Res Publica (2006) 12:435–443 Ó Springer 2006

DOI 10.1007/s11158-006-9018-3

PABLO GILABERT

GLOBAL JUSTICE, DEMOCRACY AND SOLIDARITY

Carol Gould, Globalizing Democracy and Human Rights. Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press, 2004, 276 pp.

In her latest book, Carol Gould proposes an account of global

justice based on an ‘enlarged conception of democracy within a
strengthened framework of human rights’ (2). Her account of
democracy is ‘enlarged’ in that it ‘emphasizes crossborder decision
making and transborder solidarity’ (3), while her account of human
rights is ‘strengthened’ in that it demands a more explicit and
robust focus on socioeconomic and cultural rights than is usually
provided in the theory and practice of human rights advocacy.
Gould does not merely present an original and powerful theoretical
discussion on the globalization of human rights and democracy,
but she also explores illuminating applications of her main themes,
touching on issues of racism, the relation between local and global
democratic institutions, the human rights of women, the extension
of democratic practices to the workplace, the potentials and dan-
gers of the Internet, and the role of empathy and democracy in
responding to terrorism. In what follows, I will reconstruct and
assess some central claims raised by Gould regarding (i) the central
principles of global justice, (ii) the scope and shape of democratic
practices; and (iii) the role of solidarity.

PRINCIPLES

Let me start by discussing Gould’s account of the central principles

that a theory of global justice should include. The first principle
Gould presents is:
436 PABLO GILABERT

(A) The principle of ‘equal positive freedom’, according to which

all have ‘equal rights to the conditions of self-development’
(34, see also 106).

This is the basic principle in Gould’s construction. To show respect

and concern for others is to recognize them as freely acting agents
capable of self-development and self-transformation. Since such
capabilities cannot be developed or exercised in the absence of cer-
tain conditions, and the achievement of such conditions depends on
social action, a commitment to the freedom of all demands
acknowledging equal rights to the socially determined conditions of
their realization. From (A) Gould derives:

(B) The principle of ‘human rights,’ according to which there are

‘valid claims, which all individuals make on all others, to the
conditions necessary for freedom, understood as self-develop-
ment and self-transformation’ (37, and see 71–2).

Gould distinguishes between ‘basic’ and ‘non-basic’ human rights.

The former range over ‘conditions that are minimally necessary for
any human action whatsoever’ (38, 152), whereas the latter range
over conditions that more fully enable people to engage in exten-
sive practices of self-development and self-transformation. Gould
thinks that a conception of justice must primarily focus on basic
human rights, and that among these we must include a right to
democracy. Thus Gould proposes:

(C) The principle of ‘democracy’, according to which all have ‘the

equal right to participate in decision making concerning the
common activities in which [they] are engaged’ (34–5).

Gould provides an extensive discussion of the relation between (B)

and (C). Her main claim is that (C) is derived from and
constrained by (B).1
Gould further puts forward two considerations about the
extension of (A), (B) and (C) to international and transnational
relations. The first refers to the content of the list of human rights.

1
The relations between (B) and (C) are subject to critical scrutiny in the review
essays by James Nickel and James Bohman (followed by a response by Gould) in the
Journal of Global Ethics 1.2 (2005), 207–38.
 GLOBAL JUSTICE, DEMOCRACY AND SOLIDARITY 437

According to Gould, a conception of human rights should not only

include civil and political rights, but should also as protect those
who are economically vulnerable by including robust statements of
social rights. Furthermore, we should recognize people’s ‘need for
relationships and for connectedness’ (97, and see 99–101, 144). This
need to belong to specific communities can be attended to by intro-
ducing strong statements of cultural rights. Thus, according to
Gould:

(D) Basic human rights include social and cultural rights besides
civil and political ones.

A second way in which Gould further develops her conception of

justice refers to the structure of human rights. A central claim here
is that:

(E) Human rights should be seen as grounding positive duties

besides negative duties (42–6, 72, 146–7, 216).

Thus, for example, to attend to the social rights of others is not

merely to avoid depriving them of the economic conditions of their
free development, but also to do one’s fair share in providing them
with such conditions when they cannot secure them on their own.
The introduction of (C), (D) and (E) makes Gould’s account of
human rights and global justice quite a demanding conception.
This raises at least two concerns, which are not fully addressed by
Gould in her book. First, a defence of (E) would require a detailed
discussion of the arguments supporting views of human rights as
basically negative in nature (as is the case in the recent work of
Thomas Pogge, for example).2 This is necessary in view of the fact
that the protection of human rights is normally ground for coercive
intervention on the part of political institutions. A conception of
human rights based on the value of freedom needs to show how
the enforcement of positive rights would not be incompatible with
the freedom of all. Second, a more detailed discussion of the dis-
tinction between basic and non-basic rights, and an identification

2
Thomas Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights (Cambridge: Polity, 2002).
For a defense of the relevance of positive duties for global justice see Pablo Gilabert,
‘Basic Positive Duties of Justice and Narveson’s Libertarian Challenge’, The
Southern Journal of Philosophy 44/2 (2006), 193–216.
438 PABLO GILABERT

of the relative priority of different rights, would also be desirable,

especially in view of the facts that policies attending to them are
costly and may conflict with each other.

