Book review

The resolution of conflict: Constructive and destructive

processes, by Morton Deutsch

MICHAEL BlLLlG

University of Birmingham

In the preface to The resolution of conflict (published by Yale University Press,

1973) Morton Deutsch states that he started graduate study not long after Hiro-
shima and Nagasaki and that his work in social psychology ‘has been shadowed
by the atomic cloud ever since’ (p. ix). His subsequent career in social psychology
has been a distinguished one. He has been both a theoretical and experimental
innovator. For instance he was the first social psychologist to operationalize the
Prisoner’s Dilemma into an experimental gaming situation; also he has devised
other classic paradigms for the experimental study of conflict behavior. Unlike
many of those experimental psychologists who have followed his leads, Deutsch
has never confined himself exclusively to the esoteric analysis of laboratory
studies. He has always looked beyond the confines of the social psychology
laboratory and directed his studies towards an understanding of real-life conflicts.
The atomic explosions of 1945 may have provided the impetus for his ,investiga-
tions, but Deutsch’s interests have moved with the times. The changing pattern
of world events is reflected in his various preoccupations: Problems of the Cold
War, Vietnam, race relations, student demonstrations, industrial troubles, etc.
Nor has he operated solely at the level of the grand social problem. In his role
as a practising psychotherapist he has concerned himself with the mundane
problems of individual patients.
The resolution of c o n f k t is intended to encompass Deutsch’s diverse interests.
He says that his objective is to present his own work and views rather than to give
a general overview of research into the social psychology of conflict. The book
has three parts: The first part consists of theoretical essays, the second details his
laboratory experimentation and in the third part Deutsch attempts to bring together
the various themes running throughout the work. A good deal of the contents
have been published previously, especially the experimental section. However
there is much that is new, and Deutsch attempts to present his arguments within
a broad theoretical framework. This ensures that the book is more than an anthology
of separate papers.
Eur. J . SOC. Psychol. 5(3), p p . 409-414
4 10 Michael Billig

The subtitle of the book refers to ‘constructive and destructive processes’; the
underlying aim of the work is to outline the processes by which a conflict takes a
destructive or constructive course. A conflict in Deutsch’s terms exists ‘whenever
incompatible activities occur’ (p. 10, italics in original). Conflict is not to be
equated with competition, which implies that conflicting parties have opposing
goals. The distinction between conflict and competition is an important one for
Deutsch in his argument that there are two forms of conflict. The differences
between these two forms are defined in terms of the participants perceptions: A
conflict is destructive if its participants feel dissatisfied with their outcomes and
conversely it is constructive if they feel that they have gained as a result of the
conflict (p. 17). A competitive outlook will tend towards destructive conflict
whereas a cooperative outlook will raise the chances of a constructive solution.
The crucial issue, as Deutsch sees it, is not how to eliminate conflicts but how to
turn destructive conflicts into productive forces.
Deutsch describes in some detail the psychological processes which lead to
both sorts of conflict. To achieve a constructive outcome the participants must
emphasize common interests and shown honesty, trust and openness. The reverse
is the case for destructive conflicts. The participants are competitive and suspicious.
They create an atmosphere of mutual distrust in which threats lead to counter-
threats. There is a vicious spiral of dissatisfying conflict. Deutsch hypothesizes,
and supports with laboratory experiments, that constructive conflicts can be
easily turned into destructive conflict by the competitive or contrient attitudes
of one of the participants. On the other hand it is more difficult to reverse the
vicious spiral of destructive conflict into a benevolent spiral of constructive
conflict. Generally the competitive and cooperative processes are self-fulfilling:
‘Cooperation breeds cooperation, while competition breeds competition’ (p. 367).
This is what Deutsch calls ‘Deutsch’s crude law of social relations’ (p. 365).
Deutsch concedes that whilst the extreme cases of destructive and constructive
conflict might be fairly readily identifiable, most real-life conflict situations involve
both destructive and constructive processes. If his idealized schemata is to be
useful for understanding real-life situations, then it would seem to be a sine qua
non that the meaning of the abstract concepts should be unambiguously clear.
However this is not always the case, and Deutsch’s main concepts appear at
times to be vaguely defined as well as capable of various different interpretations.
For instance on page 149 he offers a definition of the key concept of ‘trust’. He
defines a ‘trusting choice’ as the choice of an ambiguous path, when V + (or
positive motivational significance) is less than V- (or negative motivational
significance). This definition of trust is essentially nonsocial. It is based upon
the action and values of an individual decision-maker; in this way trust ceases to
 The resolution of conflict 4 1 1

