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Names: Peterman, Keith E., editor. | Foy, Gregory P., editor. | Cordes,
Matthew R., editor. | American Chemical Society. Division of Chemical
Education. Title: Climate change literacy and education / Keith E. Peterman,
editor (York College of Pennsylvania, York, Pennsylvania), Gregory P. Foy, editor
(York College of Pennsylvania, York, Pennsylvania), Matthew R. Cordes, editor
(Writing Works, Ltd., Lehighton, Pennsylvania) ; sponsored by the ACS Division of
Chemical Education. Description: Washington, DC : American Chemical Society,
[2017]- | Series: ACS symposium series ; 1247, 1254 | Includes bibliographical
references and index. Contents: volume 1. The science and perspectives from the
global stage -- volume 2. Social justice, energy, economics, and the Paris agreement
Identifiers: LCCN 2017045512 (print) | LCCN 2017048554 (ebook) | ISBN
9780841232051 (ebook, v.1) | ISBN 9780841232297 (ebook, v.2) |
ISBN 9780841232068 (v. 1) | ISBN 9780841232327 (v. 2)
Subjects: LCSH: Climate change mitigation--International cooperation. |
Greenhouse gas mitigation--International cooperation.
Classification: LCC QC902.9 (ebook) | LCC QC902.9 .C57 2017 (print) | DDC
363.738/746--dc23
LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2017045512
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9. How to Re-Energize Our Electric Grid for the Future of the Planet ................ 99
Jessica McDonald
10. It Is Better To Light a Candle Than To Curse the Darkness ............................ 111
Keith E. Peterman, Gregory P. Foy, and Matthew R. Cordes
Indexes
vii
Preface
This book is the second volume in the Climate Science Literacy and
Education series, which is written to promote climate science literacy and
education among college and university students, young adults, educators,
policymakers, and the general public. Our ACS Climate Change Public Policy
Statement recommends that “The U.S. Government should promote climate
science literacy and education for citizens and policymakers about climate change
impacts to help empower citizens and local and regional governments to make
informed decisions and preparations to help protect homes, businesses, and
communities against adverse impacts.” With the exception of the concluding
chapter, all chapters are authored by students who have represented the ACS as
UN-accredited “Observers” at the annual United Nations Framework Convention
on Climate Change (UNFCCC) Conferences of Parties (COPs) at COP18 in
Doha, Qatar (2012), COP19 in Warsaw, Poland (2013), COP20 in Lima, Peru
(2014), and COP21 in Paris, France (2015). These student authors have directly
engaged the global community, ranging from heads of state and leaders within
indigenous communities to youth and everyday citizens.
Chapters in this volume address issues of social and economic justice, the
energy crisis and mitigation strategies, public policy, and the Paris Agreement,
which was the result of COP21 in 2015. The book cover photos, meanwhile,
juxtapose the towering significance of the Paris Agreement with multiple not-to-
be-crossed red lines of climate justice. Citizens from around the globe held a
Red-Line climate action at the conclusion of COP21 where the Paris Agreement
was adopted.
We wish to acknowledge and thank Tony Noce (ACS CEI Chair) for
championing this project, Ray Garant (ACS Assistant Director for Public Policy)
for his advice and tireless organization of functions and activities, Carl Maxwell
(ACS Manager of Energy and Environment Policy) for UN accreditation logistics
and arranging informative, off-the-record meetings with federal agencies and
staffers on Capitol Hill, Joan Coyle (ACS Lead Communications Officer) for
media outreach coaching, and Diane Husic (Dean of the School of Natural and
Health Sciences at Moravian College) for serving as a faculty mentor for the ACS
students during week one of the annual COP. We also offer special thanks to Laura
Pence (former CEI Chair), under whose leadership this project was launched,
and to Rachael Bishop (former Manager of ACS Public Policy Communications)
for initiating media training sessions for the ACS COP students at ACS National
Headquarters in Washington, DC.
This project would not have been possible without the financial support and
faculty mentoring by the numerous colleges and universities that have sponsored
ix
their students’ participation in this project, as well as the support of parents and
family.
Keith E. Peterman
Professor of Chemistry, York College of Pennsylvania
York, Pennsylvania 17403, United States
717-815-1334 (office) (telephone)
717-825-1716 (cell) (telephone)
peterman@ycp.edu (e-mail)
Gregory P. Foy
Associate Professor of Chemistry, York College of Pennsylvania
York, Pennsylvania 17403, United States
717-815-1523 (office) (telephone)
717-968-0870 (cell) (telephone)
gfoy@ycp.edu (e-mail)
Matthew R. Cordes
Principal Writer, Writing Works, Ltd.
Lehighton, Pennsylvania 18235, United States
570-556-8832 (cell) (telephone)
matt@writingworksltd.com (e-mail)
x
Chapter 1
While the first COP took place in 1995, it was not until
1998 that Indigenous peoples began participating, and not
until 2001 that Indigenous Peoples Organizations (IPO) were
considered a constituency. Meanwhile, even as participation in
the UNFCCC grows, Indigenous peoples are routinely left out
of global agreements including the Kyoto Protocol and Cancun
Agreement, and only mentioned in non-binding sections of
the Paris Agreement. However, this has not, and will not stop
Indigenous peoples from taking a stand against climate change.
Defining Indigenous
One of the many difficulties Indigenous peoples face at the international
level is an ambiguous understanding of the term “Indigenous.” The United
Nations (UN) has never officially adopted a definition of the term. Instead,
the UN has a system for identifying Indigenous peoples that revolves around
self-identification. Generally, Indigenous peoples are identified by the UN as
having “self identification as Indigenous peoples at the individual level and
accept by the community as their member, historical continuity with pre-colonial
and/or pre-settler societies, strong link to territories and surrounding natural
resources, distinct social, economic or political systems, distinct language, culture
and beliefs, form non-dominant groups of society, and resolve to maintain and
reproduce their ancestral environments and systems as distinctive peoples and
communities.” While Indigenous is a generic term, in various countries different
terms are used including tribes, first peoples/nations, aboriginals, etc. (3).
2
The Journey Continues
Flash forward to December 2015; I am no longer standing in the middle of the
jungle being attacked by ants. Instead I am outfitted in professional attire, staring
up at the Eiffel Tower. I’m in Paris for a reason similar to the one that compelled
me to work in the jungle of Panama—a desire to learn more about Indigenous
peoples, their history, their culture, and what role they will play in the historic
climate change negotiations that are about to take place in Paris.
After serving as a Peace Corps volunteer, I returned to the United States
and decided to commit my studies to learning more about Indigenous peoples
and climate change. At the center of my masters research, I undertook the
challenge and privilege of working with a Native American tribe in the Pacific
Northwest, studying how climate change was impacting their community and
how the tribe could use their own, traditional knowledge to adapt. Focusing
on a subspecies of cutthroat trout that is being gravely impacted by climate
change, I worked with fish biologists and tribal members to devise a culturally
approproriate climate change management plan (4). Just as I was beginning this
research, I was given the opportunity to attend the 21st Conference of Parties
(COP 21) of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCCC) as a student delegate for the American Chemical Society. Attending
COP 21 would be the perfect way to combine what I had learned and witnessed
in the Comarca Guna Yala of Panama, with what I was learning in the Pacific
Northwest of the United States. I was excited to attend the conference and hear
more from and about Indigenous communities spanning the globe. Armed with
my NGO observer badge, I had access to areas where the general public was not
permitted. I was surprised to discover that while sovereign countries had their
pavilions in the blue zone (the area not open to the general public), the Indigenous
Pavilion was relegated to the public green zone, the area where NGOs and other
organizations had their booths. This arrangement presented me with a question:
when most Indigenous peoples from across the globe are considered to be part of
sovereign nations, why aren’t they treated like other nations in critical discussions
directly impacting their peoples by the United Nations? To better understand
the placement of the Indigenous Pavilion, it was important to learn more about
the history of Indigenous Participation within the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).
4
of adaptation techniques that could harm Indigenous Peoples’ rights (such as
nuclear energy, dams, etc), funding, risk insurance and recognition of fundamental
human rights. The list of fourteen “Calls for Action” elaborates on many of the
concerns Indigenous people across the globe have in relation to the effect of
climate change on their livelihood (11).
A few months after the creation of the Anchorage Declaration, in September
of 2009, there was an International Indigenous People’s Forum on Climate
Change (IIPFCC) held in Bangkok, Thailand. The end result of this meeting
was the creation of a Policy Paper on Climate Change. Similar to the Anchorage
Declaration, this paper contains a list of assertions, regarding the rights of
Indigenous peoples in respect to climate change (12).
Each year after, the IIPFCC wrote proposals to the UNFCCC listing
their demands. In November of 2014, the IIPFCC wrote a list of demands in
preparation for COP 20 in Lima, Peru and COP 21 in Paris, France. First on
their list of demands was “recognition of a human rights-based approach which
respects Indigenous peoples’ rights in climate-change agreements and related
actions,” followed by “respect of Indigenous peoples’ rights to lands, territories
and resources,” “recognition of, and respect for, Indigenous traditional knowledge
and the role of Indigenous peoples in adaptation and mitigation,” “recognition
of Indigenous peoples’ community-based monitoring and information systems,”
“respect Indigenous peoples’ rights to full and effective participation in all climate
change actions and UNFCCC institutions,” and “ensure Indigenous peoples’
direct access to finance and capacity building (13).”
One year later, in November of 2015, the IIPFCC narrowed their demands
to four in preparation for COP 21 in Paris and in the creation of a global
climate change agreement. The four demands included “respect for human
rights of Indigenous peoples in climate change policies and actions,” “recognize
peoples’ traditional knowledge and positive contributions to climate adaptation,
mitigation and respect Indigenous peoples’ traditional livelihoods,” “ensure full
and effective participation of Indigenous peoples including women and youth in
climate change-related processes and programs at local, national, regional and
international levels,” and “ensure direct access to climate finance for Indigenous
peoples from developed and developing countries.” (14).
Along with demands at international negotiations, the other path Indigenous
peoples recently began exploring to bring attention to their plight and to give
themselves a visible presence in the UNFCCC, is hosting a pavilion at the COPs.
This was the same pavilion that I was slightly disappointed to see relgated to the
Green Zone, rather than standing alongside the representative country pavilions
in the Blue Zone. The first Indigenous Peoples’ Pavilion occurred at COP 20
in Lima, Peru. The pavilion at COP 21 in Paris was only the second time the
International Indigenous Peoples’ Forum had been awarded such a space. And
while their space was in the Green Zone, it was the largest space awarded to any
group in that zone. The pavilion was financially supported by the government of
Norway and the COP Presidency of France. Throughout the two weeks of COP
21 the Indigenous Peoples’ Pavilion hosted over 80 different events, representing
more than 300 different Indigenous communities from around the world. Even
though the pavilion was not in the more prestigious Blue Zone, it still garnered
5
attention from high profile politicians, including presidents and prime ministers
(15).
COP 21
Peruvian Palm Oil
It was in the Indigenous Peoples’ Pavilion that I had the privilege of meeting
Hilaria Supa Humán, a Peruvian congresswoman who represents Indigenous
communities and is Indigenous herself. She and I were attending the same
presentation, led by Peruvian Indigenous activist Robert Guimaraes Vasquez
that focused on the problem palm oil companies are creating for Indigenous
peoples in Peru. While his example was very specific, he touched on a number of
shared issues concerning Indigenous peoples across the globe, many of which the
Indigenous people were petitioning to include in the Paris Agreement.
Guimaraes Vasquez pointed out that while many Indigenous Peruvians do
not have a college education, this does not mean they are not knowledgeable.
Indigenous Peruvians, like many Indigenous peoples, have extensive knowledge
about the forest and environment where they live. This knowledge is passed
down from generation to generation and instills a sense of identity within the
Indigenous peoples. This knowledge that Guimaraes Vasquez spoke about
is generally referred to as Traditional Knowledge, or more specifically, as
Traditional Ecological Knowledge.
Indigenous peoples have long standing ties to the earth and environment,
however, in Peru the federal government does not legally recognize most
Indigenous community territories, just small pieces of land. According to
Guimaraes Vasquez, there are over 1,200 communities in Peru waiting a title
on all or part of their territory, which means that over 20 million hectares of
land—land where Indigenous community reside—is vulnerable to “land grabs.”
Currently, one of the biggest threats to Indigenous lands in Peru is the palm
oil companies. Guimaraes Vasquez explained that there are around 25 companies
linked to palm oil operating in Peru. These companies come into Indigenous areas
with large machines that deforest and destroy the entire area. The once pristine
forests, the homeland of Indigenous peoples, are being turned into deserts. As of
2013 palm oil production is responsible for nearly 10% of annual deforestation
occurring in Peru, and is projected to to increase rapidly (16). According to
Guimaraes Vasquez, not only is the land being impacted, but potable water is as
well. The companies use the rivers to transport wood, degrading the quality of
water that many Indigenous peoples rely on for drinking.
Guimaraes Vasquez explained that while publicly the Peruvian government
is calling for an end to deforestation, the Indigenous people are not seeing any
action at the local level. Instead, Indigenous peoples have been mobilizing
community groups. In response to the opposition of community groups, the palm
oil companies have filed lawsuits against the group leaders. Guimaraes Vasquez
discussed how one extremely vocal opposition leader was forced to leave the area
and go into hiding after his life was threatened. But even death threats have not
stopped the local groups from fighting back to protect their ancestral lands. The
6
community groups have submitted formal complaints to the government and are
planning to take legal action on the local, national, and international levels.
Meanwhile, some of the Indigenous communities in Peru are hoping to take
advantage of a native resource, rosewood, to both protect their forests and bring
in income. Rosewood oil is a high-value product, and the Indigenous people in
the area have found a British company willing to purchase the product, but if palm
oil companies continue to come in and clear-cut their forests, all of the rosewood
trees will be gone.
The problems that Guimaraes Vasquez spoke of relate directly to one of the
demands that the IIPFCC made coming into COP 20, “respect of Indigenous
peoples’ rights to lands, territories and resources”. They also speak to the
more all-encompassing demand the IIPFCC asked for coming into COP 21,
“recognize peoples’ traditional knowledge and positive contributions to climate
adaptation, mitigation and respect Indigenous peoples’ traditional livelihoods”
(14). Indigenous peoples have the ability to protect and maintain the forests, but
not if they do not have the legal rights to their lands. The problems Guimaraes
Vasquez and his people are facing in Peru are similar to problems most Indigenous
peoples are facing.
Paris Agreement
Even with the Indigenous peoples’ demands, and their well attended
Pavilion at COP 21, the Paris Agreement still desregards their rights and
livlihood. Indigenous leaders have written multiple articles, blog posts, and an
official statement, expressing how the Paris Agreement marginalizes Indigenous
communities around the world.
While Indigenous peoples are mentioned in the Paris Agreement, the
only references occur in nonbinding portions of the text. The first mention of
Indigenous peoples can be found very early on in the document, in the preamble.
The line reads, “Parties should, when taking action to address climate change,
respect, promote, and consider their respective obligations on human rights, the
right to health, the rights of Indigenous peoples, local communities, migrants,
children, persons with disabilities and people in vulnerable situations and the
right to development, as well as gender equality, empowerment of women and
intergenerational equity” (17). Not only is this non-binding because of the
location of the statement (in the preamble), it is also non-binding due to the
wording, which encourages action using the word “should”. Only statements that
follow the word “shall” are considered legally binding and require that countries
adhere to what is written in the document.
Indigenous peoples appear to be both encouraged and disappointed by their
inclusion in the Paris Agreement. A statement released on December 12, 2016 by
the IIPFCC explains their excitement and concern, reiterating the three messages
they wanted the UNFCCC to take into consideration. The first message stated
that “it is essential that the rights of Indigenous peoples be recognized, protected
and respected within a broad human rights framework.” However, while there is
mention of this in the preamble, Indigenous peoples wanted this point to be made
in the operative section of the agreement (18).
The second message that Indigenous peoples wanted to be included in
the agreement was to keep the temperature goal “no more than 1.5 degrees
Celsius”(18). During COP 21, there were multiple marches throughout the Green
and the Blue Zones, with participants from small island nations and Indigenous
peoples demanding the UNFCCC include a temperature goal of less than 1.5
degrees Celsius increase. Signs read “1.5 to stay alive.” To the disappointment
of these groups, the Paris Agreement stated that the goal is “holding the increase
in the global average temperature to well below 2 degrees C above pre-industrial
levels and pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5 degrees C above
pre-industrial levels.” (17) For island nations like the Guna Yala, “pursuing” a 1.5
degree C goal will not be good enough.
The third, and final message the IIPFCC had for the UNFCCC was to include
“recognition, respect for, and use of our traditional knowledge, with our free,
8
prior, and informed consent.” Once again, while this provision was included in the
Paris Agreement, it included the qualification “where appropriate.” Indigenous
peoples felt that this provision should be applied throughout the entirety of the
Paris Agreement and should not include the provision “where appropriate” (18).
An article published by Cultural Survival further expressed Indigenous peoples’
disappointment in the Paris Agreement. In the early drafts of the Paris Agreement,
the protection of Indigenous rights was included in Article 2.2. However, the
European Union, Norway and the United States, who are often criticized for
their lack of support of Indigenous rights, forced the removal of the protection of
Indigenous rights from the main text of the Paris Agreement. Instead, Indigenous
rights were mentioned in the preamble of the Paris Agreement, a section of the
text that is nonbinding. The UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues Chair,
Megan Davis, explained that the Paris Agreement only asks states to “consider
their human rights obligations” when it should tell them to comply (19).
From the Indigenous peoples’ viewpoint, the largest problem with the
agreement remains the use of “should” vs “shall”. Where Indigenous rights are
mentioned in the preamble, language stating it “should” respect Indigenous rights,
does not make it legally binding (19).
While the Paris Agreement was not necessarily the perfect document, it
is still a major step in the right direction toward achieving the inclusion of
Indigenous rights, a fact that Indigenous peoples acknowledge. However, it does
not adequately reflect the rights of Indigenous peoples across the world. What
will the Indigenous Guna Yala do if the sea engulfs their ancestral homeland?
How will Guimaraes Vasquez and the Indigenous Peruvians stop deforestation if
they do not have the titles to their land?
Indigenous peoples continue their battle. Youth groups like Clima y Juventud
are fighting back; they are raising awareness and speaking out on behalf of their
people. The IIPFCC produced a statement immediately after the Paris Agreement
was signed, explaining their disappointment.