DEMOCRACY

Scope
A traditional problem in democratic theory is the determination of
the boundaries of political communities (174–80, 210–4). These
boundaries cannot be determined by democratic decision making
without assuming, in a circular way, the very boundaries that are
supposed to be drawn. This problem is exacerbated by the new
context of globalization. Gould considers two independent criteria
for determining the scope of democratic political communities:

(F) The ‘all affected’ criterion, according to which a political com-

munity should include all those affected by its policies (175).
(G) The ‘common activities’ criterion, according to which a political
community should include all those involved in ‘common or
joint activities’ (175).

Both (F) and (G) allow for multiple and interlocking political com-
munities (local, national, regional, international, transnational)
depending on the extensiveness and intensity of the impact of their
policies or of the common activities they involve. Both can, for
example, play important roles in demanding democratic reforms of
institutions such as the IMF and the WTO. Gould argues that (F)
should be rejected because of its indeterminacy in the identification
of those ‘affected’. (G), on the other hand, is more determinate,
and flows naturally from (C), the core democratic principle. Gould
recognizes, however, that (G) needs ‘supplementation’, as the
common activities of one community may seriously affect the life-
prospects of members of other communities (as is the case with
global warming or the military adventures of some powerful
countries). This can be done by introducing a modified version
of (F):
 GLOBAL JUSTICE, DEMOCRACY AND SOLIDARITY 439

(H) The ‘importantly affected’ criterion, according to which a polit-

ical community should include input from those the fulfillment
of whose human rights it affects (178).3

Gould is right in claiming that supplementing (G) with (H)

would be demanded by respect for the human rights of others. I
think, however, that there are two serious problems with this
account. First, (G) does not avoid the problem of indeterminacy
that plagues (F). If we understand a ‘common activity’ as any
‘activity in which a number of individuals join together to effect a
given end’ (175), then the world as we know it includes, or should
include, innumerable political communities. Gould actually seems
to recognize this, calling for a pluralistic theory of global democ-
racy focused on diverse ‘democratic networks’. But if there is a
problem with (F) regarding the precise districting of territorial and
functional representation of those affected, the same is the case
with (G) regarding its own parceling out of diverse demoi. The no-
tion of ‘common activity’ is too broad to decide what kinds of
communities should be given priority when their claims overlap
and conflict (as is bound to happen in the context of globalization).
Second, supplementing (G) with (H) is not enough for honoring
positive duties to deliver socioeconomic rights, as demanded by (E).
(H) leaves out the fact that we should not only include others when
we affect them, but also in order to affect them (in a positive way)
regarding the fulfillment of their socioeconomic rights.

Democratic Deliberation
Justice, according to Gould, involves ‘solidarity through differ-
ences, where the distinctive situation of the others is empathically
understood, including their unique challenges and conflicts’ (254,
and see 45):

3
See also Carol Gould, ‘Self-Determination beyond Sovereignty: Relating
Transnational Democracy to Local Autonomy’, Journal of Social Philosophy 37/1
(2006), 44–60, pp. 54–5. When discussing (F), Gould refers to the work of David
Held. See David Held, Democracy and the Global Order (Cambridge: Polity, 1995).
440 PABLO GILABERT

(I) ‘Justice requires not the same conditions for each one but
instead equivalent ones determined by diverse needs’ (46).

Justice tracks difference besides equality. This recognition must af-

fect the procedures and contents of democratic deliberation. Criti-
cizing Habermasian theories of deliberative democracy, Gould
argues that, to cater to (I):

(J) Democratic dialogue must be open to multiple procedures, and

its object should be the elucidation of different needs besides
identical interests (93).

I find Gould’s rejection of the formalistic aspects of Habermas’

discourse theory of morality and democracy plausible, but I think
that she misses the mark when she suggests that it cannot help us
to cater to (I). First, Habermas’ distinction between discourses of
justification and of application allows for the diverse interpreta-
tion of general norms that Gould demands.4 Furthermore, Seyla
Benhabib has done important work to show that discourse theory
can account for the voice and claims of ‘concrete’ besides ‘gener-
alized’ others.5 Benhabib’s ‘interactive universalism’ is in fact
quite useful in tracking the kinds of ‘concrete’ rather than
‘abstract universality’ that Gould recommends in her book. Sec-
ond, the primacy of rational argumentation demanded by dis-
course theory is not only not incompatible with (I), but is
actually necessary for its fair satisfaction. In contexts of material
scarcity and cultural and moral disagreement, it is impossible to
thoroughly cater to the demands of all. It is important that the
norms and policies resulting from democratic communication be
ones that their addressees have reason to recognize as fair.
Empathic understanding of others has an important place within
discourse, providing cognitive access to the claims of others. But

4
See Jürgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms (Cambridge, MA: The MIT
Press, 1996), p. 217–9. Gould seems to recognize this (94), but fails to see the con-
sequences of this central aspect of Habermas’ theory. Habermas also allows for
practices of constrained bargaining among those whose interests do not converge
(see Between Facts and Norms, 162–8). For a non-formalist defense of dis-
course ethics, see Pablo Gilabert, ‘A Substantivist Construal of Discourse Ethics’,
International Journal of Philosophical Studies 13/3 (2005), 405–37.
5
See Seyla Benhabib, Situating the Self (New York: Routledge, 1992); and The
Claims of Culture (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002).
 GLOBAL JUSTICE, DEMOCRACY AND SOLIDARITY 441

these claims must still undergo the impartial assessment of all

those affected. It is difficult to see what could get closer to guar-
anteeing this than the robust rational argumentation demanded by
discourse theory.

