RECENT CHANGES TO

API 521

Robert A. Sadowski, P.E.

Consulting Engineer II

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API 521 UPDATE
Important changes have been made to API STD 521 in the recently published:

Pressure-relieving and Depressuring Systems

API STANDARD 521
SEVENTH EDITION, JUNE 2020

This webinar will highlight and summarize the significant updates and revisions as they
may impact pressure relief system analyses.

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API 521 UPDATE
CHANGES TO API 521 THAT WILL BE COVERED IN THIS WEBINAR
• Additional guidance on use of administrative controls for remote overpressure
scenarios
• Review added content regarding Rapid Phase Transition (RPT) explosions
• Clarification of check valve failure analysis involving a spare pump and admin controls
• Additional cautionary statements regarding the hydraulic expansion overpressure
scenario
• Expanded narrative regarding Plate-and-Frame and Spiral-Plate (added) exchanger
leakage
• Sulfur Recovery Unit (SRU) waste heat steam generator (WHSG) tube rupture scenario
• Moving of some flare sections to API 537 and new Annex F
• Addition of flare tip icing cautions
• New Annex G (informative) regarding vapor breakthrough into liquid-containing
systems
• New Annex H (informative) highlighting possibilities of flow-induced vibration

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API 521 UPDATE
REMOTE OVERPRESSURE SCENARIOS
New in 4.2.2 Use of Administrative Controls if Corrected Hydrotest Pressure Not Exceeded:

• It is the responsibility of the user to determine the overpressure scenarios upon which the
pressure relief system is designed, and to determine the method of overpressure protection used
to mitigate each scenario in accordance with the relevant codes. It is the responsibility of the
user to determine whether administrative controls are included in the basis for the pressure
relief system design.

• If administrative controls are used to eliminate an overpressure scenario as a basis for the
pressure relief system design, the user shall evaluate the potential overpressure in the event the
administrative control fails, compare it to the equipment corrected hydrotest pressure, and
consider additional risk reduction if the corrected hydrotest pressure can be exceeded.

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API 521 UPDATE
REMOTE OVERPRESSURE SCENARIOS
• API definition of administrative controls:
– Procedures intended to ensure that personnel actions do not compromise the overpressure
protection of the equipment.

• Scenarios where this may be applied:

– Closed outlets on vessels (4.4.2)
– Inadvertent valve opening (4.4.9.2)
– Check valve leakage or failure (4.4.9.3)
– Heat transfer equipment failure (4.4.14)

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API 521 UPDATE
4.4.6 ENTRANCE OF VOLATILE MATERIAL INTO THE SYSTEM
• 6th edition had subsections on “Water Into Hot Oil” and “Light Hydrocarbons Into Hot
Oil”; these terms are no longer used. The General paragraph (4.4.6.1) now describes
possible violent explosions due to mixing water or light hydrocarbons with
significantly hotter fluid or contact with hot surfaces. Some terms used for these
incidents may be:
– Superheat-limit explosions,
– Vapor explosions,
– Steam explosions, or
– Rapid phase transitions (RPTs)
• All involve cold, volatile liquid being superheated well above its boiling temperature.
The hot liquid or surface temperature must exceed the Superheat Limit Temperature
(SLT) of the cooler, volatile liquid. This may cause an explosion that can happen in
microseconds.
– PRDs do not provide mitigation against this type of “explosion”

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API 521 UPDATE
4.4.6 ENTRANCE OF VOLATILE MATERIAL INTO THE SYSTEM
• Examples where superheat limit explosions are possible include:
– Discharge of hot heavies/oil into K-O drum containing a layer of water or light hydrocarbons
– Introduction of water into the feed to a hot feed surge drum
– Start-up of hot oil systems containing residual water from cleaning/maintenance
– Hot oil heat exchanger tube failure
– Other inadvertent mixing scenarios involving instrument, mechanical or operator errors

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API 521 UPDATE
SUPERHEAT LIMIT TEMPERATURE
• Experimentally determined; Water SLT = 536 oF at atmospheric pressure
• Can estimate SLT if critical temperature and pressure are known:

 P  
=Tsl Tcrit  0.11  + 0.89 
 Pcrit  

• When SLT is exceeded, proper design, commissioning and operation are

essential to eliminate the explosion possibility

• When SLT of the cooler, volatile fluid is not exceeded, PRDs can be
considered

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API 521 UPDATE
4.4.6 ENTRANCE OF VOLATILE MATERIAL INTO THE SYSTEM, CONT.
• Paragraph 4.4.6.4 provides a list of precautions that may be considered in order to
reduce the risk of an RPT event; these were in the previous API 521 edition:
– Maintain hot oil flow when in stand-by to minimize water collection
– Avoid water-collecting pockets
– Installing proper steam condensate traps
– Using heat tracing to eliminate condensation
– Use double block-and-bleed valves on water connections to hot process lines
– Interlocks to trip off sources of heat when water contamination is detected
– Start-up procedures to allow for gradual temperature increase

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API 521 UPDATE
NORMAL CHECK VALVE LEAKAGE (4.4.9.3.2.1)
• Caution regarding the use of administrative controls when considering check valve failure
– When lining up a spare pump, admin controls may be used to negate consideration of leakage
through the check valve and overpressuring the suction side if there is mis-valving.
– However, this type of admin control would not be credited if the same pump stops during
normal operation and is subject to backflow.