The main things I observed in my experiences in Panama, my research with
a tribe in the Pacific Northwest, and my time in Paris, were the resiliency and
determination of Indigenous peoples. They will continue to fight back and will be
leaders in the movement to reduce and eventually end man-made climate change.
Climate change is not a problem that will wait to effect Indigenous peoples in
20 years. It is a problem they are dealing with currently. From the impending
flooding of the Guna Yala lands in Panama to the reduction of cutthroat trout in the
northwest United States to the deforestation in Peru, these threats are current and
real. The exclusion of Indigenous peoples from the binding sections of the Paris
Agreement is disappointing given their role as stakeholders and how immediately
it affects some of the Indigenous community but it is not stopping Indigenous
peoples from seeking solutions that will affect the survival of their culture and
even their land.
9
References
10
static/5627862ce4b07be93cfb9461/t/565f8f51e4b06723863ccf5a/
1449103185483/Proposals+to+Governments.pdf (accessed Aug. 28, 2016).
15. International Indigenous People’s Forum on Climate Change (IIPFCC).
http://www.iipfcc.org/cop21/ (accessed Aug. 28, 2016).
16. EU Indigenous and Community Palm Oil Tour 2016 Peru Briefing, 2016.
http://www.burness.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/Peru-Palm-Oil-
Brief.pdf (accessed Dec. 21, 2016).
17. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. Adoption of the
Paris Agreement, 2015. https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2015/cop21/eng/
l09r01.pdf (accessed Aug. 29, 2016).
18. International Indigenous Peoples Forum on Climate Change
Statement at Closing Plenary of UNFCCC COP21, 2015.
http://static1.squarespace.com/static/5627862ce4b07be93cfb9461/t/
577fbe7fe6f2e15dc174d54f/1467989631569/
International+Indigenous+Peoples+Forum+on+Climate+Change+Closing+
Statement.pdf (accessed Aug. 29, 2016).
19. “Annexed:” The Rights of Indigenous Peoples in the UN
Climate Change Conference 2015. Cultural Survival, 2015.
https://www.culturalsurvival.org/news/annexed-rights-Indigenous-peoples-
un-climate-change-conference-2015 (accessed Aug. 29, 2016).
11
Chapter 2
The climate talks in Paris (COP21) brought the climate justice framework
to the forefront of my mind. There are variable definitions of climate justice,
but the following definition comes closest to describing climate justice the way
I personally experience it:
This concept seems fairly simple to grasp, but as I learned from the climate
talks in Paris, it is among the hardest principles to execute. While climate change
is seen as a threat to the entire world, it is important to understand that this global
issue is adversely affecting some communities at an alarmingly faster rate and with
more intensity than other communities. Unfortunately, the most adversely affected
communities also face other challenges such as lack of representation in positions
of power, as well as a lack of financial and social capital. This divide results in
the creation of solutions to climate change that seem effective at the surface, but
may be detrimental to certain groups of people. Through my many conversations
with youth leaders, Indigenous rights groups, and peers from around the world, I
realized that one thing I could do as a student observer at this historically important
convention was to spread these unheard voices as far as possible. Their opinions
and real life experiences are not sufficiently explained through annual UN progress
reports.
In this chapter, I will focus on a proposed solution to climate change,
Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation in Developing
Countries (REDD+), that has received a large amount of funding and international
support (2). REDD+ has also been deemed a “false solution” by many climate
justice activists and Indigenous groups who directly face the consequences
of implementing this program. Before I explain what the REDD+ program
is, I want to clarify what I mean by a false solution. For me, a false solution
is a solution that does not tackle the direct cause of the problem; instead,
the solution acts as a temporary fix and further, adversely affects certain
disadvantaged groups. In this chapter, I will discuss the straightforward problem
of deforestation, its contribution to climate change, strengths and weaknesses of
a deforestation prevention program like REDD+, and its impact on surrounding
forest-dependent and Indigenous communities. Additionally, I will discuss
REDD+ as a systemically propagated program that allows businesses to continue
business-as-usual while claiming that their activities are eco-friendly.
The fact that the REDD+ program was formed clearly indicates the
importance of protecting forests to combat climate change. To understand exactly
why deforestation is important in combatting climate change, I will now discuss
the impact of deforestation on the environment.
REDD+
Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD) has
been discussed in the UNFCCC climate negotiations since 2005 as a mechanism
to mitigate global climate change (8). It is a global initiative that aims to reward
developing countries or private parties for conserving their forests, by providing
direct funding, providing emissions credits that could be traded on a carbon
market, or combining both types of payments to reduce emissions of greenhouse
gases (9). REDD can be described as a two-tier payment system: payments are
first transferred from international donors to national-level organizations, namely
national governments (9). These payments are conditional on the implementation
of policies that help reduce emissions. Thereafter, national-level organizations
are accountable for distributing these payments to sub-national organizations such
as forest communities, or local governments that helped lower emissions (9).
Since its inception, REDD has evolved into REDD+ to include interventions
such as conservation and the sustainable management of forests, as well as the
enhancement of forest carbon stocks through tree plantations and afforestation
(10). REDD+ also emphasizes that long-term estimations of emission and
removals should be done on a land basis instead of an activity basis, since
land-based approaches more accurately reflect the land’s true effect on the
environment (11). Additionally, REDD+ aims to recognize the inclusion of the
rights of Indigenous Peoples, new social and environmental safeguards, and
concepts around financial mechanisms and equitable distribution of funds (9). In
the context of REDD+, safeguards refer to actions that protect against potential
adverse environmental and social effects of REDD+ such as loss of biodiversity,
land grabbing, and loss of livelihoods (9).
The initial phase of REDD+ involves preparing countries for its
implementation through ‘readiness’ mechanisms. These ensure that the drivers of
16
deforestation are being tackled and that procedures and safeguards are in place to
allow equitable distribution of benefits arising from REDD+ (11). Most countries
are in this phase now, though many have pushed ahead to adopt national REDD+
strategies without carrying out rigorous assessments of deforestation drivers. In
addition to the lack of proper assessments of deforestation drivers, readiness
actions have also tended to focus on measuring carbon and forest cover changes,
without adequate attention to governance and rights issues (11). REDD+ is less
likely to be successful if the readiness mechanisms do not focus on targeting
major deforestation drivers and protecting vulnerable communities.
At the surface level, the concept of compensating countries, forest
communities, and locals involved in limiting deforestation sounds like a fair
and fool-proof solution to combat climate change. However, climate justice
activists from all over the world have been pleading the international community
to recognize the downfalls of the REDD+ program. Activists claim that REDD+,
contrary to UN reporting, is destroying biodiversity, allowing large-scale
industries to continue polluting by creating carbon markets, undermining the
traditional knowledge and land rights of Indigenous peoples, and ultimately
upholding the capitalist structure of profitization over the needs of forest
dependent communities. Furthermore, REDD+ demands transparency from all
national parties but seems to have little control over how monetary rewards and
other safeguards are equitably distributed among all stakeholders. It is unclear
how REDD+ expects countries to fully uphold its principles of transparency and
accountability when each country deals with national and local level corruption
differently or has different policies regarding Indigenous land rights. In this
context, it is interesting to deconstruct why the people who are most vulnerable
to climate change are vehemently opposing an internationally approved program
that aims to mitigate climate change and promises to compensate them fairly
when implementing this program. This discordance raises the question, why are
supposed benefactors of REDD+ resistant to this program?
18
have an institutional advantage for implementing REDD+. However, while
community Forestry has successfully reforested much of Nepal, it faces a
reinvigorated government challenge to land tenure under REDD+ (19). If
the financial value of forests goes up, REDD+ payments may incentivize the
government and private companies to take advantage of current land tenure laws
and seek larger soil carbon payments. The fact that REDD+ commodifies forest
carbon—and thus creates carbon markets that encourage carbon trading rather
than limiting activities that increase greenhouse gas emissions—is an important
factor in drawing in opposition from climate justice activists. Commodifying
forest carbon is also inherently inequitable, since it discriminates against people,
especially women who contribute significantly to forest management, but will
no longer have free access to the forest resources they need to raise and care
for their families (20). Women gather fuelwood, and non-wood forest products
for food, medicine, and fodder, and often cannot afford to purchase alternative
resources. By cutting off free access to forest resources, REDD+ could increase
workloads for women without appropriately scaled compensation, displace them
from forests, deny them a fair share of benefits, or leave them out of consultations
and capacity-building activities (21).
REDD+ is based on the notion that reductions in emissions from deforestation
and forest degradation in developing countries can be achieved at a lower cost
than reductions in emissions from industrial sources in developed countries.
REDD+ is supported globally because it is much easier to restrict activities of
forest-dependent communities that do not engage in large scale deforestation
than it is to dismantle the capitalistic structure of society. Thus, there is an
economic imperative to minimize the cost of forest carbon offsets under REDD+
(20). In this way, REDD+ allows many industrialized nations and corporations
to continue carrying out their harmful activities under the pretense of being
environmentally friendly. This contradiction renders REDD+ an ineffective
solution to climate change. For example, while Nepal is considered to be a
strong site for the implementation of REDD+ due to the success of its community
forestry program, Nepal has a much smaller area of forest and a much lower rate
of deforestation as compared to Indonesia and Brazil which suffer high risks of
deforestation from industrial timber harvesting and other large-scale commercial
land uses. Any successes in small, lower-risk countries like Nepal, which
contributes less than 0.1%, to global emissions are laudable, of course, but are
also relatively insignificant. It is more important for larger developing countries
with greater rates of deforestation, such as Brazil, or larger developed nations
with greater greenhouse gas emissions due to industrial activities, to halt their
activities simultaneously. Thus, REDD+ allows many industrialized nations and
corporations to continue carrying out their harmful activities under the pretense
of being environmentally friendly
Observing and experiencing the program’s shortcomings, climate justice
activists argue that REDD+ and carbon trading are mechanisms that allow
high-polluting companies and governments to purchase carbon credits in order to
continue business-as-usual rather than reducing their emissions at source, with the
excuse that somewhere else there is a “forest” that, in theory, will “offset” their
emissions (21). Furthermore, REDD+’s approach to reducing carbon emissions
19
permits the planting of mass-scale commercial forests or monocultures on the
condition that the corporations involved ensure that the new forests contain equal
amounts of carbon to the previous forest, thereby, balancing out their carbon
emissions (22). Although planting commercial forests may balance carbon
emissions, native forests are home to a variety of species, some of which are
becoming endangered and cannot be restored by planting commercial forests (23).
Millions of hectares of forests in the world, especially in developing countries,
are being substituted by monocultures plantations under that slogan of “planted
forests (23).” These industrial tree plantations have quadrupled in developing
countries in the last two decades, so that today there are 60 billion hectares of
monoculture plantations (22). In addition, commercial forests often displace
Indigenous people from their ancestral lands. Indigenous people are displaced
largely by force or coercion and are often left with no alternative sources for their
daily needs for natural forest resources, including fuel and food (24). This scarcity
of resources leads to competition within and between different communities and
may contribute to conflicts in that region.
REDD+ also allows ‘leakages,’ where deforestation activities are merely
removed from their original site to an area of forest adjacent to an area sectioned
off for conservation. For example, in Bolivia, when loggers were forced off one
area of land sectioned for conservation, the logging companies simply bought
new areas of land elsewhere (24). Thus, the program does not help in tackling
the root causes of illegal logging, which include logging without a license or
in conservation areas, harvesting in excess of quotas, processing logs without a
license, tax avoidance, or exporting wood without paying the required duties (24).
Leakages also occur at a smaller scale when, much like large corporations
who simply move operations to unprotected forests, forest-dependent communities
acquire resources from different, unprotected forests. The REDD+ program allows
leakages by interfering with the livelihoods, as well as daily needs, of forest-
dependent communities and failing to provide them with an alternative source
of sustenance. Therefore, in Nepal, the REDD pilot (REDDp) program is trying
to prevent leakages by providing alternative resources such as cooking stoves
and biogas plants to affected households (14). It is unclear how many of these
alternative resources reach the people who need it the most in the case of Nepal.
Research done in the eastern rainforest of Madagascar has demonstrated that a
protected area and a REDD+ project are failing to even compensate forest dwellers
most affected by new restrictions imposed on their traditional livelihoods (24).
Ideally, compensation is supposed to reach the people most negatively impacted by
conservation. However, Mahesh Poudyal and Julia Jones from Bangor University
found that the compensation has disproportionately reached those more easily
accessible, are more financially sound, and have positions of authority locally (25).
REDD+ would potentially bring millions of dollars to Nepalese forest users,
but fair compensation and equitable distribution may not be reached despite $30
billion pledged by the international community to implement REDD+ programs
(11). In the REDDp pilot project, if payments were based purely on carbon
increment rates at a rate of US$10/tCO2, each community forest user group
(CFUG) would receive US$245 on average per year. This is not sufficient to
offset the costs of implementing the REDD+ program and ensuring participation
20
of all stakeholders (22). To maximize carbon benefits, CFUGs have sacrificed the
amount of resources they extract from forests and the number of animals grazing
in the forest. These sacrifices lead to a loss in livelihoods and make it difficult to
carry out daily activities. Thus, the cost of the reduced access to resources could
be high. Therefore, in this situation, REDDp may not be the appropriate avenue
for funding. This is a significant finding and leads us to one of the most important
issues related to REDD+: Who has a say in the design and implementation of
REDD+ programs?
Stakeholder participation is one of the underlying principles of REDD+. In
the case of Nepal, important stakeholders, such as community forest users and
Indigenous peoples, were left out of early talks on REDD+ (14). Forest-dependent
communities and marginalized groups have had few opportunities to provide
their input on REDD+ policies, since meetings are often closed or held in
prohibitively-distant Kathmandu (14). Only a small proportion of REDD+
workshops included groups such as Indigenous people, women, and a socially
marginalized group in the Hindu Caste system, Dalits (14). In addition to the
lack of participation of Indigenous and marginalized groups in REDD+ planning,
the government has sometimes fabricated Indigenous viewpoints. According to
one Indigenous activist in Nepal, the government “just pick[ed] up [stakeholders]
from the street and then s[aid] ‘these are Indigenous people’ (14).” Without
stakeholder engagement, there is likely to be inequitable distribution of financial
and natural resources, and the REDD+ program is less likely to succeed in the
long run.
According to Soumitra Ghosh, a climate justice activist from India, REDD+
“helps perpetuate the myth that capitalist production/accumulation can be
continued ad infinitum in an environmentally sustainable manner (22).” This
statement reflects the core value that climate justice encompasses. Without
dismantling the unsustainable consumerism and commodification of natural
resources, REDD+ (or any other forestry and conservation program) is going to
be unsuccessful in its efforts to prevent deforestation or even to offset emissions
from other sources. It is not possible to respect the needs of Indigenous peoples
and forest-dependent communities while allowing large corporations to continue
activities that are detrimental to the environment. REDD+ does not directly tackle
the main driver of deforestation, which is mass consumerism and global focus on
financial growth. REDD+ forces communities that have typically attempted to
sustainably manage their forest resources to leave their homes and to leave their
lifestyles behind to make room for more business as usual. It is simply unjust
and ineffective to ask people who have contributed the least to climate change to
make the biggest changes in their lives.
References
1. Mary Robinson Foundation. Principles of Climate Justice. http://
www.mrfcj.org/principles-of-climate-justice/ (accessed Aug. 28, 2016).
2. UN-REDD programme. About the UN-REDD programme. http://www.un-
redd.org/(accessed Aug 28, 2016)
21
3. Bradford, A. Deforestation: Facts, Causes and Effects.
http://www.livescience.com/27692-deforestation.html (accessed Aug. 28,
2016)
4. Houghton, R. A. Tropical Deforestation As a Source of Greenhouse Gas
Emissions. In Tropical Deforestation and Climate Change; Environmental
Defense, 2005; Chapter 13.
5. National Geographic. Deforestation.
http://environment.nationalgeographic.com/environment/global-warming/
deforestation-overview/ (accessed Aug. 28, 2016).
6. Conserve Energy Future. Deforestation Facts. http://www.conserve-energy-
future.com/various-deforestation-facts.php (accessed Aug. 28, 2016)
7. Homer-Dixon, T. F. Environment, Scarcity, and Violence; Princeton
University Press, 2010.
8. Forest Peoples Programme. REDD+ and related initiatives.http://
www.forestpeoples.org/topics/climate-forests/redd-and-related-initiatives
(accessed Sept. 9, 2016).
9. UNFCCC. Safeguards. http://redd.unfccc.int/fact-sheets/safeguards.html
(accessed Aug. 28, 2016).
10. Rosenbach, D. W.; Whittemore, J.; DeBoer, J. Community Forestry and
REDD+ in Nepal. Dissertation, University of Michigan, 2013.
11. Forest Peoples Programme. REDD+ and related initiatives. http://
www.forestpeoples.org/topics/climate-forests/redd-and-related-initiatives
(accessed Sept. 12, 2016).
12. Forest Peoples Programme. Is Carbon Funding Hurting Forest Peoples?
Evidence from Madagascar. http://www.forestpeoples.org/topics/redd-and-
related-initiatives/news/2016/02/carbon-funding-hurting-forest-peoples-
evidence-mada (accessed Sept. 12, 2016).
13. Friends of the Earth. A Dangerous Gamble with the World’s Forests.https:/
/www.foe.co.uk/news/emissions_deforestation_20707 (accessed Sept. 12,
2016).
14. SciDevNet. Indigenous People Keep Carbon Locked in Forests.
http://www.scidev.net/global/indigenous/news/indigenous-people-carbon-
locked-forests.html(accessed Sept. 12, 2016).
15. Lang, C. REDD Monitor. COP2: What Happened so Far? http://www.no-
redd-africa.org/index.php/news/166-cop21-what-s-happened-so-far-redd-
monitor (accessed Sept. 12, 2016).
16. Indigeneous Environmental Network. Africans Unite against New Form of
Colonialism. http://www.ienearth.org/africans-unite-against-new-form-of-
colonialism/(accessed Sept. 12, 2016).
17. Ahmed, N. World Bank and UN Carbon Offset Scheme ‘Complicit’ in
Genocidal Land Grabs - NGOs. https://www.theguardian.com/environment/
earth-insight/2014/jul/03/world-bank-un-redd-genocide-land-carbon-grab-
sengwer-kenya (accessed Sept. 12, 2016).
