memorandum.
ISSUE:
Are the spouses of justices and judges who died prior to the effectivity of R.A. No. 9946
entitled to the survivorship pension benefits and automatic pension adjustment under the said law?
RULING:
Yes, the surviving spouses of justices and judges who died prior to the effectivity of R.A.
No. 9946 are entitled to survivorship benefits.
Upon the effectivity of R.A. No. 9946, the benefits under R.A. No. 910 had been upgraded
while at the same time the age and length of service requirements were reduced. Likewise, a pro
rata monthly pension benefit was introduced for the first time in favor of justices or judges with less
than 15 years of government service who retire due to age or incapacity to discharge his or her
duties. More importantly, R.A. No. 9946 provided for survivorship benefits in favor of the surviving
spouses of justices and judges who were "retired" or eligible for optional retirement and died after
the effectivity of R.A. No. 9946.
By virtue of the retroactivity clause in Section 3-B, the "benefits" under R.A. No. 9946, the
same were made to apply to justices and judges who died prior to the effectivity of R.A. No. 9946.
This conforms with the doctrine that retirement laws should be liberally construed and administered
in favor of persons intended to be benefited.
Therefore, the benefits under R.A. No. 9946 extend to those who had died before
February 11, 2010.
| 91
A JUDGE HAS NO AUTHORITY TO IMPOSE FINES UNDER THE JUDICIAL AFFIDAVIT RULE
Melvin M. Miranda vs. Judge Wilfredo G. Oca

A.M. No. MTJ-17-1899; March 7, 2018
Caguioa, J.
FACTS:
This is a Complaint by Atty. Melvin M. Miranda against respondent Presiding Judge
Wilfredo G. Oca (Judge Oca), Municipal Trial Court of Real, Quezon, and former Acting Presiding
Judge, Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Branch 71, Pasig City.
Atty. Miranda alleges that as private prosecutor in a criminal case presided by Judge Oca,
then acting presiding judge of the MeTC, he presented private complainant with his Judicial
Affidavit, and began to state the purpose of the witness' testimony pursuant to Section 6 of the
Judicial Affidavit Rule (JAR). However, Judge Oca told Atty. Miranda that there was "no need for
that" and then directed the defense counsel, to proceed to cross-examination. Atty. Miranda asked
that he be allowed to state the purpose of his witness’ testimony. Judge Oca asked Atty. Miranda
if he included the offer or statement of the purpose of the witness' testimony in the Judicial Affidavit.
After Atty. Miranda replied in the negative, and hearing the defense counsel’s comment that
complainant violated the JAR, Judge Oca ordered the termination of the proceedings, and told
Atty. Miranda that he should have included the offer or statement of the purpose of the witness'
testimony in the Judicial Affidavit. Atty. Miranda was ordered to pay a fine, and the hearing was
set four months thereafter.
Atty. Miranda asserted that Judge Oca is grossly ignorant of the law since the JAR neither
requires the inclusion of the offer or statement of the purpose of the witness' testimony in the
judicial affidavit nor does it impose a fine on the party for failure to do the same.
ISSUE:
Does respondent Judge have authority to impose a fine in the present case?
RULING:
No, Judge Oca had no authority to impose a fine.
Basic is the rule that the imposition of a fine, being penal in nature, must strictly comply
with the rule or law, calling for its imposition. Clearly, respondent Judge had no authority to add to
the list provided in Section 3 of the Judicial Affidavit Rule. Neither did he have the authority to
impose a fine for failure of complainant Atty. Miranda to include the additional requirement he
unilaterally imposed. Even if we were to assume that respondent Judge reminded all lawyers to
include an additional requirement in their judicial affidavits submitted in court, he still had no
authority to impose the fine provided in the Rule for failure to comply with his own directive.
In addition, the main purpose of the subject Rule is "to reduce the time needed for
completing the testimonies of witnesses in cases under litigation." In arbitrarily prohibiting the
verbal manifestation of the purpose of the witness' testimony, the proceedings were delayed for
120 more days. Thus, this delay could have been averted by simply allowing complainant Atty.
Miranda to state the purpose of the testimony which would have taken just a few minutes at the
most.
92 |
VOLUNTARY INHIBITION IS A MATTER OF CONSCIENCE AND SOUND DISCRETION

ON THE PART OF THE JUDGE
Extra Excel International Philippines, Inc. vs. Hon. Afable E. Cajigal

A.M. No. RTJ-18-2523; June 6, 2018
Del Castillo, J.
FACTS
This is an administrative complaint filed by complainant Extra Excel International
Philippines, Inc. (Extra Excel) against respondent Judge Afable Cajigal (Judge Cajigal), relative to
a criminal case.
An Information for qualified theft was filed against Extra Excel’s former employee, which
case was raffled to Judge Cajigal.
Extra Excel accused Judge Cajigal, among others of evident partiality when he failed to
inhibit himself from further handling the case in view of his bias towards the accused. In his
comment, Judge Cajigal claimed that the allegations against him are unfounded, malicious, and
intended solely to harass and embarrass him.
ISSUE:
Did the Judge Cajigal’s act of failing to inhibit constitute evident partiality?
RULING:
No, the Judge Cajigal’s act of failing to inhibit did not constitute evident partiality.
Base on the provisions of Rule 137, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, judges have been
given the exclusive prerogative to recuse themselves from hearing cases for reasons other than
those pertaining to their pecuniary interest, relation, previous connection, or previous rulings or
decisions. The issue of voluntary inhibition in this instance becomes primarily a matter of
conscience and sound discretion on the part of the judge.
The charge of evident partiality when Judge Cajigal issued an order setting the case for
special sessions cannot stand in the absence of substantial evidence to support the same. In
administrative proceedings, the complainant has the burden of proving by substantial evidence the
allegations in his complaint. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the presumption that Judge
Cajigal has regularly performed his duties will prevail.
Therefore, he is not guilty of evident partiality.
| 93
ABSENCE OF PERSONAL INTEREST DOES NOT WARRANT A JUDGE’S INHIBITION IN A

CASE
Hon. Philip Aguinaldo vs. President Benigno Simeon Aquino III

G.R. No. 224302 (Resolution); August 8, 2017
FACTS:
This resolves the motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioners assailing the Resolution
dated February 21, 2017 (MR-Resolution) of the Court, which denied the petitioner’s earlier Motion
for Reconsideration (with Motion for the Inhibition of the Ponente) on December 27, 2016 and a
Motion for Reconsideration-in-Intervention (of the Decision dated 29 November 2016) on February
6, 2017.
In its Decision dated November 29, 2016, the Court En Banc dismissed the Petition for
Quo Warranto and Certiorari and Prohibition for lack of merit. The Court declared that the clustering
of nominees by the Judicial and Bar Council is unconstitutional, and the appointments of
respondents Associate Justices Michael Frederick L. Musngi and Geraldine Faith A. Econg,
together with the four other newly-appointed Associate Justices of the Sandiganbayan, is valid.
The Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) moved for the inhibition of the ponente of the assailed
Decision based on Canon 3, Section 5 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for Philippine Judiciary
alleging that the judge, as consultant of the JBC from 2014 to 2016, had personal knowledge of
the voting procedures and format of the short lists, which are the subject matters of this case. The
JBC then expresses its puzzlement over the ponente's participation in the present proceedings,
espousing a position contrary to that of the JBC.
ISSUE:
Should the Judge have inhibited herself based on her personal interest over the case?
RULING:
No, the judge validly took part in such a decision.
The judge has absolutely no personal interest in this case. She is not a counsel, partner,
or member of a law firm that is or was the counsel in the case; the judge or her spouse, parent, or
child has no pecuniary interest in the case; and she is not related to any of the parties in the case
within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to an attorney or any member of a law firm
who is counsel of record in the case within the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity.
While the judge indeed received monthly allowance from the JBC for the period she served
as consultant, her objectivity would have been more questionable and more of a ground for her
inhibition if she had received the allowance and decided the instant case in favor of the JBC.
This judge only had the opportunity to express her opinion on the issue of the clustering of
nominees for simultaneous and closely successive vacancies in collegiate courts in her ponencia
in the instant case.
94 |
AN ADMINISTRATIVE COMPLAINT IS NOT THE APPROPRIATE REMEDY FOR EVERY

ACT OF A JUDGE DEEMED IRREGULAR IF THERE ARE OTHER AVAILABLE
REMEDIES
Atty. Eddie U. Tamondong vs. Judge Emmanuel P. Pasal

A.M. No. RTJ-16-2467; October 18, 2017
FACTS:
Atty. Eddie U. Tamondong (Atty. Tamondong) file an administrative complaint for gross
ignorance of the law, gross incompetence, gross inefficiency and/or neglect of duty against RTC
Judge Emmanuel P. Pasal (Judge Pasal), relative to a Petition for Certiorari decided by the latter.
In the alleged case, the Heirs of Enrique Abada heirs filed a case for Annulment of
Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate with Sale, before the MTCC, against Atty. Tamondong's client,
Henmar Development Property Inc. (Henmar). Subsequently, Henmar, through Atty. Tamondong,
filed an Omnibus Motion which prayed for the dismissal of the complaint on grounds of lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter and over the person of Henmar, improper venue, and
prescription but was denied by the MTCC. Henmar filed a Petition for Certiorari before the RTC,
and was raffled to respondent Judge Pasal. However, Judge Pasal still dismissed the petition for
lack of merit for lack of showing that the court acted arbitrarily or despotically. Henmar filed a
Motion for Reconsideration. However, Judge Pasal denied the motion only after more six (6)
months. Hence, Atty. Tamondong initiated the instant administrative complaint for gross ignorance
of the law and/or gross incompetence, and gross inefficiency and/or gross neglect of duty for failure
to act on the Motion for Reconsideration for more than 6 months.
ISSUE:
Is the judge guilty of gross ignorance of law, incompetence, and neglect of duty for the
unreasonable delay in deciding the motion?
RULING:
Judge Pasal is not guilty of gross ignorance of law but liable for guilty for neglect of duty
for unreasonable delay in deciding the Motion. The Court declared that an administrative complaint
is not the appropriate remedy for every act of a judge deemed aberrant or irregular where a judicial
remedy exists and is available.
A judge cannot be civilly, criminally, or administratively liable for his official acts, no matter
how erroneous, provided he acts in good faith. It is only after the available judicial remedies have
been exhausted and the appellate tribunals have spoken with finality, that the door to an inquiry
into his criminal, civil, or administrative liability may be said to have opened, or closed. Moreover,
every judge should decide cases with dispatch and should be careful, punctual, and observant in
the performance of his functions for delay in the disposition of cases erodes the faith and
confidence of the people in the Judiciary, lowers its standards, and brings it into disrepute.
Absent any showing that Atty. Tamondong has exhausted all available judicial remedies
and proof that Judge Pasal acted with bad faith and bias, the Court cannot proceed to inquire on
the alleged action of the respondent Judge. However, Judge Pasal's failure to resolve the MFR
within the 30-day reglementary period is not excusable and warrants the imposition of
administrative sanctions upon him.
| 95
AN ADMINISTRATIVE CASE REMAINS JUSTICIABLE DESPITE A JUDGE’S DISMISSAL

FROM THE SERVICE
Philip See vs. Judge Rolando G. Mislang

A.M. No. RTJ-16-2454; June 6, 2018
Carpio, J.
FACTS:
This is an administrative complaint filed by complainant Philip See (See) against
respondent Judge Rolando Mislang (Judge Mislang) for dishonesty, gross misconduct, and gross
ignorance of the law.
The AFP awarded a medical procurement contract to One Top System Resources, a sole
proprietorship owned by Bautista. Bautista and See entered into a Deed of Assignment whereby
Bautista assigned to See the amount of P 2.6 Million from the proceeds of the letters of credit. In
turn, See would provide two units of portable X-ray machines. Despite delivery of the X-ray
machines, See was not able to collect from Bautista. See then filed with the RTC a complaint with
prayer for preliminary attachment. Judge Mislang denied the motion on the ground that the funds
ceased to form part of the general funds.
Bautista then filed a Motion to Quash. Despite notice, See failed to appear in the hearing.
During the hearing, See was directed to file his comment or opposition to the motion within five
days. Not having received any pleading from the See, Judge Mislang issued an Order granting the
Motion to Quash. However, during the pendency of the case, Judge Mislang was dismissed from
service.
ISSUE:
Did Judge Mislang’s dismissal render moot the administrative case against him?
RULING:
No, Judge Mislang’s dismissal did not render moot the administrative case against him.
Notwithstanding a judge’s dismissal from the service, the case remains justiciable because
other penalties, such as fine, may still be imposed if he is found guilty of an administrative offense.
Under Section 9(1), Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended, Judge Mislang’s undue
delay in rendering a decision is classified as a less serious offense. This offense has fine of more
than P10,000 but not exceeding P20,000. The intervening dismissal of Judge Mislang during the
pendency of this case cannot render the case moot because a fine can still be imposed on him if
found administratively liable.
Therefore, Judge Mislang’s dismissal does not render moot the administrative case against
him.
96 |
A JUSTICE IS COVERED BY THE TERM "GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL CONNECTED

DIRECTLY WITH THE OPERATION OF THE GOVERNMENT”
Re: Anonymous Letter-Complaint Against Associate Justice Normandie Pizarro

A.M. No. 17-11-06-CA; March 13, 2018.
Martires, J.
FACTS:
This administrative matter arose from an anonymous letter-complaint charging Assoc.
Justice Normandie Pizarro of the Court of Appeals (CA) of habitually gambling in casinos, "selling"
decisions, and immorally engaging in an illicit relationship.
It was alleged that Justice Pizarro is a gambling addict who would allegedly lose millions
of pesos in the casinos daily, and insinuated that Justice Pizarro resorted to "selling" his cases in
order to support his gambling addiction. It also accused him of having an illicit relationship, claiming
that Justice Pizarro bought his mistress a house and lot, a condominium unit, and brand-new
vehicles worth millions, as evidenced by photographs.
In his defense, Justice Pizarro explained that the photographs were taken when he was
accompanying a balikbayan friend; and that they only played a little in a parlor game fashion
without big stakes and without their identities introduced or made known. Justice Pizarro likewise
categorically denied having a mistress.
ISSUE:
Is the act of going to a casino violative of the duties of the Canons of Judicial Ethics?
RULING:
Yes, Justice Pizarro is guilty of the accusations against him.
The SC found respondent guilty of conduct unbecoming of a member of the judiciary for
gambling in casinos, and not for the other charges. In this case, the anonymous complaint accused
Justice Pizarro of selling favorable decisions, and habitually playing in casinos are acts constituting
immorality, and of unbecoming conduct.
Justice Pizarro is covered by the term "government official connected directly with the
operation of the government." Indeed, one of the functions of the government, through the
Judiciary, is the administration of justice within its territorial jurisdiction. Justice Pizarro, as a
magistrate of the CA, is clearly a government official directly involved in the administration of
justice. Thus, by gambling in a casino, Justice Pizarro violated the prohibition from gambling in
casinos of "government official connected directly with the operation of the government’ as
provided under Sec 14 (4) (a) of P.D. No. 1869. Such transgression also constitutes violations of
Pars. 3 and 22 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics, which respectively provide that “A judge's official
conduct should be free from the appearance of impropriety, and his personal behavior, not only
upon the bench and in the performance of judicial duties, but also in his everyday life, should be
beyond reproach.
Hence, Justice Pizarro was be held guilty of conduct unbecoming of a member of the
judiciary.
| 97
GROSS IGNORANCE OF THE LAW CANNOT BE EXCUSED BY A CLAIM OF GOOD

FAITH
Emma Alfelor vs. Hon. Augustus Diaz

A.M. No. MTJ-16-1883; July 11, 2017
Caguioa, J.
FACTS:
This is an administrative complaint filed with the OCA by Emma Alferor against Judge
Augustus Diaz, for gross ignorance of the law, incompetence and manifest bias and partiality in
connection with his decision in Alfelor’s criminal case.
In the subject criminal case, Judge Diaz convicted Alfelor of violation of BP Blg. 22 not only
for the subject check, but also for the nine checks which were the subjects of the BP Blg. 22 cases
raffled to MeTC 43, and where she was previously acquitted by Judge Sta. Cruz.
As Alfelor is astonished by the outcome of the subject criminal case, she filed the instant
complaint with the OCA. On the other hand, Judge Diaz acknowledged his grave error and
profusely apologized to Alfelor for his lapses. He attributed it to plain oversight on his part and
heavy caseload.
ISSUE:
Did Judge Diaz’s careless rendering of the questioned decision constitute gross ignorance
of the law?
RULING:
Yes, Judge Diaz’s careless rendering of the questioned decision constitutes gross
Jurisprudence provides that, there is gross ignorance of the law when an error committed
by the judge was "gross or patent, deliberate or malicious." It may also be committed when a judge
ignores, contradicts or fails to apply settled law and jurisprudence because of bad faith, fraud,
dishonesty or corruption. Gross ignorance of the law or incompetence cannot be excused by a
claim of good faith.
In the present case, it is obvious that the subject criminal case in Judge Diaz's sala
pertained to only one check, that is, the subject Land Bank Check. Had Judge Diaz been more
circumspect in reviewing the records of the case, he could have easily noticed that glaring fact, as
well as Judge Sta. Cruz's prior order acquitting Alfelor of the nine BP Blg. 22 cases raffled to MeTC
43, and promulgated a decision based only on that particular check.
98 |
CLAIMS OF ACTING IN GOOD FAITH AND BEING A VICTIM OF HIS STAFF’S

BETRAYAL DO NOT EXCUSE A JUDGE FROM LIABILITY
Office of the Court Administrator vs. Retired Judge Pablo R. Chavez

A.M. No. RTJ-10-2219 & 12-7-130-RTC; August 1, 2017.
Per Curiam
FACTS:
This involves a Motion for Reconsideration filed by Respondent Retired Judge Pablo
Chavez for being adjudged as guilty of gross neglect and undue delay in rendering decisions.
In his motion, Judge Chavez contends that his failure to meet the standards required of a
Presiding Judge betrays his good faith and was borne merely out of his misplaced trust on his
Clerk of Court and his other court staff.
ISSUE:
Is the claim of acting in good faith and being a victim of betrayal an excuse for a Judge’s
grossly negligent performance of his duties?
RULING:
No. The claim of acting in good faith and being a victim of betrayal does not excuse Judge
Chavez from lability.
The Court held that judges must not only be fully cognizant of the state of their dockets,
likewise, they must also keep a watchful eye on the level of performance and conduct of the court
personnel under their immediate supervision who are primarily employed to aid in the
administration of justice. The leniency of a judge in the administrative supervision of his employees
is an undesirable trait.
Here, Judge Chavez's failure to meet the exacting standards of his position, as evidenced
by the number and different irregularities discovered to have been occurring in his court, as well
as his failure to eliminate these irregularities, establishes that he was grossly negligent in the
performance of his duties. Thus, the Respondent Judge is liable for gross negligence, despite the
claim of good faith.
| 99
JUDGES SHOULD SIMPLY APPLY THE LAW WHEN IT IS SUFFICIENTLY BASIC
Samuel N. Rodriguez vs. Hon. Oscar P. Noel, Jr.