SOLIDARITY AND FEASIBILITY

The idea of solidarity has not received much attention in the recent
literature in political philosophy. Gould thinks that a suitably
construed conception of solidarity could, however, have salutary
effects in the development of plausible accounts of global justice,
claiming that ‘human rights are based on relations of care and
concern for others, extending to those at a distance, as much as
they are on more conventional considerations of justice’ (7). Gould
focuses on a notion of ‘human solidarity’ (66) that is different
from, though related to, more circumscribed notions of care and
sympathy. The latter are prominent in the work of some feminist
philosophers emphasizing the significance of women’s practice of
mothering, in which certain forms of active concern for the needs
of others are central. There have been attempts to use the model of
care to frame wider social relations, but Gould agrees with some
critics that this model has serious limitations when viewed as a
‘political morality’ (250) rather than as an ethical approach to spe-
cial relationships. Care sometimes involves a lack of reciprocity and
particularist and often exclusivist forms of concern that cannot be
helpful when thinking about what people owe to each other as a
matter of justice in societal and intersocietal contexts (44). Similar
problems are found in traditional conceptions of solidarity
which only focus on relations among members of groups sharing
particular conceptions of the good or positions of power within
society. Nonetheless, Gould claims that ‘despite these limitations
with the care model...the practice of care, along with the related
feelings of empathy and solidarity, can in fact be extended in more
universalistic ways’ (45). We can develop a broader active concern
with the needs of others that can in principle be extended univer-
sally (67, 146). According to this account, ‘human solidarity’
involves ‘an empathic understanding of the common needs and
interests of others and a standing with them in view of this’ (254).
442 PABLO GILABERT

We saw that human solidarity thus understood plays an

important role in Gould’s account of democracy. There are at least
two further respects in which human solidarity is relevant for the
development of a theory of global justice. The first is in accounting
for the developmental genesis of commitments to human rights.
Gould suggests that ‘the recognition of ... human rights... grows
out of a sort of empathic and reflective understanding of others,
including those globally situated, as alike and yet different from
oneself’ (257, and see 63–70). Second, feelings of solidarity provide
motivational resources leading people to honor human rights norms.
Without solidaristic feelings, ‘people would lack the motivation
needed to take [the] claims of others seriously and structure society
in such a way as to attempt to meet them’ (144–5).
Gould’s use of the term ‘solidarity’ is not always clear. It is some-
times used to describe certain dispositions of social agents, and some-
times to prescribe them. It is sometimes introduced to explain certain
social practices, and sometimes to justify them. I do not think, how-
ever, that the two dimensions of solidarity mentioned in the previous
paragraph are necessary for the normative justification of the princi-
ples of global justice. Their role is more indirect. We might say that
they affect the feasibility of a theory of global justice:

(K) A theory of global justice is feasible only if the agents to whom

it applies can be expected to have the solidaristic dispositions
that would move them to honor it.

Seen this way, Gould’s reintroduction of the idea of solidarity is

quite relevant. A theory of justice should not only formulate
norms that agents have reason to follow, but should also consider
what may make them more or less ready to follow them. A the-
ory of global justice must avoid a cynical realism that capitulates
to particularistic or indifferent treatment of others. But it must
also avoid an impotent idealism that fails to inquire on how cher-
ished ideals may be mobilized in real processes of social action.
Careful empirical research on (K), and moral and political action
expanding people’s solidaristic dispositions, would then prove
important for the theory and practice of global justice. Even
though Gould does not fully articulate the complexity of these
 GLOBAL JUSTICE, DEMOCRACY AND SOLIDARITY 443

tasks, her work can be read as an exciting and fertile starting

point.6

Department of Philosophy
Concordia University
1455 de Maisonneuve West
Montreal, Quebec
Canada H3G 1M8
E-mail: pablo.gilabert@concordia.ca

6
An important example is the problem of the relations between associative duties
and cosmopolitan responsibilities. The extent to which the former are conditional upon
the latter, both at the level of normative argument and at the level of empirical possi-
bilities, deserves serious study. For discussion of these issues see Samuel Scheffler,
Boundaries and Allegiances (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001); and Arash
Abizadeh and Pablo Gilabert, ‘Is There a Genuine Tension between Cosmopolitan
Egalitarianism and Special Responsibilities?’ Philosophical Studies (forthcoming).