18. Forest Peoples Programme. Securing Forest Peoples’ Rights
and Tackling Deforestation in the Democratic Republic of
Congo.http://www.forestpeoples.org/sites/fpp/files/publication/2016/05/
fppdrcreportinternet-2.pdf (accessed Sept. 12, 2016).
22
19. Bushley, B. R.; Khatri, D. B. REDD+: Reversing, Reinforcing or
Reconfiguring Decentralized Forest Governance in Nepal; Forest Action,
2011; Discussion Paper 11; p 3.
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63 (1), 239.
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25. Poudyal, M.; Ramamonjisoa, B. S.; Hockley, N.; Rakotonarivo, O. S.;
Gibbons, J. M.; Mandimbiniaina, R.; Rasoamanana, A.; Jones, J. P. Can
REDD+ Social Safeguards Reach the ‘Right’ People? Lessons from
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23
Chapter 3
Introduction
Over the course of this book, previous chapters have explored the history
of international climate change, as well as a broad spectrum of its political,
ecological, and social implications. However, a complete history of anthropogenic
climate change cannot be told without acknowledging its effects on the most
vulnerable, poverty-stricken populations of the world. Why does it matter that we
talk about climate change in the context of rich and poor nations? Because it is
naïve to say that past actions are irrelevant to the future, especially when climate
change is a global issue that has historically been caused primarily by only a
few developed nations. It is naïve to think that this small group of industrialized
countries (including the United States) should contribute to climate change
mitigation in an equivalent manner to developing countries such as India, whose
citizens produce only 3% of global greenhouse-gas (GHG) emissions (1). For
this reason, the conversation on climate change, its causes, effects, and mitigation
techniques, must take these inequities into account as we move forward.
26
Poverty
27
Figure 1. Climate Change Vulnerability Index, 2015. Reproduced with
permission from reference (11).
Each year, Maplecroft, a global risks advisory firm, releases a global ranking
calculating the vulnerability of 170 countries to the impacts of climate change
over the next thirty years. The 2015 Climate Change Vulnerability Index (CCVI),
depicted in Figure 1, was produced using data from 1995-2014. Of the 10 most
affected countries during this time period, nine were developing countries in the
low income or lower-middle income country group. While most of these countries
are located on the African continent, there are two Asian countries, Bangladesh and
the Philippines, ranked first and eighth most vulnerable, respectively (11, 12). It
is important to note that Africa and South Asia are also home to the vast majority
of the world’s poor population, as previously shown. Later we will more closely
examine Bangladesh and the role that it and other smaller, economically weaker
countries play in global climate change.
These and other, similar studies illustrate the wide variance in climate
change concern internationally and even within a single country such as the
United States. This is important because levels of climate change concern
can be directly correlated to the willingness and amount of action being taken
to address the problem. Overall, over the past decade, there has been little
change, with significant declines in concern in several key economies (such as
China). However, as previously shown, in developing countries there have been
significant increases in concern consistent with the greater risks faced by these
countries (14, 15). Moving forward, these are the countries that must be prepared
and given the resources to adapt and survive in the new world of drastic climate
change.
29
Figure 3. Yale Project on Climate Change Communication’s “Six Americas,”
2016. Reproduced with permission from reference (14).
Renewable Energy
One mechanism of adaptation and mitigation that will be extremely important
in combatting climate change and offsetting future greenhouse gas emissions
is renewable energy. Energy is also an essential component of economic
development and poverty alleviation, as highlighted in the United Nations
Millennium Development Goals. In order to effectively balance these goals of
ending energy poverty and promoting sustainable development, renewable energy
must be employed (18).
For the past few decades in developing countries, the energy needs of poor
people have been largely met through petroleum-based liquid fuels and extensions
of the electric grid, fueled primarily by fossil fuels and hydropower. This is
primarily due to government subsidies and the widespread global availability
of these resources, as well as the depletion of more traditional fuel sources like
firewood. While this has sufficed in more developed areas, it still leaves out
people in remote areas, or even urban slums, due to high costs or lack of access.
31
It is also important to note that most of the fossil fuels and technologies used by
these developing countries are imported. Of the 47 poorest countries in 2004, 38
were net importers of oil, and 25 imported all of their oil (18).
The argument for renewable energy is supported by real-world experience.
In rural areas, traditional electricity grid extensions are simply not practical
or economical. Studies by the International Energy Agency have shown that
renewable energy technologies in developing countries, while reducing carbon
dioxide emissions at the same rate as in developed countries, actually have a lower
associated cost due to their cost-competitiveness in decentralized energy areas.
These technologies can also extend reliable energy access to the approximately
1.5 billion people in rural, developing areas without traditional grid access (19).
Projects in many developing countries have shown that renewables can
directly contribute to poverty alleviation by providing necessary energy for
businesses and jobs. Furthermore, renewable technologies can make indirect
contributions to alleviate poverty and increase the standard of living by providing
energy for activities such as cooking, heating, and lighting. This, in turn,
contributes to increased education, decreased health risks, and other positive
benefits in local communities (18).
An argument against renewable energy sources in developed countries is that
they are not continuously available and are subject to variable weather conditions
(no wind, sun, etc.). However, it is important to note that people using traditional
energy sources in developing countries are often already faced with unreliable
energy delivery systems where daily outages are common, so this argument against
renewable energy is less relevant in poor countries. Still, in the future it will
be necessary to improve energy storage and distribution practices worldwide to
alleviate some of these problems.
In order for renewable energy to be effectively employed, especially in
developing countries, it is first necessary to switch subsidies from fossil fuels
to renewable technologies. In particular, in order to maximize the benefits for
local communities, programs should focus on small, off-grid projects in rural,
underdeveloped areas. Furthermore, as previously emphasized for all adaptation
and mitigation practices, it is necessary to exchange not only financial capital, but
also technology information in order to accelerate the spread of renewable energy
technologies, particularly in developing countries where this knowledge may be
limited or nonexistent. Therefore, significant time and financial investments need
to be made specifically for this technology development, transfer, and education
(19).
Asia
While climate change is clearly a global problem requiring global solutions,
it can be useful to focus on specific regions in order to form a better assessment
of concrete actions that can be taken to mitigate climate change at a regional
or local level. Asia is a key area of interest for climate change researchers and
policymakers, due to its recent rapid industrialization and growth. In addition,
the geographical location of many Asian countries, particularly island and coastal
32
nations, make them especially at risk from global climate change (12). As
previously stated, data from the World Bank shows that the uneven progress in
global poverty decline has significant regional components (8).
Asia is a key player in international climate change negotiations and has
played a critical role in the COP meetings over the past twenty years. At COP15
in Copenhagen, Asian countries—China in particular—were largely blamed for
the failure to reach a significant treaty. Through a series of backroom deals,
conducted away from the media spotlight, China purposefully undermined
the negotiations. For example, it was China’s representative who insisted on
removing the industrialized country targets, previously set as an 80% cut by 2050.
Collaborating at times with India (another developing Asian country), China
successfully removed most of the binding language of the agreement, including a
2020 peaking year in global emissions and a long-term target of 50% emissions
cuts by 2050. By doing so, China, with an economy strongly dependent on cheap
coal at the time, was able to negotiate a deal that did not limit its economic
growth while simultaneously placing the blame on the United States. This is not
to say that climate change was not an issue for China at the time. Rather, they
recognized the issue, but instead chose to prioritize growth and becoming an
international superpower (with significant negotiating power) (20).
Since 2009, and in part as a result of their actions at Copenhagen, climate
change has become a much more serious issue for Asian countries. In recent
years, China, India, Japan, and Korea have consistently ranked in the top ten
countries for carbon dioxide emissions per capita, with China recently surpassing
even the United States. At the same time, these countries began to feel the effects
of increased emissions. In China, rampant air pollution has forced city shutdowns
as air pollution contributed to more than 670,000 deaths in 2012. Importantly,
even other, less-developed countries in Asia have also felt negative repercussions.
For example, in the Philippines, Typhoon Haiyan in 2013 offered a preview of the
increase in natural disasters that the highly vulnerable nation can expect as a result
of climate change (21).
On a more optimistic note, the primary concern of Asian countries in 2009,
that cutting emissions was synonymous with cutting their growth potential, no
longer holds true. India has rapidly expanded its use of solar, and China is leading
the world in employing renewable energy technologies. Peaking emissions is
no longer a burden, but rather an opportunity, particularly for businesses, to
ensure greater energy security, affordable supplies, and recognized leadership
internationally (21).
At COP21, the Philippines took on a new leadership role as a large Asian
developing nation. As the chair of the Climate Vulnerable Forum, a coalition of
43 countries pushing for the inclusion of the 1.5°C goal as opposed to the 2°C,
the Philippines was critical in advocating for language of loss and damages to
assist countries unable to adapt to climate change. Thanks to their leadership, the
Climate Vulnerable Forum, and in particular the Small Island Developing States
(SIDS) of the Pacific Ocean, played a much more prominent role at COP21 than
at any previous meetings (21).
It is outside the scope of this chapter to address each of the unique challenges
that both poverty and climate change pose in different countries around the world
33
(or even in Asia alone). However, the following two case studies, of China and
Bangladesh respectively, offer insight into two very different Asian countries.
While relatively close geographically, they have contributed to—and been affected
by—climate change in very different ways. This provides interesting perspectives
on how we can address climate change moving forward so that countries on both
ends of the spectrum benefit.
34
Figure 4. CO2 emissions and carbon intensity for China from 1980 to 2006.
Reproduced with permission from reference (24).
After passing the United States as the world’s largest emitter in 2007, China
issued its first Climate Change Program. This was followed by a national carbon-
trading scheme in 2008 that promoted investments in carbon capture systems. In
2010, for the first time, China led the United States and all other major countries
in green energy markets, with private investments of $34.6 billion in 2009 (26).
With significant growth in wind, solar, nuclear power, and cleaner coal technology,
China’s carbon dioxide emissions are expected to peak around 2030 (27). This
is in accordance with China’s pledge at COP21, but emissions may peak earlier,
depending on new policy and implementation.
The problem remains that thus far, China’s attempts to mitigate its own
contribution to climate change, while important first steps, are insufficient. China
has a mixed record, rapidly undergoing significant economic and industrial
growth, utilizing both “dirty” and (more recently) clean energy sources to do so.
It now faces the negative repercussions of its actions and can serve as an example
for other developing countries, that they may emulate the best, clean practices for
economic growth.
36
support from organizations such as the World Bank will remain a key component
of successful adaptation and mitigation projects across local and national
platforms.
Conclusion
In summary, climate change is a global problem largely due to the actions of
developed nations. However, it is the poorest people in poorer, developing nations
who are expected to suffer the most from its negative impacts. This can be seen
most prominently in Asia, where many of the countries most susceptible to climate
change are located, including Bangladesh and the Philippines. At the same time,
Asian countries such as China and India have seen rampant growth in the past
decade using both renewable and non-renewable energy sources. As a result, these
emerging world powers, as well as smaller countries in Asia, have taken on greater
leadership roles and made their voices heard at international meetings such as the
annual UNFCCC COPs.
Adaptation and mitigation practices have had both successes and
shortcomings, as seen in the examples of China and Bangladesh. Future work
must take into account the drastic differences in geography, culture, and economic
inequalities among developing nations when considering global policy solutions.
Furthermore, there must be an exchange not only of financial capital, but also
ideas, leadership, and new technologies in order to simultaneously address issues
of both climate change and poverty worldwide.
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24. Zeng, N.; Ding, Y.; Pan, J.; Wang, H.; Gregg, J. Climate Change − The
Chinese Challenge. Science 2008, 319 (5864), 730–731.
25. Albert, E.; Xu, B. China’s Environmental Crisis. Council on Foreign
Relations, Council on Foreign Relations, Jan. 18, 2016. http://www.cfr.org/
china/chinas-environmental-crisis/p12608 (accessed Aug. 28, 2016).
26. Friedman, L. China Leads Major Countries with $34.6 Billion Invested
in Clean Technology. The New York Times, Mar. 25, 2010. http://
www.nytimes.com/cwire/2010/03/25/25climatewire-china-leads-major-
countries-with-346-billion-15729.html?pagewanted=all (accessed Aug. 28,
2016).
27. Zhou, N.; Fridley, D.; McNeil, M.; Zheng, N.; Ke, J.; Levine, M. China’s
Energy and Carbon Emissions Outlook to 2050. Report LBNL-4472E,
Ernest Orlando Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, Apr. 2011.
https://china.lbl.gov/sites/all/files/lbl-4472e-energy-2050april-2011.pdf
(accessed Aug. 28, 2016)..
28. Bangladesh Solar Program To Reach 13 Million More People. Energy
Matters, Nov. 6, 2014. http://www.energymatters.com.au/renewable-news/
bangladesh-solar-em4578/ (accessed May 5, 2016).
39
Chapter 4
Climate Racism
Times like these cause me to check my privilege. Here in the United States,
we are fortunate enough to not have to know what a climate refugee is. However,
island nations across the globe are putting together plans for when their citizens
42
become displaced due to that feared 1.5° global temperature increase—the same
1.5° that protestors pleaded against at COP21, the same 1.5° that was included on
only a minimal level in the Paris Agreement (9).
This is a solid example of climate racism, the needs of people of color being
minimized or neglected in our search for climate solutions. So many lives are
contingent upon keeping the global temperature increase under 1.5°C, and nearly
all of those lives are people of color. Granted, according to NOAA administrator
Kathryn Sullivan, that this is a nearly impossible task, our shortcomings to fully
recognize 1.5° as the official “red line” of temperature increase highlights our
minimization of the lives of people of color (10).
The twist on climate racism is that it harms people of color most but is caused
almost exclusively by white people. The reason I use “almost” as a modifier
is because China is the global leader in carbon emissions and is not majority
white. According to the World Bank, just short of 50% of the planet’s carbon
emissions come from China, the United States, and Russia (11). However, the
effects of climate change, as we all know, are not contained within the boundaries
of the country where carbon is emitted. In fact, almost the opposite is true.
Carbon emissions contribute to sea level rise and, as established earlier, this
disproportionately affects island nations and people of color.
Further, many developing countries across Africa and Central and South
America are hit hard by changes in their water cycle due to climate change.
Droughts and floods alike become more frequent, more severe, and less
predictable (12). This contributes to food scarcity as it becomes harder to grow
and sustain crops (13). Tropical storms and cyclones caused by climate change
leave wreckage in these countries as they often do not have the infrastructure to
withstand the increased intensity and frequency (14).
I spoke with a group of representatives from Ethiopia who explained to me
how serious climate disasters are to Ethiopian citizens. “Homes are destroyed.
People die,” one delegate told me plainly (15). The effects of climate change
are greater than just economic ones—they are issues of life and death for
entire villages. In Ghana, similar effects are taking place with an additional
twist; warmer, wetter climates have created a more favorable environment for
mosquitoes, which puts citizens in greater danger of Malaria (16).
When it comes down to looking at who emits versus who gets hit, the numbers
are very lopsided in terms of race, and this trend continues in terms of who is
concerned about climate change. It was obvious to me, through my observations
at COP21, that people of color are very visible in climate protests. The 1.5° protest
(the protest responsible for sparking my interest in race and climate change) was
racially diverse and majority people of color.
44
Environmental Racism
A big part of the reason people are apathetic regarding climate change is that
it is easier to deny what we have not yet experienced firsthand. Though the effects
of climate change are difficult to notice throughout most of the United States,
environmental racism is very prevalent. Regarding environmental inequalities,
Dr. Bullard says “Racism trumps class. Even middle-class African Americans are
more likely to live in more polluted neighborhoods” (20).
Environmental hazards have become a major avenue of racism in the United
States. As pointed out by an AJ+ video titled “Environmental Racism Explained,”
the Flint, Michigan water crisis is the most prominent example of this. More than
100,000 residents in Flint—a city with a 57% black population—were poisoned
by lead in their drinking water. Residents protested the dangerous water for more
than a year, but their voices were ignored and their health suffered.
The Flint water crisis made headlines, but it was not an isolated incident.
Black neighborhoods are a common target for industrial pollution, and this
trend appears to be based on race rather than class. Black Americans making
US$50K-$60K per year are more likely to live in polluted neighborhoods than
white Americans making $10k per year. This pollution has great public health
implications on the affected communities. A section of the Mississippi River
in Louisiana has even earned the nickname “Cancer Alley” (20). This 85-mile
stretch between Baton Rouge and New Orleans is home to over 200 petrochemical
plants. Consequently, high rates of cancer have been reported in the region’s
majority black population. Cancer Alley residents have been organizing to
demand industrial regulations to make their communities safer from pollution,
but with little media attention and no legislative progress (21).
This is a trend I have noticed in many similar situations—community
organizing by the affected communities with little to no success. Not only do
communities of color suffer the most from climate change effects caused by
majority white communities, but when they protest for change, they are ignored.
Dr. Spencer Thomas, Ambassador and Special Envoy for Multilateral
Environmental Agreements in Grenada, shared some important words during a
panel on coastal reliance that stuck with me: “There is no room for tokenism in
climate change decisions” (22). Essentially, we know who is affected by climate
change. Why minimize the representation of the identities affected most? History
has demonstrated that people of color are willing to protest current environmental
legislation and be advocates for progress on climate solutions. The next step is to
create avenues for them to get appropriate representation at the table.
A common mantra when dealing with decision-making regarding minorities
is “nothing about us without us.” This is something that needs to be taken seriously
regarding climate solutions. We know that people of color are disproportionately
affected by the climate change. Thus, people of color cannot only be included in
climate discussions on a tokenistic basis. We know that there is no shortage of
voices willing to represent these communities. It is time to hear these voices and
make sure that climate decisions going forward are representative of the people
they impact most.
45
Conclusion
Perhaps part of the reason climate change becomes an abstraction for so many
white Americans is because the victims are people that don’t look like them. It is
typically harder to be passionate about things to which we cannot relate. Since the
worst effects of climate change occur far away in communities we don’t identify
with, it makes it easier to ignore the issue. This is a notion that needs to be
recognized and fought, and it can only be done by including people of color in
climate change discussions.
The best way to do this is to make it happen the same way it happened to
me: stop making climate change an abstraction, a hypothetical. For so many of
us here in the United States, climate change feels so distant because it is merely a
future threat and not something that we have felt yet. The key is to put a “face to
the name.” Climate change is already affecting a lot of the planet, and for me to
properly understand this, I had to meet some of the people affected and hear their
stories. I realize not everyone will have this opportunity, but for those who do, we
need to share the stories that we hear, along with the facts that we know, to make
climate change an issue that can seem real to everyone.