A.M. No. RTJ-18-2525; June 25, 2018
Perlas-Bernabe, J.
FACTS:
This is administrative complaint filed by complainant Samuel Rodriguez (Rodriguez)
against respondent Judge Oscar P. Noel, Jr. (Judge Noel) for gross ignorance of the law, grave
abuse of discretion, and bias and partiality.
Rodriguez alleged that he took over the operations of Golden Dragon International
Terminals, Inc. (GDITI) at Makar Wharf, General Santos City after the Writ of Preliminary
Mandatory Injunction was implemented. The previous management was supposed to cease from
handling the operations of GDITI. In 2015, Rodriguez went to the port to inspect the operations
and saw a truck reportedly owned by Basalo transporting solid wastes from the docking vessel.
While he was taking pictures of the truck, a vehicle driven by Basalo came from behind with intent
to sideswipe him. He initially dodged the vehicle but was nonetheless hit.
As a result of the incident, Rodriguez filed a complaint for Frustrated Murder against Basalo
and his companions. However, on June 28, 2015, a Sunday, Judge Noel issued a Temporary
Release Order in favor of Basalo and one of his companions. Furthermore, Rodriguez claimed that
in a civil case, Judge Noel issued, on July 10, 2015, a 72-hour temporary restraining order (TRO)
enjoining him from causing any act that might cause violence and to maintain the status quo in
GDITI. To his surprise, however, on July 14, 2015, the 72-hour TRO was extended for another
twenty (20) days, or way beyond the 72-hour period.
On the other hand, Judge Rodriguez claimed that he was also not furnished a copy of the
notice of hearing relative to the extension of the TRO.
ISSUE:
Is the Judge Noel guilty of gross ignorance of the law, grave abuse of discretion, and bias
and partiality for violating the 20-day limit of a TRO?
RULING:
Yes, Judge Noel is guilty of gross ignorance of the law, grave abuse of discretion, and bias
and partiality for violating the 20-day limit of a TRO.
As a matter of public policy, the acts of a judge in his official capacity are not subject to
disciplinary action, even though such acts are erroneous. It does not mean, however, that a judge,
given the leeway he is accorded in such cases, should not evince due care in the performance of
his adjudicatory prerogatives. The observance of the law, which respondent judge ought to know,
is required of every judge. When the law is sufficiently basic, a judge owes it to his office to simply
apply it. Failure to consider a basic and elementary rule, a law or principle in the discharge of his
duties, a judge is either too incompetent and undeserving of the position and the title he holds or
is too vicious that the oversight or omission was deliberately done in bad faith and in grave abuse
of judicial authority.
The 20-day limit for TRO under the Rules of Court provides that in no case shall the total
period of effectivity of the temporary restraining order exceed twenty (20) days, including the
original seventy-two hours. In this case, Judge Noel extended the TRO beyond the period allowed
considering that at the time he issued the order extending the TRO on July 14, 2015, the original
72-hour TRO issued on July 10, 2015 had already expired at 8:01 a.m. of July 13, 2015.
Hence, Judge Noel had been remiss in the issuance of the July 14, 2015 Order extending
the TRO and the scrupulous observance of the requisites therefor.
100 |
JUDGES MUST DECIDE CASES PROMPTLY AND EXPEDITIOUSLY
Atty. Jerome Norman L. Tacorda vs. Judge Perla V. Cabrera-Faller

A.M. No. RTJ-16-2460; June 27, 2018
Carpio, J.
FACTS:
This is an administrative complainant filed by complainant Atty. Jerome Norman Tacorda
(Atty. Tacorda) against respondent Judge Pearl Cabrera-Faller (Judge Cabrera-Faller) for gross
ignorance of the law, gross inefficiency, delay in the administration of justice.
This complaint stemmed from a civil case entitled Salvilla vs. Spouses Dumdum initially
pending before Judge Felicen. Judge Felicen issued an Order requiring the parties to submit their
respective pre-trial briefs and setting the pre-trial. However, Judge Felicen inhibited himself from
the case and the case was raffled to the sala of Judge Cabrera-Faller. As the last event in the court
of origin was for pre-trial, the case was set for pre-trial. However, it was found out that the case
had already been referred for mediation, prompting the trial court to suspend the proceedings.
Meanwhile, the plaintiffs in the civil case belatedly filed their Pre-Trial Brief, which prompted
Spouses Dumdum, through complainant, to file a Motion to Expunge the Pre-Trial Brief. Almost
two years after the Motion was filed, respondent denied the motion and set the case for pre-trial
conference.
The delay attendant in resolving the motion prompted Atty. Norman to file the present case
against Judge Cabrera-Faller. In her Comment, Judge Cabrera-Faller, argued that there was no
gross inefficiency since the resetting of the hearings was part of the continuing court events and
incidents.
ISSUE:
Is Judge Cabrera-Faller guilty of gross inefficiency and delay in the administration of justice
when there is undue delay in the disposition of the case?
RULING:
Yes, Judge Cabrera-Faller guilty of gross inefficiency and delay in the administration of
justice when there is undue delay in the disposition of the case.
Delay in the disposition of cases amounts to a denial of justice, which brings the court into
disrepute, and ultimately erodes public faith and confidence in the Judiciary. Judges are therefore
called upon to exercise the utmost diligence and dedication in the performance of their duties. More
particularly, trial judges are expected to act with dispatch and dispose of the court's business
promptly and to decide cases within the required periods. The Constitution clearly provides that all
lower courts should decide or resolve cases or matters within three months from the date of
submission.
In this case, Judge Cabrera-Faller failed to meet the expectation of promptness and
efficiency that is required of a trial court judge. She failed to act on the Motion to Expunged the
Pre-Trial Brief for almost two years, which is a clear delay in the administration of justice. Failure
to decide cases and other matters within the reglementary period constitutes gross inefficiency
which warrants the imposition of administrative sanctions. Judge Cabrera-Faller failed to offer any
satisfactory reason to explain the reason for this delay.
Hence, Judge Caberera-Faller is guilty of gross inefficiency and delay in the administration
of justice.
| 101
DIRECT BRIBERY IS A CRIME OF MORAL TURPITUDE AND GROUND FOR

DISBARMENT
Office of the Court Administrator vs. Judge Conrado O. Alinea

A.M. No. MTJ-05-1574; November 7, 2017
Per Curiam
FACTS:
This administrative matter filed by the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) regarding
an entrapment operation conducted by the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) against
Respondent Judge Conrado O. Alinea, Jr. (Judge Alinea) of MTC.
Judge Alinea allegedly demanded a sum of money from the plaintiffs Raul Neria and Cesar
Abadam in a land dispute case pending in the said MTC A writ was issued but was recalled upon
a motion to quash filed by defendants. Neria and Abadam asked Judge Alinea why he recalled the
Writ. However, Judge Alinea told them to give him ₱15,000.00 in exchange for a favorable
resolution. They filed with NBI a complaint for direct bribery against respondent Judge, and an
entrapment operation was arranged by which Judge received the money.
Judge Alinea denied having demanded any amount of money from Neria and having taken
the marked money, and even accused Neria of attempting to bribe him. He alleged that he refused
to accept the said envelope and simply left it at the table before walking away.
ISSUE:
Was Judge Alinea guilty of direct bribery when he demanded money from the plaintiffs in
a land dispute pending his employment??
RULING:
Yes. Judge Alinea was guilty and should be held administratively liable.
Direct bribery involves, among others, the act of a public officer in accepting an offer or
promise, or receiving a gift, by himself or another, with a view to perform a crime or an unjust act,
or commit an omission, which is connected to his official duties. It is a crime involving moral
turpitude, an act which is "done contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals," and
involves "an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a man owes his
fellowmen, or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty
between man and woman, or conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals," and
which renders any person convicted of the said offense unfit to continue discharging his duties as
a public official or a lawyer. It is also among the serious charges enumerated in Section 8, Rule
140 of the Rules of Court, which may be punished by, among others, dismissal from the service
and forfeiture of benefits. Moreover, it is a violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the CPR, and a ground
to disbar or suspend a lawyer as gross misconduct under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court.
The evidence had fully established Judge Alinea's criminal intent to extort money from
Neria and Abadam, from demanding ₱15,000 in exchange for a favorable decision, to actually
accepting the said amount when they met at Bon's Restaurant. Thus, Judge Alinea not only gravely
violated his duty to dispense justice solely in accordance with the merits of the case, but also put
the trust and confidence of the people in the judiciary and the rule of law into serious peril, hence
rendering him utterly unfit to continue dispensing his duties as a public official and a member of
the Bar.
Thus, he was found guilty of gross misconduct for direct bribery.
102 |
THE SOLE ACT OF RECEIVING MONEY FROM LITIGANTS, WHATEVER THE REASON
MAY BE, IS ANTITHESIS TO BEING A COURT EMPLOYEE
Hon. Dennis Patrick Z. Perez vs. Almira L. Roxas

A.M. No. P-16-3595; June 26, 2018
Per Curiam
FACTS:
This present case involves the Comment with Counter-Complaint of Judge Perez against
Roxas, Clerk III, for grave misconduct, dishonesty, and violation of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act.
The instant case stemmed from an administrative complaint for oppression and grave
abuse of authority where Roxas alleged that Judge Perez conspired with Atty. Diumano, then Clerk
of Court V, to cause her removal from office without due process of law. In a resolution, the Court
dismissed the said administrative complaint. The Comment on the above-mentioned administrative
complaint filed by Judge Perez is now the subject matter of the present administrative complaint.
In his Comment, Judge Perez asserted that Roxas admitted in her complaint that she has
been receiving money from bondsmen. In her Comment to the Counter-Complaint, Roxas insisted
that it has been a long practice already in their office to keep a common fund where one of the
sources of the said fund is the amount that bondsmen give as a token of gratitude for allowing
them to facilitate the posting of bail.
ISSUE:
Is the act of accepting money from bondsmen constitute gross misconduct?
RULING:
Yes, the act of receiving money from bondsmen is a violation of the Code of Conduct for
Court Personnel. The conduct and behavior of everyone connected with an office charged with the
dispensation of justice, from the presiding judge to the lowliest clerk, must always be beyond
reproach and must be circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility.
In the instant case, the fact that Roxas received money from bondsmen is beyond dispute
as she categorically admitted the same in her Complaint-Affidavit and Comment. The sole act of
receiving money from litigants, whatever the reason may be, is antithesis to being a court
employee. Roxas' act of collecting or receiving money, no matter how nominal the amount involved,
erodes the respect for law and the courts.
Hence, Roxas' condemnable act of receiving money from bondsmen was in relation to
actions or proceedings with the Judiciary and the performance of her official duties which, thus,
constitute grave misconduct.
| 103
LOSS OF THINGS IN CUSTODIA LEGIS RUINS THE CONFIDENCE LODGED BY THE

PARTIES TO A SUIT OF THE CITIZENRY IN OUR JUDICIAL PROCESS
Hon. Maria Cristina C. Botigan-Santos, Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court,
San Ildefonso, Bulacan vs. Leticia C. Gener, Clerk of Court of the Municipal Trial Court,
San Ildefonso, Bulacan
A.M. No. P-16-3521; September 4, 2017
Peralta, J.
FACTS:
Before this court is a Letter sent by Judge Botigan-Santos, Presiding Judge of the MTC
of San Ildefonso, Bulacan which reported a robbery incident that took place in her court.
At the time the robbery incident occurred, complainant was in an Immersion Program,
having been newly appointed as an MTC judge. Upon investigation, it appeared that apart from
the stolen monies of the court employees, the trial court also lost certain exhibits while in custodia
legis.
The police having failed to determine who the malefactor is, the court considered the instant matter
as a formal administrative complaint against respondent Clerk of Court herein.
In her Comment, respondent reasoned out that when she was promoted as Clerk of Court,
she was not formally apprised of the physical custody of the exhibits. She regularly conducts
inventory of the properties under her custody but due to lack of formal turn-over of the exhibits,
she was unaware that the missing exhibits were the subject of the terminated cases.
ISSUE:
Was the Clerk of Court guilty of neglect of duty when the abovementioned exhibits
were lost while in her custody?
RULING:
Yes. The image of the Judiciary is the shadow of its officers and employees. It must be
noted that those charged or connected with the task of dispensing justice carry a heavy burden of
responsibility. A simple misfeasance or nonfeasance may have disastrous repercussions on that
image. Thus, a simple act of neglect resulting to loss of funds, documents, properties or exhibits
in custodia legis ruins the confidence lodged by the parties to a suit or the citizenry in our judicial
process. Those responsible for such act or omission cannot escape the disciplinary power of this
Court. The clerk of court is the administrative officer of a court and has control and supervision
over all court records. The Rules of Court, specifically Section 7 of Rule 136 thereof, charges her
with the duty of faithfully keeping the records, papers, files and exhibits in cases pending before
her court.
In this case, respondent Judge’s duties include conducting periodic inventory of dockets,
records and exhibits, and ensuring that the said records and exhibits of each case are accounted
for. The fact that she was unaware that the firearms were exhibits of cases which has been
terminated for a very long time also reveals that she has been remiss in the performance of her
duties. Hence, with all these, it is apparent that respondent is indeed guilty of neglect of duty in her
responsibility as custodian of records/exhibits.
104 |
THE FAILURE OF AN EMPLOYEE TO REFLECT IN THE DTR CARD THE ACTUAL TIMES
OF ARRIVAL AND DEPARTURE CONSTITUTES DISHONESTY
Ma. Asuncion SJ. Samonte vs. Rey P. Roden

A.M. No. P-13-3170; September 18, 2017
Peralta, J.
FACTS:
An affidavit-complaint was filed by complainant Ma. Asuncion SJ. Samonte against Rey T.
Roden, both of whom are Legal Researchers of different branches of the same court, for
dishonesty.
Complainant Samonte reported an incident in which respondent Roden punched in two

different Daily Time Record (DTR) cards. When confronted, Samonte discovered that Roden
punched in another person’s DTR – that which belonged to Theresa T. Banaban, in violation of
Civil Service Rules and Regulations and OCA Cicular No. 7-2003. Roden told Samonte that
Banaban was already on her way to work. He even asked her not to inform Judge Fama since they
are colleagues anyway.
Respondent Roden explained that out of compassion, he punched in the DTR card of
Banaban after learning that the latter will be coming in late as she would still have to attend to her
sick daughter. He averred that he did the said act on his own volition. On her part, Banaban denied
that she either requested or instructed Roden to punch in her DTR and requested that the Court
spare her from any sanction as she never gave consent to such unauthorized punching-in of her
DTR card.
ISSUE:
Is respondent guilty of dishonesty for failure of an employee to reflect in the DTR the actual
times of arrival and departure?
RULING:
Yes, Roden is guilty of dishonesty.
OCA Circular No. 7-2003 provides that after the end of each month, every official and
employee of each court shall accomplish the Daily Time Record (Civil Service Form No. 48)/Bundy
Card, indicating therein truthfully and accurately the time of arrival in and departure from the office.
In the instant case, it is apparent that Roden miserably failed to live up to the standard set
forth for officials and employees of the judiciary. The failure of an employee to reflect in the DTR
card the actual times of arrival and departure not only reveals the employee’s lack of candor but it
also shows his/her disregard of office rules. Equally important is the fact that this Court has already
held that the punching in of one’s daily time record is a personal act of the holder. It cannot and
should not be delegated to anyone else.
Hence, Roden is guilty of dishonesty and is clearly in violation of OCA Circular No. 7-2003.
| 105
COURT EMPLOYEES WHEN RENDERING ASSISTANCE SHOULD SEE TO IT THAT IT