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API 521 UPDATE
HYDRAULIC EXPANSION (4.4.12)
• Increase in liquid volume when liquid-filled
equipment is blocked in and exposed to solar
radiation or another source of heat.
• Case can sometimes be eliminated by the
institution of administrative procedures to drain
Dual Filters

immediately upon isolation – CAUTION: Block

valves have potential to leak, admitting cold (or
hot) fluid into exchanger.
• CAUTION: Vaporization can occur if liquid can be
heated above its bubble point at relief pressure.
Cold Side

• CAUTION: If liquid can be heated above its SLT,

result may be a BLEVE.
Hot Side

– [CSB Video]

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API 521 UPDATE
HEAT TRANSFER EQUIPMENT FAILURE (4.4.14)
• 4.4.14.3 Double-Pipe Heat Exchangers: A tube rupture contingency does NOT need to be
considered for a double-pipe exchanger. However, if pipe wall is susceptible to corrosion
or erosion, internal failure should be considered. API suggests a hole of 0.25 inches in
diameter.
• 4.4.14.4 Plate-and-Frame, Spiral-Plate, and Welded-Block Heat Exchangers: Previous
edition only referred to Plate-and-Frame. New edition added Spiral-Plate and Welded-
Block exchangers to the grouping and described the considerations as the same for all 3
categories.
– Same screening rule as applied to shell-and-tube exchangers: if the low pressure side
cannot be exposed to pressures above its hydrotest pressure, pressure relief system need
not consider a failure.
– “Failure” is considering a hole size equivalent to a single tube rupture in a S&T exchanger:
0.25 to 1.0-inch diameter. Note that flow is across one hole only.

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API 521 UPDATE
HEAT TRANSFER EQUIPMENT FAILURE (4.4.14), CONT’D.
4.4.14.5 Sulfur Recovery Unit (SRU) Thermal Reactor Waste Heat Steam Generators
(WHSG): Whole new section added.
• 4.4.14.5.1 General
– Claus sulfur recovery process uses WHSG to cool elemental sulfur gases
– Sulfur on the tubeside (TS): 2 to 6-inch tubes, DP = 15 to 150 psig, may be open to atmosphere, but may have
valves in relief path
– Water/steam on the shellside (SS): DP = 50 to 750 psig
• 4.4.14.5.2 Relief Protection Evaluation Procedure
– PRDs may be unreliable due to possible solidification of sulfur upon cooling
– Safety concerns of an atmospheric release with H2S and SO2 gases
– May be appropriate to provide overpressure protection by system design
– Failures may occur in multiple tubes; can be equated to a single full-bore tube rupture
– Analyze using steady-state techniques, considering tube breaks above and below the water line on the SS
– If hydrotest pressure is not exceeded, evaluate using the considerations in 4.4.14.5.3
– If hydrotest pressure can be exceeded, use more rigorous dynamic analysis and/or provide overpressure
protection by system design (ASME Section VIII, UG-140); address considerations in 4.4.14.5.3 in analysis

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API 521 UPDATE
HEAT TRANSFER EQUIPMENT FAILURE (4.4.14), CONT’D.
4.4.14.5 Sulfur Recovery Unit Thermal Reactor Waste Heat Steam Generators, Cont’d.:
• 4.4.14.5.3 Operational Considerations to Mitigate and Reduce the Potential for a WHSG
Failure
– Monitor upstream thermal reactor temperature
– Maintain integrity of tubesheet refractory protective system
– Verify the thermal reactor temperature is controlled to not compromise tubesheet refractory system
– Maintain effective shellside blowdown to ensure impurities are removed
– Maintain boiler feed water quality
– Ensure discharge steam check valves are maintained for reliability during possible tube fail event
– Ensure operators are properly trained regarding maintaining water level on the shellside (not allowing
dry tubes and avoiding re-introduction of water to hot exposed tubes
– Design and maintain the instrumented protective system to prevent an SRU blocked outlet
– If utilized, ensure SIS and ignition control system are designed, operated and maintained per ISA 84.01/
IEC 61511

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API 521 UPDATE
FLARE SECTION (5.7) CHANGES
• Moved some content to API 537 Flare Details for Petroleum, Petrochemical, and Natural Gas
Industries
– 5.7.2 (partial) – Combustion Properties: Flame Properties, Smoke, Flame Stability
– 5.7.3 – Combustion Methods: Smokeless Operation Options
– 5.7.4 – Flare Systems Designs: Ground, Elevated, Burn Pit
– 5.7.5 – Sizing: Stack Diameter, Height, Flare Tip Pressure Drop
– 5.7.6 – Purging: Continuous, Purge-reduction Seals
– 5.7.7 – Ignition of Flare Gases: Pilot Operation & Monitoring

• Moved some main body content to new Annex F (Informative) Flare Background Information
– 5.7.2 (partial) – Combustion Properties: Combustibility, Gas Velocity at Flare Tip and
Calculation of Radiation

• Note: when considering design aspects of flaring systems, ALWAYS refer to both the
API 521 and API 537 standards.