References
1. This information was collected from personal experiences at COP21 in Paris,
France, December 2015. The argument of 1.5 degrees versus 2 degrees
Celsius was a common motif throughout the conference.
2. Cuomo, C. J. Climate change, vulnerability, and responsibility. Hypatia
2011, 26, 690–714.
3. Rogelj, J.; Den Elzen, M.; Höhne, N.; Fransen, T.; Fekete, H.; Winkler, H.;
Meinshausen, M. Paris Agreement climate proposals need a boost to keep
warming well below 2 C. Nature 2016, 534, 631–639.
4. United Nations. Demographic Yearbook, 2016. http://unstats.un.org/unsd/
demographic/products/dyb/dyb2.htm#2001 (accessed October 2016).
5. Information gathered from personal conversations with members of the
Grenada delegation at COP21.
6. Information gathered from a personal conversation with Trevor Thompson
of Grenada’s Ministry of Agriculture, Lands, Forestry, Fisheries and the
Environment.
7. Information gathered from a personal conversation with Trevor Thompson
of Grenada’s Ministry of Agriculture, Lands, Forestry, Fisheries and the
Environment.
8. Information gathered from a panel at COP21 I attended regarding climate
resilience in the Pacific Ocean.
9. Information gathered from a panel at COP21 I attended regarding climate
resilience in the Pacific Ocean.
10. Information gathered from a personal conversation with NOAA
Administrator Kathryn Sullivan at COP21.
11. Union of Concerned Scientists. Each Country’s Share of CO2 Emissions,
2014. http://www.ucsusa.org/global_warming/science_and_impacts/
46
science/each-countrys-share-of-co2.html#.WA1kQJMrJsM (accessed
October 2016).
12. Information gathered from personal conversations with delegates at COP21.
13. World Food Programme. How Climate Change Affects Hunger, 2016. https:/
/www.wfp.org/climate-change (accessed October 2016).
14. Information gathered from personal conversations with delegates at COP21.
15. Information gathered from personal conversations with delegates of Ethiopia
at COP21.
16. Information gathered from personal conversations with delegates of Ghana
at COP21.
17. Information gathered from personal conversations with members of the
HBCU climate consortium at COP21.
18. Aleem, Z. Mic Policy. New Poll Finds Something Surprising about
Race and Climate Change, December 2, 2014. https://mic.com/articles/
105120/new-poll-finds-something-surprising-about-race-and-climate-
change#.NNB2y6Aeh (accessed October 2016).
19. Margida, G. Chemical and Engineering News. Meet a Prince Who Is
Teaching Nigerians about Climate Change, 2015. http://cop21.cenmag.org/
meet-a-prince-who-is-pushing-nigerians-to-learn-more-about-climate-
change/ (accessed October 2016).
20. Mendy, C. Environmental Justice Education Initiatives: The Deep South
Center for Environmental Justice at Xavier University. Race, Poverty
& the Environment, June 27−28, 1996. http://www.jstor.org/stable/
41554247(accessed 2016).
21. AJ+. Environmental Racism Explained, 2016. https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=TrbeuJRPM0o (accessed September 2016).
22. Information gathered while attending a Coastal Resilience forum with The
Ambassador, Dr. Spencer Thomas, of Grenada at COP21.
47
Chapter 5
Introduction
Occasionally, a few steps are more than the sum of their parts. The first human
standing upright to walk, Martin Luther King, Jr.’s march from Selma, and Neil
Armstrong’s first steps on the moon are each an example of a few steps that were
far more important to human history than just someone just walking a few steps.
This same phenomena happened to me in Doha. There I was, walking down the
palm tree lined Al Corniche Street in the middle of the desert with hundreds of
others. However, looking at the landscape you might think you were in South
Beach with the amount of manicured Bermuda grass that sat between the palm
trees and buildings.
Above the sounds of shoes hitting the asphalt, chants could be heard. “More
action, less talk!” and “we demand climate action now!” were audible as we
strolled down Corniche along the Persian Gulf. These seemingly simple acts
in the United States or Europe were magnified in Qatar. Qatar, a country built
on oil, is not known for allowing protests, especially an environmental protest
Background
Humans are extremely likely to have caused an unprecedented level of change
in Earth’s climate. Earth’s atmosphere and oceans have warmed and the amount
of snow and ice present on the surface of the Earth has fallen. These changes
are closely associated with the rapid rise in the concentration of greenhouse
gases (GHG), especially carbon dioxide (CO2), in Earth’s atmosphere. This
phenomenon is known as anthropogenic climate change (1).
Unfortunately, without global cooperation, a tragedy of the commons scenario
will unfold. In a tragedy of the commons, no single person or nation is incentivized
to keep the common area clean. Instead, each nation will maximize its economic
output, while emitting as much CO2 as necessary. Since the atmosphere is a part of
the common area all nations share, it can be difficult for a single country to observe
its individualized impact of CO2 emissions or be incentivized to stop emitting CO2
(2).
In response, representatives from around the world signed an international
treaty, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)
(3). The UNFCCC set a goal of stabilizing GHG emissions at levels that would
prevent anthropogenic climate change through an ongoing relationship instead of
a single treaty. At first, the UNFCCC encouraged nations to voluntarily submit
to reductions in GHG emissions, with the reduction taking into “account their
common but differentiated responsibilities” (3).
Nations were divided into either Annex 1, Annex 2, and non-Annex 1
countries based on each country’s economy and historical emissions. Annex 1
parties included nations with developed economies and a history of high GHG
emissions, such as the United States, the European Union, and Japan, as well as
countries with economies in transition, such as Russia and Turkey. All Annex 1
countries were expected to voluntarily submit to reductions in GHG emissions.
Non-Annex 1 countries were those countries with developing economies,
including China, India, Brazil, and the rest of the world. Non-Annex 1 counties
were not expected to submit to reductions in GHG emissions (3).
Unfortunately, the UNFCCC treaty does not include specific emissions
reductions for Annex 1 nations. The UNFCCC only provided a “target” to reduce
emissions to a low enough level to prevent anthropogenic climate change. The
signatories agreed to work towards target emissions reductions, which were the
first step in a comprehensive, global strategy to prevent anthropogenic climate
change (3).
Each year, the annual Conference of Parties (COP) to the UNFCCC nations
meet to negotiate specific aspects of the treaty. At first, the UNFCCC aimed to
make reductions in GHG emissions legally binding on Annex 1 nations. At the
1997 COP3 (the third annual COP meeting), the Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCCC
was introduced (4). Consistent with the principle of “common but differentiated
50
responsibilities,” only Annex 1 countries were required to reduce GHG emissions.
The Kyoto Protocol required GHG emission cuts based on the 1990 emissions year.
For example, the United States would be required to emit no more than 93% of its
1990 emissions levels by 2012. European countries agreed to cuts equivalent to
92% of their 1990 emissions levels. However, Russia, due to the recent fall of the
Soviet Union, was permitted to emit 100% of its 1990 levels, while Australia could
emit 108% by 2012 (3). The emissions reductions were to be “legally binding”
upon ratification by at least 55 parties and enough Annex 1 parties to represent
55% of the 1990 CO2 emission levels (5).
There were several challenges with the “legally binding” intent of the Kyoto
Protocol. First, many of the “binding” cuts did not require any reductions in CO2
emissions. For example, Germany had already met its emissions reductions prior
to signing the Kyoto Protocol. Second, there was no enforcement mechanism. As
a result, several nations that signed the Kyoto Protocol did not remain complaint
throughout the Kyoto Protocol period. Third, several Annex 1 nations either
did not ratify (United States), ratified after the Kyoto Protocol went into force
(Australia), or ratified, but later withdrew (Canada) (5, 6)
Even with all of the shortcomings in the Kyoto Protocol, between 1990-2012,
collectively, Annex 1 countries decreased GHG emissions by 10.6% based on 1990
level of emissions (7). Despite these reductions, CO2 emissions still hit a record
high in 2012. China, now the largest emitter of CO2 in the world, is exempt from
making any GHG emissions reductions under the Kyoto Protocol (8). In fact,
none of the non-Annex 1 countries, including India and Brazil, were required to
reduce GHG emissions (9). While the Annex 1 nations, in total, decreased their
GHG emissions, the Kyoto Protocol excluded developing nations, such as China,
which now emits as much CO2 as the United States and all of Europe combined
(10). After the Kyoto Protocol entered into force in 2005, the UNFCCC’s focus
shifted towards planning for what came after the Kyoto Protocol as the ratifiers
of the Kyoto Protocol only committed to reduce GHG emissions during a specific
period, the First Commitment Period, which only ran through 2012.
52
from the European Union). As a result, Australia was the lone nation outside of
Europe that was required to reduce its GHG emissions (25). Immediately after
COP18 in Doha, critics blasted the second commitment period as a failure (26).
Once again, non-Annex 1 countries were not required to agree to any
emissions reductions. Many countries in the European Union committed to up to
a 20% reduction of the 1990 base level of greenhouse gas emissions. Australia
would be required to commit to a 0.5% reduction of the 2000 base level. In
addition, Annex 1 parties could pledge GHG reductions beyond the commitment
amount. For example, the European Union pledged a 30% reduction (27). In
order to become legally binding on signatories, 144 parties to the Kyoto Protocol
must ratify the Doha Amendment. As of October, 2016, 70 countries have ratified
the Doha Amendment. Importantly, only eight of the 37 nations required to
reduce GHG emissions (Hungary, Italy, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Monaco, Norway,
Romania, and Switzerland) have ratified (28).
The first negotiation hurdle leading up to COP21 was whether the new
protocol would be legally binding. Even after the signing of the Paris Agreement,
it is not completely clear which portions of the Agreement are meant to be
legally binding (32). In fact, Article 20 of the Paris Agreement states that States
may express their consent to be bound by ratification, accession, acceptance, or
approval (33). However, the biggest issue was whether the parties’ NDCs would
be legally binding. Essentially, the biggest question was whether the NDCs
would be binding on each state under international law, such that each party was
required to meet a specific emissions target (32).
53
The United States would clearly not support any binding commitments.
Despite signing the Kyoto Protocol, the United States never ratified it. Then
President George W. Bush argued that the Kyoto Protocol’s “common but
differentiated responsibilities” pushed the bulk of the cuts to the Annex 2 parties
(34). Moreover, the U.S. Senate voted 95-0 that the Kyoto Protocol should never
have even been signed (35).
The European Union lobbied for legally binding NDCs to match the
formulation of the legally binding commitments of the Kyoto Protocol and the
second commitment period from the Doha Amendment (32). For example,
the Kyoto Protocol states, “[t]he Parties shall … ensure that their aggregate
anthropogenic carbon dioxide emissions … do not exceed their assigned amounts
… inscribed in Annex B” (4). The Doha Amendment, as its name suggests, only
amends the Kyoto Protocol in a few places. Here, the Doha Amendment replaces
the assigned amounts from Annex B with a new table that includes the second
commitment period (27). The United States, China, and India rejected requiring
conduct. Instead, the United States argued for procedural requirements relating to
the NDCs, which might not require ratification by the Senate.
Ultimately, the final text of the Paris Agreement differs starkly from the
language in the Kyoto Protocol. The Paris Agreement uses softer language. In
Article 4.1, the Paris Agreement sets out the “long-term” goal of stabilizing
the global temperature rise and recognizing that “peaking” will take longer for
developing nations. Article 4.2 states, “Each Party shall prepare, communicate
and maintain successive nationally determined contributions that it intends to
achieve.” Thus, Article 4.2 requires parties to undergo the procedural hurdles to
create a NDC, but the wording does not require a party to actually achieve the
NDC, but only one that it “intends to achieve” (33).
Article 4 goes on to provide additional requirements of parties. While states
are not required to commit to a particular NDC, Article 4 provides additional
guidance on how the NDC should be selected by each party. Article 4.3 states,
“Each Party’s successive nationally determined contribution will represent a
progression beyond the Party’s then current nationally determined contribution
and reflect its highest possible ambition, reflecting its common but differentiated
responsibilities and respective capabilities, in the light of different national
circumstances.” Article 4.4 continues this theme and states that developed
countries “should continue taking the lead” in mitigating anthropogenic climate
change (33). The closest that the Paris Agreement gets to requiring domestic
mitigation is found in Article 4.2, where it states that Parties shall pursue domestic
mitigation but does not tie the mitigation to a particular NDC (33). Thus, the
language of the Paris Agreement requires procedural steps but not a binding
emission target.
A Global Response
The second concern was whether the entire world would be open to reducing
GHG emissions. For the United States to sign the Paris Agreement, China and
India needed to be involved. China and India did not have any binding reductions
in GHG emissions under the Kyoto Protocol (4). However, GHG emissions
54
have risen steadily in China and India. In 1990, the base year calculation used
by the Kyoto Protocol, the United States emitted, 5,000 million tons of CO2,
representing 22% of the emissions of the world. The United States was also the
highest emitter of CO2 per capita of the Annex 1 nations, emitting 19.6 tons per
person. China, meanwhile, emitted 2,500 million tons of CO2 that year, which
was more than every other Annex 1 party other than the United States. However,
China’s per capita rate of emissions was only 2.1 tons per person, which was less
than every other Annex 1 country (36). China’s per capita rate of CO2 emissions,
its historical emission of GHG emissions, and the classification of its economy
in 1990 as “developing,” ensured that China would not be required to commit
to reductions under the common, but differentiated responsibility approach the
UNFCCC adopted in the original framework treaty (3).
However, in the past nearly 25 years, this situation has rapidly changed.
By some measures, China is now the world’s largest economy due to rapid
urbanization and modernization (37). As of 2013, China, which emitted 10.3
million tons, now leads the United States, which emitted 5.3 million tons, in total
CO2 emissions. In fact, the United States emissions have been reduced from a
high of 5.94 million tons in 2005. Additionally, while the United States retained
the title of highest CO2 emitter per capita amongst the Annex 1 countries with
16.6 tons per person, China 7.4 tons per person is not far behind emitting 7.4 tons
per person. China also surpasses the European Union, which only emits 7.3 tons
per person. Over the past 23 years, the United States saw a 6% increase in total
CO2 emissions and a 16% decrease in per capita CO2 emissions, while China saw
a 312% increase in total CO2 emissions and a 246% increase in per capital CO2
emissions (36). Thus, the Bush Administration, with unanimous support from
the 105th U.S. Senate, thought that the Kyoto Protocol would be an ineffective
means of lowering GHG emissions since many developing nations would dwarf
the emissions of the United States (34, 35). Even the Obama Administration was
unwilling to commit or pledge GHG emissions reductions without similar actions
by developing nations (14). This has proven partly true, as GHG emissions
have continued to rise to an unprecedented level despite binding GHG emissions
reductions under the Kyoto Protocol (8).
However, even before COP21, the United States and China held bilateral
talks to create an agreement upon which both parties could agree. In September
2014, the two sides announced a political agreement, in which the United States
“intends” to lower its emissions by at least 26% of the 2005 levels by 2030, while
China will seek to peak its CO2 emissions by 2030 and get at least 20% of its energy
production from non-fossil fuel sources (38). Ultimately, China, India, the United
States, and 172 other countries signed the Paris Agreement, indicating their intent
to ratify it (39). Parties deposited their NDCs with the UNFCCC when each Party
ratified the Paris Agreement. Each country released an INDC prior to COP21,
where the final negotiations for the Paris Agreement took place. China’s INDC,
stating it intends to peak its CO2 emissions by 2030, closely matches its targets set
during the bilateral talks with the United States (40). Similarly, the United States
reiterated its goals from the bilateral political agreement with China (38). Thus,
the Paris Agreement represents a global effort to mitigate anthropogenic climate
change, unlike the Kyoto Protocol and the Doha Amendment. As both China and
55
India have signaled that they will contribute to the mitigation efforts, the United
States decided to sign the Paris Agreement.
Ratification
As discussed above, the Paris Agreement requires procedural conduct, but
it does not require Parties to commit to a particular emissions target. However,
for these procedural steps to be binding on the parties, they must do more than
simply sign the agreement, as 175 countries did in April 2016 (39). According
to Article 20, the Agreement is subject to “ratification, acceptance, or approval by
States.” Article 21 further states that the Paris Agreement will enter into force once
“55 Parties to the Convention accounting for … 55 percent … of the total global
greenhouse gas emissions have deposited their instruments of ratification, approval
or accession” (33). “Ratification” is broadly used to cover all possible ways a party
may indicate its intent to be bound by international law for the obligations in the
Paris Agreement. As of October 2016, 81 of the 197 parties to the UNFCCC had
ratified the Paris Agreement representing greater than 55% of the global GHG
emissions. As such, the Paris Agreement is set to go into force on November 4,
2016 (41).
In comparison, 4 years later, the Doha Amendment has still not been entered
into force. It requires 144 parties to ratify the agreement, and as of October
2016, only 70 had done so (28). At this rate, it does not appear that the Doha
Amendment will ever be entered into force because very few developed countries,
which contribute the largest portion of GHG emissions, have ratified or accepted
the Doha Amendment. China has agreed to the Doha Amendment, but it was not
required to commit to any reductions in greenhouse gas emissions (27).
When signing the Paris Agreement, both China and the United States –
together representing almost 40% of the global GHG emissions - pledged to
“ratify” the Paris Agreement by the end of the year (42, 43). Thus, ratification
by these two countries would virtually ensure that the Paris Agreement will be
entered into force.
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) is the leading
international agreement on the law of treaties. While the United States is not a
ratifier of the VCLT, it acknowledges that it contains customary law, which is
binding on the United States (44). In Article 2, the VCLT defines a treaty as “an
international agreement concluded between States in written form and governed
by international law.” Article 2 further states “‘ratification’, ‘acceptance’,
‘approval’ and ‘accession’ mean in each case the international act so named
whereby a State establishes on the international plane its consent to be bound by a
treaty” (45). As such, the United States must establish that it intends to be bound
by the Paris Agreement under international law through consent. The fact that the
Paris Agreement is not entitled a “protocol” or a “treaty” does not indicate that
it is not a treaty. In fact, virtually all of the participants indicated that the Paris
Agreement would be a treaty (32).
The United States has several options for ratifying an international treaty: (1)
approval of an Article II treaty by the Senate, (2) Submission to Congress as an
56
executive agreement, or (3) by the President alone using existing treaty authority
(46).