DOES NOT IN ANY WAY COMPROMISE PUBLIC TRUST IN THE JUSTICE SYSTEM
Maria Magdalena R. Joven, et. al. vs. Lourdes G. Caoili

A.M. No. P-17-3754; September 26, 2017
Per Curiam
FACTS:
The instant administrative complaint was recommended by the Investigating Judge after
finding that Lourdes Caoili guilty of violating A.M. No. 03-06-13-SC or the Code of Conduct for
Court Personnel. Specifically, Section 1, Canon I with respect to Fidelity of Duty, Section 2 (b),
Canon III regarding Conflict of Interest, and Section 5, Canon IV on Performance of Duties of the
said Code.
This arose from a complaint-affidavit filed by Maria Magdalena Joven, et al., charging
Caoili, a clerk of court, with impropriety, conduct unbecoming a court employee, and grave
misconduct.
Complainants allege that Caoili was giving improper services to aid Rillera, one of the
complainants, in her cases such as securing court documents, releasing a copy of an unsigned
court order, and procuring lawyers for the latter in exchange of monetary and other benefits such
as giving respondent's daughter employment as Rillera's private secretary.
ISSUE:
Was the Clerk of Court’s act of assisting Rillera in exchange of benefits to the former
amount to an administrative liability?
RULING:
Yes. Meeting with a party litigant, giving undue assistance thereto, and receiving
consideration therefor, are acts definitely constitutive of grave misconduct, impropriety, and
conduct unbecoming of a court employee.
Those who work in the judiciary must adhere to high ethical standards to preserve the
court's good name and standing. All court personnel should be reminded that they have no
business getting personally involved in matters directly emanating from court-proceedings, unless
expressly so provided by law. The reason is that the image of the courts of justice is reflected in
the conduct, official or otherwise, of even its minor employees.
In this case, it was established during the investigation that respondent, using her
employment in the Judiciary as stenographer, gave aid to Rillera with regard to her pending cases
by procuring lawyers for the latter, securing a TSN and a purported advanced copy of the court's
order on the case, and giving advice and updates to Rillera as regards the case. It was also
established that respondent was receiving monthly remuneration from the latter for such aid. Also,
because of such services, respondent's daughter was employed by Rillera as a private secretary,
which is another form of consideration and/or remuneration.
Therefore, the acts imputed of her are acts definitely constitutive of grave misconduct,
impropriety, and conduct unbecoming of a court employee.
106 |
ANY FORM OF SOLICITATIONS OR GIFTS TO COURT EMPLOYEES CONSTITUTES

MISCONDUCT
Prosecutor Filipina C. Cabauatan vs. Domingo B. Uvero

A.M. No. P-15-3329; November 6, 2017
Peralta, J.
FACTS:
Filipina Cabautan (Cabautan), Associate Provincial Prosecutor, filed a complaint against
Domingo Uvero (Uvero), Sheriff of RTC for grave misconduct due to the latter's inappropriate
conduct in connection with a criminal case before the MCTC.
Cabauatan averred that Uvero went to her office and tried to give her money amounting to
₱7,500 wrapped in a paper, purportedly coming from the private complainant Nancy Reynancia
(Reynancia) in the above-mentioned case. She claimed that she refused the "bribe" and told Uvero
that she neither accepted nor demand money from litigants, and that all cases under her care are
given due course without any money involved. Also, Cabauatan narrated that before the pre-trial
of the criminal case, Reynancia admitted to her that she obtained a loan for the purpose of giving
it to her as an assurance that her case will be handled well.
Uvero denied the allegations in the complaint for lack of basis and for being malicious. That
the handed to him money was suppposedly intended for Cabauatan's merienda which Reynancia
forgot to give. Uvero also opined that party-litigants' act of giving gifts as token of appreciation to
government lawyers is common knowledge and practice.
ISSUE:
Does the Sheriff’s act of handing over complainant’s money in connection with a criminal
case constitute misconduct?
RULING:
Yes, Uvero is guilty of misconduct, pursuant to Section 2, Canon I of the Code of Conduct
for Court Personnel.
The sole act of receiving money from litigants, whatever the reason may be, is antithesis
to being a court employee. Neither the fact that the money was given voluntarily nor good intention
to help party-litigants is a defense as they are self-serving, and will not absolve the misconduct
committed by court employees. There is no defense in receiving money from party-litigants. The
act itself is not only inappropriate but also constitutes grave misconduct.
Here, Uvero admitted that he went to Cabauatan's office to hand over Reynancia's money
wrapped in paper. While Uvero insists that the money was meant as "merienda", indeed,
₱7,500.00 is a considerable amount which cannot be just for "merienda". Thus, as Prosecutor
Cabauatan's impression, the more apparent purpose of the giving of the ₱7,500.00 is to influence
her to resolve Reynancia's case to the latter's favor. Even if it was not his intention, Uvero should
have exercised prudence and be more circumspect considering that he knew that Reynancia had
a pending case before the prosecutor's office.
Thus, Uvero is guilty of misconduct.
| 107
A COURT PERSONNEL’S FAILURE TO REMIT HIS COLLECTIONS CONSTITUTES

GRAVE MISCONDUCT AND DISHONESTY
The Office of the Court Administrator vs. Mr. Crispin C. Egipto

A.M. No. P-05-1938; November 7, 2017
Per Curiam
FACTS:
This administrative case stemmed from the Cash Examination Report (CER) submitted by
Marry Rose D. Eleno, State Auditor of COA, relative to the cash and accounts of respondent
Crispin C. Egipto, Jr. (Egipto), Clerk of Court of the MTCC. The Cash Examination Report disclosed
that there was a cash shortage, collections were not deposited intact daily, difference between
bank balance and the accountable officer’s statement, non-reconciliation of cashbook and
subsidiary ledger, and disbursement vouchers were not submitted.
Egipto admitted having incurred the shortages as reported by COA State Auditor Eleno,
but explained that he had not been able to remit his collections because of his financial difficulties
and personal problems caused by the murder of his son and the hospitalization of his daughter.
ISSUE:
Is the respondent's failure to remit his collections as clerk of court constitutive of neglect of
duty, dishonesty, and grave misconduct?
RULING:
Yes, he is liable for neglect of duty, dishonesty and grave misconduct. Clerks of court,
being the custodians of court funds and revenues, records, properties, and premises, are liable for
any loss, shortage, destruction or impairment of the funds or other assets entrusted to them. Their
personal accountability is always enforceable. Specifically, any shortages in the amounts remitted
and any delays incurred in the actual remittance of collections shall constitute gross neglect of duty
for which the clerks of court concerned shall be held administratively liable.
Egipto admitted his failure to remit his collections. Even if he did not categorically state
having misappropriated or converted the funds for his personal benefit, he was still worthy of stern
reprobation. Personal problems should never justify the incurring of shortages and the delay in
remitting cash collections for the Judiciary. In this case, Egipto's sin was aggravated by the fact
that this charge was not his first offense and that he had been previously reprimanded for his failure
to deposit prior fiduciary collections.
Thus, Egipto is administratively liable for grave misconduct and dishonesty.
108 |
FIGHTING AND SHOUTING BETWEEN COURT EMPLOYEES DURING OFFICE HOURS

IS A DISGRACEFUL BEHAVIOR CONSTITUTIVE OF MISCONDUCT
Ferdinand E. Tauro vs. Racquel O. Arce

A.M. No. P-17-3731; November 8, 2017
Caguioa, J.
FACTS:
For resolution is the Complaint Affidavit filed by complainant Ferdinand E. Tauro, Court
Interpreter of Regional Trial Court, Branch 122, Caloocan City, charging respondent Racquel O.
Arce, Clerk III of the same court, with serious misconduct.
The complainant was allegedly heckled by respondent who was looking for missing court
records which were supposedly under respondent's custody. He allegedly shouted at complainant
statements such as, "Ikaw ang kumuha, ikaw ang gumalaw ng mga records, sinungaling,
sinungaling ka! Dapat sa iyo mag-resign." Despite the intervention of other court personnel,
respondent allegedly continued to throw slanderous and threatening remarks against complainant.
When complainant denied the accusations, respondent became furious and, seemingly
determined to kill complainant, attacked him with a kitchen knife, which attack was fortunately
prevented by their fellow court employees.
Respondent, in her defense, said that complainant had the habit of taking case folders in
order to update the court calendar. The respondent asked the complainant about the missing
records, but the latter was evasive and kept deflecting every question respondent posed. Hence,
an argument ensued causing her to utter said statements out of anger. The respondent, however,
denied aiming the knife at complainant.
ISSUE:
Are the court employees guilty of misconduct for fighting during office hours?
RULING:
Yes, they court employees are guilty of misconduct. The image of a court of justice is
necessarily mirrored in the conduct, official or otherwise, of the men and women therein, from the
judge to the least and lowest of its personnel. Employees of the judiciary should be very
circumspect in the way they conduct themselves both inside and outside the office. Any scandalous
behavior or any act that may erode the people's esteem for the judiciary is unbecoming of an
employee. Professionalism, respect for the rights of others, good manners and right conduct are
expected of all judicial officers and employees. Any transgression or deviation from established
norm of conduct, work related or not, amounts to a misconduct.
Fighting between court employees during office hours is a disgraceful behavior reflecting
adversely on the good image of the judiciary. It displays a cavalier attitude towards the seriousness
and dignity with which court business should be treated. Shouting at one another in the workplace
and during office hours is arrant discourtesy and disrespect not only towards co-workers, but to
the court as well.
Hence, in this case, it is not only the respondent, but the complainant as well, that is guilty
of misconduct.
| 109
TO INSPIRE PUBLIC RESPECT FOR THE JUSTICE SYSTEM, COURT OFFICIALS AND
EMPLOYEES ARE AT ALL TIMES BEHOOVED TO STRICTLY OBSERVE OFFICIAL TIME.
In Re: Habitual Absenteeism of Rabindranath A. Tuzon

Per Curiam
FACTS:
In a Report dated October 16, 2014, submitted by the Office of the Court Administrator
(OCA), it was shown that Rabindranath A. Tuzon (Tuzon), a Legal Researcher in RTC Baler, had
incurred 32 days of unauthorized absences for the months of June to November 2013. Tuzon failed
to comply with the directive to file a comment. The Court issued a Resolution dropping Tuzon from
the rolls effective March 1, 2014, for incurring absence without an official leave, but was held to be
qualified to receive any benefit he may be entitled to without prejudice to the outcome of this
administrative case. The OCA recommended that the aforementioned report be re-docketed as a
regular administrative matter and that Tuzon be found guilty of habitual absenteeism.
ISSUE:
Is Tuzon guilty of habitual absenteeism when he incurred absences for the months of June
to November 2013?
RULING:
Yes, Tuzon is guilty of habitual absenteeism.
Officials and employees of the Judiciary must be role models in the faithful observance of
the constitutional canon that public office is a public trust. Inherent in this mandate is the
observance of prescribed office hours and the efficient use of every moment thereof for public
service, if only to recompense the Government, and ultimately, the people who shoulder the cost
of maintaining the Judiciary. Thus, to inspire public respect for the justice system, court officials
and employees are at all times behooved to strictly observe official time.
Since Tuzon was been absent for 4 days in June, 6 days in August, 10 days in September,
8 days in October, and 4 days in November 2013, there is no dispute that he had been habitually
absent.
Hence, the Court finds Tuzon guilty of habitual absenteeism.
110 |
A COURT EMPLOYEE MERELY PERFORMING A CIVIC DUTY IS NOT ENGAGED IN

OUTSIDE EMPLOYMENT OR ANY PRIVATE BUSINESS OR PROFESSION
Isagani R. Rubio vs. Igmedio J. Basada

O.C.A. IPI N. 15-4429-P; December 6, 2017
Caguioa, J.
FACTS:
Isagani R. Rubio brought an administrative case against Igmedio J. Basada, Legal
Researcher II, for violations of the Code of Conduct of Court Personnel, Republic Act Nos. 6173
and 3019, as well as regulations of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB).
Rubio accused Basada of misrepresenting himself as a law graduate and that Basada’s
duties as president of the Camella Springville City West Homeowners’ Association conflicts with
his functions as legal researcher. Rubio also accused Basada of violating the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act and HLURB rules and procedures when he solicited and accepted donations
from several individuals without properly informing the general membership of the homeowners’
association.
Basada denied misleading anyone about his academic background and asserted that he
performs his duties as a legal researcher during regular office hours. He also admitted that he
solicited and accepted donations from certain politicians as president of the homeowners’
association but denied receiving said donations in his personal capacity or as an employee of the
court.
ISSUE:
Is there a need for Basada, an employee of the court, to relinquish his post as president of
the homeowners’ association?
RULING:
No, Basada is not required to relinquish his post as president of the homeowners’
association.
Section 18, Rule XIII of the Revised Omnibus Rules on Appointments and Other Personnel
Actions also proscribes government officers or employees from engaging directly or indirectly in
any private business or profession, except where a written permission from the head of agency is
obtained, and the time devoted outside of office hours is fixed by the head of the agency so that
the efficiency of the officer or employee is not impaired and to avoid any conflict with official
functions.
In this case, respondent Basada is neither engaged in outside employment nor in any
private business or profession. He is merely exercising a civic duty as a member of the community.
His involvement in the homeowners' association should be commended rather than censured.
Accordingly, since Basada is merely performing a civic duty and is not actually engaged in outside
employment or any private business or profession, the requirement of obtaining authority from the
head of office to engage in outside employment obviously does not apply to him. Thus, there is no
need for Basada to relinquish his position as president the homeowner’s association.
| 111
DISSEMINATING CONTENTS OF A LETTER-COMPLAINT TO PERSONS NOT PRIVY TO

THE CASE CONSTITUTES IMPROPRIETY AND SUBJECTS THE IMAGE OF THE COURT
TO PUBLIC DISTRUST.
Atty. Ma. Jasmine P. Lood, et. al. vs. Ruel V. Delicana

A.M. No. P-18-3796; January 22, 2018
Tijam, J.
FACTS:
Ruel Delicana is the Legal Researcher of Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) – Branch
3 in General Santos City – South Cotabato. Delicana sent a letter to Judge Alejandro Ramon C.
Alano, Executive and Presiding Judge of the same MTCC, wherein he protested the designation
of Mary Jane Ganer-Corpuz, Sheriff III from the Office of the Clerk of Court, MTCC of General
Santos City, as Acting Clerk of Court of MTCC-Branch 3.
Delicana, then, disseminated copies of his letter-complaint, including the minutes of office
meetings, to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), numerous Judges of the MTCC, RTC,
and MCTC, IBP President, Mayor of General Santos City, and to the President and Vice President
of the Philippine Association of Court Employees (PACE).
Atty. Lood, Ganer-Corpuz and Sebial filed the instant administrative complaint and claimed
that the sending of the said confidential documents to hereinabove mentioned offices is libelous
and scandalous and deleterious. In his answer, Delicana countered that his act was not malicious
because only the cover letter of the complaint was attached in his letter, and there is no intention
on his part to defame, malign or destroy complainant’s reputation.
ISSUE:
Was Delicana’s act of disseminating the letter-complaint to persons not privy to the
complaint constitutes impropriety?
RULING:
Yes, Delicana’s act of disseminating the letter-complaint constitutes impropriety.
Jurisprudence has repeatedly stressed that the image of a court of justice is necessarily mirrored
in the conduct, official or otherwise, of the men and women therein, from the judges to the most
junior clerks. Thus, their conduct must be guided by strict propriety and decorum at all times in
order to merit and maintain the public's respect for and trust in the judiciary. Needless to say, all
court personnel must conduct themselves in a manner exemplifying integrity, honesty and
uprightness.
Here, in disseminating the letter, minutes of the meeting and administrative case of
complainants, Delicana contributed to the erosion of the public's confidence in the judiciary.
Indeed, the Court frowns upon any display of animosity by any court employee. Colleagues in the
judiciary, including those occupying the lowliest positions, are - entitled to basic courtesy and
respect. In indiscriminately providing a copy of the administrative case to those who are not even
privy to the case, even if it consists of the covering letter only of the complaint, it was enough to
inform whoever should read it that an administrative complaint has been filed against complainants
which would unnecessarily harm their reputation. Hence, Delicana’s act of disseminating the letter-
complaint to persons not privy to the case constitutes impropriety and subjected the image of the
court to public distrust.
112 |
FAILURE TO FOLLOW THE RULES OF COURT IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE

WRIT, AS WELL AS THE LEVY AND SALE OF THE PROPERTY IN EXECUTION
CONSTITUTES GROSS NEGLECT IN THE PERFORMANCE OF JUDICIAL DUTIES
Ma. Cecilia Fermina T. Roxas vs. Allen Fransisco S. Sicat

A.M. No. P-17-3639; January 23, 2018
Per Curiam
FACTS:
Ma. Cecilia Fermina T. Roxas, Manager and Corporate Secretary of ROTA Creditline
Finance Corporation (ROTA), filed a complaint against Sheriff Allen Francisco S. Sicat, charging
him with gross inefficiency and gross misconduct relative to the implementation of the writ of
execution, and the levy and sale of the property in execution.
She alleged that ROTA filed a civil case for collection of a sum of money against its debtors,
Arnold Cruz, Renato Nunag and Miradora Mejia. A compromise agreement was signed by ROTA
and Mejia, and was approved by the Court. However, Mejia failed to comply with the decision. A
writ of execution was then issued to Sheriff Sicat upon ROTA’s application. It was later on found
that in the implementation of the writ was improper.
ISSUE:
Did Sicat commit gross neglect of duty, inefficiency in the performance of official duties,
and misconduct when he failed to properly implement the writ and the sale of the property?
RULING:
Yes, Sicat’s failure to follow the Rules of Court in the implementation of the writ, as well as
the levy and sale of the property in execution, shows that his acts fell short of his responsibility to
discharge a sheriff’s duties with due care and utmost diligence.
Jurisprudence points out the heavy burden and responsibility which court personnel are
saddled with in view of their exalted positions as keepers of the public faith. They should, therefore,
be constantly reminded that any impression of impropriety, misdeed or negligence in the
performance of official functions must be avoided. Those who work in the judiciary must adhere to
high ethical standards to preserve the courts' good name and standing. Section 10, Rule 141 of
Rules of Court provides the duties of sheriffs in the implementation of the writ which provides that
sheriffs are not authorized to receive direct payments from a winning party and Section 14, Rule
39 of Rules of Court mandates sheriffs to execute and make a return on the writ of execution within
30 days from receipt of the writ and every 30 days thereafter until it is satisfied in full or its effectivity
expires.
In this case, Sicat received money from Roxas in order to defray his expenses in the
implementation of the writ. Moreover, Sicat never made a return of the writ and irregularities were
found in the conduct and documentation of the auction sale. Further, Sicat discharged the wrongful
levy on the property of Renato Nunag without proper court order. Hence, Sicat committed gross
neglect of duty, inefficiency in the performance of official duties and misconduct.
| 113
AN OFFICIAL OR EMPLOYEE WHO IS CONTINUOUSLY ABSENT WITHOUT APROVED

LEAVE FOR AT LEAST 30 WORKING DAYS SHALL BE CONSIDEREDON ABSECE
WITHOUT LEAVE (AWOL) AND SHALL BE SEPARATED FROM THE SERVICE OR
DROPPED FROM THE ROLLS WITHOUT PRIOR NOTICE
Re: Dropping from the Rolls of Lemeuel Vendiola, Sheriff IV, Office of the Clerk of Court
A.M. No. 17-11-272-RTC; January 31, 2018
Perlas-Bernabe, J.
FACTS:
This is an administrative case to drop Lemuel Vendiola, Sheriff IV of the Office of the Clerk
of Court. from the rolls due to his absences without official leave.
Vendiola was appointed to the position of Sheriff IV on a permanent capacity in 2010. In

2013 Executive Judge Solis sent a letter to the OCA to request for the dropping from the rolls of
Vendiola and declaring his position vacant considering his absences without official leave since
April 2012.
ISSUE:
Is the continued absence without official leave of Vendiola a violation of his duty as a court
personnel which warrants separation from service?
RULING:
Yes. Vendiola should be separated from service or dropped from the rolls in view of his
continued absence since April 2012.
An official or employee who is continuously absent without approved leave for at least 30
working days shall be considered on absence without leave (AWOL) and shall be separated from
the service or dropped from the rolls without prior notice.
Vendiola’s prolonged unauthorized absences caused inefficiency in the public service as

it disrupted the normal functions of the court. By failing report for work since April 2012 up to the
present, Vendiola grossly disregarded and neglected the duties of his office. Undeniably, he failed
to adhere to the high standards of public accountability imposed on all those in the government
service.
Therefore, Vendiola’s continued unauthorized absence warrants his separation from

service.
114 |
FAILURE TO SUBMIT FINANCIAL REPORTS CONSTITUTES GROSS NEGLECT OF DUTY
Office of the Court Administrator vs. Alma P. Licay

A.M. No. P-11-2959, February 6, 2018
Per Curiam
FACTS:
These are two consolidated administrative cases filed against respondent Clerk of Court
of the MTC of San Juan, La Union.
The Office of the Court Administrator reported that the Financial Management Office (FMO)
of the OCA found that Licay failed to regularly submit her Monthly Financial Reports for different
fund allowances of the MCTC. OCA sent letters to Licay reminding her to submit these reports, but
it remained unheeded. Subsequently, the Court issued a show cause resolution to Licay but she
still failed to comply with the said orders. Hence, the Court imposed a fine to Licay.
The audit team, after conducting an examination of the books of account of the MCTC
found that Licay incurred shortages in the judiciary collections. Licay requested for an extension of
time for the submission of the documents but she failed to fully comply with the Court’s order to
submit the documents.
ISSUE:
Did Licay commit gross neglect of duty when she failed to submit the Monthly Financial
Reports?
RULING:
Yes, for her inexcusable non-submission of the Monthly Financial Reports, Licay is guilty
of gross neglect of duty. As distinguished from simple neglect of duty, which is defined as the
failure of an employee to give proper attention to a required task or to discharge a duty due to
carelessness or indifference, gross neglect of duty is characterized by want of even the slightest
care, or by conscious indifference to the consequences, or by flagrant and palpable breach of duty.
Jurisprudence holds those in the Judiciary serve as sentinels of justice, and any act of
impropriety on their part immeasurably affects the honor and dignity of the Judiciary and the
people’s confidence in it. The Judiciary demands the best possible individuals in the service and it
had never and will never tolerate nor condone any conduct which violates the norms of public
accountability, and diminishes, or even tends to diminish, the faith of the people in the justice
system.
In this case, Licay, despite repeated directives from the Court to submit the Monthly
Financial Reports, deliberately ignored the Resolutions showing her manifest indifference to the
serious repercussions of her omissions. Hence, repeated failure to submit the Monthly Financial
Reports, without any explanation or justification, clearly constitutes gross neglect of duty.
| 115
A COURT OFFICIAL’S PROLONGED UNAUTHORIZED ABSENCE WARRANTS

SANCTIONS FOR HIS NEGLECT OF DUTY TO THE COURT.
In Re: Janice Millare

A.M. No. 17-11-131-MeTC; February 7, 2018
Perlas-Bernabe, J.
FACTS:
This is an administrative case against Ms. Janice C. Millare, Clerk of Court in the MTC, for
failure to submit her Daily Time Records (DTRs) starting July 2017.
Millare traveled to Saipan from June 5 to July 14, 2017 without approval for leave from
work. However, until the time this case has been submitted for decision, she still has not reported
for work.
ISSUE:
Did Millare’s continuous absence without official leave violate the Rules of Court governing
the conduct of court personnel?
RULING:
Yes. Millare must be dropped from the rolls for having been absent without official leave
for more than thirty working days and her position be declared vacant.
A Court personnel’s conduct is circumscribed with the heavy responsibility of upholding

public accountability and maintaining the people’s faith in the judiciary. Continuous absence from
work beyond the required number of days represents a gross disregard and neglect of duties of
office.
Millare’s prolonged unauthorized absences caused inefficiency in the public service as it

disrupted the normal functions of the court. It contravened the duty of a public servant to serve with
the utmost degree of responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency.
Thus, Millare’s continued absence without official leave warrants her position to be
declared vacant.
116 |
A COURT PERSONNEL’S UNAUTHORIZED ABSENCES CAUSES INEFFICIENCY IN THE

PUBLIC SERVICE AND DISRUPTS THE NORMAL FUNCTIONS OF THE COURT
Re: Marissa M. Nudo

A.M. No. 17-08-191-RTC; February 7, 2018
Perlas-Bernabe, J.
FACTS:
This is an administrative case against Ms. Marissa M. Nudo, Clerk III of the Manila RTC
Branch to be dropped from the rolls having been absent without official leave March 2017.
The records of the Employees’ Leave Division, Office of Administrative Serices (OAS),
Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), show that Nudo has not submitted her Daily Time Record
(DTR) since March 2017, up to the time the case has been submitted for a decision. She neither
submitted any application for leave. Thus, she has been on AWOL since March 1, 2017.
ISSUE:
Did Nudo’s continuous absence without official leave violate her role as a public official?
RULING:
Yes. Nudo’s prolonged unauthorized absence caused inefficiency in the public service as
it disrupted the normal functions of the court.
Unauthorized absence without leave contravenes the duty of a public servant to serve with
the utmost degree of responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency. It should be reiterated and
stressed that a court personnel’s conduct is circumscribed with the heavy responsibility of
upholding public accountability and maintaining the people’s faith in the judiciary.
By failing to report for work since March 2017 up to the time the case has been submitted
for a decision, Nudo grossly disregarded and neglected the duties of her office. Undeniably, she
failed to adhere to the high standards of public accountability imposed on all those in the
government service.
| 117
A COURT UTILITY WORKER’S ACT OF COHABITING WITH ANOTHER WOMAN NOT

HIS WIFE CONSTITUTES IMMORAL CONDUCT
In Re: Camay Jr.

A.M. No. P-17-3659; March 20, 2018
Per Curiam
FACTS:
An anonymous complainant charged Emeliano C. Camay, Jr., Utility Worker 1 at Branch
61 of the RTC in Bogo City, Cebu with various serious offenses of immorality.
The complainant alleged that Camay, a married man, had been cohabiting with a woman
who was not his wife, and they had a son. Camay denied all the allegations against him. Judge
Galanida of RTC Bogo City however, recommended that Camay be held liable for immorality,
disgraceful conduct, and bail bond fixing. The OCA agreed with the report and recommendation of
Judge Galanida.
ISSUE:
Is Camay administratively liable for disgraceful and immoral conduct for cohabiting with a
woman not his wife despite being married?
RULING:
Yes, Camay should be administratively liable. If the father of the child born out of wedlock
is himself married to a woman other than the mother, there is a cause for administrative sanction
against either the father or the mother.
His combined offenses have firmly demonstrated his total unfitness to continue in the
service of the Judiciary. The Court will never tire to insist that everyone of its officials and
employees comes under the strict and immediate obligation to maintain the highest standard of
conduct and decorum while serving in the Judiciary.
Jurisprudence holds that “Court employees should be models of uprightness, fairness and
honesty to maintain the people's respect and faith in the judiciary. They should avoid any act or
conduct that would diminish public trust and confidence in the courts. Indeed, those connected
with dispensing justice bear a heavy burden of responsibility.”
Therefore, respondent is guilty of disgraceful and immoral conduct.
118 |
ANY SCANDALOUS BEHAVIOR OR ANY ACT THAT MAY ERODE THE PEOPLE’S
ESTEEM FOR THE JUDICIARY IS UNBECOMING OF A COURT EMPLOYEE
Ruth Nadia N. De Los Santos vs. Jose Rene C. Vasquez

A.M. No. P-18-3792; February 20, 2018
Per Curiam
FACTS:
This case stemmed from a letter-complaint filed by complainant Ruth Nadia De Los Santos
against respondent Sheriff Jose Rene Vasquez before the Office of the Court Administrator, for
inhumane and unruly behavior, dishonesty and threat.
In the affidavit-complaint, De Los Santos alleged that while she was doing her groceries
around 3 o’clock in the afternoon, she met Vasquez's wife who owed her a sum of money; that
while confronting the wife about her loan, Vasquez, who was smelling and reeking of liquor,
suddenly appeared from behind and hit her left arm and threatened her; and that because of fear
and Vasquez's threat, De Los Santos caused the incident to be recorded in a police blotter.
Vasquez denied the claim and alleged that he saw his wife and De Los Santos in a tussle. He then
confronted the complainant and thereafter, left the store with his wife.
In the investigation report of the Executive Judge, Vasquez was found guilty of conduct
unbecoming a court employee. The Executive Judge opined that Vasquez's act of slapping the
shoulder of De Los Santos, and his use of unsavory language failed to meet the exacting standards
required of a court employee.
ISSUE:
Did Vasquez’s unruly behavior and act of issuing threats render him guilty of conduct
unbecoming of a Court Employee?
RULING:
Yes, Vasquez’s unruly behavior and threat render him guilty of conduct unbecoming of a
Court Employee.
It must be stressed that employees of the Judiciary should be living examples of

uprightness not only in the performance of official duties but also in their personal and private
dealings with other people so as to preserve the good name and standing of the courts in the
community at all times. Professionalism, respect for the rights of others, good manners and right
conduct are expected from all judicial officers and employees at all times as the image of the
Judiciary is necessarily mirrored in their actions. Thus, any scandalous behavior or any act that
may erode the people's esteem for the Judiciary is unbecoming of an employee, and tantamount
to simple misconduct.
In the present case, Vasquez's act of slapping the shoulder of De Los Santos, and his use
of improper and intemperate words and his threat against her tarnished not only the image and
integrity of the public office but also the public perception of the very image of the Judiciary of
which he was a part of.
Hence, Vasquez is guilty of conduct unbecoming of a court employee.
| 119
CLERKS OF COURT ARE COURT CUSTODIANS AND ARE RESPONSIBLE TO ENSURE

THAT EXHIBITS ARE SAFELY KEPY AND READILY AVAILABLE
Office of the Court Administrator vs. Gilbert T. Inmenzo

A.M. No. P-16-3617; June 6, 2018
Carpio, J.
FACTS:
This administrative case arose from a letter of then Acting Presiding Judge Lourdes Grace
S. Barrientos-Sasondoncillo of the MTC, Branch 52, Caloocan City to the Office of the Court
Administrator.
Gilbert T. Inmenzo was Clerk of Court III of the MeTC. Inmenzo issued a subpoena duces
tecum/ad testificandum directing PO2 Bagting to bring the evidence in People v. Hidalgo before
the MeTC. Inmenzo acknowledged receiving from PO2 Bagting, one firearm along with other
pieces of evidence. Judge Sasondoncillo later found out that the firearm was now missing and
requested that the OCA conduct an investigation of the missing firearm.
The investigation team found that Inmenzo received the missing firearm from PO2 Bagting
on 31 May 2007, evidenced by an acknowledgment receipt.
Inmenzo denied receiving the firearm but admitted to signing the acknowledgment receipt.
He claimed that he signed inadvertently and without reading its contents due to heavy workload.
ISSUE:
Did Inemnzo’s act of losing an item in custodia legis constitutive of simple neglect of duty?
RULING:
Yes, Inemnzo’s act of losing an item in custodia legis constitutive of simple neglect of duty.
The Manual for Clerks of Court provides that the clerk of court is the administrative officer
of the court who controls and supervises the safekeeping of court records, exhibits, and
documents, among others. Rule 136, Section 7 of the Rules of Court further provides that the clerk
of court shall safely keep all records, papers, files, exhibits, and public property committed in his
charge. Section 1 of Canon IV of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel stresses that court
personnel shall at all times perform official duties properly and diligently. A simple act of neglect
resulting to loss of funds, documents, properties or exhibits in custodia legis ruins the confidence
lodged by litigants or the public in our judicial process. On the other hand, simple neglect of duty
is the failure to give attention to a task, or the disregard of a duty due to carelessness or
indifference.
Inmenzo clearly received the firearm from PO2 Bagting and marked it as an exhibit, based
on the acknowledgment receipt Inmenzo himself admittedly signed. He, however, failed to explain
the whereabouts of the firearm after receiving it and consequently, lost it under his custody. As
court custodian, it was his responsibility to ensure that exhibits are safely kept and the same are
readily available upon the request of the parties or order of the court.
For failing to give due attention to the task expected of him resulting to the loss of a
firearm committed in his charge, Inmenzo is therefore, guilty of simple neglect of duty.
120 |
CLERKS OF COURT HAVE THE DUTY TO IMMEDIATELY DEPOSIT VARIOUS FUNDS

RECEIVED BY THEM TO THE AUTHORIZED GOVERNMENT DEPOSITARIES
Office of Court Administrator vs. Elizabeth Tengco