be a relation between persons but becomes a property of a decision. According

to this definition irrational gambling decisions can be called ‘trusting choices’;
thus a decision to stake $2 to win $1 on an even chance bet is a trusting choice.
Moreover to make a trusting choice one does not have to trust anyone. It is hard
to see how a series of irrational gambling bets could possibly lead to a constructive
solution of conflicts. It may be significant that Deutsch’s definition of trust, which
he claims ‘does not violate everyday usage’ @. 213), is taken from one of his
earlier papers, when he was clearly much influenced by utility models of decision-
making. This interest seems to have been a passing one; Deutsch has not followed
those gaming theorists and strategists who have attempted to mathematize the
study of conflict. His definition of trust, together with some of the other formula-
tions which he derives from the utility model in chapter seven, seem to have
little or no connection with the explicitly social psychological account that
dominates the rest of the book. This has the result of making the discussion some-
what uneven. More seriously Deutsch leaves the impression that he has succeeded
in defining adequately one of his major theoretical concepts; if, however, this
definition is rejected then further clarification of the concept of ‘trust’ is needed.
A similar conceptual looseness can be discerned in Deutsch’s treatment of
‘threat’. In the second part of the book he describes the famous series of
‘trucking-game’ experiments he conducted into the use of threat. In this section
Deutsch defines threat as ‘the expression of an intention to do something that is
detrimental to the interests of another’ (p. 217). There follows a lengthy account
of the trucking game studies in which threats are operationally defined in terms
of the use of a sanction by one player which prevents the opponent from
achieving his ends. Some fifty pages after introducing the original definition
Deutsch concedes in a brief comment that the use of the sanction itself does not
properly constitute a threat according to the definition (p. 268). However this
does not deter him from discussing and drawing conclusions about ‘threats’ in
these situations. It surely is remiss of Deutsch not to have revised his previously
published accounts in the light of a criticism which he himself admits to be valid.
Throughout Deutsch’s theories of trust and threat the shadow of the atomic
cloud is clearly visible. He was formulating his theories at a time when American
strategists like Herman Kahn were developing non-psychological analyses of
nuclear tactics and were cold-bloodedly assessing the relative effectiveness of
various sorts of nuclear attack. These were the technicians of the Cold War
ideology. In contrast Deutsch was stressing those psychological variables which
he hoped might ease the tensions of the Cold War. Above all he was formulating
a psychological theory of dkteizte. The vicious spiral of threat and counter-threat
between the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. could in his opinion only lead to the ultimate
4 I 2 Michael Billig

in destructive conflict. Deutsch was urging the Cold War hard-liners to adopt a
more trusting attitude towards the Russians - only in this way could a nuclear
holocaust be avoided. In the same way his views on the effects of commitment to
competitive strategies are intended to describe and oppose the vicious spiral of
U.S. involvement in Vietnam. According to Deutsch the American strategists and
politicians found themselves entrapped in a destructive conflict through processes
of increasing commitment from which they found it hard to back down. His
analysis of the Vietnam war, in common with his analysis of the Cold War, is
based upon the assumption that world conflicts depend upon the perceptions and
misperceptions of world leaders and that openness in place of deviousness, trust
in place of suspicion, friendship not hostility can resolve the world’s difficulties
productively. In this respect his analysis differs from a Marxian analysis which
would seek the ideological origin of individual and interpersonal trust and distrust.
Although Deutsch’s liberal analysis provides him with a clear perspective on
foreign affairs, it faces certain difficulties in understanding internal conflicts. It
is at this point that the ambiguities in Deutsch’s conceptual framework become
conspicuous. Deutsch does not deny that all competition is pernicious; to do so
would be a criticism of the meritocratic society based upon free enterprise which
Deutsch commends. He therefore specifically defends competition within a society
and argues that it ‘provides a useful social mechanism for selecting those who are
more rather than less able to perform the activities involved in the competition’
(pp. 31-2). Prima facie this would seem to conflict with his statement that ‘there
are pathogenic processes inherent in competitive conflict. . . that tend to magnify
and perpetuate the conflict’ (p. 47). The question therefore for Deutsch is why
this form of competition is non-destructive and why the competitive society does
not fragment. In providing an answer Deutsch introduces a new criterion to
differentiate the constructive conflict from the destructive one, over and above
his psychological criterion of the participants’ feelings of satisfaction. He suggests
that the defeat of an individual, group or nation can be constructive and lead to
productive outcomes (p. 31). If defeat is accompanied by feelings of dissatisfac-
tion, then by definition he is using the term ‘constructive’ in a different sense
from his original definition. He could be interpreted as implying that particular
defeats and particular sequences of oompetitive processes can help to maintain
a social system which itself has a positive value. He justifies instances of com-
petitive conflict when they motivate the dissatisfied parties to engage in cooper-
ative processes in the future @. 32). However, in arguing thus Deutsch is in danger
of sacrificing much of the force of his arguments against the Cold War strategist.
If competitive conflicts can be justified on the basis of means-end arguments, the
hawk is open to use Deutsch’s own theoretical framework. He might argue, for
 The resolution of conflict 41 3