According to the treaty clause of Article II of the U.S. Constitution, “[The
President] shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate,
to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur” (47). Thus,
the President could submit the Paris Agreement directly to the Senate to ratify
it. However, 70% of the Republican Senators, or 38 members, have denied
anthropogenic climate change even exists (48). Thus, if the Paris Agreement
was introduced in the Senate this year, it would be mathematically impossible to
obtain the 2/3 majority needed to ratify it.
A second option would be to submit the treaty for ex post approval by a statute
from the entire Congress. This option requires a statute that specifically gives
President Obama the authorization to accept the international obligations required
by the Paris Agreement. While this option would not require a 2/3 majority, it
would still require a majority vote in both the House of Representatives and the
Senate (46). Unfortunately, the Republican party holds a majority in both the
House of Representatives and the Senate (49). Thus, it would be unlikely for the
Paris Agreement to be accepted under this option.
A third option for the acceptance of the Paris Agreement would be for
the President to accept the treaty using existing treaty authority. The United
States ratified the UNFCCC, or treaty document 102-38, in 1992 with a 2/3
supermajority of the Senate (50). The UNFCCC already binds the United
States to undertake mitigation efforts and subsequently report on these actions
(46). Specifically Article 4, binds parties to “adopt national policies and take
corresponding measures on the mitigation of climate change.” Article 4.2(b)
further requires parties to communicate these efforts (4).
In fact, a senior State Department official specifically mentioned the
UNFCCC as the source of the President’s legal authority to enter into the Paris
Agreement without submitting it to the Senate for approval (51). Republican
members of Congress disagree that the President has the authority to accept the
Paris Agreement without the consent of 2/3 of the Senate. In fact, Rep. Mike
Kelly of Pennsylvania introduced a resolution in the House of Representatives
with the support of 28 other Representatives that the President should submit
the Paris Agreement to the Senate for approval (52). Sen. Mike Lee of Utah
introduced a similar resolution in the Senate with the support of 30 other Senators
(53). Others have agreed with these members of Congress and argued that the
Paris Agreement is a treaty that should be submitted to the Senate for approval
prior to ratification (54).
Regardless, it seems clear that President Obama will accept the Paris
Agreement using existing treaty authority under the previously ratified UNFCCC
treaty (55). As such, on September 3, 2016, the United States formally entered the
Paris Agreement with China (56). However, the legality of the President’s move
is far from certain. Many members of Congress could try to challenge this move,
but it might not be possible to challenge the President’s authority if acting under
existing treaty authority (46). A more likely scenario is that a future president
could attempt to withdraw from the Paris Agreement. According to Article 28.1
of the Paris Agreement, a Party may not withdraw from the treaty until three
57
years after the Agreement comes into force, with a one-year waiting period. The
Agreement will not enter into force until the day after it is closed for signatures
(April 21, 2017) (41). Thus, the incoming president could not withdraw from the
treaty until at least 2021, well after the U.S. Presidential election of 2020. In fact,
President-elect Trump has vowed to “cancel” the Paris Agreement some days and
offered suggestions that he may be flexibile on the United States’s contribution on
other days. While Trump can’t withdraw from the Paris Agreement until 2021,
he could simply not fufill the obligations of the Paris Agreement with the only
penalty the loss of international credibility (57).
58
The United States and China officially ratifying the Paris Agreement is an
historic event. It marks the beginning of a global response to anthropogenic
climate change. While I believe it is too late to prevent the Earth from rising 2°C
(much less 1.5°C), this agreement will prevent a global catastrophe as long as
the Parties continue to operate under this agreement in good faith for decades to
come.
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59
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Chapter 6
What exactly was she referring to when she said we will get this done?
Well, her speech focused on new standards in the United States that target carbon
emissions from existing coal-fired power plants under the authority of the Clean
Air Act. Originally released on June 2, 2014 and finalized on August 3, 2015,
the ruling, called the Clean Power Plan (CPP), is an historic set of rules that, if
instituted, would put the United States on a trajectory to cut carbon approximately
30% in the power sector relative to 2005 emissions (1).
The room erupted in applause. My friends and I looked at one another with
gleaming smiles. In short, Gina McCarthey is an environmental hero for us young
professionals looking to make an impact in the energy field. Instituting the CPP
rules presents a huge national climate policy opportunity. It’s the cornerstone of
the United States’ climate pledge under the Paris Agreement. However, even more
importantly, it also presents an enormous economic opportunity for the United
States. Every successful climate policy must have these two pillars in mind: the
environment and the economy.
64
“How many tons or tonnes of carbon dioxide will this policy reduce by [insert
date]?” is typically trumped in policy debates by the question, “How will this
policy impact the economy?”
The ambitiousness of emissions reductions is limited by the perceived
negative economic costs nations and businesses are willing to absorb. Well, at
least that was the status quo of climate policy understanding during the 1990s and
most of the early 2000s. The tide is turning with current and emerging climate
technologies and growing evidence that highlights the profitability of renewable
energy and low-carbon projects. Acting on climate change does not have to stymy
economic growth and can result in a stronger, more resilient economy.
After hearing Gina McCarthy’s speech, I thought back to my experience at
the UN climate conference in Lima. I attended COP20 as one of eight student
delegates for the American Chemical Society during my first year in graduate
school at Duke University. During the conference, I thrived in the fast-paced,
high-level policy atmosphere. I interviewed the national delegation from
Madagascar, participated in several events focused on gender equality and climate
change, and even spoke with the Prime Minister of Togo. I left the conference
with the goal to better understand the public policies shaping the international
climate discourse. From my academic coursework in graduate school, I engaged
in discussions regarding the economics of natural resource management and
climate change. I learned about the public policy tools we can leverage to cut
emissions. There was one kind of policy that came up time and time again:
carbon pricing.
My support for market mechanisms as a central pillar to combat climate
emissions deepened while I worked for the International Centre for Trade
and Sustainable Development (ICTSD) in Geneva, Switzerland as part of a
Duke Program to study public policy and global environmental governance. I
researched the emergence of carbon pricing policies around the globe and closely
followed the discussion of markets in the development of the Paris Agreement.
My work for ICTSD continued during my second year at Duke and
complemented my participation in a unique annually held Practicum that teaches
students about the climate negotiations and the structure of the UNFCCC.
Through this Practicum, I traveled to Paris to attend COP21 as part of ICTSD’s
climate negotiations team. It was our responsibility to track changes in the
negotiating text, in particular references to the use of market mechanisms.
While carbon pricing is not explicitly mentioned in the Paris Agreement,
language referring to the use of market mechanisms to curb emissions was agreed
upon on the final day of negotiations. Referred to as “cooperative approaches,”
this language on markets could encourage the future linking of carbon market
schemes (2).
There remains a significant amount of uncertainty regarding the formation
of these linked carbon markets around the globe. However, the message is clear
that market mechanisms and carbon pricing are essential to implementing the new
Agreement. If designed correctly, carbon pricing is a triple dividend. It’s good
for people and the environment, it raises revenue efficiently, and it spurs private
sector innovation needed to invest in clean and low-carbon technologies (3).
65
I support the potential of markets to provide tangible emissions reductions
in a cost-effective manner, and there are a number of lessons that can be learned
from countries around the world that have been experimenting with pricing
systems. This chapter provides a high-level snapshot of the economic argument
for establishing carbon pricing policies, reviews current carbon pricing schemes
in key emitter countries, and outlines the political momentum for carbon pricing
that has surfaced in recent years.
Externalities
In its most skeletal form, economic theory tells us how to most efficiently price
goods and services to produce an outcome that is socially optimal. One aspect of
the theory teaches us about how to deal with externalities. An externality can be
either positive or negative, and it occurs when an action impacts a third party that
is not directly involved in an economic transaction (4).
For example, when I was a student at Duke, my roommate was an avid
environmentalist who walked to campus instead of driving. This is a positive
externality, because her decision benefited others by reducing congestion on the
roads and by reducing pollution. On the other hand, when I was late and rushing
to campus, I would hop in my car and drive. My decision to drive resulted in a
negative externality for society. I contributed to local air pollution and to global
emissions driving climate change, pun intended.
These negative externalities are one kind of market failure in the eyes
of economists. As stated by economist Nicholas Stern, climate change is the
“greatest market failure the world has ever seen” (5). Those who produce
greenhouse gases are imposing huge costs on other people around the world and
on future generations.
The costs of emitting carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases are not truly
reflected in the costs emitters pay. The costs are borne by society through public
health costs and the costs that accrue through the impacts of climate change,
including temperature and sea level rise, and the devastating effects of extreme
weather events, among many others.
If climate change goes unmitigated, the economic costs of inaction will
reshape the global economy by reducing average global incomes approximately
23% by 2100 and widening global inequality (6).
The costs of acting on climate now far outweigh the costs we will face as a
global society if we fail to mitigate emissions. We must implement policies to
curb emissions and we must do so quickly. In the United States, net mitigation
costs could increase, on average, 40% for each decade of delay on hitting a
specified climate target, according to a report released by the White House
Council of Economic Advisers in 2014 (7).
Thus, we need to account for the external costs of carbon in our
decision-making, which can help correct the economic market failure of
externalities. However, there is another economic issue with mitigating emissions
and tackling climate change. We’re facing the challenges inherent to global
public goods.
66
One Jurisdiction at a Time
We all enjoy using the climate. The climate includes our atmosphere,
biosphere, hydrosphere, geosphere, and cryosphere. However, the state of the
climate is the product of everyone’s behavior. The climate is a public good,
because it meets the two properties of non-rivalry and non-excludability (8). This
means that consumption of a good does not reduce the quantity available to others,
and it is impossible to prevent anyone from consuming the good. However, the
climate falls into a particular category of a public good: a global public good.
The impacts of climate change affect the entire globe and will affect generations
yet to come (9).
A distinguishing factor of a global public good is that it involves “stock
externalities” (8). In the case of carbon dioxide emissions, every tonne of carbon
dioxide emitted in the United States is equivalent to a tonne of carbon dioxide
emitted elsewhere in the world, whether it be in China, Indonesia, Germany,
Nigeria, or Antarctica. The colorless carbon dioxide in the atmosphere mixes and
accumulates. Unbeknownst to generations before us, our atmosphere turned into
a free carbon dioxide disposal site. With the growing scientific understanding
of the Earth’s linked natural systems, we now know that there is a long-lasting
consequence of increasing the concentration of carbon in the atmosphere.
Tackling the global public goods challenge requires international collective
action.
Building the necessary frameworks for international collective action in order
to stay within our carbon budget is a complex and multifaceted issue. Elinor
Ostrom researched the issues of the global commons and collective action and
won the 2009 Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences. Ostrom won the Nobel Prize
for her groundbreaking research that demonstrated how common resources can be
successfully managed at the local level. She is the first woman to win the Nobel
Prize in Economic Sciences, and she was also listed in Time Magazine as one of
the world’s most influential people in 2012 – the same year she passed away (10).
I recommend watching her Prize Lecture on the Nobel Prize website (10).
In her paper, “A Polycentric Approach for Coping with Climate Change,”
Ostrom argues that a single government unit is incapable of solving a global
collective action problem like climate change because of free-rider problems (11).
Free-riding occurs when an actor receives the benefits of a public good without
contributing to the costs. In the case of international climate action, countries
have the incentive to rely on others mitigation actions. For instance, when the
United States pays for new technologies to cut carbon emissions, the benefit of
these actions is global. Thus, other countries are less inclined to cut their own
emissions, because they can “free-ride” off of the United States’ emissions cuts.
Free-riding is problematic in these instances where the costs are concentrated and
the benefits disperse (12). In order to overcome the free-rider challenge, Ostrom
recommends a multi-tiered approach to governance with interlinked actions at the
local, regional, and national levels (11). This layered approach to climate action
would build commitment and trust between actors through a comprehensive
monitoring and information-sharing framework. The challenge of how best to
establish these linkages with a robust monitoring system has not yet been solved,
67
but I believe that Ostrom’s vision for a polycentric, joint-policy cooperative
approach to climate governance is slowly coming to fruition.
At the international level, the Paris Agreement sets forth a framework for
countries to submit national climate action plans. These plans link international
climate goals to bottom-up climate and energy policy approaches in 190 countries
(13). As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, the Agreement also
establishes a hook for the use of cooperative approaches among jurisdictions,
including through the use of “internationally transferred mitigation outcomes,”
ITMOs for short (14). The definition of what actions can be counted as ITMOs
is still under consideration by the UN. Nonetheless, this is a compelling sign
for the more than 90 developed and developing countries that indicated plans to
use international, regional, or national carbon pricing mechanisms for mitigating
greenhouse gas emissions (15).
It may take a decade or more before substantial cooperative approaches with
carbon pricing systems are established. However, we need to take this step by
step. The first step is for jurisdictions to create carbon pricing policies. The
momentum towards carbon pricing can be seen in recent statistics released by
the World Bank. According to the World Bank’s “Carbon Pricing Watch 2016”
report, in 2016 approximately 40 national jurisdictions and more than 20 cities,
states, and regions—together representing almost a quarter of global greenhouse
gas emissions—are putting a price on carbon (16). Furthermore, the number of
carbon pricing instruments already implemented or scheduled for implementation
has nearly doubled since 2012 (17).
To Cap or Tax
There are two common instruments used to price carbon. Firstly, a carbon tax
directly puts a price on carbon. This tax can be defined by a tax rate on greenhouse
gas emissions or even a tax rate on the carbon content of certain fuels—particularly
68
carbon-heavy fuels like coal and oil. It is important to note that a carbon tax does
not guarantee a certain quantity of emissions reductions.
The second popular instrument for carbon pricing is an emissions trading
system (ETS). These systems are also referred to as cap-and-trade systems, and
they set a cap on the total level of greenhouse gas emissions permitted. Industries
with low emissions have the flexibility to sell their extra allowances to the larger
emitters. This creates a market price for carbon through the buying and selling of
allowances. Any company that does not fulfill their compliance obligations under
the ETS is typically penalized by a regulator. The benefit of an ETS is that it is
more likely to ensure that the aggregate required emissions reductions occur. The
similarities of a carbon tax versus an ETS outweigh their differences, as both a
well-designed carbon tax and ETS incentivize industries to invest in measures that
result in cost-effective emissions reductions (20).
The stringency of both instruments is critical, and thus the success of either a
carbon tax or ETS boils down to its design. Policymakers and economists have not
settled all questions regarding carbon pricing instruments, but the message now is
louder than ever that the use of these tools is essential to raising the global ambition
of emissions reductions.
As World Bank Group President Jim Yong Kim said in April 2016, “The most
direct and certain path to reduce carbon emissions is to put a price on them, so that
carbon pollution becomes an operating cost, and incentives are created to push
forward with greener technologies and solutions” (21).
The EU established the world’s first major emissions trading system (EU ETS)
in 2005 and is currently the world’s largest carbon market. The EU ETS operates in
31 countries (all 28 EU countries, as well as Iceland, Liechtenstein, and Norway)
using a cap-and-trade system. It covers around 45% of the EU’s greenhouse gas
emissions and limits emissions from more than 11,000 energy-intense industries
including power stations and industrial plants (22). It also covers airline emissions
when a flight takes off in the region and lands in another country included under
the scheme. The success of emissions reductions under the EU ETS is critical
in order for the EU to reach its emissions reduction target to reduce greenhouse
gas emissions by at least 40% domestically by 2030 from 1990 levels (23). The
system was executed in several phases in order to allow for flexibility as the EU
experimented with the design of the system.
The EU ETS is currently in the middle of its third phase, which started in 2013
and will remain in place until 2020 (24). Due to the design of the EU ETS in the
first two phases and the 2008 recession, the EU ETS is facing challenges with an
oversupply of allowances and credits for emissions reductions that, at times, even
exceeded total emissions. Thus, since the price of carbon is set by the market,
the price of the allowances has been historically lower than anticipated (25). This
means that there is not a strong incentive for businesses to reduce their emissions.
69
The design of phase three is considerably different from the rules in the
first two phases in the attempt to raise the low carbon price set by the market.
For instance, there is now a single, EU-wide cap on the number of emissions
allowances. Each allowance gives the holder the right to emit either one tonne of
carbon dioxide, or the equivalent amount of two more powerful gases including
nitrous oxide (N2O) or perfluorocarbons (PFCs). In 2013, the cap for emissions
from installations was set at approximately 2 billion allowances. This cap then
decreases each year by a linear factor of 1.74% of the average total number
of allowances issued each year from 2008-2012. According to the European
Commission, this equates to a reduction of 38,264,246 allowances each year.
Ultimately, this means that the number of allowances, and thus the level of
emissions from businesses covered in the scheme, will be 21% lower in 2020
than in 2005 (26).
However, even with this annually decreasing cap, emissions are not
decreasing at a rate sufficient enough for the EU to reach its climate target. In
2014, the EU proposed a new mechanism to handle the surplus of allowances in
the ETS in order to increase the carbon price and incentivize greater mitigation
actions. The mechanism, called the Market Stability Reserve (MSR), will remove
excess emissions allowances based on a set of “trigger” thresholds and place
them into a reserve, and thus out of the market (27). The mechanism will also be
equipped to feed allowances back into the system when there are too few. This
new element of the EU ETS will be operational by 2019 (28).
Moreover, in 2015, the European Commission presented a legislative
proposal to revise the EU ETS design for its fourth phase starting in 2021.
One central element of the reform is to increase the annual linear reduction
of allowances by 2.2%, compared to the current 1.74% (29). The reform also
outlines new rules for the allocation of free allowances to high-emitting industries
in order to combat concerns regarding carbon leakage. Carbon leakage occurs
when industries move to another country that has less stringent greenhouse gas
regulations, thus impacting the competitiveness of European industries. These
concerns are addressed in the reforms, and these structural changes to the EU
ETS will be considered in the plenary in February 2017 (30). However, after
more than a year of negotiations, EU member state environment ministers failed
to find common ground on the reform in December 2016 (31).
The EU ETS has certainly experienced some growing pains. However, the
lessons learned by the EU ETS can be incorporated into the design of other
emissions trading schemes. The creation of the MSR and the reforms to the
EU ETS will help to ensure greater emissions reductions as the emissions cap
decreases and the carbon price, hopefully, increases.
72
to the Supreme Court. Looking ahead to 2017, the seat will be filled by President
Donald Trump’s administration. It is in the best interests of our health and planet
for there to be a ninth justice on the Court who understands the science of climate
change and the urgency with which we must act.