A.M. No. P-07-2360; July 12, 2017
Leonardo De Castro, J.
FACTS:
These are consolidated administrative matters arising from several memoranda issued by
Judge Elpidio Calis, Presiding MTC Judge of Sta Cruz Laguna, addressed to the Office of the
Court administrator. The Office of the Court administrator has recommended respondent clerk
Elizabeth Tengco to be suspended from work and her salaries and other benefits be withheld in
addition to the immediate financial audit of her books of account.
Records disclose that there were missing 118 booklets of official receipts and 87 pieces of
official receipts during Tengco's term as Clerk of Court of the MTC, Sta. Cruz, Laguna. From the
Final Report of the Financial Audit Team, her total accountabilities amounted to P1,534,916.70,
consisting of various court funds.
Tengco had been continuously absent even before the abovementioned memoranda were
issued and had refused to cooperate in the financial audits.
ISSUE:
Should Respondent Tengco be held accountable for the missing court documents and
funds?
RULING:
Yes. Respondent Tengco should be held accountable for the missing court documents and
funds.
Clerk of Courts, as custodians of court funds and revenues, have the duty to immediately
deposit the various funds received by them to the authorized government depositories for they are
not supposed to keep funds in their custody. Failure of the Clerk of Court to remit court funds is
tantamount to gross neglect of duty, dishonesty, and grave misconduct.
In this case, Tengco was remiss in her duties to safeguard the receipts and to deposit the
funds entrusted to her on time. She likewise failed to comply with the memoranda regarding her
unexplained actions coupled with her absence without official leave, which lead the Supreme Court
to conclude that she went into hiding to run away from her accountabilities. Such silence and
inaction are indications of guilt.
Thus, the aforementioned acts of Tengco should be characterized as gross in nature, and
should thus warrant her perpetual disqualification in government offices, the application of her
unclaimed salaries and benefits to the missing funds, and the filing of other necessary actions for
the recovery of the deficiency.
| 121
THE ACT OF A SHERIFF IN ACCEPTING FEES FOR DEMOLITION CONSTITUTES

GRAVE MISCONDUCT
Gloria Serdoncillo vs. Sheriff Nestor M. Lanzaderas

A.M. No. P-16-3424; August 07, 2017
Peralta, J.
FACTS:
This is an administrative complaint filed by petitioner Gloria Serdoncillo against respondent
Sheriff Nestor Lanzaderas before the OCA for grave misconduct and incompetence.
Petitioner alleged that respondent charged them an excessive amount of Php172, 600,
and failed to account said amount. She prayed that the expenditures be liquidated. On the other
hand, respondent denied the allegations and argued that because the plaintiffs’ counsel wanted to
immediately start the demolition, the money was given directly to him instead of being deposited
to the Clerk of Court, to avoid any inconvenience. Petitioner reiterated her position stating that they
were not informed that they should deposit the amount with the Clerk of Court.
ISSUE:
Is the Sheriff administratively liable for directly accepting the fees for demolition?
RULING:
Yes. There is no defense in receiving money from party-litigants. The act itself makes court
employees guilty of grave misconduct.
Section 2, Canon I of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel specifically prohibits all
court employees from soliciting or accepting any gift, favor or benefit based on any or explicit
understanding that such gift, favor or benefit shall influence their official actions. They are likewise
forbidden from soliciting or accepting any gift, loan, gratuity, discount, favor, hospitality or service
under circumstances from which it could reasonably be inferred that a major purpose of the donor
is to influence the court personnel in performing his official duties.
In this case, the respondent failed to comply with such rule regarding the collection and
receipt of the money and liquidation of his expenses. The fact that there was an agreement with
the petitioners on the sheriff’s direct receipt of the expenses is immaterial. These acts not only
violate the rules but also shows misconduct which falls too far short from the required standards
of public service.
Thus, the sheriff is administratively liable for directly accepting the fees for demolition and
should be dismissed from service.
122 |
FINANCIAL DISTRESS DOES NOT EXCUSE A CLERK OF COURT FROM LIABILITY DUE
TO NON-REMITTANCE OF THE COURT’S MONTHLY COLLECTIONS
Judge Ramon V. Efondo vs. Eden D. Favorito

OCA IPI No. 10-3423-P; August 22, 2017
Per Curiam
FACTS:
This is an administrative case of insubordination filed by petitioner Judge Ramon Efondo,
against respondent Eden Favorito, a Clerk of Court, in relation to a Court Resolution placing
respondent under preventive suspension. The Resolution was the result of an OCA investigation
showing that respondent failed to submit monthly reports of collections, deposits and withdrawals
and failure to regularly remit the court’s monthly collections. It was also shown that respondent
falsified several ORs and cashbooks.
Respondent denied the accusation and explained that she was in financial distress after
her husband’s death as she had to raise three children on her own. She asked for consideration
to redeem herself and expressed her intention of settling the matter.
ISSUE:
Is respondent administratively liable for insubordination considering her acts were the
result of financial distress?
RULING:
Yes. Respondent is administratively liable for her acts despite the facts that they were the
result of financial distress.
The Court ruled that the Clerk of Court performs administrative and judicial functions which
are for the administration of justice. He or she is the custodian of the court’s funds and revenues,
records, property and premises. Being the custodian, the Clerk of Court must be held liable for any
shortage, destruction or impairment of said funds and property. Public servants like the Clerk of
Court must live up to the strictest norms of probity and integrity in the public service.
In this case, sufficient evidence show that respondent failed to perform her duties as Clerk
of Court by failing to submit monthly reports and court collections and falsifying ORs and
cashbooks. Such acts constitute gross negligence, and is unbecoming of a court personnel. The
fact that such actions stemmed from financial distress did not sway the Court to be lenient or
benevolent in her favor.
Therefore, for her acts, respondent is guilty of misconduct, dishonesty, and gross neglect
of duty and is hereby dismissed from the service.
| 123
SERIOUS MISMANAGEMENT OF THE ISSUANCE OF SEARCH WARRANTS

CONSTITUTES GROSS NEGLECT OF THE DUTIES OF A JUDGE
Re: Report on the Preliminary Results of the Spot Audit in the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 170, Malabon City
A.M. No. 16-05-142-RTC; September 5, 2017
Del Castillo, J.
FACTS:
This administrative matter refers to the report on the preliminary results of the spot audit
conducted by the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) in the RTC, Branch 170 in Malabon City
due to persistent reports pertaining to the alleged irregular issuance of search warrants by
Presiding Judge Zaldy Docena that led to his being preventively suspended after the investigation.
Among other things, Judge Docena posits the defense that he granted the search warrant
applications before him "in the good faith belief that there was probable cause for their issuance
and in compliance with law and procedure.”
ISSUE:
Is Judge Docena administratively liable for gross neglect of duty for the alleged irregular
issuance of search warrants?
RULING:
Yes. Judge Docena must be administratively liable for gross neglect of duty for the serious
mismanagement of search warrant applications.
Gross neglect of duty or gross negligence "refers to negligence characterized by the want
of even slight care, or by acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, willfully
and intentionally, in so far as other persons may be affected. However, that the term "gross neglect
of duty" does not necessarily include willful neglect or intentional wrongdoing. It can also arise from
situations where "such neglect which, from the gravity of the case or the frequency of instances,
becomes so serious in its character" that it ends up endangering or threatening the public welfare.
The records show that Judge Docena has failed to properly monitor the submission of
returns as required under Section 12 (b) and (c) of Rule 126 if the Rules of Court and likewise
committed several lapses in ascertaining whether Section 12 (a) of Rule 126 was complied with
by the applicants. Furthermore, Judge Docena failed to comply with his administrative
responsibilities under Rules 3.08 and 3.09 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.
Therefore, Judge Docena is administratively liable for gross neglect of duty for the serious
mismanagement of search warrant applications.
124 |
A JUDGE NOT ASSIGNED TO WHERE A CASE IS PENDING HAS NO AUTHORITY TO

GRANT BAIL WITHOUT A STANDING WARRANT OF ARREST
Prosecutor Ivy A. Tejano vs. Presiding Judge Antonio D. Marigomen

A.M. No. RTJ-17-2492; September 26, 2017
Leonen, J.
FACTS:
This resolves the Affidavit-Complaint filed by Prosecutor Ivy Tejano against Presiding
Judge Antonio Marigomen of Branch 61, Regional Trial Court, Bogo City, Cebu, for grave abuse
of authority and gross ignorance of the law.
On her charge of gross ignorance of the law, Tejano alleged that Judge Marigomen issued
the Order of Release on May 9, 2013 with no standing warrant of arrest against Jose Andrino
(Andrino), in violation of Rule 114, Section 1 of the Rules of Court. The Warrant of Arrest was
issued by Judge Saniel only on May 30, 2013.
ISSUE:
Did the act of Judge Marigomen in issuing an order of release with no standing warrant of
arrest amount to gross ignorance of the law?
RULING:
Yes. A judge not assigned to the province, city, or municipality where the case is pending
but approves an application for bail filed by an accused not arrested is guilty of gross ignorance of
the law.
The last sentence of Rule 114, Section 17 (a) of the Rules of Court is clear that for purposes
of determining whether or not the accused is in custody of the law, the mode required is arrest, not
voluntary surrender, before a judge of another province, city, or municipality may grant a bail
application. In the same vein, it is gross ignorance of the law if a judge grants an application for
bail in a criminal case outside of his or her jurisdiction without ascertaining the absence or
unavailability of the judge of the court where the criminal case is pending.
Judge Marigomen was not a judge in the province, city, or municipality where the case was
pending. Neither was Andrino arrested in a province, city, or municipality other than where the
case was pending precisely because no warrant of arrest had yet been issued when he posted
bail on May 9, 2013.
Therefore, a judge not assigned to the province, city, or municipality where the case is
pending but approves an application for bail filed by an accused not arrested is guilty of gross
| 125
ALLOWANCE OF AN UNOFFICIAL ACTIVITY TO TAKE PRECEDENCE OVER THE

CONDUCT OF HEARING IS A GROUND FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION
Re: Anonymous Complaints Against Hon. Dinah Evangeline B. Bandong

A.M. No. RTJ-17-2507; October 9, 2017
Del Castillo, J.
FACTS:
The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) received two letter-complaints, both narrating
the difficulties encountered by the employees and litigants appearing before Branch 59 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Lucena City concerning then Presiding Judge Dinah Evangeline
Bandong.
The OCA eventually believed that respondent Judge is liable for conduct prejudicial to the
best interest of the service for watching TV during court trials and hearings; gross misconduct for
erroneously referring cases for mediation; and violation of Supreme Court rules, directives, and
circulars for wrongful delegation of duties to court personnel.
ISSUE:
Did the acts imputed against Judge Bandong, such as allowing unofficial activity to take
precedence over the conduct of hearings, exhibit conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service?
RULING:
Yes, Judge Bandong is guilty of Gross Misconduct which is prejudicial to the best interest
of the service.
Decision-making is the primordial duty of a member of the bench. In the case of trial courts,
the conduct of hearings is unquestionably an important component of their decision-making
process and, conversely, all other official tasks must give way thereto. Hence, for a judge to allow
an unofficial activity to take precedence over the conduct of hearings is totally unacceptable. It is
a patent derogation of Sections 1 and 2 of Canon 6 and a blatant disregard of the professional
yardstick that "all judicial officials and employees must devote their official time to government
service.”
Judge Bandong's habit of watching television during office hours violates Section 7 of the
same Canon 6 which requires Judges "not to engage in conduct incompatible with the diligent
discharge of judicial duties." Watching telenovelas surely dissipates away Judge Bandong's
precious time in the office, which, has an adverse effect on the prompt administration of justice.
Therefore, respondent should be held administratively liable for the acts complained of.
126 |
A JUDGE SHOULD BE PATIENT, ATTENTIVE AND COURTEOUS TO LAWYERS, TO

LITIGANTS, WITNESSES, AND OTHERS APPEARING BEFORE THE COURT
Leo T. Cahanap vs. Judge Leonor S. Quiñones

A.M. No. RTJ-16-2470; October 1, 2017
Caguioa, J.
FACTS:
This is an administrative complaint against Judge Quiñones, charging him with gross
ignorance of the law, gross misconduct and violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct.
Complainant Leo T. Cahanap alleged that there were several instances that he, as a
prosecutor under respondent Judge’s branch, suffered unbearable and intolerable oppression in
the hands of the latter. There was also an incident wherein respondent Judge issued an order
blaming complainant for failure to be prepared with the necessary evidence, and at the same time
gave a lecture on the proper demeanor and conduct in court while he was making a formal offer of
a testimony, causing extreme embarrassment to complainant. Complainant also averred that
respondent Judge mistreated her court staff, shouting at them and calling them with insulting
words.
In her defense, respondent Judge denied that she maltreated the prosecutors assigned to
her sala. She also denied being oppressive to her staff. She claimed that she merely rebuked or
admonished them in the exercise of her supervisory authority.
ISSUE:
Do the several incidents of misbehavior by the judge constitute oppression or gross
misconduct constituting violation of the New Code of Judicial Conduct?
RULING:
Yes. The several incidents of misbehavior by the judge constitute oppression or gross
misconduct, which is in violation of the New Code of Judicial Conduct.
Judges are expected to observe courtesy and civility at all times in addressing lawyers,
litigants and witnesses appearing in his/her sala considering that judges must act beyond reproach
to maintain the court’s integrity and public confidence in the judicial system. The Code of Judicial
ethics sets a high standard of demeanor for all judges to observe. At the same time, judges must
always be courteous and patient with lawyers, litigants and witnesses appearing in his/her court.
A display of petulance and impatience in the conduct of trial in a norm of behavior incompatible
with the needful attitude and sobriety of a good judge.
In this case, the Respondent Judge failed to show compassion, patience, courtesy and
civility to lawyers who appear before her. Her antagonistic behavior in several incidents pointed
out by the Complainant also showed that she is guilty of oppression.
Therefore, Respondent Judge is guilty of oppression or gross misconduct, which is in

violation of the New Code of Judicial Conduct.
| 127
IT MUST BE ESTABLISHED THAT NOT ONLY WAS THERE ERROR BUT ALSO THAT A
JUDGE WAS MOVED BY BAD FAITH, DISHONESTY, HATRED OR SOME OTHER LIKE
MOTIVE FOR LIABLITY TO ATTACH FOR IGNORANCE OF THE LAW
Atty. Berteni Causing and Percival Mabasa vs. Presiding Judge Jose Lorenzo Dela Rosa
OCA IPI No. 17-4663-RTJ; March 7, 2018
Caguioa, J.
FACTS:
This is an administrative complaint filed before the OCA by Atty. Berteni Causing and
Percival Mabasa against Judge Lorenzo Dela Rosa on the grounds of gross ignorance of the law,
gross misconduct, and gross incompetence for reversing the dismissal of a libel case, where
Mabasa was one of the accused.
Judge Dela Rosa granted the prosecution’s Motion for Reconsideration in the libel case,
which was dismissed by former Presiding Judge Disalo. He issued the assailed resolution
reversing the dismissal of the libel case.
Atty. Causing and Mabasa questioned the Resolution, arguing that the prior dismissal of a
criminal case due to a violation of the accused’s right to speedy trial is equivalent to a dismissal
on the merits of the case and, as such, granting the prosecution’s Motion for Reconsideration was
tantamount to a violation of the constitutional right against double jeopardy. On the other hand,
Judge Dela Rosa averred that he had already reversed the Resolution way before the filing of the
Complaint.
ISSUE:
Is Judge Dela Rosa liable for gross ignorance of the law by reversing the dismissal of the
libel case?
RULING:
No, Judge Dela Rosa is not liable for gross ignorance of the law.
For liability to attach for ignorance of the law, the assailed order, decision or actuation of
the judge in the performance of official duties must not only be found erroneous but, most
importantly, it must also be established that he was moved by bad faith, dishonesty, hatred, or
some other like motive. As a matter of policy, in the absence of fraud, dishonesty or corruption, the
acts of a judge in his judicial capacity are not subject to disciplinary action even though such acts
are erroneous.
The Court agreed with the OCA that it would be absurd to hold Judge Dela Rosa liable for
his assailed Order when he had himself rectified this in his subsequent Order. To rule otherwise
would be to render judicial office untenable, for no one called upon to try the facts or interpret the
law in the process of administering justice can be infallible in his judgment. Furthermore, nothing
in the records of the case suggests that respondent Judge Dela Rosa was motivated by bad faith,
fraud, corruption, dishonesty or egregious error in rendering his decision.
Hence, Judge Dela Rosa cannot be held liable for gross ignorance of the law.
128 |
AN IMPROPER ISSUANCE OF A TEMPORARY PROTECTION ORDER CONSTITUTES