instance, that the American involvement in the Far East only appears to be
destructive; he might contend that it prevents a greater destructiveness inherent in
a ‘red takeover’ of the whole of Indo-China. Alternatively he might argue that
it is a prelude to a more constructive solution and that the Vietcong must be
bombed into adopting a more ‘cooperative’ attitude, Either way the means-end
argument is used and the precise ways in which a present destructive conflict can
be changed into a future constructive conflict are left suitably vague. Moreover
Deutsch would seem to be qualifying substantially his ‘crude law of social rela-
tions’ by allowing that a competitive conflict can have beneficial consequences.
By so doing he may be playing into the hands of precisely those he wishes to
refute.
According to Deutsch, conflict within a society can be resolved productively
by the establishment of institutions or third parties that regulate potential disrup-
tions. Also cultural norms will bind together both ‘winners’ and ‘losers’; thus both
the haves and have-nots share the values of the competitive free-enterprise
system. The losers can therefore be expected to share the values which justify
their own failure - although according to Deutsch those in higher socioeconomic
status show greater levels of trust than those in lower positions (p. 56). The short
step from this position is to claim that if the distrusting members of lower socio-
economic groups campaign actively against their position in society, then they
will be responsible for setting in train a destructive conflict - this by definition
will be self-defeating. By this argument present social inequalities would be
justified and the possibility of radical social reform from below discounted.
Deutsch however does not take this short step. His arguments are intended to
show support for the Black civil-rights campaigns, and his focus of attention
shifts from the interpersonal to the intergroup. He specifically relates social change
to intergroup conflict in chapter five. He argues that the Black protests and the
conflict engendered provide the opportunity for a constructive solution. It will
ultimately strengthen American society by reaffirming the professed standards of
equality and justice. Again Deutsch seems to be departing from his strict
psychological criterion for differentiating the constructive conflict from the destruc-
tive one. In this case he suggests that the racial conflict will not escalate into a
vicious spiral if the participants adopt a cooperative attitude. All too often,
Deutsch notes, conflict theorists offer advice solely to those in positions of power;
to remedy this Deutsch in his final chapter attempts to advise Blacks how to
achieve their ends by still maintaining a cooperative approach.
Deutsch’s advice to the underprivileged is revealing. He phrases it in terms of
the steps that the underdog (Acme) must take to convince the powers that be
(Bolt) of the justness of his demands. Deutsch includes propositions that there
4 14 Michael Billig

should be communication and Acme should appreciate Bolt’s difficulties. Signifi-

cantly Deutsch offers two more pieces of advice to Acme: He should make ‘a
statement of the negative harmful consequences that are inevitable for Bolt’s
values and objectives if Acme’s wishes are not responded to positively’ and also
‘an expression of the power and resolve of Acme to act effectively and unwaver-
ingly to induce Bolt to come to an acceptable agreement’ (p. 392). Using everyday
language, one might say that Acme should threaten Bolt.
Deutsch, however, does not use the everyday expression and does not describe
these two prescriptions as ‘threats’. It is hard to see a threat as anything but a
statement designed to ‘induce’ another to act in a certain way by spelling out the
‘harmful consequences’ that are inevitable if he does not so act. To admit that
these prescriptions are threats would seem to run counter to Deutsch’s thesis
that he is providing a recipe for constructive conflict resolution. Threats belong
to the destructive conflict and they ‘tend to elicit more resistence than do positive
sanctions such as promises and rewards’ (p. 389). The point is that the have-nots
generally do not have the power to reward the haves; their only sanctions are
threats. Deutsch seems to recognize this at least implicitly in his advice to the
have-nots. However, he fails to see that this contradicts his theory that threats
are counter-productive properties of destructive conflict.
There would seem, therefore, to be a certain amount of ambiguity in Deutsch’s
theoretical formulations; it is suggested that beneath this vagueness lie inconsist-
encies. However, these may not be a product of a deficiency in Deutsch’s theorizing
or due to a misinterpretation of his often intriguing experimental results. The
inconsistencies might lie in the liberal stance which he is defending. The liberal’s
basic vision is that good sense and honesty point the way and that aggressive
hostility is to be avoided. However the liberal’s rationality must founder when
he encounters a powerful and unreasoning enemy bent upon obstructing justice.
The liberal is then faced with a dilemma. If he continues merely applying
reasoned arguments they will fall on deaf ears, and he will not have advanced the
cause of justice. If, on the other hand, he takes up the weapons he had previously
disdained, he will be betraying his faith in the reasoned approach. This is precisely
the dilemma which Deutsch faces when he implicitly advises the have-nots to use
threats in their fight for social justice. Viewed in this light Deutsch‘s career as a
social psychologist need not be solely understood in terms of the shadow of
Hiroshima and Nagasaki; it can also be seen as a testimony to the difficulties that
the liberal conscience has had in adjusting to the setbacks and disappointments
which post-war events have offered. It is Deutsch’s strength that he has never
retreated into a cynical detachment; he optimistically continues to search for
reasonable and humane solutions to the world’s problems.