Coalition Launch
The goal of the coalition is to help advance effective and well-designed carbon
pricing systems around the world. The work plan of the coalition was also released
during the launch, and it outlines three main objectives of the coalition that will
enable the establishment of strong, well-designed carbon markets for national and
sub-national governments around the world.
Firstly, the coalition aims to help government and business leaders build the
evidence base for implementing successful carbon pricing schemes. This means
capturing best practices and lessons from partners such as EU countries that have
experience with the EU ETS. Secondly, the coalition aims to mobilize ambitious
private sector support. Lastly, it establishes a framework for constructive dialogue
between countries. These Leadership Dialogues are expected to take place in
Chile, Mexico, Germany, and India (56).
This knowledge and best practices sharing platform is what governments need
to develop comprehensive and successful policies.
Link to Business
Similarly to governments, carbon pricing is a high priority for businesses. The
Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP) found that 435 companies from around the globe
reported using an internal price on carbon in 2015. This number was only reported
as 150 in 2014. Even more shocking is that 1000+ companies are now disclosing
to their stakeholders that they are pricing, or plan to price in the next two years,
their carbon emissions in order to understand the risks to operations due to climate
change (57).
On July 15, 2016, the largest number of companies, almost 20, joined the
CPLC at the same time. All of the companies that recently joined are Canadian
businesses (58).
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on-the-move (accessed August 31, 2016).
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Chapter 7
Introduction
The largest source of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions is from our energy
supply, which produces 26% of global GHG emissions (1). Transitioning to
renewable energy is one of the most viable options we have to curb our GHG
emissions from the energy sector; however, the task of implementing renewable
energy on a global scale is much easier said than done.
I had the amazing opportunity to travel to the 20th Conference of Parties
(COP20) for the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCCC) in Lima, Peru in December 2014. The COP20 consisted of
negotiations among delegates from all Parties to the UNFCCC, specficially
focusing on forming the anticipated Paris Agreement that would be signed at
the following COP21 in Paris. At the conference, if one solely focused on the
negotiation among Party delegates, it would be easy to be discouraged by the
lack of progress. However, the conference was so much more than detailed
neogiations. From the daily “Fossil of the Day” presentation, animated protests,
and the impassioned speakers, it was clear that there was a global interest in
combatting climate change.
Kyoto Protocol
The Kyoto Protocol highlights the difference between industrialized and
developing nations by completely separating their responsibilities for reducing
carbon emissions. This treaty uses the convention’s designation of the Parties to
help assign emission reduction targets. The designations are Annex I, Annex II,
Non-Annex I, and Least-Developed Countries (LDCs). Annex I Parties are made
up of industrialized nations that were a part of the Organization for Economic
Co-operation and Development (OECD), and countries with economies in
transition (EIT Parties) such as the Russian Federation and Eastern European
countries. Annex II includes the OECD members but excludes the EIT Parties.
Non-Annex I and LDCs are mostly developing nations. The Kyoto Protocol
legally binds the Annex I and Annex II Parties to GHG emission reduction targets.
Annex II Parties are required to give financial aid to help developing countries
reduce their GHGs, while Annex I Parties are not required to financially aid
developing nations. Non-Annex I and LDCs are not bound to any GHG emission
reduction targets (2).
A total of 192 Parties ratified the Kyoto Protocol, with the United States as
the most the most notable Party in a small number of Parties to abstain. The first
commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol started in 2008 and ended in 2012.
Under this commitment period, industrialized Parties commited to reduce their
GHG emissions by an average of 4% below their 1990 GHG emission levels. For
these Parties, the protocol was quite successful as they surpassed their emission
reduction targets by 24%. Unfortunately, it was not successful in reducing GHG
emissions globally (3). Just before the first commitment period was over, the Doha
Amendment was adopted in 2012, which provids a second commitment period
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that started in 2013 and ends in 2020. Currently, 74 Parties have ratified this
amendment to the Kyoto Protocol (4).
While the Kyoto Protocol has been instrumental in taking steps towards a
low carbon future, ultimately it has failed to reduce GHG emissions on a global
scale in the first commitment period. This failure is largely due to the division
of emission reduction resposnibilities. It is reasonable that industrialized Parties
should have the most ambitious GHG reduction targets, as they have the financial
and technological resources to achieve these goals. Moreover, industrialized
nations are more primed to provide aid to developing nations that cannot allocate
their own resources toward renewable energy projects. Unfortunately, GHG
emission data proves that developing nations should also be held accountable
for the emission reduction effort. According to the World Resources Institute,
five out of the top ten worst GHG-emitting countries between 1990 and 2011 are
considered Non-Annex I Parties by the Kyoto Protocol. These five countries alone
made 30% of the global GHG emissions during that time period (5). It has been
largely recognized that developing nations need to be held accountable for their
GHG emission. This realization led to the Paris agreement, a new international
agreement that addresses climate change mitigation and adaption.
Paris Agreement
One of the main goals of the Paris Agreement is to hold the warming of the
planet “well below” 2°C above the global average temperature. Other important
goals include peaking GHG emissions as soon as possible and achieving net-zero
emissions in the second half of the century. The Paris Agreement requires climate
change mitigation efforts of all Parties, instead of holding only Annex I and Annex
II countries to reduce GHG emissions, as the Kyoto Protocol does. Each party
must submit intended nationally determined contributions (INDCs) that identify
their reduction targets and their plans to reach that goal. These INDCs must be
revised at least once every five years to ensure ambitious emission reduction targets
(6). Compared to the Kyoto Protocol, the Paris Agreement is more focused on
the process of determining targets and holding Parties accountable, as opposed
to achieving strict quantified emission reduction goals. This attribute of change
promotes global responsibility of mitigating climate change, while simultaneously
allowing Parties the freedom to develop their own goals that suit their unique
situtations politically, geographically, economically, etc.
Industrialized Nations
The EU has been quite successful in terms of their GHG emission reduction.
In 2014, the GHG emissions for the collective 28 EU countries (EU-28) were
reduced to 22.9% below their 1990 levels, which has already surpassed their 2020
goal to reduce their GHG emissions to 20% below their 1990 levels (7). In order
to continue to achieve such a high level of success, the EU has set up clear goals
for renewable energy use, national action plans for each country, and mechanisms
to allow cooperation among EU countries.
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In 2009, the EU published the Renewable Energy Directive with the binding
goal of producing 20% of their energy from renewable sources by 2020 and at
least 27% by 2030 (8). These targets permit flexibility for countries as there are
not strict targets for what source of renewable energy is to be used or how much
emission reduction needs to come from each country. This freedom allows for
each country to leverage resources most efficient for them. For instance, Spain
has a high potential for solar energy, especially in the southern part of the country,
while Denmark has a high potential for wind energy due to the strong winds from
the North Sea (9).
Through the Renewable Energy Directive, each country is required to submit
a renewable energy national action plan. These plans include detailed targets for
various energy sectors, a list of the different renewable technologies planned to be
used, policies to be used to achieve their target, and any anticipated coordination
with other countries, such as joint projects. Requiring the submission of these
plans is essential, as it forces each country to develop concrete and realistic ideas
for how they can implement renewable energy into their energy mix. There is
no requirement for exactly how much each country must contribute, as long as
the EU as a whole has at least 20% of its energy supply produced by renewables
by 2020. For example, Malta is a small, fairly isolated island nation with
limited access to renewable resources, so it makes sense that they would only
plan to have renewables contribute 10% of their energy consumption by 2020.
Whereas Sweden, for example, is already quite progressive and fairly wealthy
with renewable resources, and they will help make up the difference by planning
to produce 59% of their energy from renewable sources by 2020 (10). Those
countries that choose to contribute more than their share can compensate for those
countries that cannot without making substantial sacrifices.
The mechanisms set up by the Renewable Energy Directive also permits
cooperation and coordination to permit the transfer of renewable resources from
resource-rich countries to resource-poor countries. These mechanisms include
statistical transfers of renewable energy, joint renewable energy projects, and
joint renewable energy support schemes. A statistical transfer allows countries to
deduct an amount of renewable energy from their progress and add it to another
country’s progress for their renewable energy target. Through this transfer, no
energy is physically exchanged; this encourages countries to exceed their target
to receive payment. Joint projects encourage the EU countries to work together to
develop and implement a renewable energy project, enabling each participating
country to earn renewable energy credits to help meet their target. Joint support
schemes let EU countries co-develop renewable energy incentive policies such
as a common feed-in tariff, a common quota, or a certificate trading regime
(11). These mechanisms are a great way to encourage the development of new
renewable energy projects. This cooperation is especially helpful for countries
who lack the renewable and/or financial resources to develop.
There is a lot to learn from the EU-28 with regard to implementing renewables
and ultimately reducing GHG emissions, as they have already achieved a high
level of success. A coherent plan is in place that requires nations to submit
detailed action plans for how they plan to implement renewable energy into their
energy mix without requiring each nation to achieve a pre-determined percentage
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of renewable energy. The plan gives each country the ability to determine how
ambitious to be and what types of renewable energy to use. The Renewable
Energy Directive also provides the opportunity for countries to collaborate with
other countries, allowing ambitious countries to aid those countries that may have
difficulty in achieving their targets alone.
GCC Countries
While at COP20, I took a particular interest with the GCC countries, which
include Middle Eastern countries like Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, etc. A majority
of their talks pertained to energy issues faced within the area. In addition to talking
about renewable energy projects, I found it interesting to observe how countries
are working to mitigate climate change when their main source of revenue is from
oil and gas. In particular, I was impressed with current efforts to construct a solar
panel research, development, and manufacturing complex in Saudi Arabia.
Under the UNFCCC, all of the GCC countries are listed as Non-Annex I
Parties, meaning they are not legally bound to any GHG emission reduction
targets under the Kyoto Protocol. Between 1990 and 2008, CO2 emissions in
Saudi Arabia from fossil fuels rose by over 200% and continue to rise (12, 13).
Under the Kyoto Protocol, Saudi Arabia’s efforts to mitigate climate change have
been largely inadequate. Days after the Paris Agreement was opened for signing
Saudi Arabia announced a plan called Vision 2030. This plan covers a wide
spectrum of issues, but one of the main goals is to grow Saudi Arabia’s economy
by “investing for the long-term.” Vision 2030 sets out to diversify Saudi Arabia’s
economy beyond oil and gas, which includes the development of its renewable
energy sector (14, 15).
Through Vision 2030, Saudi Arabia plans to raise their share of non-oil exports
from 16% of their GDP to 50% by investing in a variety of different industries,
including retail and mining. This effort to diversify is encouraging, as it shows
they are beginning to recognize that an economy based on oil is neither sustainable
for the planet nor their economy. However, this does not mean that Saudi Arabia
seeks to slow down the production of oil and gas. In fact, the Vision 2030 plan
claims that Saudi Arabia will double their gas production and build a new gas
distribution network (16).
One particularly exciting project is Saudi Arabia’s plan to develop a stronger
renewable energy market, in which their goal is to be a center for research,
development, and manufacturing of renewable energy. Due to Saudi Arabia’s
large resources of raw input materials for renewable projects (e.g. silica and
petrochemicals), they plan to localize production of materials for these projects.
Their goal is to generate 9.5 GW of renewable power (roughly 10% of their
energy mix) by 2030. While at first glance this may seem like an ambitious target,
it will only make a fairly small dent in their energy mix, as Saudi Arabia’s energy
consumption is expected to triple by 2030, Saudi Arabia’s Energy Minister,
Khalid Al-Falih, has said “Our energy mix has shifted more toward gas, so the
need for high targets from renewable sources isn’t there anymore. The previous
target of 50% from renewable sources was an initial target and it was built on
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high oil prices.” Al-Falih continues, “Gas currently makes up around 50% of
the energy mix in Saudi Arabia, and we have an ambition to see this grow to
70% in the future (17).” It is reasonable that the plan for Saudi Arabia would
be influenced by the oil market, but such a drastic drop in mitigation efforts is
quite extreme. Saudi Arabia has signed and ratified the Paris Agreement as of
November 2016. They have not set a specific GHG emission reduction target
and have submitted an “actions only” mitigation contribution with the actions
that are largely set out by the Vision 2030 plan (18). It seems that Saudi Arabia
is choosing not to be near as ambitious in their mitigation plan as they could be,
putting their economic growth first and foremost and leaving sustainability and
climate change mitigation far from their top priorities.
It is encouraging to see Saudi Arabia, the world’s leading exporter of oil,
making moves towards a cleaner future. With the announcement of Vision 2030,
they have shown that they are looking to drastically increase their non-oil exports.
It also shows that they are planning to develop their renewable energy sector.
These steps are an essential recognition that oil is not a sustainable resource,
but there is still a lot of room for improvement and a more ambitious renewable
energy plan. Even with these anticipated changes, Saudi Arabia’s CO2 emissions
are likely to continue to drastically increase with the expected increase in energy
consumption.
Developing Nations
For the 2015-2016 school year, I had the opportunity to teach science for
middle and high school students in Phnom Penh, Cambodia. While I consider
myself a fairly environmentally conscious person, it was difficult to be too
worried about Cambodia’s GHG emissions and their mitigation efforts. Virtually
everywhere I travelled within the country, I witnessed large families living in
structures that could barely be even considered shacks. I lived in the capital
and the largest city in Cambodia, where access to electricity and water was not
an issue—outside of the ridiculously high prices for electricity, that is. I paid
almost four times what I currently pay in Texas. While, a short tuk-tuk ride away
from the center of the city made it very apparent that the vast majority of the
country did not live this way. Outside of Cambodia’s larger cities/towns, access
to electricity is limited. Phnom Penh uses 90% of Cambodia’s total electricity
consumption, even though the city only accounts for roughly 10% of the country’s
population (19). Needless to say, it is understandable that for developing nations
in similar situations expensive renewable energy projects are not their top priority.
However, through the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement, there are still
methods that will help countries like Cambodia develop in a more sustainable
way.
Prior to my time at COP20, I did not know much about the specific
mechanisms that the Kyoto Protocol set up to aid parties so that all of their
GHG emission reductions did not have to come from domestic projects.
These mechanisms could count towards their GHG emission reduction targets,
while simultaneously funding the development of carbon reducing projects in
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developing nations. One commonly used mechanism was the clean development
mechanism (CDM). The CDM allows Annex II Parties to implement an
emission-reduction project in developing countries, which can earn the Annex
II Parties emission-reduction credits that can count towards reaching their target
(20). At COP20, I visited a side event from Japan where they discussed a
mechanism developed to aid other countries called the joint credit mechanism
(JCM). This mechanism helps to achieve Japan’s reduction target as well as earn
the partner country GHG reduction units (21). They had representatives from a
handful of the countries that Japan had helped come speak about the JCM project
developed in their country. There was a speaker from Mongolia who discussed
the project that helped them develop cost-effective and energy-efficient water
boilers in Mongolian homes. Another speaker from Cambodia talked about a
feasibility project to determine if developing electric powered tuk-tuks would be a
cost-effective form of carbon-emission reduction in their country. It is difficult for
developing nations to allocate resources to fund GHG emission reducing projects,
which is part of why these CDM and JCM-type projects are invaluable. It is
estimated that leading up to 2012, CDM projects helped to remove as much as 1
billion tons of GHG emissions (22). These mechanisms demonstrated an amazing
aspect of the UNFCCC that can allow countries to earn credit for reducing their
GHG emissions, while aiding developing nations in a practical and sustainable
way.
While CDM projects will be a major player for emission reduction in
developing countries like Cambodia, it is also important for them to have a plan of
their own to develop sustainably. In terms of Cambodia’s energy supply, they face
two major problems, which include their dependence on foreign-supplied energy
and their limited access to electricity in rural areas. Currently, more than 50% of
Cambodia’s electricity is imported from neighboring countries, and most of that
which is generated locally comes from imported fuel (23). This dependence on
foreign energy sources has resulted in extremely high electricity prices, especially
in the rural areas that have limited access to electricity. The larger cities account
for the vast majority of the country’s electricity consumption, while only making
up roughly 15% of the population. 85% of the population lives in rural areas, yet
only 15% of this rural population has access to electricity. Developing electricity
services for this rural population is one of Cambodia’s main goals. They have
developed a plan called the Rural Electrification Plan that aims to accomplish this
task. The major goals of this plan include having 100% of villages with electricity
access by 2020 and 70% of rural households with electricity access by 2030. The
remaining 30% of households fall under a different plan called the Renewable
Energy Development Program, which will rely largely on solar applications to
provide energy to remote regions of Cambodia. While the major focus of the
Rural Electrification Plan is to expand Cambodia’s electricity grid, the plan does
take into consideration the development of renewable energy.
There are other plans, such as the Renewable Electricity Action Plan (REAP),
that focus more on the development on renewable energy. REAP seeks to have 5%
(or 6 MW) of new electricity generation come from small-scale hydropower (23).
Cambodia is rich with potential for renewable energy, especially hydropower,
biomass, and solar energy, making renewable energy a great option for Cambodia.
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Renewable energy would greatly reduce their dependence on foreign-supplied
energy sources. It also would help to make electricity available in remote areas,
as they could use the resources available in the immediate area to generate
electricity. As of this writing, Cambodia has signed the Paris Agreement but has
yet to ratify the agreement. They have submitted a conditional INDC, proposing
to reduce their emissions by 27% their expected business-as-usual emissions (18).
One possible way to create more ambitious emission reduction goals among
developing nations would be to develop plans similar to the EU’s Renewable
Energy Directive. Nations within a given region could aid each other in one overall
emission reduction target among all nations involved. This would allow nations to
benefit off of each other’s natural resources, especially in nations where resources
for renewable energy are scarce. For example, nations that are members of the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) like Cambodia, the Philippines,
Singapore, etc. could set an overall emission reduction target of 10% below typical
emissions among all members of ASEAN. More wealthy nations like Singapore
would be more likely to set ambitious goals that are higher than the 10%, allowing
other nations involved to benefit.
Developing nations face a difficult set of challenges. Their primary focus
is advancing as nations in order to create better lives for their citizens, but there
is a strong pressure to develop in a sustainable manner. CDM-type projects are
a great opportunity for industrialized nations to earn credit towards their GHG
emission reduction targets while spurring sustainable development in developing
nations. Each country has a unique set of obstacles, which is why it is crucial
for all developing nations to lay out a plan for their own development. Not all
nations will be able to set extremely ambitious goals with regards to GHG emission
reductions, but taking GHG emission reduction into consideration is an important
stepping stone in creating a low-carbon future.