GROSS IGNORANCE OF THE LAW
Marie Roxanne G. Recto vs. Hon. Henry J. Trocino

Per Curiam
FACTS:
Complainant Marie Roxanee G. Recto filed an administrative complaint is filed against
Regional Trial Court (RTC) Judge Henry J. Trocino (Judge Trocino) for bias and partiality,
ignorance of the law, grave oppression, and violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct for issuing
an ex parte Temporary Protection Order (TPO) in a civil case for Child Custody under the Family
Code. Magdaleno Peña (Peña) filed a petition for Child Custody with Prayer for Protection Order
(Peña) against Recto. The RTC issued, ex parte, a Temporary Protection Order (TPO), granting
temporary custody of their fifteen (15) month-old child to Peña. OCA found him liable for gross
ignorance of the law for issuing an ex parte TPO.
Complainant claims that the Judge inappropriately issued the so called TPO using the Rule
on Anti-Violence against Women and their Children and not the Rule on Custody of
Minors. Apparently, respondent has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the petition before him
and to issue the so called "Temporary Protection Order" yet, he did so, rendering the same null
and void.
Judge Trocino asserted that the ex parte TPO was issued after a careful evaluation not
only of the material allegations in the petition but all other circumstances relevant to the welfare
and best interest of the minor offended party, and that it was issued judiciously in complete good
faith, devoid of any grave, whimsical and capricious abuse of discretion.
ISSUE:
Was the judge guilty of gross ignorance of the law in issuing a TPO under the Rule on Anti-
Violence against Women and their Children in a case for child custody?
RULING:
Yes, Judge Trocino’s act constitutes gross ignorance of the law.
The Code of Judicial Conduct requires a judge to be the embodiment of competence,

integrity and independence. A judge owes it to himself and his office to know by heart the basic
legal principles and relevant doctrines. It is highly imperative that he be conversant with them
because when a judge displays an utter lack of familiarity with the laws and rules, he erodes the
confidence of the public in the courts.
A protection order is issued to prevent further acts of violence against women and their
children, their family or household members, and to grant other necessary reliefs. A protection
order may be issued ex parte if the court finds that there is danger of domestic violence to the
offended party. In the case at bar, a reading of the petition for child custody filed by Peña would
show that no specific allegation of violence or abuse, whether physical, emotional or psychological
was committed or was about to be committed against the minor child.
Thus, Judge Trocino is guilty of gross ignorance of law.
| 129
NON-COMPLIANCE WITH OCA DIRECTIVES CONSTITUTES SERIOUS MISCONDUCT

AND GROSS MISCONDUCT OF THE LAW
Re: Judicial Audit Conducted in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 20, Cagayan De Oro City,
Misamis Oriental
Del Castillo, J.
FACTS:
This is a complaint against Judge Bonifacio Macabaya arising from a judicial audit of the
RTC where he is the presiding judge.
The audit showed that said Branch had a lot of unresolved cases beyond the 90-day period
mandated by the Constitution and second, that Judge Macabaya’s wife has been working on the
court despite not being an employee. The OCA then issued recommendations and directives for
Judge Macabaya’s compliance, however, the judge only complied on a piecemeal basis which is
equal to noncompliance. So, the Court then directed the judge to show cause why he should not
be held administratively liable.
According to the judge, the audit miscounted his inherited cases, that their
recommendation and directives were impossible to do, and that he has control over his wife’s
actions. On the other hand, the OCA stated that the judge’s deliberate failure to comply with the
directives of the OCA amount to insubordination and disrespect of the authority of the Court. OCA
recommended that the judge be found guilty of gross misconduct and gross ignorance of the law.
ISSUE:
Is Judge Macabaya guilty of gross misconduct and gross ignorance of the law due to his
non-compliance with the OCA directives?
RULING:
Yes. Judge Macabaya is guilty of gross misconduct and gross ignorance of the law due to
his non-compliance with the OCA directives, but such does not warrant his dismissal from service.
According to the Court and as stated in the OCA Memorandum, all directives from the
Court Administrator and his deputies are issued in the exercise of the Court’s administrative
supervision of trial courts and their personnel, hence, said directives should be respected and
should not be considered mere requests, and should be complied with promptly and completely.
In this case, despite several directives of the OCA, the judge only complied on a piecemeal
basis which is equivalent to noncompliance. With regard to the unresolved cases, the records show
that the judge failed to decide the cases within the reglementary period as required by the
Constitution. The Court also ruled that the participation of his wife results to impropriety as court
records are confidential and should be only accessed by the judge, the parties, their counsels, and
the appropriate court officials.
For non-compliance with the court directives, Judge Macabaya should be liable for serious
misconduct and gross ignorance of the law.
130 |
FAILURE OF A JUDGE TO DECIDE A CASE WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED PERIOD IS

INEXCUSABLE AND CONSTITUTES GROSS INEFFICIENCY
Daniel Fajardo vs. Judge Antonio Natino

A.M. No. RTJ-16-2479; December 13, 2017
Tijam, J.
FACTS:
This is an administrative case filed before the Court to determine whether the decision of
the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) to penalize Judge Natino for failure to render a
judgment of a case in time.
Fajardo filed a complaint against Judge Natino for his fault and negligence in performing
his duties as a judge. The complaint stemmed from a civil case decision that took more than three
years after the case was submitted for a decision. Among the charges filed where: (1) violation of
the 90-day period within which a case to be resolved; and (2) delay in the release of the decision.
Fajardo claims Judge Natino was delaying the delaying to resolve the case because he wanted to
obtain a part of the money.
Judge Natino explained that the delay in rendering the judgment of the cases was beyond
his control. He also claimed that the extended period of deciding the civil cases was for a proper
quality of administration of justice. Hence, it is Judge Natino’s opinion that the 90-day rule in
deciding cases may be considered as directory and shall be considered mandatory only when the
delay was attended by vexations, capricious and oppressive delay.
ISSUE:
Is the Judge’s failure to render a decision within the prescribed period a violation of his
duty as a judge?
RULING:
Yes. An undue delay in the resolution of a case constitutes a violation of a duty of a judge.
Article VIII, Section 15(1) of the 1987 Constitution provides that the lower courts have three
months within which to decide cases or resolve matters submitted to them for a resolution. In
relation thereto, Canon 3, Rule 3.05, of the Code of Judicial Conduct mandates judges to dispose
of their business promptly and decide cases within the required period.
Records of the case shows that the decision in the civil case took more than three years
from the time it was submitted for a decision. Even though Judge Natino has considerable
justifications and explanations on such delay, they are not sufficient to exonerate him from liability.
Hence, the 90-day period within which to decide cases is mandatory. Consequently, failure
of a judge to decide a case within the prescribed period is inexcusable and constitutes gross
inefficiency warranting a disciplinary action.
| 131
THE CLERK OF COURT’S FAILURE TO TRANSMIT THE COURT RECORDS AFTER

PERFECTION OF THE APPEAL RESULTS TO NEGLECT OF DUTY
Darwin Azuel Reci vs. Atty. Emmanuel Villanueva

A.M. No. P-17-3763; November 21, 2017
Per Curiam
FACTS:
The instant administrative matter stemmed from an administrative complaint filed by
Complainant Engr. Darwin Azuela Reci (Reci) against Respondent Judge Amelia Tria-Infante
(Judge Tria-Infante).
In a criminal case, Judge Tria-Infante rendered a Decision convicting complainant’s

brother, PO2 Dennis Reci, of the crime of Qualified Trafficking in Persons. The decision was
promptly appealed but complainant later discovered that after almost three years, no transmittal of
the records of the case was made to the CA. This pushed Reci to file an administrative complaint
against Judge Tria-Infante for grave abuse of discretion and gross neglect of duty. In said case, it
was, however, declared that the delay is attributed to Judge Tria-Infante’s Clerk of Court, Atty.
Emmanuel Villanueva and Court Stenographer Sonia Carreon, who were tasked to prepare the
case records, collate the Transcript of Stenographic Notes, and transmit them to the CA.
In her Comment, Carreon averred that the obligation to prepare the records of cases for
transmittal to another court was not part of her duty as a court stenographer., Carreon also avers
that Atty. Villanueva coerced her to admit the blame in the delay of the transmittal of the records.
ISSUE:
Were Atty. Villanueva and Carreon, in failing to timely transmit the court records to the
Court of Appeals, liable for neglect of duty?
RULING:
Yes, in failing to timely transmit the court records the Court of Appeals, Atty. Careon is
liable for neglect of duty. However, Carreon is not liable for neglect of duty.
Section 10(d), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court explicitly provides that within thirty (30) days
after perfection of all the appeals, it shall be the duty of the clerk of court of the lower court to
transmit the records to the appellate court. As clerk of court, he occupies a very sensitive position
that calls for the exercise of competence and efficiency to affirm the confidence of the public in the
administration of justice. He is responsible for the shortcomings of his subordinates and thus, he
is still primarily liable for the negligence of his staff.
In the case, Atty. Villanueva, in his Memorandum addressed to Judge Tria-Infante,

admitted that he has no valid excuse for his failure to comply with the order directing him to
immediately transmit the records to the Court of Appeals. It was also found that Atty. Villanueva
was previously suspended for three months on account of a judicial audit which is why dismissal
from service is in order.
Therefore, Atty. Villanueva is liable for neglect of duty. However, in view of Atty.
Villanueva’s resignation, the penalty of dismissal can no longer be implemented.
132 |
UNAUTHORIZED AND DECEITFUL WITHDRAWALS MADE BY A COURT EMPLOYEE

CONSTITUTE GROSS MISCONDUCT AND DISHONESTY
Judge Lita S. Tolentino-Genilo vs. Rolando S. Pineda

A.M. No. P-17-3756; October 10, 2017
Per Curiam
FACTS:
This is an administrative case for grave misconduct and dishonesty filed by Complainant
Judge Lita S. Tolentino-Genilo (Judge Tolentino-Genilo), Presiding Judge, Branch 91, RTC of
Quezon City, against respondent Rolando S. Pineda (Pineda), Court Aide of the same branch,
filed before the Office of the Court Administrator.
Judge Genilo owns a payroll account with the Landbank of the Philippines. She received
an SMS from LBP informing her that there has been withdrawn from her account. Thus, she
requested from LBP for the records and surveillance footage to determine how the unauthorized
withdrawal was made. On the same day, Judge Genilo received another SMS stating that another
withdrawal was made. Thereafter, LBP issued a Transaction Journal, indicating the withdrawals
made. A copy of the CCTV footage was also secured by complainant, showing Pineda, coming
from Quezon City Hall's LBP ATM machine and counting the money he withdrew.
Judge Genilo averred that she received a text message from Pineda, admitting the
unauthorized withdrawal. On the other hand, Pineda denied the allegations against him.
ISSUE:
Did Pineda’s unauthorized and deceitful withdrawals constitute gross misconduct and
dishonesty?
RULING:
Yes, Pineda’s unauthorized and deceitful withdrawals constitute gross misconduct and
dishonesty.
Misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more

particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by the public officer. Dishonesty, on the other
hand, is the disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, defraud, or betray; unworthiness; lack of integrity;
lack of honesty, probity, or integrity in principle; and lack of fairness and straightforwardness.
In the case at bench, respondent committed acts that clearly constitute grave misconduct
and dishonesty. Indubitably, respondent's admission that he made a withdrawal from the account
of complainant, without the latter's consent, coupled with his apology that he did it because he has
gambling addiction, indicates deliberate intent to commit serious infraction. There is no place in
the judiciary for those who cannot meet the exacting standards of judicial conduct and integrity.
This is because the image of a court of justice is necessarily mirrored in the conduct, official or
otherwise, of the men and women who work thereat, from the judge to the least and lowest of its
personnel.
Therefore, Pineda is guilty of committing gross misconduct and dishonesty.
| 133
CLERK OF COURT’S HABITUAL FAILURE TO SUBMIT FINANCIAL REPORTS

CONSTITUTES GROSS NEGLECT OF DUTY
Office of The Court Administrator vs. Michael S. Calija

A.M. No. P-16-3586; June 5, 2018
Per Curiam
FACTS:
The instant administrative complaint stemmed from the habitual failure of respondent
Michael S. Calija (Calija), Clerk of Court II of the MCTC of Dingras-Marcos, Ilocos Norte, to submit
the required Monthly Financial Reports of court funds on several occasions.
There are various instances where Calija’s salary was withheld for failure to submit the
required Monthly Financial Reports. Due to his repeated failure to comply his duties to timely
submit the reports, the Legal Office of the OCA recommended that a financial audit be immediately
conducted by the Fiscal Monitoring Division of the Court Management Office. In a letter, the OCA
required Calija to show cause why his salary should not be withheld for failure to submit the monthly
financial reports.
In view of Calija’s repeated failure to submit the monthly financial reports of court funds,
Atty. Barribal-Co charged him with dereliction of duty in her Memorandum Report. The OCA twice
required Calijas to submit his comment on the Memorandum Report. However, Calija failed to
submit a comment thereon.
ISSUE:
Did Calija’s repeated failure to submit the monthly financial reports constitute gross neglect
of duty?
RULING:
Yes, Calija’s repeated failure to submit the monthly financial reports constitute gross
neglect of duty.
Dereliction of duty may be classified as gross or simple neglect of duty or negligence.

Gross neglect of duty is characterized by want of even the slightest care, or by conscious
indifference to the consequences, or by flagrant and palpable breach of duty. It is such neglect
which, from the gravity of the case or the frequency of instances, becomes so serious in its
character as to endanger or threaten the public welfare.
Calija’s attention had been repeatedly called by the OCA for his failure to submit the
required monthly financial reports, but he refused to heed the said office’s directives on numerous
occasions. The various violations by Calija, committed with such frequency and without
conscientious regard to their consequences, and despite constant reminder from the Supreme
Court, are testament to his gross negligence in the performance of his duties.
Thus, Calija is found guilty of gross neglect of duty, and hereby dismissed from service.
134 |
GROSS NEGLECT DOES NOT NECESSARILY INCLUDE WILLFUL NEGLECT OR

INTENTIONAL OFFICIAL WRONGDOING
Rube K. Gamolo, Jr. vs. Reba A. Beligolo

A.M. No. P-13-3154; March 7, 2018
Bersamin, J.
FACTS:
This relates to the sworn complaint filed by complainant Rube K. Gamolo, Jr. (Gamolo),
charging respondent Reba A. Beligolo (Beligolo), Court Stenographer of MTCC of Malaybalay,
Bukidnon with gross neglect of duty and inefficiency in relation to her duty to transcribe
stenographic notes, and absenteeism and tardiness based on her failure to observe regular
working hours.
Gamolo accused Beligolo of having repeatedly violated Administrative Circular No. 24-90,
which is the Revised Rules on Transcription of Stenographic Notes and their Transmission to
Appellate Courts, and Administrative Circular No. 02-2007, which is the Reiteration of
Administrative Circular No. 2-99 on Strict Observance of Working Hours and Disciplinary Action
for Absenteeism and Tardiness.
Gamolo alleged that Beligolo did not transcribe and submit on time the transcript of
stenographic notes or TSNs, and orders of the MTCC in several criminal cases.
Beligolo denied being an incorrigible employee, claiming that she had received
performance ratings ranging from "Satisfactory" to "Very Satisfactory" from December 1997 up to
the filing of the complaint, and that she had submitted the TSNs and prepared the orders. However,
she admitted showing up late in court on two dates, and being habitually tardy on 12 occasions in
January 2009 and 14 times in November 2008. She clarified that she submitted her daily time
records for the period from May to June 2010, along with her leave applications, but the Gamolo
refused to accept them.
ISSUE:
Did Beligolo’s act of failing to submit the TSNs on time constitute gross neglect of duty?
RULING:
No, Beligolo’s act of failing to submit the TSNs on time constitute gross neglect of duty.
However, she is still liable for simple neglect of duty.
Neglect of duty is the failure to give one's attention to a task expected of the public
employee. Simple neglect of duty is contrasted from gross neglect, the latter being such neglect
that, from the gravity of the case or the frequency of instances, becomes so serious in its character
as to endanger or threaten the public welfare. Gross neglect does not necessarily include willful
neglect or intentional official wrongdoing. Those responsible for such act or omission cannot
escape the disciplinary power of this Court. Administrative Circular No. 24-90 requires all
stenographers "to transcribe all stenographic notes and to attach the transcripts to the record of
the case not later than 20 days from the time the notes are taken."
Beligolo showed that she was able to submit the TSNs and orders in question but she did
not establish that her submission of the TSNs and orders was made within the prescribed period.
Nonetheless, although she did not comply with her duty to submit her TSNs within the prescribed
period, there is no showing that her failing to do so was habitual. Also, she ultimately submitted
the TSNs and transcribed the orders.
As such, she was only liable for simple neglect of duty, and not gross neglect of duty.
| 135
JUDGE’S DELAY IN RESOLVING MOTIONS WITHIN THE REGLEMENTARY PERIOD IS

INEXCUSABLE AND CONSTITUTE GROSS INEFFICIENCY
Atty. Makilito B. Mahinay vs. Hon. Ramon B. Daomilas