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API 521 UPDATE
FLARE SECTION (5.7) CHANGES, CONT’D.
• Added Section 5.7.5 Freezing and Icing in Flare Tips
– Caution regarding the use of steam injection systems, which may condense and freeze in
cold climates, resulting in blockage of the flare stack.
– Also caution regarding the use of assist air when flaring vapors with temperatures below
32°F (0°C); the moisture in the assist air may freeze leading to blockage of flare gas flow
paths.
• Consult with flare vendor; provide all possible conditions of the flare operating
envelope for vendor to assess.
• This caution was added due to a recent incident where an air assisted flare design for
LNG tankage /ship loading and unloading resulted in a flare capacity reduction due to
icing up the flare tip such that ship loading was severely impacted. This was
principally caused by cryogenic liquid vapors condensing/freezing out moisture in the
assist air.

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API 521 UPDATE
ANNEX G (INFORMATIVE) VAPOR BREAKTHROUGH INTO LIQUID-CONTAINING SYSTEMS

• New Annex, referred to from vapor breakthrough discussion in paragraph 4.4.8.3,

“Inlet Control Devices and Bypass Valves”
• Adds criteria on liquid displacement considerations following gas breakthrough,
specifically HP liquid bottoms discharging to LP downstream system

NLL

HP Separator

LCV

NLL

LP Separator

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API 521 UPDATE
ANNEX G (INFORMATIVE) VAPOR BREAKTHROUGH INTO LIQUID-CONTAINING SYSTEMS, CONT’D

• Loss of liquid level in the high pressure system (HPS) may result in vapor breakthrough
across the LCV and/or bypass
• Vapor will push (displace) the liquid into the low pressure system (LPS) until relief path is
established
• Depending on the HPS and LPS volumes as well as liquid inventories and liquid
properties, the LPS may overfill with liquid, resulting in a liquid relief case for the PRD
• Two potential relief scenarios are presented:
– Upstream liquid inventory less than downstream vapor volume. LPS may be able to
accommodate liquid. Consider other factors to determine phase quality of relief stream,
including possible disengagement analysis.
– Upstream liquid inventory more than downstream vapor volume. Initial relief will be
liquid. Vapor breakthrough will lead to liquid displacement at volumetric rate of vapor
through LCV or other flow limiting device. May result in impractical relief system design.

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API 521 UPDATE
ANNEX G (INFORMATIVE) VAPOR BREAKTHROUGH INTO LIQUID-CONTAINING SYSTEMS, CONT’D

• Factors to consider for determination of phase quality and flowrate of the relieving
stream are provided, some of which are:
– The HPS and LPS fluid properties and compositions
– Liquid levels in the subject vessels
– Disengagement regimes (foamy, bubbly, churn-turbulent?)
– Vessel orientations and nozzle locations
– Location of the PRD
– Assumptions involving continuing flows during an overpressure event; both incoming and
discharging

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API 521 UPDATE
ANNEX G (INFORMATIVE) VAPOR BREAKTHROUGH INTO LIQUID-CONTAINING SYSTEMS, CONT’D

• Mitigation options are presented to satisfy or reduce the relief requirements, some of
which are:
– Increasing LPS MAWP’s to negate or make the scenario less severe
– Increasing size of LPS vessel to accommodate more liquid
– Properly size the PRD(s) for possible liquid displacement
– Providing High-Integrity Protection System (HIPS) to either isolate the flow from the HPS
or progressively remove liquid from the LPS
– Use flow-limiting elements (Caution: must be designated safety-critical items)
– Perform hydraulic analysis to take credit for pressure drop between HPS and LPS
– Modify liquid levels
– Determine if credit can be taken for continuing out-flowing fluid(s)

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API 521 UPDATE
ANNEX H (INFORMATIVE) FLOW-INDUCED VIBRATION
• New Annex referenced from:
– 5.0 Disposal Systems
• 5.5 Piping
– 5.5.12 Acoustic Fatigue
• 5.5.12.1 General: …. “Flow-induced vibration can also be the cause of
piping fatigue failure in pressure relieving systems (see Annex H).”

• Turbulence energies increase after tees, reducers, bend, valves, etc. due to vortex formations,
resulting in pressure fluctuations
• References are cited for screening methods
• Common mitigations include enlarging pipe diameter, adding pipe supports and increasing wall
thickness

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QUESTIONS?

EMAIL RSADOWSKI@E2G.COM