Conclusion
Replacing fossil fuels with clean, renewable resources is not a simple task
with a “one-size-fits-all” solution, but the Kyoto Protocol and Paris Agreement
have set up a great framework to make this feat more achievable. These
treaties have made it commonplace for countries, even countries as poor as
Cambodia, to develop plans for renewable energy. The EU has released an
ambitious plan, which allows EU nations to work together in accomplishing the
overall emission-reduction target for the EU. Their goal is to have 20% of their
energy come from renewable resources, and they have already achieved 22.9%.
Industrialized and developing nations alike can look at the EU’s plan as a model,
as it encourages nations to work together to utilize the unique resources available
in each country to achieve ambitious emission-reduction targets. It is encouraging
to see countries whose economies are dependent on oil exporting, like Saudi
Arabia, working towards developing sustainably. While these plans are largely
influenced by the oil market, they are still looking to expand their exports beyond
oil and to implement renewable energy into their energy mix. The CDM-type
mechanisms that have been set up by the Kyoto Protocol will be instrumental
88
in the growth of renewable energy in developing nations. These projects
help industrialized nations earn emission reduction credits while encouraging
sustainability in developing nations. It is also important for developing nations to
set out their own plans for advancing renewable energy. Cambodia has modest
plans to develop renewable energy, but naturally, their main focus is expanding
the electricity grid to parts of the country without access to electricity. Overall, it
is promising to see nations making strides to develop and implement renewable
energy on a global scale. However, these strides are by no means perfect nor
complete. In order to successfully phase out fossil fuels, a much greater level
of ambition is needed. Through international coordination, there is hope to
successfully curb our GHG emissions and mitigate climate change.
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89
11. Cooperation Mechanisms, Energy, European Commission. https:/
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Analysis Center. http://cdiac.ornl.gov/trends/emis/tre_sau.html (accessed
Oct. 29, 2016).
13. Saudi Arabia, Climate Action Tracker. http://climateactiontracker.org/
countries/saudiarabia.html (accessed Oct. 26, 2016).
14. United Nations Treaty Collection. https://treaties.un.org/ (accessed Oct. 26,
2016).
15. Saudi Vision 2030. http://vision2030.gov.sa/en (accessed Oct. 26, 2016).
16. Investing for the Long-Term, Saudi Vision 2030. http://vision2030.gov.sa/en/
node/6 (accessed Oct. 26, 2016).
17. Saudi Arabia Scales Back Renewable Energy Goal to Favor Gas, Bloomberg.
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back-renewable-energy-target-to-favor-gas (accessed Oct. 29, 2016).
18. CAIT Climate Data Explorer, World Resources Institute. http://cait.wri.org/
indc/#/ (accessed Dec. 6, 2016).
19. Energy, Open Development Cambodia. https://
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2016).
90
Chapter 8
92
ballot referendums and supportive Supreme Court rulings. Usually only then do
these causes have enough momentum and publicity to hold federal priority. But
even without Congressional attention, these smaller-scale actions are making an
impact.
94
well, helping inform residents about the cost savings and emissions reductions
that they can feel positive about. Public awareness-building efforts like this have
helped spread the word, and community solar farms are being organized across
the country, allowing people to pool their resources and benefit from a cleaner
fuel technology.
Acknowledgments
The views and opinions expressed in this chapter are those of the author and
do not necessarily reflect the views of Idexx Laboratories, Inc.
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9. Donahue, B; Anderson, M; Beal, A; Berlin, L; Burke, J; Kelly, T; Lapping,
M; Libby, R; Ramer, H. A New England Food Vision; Food Solutions
New England, University of New Hampshire: Durham, NH, 2014.
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20, 2016).
10. Nordhaus, T; Rayner, S; Hayward, S; Shellenberger, M; Pielke, R.; Sarewitz,
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98
Chapter 9
Instantaneous Demand
We were already more than 15 miles into our hike. The soft sunlight was
peaking through the forest cover, which was beginning to thin as we gained
elevation. One...two…ten…twenty…the number of switchbacks continued to
rise, taunting my tired legs. I stopped as we hit switchback number 30, and I took
a deep inhale to steady my racing heart. The air felt thin. We were close. An hour
later, the forest trail straightened and we were surrounded by the mountains of the
Northern Cascades. I threw off my 65-liter Sierra Nevada pack and spun around
in circles to take advantage of the 360-degree view. Glacier Peak captured my
attention (Figure 1). We camped in view of the volcano, and we were already on
the trail when we saw the sun peering over the mountaintops the next morning.
Sixteen miles later and I’m situated in the passenger seat of my friend’s car
racing back into civilization. Going “off the grid” is my favorite kind of vacation,
however, I return from every trip with a revived appreciation for some modern
amenities: hot shower, cup of espresso, and the ability to turn on the lights and
read after dark. Okay, maybe those aren’t considered today’s “modern” amenities
with the rise of technologies like Amazon Echo and Virtual Reality, but when I
return from a multi-day hiking trip, I’m reminded of my dependence on electricity
for almost every aspect of my daily routine.
I flip up my light switch. The lights turn on. When I’m home, I never doubt
the outcome of this perceived simple action. Our demand for electricity is met
instantaneously.
Think about it. How incredible is that?! Our electric grid is this reliable and
extraordinarily complex machine that powers our homes, businesses, and electric
cars. However, our grid is going to face some challenges in the near future if we
are to transform to low-carbon generation.
Approximately 67% of our electricity comes from burning coal and natural
gas. In 2014, electricity production contributed to 30% of greenhouse gas
emissions in the United States (1). Due to climate change, air pollution concerns
and significant improvements in renewable energy technologies, the Energy
Information Administration (EIA) predicts the share of energy generation from
renewables and nuclear energy in North America is expected to rise to 45% in
2025 (2). This analysis by the EIA gives clout to the latest trilateral clean energy
and climate agreement target set by the United States, Mexico, and Canada to
reach 50% of electricity generation from clean energy sources by 2025 (3).
The United States, Mexico, and Canada are not the only countries to set a
regional renewable energy target. The Caribbean Community (CARICOM) has set
a regional goal of 47% renewables in the power sector by 2027, and the Economic
Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has set a target for a share of
renewable energy in the region’s overall electricity mix to 10% in 2020 and 19%
in 2030 (4, 5).
100
When you add these regional targets to the subnational and national policy
landscape, the holistic picture of clean energy targets and greenhouse gas reduction
commitments turns into a jigsaw puzzle where everyone is questioning the overall,
cumulative greenhouse gas reductions. Nevertheless, the ultimate objective is
clear through the multi-layered climate policy landscape: phase out fossil fuels
before the end of the century. This phase-out of fossil fuels by 2100 was also
supported by the leaders of the G7 economies in June 2015 (6).
In the power sector, this is going to require innovation and the creation of
a new status quo of how we generate, transmit, distribute, use, and measure
electricity. We have a grid in the United States that was built for a time of fossil
fuel generation in a centralized generation system. The integration of solar and
wind technologies is going to transform our infrastructure due to the variability
of renewables and the transition from centralized to more distributed generation.
We must understand the challenges we face as we look to meet our climate goals
while ensuring the lights always stay on.
We must also remember that building a flexible, efficient, and responsive
grid for those who currently do not have access to electricity is a critical piece
of the puzzle. Globally, there are an estimated 1.2 billion people without access
to electricity, which is nearly 17% of the global population (7). More than
95% of people living without electricity are located in Sub-Saharan Africa and
developing Asia. In recent decades, hundreds of millions of people have gained
access to electricity, with the majority of those people living in China and India
(8). Electrifying rural communities and cities that currently lack power is central
to enable economic empowerment and to raise standards of living. This challenge
of meeting energy access needs while ensuring the mitigation of greenhouse gas
emissions is one of the central challenges we face as a global community looking
to meet targets set forth under the Paris Agreement and the 2030 Sustainable
Development Goals.
101
Figure 2. Left to right: , Shelby Barianna, Kowan O’Keefe, Jessica McDonald
(author), Nina Diklich, Kaitlyn Teppert. COP20 Lima, Peru. 2015.
Cost
Variability
The central challenge that arises from the use of more solar and wind is the
inherent variability of these sources. Simply put, the sun does not always shine
and the wind does not always blow, and the amount generated by these sources
varies by time of day, season, and geographic location. Thus, solar and wind
resources have high inherent resource variability and limited predictability – which
is why they’re often referred to as Variable Renewable Energy (VRE). When the
percentage of VRE on the grid is between 5-10%, the variability of supply can be
managed relatively easily without significant investment (12). We can see from
the renewable energy targets mentioned above that the integration of renewables
is going to be much higher than 10%!
Thus, additional investments in the flexibility of the power system are
required to balance the increased levels of uncertainty while keeping the lights
on and costs down. In addition to flexibility, power operators also need to adopt
new operational strategies and policymakers need to put in place policies and
104
regulations that support VRE. For example, operators are strengthening their
ability for advanced renewable energy forecasting and on the economic side,
policymakers are evaluating reforms to electricity pricing (23).
The integration of renewables is unique to each system, and there are several
strategies that can be adopted into power systems. Firstly, technologies can focus
on the supply side and focus on generation technologies that can be quickly
ramped up and down. Secondly, on the demand side, smart-grid technologies
and efficiency improvements can more readily align supply with demand. Lastly,
storage can work with both supply and demand to quickly fill the gap between
VRE generation and demand (12).
Most fossil fuel plants were designed in the United States to operate at a
consistent, high-level to provide base-load generation. Nuclear and coal plants are
known for being among the least flexible forms of electricity generation. While
coal and nuclear generators can take more than 12 hours to ramp up, some gas
combustion technologies can start-up in minutes (24). This means that natural gas
generation can quickly fill in the generation supply gap when there is a significant
and fast change in electricity generated from solar and wind. There are limitations
to the flexibility of these systems, which can be complemented by energy storage.
The preferred technologies for energy storage include pumped hydro,
compressed air storage, and multiple battery technologies (25). With storage,
system operators can save the excess energy created by solar and wind and release
the energy when demand is high or supply is low. The current market for the
storage industry is limited, despite the large potential of scaling-up storage in
the future. The prices of batteries are still either too expensive or not durable
enough to remain a worthwhile investment. In the first quarter of 2016, just over
18 megawatts (MW) and 21 MwH of storage were deployed (26).
Demand response measures allow consumers to play a significant role in
the balance of electricity on the grid. Demand response involves consumers,
either residential, commercial, or industrial users, reducing or shifting their
electricity usage during peak electricity periods (27). With renewables, demand
response can be utilized when there is a surge in wind or solar power. This is
oftentimes motivated by a financial incentive provided by the utility, and thus
can save consumers money. This can be achieved through the installation of
control equipment that manages electricity use based on price signals from grid
operators. One aspect of this is the introduction of two-way communications for
measuring and controlling energy usage. These “smart-grid” technologies, such
as two-way thermostats in residential homes, can allow customers to sign up to
demand-response programs and opt-in to reduce power from smart devices, such
as iPhones and tablets (28).
Several countries have already started utilizing the technologies and policies
that are best suited to their unique power systems, leading the way in the renewable
energy transition.
105
Renewables Are Forging Ahead
Decentralized Systems
106
Clean Energy Ministerial
The challenges that we face as a global community in reaching our clean
energy targets and mitigating climate change requires the acceleration of clean
energy markets, political leadership, and the sharing of best practices for policies
and financing mechanisms. Outside of the UNFCCC framework, there are other
international forums that are actively bringing governments together to mobilize
knowledge and resources for increasing energy efficiency, transforming power
systems, and expanding energy access. The Clean Energy Ministerial (CEM) was
announced in 2009 after the UNFCCC stalled in negotiations in Copenhagen.
This voluntary forum brings together 24 countries and the European Commission,
including all major economies, to improve and expand the deployment of clean
energy technologies. With a combination of technical expertise, private sector
participation, and high-level policy dialogue, the CEM is a forum through which
countries can gain the knowledge and capacity needed to reach their domestic
energy and climate goals. Through initiatives such as the 21st Century Power
Partnership (21CPP), Super Efficient Appliances and Equipment Deployment
(SEAD), the International Smart Grid Action Network (ISGAN), and the Global
Lighting and Energy Access Partnership (Global LEAP), the CEM is filling a
vital niche in the international policy dialogue on how we’re going to transition
to a clean energy economy.
This platform for knowledge sharing and technical assistance in clean energy
technologies and policies supplements the targets set forth under the UNFCCC
negotiations. My experience as a delegate for ACS two years ago at COP20
directed my career towards international climate policy. In 2017, the 8th Clean
Energy Ministerial will be held in Beijing in early June.
Reaching the targets set forth for 2030 and 2050 is going to take a systems
approach, and I look forward to seeing the transformation of our energy systems
in my lifetime.
References
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ghgemissions/sources-greenhouse-gas-emissions (accessed October 2,
2016).
2. EIA. Renewables Share of North America Electricity Mix Expected To Rise.
http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=27332 (accessed October
2, 2016).
3. The White House. North American Climate, Clean Energy, and Environment
Partnership Action Plan, June 29, 2016. https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-
press-office/2016/06/29/leaders-statement-north-american-climate-clean-
energy-and-environment (accessed October 2, 2016).
4. IRENA. Renewable Energy Target Setting, June 2015.
5. ECREEE. ECOWAS Renewable Energy Policy, July 2013.
6. The Guardian. G7 Leaders Agree to Phase Out Fossil Fuel Use by End of
Century, June 8 2015. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jun/08/g7-
107
leaders-agree-phase-out-fossil-fuel-use-end-of-century (accessed October
15, 2016).
7. IEA. Energy Poverty. http://www.iea.org/topics/energypoverty/ (accessed
October 14, 2016).
8. IEA. World Energy Outlook: Energy Access Database.
9. UNFCCC. Morocco’s INDC, June 5, 2015.
10. UNFCCC. Chile’s INDC, September 2015.
11. UNFCCC. Malawi’s INDC, October 2015.
12. IEA. Next Generation Wind and Solar: From Cost to Value, April 2016.
13. BNEF. Solar and Wind Just Did the Unthinkable, January 14, 2016.
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-01-14/solar-and-wind-just-
did-the-unthinkable (accessed October 14, 2016).
14. BNEF. Wind and Solar Are Crushing Fossil Fuels, April 6, 2016.
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crushing-fossil-fuels (accessed October 14, 2016).
15. UCS. Solar Power on the Rise: The Technologies and Policies Behind a
Booming Energy Sector, August 2014.
16. REN21. Renewables 2016: Global Status Report.
17. SEIA. US Solar Market Set to Grow 119% in 2016, Installations to Reach
16GW, March 9, 2016. http://www.seia.org/news/us-solar-market-set-grow-
119-2016-installations-reach-16-gw (accessed October 14, 2016).
18. REN21. Renewables 2016: Global Status Report.
19. BNEF. Wind and Solar Just Passed Another Big Turning Point, October
6, 2015. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-10-06/solar-wind-
reach-a-big-renewables-turning-point-bnef (accessed October 15, 2016).
20. EIA. Electric Generator Capacity Factors Vary Widely across the World,
September 2015. http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=22832
(accessed October 15, 2016).
21. Climate Home. Renewables Cheaper than Half-Idle Fossil Fuel Plants-
Analysis, September 14, 2016. http://www.climatechangenews.com/
2016/09/14/renewables-cheaper-than-half-idle-fossil-fuel-plants-analysis/
(accessed December 26, 2016).
22. Penn State University. Basic Economics of Power Generation, Transmission,
and Distribution. https://www.e-education.psu.edu/eme801/node/530
(accessed October 14, 2016).
23. Bird, L.; Milligan, M.; Lew, D., Integrating Variable Renewable Energy:
Challenges and Solutions; NREL, September 2013.
24. World Bank Group. Energy Sector Management Assistance Program:
Bringing Variable Renewable Energy Up to Scale, June 2015.
25. IEA. Technology Roadmap: Energy Storage, 2014.
26. Forbes. One Expert’s View on the Near-Term Future of Energy Storage, July
2016. http://www.forbes.com/sites/peterdetwiler/2016/06/06/one-experts-
view-on-the-near-term-future-of-energy-storage/#5ebf442152c0 (accessed
October 14, 2016).
27. DOE. Smart Grid and Demand Response. http://energy.gov/oe/services/
technology-development/smart-grid/demand-response (accessed October
14, 2016).
108
28. GreenBiz. What Do You Need to Know about Demand Response? April
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you-need-know-about-demand-response (accessed October 14, 2016).
29. Fortune. Uruguay: This Country Gets Nearly All Its Electricity from
Clean Energy, December 7, 2015. http://fortune.com/2015/12/07/uruguay-
renewable-energy/ (accessed October 14, 2016).
30. The Guardian. Uruguay Makes Dramatic Shift to Nearly 95% Clean Energy,
December 2015. https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/dec/03/
uruguay-makes-dramatic-shift-to-nearly-95-clean-energy (accessed October
14, 2016).
31. The Guardian. Scotland Completely Powered by Wind Turbines for
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14, 2016).
109
Chapter 10
As we wait for the start of the second week of COP22, I am trying to put into
words the feelings and lessons that have been gleaned throughout this project. The
overwhelming feeling throughout has been one of hope. When our project first
began at the December 2010 COP16 in Cancun, we witnessed that hope first-hand
as COP16 President Patricia Espinosa brought the crowd of delegates, NGOs, and
others that had packed the auditorium beyond capacity to their feet in thunderous
applause for the unification felt from her leadership throughout COP16 (1).
Espinosa’s continuing leadership in the ensuing years was recognized with her
appointment in May 2016 to serve as Executive Secretary to the UNFCCC (2).
Now, on the eve of the second week of COP22, I feel as though a soaking
wet blanket has been thrown over that hope by the recent U.S. elections. The
overarching goal of climate science literacy, however, cannot be thwarted by
ideological politicians.
This reflection is not just about two points in time, but a journey that
began in 2010 when the ACS was making plans to celebrate the then-upcoming
International Year of Chemistry (IYC 2011). The celebration was scheduled to
last throughout 2011. Planning commenced at the Spring 2010 ACS National
Meeting in San Francisco. I did not get in on the ground floor in San Francisco,
but very shortly afterward Keith Peterman asked me to join him as co-chair
of the national ad hoc committee charged with Incorporating Sustainability
into the International Year of Chemistry (3). This committee was launched
at a Sustainability Engagement Event (SEE) in San Francisco that focused on
including the ACS in the IYC2011 celebration.