A.M. No. RTJ-18-2527; June 18, 2018
Caguioa, J.
FACTS:
This is a complaint filed before the OCA by complainant Atty. Makilito B. Mahinay (Atty.
Mahinay) against respondent Judge Ramon B, Daomilas (Judge Daomilas) for gross inexcusable
negligence and gross ignorance of the law.
The charge is relative to an SRC case wherein Atty. Mahinay is the counsel for the plaintiffs
in the said case. The plaintiffs in the SRC case filed their complaint wherein they sought, among
others for the issuance Writ of Preliminary and TRO. The subject case was raffled to Judge
Daomilas.
Atty. Mahinay alleged that Judge Daomilas violated the law when he failed to act on the
prayer despite the lapse of more than two years from the date the matter was submitted for
resolution.
In his Comment, Judge Daomilas denied the delayed the resolution. He alleged that he
had very limited time to study and evaluate the motions and cases for decision. He also explained
that concurrent to his regular branch, he was previously assigned to RTC in Toledo City, Lapu-
Lapu City and Mandaue City.
ISSUE:
Did Judge Daomilas’ handling of the case which resulted to undue delay constitute
inefficiency?
RULING:
Yes, Judge Daomilas’ handling of the case which resulted to undue delay constitute
inefficiency.
Section 5, Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary states
that a judges shall perform all duties, including the delivery of reserved decisions, efficiently, fairly
and with reasonable promptness. The Court has been consistent in holding that the delay of a
judge of a lower court in resolving motions and incidents within the reglementary period as
prescribed by the Constitution is not excusable and constitute gross inefficiency.
In this case, Judge Daomilas rendered an order beyond the 90-day period within which a
judge should decide a case or resolve a pending matter, reckoned from the date of the filing of the
last pleading, in accordance with Section 15, paragraphs (1) and (2), Article 8 of the Constitution.
Therefore, Judge Daomilas’ act constitute inefficiency, and is administratively liable for
undue delay in rendering an order.
136 |
MANIPULATION OF THE FIDUCIARY FUND BY A JUDGE CONSTITUTES GRAVE

MISCONDUCT AND SERIOUS DISHONESTY
Office of the Court Administrator vs. Rolando C. Tomas and Angelina C. Rillorta
A.M. No. P-09-2633; January 30, 2018
Per Curiam
FACTS:
This case stems from the result of the financial audit conducted in the Regional Trial Court,
Santiago City, Isabela.
The Office of the Court Administrator conducted a financial audit in the RTC, Santiago,
Isabela and the financial audit team found a shortage in the judiciary funds, tampering of official
receipts, and overwithdrawal of cash bonds allegedly committed by Angelina Rillorta, Officer-in-
Charge. An administrative complaint was filed against Rillorta and Tomas, the former OIC.
However, another complaint was filed by Rillorta against Executive Judge Fe Albano Madrid.
Rillorta alleged that she submitted monthly financial reports for approval to the Judge
Madrid and the latter would instruct her to alter the entries to conform with the entries in the
passbook for the fiduciary account and in the official receipts issued by the court. It was also found
out that Judge Madrid was the lone signatory of the RTC Santiago City Bank Accounts, contrary
to the guidelines set by the Supreme Court requiring a co-signatory to the account who are the
Executive Judge and the Clerk of Court/OIC. While, Judge Madrid contended that she did not
include Rillorta as co-signatory because the latter is only an OIC.
On the other hand, the Investigation Report showed that Judge Madrid manipulated the
Fiduciary Fund.
ISSUE:
Did Judge Madrid’s act of manipulating the Fiduciary Fund constitute grave misconduct
and serious dishonesty?
RULING:
Yes, Judge Madrid’s act of manipulating the Fiduciary Fund constitutes grave misconduct
and serious dishonesty.
Misconduct is defined as a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a

forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, unlawful behavior, willful in character, improper or wrong
behavior. Dishonesty, on the other hand, is defined as a disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or
defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of honesty, probity or integrity in principle; lack of
fairness and straightforwardness; disposition to defraud, deceive or betray.
In this case, the contention of Judge Madrid is rejected. Indeed, if she was uncomfortable
that only an OIC was assigned to the Office of the Clerk of Court, she, as then Executive Judge,
should have declared the position open so that a regular clerk of court could be appointed.
However, she did not do so. Furthermore, it did not help her case that the Investigation Report
showed evidence that she manipulated the Fiduciary Fund.
Therefore, Judge Madrid’s act of manipulating the Fiduciary Fund constitutes grave
misconduct and dishonesty.
| 137
JUDGES SHOULD CONDUCT THEMSELVES IN A MANNER WHICH MERITS RESPECT

AND CONFIDENCE OF THE PEOPLE AT ALL TIMES
Atty. Plaridel C. Nava II vs. Judge Ofelia M. D. Artuz

A.M. No. MTJ-08-1717; August 29, 2017
Per Curiam
FACTS:
This is an administrative complaint filed by complainant Atty. Plaridel C. Nava II (Atty.
Nava) against respondent Judge Ofelia Artuz (Judge Artuz) which seeks the nullification of the
nomination and appointment of Judge Artuz for being patently illegal, improper, and irregular.
The present case involves two consolidated cases. In the first case, Atty. Nava claimed
that he filed a Request for Inhibition and Re-raffle of his client’s case on the ground that he and
Judge Artuz, as then assigned prosecutor handling his client’s case, are not in good terms because
they are adversaries in various administrative and criminal cases. Meanwhile, the record shows
that Nava filed before the JBC an opposition to the application for judgeship of respondent.
Notwithstanding, respondent was appointed and took her Oath of Office as Presiding Judge of
MTCC.
In the second case, Atty. Nava filed a petition for nullification of the nomination and
appointment of Judge Artuz. Atty. Nava alleged that respondent is unfit and incompetent to be
appointed as a trial judge as she faces several criminal and administrative cases. The OCA then
wrote letters to the DOJ and the Ombudsman, requesting details on the criminal and administrative
filed against respondent. In a Letter, the OCA was informed that respondent was notified of the
cases against her. The OCA then requested from the Secretary of the JBC a certified copy of
respondent’s Personal Data Sheet (PDS) which she submitted relative to her application to the
judiciary. Thereafter, the OCA recommended Judge Artuz to show cause why no disciplinary action
should be taken against her for not disclosing in her PDS that she has been formally charged and
that she has a pending criminal, administrative and disbarment cases.
ISSUE:
Is Judge Artuz guilty of grave misconduct, dishonesty and falsification of official document
for her failure to disclose in the PDS the material fact that she had been formally charged?
RULING:
Yes, the Judge Artuz is guilty of grave misconduct, dishonesty and falsification of official
document for her false statements in her PDS.
The Court has emphasized that a judge should conduct himself or herself in a manner
which merits the respect and confidence of the people at all times, for he or she is the visible
representation of the law.
Judge Artuz’s dishonesty, and tenacity to commit the same, misled the JBC and tarnished
the image of the judiciary. The Court agrees that Judge Artuz deliberately and calculatedly lied in
her answers to the subject questions in her two PDS to conceal the truth and make it appear that
she is qualified for the judgeship position which she now holds. Indeed, it is inconceivable for her
not to have been aware of any of the pending cases against her since an administrative case filed
against her had been pending before the DOJ.
Hence, Judge Artuz committed grave misconduct, dishonesty, and falsification of official
document warranting the penalty of dismissal from service.
138 |
DELAY IN THE PERFORMANCE OF A JUDGE’S FUNCTIONS IS CONSIDERED AS SIMPLE

NEGLECT OF DUTY
Dominador I. Ferrer, Jr. vs. Judge Arniel A. Dating

Caguioa, J.
FACTS
For resolution is the Administrative Complaint filed by complainant Atty. Dominador I.
Ferrer, Jr. (Atty. Ferrer, Jr.) against respondent Judge Arniel A. Dating (Judge Dating) of the RTC
for abuse of authority, judicial oppression, and unreasonable/malicious acts to delay raffle of cases.
The subject case, where Atty. Ferrer, Jr. is one of the respondents, was first raffled to
respondent Executtive Judge Dating's sala. The case was then subsequently re-raffled.
Atty. Ferrer, Jr., filed an Administrative Complaint against Judge Dating, alleging that he
deliberately caused the delay of the re-raffle of the subject case for more than a month as he was
always unavailable, either on a leave of absence or in a seminar. He alleged that while Judge
Dating has the right to attend seminars or take a leave of absence, the same should not cause
unreasonable delay in the re-raffle of the subject case.
Judge Dating however contended that the case raffle is conducted every Thursday,
however no raffle was conducted since there was no urgent case and the number of cases was
not sufficient for a raffle. He cited several other reasons for failing to raffle the case such as
attending General Assembly of Judges, hearing cases where he was designated as concurrent
assisting judge and attending various seminars and conventions.
ISSUE:
Did the Judge Dating’s alleged act of causing delay constitute simple neglect of duty?
RULING:
Yes, Judge Dating’s alleged act of causing delay constitute simple neglect of duty.
Simple neglect of duty signifies a disregard of a duty resulting from carelessness or

indifference. The Court has consistently held that mere delay in the performance of one's functions
is considered as simple neglect of duty. Also, Chapter V of A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC, specifically the
provisions on the conduct of raffle of cases, reveals that it was never intended as an indispensable
requirement that a substantial number of cases must have been filed in court before raffle of cases
could be conducted. On the contrary, Section 2 thereof explicitly mandates that "raffling of cases
shall be regularly conducted at two o'clock in the afternoon every Monday and/or Thursday as
warranted by the number of cases to be raffled." Clearly, as can be easily inferred from the use of
the words "shall" and "regularly," the raffle of cases should be mandatorily done on a regular basis
and, much more, not only once but even twice a week depending on the number of cases to be
raffled.
In this case, while it is commendable for Judge Dating to still perform his duties as a
Presiding Judge by holding trial in the morning, his exemplary action was virtually negated by the
fact that he failed to perform his duties as an Executive Judge. He and the other members of the
Raffle Committee could still have set aside even a few minutes of their time to conduct a raffle
before leaving their station to attend to other matters. As Executive Judge, it is the personal duty
and responsibility of Judge Dating to exercise supervision over the raffling of cases.
Hence, he is guilty of simple neglect of duty.
| 139
A JUDGE BECOMES LIABL FOR GROSS IGNORANCE OF THE LAW WHEN THERE IS A
PATENT DISREGARD FOR WELL-KNOWN RULES WHICH CAN BE RELATED TO BAD
FAITH, DISHONESTY AND CORRUPTION
Edgar R. Erice vs. Presiding Judge Dionisio C. Sison

Caguioa, J.
FACTS:
This is an administrative complaint filed by complainant Edgar Erice (Erice) against retired
respondent Judge Dionisio C. Sison (Judge Sison) for gross misconduct, knowingly rendering
unjust judgment or order, and gross ignorance of law or procedure.
This case stemmed from an affirmation of the Court of Appeals of the Order of Preventive
Suspension by the Ombudsman against Echiverri, et al. Echiverri then filed a petition for
declaratory relief with prayer for writ of preliminary injunction before the RTC. Pending the case,
Erice and DILG informed Judge Sison that the OSG was not notified that the case shall proceed
at that time, but even so, Judge Sison proceeded the said hearing and allowed Echiverri, et al. to
present evidence. When petitioner’s Motion to Dismiss was scheduled to be heard, Judge Sison
stated that he would hear evidence in favor of the writ of preliminary injunction. Erice filed a Motion
to Inhibit against respondent but Judge Sison ignored such motion and instead granted the writ of
preliminary injunction.
Judge Sison denied the allegations that he violated the right to due process of Ericeand
DILG in allowing the summary hearing to proceed and the adverse party to present evidence
without notifying the OSG.
ISSUE:
Did the acts of taking cognizance of a case when the CA has affirmed the Order of
suspension, and of the petition for declaratory relief constitute gross ignorance of the law?
RULING:
Yes, the acts of taking cognizance of a case when the CA has affirmed the Order of
suspension, and of the petition for declaratory relief constitute gross ignorance of the law.
Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC, requires
a judge to perform his or her duty and to be acquainted with the law and the rules. A judge becomes
liable for gross ignorance of the law when there is a patent disregard for well-known rules which
can be related to bad faith, dishonesty, and corruption.
In this case, the Court pointed out two instances when Judge Sison showed gross
ignorance of the law. The first is the violation of the principle of non-interference. Since the CA
already affirmed the Order of Suspension by the Ombudsman, Judge Sison could no longer take
cognizance of the case. In disciplinary cases, the Ombudsman and the RTC are co-equal. The
second would be taking cognizance of the petition for declaratory relief. Under Rule 63 of the ROC,
such petition is not applicable on orders, resolutions or decisions of judicial or quasi-judicial bodies
in relation to the principle of res judicata.
By virtue of the aforementioned acts, the Court finds Judge Sison guilty of gross ignorance
of the law.
140 |
IN ORDER TO BE LIABLE FOR GROSS IGNORANCE OF THE LAW, A JUDGE MUST

COMMIT AN ERROR SO EGREGIOUS THAT IT AMOUNTED TO BAD FAITH
Office of the Court Administrator vs. Judge Perla Cabrera-Faller

A.M. Nos. RTJ-11-2301, RTJ-11-2302 & 12-9-188-RTC; January 16, 2018
Sereno, C.J.
FACTS:
This is a compilation of administrative complaints filed against judges and personnel of four
RTC Branches in Cavite.
After a judicial audit was conducted, the investigating team found out that there were
irregularities as to court proceedings in the annulment and declaration of nullity of marriage cases
in four RTC branches in Cavite. The judges involved were asked to comment on the allegations of
their disregard of the provisions of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.
For Judge Cabrera-Faller, he reiterated the regularity of the raffle of the marriage cases.
On the other hand, Judge Quisumbing states that he does not have any control over the number
of case filed and raffled. While, Judge Felicen emphasized that the judges have no option or
privilege to choose or select the cases to be assigned to their court. As for Judge Mangrobang, he
explained that cases involving the declaration of nullity of marriage are not difficult to decide.
Hence, he finds no reason to delay the promulgation of the decision after the parties have
terminated the presentation of their evidence.
ISSUE:
Did the Judges’ blatant disregard of the provisions of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC constitute
gross ignorance of the law and misconduct?
RULING:
Yes, The Judges’ blatant disregard of the provisions of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC constitute
gross ignorance of the law.
For a judge to be liable for gross ignorance of the law, it is not enough that the decision,
order or actuation in the performance of official duties is contrary to existing law and jurisprudence.
It must also be proven that the judge was moved by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty or corruption; or
committed an error so egregious that it amounted to bad faith.
The four courts herein have allowed themselves to become havens for “paid-for-
annulments.” Their apparent conspiracy with the counsels of the parties in order to reflect paper
compliance with the rules if not complete disregard thereof, as well as their failure to manage and
monitor the regularity in the performance of duties by their court personnel, shows not only gross
ignorance of the law but also a wrongful intention that smacks of misconduct.
Therefore, the Judges are guilty of gross ignorance of the law and misconduct.
| 141
A JUDGE SHOULD CONDUCT HIMSELF WITH DIGNITY, INDEPENDENCE AND

RESPECT FOR HIMSELF/HERSELF, THE COURT, AND THE JUDICIARY AS A WHOLE
Bernardita F. Antiporda vs. Francisco A. Ante

A.M. No. MTJ-18-1908; January 16, 2018
Per Curiam
FACTS:
This is an administrative case from a complaint for grave misconduct filed by complainant
Bernardita F. Antiporda (Antiporda) against respondent Judge Francisco A. Ante (Judge Ante).
One morning, while Antiporda was in a backyard adjacent to the lot where Judge Ante was
attending to his fighting cocks, suddenly a confrontation occurred. Said confrontation led to Judge
Ante saying hurtful comments against Antiporda. The Judge also allegedly pointed his gun at the
former.
In his defense, respondent claimed that it was complainant who attempted to kill him by
ordering her workers to attack him with bolos. He denied that he slapped and whipped her with a
dog chain. He also maintained that complainant harbored a grudge against him for having reported
her illegal house renovation to the Engineering Department of the City Hall.
ISSUE:
Are the respondent Judge’s acts in the confrontation, of saying hurtful comments and
pointing his gun reflect the rightful conduct of a member of the judiciary?
RULING:
No. Respondent judge did not act accordingly as a dutiful judge should ought to be.
A judge should always conduct himself in a manner that would preserve the dignity,
independence and respect for himself/herself, the court, and the judiciary as a whole. He should
choose his words and exercise more caution and control in expressing himself. Judges are
required to always be temperate, patient and courteous, both in conduct and in language.
Respondent’s behavior towards complainant amounted to a conduct that the Court cannot
countenance. Apart from being a display of arrogance, respondent Judge’s demeanor and
actuations, which resulted in physical injuries to complainant, are in direct contravention of the
virtues of patience, sobriety and self-restraint so espoused by the Court and highly expected of a
member of the judiciary. Regardless of the reason for the incident, respondent being a magistrate,
should have observed judicial temperament which requires him to be always temperate, patient
and courteous, both in conduct and in language.
Therefore, the Respondent judge is guilty of acts unbecoming of a member of the judiciary.
142 |
PARTY SEEKING THE DISBARMENT OF A MEMBER OF THE BAR MUST PROVE BY

PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE THAT DISBARMENT IS NECESSARY
Re: Verified Complaint of Fernando Castillo Against Associate Justice

Mariflor Punzalan-Castillo
I.P.I. No. 17-267-CA-J; April 24, 2018
Martires, J.
FACTS:
In a verified petition, complainant Castillo accuses CA Associate Justice Mariflor Punzalan-
Castillo of misfeasance or malfeasance.
Complainant accuses Justice Punzalan-Castillo of the following acts: (1) publicly maligning
him as a fraud sans proof during Justice Punzalan-Castillo’s public interview before the JBC when
the latter accused him of falsifying documents; (2) lying under oath when respondent
misrepresented during the same JBC interview; (3) failing to inhibit in spite of conflict of interest in
a case where some of the parties were her husband’s partners; (4) falsifying pleadings filed before
the RTC; and (5) committing forgery in notarizing a deed of mortgage executed by complainant’s
mother.
In her comment, Justice Punzalan-Castillo denied the allegations and offered

corresponding defenses thereto.
ISSUE:
Was the guilt of Associate Justice Punzalan-Castillo for misfeasance and malfeasance
sufficiently proven with preponderant evidence?
RULING:
No, Justice Punzalan-Castillo is not guilty of misfeasance nor malfeasance.
Parties seeking to disbar members of the bar must prove with clearly preponderant evidence that
disbarment is necessary due to the gravity of the said punishment. It is settled that lawyers enjoy
the legal presumption that they are innocent of the charges against them until proven otherwise.
In the present case, the complainant must present sufficient and concrete evidence to
substantiate his accusations against Justice Punzalan-Castillo; otherwise, there will be no basis to
disbar, suspend or remove Justice Punzalan-Castillo from her position as associate justice. The
Court found that the complainant miserably failed to sufficiently substantiate his grave accusations
against Justice Punzalan-Castillo. Therefore, the complaint against Justice Punzalan-Castillo is
dismissed.
| 143
THE COURT HAS THE DISCRETION TO MITIGATE THE PENALTY CONSIDERING THE
CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
Office of the Court Administrator vs. Cobarrubias

A.M. No. P-15-3379; November 22, 2017
Caguioa, J.
FACTS:
An anonymous letter-complaint was sent to the Office of the Court Administrator against
the following personnel of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Branch 24, Manila: Alden
Cobarrubias, Vladimir Bravo, Teodora Balboa, and Antonio Abad, Jr. Abad, Cobarrubias, and
Bravo allegedly falsified their respective daily time record or DTR, while Balboa tolerated the
same.
After an investigation conducted by the OCA, it was found out that Cobarrubias and Bravo,
both clerks of court, have falsified their respective DTR which was allegedly tolerated by Balboa.
Bravo admitted his absences and tardiness but denied that the same were due to drinking.
He explained that he was experiencing severe recurring pain in his joints which made it difficult for
him to walk, thus he incurred the said absences and tardiness. Cobarrubias admitted making the
alterations in his DTRs for fear of suspension for tardiness due to grave personal problems, and
difficulty in traveling from his residence in Bulacan to the office which gave him great stress and
affected his work performance.
OCA recommended for the 3-month suspension of Cobarrubias and a fine of Php 20,000
for Bravo. It also recommended for the dismissal of the complaint against Balboa based on lack of
merit.
ISSUE:
Are the penalties imposed by the Court, which are lower than that prescribed in the rules,
sufficient?
RULING:
Yes, the penalties imposed by the Court, which are lower than that prescribed in the rules,
are sufficient.
While the Court has the duty to discipline its employees, it also has the discretion to temper
the harshness of judgment with mercy.
Considering that Cobarrubias readily admitted his offense, apologized and promised to
reform his ways, the OCA deemed that the penalty of three (3) months suspension without pay will
suffice. Bravo also readily admitted the said findings, sought forgiveness therefor, and attributed
his absences and tardiness to the alleged recurring and severe pain in his joints. Also, since Bravo
already resigned the OCA imposed fine of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) in lieu of
suspension. As for Balboa, the OCA took into consideration her 43 years of service in the
government and the fact that she received several awards including Outstanding Clerk of Court,
First Level Court, from Society for Judicial Excellence for 2007, and Loyalty Award from the City
of Manila.
Therefore, the Court adopted the recommendations of OCA, which imposed penalties
lower than that prescribed in the rules.
144 |
PROOF OF REFORMATION AND A SHOWING OF POTENTIAL AND PROMISE

INDISPENSABLE TO THE GRANT OF JUDICIAL CLEMENCY
Re: Deceitful Conduct of Ignacio S. Del Rosario

A.M. No. 2011-05-SC; June 19, 2018
Carpio, J.
FACTS:
For resolution is a petition for clemency filed by Ignacio S. Del Rosario, a former Cash
Clerk III of the Records and Miscellaneous Matter Section, Checks Disbursement Division,
Financial Management Office-Office of the Court Administrator.
The OCA was furnished a copy of the letter-complaint of Noel G. Primo. The letter-
complaint of Primo was addressed to Del Rosario, demanding the return of a sum of money that
was entrusted to petitioner by Primo in exchange for Del Rosario’s help in processing his retirement
papers. Primo later on discovered that his retirement papers were still with the Court and that Del
Rosario did not actually pay his financial liability with the Court. The Court En Banc dismissed him,
finding that Del Rosario's actions constituted dishonesty and demonstrated conduct prejudicial to
the best interest of the service.
In his motion for reconsideration, Del Rosario noted that, up until his dismissal, he had
served the Judiciary for 33 years and, except for his administrative case, he had not been charged
with any other misdemeanor. In his petition for clemency, Del Rosario attached a Certificate of
Good Moral Standing issued by the Office of the Sangguniang Barangay of Sta. Cruz, Naga City,
certifying that he has been an active partner in various programs and activities conducted in their
barangay, and a Certificate of Good Moral Standing issued by the San Lorenzo Ruiz de Manila
Parish, Abella, Naga City.
ISSUE:
Is Del Rosario, after submitting Certificates of Good Moral Character, entitled to a grant of
judicial clemency?
RULING:
No, Del Rosario, after submitting Certificates of Good Moral Character, is not entitled to a
grant of judicial clemency.
Judicial clemency is an act of mercy removing any disqualification from the erring official.
It is not a privilege or a right that can be availed of at any time. The Court will only grant it in
meritorious cases. Proof of reformation and a showing of potential and promise are considered as
indispensable requirements to the grant of judicial clemency.
In Re: Letter of Judge Augustus C. Diaz, the Court laid down the following guidelines in
resolving requests for judicial clemency: (1) There must be proof of remorse and reformation; (2)
Sufficient time must have lapsed from the imposition of the penalty to ensure a period of
reformation; (3) The age of the person asking for clemency must show that he still has productive
years ahead of him that can be put to good use by giving him a chance to redeem himself; (4)
There must be a showing of promise as well as potential for public service; and (5) There must be
other relevant factors and circumstances that may justify clemency.
Nevertheless, the Certificates of Good Moral Standing do not sufficiently prove that he has
already fully and effectively reformed himself after his dismissal from the service meriting the
Court's liberality. Being an active member in his barangay and Parish Lay Ministry does not
necessarily show true repentance and reformation, considering that what is at stake is the integrity
of the Judiciary. Thus, he is not entitled to judicial clemency.
| 145
THE SUPREME COURT HAS DISCRETION TO ADJUST THE PENALTIES IN THE

PRESENCE OF MITIGATING FACTORS
The Office of the Court Administrator vs. Crispin Egipto

A.M. No. P-05-1938; January 30, 2018
Per Curiam
FACTS:
This is a resolution from the motion for reconsideration filed by respondent Egipto, Clerk
of Court of MTC of Pagadian City, of his penalty of dismissal with forfeiture of all his retirement
benefits, to suspension of six months, or to a fine in an equitable amount.
The Court declared respondent guilty of gross neglect of duty, dishonesty and grave
misconduct for failing to remit his collection on time. Accordingly, he was dismissed from his work
with forfeiture of all retirement benefits, with prejudice to his re-employment in the Government.
Respondent raised as consideration for his motion that he served the Judiciary for more
than 36 years and that he has returned the full amount that he neglected to remit.
ISSUE:
Can the Supreme Court reduce the penalty when there are circumstances that provide for
its reduction?
RULING:
Yes. In several administrative cases, the Court has refrained from imposing the actual
penalties in the presence of mitigating factors.
Factors such as the respondent’s length of service, the respondent’s acknowledgement of

his or her infractions and feeling of remorse, family circumstances, humanitarian and equitable
considerations, respondent’s advanced age, among other things, have had varying significance in
the Court’s determination of the imposable penalty.
The circumstances listed by the respondent merit the mitigation of the ultimate penalty of
dismissal from the service with forfeiture of all retirement with prejudice to his reemployment in the
Government, including GOCCs imposed upon him. Thus, the Court can reduce the penalty
provided for.
146 |
SERVICES AS BAR EXAMINER NOT INCLUDED IN THE COMPUTATION OF

LONGEVITY PAY
Re: Martin S. Villarama

A.M. No. 15-11-01-SC; March 6, 2018
Martires, J.
FACTS
This case concerns the computation of the longevity pay of Associate Justice Martin S.
Villarama, Jr., a former member of the Supreme Court.
Under Administrative Circular No. 58-2003, earned leave credits shall be allowed to be
tacked to the length of judicial service for the purpose of increasing the longevity pay of Justices
and Judges who reach the age of compulsory retirement. The computation should also include the
additional percentage of longevity pay that corresponds to any fraction of a five-year period in the
total number of years of continuous, efficient and meritorious service rendered, considering that
the retiree would no longer be able to complete the period because of his compulsory retirement.
Gleaned from the text of A.C. No. 58-2003, the benefits provided therein seemed to apply only to
justices and judges who retire compulsorily.
Justice Villarama applied for optional retirement. In a letter, he requests that the benefits
of A.C. No. 58-2003 be applied in computing his longevity pay.
ISSUE:
Should the service rendered by a member of the judiciary as bar examiner be credited as
part of judicial service for the purpose of increasing longevity pay?
RULING:
No, the service rendered by a member of the judiciary as bar examiner should not be
credited as part of judicial service for the purpose of increasing longevity pay.
After careful deliberation, the Court rules to grant Justice Villarama's request to tack his
earned leave credits, but not his services as Bar Examiner in 2004, to his years in judicial service
for purposes of computing his longevity pay. The reason for denying an incumbent member of the
judiciary the inclusion of his or her service as bar examiner in the computation of the longevity pay
is simple. At the time of his or her appointment as bar examiner, an incumbent justice or judge is
already concurrently serving in the judiciary. The regular functions of the justice or judge and the
service performed as bar examiner cannot appropriately be considered as two separable and finite
judicial services if they supposedly coincide at the same time or period.
It would be defying logic and sensible reasoning if one is to be tacked to the other, in effect
extending the length of judicial service, even if no additional time was really spent in the
performance of the service as bar examiner outside of the time or period actually served as justice
or judge. Not even the liberal approach in the treatment of retirement laws could save the argument
for tacking such service as bar examiner in favor of an incumbent justice or judge.
Thus, for purposes of computing longevity pay, we find no justifiable reason in tacking the
service as bar examiner to the judicial service of one who is already member of the judiciary.
| 147
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LAYOUT AND CONTENT EDITORS

SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW

GERARD ANGELO T. DE JESUS

DENNISSE IAN I. BONSATO

UT IN OMNIBUS GLORIFICETUR DEUS!

THIS IS THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OF THE

THE UNAUTHORIZED COPYING, REPRODUCTION,

Joaquin G. Bonifacio vs. Atty. Edgardo O. Era and ……………………………………… 1

Heirs of Juan de Dios E. Carlos vs. Atty. Jaime S. Linsangan …………………………… 3

Cesar Sta. Ana vs. Atty. Antonio Cortes ……………………………………………………. 55

Elibena A. Cabiles vs. Atty. Leandro S. Cedo …………………………………………….. 69

LAWYER’S ACTIONS AS AN ATTORNEY-IN-FACT PURSUANT TO A SPECIAL POWER

GOOD MORAL CHARACTER OF A LAWYER IS A CONTINUING REQUIREMENT UNTIL

Gizale O. Tumbaga vs. Atty. Manuel P. Teoxon

THE PROSCRIPTION ON NON-PURCHASE OF INTEREST IN THE SUBJECT MATTER OF

Heirs of Juan de Dios E. Carlos vs. Atty. Jaime S. Linsangan

FALSIFICATION IS AN ACT OF FALSEHOOD, REPREHENSIBLE UNDER THE CODE OF

Manuel L. Valin vs. Atty. Rolando T. Ruiz

A LAWYER MUST BE A DISCIPLE OF TRUTH OTHERWISE HIS COMMISSION OF

Marjorie A. Apolinar-Petilo vs. Atty. Aristedes A. Maramot

A LAWYER SHALL NOT ENGAGE IN UNLAWFUL, DISHONEST, IMMORAL, OR

Freddie A. Guillen vs. Atty. Audie Arnado

A LAWYER’S FAILURE TO FULFILL THE BASIC UNDERTAKING IN FOLLOWING THE

Ma. Vilma F. Maniquiz vs. Atty. Danilo C. Emelo

A LAWYER MUST BE CONVERSANT WITH BASIC LEGAL PRINCIPLES IN ORDER NOT

Luzviminda S. Cerilla vs. Atty. Samuel SM. Lezama

A LAWYER SHALL NOT USE INTEMPERATE LANGUAGE IN HIS PROFESSIONAL

Lito V. Buenviaje vs. Atty. Melchor G. Magdamo

IBP-CBD recommended that responded be reprimanded. IBP-Board of Governors raised

Thus, by using intemperate language, respondent is administratively liable and is

A LAWYER HAS A DUTY TO MAINTAIN THE HONOR DUE TO THE LEGAL

Atty. Rosita L. Dela Fuente Torres vs. Atty. Bayani P. Dalangin

LAWYERS MUST NOT ENGAGE IN CONDUCT WHICH TENDS TO LESSEN IN ANY

Oliver Fabugais vs. Atty. Berardo C. Faundo Jr.

IBP HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER ADMINISTRATIVE OFFENSES INVOLVING

Manuel B. Trovela vs. Michael B. Robles, as Assistant City Prosecutor, et al.,

Consequently, Trovela initiated disbarment proceedings against the respondents. In his

The acts complained of undoubtedly arose from the respondents' performance or

FORUM SHOPPING AMOUNTS TO ABUSE OF THE COURT’S PROCESSES AND WILL BE

Dr. Eduardo R. Alicias, Jr. vs. Atty. Vivencio S. Baclig

LAWYERS SHALL OBSERVE AND MAINTAIN RESPECT TO COURT AND COURT

Carlina P. Robiñol vs. Atty. Edilberto P. Bassig

A LAWYER DOES NOT HAVE AN UNBRIDLED RIGHT TO FILE PLEADINGS, MOTIONS

Ret. Judge Virgilio Alpajora vs. Atty. Ronaldo Antonio V. Calayan

THE FILING OF MULTIPLE PETITIONS CONSTITUTES ABUSE OF THE COURT'S

REPETITIVE DISREGARD OF THE COURT’S DIRECTIVES CONTRAVENES A

Zarcilla executed an Affidavit-Complaint against Atty. Quesada and Bumanglag for

THE FIRST AND PRIMARY DUTY OF LAWYERS IS TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF

In Re: CA-G.R. CV No. 96282 vs. Atty. Claro Jordan M. Santamaria

THE SUPREME COURT MAY TAKE NOTICE OF A LAWYER WHO IS NOT A

THERE IS CONFLICT OF INTEREST WHEN A LAWYER REPRESENTS INCONSISTENT

Gregorio V. Capinpin, Jr. vs. Atty. Estanislao L. Cesa, Jr.

LAWYERS ARE DEEMED TO REPRESENT CONFLICTING INTERESTS WHEN IT IS

Filipinas O. Celedonio vs. Atty. Jaime F. Estrabillo

THE TERMINATION OF THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP DOES NOT JUSTIFY

Paces Industrial Corporation vs. Atty. Edgardo M. Salandanan

Salandanan was a stockholder and counsel of Paces Corporation. As counsel, he

The termination of attorney-client relationship does not justify a lawyer to represent an

IN CONFERRING WITH A PROSPECTIVE CLIENT, A LAWYER MUST DISCLOSE ANY

Complainant is the owner-developer of a parcel of land being developed into a residential

Hence, absent such written consent, respondent is guilty of representing conflicting

THERE IS CONFLICT OF INTEREST WHEN A LAWYER SUBSEQUENTLY HANDLES A