The journey really began when we formed a plan to expose students to the
issues surrounding climate change by getting them front row seats at the epicenter
of international climate negotiations. The project proposal was developed
throughout the summer of 2010 and proposed that fall at the National ACS
Meeting in Boston. Keith and I presented the proposal to the Committee on
Environmental Improvement (CEI), where it was met with strong support. To the
best of our knowledge, this project remains as the only ACS’s enduring legacy
from IYC 2011, and as such, to say that this project has exceeded our expectations
is an extreme understatement (4).
Boston was the start of a journey that has had numerous stops at the ACS
National Headquarters in Washington D.C., seven COPs on three different
continents, and multiple ACS meetings from Dallas to San Diego, with multiple
symposia and an ever-growing number of speakers.
There have been a number of COPs that really have altered the complexion
of the global fight against climate change. COP16 was the starting point of the
project, and having never experienced the negotiations on the international stage,
the students and I had no idea of what to expect. My veteran colleague, Keith,
having attended COP15 the previous year, kept describing it as a fifteen-ring
circus with all fifteen rings constantly hosting an act. We found out quickly that
Keith’s description was extremely accurate—it was impossible to understand
everything. We learned to make a plan but be very flexible. My impression of that
first COP was one of awe; the intelligence and dedication of the leadership was
112
incredible. We attended multiple press conferences with Christiana Figueres, the
then-UNFCCC Executive Secretary and Chief Negotiator for the UN. Figueres’
calm demeanor, pleasant tone, and continuously positive attitude were infectious.
UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon was also a regular at press conferences, and
I can say without a doubt that Ban is the most impressive, thoughtful, kind, and
ethereal man that I have ever encountered. But COP16 was Patricia Espinosa’s
shining moment. As the president of the COP, she managed to establish, promote,
and portray an aura of inclusiveness that permeated the negotiations. Everyone
that we spoke to sang her praises, and at the closing plenary session, she received
a standing ovation that lasted at least five minutes. The delegates, NGOs, press,
and other observers were not joining the ovation out of a sense of duty, but from
genuine, heartfelt appreciation.
The intervening COPs were speckled with special moments—the tremendous
feeling of community and culture in Durban, South Africa (2011 COP17) and the
strange, almost sterile feel in Doha, Qatar (2012 COP18). We wondered at the
choice of venue for COP18, and then were struck again the next year at the choice
of Warsaw (2013 COP19). Both seemed quite out of place given their significant
production and use of fossil fuels; Qatar as the largest per capita greenhouse gas
producer on the planet, while Poland (dubbed “Coal-land” at COP19) is one of
the world’s major coal users and producers. The choice of Warsaw became even
more peculiar when it was announced that the World Coal Council was meeting
at the same time. The meeting location seemed to get back to a more reasonable
spot with the 2014 COP20 in Lima, Peru. With this COP, there was a feeling
that the attendees and civil society were reengaging. Keith and I took part in the
largest climate change march in the southern hemisphere with an estimated 15,000
people marching through the streets of Lima calling for action, and this seemed
to invigorate the negotiations (5). All signs were pointing toward tremendous
advances in Paris.
The energy leading up to Paris was palpable. With massive climate
demonstrations around the world and Secretary General Ban calling for a summit
at the UN in New York, the world was taking notice. There was promise of
action in the air. In the previous five years that we had been involved, nothing
came close to the expectations for Paris. Then came the terrorist bombings just
two weeks before the opening of the COP. The City of Lights was rocked with
chaos, destruction, senseless injury, and loss of life. The overwhelming feelings
of sorrow for the victims and rage against the perpetrators turned to thoughts of
what this would mean for the people of the world who were fighting to save the
earth and its people from the devastating impacts of climate change before it was
too late.
The people of France, and especially the citizens of Paris, stood strong and
proud as their President and the Secretary General announced that COP21 would
take place. The 2015 COP21 lived up to expectations, producing an Agreement
that all countries could support using their Intended Nationally Determined
Contributions (INDCs) to keep global temperature rise below two degrees
centigrade (6, 7). The city of Paris also lived up to expectations as the most
exceptional host city that we have encountered during this journey.
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Paris lit a flame that continued to grow throughout the year leading to
the 2016 COP22 in Marrakech, Morocco. INDCs (“Intended” commitments)
became NDCs as countries around the globe formally submitted their Nationally
Determined Contributions. President Obama and President Xi of China jointly
announced the U.S. and Chinese commitments to reducing global emissions,
a move that led to a cascade of commitments from more than 55 countries
representing more than 55% of emissions by October 5—a result nobody had
expected to occur so quickly (8). This meant that the Paris Agreement would
enter into force the day before the start of COP22 (9). We had assumed that the
Paris Agreement would not likely enter into force until Earth Day 2017! The
excitement that started in Paris grew dramatically in the ensuing months. COP22
was dubbed the “COP of Action,” and Marrakech seemed headed for grand
success.
Then the U.S. election of November 8, 2016 took place. In an outcome that
shocked the world, our country elected a President who will be the only head-of-
state in the world who denies the human contribution to climate change (10). I had
not yet left for COP22 by November 8, but I felt shock, devastation, and frankly
unease at the thought of travelling to Northern Africa. When I finally did arrive
at COP22 in Marrakech, there was a somber feeling permeating the entire official
venue.
Once we were identified as Americans, the immediate reaction was shock at
our choice of President and questions as to how such an event had taken place. One
of my colleagues was asked “Why does America hate Muslims?” We had very few
answers. On Tuesday of the second week, we were fortunate to be able to attend a
talk by U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry (11). The room was one of three press
conference rooms in the Blue Zone, and the guard at the entrance told us that it
had 380 seats. Since we were among the first few in line, we had no worries about
getting in, but as the time grew nearer, the line grew rapidly, and we wondered
whether everyone would be able to attend.
By the time the U.S. delegation began to enter, the room was packed well
beyond seating capacity. It was difficult to see if there was even any aisle space
left. When Secretary Kerry entered, the standing ovation was emotional and
heartfelt. I am not a seasoned veteran of the press, but I have attended seven
COPs as a member of the press, and I have never witnessed a standing ovation at
the beginning of a briefing.
Secretary Kerry proceeded to deliver a message of hope and action. I felt like it
lifted the giant wet blanket off of the negotiations. His message, that the reduction
of fossil fuels and the rise of renewable energy sources has already turned the
corner in terms of investment, and that the U.S. clean energy economy will not
be stopped, provided the much-needed force to turn the COP of action into one
of true hope and action! I actually had to leave before the end of Kerry’s talk to
start a web chat with some students, but Keith was able to stay and reported that
the standing ovation at the end of the briefing was even more impressive than the
start!
We are at a critical juncture in the fight against climate change. The world is
moving forward with climate action, as is the U.S. clean energy economy. There
114
is still, however, a tremendous amount of uncertainty about what our government
will do.
115
the day that countries of the world shut the door on inevitable climate disaster and
set off with determination towards a sustainable future” (13).
The stage was set. Morocco would mark an important pivot from the hard
work of forging an international agreement, to the even harder work of executing
the plan laid out in Paris.
The pivot, it turned out, was not the one we expected. Instead, it came in the
form of a presidential election result that sent shock waves across the country and
around the world. Perhaps nowhere were these waves felt more acutely than at
Bab Ighli, the official venue for COP22.
I arrived at Marrakesh Menara airport just six days after the election, and I’m
sure I was not alone in my misgivings about the future of the COP process. King
Mohammed VI of Morocco had welcomed the attendees to “…the land of dialogue
and coexistence,” but judging from the mood I’d left back home, this might be the
last time we would experience either of those things for some time to come (14).
Donald Trump is many things, but a believer in the science of climate change
is not one of them. He has famously called global warming a hoax “created by and
for the Chinese in order to make U.S. manufacturing non-competitive” (15).
As he contemplates the fastest means to remove the U.S. from the Paris
Agreement, though, one thing is clear—withdrawal will not mean the death of the
agreement. If we cede leadership on this issue as part of an attempt to revitalize
our reliance on coal and other fossil fuels, the world will simply move on without
us:
• France has announced plans to decommission all of its coal power plants
by 2023 (16). Already a leading exporter of electricity (due in large part
to low generation costs), France sees revenue exceeding €3 billion per
year as a result of its renewable focus (17);
• The UK (which met more than half of its energy needs through renewable
means in the summer of 2016) has similar plans to shutter all coal-fired
power plants by 2025 (18);
• Germany’s coalition government has agreed on a climate change action
plan that will reduce greenhouse gas emissions by as much as 95% by
2050 (19). Among the world’s primary industrial nations, Germany
is an established leader, drawing roughly 27% of its electricity from
renewables in 2016—an increase of 300% over the last decade and more
than twice what the United States gets today (20); and
• China has unveiled a proposal for a $50 trillion global electricity network
linking existing and future solar farms, wind turbines and electricity
plants in Asia, Europe, Africa and the Americas, with the expressed
purpose of fighting pollution and the effects of climate change (21).
116
This plan, called the Marrakech Vision, promises that the members will “strive
to meet 100% domestic renewable energy production as rapidly as possible, while
working to end energy poverty and protect water and food security, taking into
consideration national circumstances” (22). Costa Rica is years ahead of even
this ambitious goal, having announced that more than 98% of its energy in 2016
came from a mix of hydroelectric, geothermal, wind, biomass, and solar generation
methods (23).
The loss of any sort of credibility on the global climate stage, however,
will put us at risk of damaging our economic competitiveness. Both Mexico’s
Undersecretary for Environmental Policy and Planning, and French Presidential
candidate Nicolas Sarkozy have said carbon tariffs against the United States are
an option for us,” (24, 25).
The pace of innovation and investment related to clean energy is
staggering. No longer are emission-free energy sources economically
questionable—unsubsidized solar is becoming cheaper than wind and outcompetes
coal and natural gas on a larger scale (26). Thierry Lepercq, Head of Research,
Technology and Innovation at the French energy company Engie SA, has even
said that he sees potential for the cost of solar energy in the most favorable
climates to fall below $0.01 per kilowatt hour by 2025 (27).
Meanwhile, software-titan-turned-philanthropist Bill Gates has announced
the creation of the $1 billion Breakthrough Energy Ventures fund, aimed
at commercializing new technologies for power generation and storage,
transportation, and system efficiency, among others (28).
Moreover, as then-UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon stated in Morocco,
“We have no right to gamble with the fate of future generations” (29). The COP
process is an established, effective hedge against precisely the kinds of threats that
can be presented by a lone demagogue. As the parties gather again in Bonn for
COP23, they will reaffirm this fact, and the ACS student representatives will be
on hand to play their ongoing, vital part in the process (30).
Paris to Marrakech
This reflection is written in part as I sit with my co-editors Greg and Matt at
the COP22 venue in Marrakech, Morocco. I’m touched by conflicting emotions
of melancholy and hope.
We are in Marrakech for the November 2016 COP22 (35). Marrakech is
a gritty, bustling commercial hub situated on a plateau and surrounded by the
snow-capped Atlas Mountains. While the city basks under clear, blue, sunny skies,
COP22 negotiators labor under a dark cloud of uncertainty due to the outcome of
the recent U.S. Presidential elections. During the run up to the election, President-
Elect Donald Trump proclaimed that he would withdraw from the Paris Agreement
on day one of his presidency.
Matt, Greg, and I also participated in the December 2015 COP21 in Paris,
where 196 parties to the UNFCCC forged a long-awaited global agreement to
address climate change (36). COP22 in Marrakech serves as the first meeting of
Parties to the Paris Agreement—called CMA1—which will establish the Paris
Agreement governing body with authority over all administrative, procedural,
operational, and substantive matters.
November 2016 may turn out to be a true turning point in the global climate
change story, or it may ultimately go down in history as a month of infamy. The
Paris Agreement entered into force on November 4, 2016. COP22, dubbed “The
COP of Action,” opened just three days later on November 7. The very next day,
the outcome of the U.S. election shocked the world as a minority of American
voters were able to elect Donald Trump under the U.S. Electoral College system.
Trump is a climate change denier who has declared the very existence of
climate change a hoax “created by and for the Chinese to make U.S. manufacturing
less competitive.” Here in Marrakech, China’s vice foreign minister, Liu Zhenmin,
pointedly countered Trump’s claim, stating, “If you look at the history of climate
change negotiations, actually it was initiated by the IPCC with the support of the
Republicans during the Reagan and senior Bush administration during the late
1980s (37).” Once inaugurated, Trump will stand as the only head of state who
denies the science of climate change (10).
118
As of this writing, Trump is surrounding himself with self-proclaimed climate
skeptics. He appears to be tapping fossil fuel barons and anti-environmental
regulation industrialists to stack senior positions within his administration.
At the opening of the High-Level Segment of COP22, UN Secretary-General
Ban Ki-moon counseled, “countries have strongly supported the [Paris]
Agreement, because they realize their own national interest is best secured
by pursuing the common good.” As this book goes to press, the question
remains: will Trump’s inner circle heed Ban’s warning that “no country, however
resourceful or powerful, is immune from the impacts of climate change” (38)?
In a compelling speech during week two of COP22 in Marrakech, U.S.
Secretary of State John Kerry said, “For those in power in all parts of the world,
including my own, who may be confronted with decisions about which road to
take at this critical juncture, I ask you, on behalf of billions of people around the
world: Don’t take my word for it. Don’t take just the existence of this COP as
the stamp of approval for it. I ask you to see for yourselves. Do your own due
diligence before making irrevocable choices (11).”
It is my hope that this book, written by youth working to promote climate
literacy, will fall into the hands of business decision makers and those who have
influence over public policy whose due diligence will help to inform our path
forward.
Hope
As we rode the bus to the official venue on the last day of COP22, ACS student
representative Hannah Melton—a senior at Johns Hopkins University—told me
that she had hope and felt energized by the Conference. She said that older
participants interacted with respect and were genuinely interested in what she had
to say. She recognized the somber mood of uncertainty created by the election,
but she also sensed a passing of the torch. Aging policymakers will soon be gone,
and her generation will take a seat at the negotiating table. With any luck, her
generation will not be encumbered by climate change skeptics.
I, too, have hope. Hannah, the student authors of chapters in this book, and
future policymakers from her generation will be making decisions for my Earth
Day granddaughter Annette, my other eight grandchildren, children around the
globe, and those not yet born.
Pope Francis admonishes, “We receive this world as an inheritance from past
generations, but also as a loan for future generations, to whom we will have to
return it (40).” It is my hope that the students engaged in this ACS-sponsored
climate change literacy program and this book help inform you and others of our
moral and ethical obligation to act now for future generations.
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Editors’ Biographies
Keith E. Peterman
Gregory P. Foy
Dr. Gregory P. Foy is an Associate Professor of Chemistry at York College of
Pennsylvania. He is the Chemistry Program Coordinator, and his research interests
are focused on Environmental Chemistry. He is a member of the ACS Committee
on Meetings and Expositions. Since the International Year of Chemistry 2011, he
has shepherded more than 50 college students to attend the yearly United Nations
climate change meetings. He writes a blog hosted by the York Daily Record and
is a contributing member of the Huffington Post blog team and attends the COPs
as an accredited member of the press.
Matthew R. Cordes
Matt Cordes is the Founder and Principal Writer at WritingWorks. Since
2005 he has worked with more than 250 commercial and nonprofit clients in
the northeastern U.S. to provide writing, research, and business development
consulting. With several clients working in the renewable energy space, (primarily
solar photovoltaics and biodigestion), Matt focuses on topics of climate and
energy in many of his writing efforts. He has participated in several UN climate
conferences and written extensively on the topic of climate change.
129
Subject Index
C Barianna, Shelby, COP20 Lima, Peru,
102f
Carbon, price renewables, next generation
carbon pricing cost, 103
China, 70 decentralized systems, 106
European Union, 69 ramping up, storage, smart grids, 105
United States, 71 renewables are forging ahead, 106
carbon pricing, momentum variability, 104
carbon pricing leadership coalition,
government support, 74t
coalition launch, 73 F
establishing jurisdictional carbon
pricing mechanisms, process, 75
Fighting climate change, power of the
link to business, 74
public
raising the bar, 74
empower each other, creating the tools,
we will get this done, 63
96
cap or tax, 68
environmentalism, resilience, 95
emissions reductions, 65
local government collaboration, 93
externalities, 66
regional collaboration, 94
one jurisdiction at a time, 67
non-profits that foster a movement, 93
Poirrier, Alyssa, National Conference
on Science, Policy, and the
Environment, 64f
polluter pays principle, 68 I
Climate change
adaptation and mitigation, 30 Indigenous peoples, climate change policy
Asia, 32 COP 21
attitudes towards climate change, 28 indigenous youth groups, 7
Pew Research Center Global Attitudes Peruvian palm oil, 6
Survey, 29f defining indigenous, 2
Yale project, 30f it’s not over, 9
Bangladesh, case study, 35 journey begins, 1
sustainable development, Bangladesh, journey continues, 3
36 Paris Agreement, 8
China, case study, 34 United Nations Framework Convention
China, CO2 emissions and carbon on Climate Change, history of
intensity, 35f indigenous participation, 3
poverty, 27 declaration, the, 4
Climate Change Vulnerability Index, International Indigenous People’s
28f Forum on Climate Change
renewable energy, 31 (IIPFCC), 5
E P
Electric grid, re-energize Paris Agreement
clean energy ministerial, 107 background, 50
instantaneous demand, 99 Doha amendment, 51
Glacier Peak, 100f from Doha to Paris, 58
Paris Agreement, renewable energy, 101 first pledge period, 53
global response, 54
131
NDCs, legally binding character, 53 faces with the names, 41
ratification, 56 one-point-five to stay alive, 42
Personal COP journey promote climate literacy, Prince’s effort,
Cordes, Matt, COP reflections, 115 44
Foy, Greg, unfinished COP journey, 112 REDD’s impact on indigenous
it is better to light a candle than to curse communities,
the darkness, 111 COP21, voices against REDD+, 17
Peterman, Keith, reflections deforestation, 14
Earth Day 2016, 117 deforestation, drivers, 15
hope, 120 deforestation, main consequences, 15
living in the Anthropocene, 119 pathway to climate justice, COP21, 13
Paris to Marrakech, 118 REDD+, 16
Renewable energy, global implementation
developing nations, 86
GCC countries, 85
R industrialized nations, 83
Renewable Energy Directive, 84
Race and climate change Kyoto Protocol, 82
Black Lives Matter, 43 Paris Agreement, 83
climate racism, 42
environmental racism, 45
132